

The Effect of Democracy versus Autocracy in
Environmental Policy-making using Six African Cases

Peace and Development Studies Bachelor Thesis

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Abstract

As climate change continues to permeate the current political discourse and its effects becomes increasingly visible, the way countries respond to the situation is crucial for determining the extent of future environmental degradation. The Paris Agreement is an attempt to mitigate and adapt to the situation, however the western values tied to it have been criticised. The effectiveness of democracy in environmental protection has been questioned, especially its ties to capitalism and individualism. This thesis uses the theory of authoritarian environmentalism to investigate this debate and see whether the claims have any legitimacy in the context of the Paris Agreement and the promises made in relation to it.

This thesis is a structured focused comparison which compares the policies and projects in three democratic and three autocratic African countries in close geographical proximity and similar environmental situations, to investigate if and in what way the type of government affects the promises made, and whether they are kept, to the Paris Agreement and its signatories. The indicators used for the thesis include policies and internationally funded projects, due to their accessibility, however it is worth noting that they only give a crude approximation of the activities and ambition in the countries, with several others having important roles.

The quality of the six countries' Intended Nationally Determined Contributions is investigated and followed up with an evaluation of some of the projects active to examine if the countries are implementing their promised efforts, already in these early, yet important, stages of the Agreement. In addition, the theory is applied to the countries' efforts and some conclusions are reached, including the overall good quality of the countries' environmental work and confirming that authoritarian countries can produce quality policies, while still having lacking areas, similar to their democratic counterparts, pointing to the complexity of the topic.

Keywords: Authoritarian Environmentalism, the Paris Agreement, Intended Nationally Determined Contributions, Southern and Central Africa,

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List of abbreviations

AFDB – African Development Bank

AFOLU – Agriculture, Forestry and Land-use

BAU – Business as Usual

CAFI – Central African Forest Initiative

CAT – Climate Action Tracker

CTCN – Climate Technology Centre and Network

DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo

DRR – Disaster Risk Reduction

FAO – Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

GCF – Green Climate Fund

GEF – Global Environment Facility

HDI – Human Development Index

IPPU – Industrial Processes and Product Use

(I)NDC – (Intended) Nationally Determined Contribution

MDG – Millennium Development Goals

NAP – National Adaptation Plan

NAPA – National Adaptation Programmes of Action

NAMAs – Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions

NDP – National Development Plan

NGO – Non-Governmental Organization

NWP – Nairobi Work Programme

POP – Persistent Organic Pollutants

REDD+ – Reduction Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation

SDG – Sustainable Development Goals

TCP – Technical Cooperation Programme

TEP – Technical Examination Process

UNFCCC – United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

ZUNDAF - Zimbabwe United Nations Development Assistance Framework

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1. Introduction

Mainstream political discourse has increasingly become saturated with discussions of climate change over the last decade. The evidence of anthropogenic global warming is unambiguous as the ever-growing process of modernisation continues and places increasing stress on the global environment. Economic growth has thus far been one of the biggest reasons for environmental degradation, despite its positive societal effects, and it will be impossible to sustain a western lifestyle for everyone currently inhabiting the earth, ultimately leading one to question those western values (Beeson, 2010, p. 278 & 289-290). The type of liberal democracy and capitalism encouraged in, for example, the US has led to high per capita consumption which in turn has substantially increased emission rates (Wells, 2007, p. 213) whereas the authoritarian regime in China might be the leader in environmental mitigation efforts, partly thanks to their one-child policy and their investments in solar energy (Beeson, 2010, p.289-290). However, Wells (2007, p.218) claim that a centralized and authoritarian approach rarely works and that the consequences of giving up democracy might be dire for the population in that country.

The debate between liberal democracy and more autocratic governance has spawned the theory of authoritarian environmentalism (Beeson, 2010; Gilley, 2012), which is used here to investigate in what way the political regime of a country affects the national environmental policies, specifically regarding the difference between democracies and autocracies in policy-making. Beeson (2010, p.282) states research is needed within the area, saying that there are very few studies relating to environmental politics under authoritarian rule. Research has been carried out on the theory (Beeson, 2010; Gilley, 2012; Doyle & Simpson, 2006; Sowers, 2007), but little information can be found strictly on the effects the type of government has on internationally funded and mandated policy-making, which this thesis will focus on.

The criticism regarding the liberal and western values, which for some time has sparked debate regarding the usefulness of democracy for environmental protection and mitigation of climate change (Shearman & Smith, 2007; Lin, 2016), also covers international agreements which, with a critical perspective, adopts a cumbersome, democratic process attempting to reconcile individual interests with the common good and often produces sub-optimal agreements at the lowest common denominator (Wells, 2007, p. 214-215). The Paris Agreement, agreed upon in 2015, is the latest agreement within the environmental area. It has spawned plenty of research on how the implementation will fare and problems it might encounter (Ishikawa & Nishioka, 2017; Lin, 2016; Höhne et. al., 2016). The article by Höhne

et al. (2016) introduces the subject of a possible inconsistency between the global goals and national contributions. However, it operates on a different level than this thesis, by not specifically focusing on certain countries when investigating the gap between current national actions and actions needed to meet the 2°C goal decided in the Paris Agreement. Höhne's article (2016) also argues that some countries have been careful in what they promise, to avoid being legally bound to perform. This thesis investigates how the type of government affects reactions to the agreement, seeing as their relatively small historical contribution to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions has caused many of them to object to having their development restricted by international, environmental agreements (Held, Theros & Fane-Hervey, 2011, p. 102). The thesis explores how six countries in Southwestern and central Africa implement the different parts decided upon in the Paris Agreement and primarily examines whether promises have been kept or not, by looking at the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) and other documents supplied by each government which show their intended actions. It mainly focuses on policy formulation, rather than policy implementation, in order to investigate the intended efforts of the countries as well as the quality of the environmentally-related decisions made by governments. This also helps to narrow down the scope of the essay. However, it is worth noting that any manner of policy formulation does not guarantee implementation, in fact it is not uncommon for policies to change and perform less than expected in their implementation stage.

The countries have different political regimes in order to identify the differences between having democratic or autocratic environmental policy-making. As the countries have potential and ambition for socio-economic development, how they do so will prove vital, hence this thesis objective. The Climate Action Tracker (2018) similarly investigates the overall usefulness and implementation of the Paris Agreement so far, but it has a limited scope by only covering one of the cases chosen for this thesis.

The research provides insight into the supposed advantages and disadvantages of autocracy versus democracy regarding implementation of environmental policies and attempts to add to the debate from the perspective of the chosen African cases. Thus, the research will also help expand the scope of the theory used, which mostly has covered an Asian perspective (Beeson, 2010; Gilley, 2012). On top of this, the thesis gives an idea of what can be expected for the implementation of the Paris Agreement and the performance of the INDCs in the chosen cases by examining what has been done so far. As the cases chosen are African, it helps to cover certain parts of the research and knowledge gaps mentioned by the IPCC for example regarding the adoption of institutional frameworks and potential conflicts caused by

climate change (Niang et al., 2014, p. 1204). Furthermore, Ward (2008, p.388) states that even though there are comparative studies of regions such as the EU on the subject, most do not include a comparison of authoritarian and democratic system which is what this thesis aims to do. The thesis can also potentially increase the accountability and efforts of the case countries by scrutinizing their work relating to the Paris Agreement. However, the output might be limited because of the scope of the research which will be explained in the methods chapter below.

1.2 Objective and Research Questions

The objective of this research paper is to investigate if and how the type of government affects the environmental policies and projects developed, by looking at six Southwestern and central African, developing countries with autocratic and democratic rule respectively in relation to international agreements and see if they deliver according to their own submitted promises, as defined in donor and government documents. By doing so, this thesis endeavors to answer the following questions:

- I. Using six southern and central African countries as cases, to what extent do these countries comply and implement the global agendas and agreements for environmental policies according to their own promises?
- II. In what way does autocracy versus democracy impact national environmental policies and projects developed in the chosen countries?

1.3 Structure of the thesis

This first chapter has introduced the subject and defined the objective of the thesis. The following chapter covers the theoretical, conceptual and analytical frameworks, describing the theory of authoritarian environmentalism and using the Paris Agreement as an analytical framework. The theory is used to define the differences between autocracies and democracies and to identify the positive environmental aspects associated with autocracies. The Paris agreement will in turn be used to evaluate the countries' INDCs. The third chapter defines the methodological framework, which is a structured focused comparison, and describes the

sources used. Chapter four consists of the discovered findings and chapter five analyses that information in relation to the mentioned frameworks. The last chapter concludes the essay and summarizes it by answering the research questions. There are two appendices which consist of additional background information and specific information on each countries' policies and projects.

2. Framework considerations

2.1 Theoretical framework

This chapter will present and define the theory used for this thesis, which is the emerging theory of 'authoritarian environmentalism'. It is used as a theoretical framework by testing if the arguments presented are accurate and applicable in the cases that will be used. Gilley (2012, p. 287) defines it as a theory of policy-making in the face of serious environmental challenges and claims it can be used both as a prescriptive or a descriptive method - how countries should respond versus how they are likely respond. The approach shows some of the strengths of authoritarian rule. Firstly, the ability to quickly form a centralized response and mobilize actors when faced with environmental threats (Gilley, 2012, p. 300). Secondly, the theory also mentions the positive aspects of a decrease in individual liberties, as it could prevent citizens from engaging in unsustainable behaviour and compel them to obey the policies put in place by the government. Said governments often give little or no role to social actors or their representatives. Any public participation that exists is usually limited to scientists and technocrats, whereas the common people are expected to participate in state-led mobilization (Gilley, 2012 p. 288-9).

Thirdly, regime type also affects the level of international and transnational influence that permeates the country, which in turn could have a substantial impact on the decisions made by the government (Doyle & Simpson, 2006, p.751). NGOs and international organisations might be able to operate in an authoritarian country, as it is often seen as a 'harmless' form of mobilization. Sowers (2007, p.379) notices this when using Egypt as a case, as the organizations' ability to affect policy-making there remained small. However, Doyle and Simpson (2006, p.759) argue that being any sort of activist in an authoritarian regime, even an environmental one, challenges the established modes of power. Lastly, the authoritarian practice of excluding certain business actors from participation as stakeholders might also

have positive effects, seeing businesses are the actors that most commonly oppose environmental action (Gilley, 2012, p.289).

Criticism on the theory includes that there is little incentive for authoritarian rulers to implement sustainable policies as they would rather promote economic development to legitimise their rule (Ward, 2008, p.387) However, one could argue that proper and visible mitigation and adaptation to climate change serves the same purpose. Democratic environmentalism, as the opposite version, is defined by Gilley as “public policy model that spreads authority across several levels and agencies of government, including representative legislatures, and that encourages direct public participation from a wide cross-section of society” (Gilley, 2012, p. 289). The arguments for liberal democracy often comes in the form of deliberation and discourse, citizens using elections, social movements and the free media as tools to affect the policies made by their government, which authoritarian regimes often do not allow (Ward, 2008, p.387). Doyle and Simpson (2006, p. 750) points out that the prevalence of human rights such as freedom of speech and freedom of association is determined by the type of government and clearly affects the possibilities of environmental protest.

The current trend of a worldwide recession in democracy (Freedom House, 2018) is an appropriate reminder that there is nothing inevitable about the liberal and western political ideals, and that western environmental and political theory often are at odds with one another (Beeson, 2010, p. 278). There is little convincing evidence that democracy will promote good environmental outcomes or that an increase in living standards would increase sustainability, rather it is the opposite as democratisation indirectly worsens environmental degradation because of the effect it has on the national income. Therefore, the positive outcome of economic growth and democratisation could actually cause the environmental costs that in the long-term would undo said positive outcomes and cause a turn back to autocracy (Beeson, 2010, p.282; Ward, 2008, p.388).

There has been critique of democracy, saying it relies too much on the supposedly naive belief that citizens will push for greener decisions, when they in reality are not at all compelled to do so (Beeson, 2010, p. 282). Shearman and Smith (2007, p. 12 & 55) criticizes democracy, saying it is intertwined with capitalism and that it promotes individual and selfish behaviour while failing to protect the common resources of the world. They question if protection of one political philosophy or another is important when the most concerning issue is the preservation of the human species (Shearman and Smith, 2007, p.100) and as China and Russia continues to assert themselves internationally, ideas of what is desirable and not when

it comes to governance and values of a country are blurred. When the environmental threat intensifies, even the West might agree that any form of order is preferable to disorder, and thus put democracy on hold while handling more pressing issues (Beeson, 2010, pp. 287-8).

Lastly, Beeson (2010, P. 276-7) argues that environmental degradation might negatively affect the political systems, especially in countries with pressing issues and a state with little capacity, which in turn can create an even weaker state sensitive to authoritarian rule and coup d'états, particularly when coupled with economic failure.

The research will not 'side' with the theory and will rather use it as a framework to test the cases to see if the arguments presented by the theory holds any merit. Several questions, taken from the information presented in this chapter will be posed to the cases and are as follows:

- I. Authoritarian regimes decrease individual liberty to limit unsustainable behaviour and compel more sustainable policies which suggests low levels of citizen participation and little mention of participation in policy documents, to what level is this the case for the countries in question?
- II. There is also said to be an exclusion of businesses and other national and social actors, to what degree does this correspond with the chosen countries?
- III. The theory suggest autocracies can rapidly form centralized response to acute environmental threats, can this be said for the chosen cases?
- IV. Authoritarian regimes arguably have low levels of transnational and international influence in their countries, to what level can this be said for the countries in question?

2.2 Analytical Framework

To be able to analyse whether and how well the countries in question fulfil their international promises, and if it in turn is affected by the type of government, the Paris Agreement is used as analytical framework. As mentioned above, it is an international agreement that builds upon the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which was adopted in 1992 with all cases as signatories to it as seen in the table below.

Country	Angola	Botswana	DRC	Namibia	South Africa	Zimbabwe
Signature	14 Jun 1992	12 Jun 1992	11 Jun 1992	12 Jun 1992	15 Jun 1993	12 Jun 1992
Ratification	17 May 2000	27 Jan 1994	9 Jan 1995	16 May 1995	29 Aug 1997	3 Nov 1992

Table 1: *Dates of signing and ratification (United Nations Treaty Collection, 2018)*

The Paris Agreement entered into force on November 4, 2016 with the current number of 175 ratifications (UNFCCC, 2018a; UNFCCC 2018b). From this agreement a certain number of points will be drawn to see if the INDCs submitted by each country contain the parts set out by said agreement.

Firstly, in article 2 §1 the principle of the common but differentiated responsibilities, according to each country’s capabilities and circumstances, is mentioned along with the need for equity. Article 3 mentions the need for support of the developing countries’ mission to implement the goals set out in the agreement and both article 9 §1 and 11 §3 requests developed countries to provide funds for developing countries to these ends.

The goal of keeping the global average temperature to well below a 2°C increase above pre-industrial levels, which is set out in article 2 §1, aims to avoid and mitigate the risks and impacts stemming from anthropogenic climate change, as well as promote adaptation and resilience in a way that does not threaten people’s livelihoods. The need for Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) is stated in article 3 and defined in the following articles. Article 4 §1 and 2 calls for: the peaking of GHG emissions through the inception of rapid reduction with the best means available; preparation and communication of the NDCs and the pursuit of national mitigation measures that aims at being achievable. Article 10 §5 and §6 calls for innovation and development of new technology to enable an efficient response to climate change, while once again inciting developed countries to provide financial support for the developing countries.

The agreement identifies several aspects that are expected to be present in the INDC or NDC upon its delivery. Parties to the agreement should: conserve and enhance sinks and reservoirs, such as forests, through well-planned policy approaches and sustainable forest management (Article 5 §1-2); provide a section on mitigation, voluntarily submitted, which promotes mitigation of GHG, succeeds in its mitigation goal and fosters sustainable development (Article 6 §4); include an adaptation section focusing on the strengthening of resilience and reduction of vulnerability through a participatory, gender-responsive, effective and transparent implementation process while recognizing the importance of international

cooperation and indigenous knowledge systems (Article 7 §1, 5 and 6); recognize the importance of minimizing loss and damages associated with the negative effects of climate change and identify areas in which actions such as early warning systems, emergency preparedness and comprehensive risk assessment is appropriate (Article 8 §1 and §4).

Furthermore, the parties to the agreement should also promote involvement of the private and public sector in the implementation phase and enable coordination across institutions (Article 6 §8). Each party should also formulate a National Adaptation Plan (NAP) and implement a system of monitoring and evaluation to enable a learning process (Art.7 §9) as well as take measures to provide training and education to promote public awareness and access to information (Article 12). According to article 14 §1 and 2, there will be a so-called global stocktake to evaluate to collective progress of the implementation of the agreement and achieving the long-term goals, the first one being held in 2023 and every five years thereafter.

Lastly it is important to note that according to article 27, there may be no reservations made to the Paris agreement, however there can be adjustments to increase the level of ambition if deemed appropriate (Article 4 §11).

Summaries of the INDC's produced by the World Bank has been utilised as inspiration for some of the different aspects needed for a satisfactory INDC, which are: at which political level was the decision taken, indicating the seriousness of the country; if a participatory process was applied; what climate policies and actions are under development or in place; if the private sector is intended to be involved and if carbon pricing will be used; and lastly if there are gaps and barriers identified which will hinder the implementation of the INDC (World Bank Group, 2016a).

Finally, a list of points extracted from the information above will be presented. However, it is at this point worth to mention that this framework will only present a crude measurement which will not reflect all aspects to the phenomenon. For example, an INDC might be less detailed but feasible, which will make it seem less satisfactory compared to a more holistic INDC which perhaps is not doable in practice. Despite this, it can be used to give an indication if the cases' INDCs intend to implement the following:

- I. A goal of GHG peaking and of minimizing global warming to 2°C.
- II. A request for funding and assistance from external parties.
- III. Forest conservation through policies and management.

- IV. Mitigation efforts which encompass the lowering of GHG emissions, fostering of sustainable development and incentivization of public and private participation
- V. Adaptation measures which focus on resilience and reduction of vulnerability while utilising indigenous and international knowledge as well as being gender-responsive.
- VI. Minimizing Loss and damage by intending to or engaging in activities such as emergency preparedness and Early Warning Systems.
- VII. Promoting the participation of the private sector.
- VIII. Training and education to promote public awareness.
- IX. Policies already in place or under development
- X. Level of political decision and any coordination across governmental institutions.
- XI. Intended use of carbon pricing mechanisms.
- XII. Gaps and barriers identified to the implementation of the INDC.
- XIII. Means of Implementation and Monitoring and Evaluation.
- XIV. Participatory process of INDC development.

2.3 Conceptual framework

A number of concepts will be used during this study and to clarify their meaning in this context they will now be defined. Democracy will be used according to Freedom House (2018), seeing as their Freedom Report was used to decide the chosen cases. It is a primarily liberal view which aligns with Held's perception of liberal democracy, focusing on political rights such as free and fair elections and civil liberties such as freedom of speech (Held, 2006, p.95). Autocracy, as the opposite, is where these freedoms and rights to varying degrees are impeded and one person or party is in control of the country. Once again, Freedom House's definition of what constitutes 'not free' countries is used (Freedom House 2018).

Furthermore, this essay speaks of developed and developing countries, the definition of which is not universally agreed upon. As Ari and Sari mention in their article, a definition of developed and developing countries is not mentioned in the Paris Agreement, forcing a

referral back to the Annexes of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which was adopted in 1992 and might be out of date seeing as the development levels of many countries has changed since (Ari & Sari, 2017, pp.175-6). However, as a better definition is lacking, the UNFCCC definitions will be used, where Annex I and II countries are seen as developed countries and Non-annex countries as developing countries (UNFCCC, 1992, p. 23-4). The reason for this is that they are part of an internationally agreed upon framework, which all case countries have ratified, and that the Paris Agreement refers to this framework as well. Lastly, this thesis will use the UNFCCC definition on what constitutes climate change:

“‘Climate change’ means a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods.” (United Nations, 1992, p. 7)

3. Methodological framework

This thesis is a qualitative, abductive desk study, which means it is interested in collecting and analyzing texts, rather than data, to understand a phenomenon and will not engage in interviews and other types of field work. It is abductive as it uses a theoretical lens to understand and analyze primary and secondary sources in order to find a new angle on the topic of global climate change policy-making on a national level (Bryman, 2016, pp. 375 – 378 & 394). It is best suited as such because of the scale of the topic and the lack of interest in quantifiable data or personal opinions, and instead the information presented by countries and organizations.

Furthermore, this study is a structured focus comparison as it compares the policies and projects of six different cases. George and Bennett (2005, p. 67) describes structured focused comparison as a useful method for generating knowledge on foreign policy problems, which makes it suitable for this thesis. The method itself consists of asking a set of standardized questions relating to one phenomenon to all the cases, which in this thesis is derived from the international agreement mentioned in the analytical framework section and the chosen theory. George and Bennett (2005, p. 67) also identify the need to carefully develop questions that fit

the research objective and theoretical focus, which has been considered for the written questions.

For this study, six Southwestern and central African countries were chosen as cases because of their similar size and geographical location, as well as their type of government. Particularly as the region is one of few with 'clear-cut' autocratic and democratic countries in such proximity. To be able to investigate the difference in policy-making between an autocracy and a democracy, three of the cases are democracies and three of them are autocracies, identified as such by Freedom House (2018) and supported by the index made by the Economist (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2018). The cases in question are Angola, Botswana, The Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe, South Africa being a slight outlier as it has substantially higher levels of economic growth, but remains under threat from climate change and thus appropriate for the thesis

For this study, I used several different primary and secondary sources are used, including policy documents, project databases, academic articles, some books and a few news articles. The policies, such as the National Development Plan, come from the countries themselves and mostly indicate what the country intends to do and not what is being done, which is why the thesis will focus on projects implemented together with different international actors, which supposedly act impartially and has accessible material. A set of standard organisations and funds will be used for all countries, however there will be a few special ones for certain countries, which express the unique situation for each country. The existence of any Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) and National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPA) will be presented, seeing as none of the countries has submitted a National Adaptation Plan (NAP) (UNFCCC, No Date e). These three documents are called for by the UNFCCC as part of the effort towards the global climate change goals. Beyond this, the projects funded by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Green Climate Fund (GCF) is considered, as they are part of the Financial Mechanism of the UNFCCC (UNFCCC, 2018b). Furthermore, projects by the EU commission, the African Development Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the Adaptation Fund, the World Bank, the Technical Examination Process, REDD+ and the Climate Technology Centre and Network are used as they are the main funding organisations in the area of climate change and the environment.

For the presence of NGOs and the private sector, the NAZCA platform, the Trickle Out Project and the Nairobi Work Programme (UNFCCC, 2018a) action pledges will be used. The NAZCA platform is a UNFCCC platform which monitors global climate actions submitted by

non-state actors (Global Climate Action, No Date a), the NWP is a UNFCCC knowledge-to-action hub which collaborates with partners, Parties and other experts and the Trickle Out Project is an online directory of social and environmental enterprises across 19 countries in Africa which started as a research project by Dr. Diane Holt (Trickle Out Africa, 2015a). None of these mentioned information sources are exhaustive and do not describe all national and sub-national activities but instead serve as indicators of the level of activity in the country.

As mentioned, some newspaper articles are used, but only to serve as indicators of the most recent updates and activities in the countries. Furthermore, several scholarly works are used for this thesis. Scholars Mark Beeson and Bruce Gilley discuss the topic of environmental authoritarianism in their articles and introduce the concept along with the debate on whether democracy or autocracy is preferable for climate change and environmental policies and actions. However, both articles cover Southeast Asia and China, which is why this study will bring the approach to another region of the world. The article by Doyle and Simpson (2006) shows examples in Burma and Iran, showing a possibility for applying the approach in a different part of the world.

The criticism on democracy reaches its peak in *'The Climate Change Challenge and the Failure of Democracy'*, by Shearman and Smith (2007), which condemns democracy as a tool for addressing the climate change challenge, stating that it is interconnected with free market capitalism. On the other hand, political theorist David Held identifies the typical positive aspects of democracy, specifically liberal or representative democracy, including free and fair elections, the right to stand for office and to associational autonomy as well as the protection of human rights (Held, 2006, p. 95) and later continues to argue that the role of the state in the governance of climate change could be as 'the ensuring state', enabling and facilitating rather than having a top-down attitude (Held, 2011, p.105). Hugh Ward (2008, p.38) continues the debate by saying that the main argument for liberal democracy is that citizens can affect political decisions in numerous ways. Thus, this study aims to cover some of this debate and find more evidence to support one side or the other, or neither, depending on the findings.

The information available on the situation in Southwestern and central Africa points to several risks and gaps for further research, including the adoption of institutional frameworks, risks for violence and migration in relation to climate change, and severe droughts (Niang et al., 2014). Such phenomena can already be observed, for example in the water crisis in Cape Town, South Africa (Chambers, 2018). Using this knowledge as a base, it is highly appropriate to choose Africa as an example for this study. However, it is worth noting, that

the authors mentioned above are not from Africa nor Asia but rather have a perspective more representative of the global north. Lin (2016) criticises global climate change governance regime as yet another opportunity where some states can exert power over others, which could be an additional perspective to consider for this study.

In practice, the research was initiated by familiarization with the subject, which was achieved through reading articles and books relating to the chosen topic and discovering a research gap as well as formulating a research problem. The information supplied by the books and articles was then used as a guideline for finding the appropriate international agreements, databases and funding institutions to collect data and information from. This was then done for each of the chosen countries in order to compile comparable material on the topic. Often, one of the sources referred to a few others which helped uncover the most important sources to investigate, namely the ones that were mentioned frequently. The information collection and sorting were the most arduous parts, especially because of the relatively large number of countries for a qualitative study. After the information collection period, it was a matter of pulling the thesis together and making sense of the research results. This involved writing and rewriting of paragraphs and adding sections that felt missing and removing superfluous information. Despite the condensation of the content, it remained rather long for a bachelor thesis, as substantial parts were moved to the appendices. In retrospect, it is worth to note that perhaps too much time was spent on the background and findings section, which left the analysis and conclusion somewhat underdeveloped.

3.1 Ethical Considerations

As this study will be a desk study and therefore not come in contact with sensitive or personal information, there is no need for ethical considerations, especially since the focus of this study will be on a national level and not a single organization or a group of people.

3.2 Limitations and Delimitations

One of the limitations for this study was data availability, especially on websites from the cases as they often were unfinished or not functioning, although the information needed could often be found in other places. Another limitation was the language barrier as two of the countries did not have English as an official language, but instead French and Portuguese,

which meant secondary sources sometimes had to be used. Furthermore, as this study focuses on the information presented by the countries and different organisations, it could not confirm local level activities and instead had to trust the statements by the sources used. Also, as this is a highly topical subject with new developments daily, it is worth noting that new projects and documents might become available. Secondary sources are also used, and it is good to be aware that they might show a biased or one-sided perspective of a topic.

To be able to go in depth on the research topic, some delimitations had to be put on the scope of the study. The topic of environment and climate change encompasses plenty of different aspects and covering them all would be impossible, which is why policy-making was chosen as the main focus, with the method and theory further narrowing the scope. The number of organisations and institutions providing funding also had to be limited as there are a myriad of them. Therefore, a few ones operating in the majority of the countries were used along with a few country-specific ones, identified in the INDC or other government documents as important. As mentioned above, the chosen cases were decided upon because of their geographical position, their form of government and their relatively similar size. The number of cases also had to be appropriate for the chosen method, preferably more than at least three, which is why three of both democracy and autocracy respectively was chosen. Few regions in the world have autocracies and democracies mixed and in proximity to each other, often it is one or the other with a few exceptions.

4. Background

For this section, a short summary of the cases' political and socio-economic backgrounds will be presented to provide an understanding of each country's preconditions for engagement in climate change actions. All information mentioned here, and more, is available with sources in Appendix A.

All the countries in question share some characteristics, they all have a colonial history and are quite similar in size, with some exceptions. The DRC is mostly covered by forest and Namibia is one of the driest countries on the continent, the others fall somewhere between. However, what they all have in common is vulnerability to climate change. Changes in precipitation and extreme weather, such as droughts, are risks they all face as the global

climate continues to get warmer. Furthermore, all countries claim to be multi-party systems, however, some are more successful than others. Botswana, Namibia and South Africa are stable democracies, despite some minor political problems, and have enjoyed long-term political stability which has allowed the countries to climb economically and reach middle-income status. However, the economic growth has not been without its own problems, the three countries all suffer from high inequality and unemployment. Both Namibia and South Africa have had apartheid systems in place. The three countries do differ, South Africa is the largest economy in Africa and has a population of 56,5 million, whereas the other two are considerably smaller with populations of 2,5 million (Namibia) and 2 million (Botswana).

The other three countries have not seen the same level of development and are as mentioned politically unstable and unfree. They have all seen considerable levels of conflict, especially Angola and the DRC which have been engaged in protracted civil wars. Both the DRC and Zimbabwe has seen a decline in their political rights in the recent years, Zimbabwe has even fallen from 'Partly Free' to 'Not free' in the Freedom House Index due to the failure to host free and fair elections. All three countries have the necessary natural resources to potentially enjoy economic growth but have failed to manage them prudently and have suffered from economic crises. Zimbabwe has seen hyperinflation and rampant corruption over the last two decades and Angola has suffered from oil shocks, as their economy relies on it. This has left the countries with low development levels, but they are slowly improving. The countries' populations are on the larger side, Angola has 24 million, Zimbabwe has 16.6 million and the DRC is the largest in the region with 81,5 million.

Regarding the climate change effort, most of the countries are or have for a long time been net sinks of GHGs, meaning the largest responsibility does not lie with them. However, as they all aspire to have socio-economic growth, which is causing a decrease in the net sink capacities, they have an opportunity to do it sustainably. All countries are at some level engaged in environmental management and policy-making, e.g. both Zimbabwe and Namibia have environmental rights written in their constitution, but Botswana has claimed that it does not prioritize climate change.

5. Findings

This chapter will present the main body of work for this essay. It will introduce the reader to each of the cases' INDC and connect them to the analytical framework to see whether they

fulfil the list of points identified there. A summary of all policies and projects chosen as indicators for this essay is also included, with a connection to what has previously been written and to the theoretical framework. For each case, there will be a short section describing what information was available and how it relates to what was promised in the INDC. The full version of this is available in Appendix B.

5.1 Intended Nationally Determined Contributions

5.1.1. The Republic of Angola

The INDC of Angola was submitted November 29 in 2015 (UNFCCC, No Date b) by a ministry level decision, specifically by the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Energy and Water. It is 20 pages long and the technical development had stakeholder involvement (Republic of Angola, 2015, p.5). It starts off by reaffirming its commitment to contribute to the global efforts to reduce GHG emissions and fight against climate change. Both conditional and unconditional mitigation measures which aim to stabilize emissions by 2030 are mentioned. Renewable energy sources and reforestation are the primary targeted sectors and the plan is to reduce emissions by 50% compared to the Business as Usual (BAU) scenario, which has 2005 as base year (Republic of Angola, 2015, p.4). Angola uses 2005 instead of the standard 2000 because of the civil war that raged during that time which hampered access to data (Houngo, Abias et al. 2012, p.20.).

More than 90% of the country's emissions comes from the Energy sector, making it the primary area for mitigation actions hence the promotion of renewable energy. The document mentions some examples of energy projects that are being implemented in Angola, for example, the central and the second Cambambe hydroelectric power plants and the Tombwa Wind Farm (Republic of Angola, 2015, p.6-13). Less than 20% of Angola's population has access to electricity, which means the access rate to the main grid must increase simultaneously. The country also aims to stabilize emissions from agriculture, industrial processes and Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LALUF). Agricultural process covers 26% of land area and emissions comes mostly from animal production and wild fires. However, industrial emissions are estimated to be minimal. Additionally, the country intends to promote afforestation, reforestation and promote the use of biofuels to minimize the negative effects of deforestation (Republic of Angola, 2015, p.12). REDD+ (Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation) projects are identified as essential, as

reforestation has the possibility to reduce 35 million ton of CO₂ emissions. The country has a National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) but does not have any Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (World Bank Group, 2016a, p.5).

Angola is highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, especially in some key economic sectors, which is why the INDC also includes an Adaptation section aiming to strengthen the resilience of the country. The adaptation measures prioritize the following sectors: Agriculture, water resources, health, coastal zones, ecosystems and biodiversity (Republic of Angola, 2015, p.4). The estimated cost for the implementation of the mitigation and adaptation actions identified in the INDC is 15.7 billion US Dollars (World Bank Group, 2016a, p.5).

Angola completed its NAPA in 2011 and the two primary policy measures identified are the revision of sectoral laws for proactive adaptation and a national institutional mechanism for adaptation planning. A number of adaptation projects are identified in the INDC, including: Promoting climate-resilient development and enhanced adaptive capacity to withstand disaster risks in Angola's Cuvelai River Basin; Disaster risk reduction/ management to support agropastoral communities affected by recurrent droughts and other natural disasters in southern Angola and northern Namibia; and, the Solar Village programme which at the time of the INDC had electrified 48 villages and which aims to continue until 2025 (Republic of Angola, 2015, p.13-16)

The government of Angola claims to have diverted its own funds to implement projects as well as produced a considerable amount of laws and policies, therefore believing their contribution to be fair and ambitious (Republic of Angola, 2015, p.19-20). Angola has a few different strategies and policies, including the National Strategy for Climate Change from 2008, National Afforestation and Reforestation Strategy from 2010 and the Strategic Plan for Disaster Risk Management from 2011 (World Bank Group, 2016a p.6). The mitigation and adaptation actions identified above will also aim to help attain the Long-Term Strategy for Development of Angola (2025) (Republic of Angola, 2015, p.5).

The INDC has a section on means of implementation which identifies the need for proper enforcement of the already existing laws and policies. It also mentions the need for international support in the form of finance, investment, capacity-building and transfer of technology Angola also intends to make use of carbon pricing. Angola also identifies a number of socio-economic benefits on top of the environmental ones, which include electrification, creation of youth jobs, resilience and international support for other sectors (Republic of Angola, 2015, pp. 10 &19-20). The INDC does not mention any intention of

involving the private sector in the implementation phase and fails to provide a section on gaps or barriers to the implementation of the INDC (World Bank Group, 2016a, p.6).

Finally, the INDC has a section on the gender perspective which aims to avoid exacerbation of the disproportionate effects climate change can have on women, particularly in agriculture and water management (Republic of Angola, 2015, p.19-20).

5.1.2 The Republic of Botswana

The first of October 2015 marks the date of the submission of Botswana's INDC. It consists of 5 pages of material and the political decisions regarding the INDC were taken at the parliamentary level. The technical process of the development of the INDC was partly participatory through a multisector commission and it formulates a goal to reduce overall emissions by 15% in 2030, with 2010 as a base year (Botswana, 2015, p.1-2).

A Climate Change Policy and Institutional Frame, which will be operationalized with a strategy, was according to the INDC under development in 2015 and ready for parliamentary approval in 2016, however this could not be confirmed by the author. Botswana's other policies include the Second National Communication and the development of a National Adaptation Plan (NAP). The INDC also mentions that NAMAs and promotion of public awareness are necessary actions to implement the INDC. Furthermore, Botswana's INDC recognizes that to be able to reach its goals there is a need for certain resources availability and functional legal frameworks (Botswana, 2015, p.1).

The document has a mitigation section, which identifies the GHGs targeted and the areas where the mitigation measures will be implemented. The primary areas are the Energy sector, the Waste sector, transportation sector and the Agriculture sector. There are no specific examples, instead the INDC states that initiatives for emission reductions are going to be developed (Botswana, 2015, p.1). To enable the formation of mitigation measures, some future activities are needed on the following topics: Identification of sources of funding; gaining government and international support of the mitigation measures; assessing the impacts on the national growth when allocating resources to mitigation actions; and developing a conducive legal framework (Botswana, 2015, p.4-5).

The adaptation section of the INDC mentions that Botswana is sensitive to the impacts of climate change and therefore prioritizes adaptation in order to increase resilience (Botswana, 2015, p.2). Extreme droughts and extreme rainfall are examples of risks that can come to affect the country (Botswana, 2015, p.4-5). Botswana's ministry of Environment, Wildlife

and Tourism is developing a National Adaptation Plan with the help of the National Committee on Climate Change, which includes the priority area of Climate Smart Agriculture and which calls for a broad stakeholder consultation (Botswana, 2015, p.2). Botswana identifies several adaptation priorities that were at the time being implemented by the government to assist communities with adaptation measures within the water, agriculture and health sectors. For example, within the water sector, construction of pipelines and reduction of water loss during transmission, are measures to prevent droughts. Examples within the agriculture sector are the improvement of livestock genetics and a switch to drought resistant and tolerant crops (Botswana, 2015, p.4-5).

To reach the set goal for emissions reduction and the adaptation section, it is estimated that USD18.4 billion is required (Botswana, 2015, p.4-5). Botswana intends to use carbon pricing to fund some of its activities. Under the section of 'Means of Implementation', it is stated that the Government of Botswana spends a substantial part of its national income for climate change adaptation purposes (Botswana, 2015, p.2). There is no intention by the INDC for the private sector to be involved and there are no gaps and barriers to the implementation of the INDC identified.

5.1.3 The Democratic Republic of Congo

On August 8, 2015, the Democratic Republic of Congo submitted a 12 pages long INDC which aims to reduce GHG emissions by 17% up until 2030. The document uses year 2000 as a base line and focuses on conditional contributions, covering the main areas of agriculture, forestry and energy (Republique Democratique du Congo, 2015, p.1). The political decision of the adoption of the INDC was taken at the head of state level with the help of the ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development and the INDC's technical development was completed through a participatory process, both by a multisector commission and with stakeholder involvement (Republique Democratique du Congo, 2015, p.4). Moreover, the country has engaged in a number of activities and developed some policies and strategies, including the development of the National Environment, Forests, Water and Biodiversity programme, development of NAMAs, reducing deforestation emissions through REDD+ projects the formulation of the NAP and the creation of an electricity sector policy document (Republique Democratique du Congo, 2015, p.4-5).

The INDC starts by describing the growth in GDP and the recent focus on expanding and improving infrastructure to foster further economic growth. It also mentions that the

agriculture sector occupies 70% of the labour force in the country. Furthermore, it covers the development challenges facing the country, for example the food insecurity which affects 76% of the population along with a vision of the country's development until 2060 which includes moving from a low-income to a middle-income country and industrializing in order to become a developed country, while still being sustainable and respectful of the environment (Republique Democratique du Congo, 2015, pp. 2-4).

The document presents a section on adaptation, which recognizes that the country is highly vulnerable to climate change effects, especially within food security and health. The adaptation goals identified are anchored in the NAPA from 2006 which identifies three main areas. Ensuring the security of livelihoods for both rural and urban communities, appropriate forest management and protection of vulnerable ecosystems in coastal areas. These goals have been included and updated in the more recent National Adaptation Plan from 2014 (Republique Democratique du Congo, 2015, pp.5-6)

There are adaptation initiatives already under way in the country which aims at adaptation within agriculture, resilient economic growth, coastal zone adaptation and increasing resilience for women and children. The adaptation section also mentions the avoidance of loss and damage by implementing an Early Warning system. Some of these initiatives are already finished and some stretch into 2020. Gaps and barriers are included, for example regarding a lack of reliable climate data and weak technical, institutional and legal capacities in the adaptation dimension. The INDC also mentions a goal to include adaptation indicators into a national monitoring, reporting and verification system (Republique Democratique du Congo, 2015, pp. 7-8).

In the mitigation section, the primary sectors where efforts will take place are Land-Use, Agriculture and Forestry. However, the Government notes that only a small amount of the large investment needed for the activities can come from governmental resources and that external help is needed (Republique Democratique du Congo, 2015, p.9-10). The country received both financial and technical support for the development of the INDC but requests further international assistance and provision of technology transfers, financial support and capacity-building for the implementation phase (Republique Democratique du Congo, 2015, p.9).

Towards the end of the INDC, there are sections on means of implementation and equity and ambition. The section on means of implementation identifies the costs and places the responsibility with the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development (Republique Democratique du Congo, 2015, p. 10-12). It is estimated that the total cost of implementation

will land at USD 21.6 billion. The INDC mentions no intention of including the private sector in the implementation phase and no intention of using carbon pricing (World Bank Group, 2016b, p.5-6). Regarding equity and ambition, the DRC is one of the Least Developed Countries and has faced countless socio-economic challenges, thus regarding its goal of a GHG reduction of 17% as ambitious and equitable. Particularly as its contribution to the global GHG emissions is very low (Republique Democratique du Congo, 2015, p. 10-12).

5.1.4 The Republic of Namibia

Namibia handed in their 21-page long INDC on September 29, 2015. A multisector commission participated in the technical development of the INDC, proving it to be somewhat participatory (Republic of Namibia, 2015a, p.4). The Namibian INDC begins with a statement regarding the country's status as a Non-Annex I party and a clarification that the country does not have any obligations under the UNFCCC, but that the submission of the INDC shows the commitment to fight climate change. Namibia sets the ambitious goal of reducing GHG emissions by 89% before the 2030 deadline, compared to the BAU scenario, which uses 2010 as base year. It will aim to decouple economic growth and carbon emissions and focus its contributions to the energy, IPPU (Industrial Processes and Product Use), AFOLU (Agriculture, Forestry and other land-use) and waste sectors. The AFOLU sector will be the major target of the mitigation efforts (Republic of Namibia, 2015a, p.1-3)

Namibia received both technical and financial support during the development of its INDC and the implementation of the INDC is also recognised as a major challenge for the Namibian government, with many constraints and obstacles to overcome. To be able to do so, Namibia requests further international assistance in the form of financial support, human capacity-building and the transfer of green technology. The document underlines Namibia's aspiration to continue its socio-economic development work to improve the welfare and of its population and counteract the societal inequalities, although the country will promote sustainability in this development work. Namibia considers its INDC as equitable and ambitious, given the country's national circumstances (Republic of Namibia, 2015a, pp.1-5 & 8).

The decision on adopting the INDC was taken on multiple levels, both head of state and ministries were involved. The Ministry of Environment and Tourism is responsible for all environmental issues in the country as well as the monitoring of decisions made on the INDCs. The Cabinet of Namibia validated and endorsed the INDC before it was submitted to the UNFCCC. Furthermore, the INDC promotes that all ministries and departments

collaborate and contribute to the implementation of INDC activities. Political stability, good governance and appropriate legislations are all identified as prerequisites for a rapid and successful implementation of the INDC. It also identifies the need for robust public awareness campaigns (Republic of Namibia, 2015a, pp.4 & 17-8).

Any mitigation or adaptation plans were not fully developed at the time of submission, but both NAMAs and a NAP were under development and general national policies has seen climate mainstreaming. The country has several of these policies and frameworks but the National Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan for 2013-2020 and the National Development Plan are currently the most relevant. Namibia has continuous 5-year National Development Plans which will guide the development work completed to achieve their Vision 2030, which is their National Policy Framework (Republic of Namibia, 2015a, p.5)

The mitigation section mentions a few contributing areas but focuses mostly on the energy and AFOLU sectors, as the largest emitters. The energy sector will see a turn to renewable sources and there will be an implementation of an energy efficiency programme and the introduction of a mass transport system in Windhoek reducing use of fossil fuels (Republic of Namibia, 2015a, p.7).

The AFOLU sector defines deforestation and livestock industry as its biggest emitters, and the INDC suggest the following measures to combat this: Reducing the deforestation rate by 75% in 2030; engaging in reforestation; increasing the number of livestock heads in feedlots; and reducing chemical fertilizers by 20% through climate smart agricultural practices. As the mitigation section is still being refined, Namibia reserves the right to update it in the future (Republic of Namibia, 2015a, pp. 9 & 11).

Namibia is one of the driest sub-Saharan countries and depends on development sectors that are highly sensitive to changes in the climate, including agriculture and water supplies (Republic of Namibia, 2015a, p.13). As a response to this Namibia is developing its NAP and the INDC mentions some of the actions that will be incorporated there. There will be improvement of ecosystem management, development of appropriate responses to extreme weather and the improvement of the technical capacity to develop a greater understanding of the effects of climate change.

Adaptation has been an unconditional part of the national development, but the government has already implemented some actions to improve the resilience of the country. For example, promotion of Climate Smart Agriculture, preservation of forests, improvement of rural water supply and surveillance along with prevention of diseases are all actions

identified as under way. Additionally, the country wants to set up appropriate early warning systems to minimize losses (Republic of Namibia, 2015a, p.15).

The country faces numerous gaps and barriers to the implementation of the INDC. Recurring gaps are, but not limited to, lacking human capacity, inadequate access to technology, data limitation and limited citizen awareness. Key barriers include a lack of coordination and lack of access to information, as well as a lack of capacity at the local levels. The document has a section on means of implementation and it identifies the possibilities of funding and legislative as the two most important, enabling actions. Some of the major legislative actions include a review of taxation policy to promote cleaner technologies and energy efficiency regulations. Financial possibilities will come in part from the Namibian government and in part from bi- and multilateral grants, Foreign Direct Investment, private partners and the Namibian private sector (Republic of Namibia, 2015a, p.15- 17). The cost of the implementation of all sections of this INDC is calculated at USD 33 billion and the country calls upon the international community for support. The INDC does not rule out the use of carbon pricing and other market-based mechanisms, which will be used to achieve the target set out (Republic of Namibia, 2015a, p.1- 6). It also includes a section on the progress of Monitoring and Reporting, although it focuses more on the monitoring of the achievements by the National Development Plans instead of the INDC, or perhaps in tandem with it (Republic of Namibia, 2015a, p.18).

5.1.5 The Republic of South Africa

The INDC of South Africa was submitted on September 25, 2015 and consists of 11 pages. It does not mention at what political level the decision of the adoption was taken and was not developed in a participatory way. The INDC does not set a clear percentage goal of its emission reduction, as the other mentioned countries have done, instead it would seem South Africa identifies its absolute emission reduction by 2030 as 614 MtCO_{2e}. No potential development benefits were assessed or considered in the INDC and the development of it not receive any technical or financial support (World Bank Group, 2016c, p.5-7)

The INDC of South Africa starts off by stating that it has been developed on the premise that the Paris Agreement will be binding, fair and effective. They agree that all countries must implement mitigation efforts to curb the anthropogenic climate change, particularly since the collective overuse of global commons is a characteristic of the current crisis. The INDC does

state that the elimination of poverty and eradication of poverty overrides the climate change necessities, although sustainable development is still promoted (South Africa, 2015, p. 1-2).

South Africa has already observed climate changes, from increased temperatures to a variation in precipitation, and is projecting to face more extreme weather in the future. The country thus considers its adaptation section as a vital and ambitious component of its climate change response and it consists of several goals for the coming decades which aim to create resilience in all communities. First and foremost, it states the need for the development of a National Adaptation Plan (NAP), which will improve the institutional capacity to plan and implement adaptation projects while promoting indigenous knowledge and the gender perspective (South Africa, 2015, p.1-2). Moreover, when looking at policies and strategies, it is worth noting that there are no NAMAs and no NAPA submitted from South Africa (World Bank Group, 2016c, p.5) but they do have a National Development Plan from 2012 which includes a 2030 vision (South Africa, 2015, p.1-2). More goals include the development of an early warning system; a vulnerability assessment and needs framework; and communication of past efforts to promote awareness and garner international support. It also endeavours to promote education and public awareness. The main sectors that will be covered by adaptation measures are water, agriculture, forestry, energy, settlements, biodiversity and disaster risk reduction (DRR) (South Africa, 2015, p.4-6).

To peak its emissions, South Africa has developed a mitigation section which firstly mentions the policy instruments, such as a carbon tax, that are under development. The mitigation approach is based the principle of sustainable development and on the National Climate Change Response and Policy. It covers the main areas of energy, IPPU, waste and AFOLU, however the it fails to mention any specific examples or projects that will be implemented and instead only mentions some technologies that could help reduce emissions (e.g. energy efficient lighting and solar water heaters) and that already existing projects will be upscaled (South Africa, 2015, p.6-10).

In the light of its national circumstances, South Africa considers its INDC as fair and ambitious as substantial mitigation investments have already been made into these existing projects. There have been public transport investments, the inception of the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme and the establishment of the South African Green Fund which provides funding to green economy initiatives (South Africa, 2015, p.8-9). To be able to implement the mitigation and adaptation efforts, the country must overcome some barriers. Human and institutional capacity needs to be improved and negative impacts on growth and employment needs to be avoided. South Africa also

requests provision of means of implementation from the international community and the private sector. The transfer of technology, financial support and capacity-building are all requested (South Africa, 2015, p. 9-11) There is an intention for carbon pricing and/or other international market mechanisms to be used in South Africa to help cover the total cost of the adaptation and mitigation actions, which is estimated to cost USD 1688 billion (South Africa, 2015, p.6).

South Africa calls out the fact that poorer, developing countries often suffer disproportionately from the changes in climate brought on by the more developed countries. The INDC places responsibility with the developed countries, stating that they should assist the more vulnerable, developing countries as a matter of fairness. The INDC primarily identifies a need for financial assistance as the country aims to develop. Lastly, the INDC mentions some uncertainties, namely the data unavailability in AFOLU emissions and the estimation of costs, which needs an improvement in the use of methodology (South Africa, 2015, p.10-11).

5.1.6 The Republic of Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe's INDC was handed in on the 30th of September 2015 (UNFCCC, No Date b). It consists of 12 pages and sets the goal of reducing GHG emissions by 33% below the BAU line, mitigation efforts will primarily focus on the energy sector. Zimbabwe endeavours to build resilience and to ensure sustainable development, therefore the country seeks to reach the ambitious goal of keeping global temperature rise below 1.5°C. The country considers itself committed to the global cause of the limitation of climate change and identifies its responsibility according to the Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (Zimbabwe, 2015, p.1 & 9).

The development process of Zimbabwe's INDC was completed through guidance from the Office of the President, the Cabinet and the Ministry of Environment. The process was also participatory as it engaged a multisector commission which consisted of a group of experts who consulted key socio-economic actors from the private and public sector, which all are intended to participate in the implementation of the INDC. The potential development benefits of the INDC were considered during the drafting of the document and the process was given international financial and technical support (Zimbabwe, 2015, p. 3-4).

Zimbabwe has numerous policies addressing climate change and development, for example the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation and the National Climate Change Response Strategy (Zimbabwe, 2015, p.1).

Precipitation rates are the most critical climate changes affecting Zimbabwe, as even the smallest changes in rainfall can affect the vulnerable ecosystems and key socio-economic sectors (Zimbabwe, 2015, p.2). Consequently, the INDC firstly covers a quite extensive adaptation section which seeks to build resilience to current and anticipated climate changes. It identifies both long- and short-term visions and targets, which are as follows: the promotion of climate smart agricultural practices by improving the possibilities of generating knowledge and promoting the use of both scientific and indigenous knowledge; building resilience by strengthening early warning systems and maintaining an integrated approach in all sectors of the economy; improving irrigation systems and water management; diversifying livelihoods so as to minimize the impacts on communities currently relying on agriculture; and lastly, mainstreaming gender responsive climate policies and providing extra support to women, youth and children. The INDC also intends to promote sustainable agro-forestry in order to protect the forest-covered areas of the country. The government is responsible for the large-scale and long-term projects while allowing civic organisations to cover local and short-term projects (Zimbabwe, 2015, p.6).

Barriers and gaps to the implementation of the adaptation actions include lack of knowledge, technology and financial resources as well as inadequate research possibilities. The INDC recognizes that a more comprehensive NAP is needed to advance the assessment of the country's needs and that both international support and the private sector are necessary. There will be monitoring and reporting from several sources, but the INDC National Steering Committee will assume the greatest responsibility (Zimbabwe, 2015, p.7-9).

The mitigation measures identified in the INDC are amongst others, the implementation of solar water heaters, increasing the amount of energy from hydropower, improving energy efficiency and general refurbishment. On top of this, Zimbabwe will attempt to achieve an integrated management of waste, a review of the transport system and the implementation of the REDD+, all in order to reach 33% reduction goal which the INDC believes is fair and adequate (Zimbabwe, 2015, p.10).

As mentioned above, Zimbabwe is particularly interested in the energy section and is currently working towards universal access clean energy. The efforts made towards this include rewarding companies for making clean and efficient energy, increasing the output of the Kariba Hydro Power Plant and considering the usage of solar energy.

Lastly, there is a means of implementation section which states Zimbabwe's needs for international financial support, technology transfer and capacity-building as well as the intention to use carbon pricing and international market mechanisms to fund its implementation of the INDC (Zimbabwe, 2015, pp. 11-12).

5.1.7. Summary of INDCs

According to the analytical framework, each country's INDC will now be questioned on the key areas identified, with the help of the information presented above, and rated on a scale from 0-2 where 0 represents 'not mentioned', 1 represents 'mentioned', and 2 represents 'mentioned with specific examples, goals or actions' in the table below. The total score will give an idea of the comparative quality between the INDCs from the case countries. All the country's efforts will then be presented and investigated to see if there are any discrepancies in what is said and what is being done and if there is a difference between countries with autocratic tendencies or democratic tendencies.

2

Freedom house democracy index status	Autocratic tendencies (Not Free)			Democratic tendencies (Free)		
Country	Angola	Dem. Rep. Congo	Zimbabwe	Botswana	Namibia	South Africa
I. GHG emission reduction goal	2	2	2	2	2	1
II. Request for international assistance	2	2	2	2	2	2
III. Forest conservation	2	2	2	0	2	1
IV. Mitigation	2	2	2	1	2	1
Promotion of sustainable development	1	2	2	0	2	2
V. Adaptation	2	2	2	2	2	2
Resilience and vulnerability	2	2	2	2	2	2
Utilising indigenous knowledge	0	0	1	0	0	1
Utilising international knowledge	0	0	1	0	0	1
Gender-responsive	1	1	1	0	0	1
VI. Minimizing loss and damage	1	1	2	0	1	1
Early warning systems	1	1	1	0	1	1
Emergency preparedness	1	0	1	0	0	1
VII. Participation of private sector	0	0	2	0	2	1
VIII. Promotion of public awareness	0	0	2	1	1	1
IX. Policies in place or under development	2	2	2	2	2	2
NAP	0	2	1	2	1	1
NAMAs	0	1	0	1	1	0
NAPA	2	2	0	0	0	0
X. Level of political decision	2	2	2	2	2	0
XI. Carbon pricing mechanisms	1	0	1	1	1	1
XII. Gaps and Barriers	0	2	2	0	2	2
XIII. Means of implementation	2	2	2	1	2	1
XIV. Participatory process	2	2	2	2	2	0
TOTAL	28	32	37	21	32	26

Table 2: INDC performance: 0 – not mentioned, 1 – mentioned, 2 – mentioned with specific examples, goals or actions.

5.2 Projects and policies

For this section, a summary of the found projects, primarily internationally funded ones, and any appropriate policies, which express what kind of environmental work the different

countries are engaged in, will be presented. The full version with more specific information and is available in Appendix B.

All the countries, regardless of the type of government, have active programmes and projects covering most of the identified environment and climate areas, including adaptation and mitigation actions. Most of the countries have an NDP which corresponds to and explains the efforts mentioned in each respective INDC, except for the DRC where an NDP could not be located, although their National Communication identifies some of their intended actions. The table below presents the NDPs and the policies which are called for by the UNFCCC. They are not mandatory, but the submission of them shows commitment to the UNFCCC and the effort made by the global community.

3

Country	Autocratic tendencies			Democratic tendencies		
	Angola	DR Congo	Zimbabwe	Botswana	Namibia	South Africa
NAP	-	-	-	-	-	-
NAPA	✓	✓	-	-	-	-
NAMA	-	-	✓	-	✓	-
NDP	✓	-	✓	✓	✓	✓

Table 3: *Developed policies*

The projects identified for this essay are funded from different organisations and institutions together with the government of each country and they cover areas from biodiversity to energy and technology transfer. Angola have projects funded by FAO, the World Bank, the EU Commission and the African development bank which target resilience, agriculture, governance, rural development and capacity-building. Furthermore, Angola has 39 projects with the Global Environment Facility, which span from 2003-2018 and amongst other things cover projects on rural electrification, adaptation needs and some of the projects mentioned in the INDC.

Botswana also has several different projects from FAO, WB and the EU commission covering energy, drought prevention and sustainable land management. The GEF has 51 projects in Botswana, spanning from 2001-2015, the majority of which were started before

2010. Most of them are still active and they target areas ranging from management policy to renewable rural electrification and transport.

As the DRC is a forest-covered country, most of its projects relate to forestry. It is the only country with a REDD+ project and has the large number of 20 FAO projects which mostly address land and forest management issues as well as food security. USAID and the WB also cover forest-related programmes, including support of forest dependent communities. The African Development Bank has focused its support on the energy sector. The DRC has 69 projects through the GEF spanning over a period between 1996 and 2018, covering similar areas as the ones mentioned above.

Namibia has a few projects through the FAO with support from the EU commission which aims at combatting drought and supporting smallholder farmers. The country does not have any relevant WB or AFDB projects. Instead, on top of having 66 GEF projects, Namibia is one of the few who also has projects through the Green Climate Fund. The GEF projects cover a period from 1999 to 2018, however the majority were started before 2015, and they target capacity-building, solar power technology transfer, resilient agriculture, sustainable land management and more.

South Africa has 42 projects identified on their government website, which was the most accessible of all the countries, covering many aspects, for example climate change awareness and education. Additionally, projects from the EU, WB and AFDB on energy were also active. South Africa also has the largest amount of GEF projects of all the cases, reaching 103 between 1998 and 2018, the majority are ongoing and plenty of them had their inception after 2015. They cover, inter alia, sustainable land management, biodiversity and capacity-building.

Finally, Zimbabwe, has 12 FAO projects and a number of projects by the WB and the EU, which attempt to improve the water management, develop skills of smallholder farmers, and increase energy supply from sustainable sources (a project specifically mentioned in the INDC). 42 GEF projects have been started over the period of 1992 up until 2015, which means there have been no recently started projects. The existing projects reinforce the aforementioned areas as well as conservation and management capabilities.

Regarding technology transfer, technical assistance and efficiency, all countries except for Angola and the DRC, have received support from TEP, CTCN and/or the Adaptation Fund. South Africa has received an especially large number of 21 TEPs.

Lastly, the topic of private sector and NGO participation rates in each country has been assessed. The Trickle Out Project is used as an indicator for the prevalence of businesses and NGOs, as well as NWP action pledges and NAZCA global actions. Zimbabwe and the DRC

have 27 and 22 enterprises respectively in the Trickle Out Project, while Angola only has nine. These three countries each have very few or no NAZCA and NWP action pledges. The rest of the cases have higher numbers of enterprises, Botswana has 66 plus another 20 from a separate website listing their environmental NGOs, Namibia has 119 and South Africa has the huge number of 762. The NAZCA and NWP action pledges reflect the same image, where Botswana and Namibia only have a few each and South Africa has 245 NAZCA actions and 124 NWP pledges.

6. Analysis

This chapter will use the presented findings and analyse them according to the theoretical framework and the research questions posed in the introduction chapter. Firstly, there will be a description and discussion of the noteworthy discoveries presented in the findings chapter, for example, any discrepancies between the INDCs and projects presented. After this, the questions posed in the theoretical framework will be used for a discussion regarding the relevance of the statements of the theory and any differences between the democratic and autocratic countries' performances. As mentioned before, it is worth noting that the formulation of a policy does not guarantee a successful implementation.

6.1 Quality of the INDCs

The presented INDCs all have some good qualities and covers both adaptation and mitigation, although some are weaker than others. Moreover, the countries all have projects and policies active in the country, funded from a range of different institutions and organisations. In table 2, presented in the findings chapter, the performance of each of the countries' INDC is given a number to simplify the comparative process. The DRC, Namibia, and Zimbabwe have the highest scores with 32, 32 and 37 respectively, and the rest have scores of 28 (Angola), 21 (Botswana), and 26 (South Africa). This means that two of the countries with the comparatively best scores are autocratic, whereas countries such as Botswana and South Africa who could be expected to perform well, has not delivered. Botswana, which has the lowest score, is a smaller, middle-income country which has enjoyed political stability, and thus could be expected to have better resources to prepare the INDC and to address climate change. It still has numerous projects however, which cover more than

what has been mentioned in the INDC, for example it has 51 GEF projects which is comparatively quite extensive seeing as it has one of the smallest populations. The effects of these projects on the local level cannot be confirmed in this thesis, but it can speculate that the lack of commitment in the INDC is due to an unwillingness to commit in order to avoid any repercussions if the country fails to reach its targets or perhaps it is simply because of lacking capabilities. However, awareness of one's limitations and setting a target thereafter could be a positive aspect, as this would mean implementation of the mentioned goals is more likely to occur compared to a country with big promises and low performance.

South Africa, as the largest country and largest emitter with a stable political situation, could certainly be expected to take the lead in mitigation efforts, however its INDC fails to mention specific goals for the future and instead contains long paragraphs on ambition, equity and the Paris Agreement. It also includes a section specifically on clarifying that responsibility lies mostly with the developed countries, which none of the other poorer and less developed countries do. South Africa is certainly not wrong in this statement, but it seems like an attempt to exempt themselves from responsibility, despite being one of the largest emitters in Africa. They also have plenty of adaptive actions to complete seeing as they have huge socio-economic inequalities, meaning that even within their own country the poorer people are likely to be affected more, which makes their statement regarding fairness somewhat hollow. The Climate Action Tracker has identified South Africa's actions as highly insufficient for reaching the goal of the Paris Agreement, which means South Africa is currently not fulfilling the role as a leader for the continent. This does not mean they are not doing anything, in fact they have the largest number of projects of all cases, but this only reflects that they have the most human and financial capabilities, not that they have the most commitment.

Angola's lacking ambition is more understandable as it has experienced civil war and other socio-economic struggles, although it is starting to slowly recover. Its INDC mentions things such as gender and the participatory aspect which points to an ambitious, holistic approach, even though it is easy to say such things and harder to do them. Angola is engaged in plenty of projects, several of which are mentioned in the INDC and confirmed in this thesis which points to an effort of trying to keep promises. Still, there are also some weak points, for example it mentions the importance of REDD+ projects but have yet to submit any. The DRC which also is a war-torn country has been able to create a more ambitious INDC which primarily focuses on forests, which are one of the country's most vital resources, and has plenty of corresponding projects from the GEF and other sources such as the REDD+

platform. Similar to Angola, the DRC mentions gender and has some projects which focus on this aspect. Moreover, Zimbabwe, as a non-democratic country has been able to create an even more favourable INDC, which is holistic and mentions confirmed examples of projects, although it has less GEF projects than both the DRC and Namibia. The country has been spared from larger conflicts, which might have made the focus on the environment easier compared to Angola and the DRC, but it has had political instability and large economic crises. It has some discrepancies however, mentioning the need for REDD+ activities but failing to engage in any so far.

Lastly, Namibia is ambitious in its INDC, aiming to lower its GHG emissions by 89%. However, this could also be overly confident, seeing as the country does not have any developed goals or actions for the mitigation or adaptation sector. Despite this, there are broader vision identified and Namibia has plenty of active projects targeting all types of environmental issues. Namibia is a smaller, more stable country, which despite being plagued by inequalities therefore can afford to spend more on the fight against climate change. Indeed, it needs to do so, as one of the driest and more climate sensitive countries.

One of the reasons for why some of the INDCs are more comprehensive than the other is that they discuss more issues, such as means of implementation, gaps and barriers and gender-responsiveness along with level of public and private participation. However, as mentioned, even if the existence of these things in INDC has the potential of making the implementation smoother and more inclusive, there is no guarantee that they will be used simply because they are mentioned. Nonetheless, it shows ambition and commitment which might encourage other countries to consider it in their efforts.

Another factor that shows commitment is the submissions of UNFCCC policy documents. In table 3, each of the countries' contributions is presented, and the result is quite even, none of the countries have presented all documents but all have presented some, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe have presented most. None have submitted a National Adaptation Plan, even though other countries in similar situations have handed in theirs and both South Africa and Zimbabwe mention the need for a NAP in their INDC. The NAPA is the predecessor of the NAP, and only Angola and the DRC has presented one. Finally, both Botswana and the DRC mentions the need for the development of NAMAs, but neither of them has done so after the submission of their INDCs. Only Zimbabwe and Namibia have managed to do so, proving that it should be possible in the given time frame.

6.2 Public Awareness and Private Sector Involvement

Four questions were identified in the theoretical framework and they will now be discussed together with information from the findings. The first two questions concern the level of public awareness and participation as well as the private sector involvement. The theory states that these two indicators will be low, but that this might simplify the implementation process as the decisions are forcibly executed and not relying on the ‘whims of the people’. However, as also stated above, the existence of environmental NGOs is not unthinkable in autocratic countries as might be seen as a harmless form of activism. The counterargument against this is that democratic countries with high participation rates from its citizens will do better as it combats climate change on all levels and engages more people.

Most of the countries in one way or another mention public awareness in the INDC or their NDP, except for Angola and the DRC, which corresponds well with what the theory states. The same two countries, together with Botswana, do not have an intention of including the private sector either, although Botswana does mention the private sector in its NDP. However, the three countries did have a participatory INDC process, which all countries except South Africa had. Although, this refers to experts partaking in the development process, which of course is positive as they have scientific know-how, but it does not mean that the common citizens and other stakeholders have been involved at all. Such elitist practices are common for autocratic regimes, but not uncommon in democratic ones. Also, unsurprisingly, when looking at the numbers of environmental enterprises, both NGOs and businesses, the three autocratic countries have the lowest numbers by far. Angola and the DRC, which both are large countries with large populations, have the lowest numbers of enterprises in the Trickle Out project, the NAZCA platform and the NWP action pledges. The DRC has 22 registered NGOs and business, which is not a lot compared to their population of 81.5 million people, the same goes for Angola which only have nine. These low rates could depend on a lack of financial and human capacities or a lack of encouragement for citizens to participate.

On the other side of the scale, South Africa easily has the most enterprises, surpassing the other two democratic countries, which already have larger levels than the autocratic ones, by almost 600 organisations and businesses. Although, it does have a significantly larger population and economy, which could explain the large difference. South Africa is also the only country which has any action pledges to speak of, it has several hundred whereas all the other countries have a few each. Furthermore, it has its own governmental fund for

sponsoring NGOs, Botswana being the only other country who has this through a project with USAID.

6.3 Responsiveness to Environmental Issues

The third question mentions the supposed ‘rapid response to environmental issues’ which autocratic regimes are said to have. This was difficult to examine, but there are some indicators that will be used, they are the time of submission for the INDC, the timelines of the GEF projects and the previous ratifications. All countries are signatories to the Framework Convention on Climate Change; however, their time of ratification varies a little, Zimbabwe is the earliest, ratifying already in 1992 and the DRC is not far behind, ratifying in 1994. Angola is the last, however ratifying in 2000, possibly because of its civil war. Botswana and Namibia also ratified in 1994 but South Africa was a bit behind, signing a year after the others and ratifying in 1997. It is possible that this delay was due the current regime shift with the abolishment of apartheid, either way, it does not give enough information to go on seeing as the first and the last countries are autocracies and the rest are bunched up in the middle. For the submission of the INDC, the countries managed to hand in their document within 4 months of each other, showing no significant difference here.

For the GEF projects, two indicators are interesting to note: The time of the first implemented project, showing a fast response to the climate change threat as it was emerging, and the number of projects implemented after 2015, showing renewed determination in response to the Paris Agreement. Angola’s first project came in 2003, again most likely relating to the civil war, however it does have projects starting in 2018. Botswana’s GEF efforts start in 2001 and do not stretch beyond 2015 in start dates, however they do have previous projects which are still ongoing. The DRC has projects evenly spread from 1996 to 2018, showing an ambitious attitude and perhaps as the theory states, a quick centralized response. Namibia is similar to the DRC and has been active since 1999 while still engaging in new projects in 2018. South Africa also falls in this category, with even numbers of projects since 1998 up until the present. This would perhaps indicate that there is little relation to the time of response and type of government. Lastly, the thus far well-performing Zimbabwe, was first of the bunch with projects already in 1992 but does not have any recently started projects which arguably is more important, as that would indicate that it has not started working towards its INDC identified projects.

6.4 International Influence

The final question brings up international influence and theorizes that autocracies would not be as likely as democracies to allow international organizations and institutions to interfere with the country. Considering that all countries have projects with international institutions and organisations, not only the GEF but also the FAO, the World Bank, the EU commission and so on, it would seem that none of them has a problem with international influence, especially since all the countries sought international assistance in their INDC as well. The number of GEF projects are fairly even in all countries, except for South Africa with the largest number, which perhaps suggests that democratic countries has a bit more international cooperation, seeing as the significantly smaller countries Namibia and Botswana has similar number of projects to the larger Angola and the DRC. However, the projects might consider country size in their implementation, meaning each project would be more widespread and extensive in the two larger countries.

As all countries seem willing to accept involvement of the international community, perhaps outside interference is more acceptable in an area which does not necessarily include government critique, but instead provides funding and assistance beneficial to the country. It might also make the government look good to its people (if the people are helped, they are more likely to approve of their government) and to the rest of the world, when they, as developing countries, are doing their fair share in the global climate change battle. However, this thesis cannot answer for how the international influence is received on the local level and if it ever gets overruled by the authorities.

To summarize, the private sector and citizen participation is indeed lower in the autocratic-led countries, and since they are not performing considerably worse than the democracies, the first two questions in the theoretical framework might hold some truth in saying that public and private sector participation is lower in autocracies. However, even if the lack of business involvement and direct decisions made by the government is good for the environment, it probably will not favour the population in other terms, such as political freedom and economic opportunities.

The information regarding response time would argue that even if the autocratic countries are not faster to act on climate change activities, they are definitely not slower than the democratic ones, Zimbabwe is for example faster in some cases and both the DRC and Angola are presently working to fulfil their INDCs, which is more than can be said for some

of the democratic countries. However, overall, the countries are quite similar in their response times which would mean the theory does not quite fit in this case.

Finally, the theoretical framework examines if autocracies are more likely to reject international influence, which does not seem to be the case. Perhaps they have a slightly smaller number of projects, but they still have a considerable amount like the democratic ones. As developing countries with colonial backgrounds, they are all entitled to get assistance from developed countries, regardless of their political status.

The general conception of autocratic countries, at least here in the west, would be that they automatically perform worse within environmental work because of their political disposition. However, as the information presented above would indicate, this might not be the case. The authoritarian environmentalism framework might not fit perfectly but it is correct in saying that autocracies can perform at least as well as democratic ones, with efficiency, ambition and direct decisions. For example, Zimbabwe, as 'Not Free' has produced a holistic INDC and implements many projects covering the mentioned areas while Botswana's INDC is lacking in many aspects. Even South Africa, which should be a leader in the area, is failing to engage in enough activities compared to its size and emissions rate. Perhaps this all comes from failing and surpassing expectations, more is expected of democratic, stable countries than war-torn, autocratic countries, which is why it is surprising when the autocracies perform well.

From all this one can draw the conclusion that all of the countries have their strengths and weaknesses and the mode of government does not seem to be the biggest contributor to the level of performance. The democratic and autocratic cases in this thesis all engage in similar activities relating to the Paris Agreement, thus to some extent fulfilling their promises, some more than others. However, since some INDCs are lacking and some avoid responsibilities, those countries might have a smaller imperative to continue to engage in mitigation and adaptation actions, and instead focus on other development areas which will contribute to emissions if the development is not decoupled from higher levels of emissions.

If it is not the type of government that determines the contribution, it might be other national circumstances, such as economic level, human and financial capabilities and conflict level in the country as well as the level of ambition, vulnerability and national responsibility. It is also likely to be related to the strength or weakness of the state and government in each country, as a weak government is less likely to succeed in implementing its policies as well as decide on appropriate policies in general. It should also be underlined that the NGO sector is significantly lower in autocratic countries, which indicates low public participation which in turn can affect the way policies are adopted and truly followed, as mentioned above. Finally,

as the environment does not seem to be worse off in the autocratic cases, perhaps even better than some of the democratic cases, one must consider if the positive environmental aspects justifies the other included characteristics of a more autocratic rule, such as oppression and restriction of political rights, which brings the thesis into the Malthusian debate of people versus the environment. If an autocracy existed which did not cause any direct harm to its citizens, then perhaps it would be preferable to a liberal democracy from an environmental standpoint, however this does not seem to exist, not in the cases discussed in this study and not in the rest of the world.

7. Conclusion

In the six African cases used for this thesis there were many different aspects which played in regarding the way autocracies and democracies handled their policy-making and project implementation, including levels of economic growth, conflict and ambition. However, broadly speaking, the performance was quite similar between all the cases and differed only to a minor extent in some areas, meaning the type of government did not affect the performance extensively. In general, the autocratic countries did, in line with the theory, perform better than expected and actually had an extensive focus on climate change. However, unsurprisingly, they lacked in public participation, but seeing as they did not perform considerably worse than the countries with bigger participation perhaps it is not as important as it has been proclaimed to be. Although, it is worth remembering that despite perhaps being environmentally preferable, autocracies are not preferable from a human rights perspective.

The countries seem to be fulfilling their promises in the INDCs, judging from the internationally funded projects and programmes which have been identified, however the ambition level set in each of the INDCs differ and this will in turn affect what the countries will do. Of course, countries with low targets will have a nice opportunity to exceed the (low) expectations, and thus look good in the global arena, but if goals are set low then the activities tend to follow suit. Consequently, this has the possibility of minimizing the reduction and negatively affect the possibilities of reaching the global emissions reduction target. As some of the most extensive INDCs are from autocratic countries and some of the lacking ones are from democracies, perhaps one can say that autocracies are better at performing for the global agreements, at least on paper. However, this conclusion cannot be drawn as the evidence is not generalizable, instead one can say that in these six cases, depending on the different

reasons mentioned in the analysis, some of the countries have performed better than others and they happen to be autocratic, interestingly enough. Similarly, the theory cannot be fully confirmed nor discredited, however parts of the theory used seem to hold some merit, for example regarding the low public participation in autocratic countries. However, international influence does affect all countries and time does not seem to be the most significant factor in the chosen countries, which speaks against the claims of the theory. Despite this the theory presents a useful frame for the consideration and critique of the democratic countries' actions within the climate change arena, questioning the actions and measures taken as well as the foundations upon which democracy rests.

7.1 Future research

There are many potential areas for future research within this area. Firstly, one could look deeper into the relationship between autocratic regimes and environmentalism in other locations to see what trends can be noticed there, as well as look deeper into each mentioned case to investigate the connections more thoroughly. Furthermore, one could wait until the Paris Agreement has been active for a few years and evaluate the process or one could dig deeper into the debate on the well-being of people versus the wellbeing of nature, if one even can differentiate between the two.

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Appendix A – Background

For this chapter a brief introduction to the six chosen cases will be provided to give pertinent information regarding the mode of government, development level, economic situation and other aspects that might factor in when the decision regarding environmental policy-making, and later on implementation, is made. Despite this thesis focusing on the potential differences between autocracy and democracy, other factors most likely play in greatly to the decision-making and thus it would be advantageous to be aware of these factors when analysing the findings. This background chapter will use the United Nation's Human Development Index as an indicator for the development level in each country, as it gives a good overall picture of development status through investigating levels of health, education and the chance at a decent way of living (UNDP, No Date a).

The Republic of Angola

Political Context

The Republic of Angola, hereafter referred to as Angola, is a South Western African country that in 2016 had a population of about 24 million (World Bank, 2017a) which has been steadily increasing, with a growth rate of 3,5% in 2012 (Huongo et al., 2012, p.21). Angola is officially a multi-party system with a parliament and a president, both elected for five years, but has been ruled by one single party and only two different presidents from independence in 1975 up until 2017 (Nationalencyklopedin, 2018a). There is also a National Assembly which is represented by five different political parties but has been dominated by the long-ruling MPLA party (Freedom House, 2017a). The President has the ultimate executive power and holds the positions as head of state and government as well as being commander of the army. (Nationalencyklopedin, 2018a). The president of more than three decades, José Eduardo dos Santos announced that he would step down and was replaced by his preferred successor João Lourenço in the 2017 election (Nationalencyklopedin, 2018b).

Angola scores a total of 26/100 in the Freedom House Index of 2018 (Freedom House, 2018a), giving it a value of 6/7, which indicates that country is not free but rather an autocracy or a failing democracy. Repression of dissent and restrictions of freedoms are common, along with corruption and abuse. Freedom of information and freedom of expression are guaranteed both constitutionally and through legislation but almost all

traditional media outlets are owned by the state or privately by senior officials, meaning censorship and self-censorship is common, and government-related information remains incredibly challenging to access. Several laws were passed in 2016 to increase government control over online media as well. Involvement of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) is not unheard of but they must register with the government to operate and regularly submit to government supervision. Organizations that are critical of the government risk state interference and threats of closure (Freedom House, 2017a).

Economic Overview

Angola's economy is currently struggling due to the instabilities in the global oil market, which has seen a decline in price since 2014. As oil represent one third of the GDP of the country, and thus has a large impact on its economy, the country has suffered because of this decline. The government has been forced to cut expenditure as a response but a long-term investment in diversification is recommended by the World Bank. Public debt was estimated at 59.2% in 2016 and projected to increase. Despite huge potential to cultivate more arable land, the agriculture sector only represents 11% of GDP. Infrastructure, a general lack of skills, and a challenging regulatory climate for business climate remain constraints for private investment outside the oil sector (World Bank, 2017a). Natural forests are the most important biomass resource, however current deforestation rates land at 0,2% per year which is only likely to increase if no change happens (Republic of Angola, 2015, p.9).

Development level

Angola gained independence in 1975 after being a Portuguese colony for 500 years, during which the population suffered through slavery and exploitation, leaving the country with some of the lowest development levels in the world (Tvedten, 1997, p. 1). From independence until 2002 the country was ravaged by a more or less constant civil war (Huongo et al., 2012, p.20). However, since then, Angola has been showing international commitment to stability and peace in Africa and the Great Lakes Region (World Bank, 2017a) and is also expected to move out of the Least Developed Countries category by 2021 (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2017).

The socio-economic progress made by the country since the civil war ended in 2002 is not sufficient, there are still many development challenges remaining. Angola scores 0,533 in the

Human Development Index, giving them the low rank of 150 (UNDP, No Date b) and large parts of the population still live in poverty and lack access to basic services.

Regarding the environment, which is the main topic of this essay, Angola identifies themselves as highly vulnerable to the impacts climate change can produce, particularly to extreme weather such as floods and droughts. They identify the main vulnerable sectors as “agriculture and food security; forest and biodiversity; fisheries; water resources; human health; infrastructures; coastal zones; and energy”. Angola uses 2005 as a reference year for their GHG emissions data, and in that year total emissions 66.8 million tons of CO₂e. 95% of emissions is said to stem from fossil fuel consumption (Republic of Angola, 2015, p.6).

The Republic of Botswana

Political context

The Republic of Botswana, hereafter referred to as Botswana, gained its independence in 1966 and has since then been a multi-party system where executive power lies with the president, who according to the constitution can be re-elected once. Legislative power lies with the National Assembly and the president (Nationalencyklopedin, 2018c). The term of President Seretse Khama Ian Khama, son of the first ever president of the country, came to an end on March 31 (World Bank, 2017b). He handed over power to the vice-president Mokgweetsi Masisi, who will serve as the leader until the national elections in 2019, where he will most likely be named the presidential candidate of the Botswana Democratic Party (Motsoeneng, 2018) which has dominated the country since independence, despite being a multi-party system (Freedom house, 2017b).

Botswana is considered one of the more stable democracies, but critics of the current government is concerned over an authoritarian trend in the governance of the country. Indigenous people, refugees and LGBT people have all faced discrimination and journalists have been actively pressured to avoid topics regarding corruption and/or opposition activities. Moreover, the country is allegedly becoming more and more centralized around the president as many powerful positions and top jobs are falling into the hands of family or members of the military elite (Freedom house, 2017b).

Despite this, Botswana has a robust media sector and protection of civil and political rights, earning it a score of 72/100 and 2.5/7 in the Freedom house index meaning it is considered a free country (Freedom House, 2017b).

Economic overview

Botswana is a lower middle-income country (Ntiki Masisi et al., 2012, p.1) Since its independence, the country has experienced substantial economic growth, mostly due to the stable political situation and the extraction of diamonds (Nationalencyklopedin, 2018c). Prudent management of this mineral wealth coupled with good financial governance has led to the economic gains made so far. The reliance on diamonds has diminished over the past 20 years, but to offset the loss of mineral revenues, an increase in revenues from other sources is needed (World Bank, 2017b).

The development policies of the government so far have been focused on diversification of the economy, to avoid the historical overreliance on diamonds, as well as health and education (Nationalencyklopedin, 2018c). Even with these generous social sector expenditures, Botswana has failed to yield the type of positive results that might have been expected. For example, up to 9% of the GDP has been spent on education expenditure, however has not created the envisioned skilled workforce. Instead, unemployment has remained high at the soaring level of 17.8% which has continued to deepen social divisions (World Bank, 2017b).

Development level

Botswana has a comparatively small population, only reaching slightly above 2 million people (World Bank, 2017b). It scores 0,698 in the Human Development Index, which gives it a rank of 108, supporting the evidence of its middle-income status (UNDP, No Date b). Approximately a quarter of all Botswanans live under the poverty line and 25% of the population aged between 15-49 is estimated to be infected by HIV/Aids (Nationalencyklopedin, 2018c). Poverty is especially high in rural areas, among female-headed households and for those with lacking skills and education levels. Unfortunately, it is also concentrated among youth and children which can have severe effects for cohesion,

observable in the high inequality within the country. The prevalence of such inequalities could potentially undo the development accomplished so far (World Bank, 2017b).

In the reference year used in the National Communication to the UNFCCC, year 2000, Botswana's total emissions indicated that the country was a net sink. Savannah woodland and scrub cover over 60% of Botswana's land area and due to poor soils, scarce water resources and insufficient infrastructure, crop production is severely disadvantaged and only around 0,7% of all land area is arable. Savannah burning is common and contributed to significant parts of GHG emissions, especially in CH₄ and N₂O. The existing forested areas are important resources which can promote socio-economic and environmental benefits if managed in a sustainable manner. However, fuelwood and other biomass products along with coal and petroleum products currently dominate Botswana's energy supply (Ntiki Masisi et al., 2012, p. 2-4). The National Development plan notes the usefulness and sustainability of solar energy but also its capital intensiveness which makes it more suitable for small-scale projects in Botswana (Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, 2016, p. 138).

In the National Communication to the UNFCCC it is stated that climate change as of the time of the submission is not a priority for the country and that the integration of climate change awareness into development projects remain a challenge (Ntiki Masisi et al., 2012, p. 10). The same is also said in the National Development Plan, however it does mention that the preparation of a national climate policy was started in 2015, with the help of the UNDP. The same report also points to the problem of an overarching negative public outlook towards environmental protection with a sort of 'out of sight, out of mind' attitude (Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, 2016, pp.135-6).

The Democratic Republic of Congo

Political context

The Democratic Republic of Congo, hereafter referred to as the DRC, has experienced civil war and armed conflicts intermittently ever since its independence from Belgium in 1960 (Nationalencyklopedin, 2018d) and is still recovering from the conflict which ravaged the country in the 1990s (World Bank, 2017c). The country has a democratic constitution, but power is concentrated with the president, who is supposed to be elected in general elections

every five years. The executive power is shared with a prime minister who is representing the party with the most seats in the parliament (Nationalencyklopedin, 2018d).

The long-running president Joseph Kabila, head of state since 2001 (World Bank, 2017c), recently overstayed his term limit and refused to step down for the scheduled 2016 elections (Freedom House, 2017c). This refusal caused protests which killed several dozens and sparked fears of a return to civil war (Stewart, 2018). An agreement was then made to provide a transition period where the president and the opposition shared power until a new election was supposed to be held in the end of 2017. However, this agreement never entered into force (World Bank, 2017c) and it is currently uncertain if the expected election will be held by the end of 2018 (Stewart, 2018).

The DRC's political rights have been declining over the last years, from 25/100 in 2016 to 17/100 in the 2017 Freedom House Democracy Index, because of the authorities' failure to hold the mandated elections and occurrences of human rights violations committed by state forces (Freedom House 2017c; 2016a; 2018b). Opposition politicians and civilians have less and less opportunities to impact the country's politics. Civil liberties are limited, however the right to association and freedom of expression is continuously exercised by the population despite the increasing threat of state repression. For example, in recent years there have been fatal attacks against civilians by state security forces and journalists and human rights advocates have faced harassment and unlawful detention (Freedom House 2017c).

Economic overview

With all its natural resources, the country has great potential for economic growth, especially with its mineral wealth and the high amounts of arable land (World Bank, 2017c). Despite the economic potential found in the country's resources, GDP per capita is less than 1 US dollar per day. The unofficial and rural sectors are prevailing, unfortunately having low capacity for generating jobs and economic opportunities. Furthermore, the industrial sector is basically non-existent (UNFCCC, No Date a, p.1).

In 2013-2014 there was a sharp increase in the GDP growth rate, reaching almost 9%. However, since then it has fallen to its lowest point since 2001 due to declining prices and a decrease in the demand for the country's raw material exports, predominantly copper and cobalt which make up 80% of the export revenue. This decrease in access to the international financial markets has compelled the government to reduce public expenditure (World Bank, 2017c).

Development level

The DRC currently has a population of around 81.5 million in 2017 (Nationalencyklopedin, 2018d), however fewer than 40% of all inhabitants are situated in urban areas (World Bank, 2017c). The poverty rates have been decreasing, from 71% to 64% between 2005 and 2012, but the country still ranks as one of the poorest in the world (World Bank, 2017c) with unemployment levels reaching 18%, and affecting youth aged 15-24 the hardest (Republique Democratique du Congo, 2015). D.R. Congo scores a meekly 0,435 in the Human Development index and lands on a rank of 176, which indicates there a large development challenges still left to tackle (UNDP, No Date b). For example, the electricity rate remains low in the country, only 15% nationally. Rural areas have a miniscule 1% rate while urban areas land at 30%. Access to drinking water is also insufficient, only around half of the population has access (Republique Democratique du Congo, 2015).

Furthermore, the UN has estimated that the DRC has 2.3 million internally displaced persons and another 300,000 nationals that have fled the country (World Bank, 2017c). Armed groups have been active in the eastern provinces of the country and contributing to the large-scale internal displacement (Freedom House, 2017c).

Regarding the climate sector, according to its American embassy, the DRC has been a leader in environmental protection for a long time, by ratifying agreements and keeping a relevant inventory of GHG emissions despite its history of violent conflict (Ministère de l'Environnement et Développement Durable, No Date). The biggest climate risks for the country includes droughts, floods, intense rainfalls and heat waves, pointing to the danger of an overall increase in extreme weather. The DRC has historically been a low-carbon country and it has plenty of natural resources, especially in its forests covering around 152 million ha in 2010, all in need of protection from deforestation and forest degradation which are some of the main causes for GHG emissions (Republique Democratique du Congo, 2015). The rainforests covering parts of the DRC has high levels of biodiversity and is home too many species of plants and animals. As part of the second largest tropical rainforest in the world, it plays an important role for absorbing greenhouse gases as well as supporting people as part of their livelihood (USAID, 2018a). The Land use, Land-Use Change & Forestry (LALUF) sector followed by the agriculture and the waste sectors, are the biggest emitters of CO₂ (UNFCCC, No Date a, p.4).

The Republic of Namibia

Political Context

The Republic of Namibia, hereafter referred to as Namibia, is an upper-middle-income developing country (Republic of Namibia, 2017, p.xiii) with a population of 2.5 million people in 2017. After being a German colony, the country gained independence in 1990 and has therefore not been independent for as long as many other former colonies. Namibia has a multiparty system according to its 1990 constitution, which demands free and fair elections, an independent judicial system and respect of the basic human rights (Nationalencyklopedin, 2018e). It scores 77/100 in the Freedom House Index, which points to the democratic status of the country (Freedom House, 2017d). Though, it is worth noting that the ruling party has won landslide victories in every election since independence. Executive power is held by the president, elected on a five-year basis, and the cabinet nominated by the president which consists of the prime minister and ministers chosen from the National Assembly (Nationalencyklopedin, 2018e).

There are socio-economic inequalities present in the country and they are inherited from the years when it was run under an apartheid system (World Bank, 2017d) but there are protections in place for civil and political rights, despite some accusations of discrimination and marginalization of minority ethnic groups and criminalization of same-sex sexual relations as well as some legislative discrimination against women (Freedom House, 2017d).

Economic Overview

Namibia has enjoyed both political and macroeconomic stability for a significant amount of time (Republic of Namibia, 2017, p.xiii), and this long-term political stability coupled with well-functioning economic management has provided a stable base for reduction of poverty and have made it an middle-income country (World Bank, 2017d). The economy is also closely tied to South Africa, with whom the country has had good relations, for example when South Africa cancelled all of Namibia's debts in 1996 (Nationalencyklopedin, 2018e).

Resulting from its colonial background, Namibia has gained an export-focused economy and half of the country's export revenues comes from the export of diamonds (Nationalencyklopedin, 2018e). Mining and quarrying is the highest primary industry contributor to the GDP with 12.4% in 2007, followed up by the agriculture and forestry

sector. However, Namibia also has some of the most productive fishing waters in the world, due to its proximity to the Benguela current (Republic of Namibia, 2015b, p.2). 2016 saw a substantial slowdown in economic growth, it was limited to a modest growth of 1.2% compared with the previous five years which saw an average of more than 5% growth. The negative effects were felt across sectors and caused a cut in public sector spending, but this is addressed through a process of fiscal consolidation and economic activity is expected to recover in the medium-term (World Bank, 2017d).

Development Level

Despite the overall stable economic growth, unemployment has not seen any significant reductions which continues to strengthen the inequality in one of the most unequal countries in the world (Republic of Namibia, 2017, p.xiii). Namibia has one of the most inequitable income distributions in the world. More than half of the population relies on subsistence farming as a livelihood and are highly sensitive to droughts which can cause food shortages (Republic of Namibia, 2015a, p.13).

In the Human Rights Index presented by the UNDP, Namibia scores 0,640 out of 1, landing it on a rank of 125 (UNDP, No Date b). The country has a high climate variability and is the driest in sub-Saharan Africa. It is not uncommon with drought and variable rainfall patterns (Republic of Namibia, p.5), meaning water scarcity is the major limiting factor for development in Namibia. Only 1% of all precipitation reaches and recharges the groundwater, most of the rest is lost through evaporation and as Namibia relies heavily on groundwater as their source of potable water, this is a serious issue (Republic of Namibia, 2015b, p.2). The prevalence of HIV is also a significant problem for the nation, reaching levels of 16.9% in 2014 (Republic of Namibia, 2017, p.xiii).

By incorporating environmental protection into its constitution, and being the first nation to do so, Namibia has shown commitment to combatting climate change and environmental degradation (Republic of Namibia, 2017, p.xiii). The country has unique biodiversity and its fragile ecosystem stands a high risk of being destabilized by climate change. The Agriculture, Forestry and Land-use (AFOLU) sector is among the highest emitters in the country, as a result of deforestation, use of fuelwood and more. In 2010, 33% of the electricity production came from renewable sources (Republic of Namibia, 2015a, pp.7-9 & 13).

In the period 2000 to 2010, the country was a net sink of GHG, but the capacity has greatly decreased. Net per capita removals changed from 10 to 0.6 Gg CO₂-eq over the same time

period. The government recognizes that climate change affects all socio-economic development sections and collaborates within all ministries and departments to implement activities to counteract the negative environmental changes (Republic of Namibia, 2015a, pp. 12 & 16)

The Republic of South Africa

Political context

The Republic of South Africa, hereafter referred as South Africa, is according to its constitution, a democracy (Freedom House, 2018c) and had a population of 56.5 million inhabitants in 2017. The country has experienced two long periods of colonialism, first with the Netherlands and later with the British Empire. Afterwards, it was divided by the apartheid system from 1948 to 1994 (Nationalencyklopedin, 2018c). The political transition that ensued has come to be recognized as one of the most extraordinary and peaceful political events in the last century (World Bank, 2017e). Since apartheid ended, the country has been a leader in Africa and a proponent for human rights. However, poverty remains common and the ruling party African National Congress has been accused of corrupt practices to remain in power as its public support is dwindling (Freedom House, 2018e). Despite South Africa's work to decrease poverty and inequality, which started when the African National Congress first took office, the society remains divided. Parts of the population, mainly white people, are living in high standards, while the rest are situated in rural areas, suburbs and shanty towns (Nationalencyklopedin, 2018c).

The president, who is chosen by the parliament on five-year basis and can be re-elected once, is both head of state and head of government (Nationalencyklopedin, 2018f), a position held up until recently by Jacob Zuma. He has been at the centre of countless corruption scandals and narrowly survived a fourth vote of no confidence which took place recently and was conducted by secret ballot (Freedom House, 2018c). In December, the vice-president of the country, Cyril Ramaphosa, was elected as the new president of the ANC and more recently president of the country after Zuma's resignation (Freedom House, 2018c). On top of this, the ANC has been losing some of its foothold in recent elections, for example in 2014 the opposition party Democratic Alliance managed to get 22% of the votes (Nationalencyklopedin, 2018f).

Overall, South Africa is considered a stable democracy with protections in place for civil

and political liberties, thus earning a score of 78/100 in the 2018 Freedom House Index (Freedom House, 2018c). Some issues that have arisen include harsh treatment of protesters and land reform. Protesters and strikers have been harshly treated, for example 34 striking miners were shot in 2012 by the police (Nationalencyklopedin, 2018f), and land reform has been a hot topic as the public have been displeased with the government who have failed to keep their promise of assigning 30% of arable land to the black population by 2014 (Nationalencyklopedin, 2018f).

Economic overview

South Africa has the largest economy in all of Africa (Department of Environmental Affairs, 2017, p.9) and enjoys significant industrial and economic power within the continent with its well-developed mining, manufacturing, tourism and transport sectors. Among other things, it exports energy, food and telecommunications to its neighbors (Department of Environmental Affairs, 2011, p.1). South Africa has had consistent and sound economic policies (World Bank, 2017e) and the trade and industry of South Africa is characterized by a well-developed infrastructure, a sophisticated banking system and good communications.

There are extreme differences between this modern, urban sector and the traditional sector however, which points further to the socio-economic gaps (Nationalencyklopedin, 2018f). South Africa's poorest 20% consume as little as 3% of total expenditure, whereas the wealthiest 20% consume up to 65% (World Bank, 2017e). The South African economy contributes towards aggravating the development situation, partly by consolidating the already severe inequalities among the citizens and partly by increasing the emissions intensity through the commodity production in the country, which somewhat lacks sustainability (Department of Environmental Affairs, 2017, p.9). The latest four years have seen a contraction of per capita GDP, mainly due to a plunge in commodity prices and domestic problems such as policy uncertainty and weak investment sentiment (World Bank, 2017e).

Development level

The decrease in poverty has been significant since the transition to democracy in 1994, mainly due to social safety nets and real income growth, but the reduction is slowing. Over a five-year period, between 2011 and 2016, poverty only sank marginally from 16.6% to 15.9%. Structural challenges and weak global growth are contributors to this stagnation (World Bank,

2017e). Roughly 20% of the population lives in extreme poverty (Department of Environmental Affairs, 2017, p.9) and the country has high levels of unemployment, currently around 26%, with a concentration among youth where it is almost 50% (World Bank, 2017e). Furthermore, South Africa is currently facing acute energy deficiencies, as a result of relying on old and inefficient coal-fired power plants, which in turn hinders economic development (South Africa, 2015, pp. 1-2). South Africa has an electricity emissions intensity above the global average due to the dominance of coal which made up 94% of the electricity sector (Climate Action Tracker, 2016). The National Development Plan of South Africa sets out the goal of providing access to electricity to poor household while reducing emission per unit of power substantially. The government also aims to provide all citizens with access to clean, running water. A decrease in water and food availability will also have consequences for conflict levels and patterns of migration, with a disproportionate impact on the poor (Republic of South Africa, 2018, pp. 23-4).

South Africa is both a major contributor and vulnerable to climate change and its effects (Republic of South Africa, 2018, p. 23) and total GHG emissions in South Africa has increased by 21.7% between 2000 and 2012 (Department of Environmental Affairs, 2011, p.31). The impacts of climate change in South Africa are likely to be temperature increases, an increase in natural disasters and irregularities in the precipitation patterns, which in turn will affect people's livelihood and the availability of freshwater (UNFCCC, No Date c). South Africa is attempting to pursue sustainable development and has the opportunity to be an international leader in the efforts to mitigate carbon emissions, because of its already prominent status among African countries (USAID, 2018b). The South African government has invested approximately USD 11.7 billion in grants to help fund climate change programmes (Department of Environmental Affairs, 2017, p.12) and has established a process where the vulnerabilities of ecosystems and biodiversity is considered in both decision-making and land-use planning (UNFCCC, No Date c).

The Republic of Zimbabwe

Political context

The Republic of Zimbabwe, hereafter referred to as Zimbabwe, gained its independence from Great Britain in 1980 and is according its constitution a democratic, parliamentary republic

but has in effect been a restrictive one-party state. The role of prime minister was abolished for a long time, meaning the president also was the head of government. However, the role was reinstated and given to the leader of the opposition party after violent protests followed the most recent parliamentary elections (Nationalencyklopedin, 2018g). Since independence, politics in Zimbabwe has been dominated by Robert Mugabe and his party, the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front. This domination has partly been carried out through regular, violent crackdowns on oppositional politicians, dissenters and critical media outlets (Freedom House, 2018d)

The ZANU-PF has in recent years fragmented, as several politicians has moved in position to succeed Mugabe as president and finally in 2017, Mugabe was forcefully removed from the presidency through a military intervention and replaced by the country's vice president Emmerson Mnangagwa, who promised elections would be held as planned in 2018. After the removal of Mugabe, numerous high-profile figures supporting Mugabe were arrested and detained without being told the charges against them (Freedom House, 2018d)

Because of this forcefully compelled resignation of the elected Mugabe by the military, Zimbabwe's score on the Freedom House Index decreased from 32/100 in 2017 to 30/100, pushing the country from the Partly Free to the Not Free category (Freedom House 2018f; Freedom House 2017f). Furthermore, none of the elections held in the 21st century could be described as free and fair ones when rigging of elections, threats and violence have been common measures from the authorities in order to affect the result of the elections (Nationalencyklopedin, 2018g).

Economic overview

The economy in Zimbabwe was paralysed by a cash crisis which left the government unable to pay much of the employed civil servants for a long period. The crisis also forced banks to limit cash withdrawals (Freedom House, 2017e). Zimbabwe's economic growth was minimal in 2016, only reaching 0.7%, but is due to recover in coming years following a decent rain season in 2017 which boosted the agricultural sector (World Bank, 2017d). The country also experienced hyperinflation in 2008 which led to a necessary shift to a multicurrency regime which since has introduced some macroeconomic stability and economic growth to the country. The economic crisis caused many grievances and provoked protests, which garnered harsh responses by the authorities, including violent dispersions of protesters and hundreds of arrests as well as allegations of threats, abductions and torture (Freedom House, 2017e)

Decades of reduction in the economy has produced an unfavourable policy environment and an economy sensitive to external shocks (World Bank, 2017f) and rampant corruption and ineffective land-reform policies continue to hamper economic recovery and growth (Freedom House, 2017e). The necessary conditions for poverty reduction and economic growth are present within the country, for example its natural resources and its relatively skilled human resources, provided the political fragility is addressed and consensus around investment policies is reached (World Bank, 2017f).

Zimbabwe has seen some isolation from the international community and has built up arrears to several bi- and multilateral partners. There are ongoing attempts to clear these debts to be able to gain assistance from international institutions, but the recent economic slowdown and financial sector fragility has complicated this work (World Bank, 2017f).

Development level

From 2000 to 2008, the country suffered from economic crises which almost halved the GDP. Poverty saw an increase to almost 72% and extreme poverty affected a fifth of the population, (World Bank, 2017f) which reached 16.6 million inhabitants in 2017 (Nationalencyklopedin, 2018g). Meanwhile, health and education services largely collapsed. During this time, in 2001, the Human Development Index ranked Zimbabwe as number 173 out of 187 countries (World Bank, 2017f). More recently, the country scored 0,516 in the HDI which gave it a rank of 154, pointing to a clear socio-economic improvement (UNDP, No Date b).

Social services have also recovered, as seen for example in the HIV prevalence which is down from 40% in 1998 to around 15% since 2014. The maternal mortality has also declined from 960 to 614 deaths per 100,000, in 2011 and 2014 respectively. However, despite these improvements, Zimbabwe failed to accomplish a number of the global targets set out in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which ended in 2015 (World Bank, 2017). The UN has developed a strategic programme framework which aims to support the 2013-2018 Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation and help the country achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and other development commitments. This strategy is called the 2016-2020 Zimbabwe United Nations Development Assistance Framework (ZUNDAF) (United Nations Zimbabwe, 2016)

The country is located in the Southern subtropics and is especially vulnerable to the levels of rainfall, which determines its seasons and small changes can affect all ecosystems and

socio-economic factors. 45% of Zimbabwe's total land area is covered by forests, this together with the relatively low emissions of the country makes it a net carbon sink. Most of Zimbabwe's major sectors of the economy, such as agriculture, forestry and tourism, are highly vulnerable to climate change. Agriculture constitutes between 15 to 20% of the GDP and is highly dependent on rainfall, making it extra sensitive for any environmental changes (Zimbabwe, 2015, p.2). Furthermore, the agriculture sector is a dual system, divided into two distinct sections. One large-scale sector with a commercial aim, most often privately owned, and one communal sector which consists mainly of subsistence farming, often in regions with little rainfall and poor soils (UNFCCC, No Date d).

The energy sector is the one of the biggest emitters, but plans are underway for a turn to renewable sources (Zimbabwe, 2015, p3). There is a growing demand for energy and the local supply does not meet this increasing demand, forcing Zimbabwe to import from its neighbours. Because of the methods used when engaging in mining activities, some serious environmental problems have been caused (Ministry of Environment, Water and Climate, 2016, p. vii).

Zimbabwe's constitution from 2013 stipulates that all citizens have environmental rights which include a non-harmful environment; protection of the environment for present and future generations; prevention of environmental degradation; and, promotion of ecologically sustainable development. The constitution also holds the state responsible for legislative and other measures to achieve the rights previously set out (Zimbabwe, 2015, p.1). The country has also set aside roughly 12% of all land area for National Parks and Wildlife Estates. However, climate change awareness in Zimbabwe remains low, which negatively affects reporting and implementation of initiatives relating to mitigation and adaptation (Ministry of Environment, Water and Climate, 2016, pp. viii-xviii).

Appendix B - Policies and projects

For this section, the policies and projects relating to the INDCs of all the countries in question will be presented with the aim of determining if the countries are implementing or attempting to implement the actions and activities identified in each of the countries' INDC. There will be a summary for each country which will include projects from a number of different funds and international organisations as well as any policies or strategies that are deemed necessary for a sufficient overlook. Additionally, there will be a summary of the civil society, NGO and private sector participation in each country.

The Republic of Angola

Angola provided their latest National Communication to the UNFCCC in 2012. This document provides a summary of the Angolan Development Strategy for 2025, which in its original form is in Portuguese. Angola also has a NAPA submitted in 2011 (UNFCCC, 2018e) but does not have any submitted NAMAs (UNFCCC, No Date f). The national strategy's objective is to build a more just and equitable society which promotes the sustainable use of natural resources. There will be a focus on employment and the value of human resources with the goal of building competitiveness and developing the private sector. The National Strategy is amongst other things said to include a National Technical Capacity Reinforcement program and a National Rural and Urban Mobility Program as well as programs regarding waste and energy (Houngo, Abias et al, 2012, pp.21 & 25). The energy section of the strategy endeavours to expand the electricity network of Angola while focusing on rural electrification through grid extension and smaller isolated systems such as the 'Solar village' initiative.

The key options for increasing the electricity supply in Angola is the hydro, thermal and renewable options. Plans for new large hydropower plants have been developed, with awareness of their impact on the territory and climate, and some expansion to hydropower section has already been completed (Angola Energy 2025, 2018b). The expansion of the Cambambe Hydroelectric power plant, which was mentioned in Angola's INDC section above, was according to a news article from the Angola Press News Agency opened in June 2017, thus adding 700 megawatts worth of power generation (ANGOP, 2017). Plans for thermal energy has also been developed and several sites have been assessed for possible

projects. Additionally, the Government has approved the National Strategy for New Renewable Energies which aims to produce 800 MW, 100 of which will come from wind energy. The Tombwa wind project, mentioned in the INDC section above, has been limited and two medium-sized projects have been planned instead. They will be built close to the main network, near the cities of Cuanza Norte and Lubango. To be able to achieve the energy vision in the period 2018-2025, investments of USD 23 billion is required from public and private investments (Angola Energy 2025, 2018a; Angola Energy 2025, 2018b).

Angola has 39 funded projects from the Global Environment Facility, 24 of which are regional. The national projects cover several focal areas, including climate change, land degradation and biodiversity, and their start dates range from 2003 to 2018. Within the climate change area most of the projects focus on adaptation, for example, two projects initiated in 2013 and 2014 covers this. One is ‘Promoting Climate-resilient Development and Enhanced Adaptive Capacity to Withstand Disaster Risks in Angola’s Cuvelai River Basin’ and the other is ‘Addressing Urgent Coastal Adaptation Needs and Capacity Gaps in Angola. There is also an ongoing project from 2013 which attempts to integrate climate change into sustainable land management practices and one project from 2018 which is promoting sustainable energy access for rural communities. There are quite a few projects initiated in 2018, one in land degradation, which target landscapes in the southwestern region of Angola and provides them with sustainable land management, and two in the biodiversity sector which covers the fight against the illegal wildlife trade and the creation of marine protected areas (Global Environment Facility, 2018a.)

Angola has a number of programs together with FAO, eight trust fund projects and three projects through the Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP). Most of the trust fund projects span over the 2014-2021 period and focus on agriculture, resilience and adaptation, examples of projects are ‘Integrating Climate Resilience into Agricultural and Agropastoral Production’ and ‘Building resilience of vulnerable and drought affected communities in Huila Province’. The three Technical Cooperation Programme projects span over a period between 2016-2018 and provides technical expertise and know-how (FAO 2018a; FAO 2018b).

The World Bank has mostly focused on supporting smallholder farmers by improving their access to knowledge, technology and other capacity-building skills. It has focused on development of the rural economy; therefore, it does not have any climate-focused projects, but might induce positive effects on resilience as byproduct (World Bank, 2017a).

The EU commission has provided funding for a number of projects in Angola, most of them focusing on development, governance and capacity-building. However, it has had some

projects in the climate area, including the ‘Monitoring for Environment and Security in Africa (SADC-THEMA): Agricultural and environmental resource management (European Commission, 2018b)’ which was finished in 2017 and the ‘National biodiversity project: Conservation of Iona National Park’ which is due to wrap up in 2018 (European Commission, 2018c). There is information regarding how much money the EU is contracted to spend but the only mentioned results on the EU commission website is that 5 000 ha of coastal forests have been covered by the inventory of species (European Commission, 2018a).

The African Development Bank has had an ongoing project in Angola since 2010, which provides support to the environment sector through the strengthening of environmental governance and legislation as well as the provision of institutional capacity building (African Development Bank Group, 2018a). Angola mentions REDD+ projects as an important contribution in the country’s INDC (Republic of Angola, 2015, p.3), however, there are no REDD+ projects submitted to the UNFCCC registry (UNFCCC: REDD+, 2018a). USAID has also been involved in Angola’s efforts, for example by training local staff in how to manage disaster response and risk reduction efforts (USAID, 2016).

From the rest of the organisations and funds mentioned above, there is little or no information available, for example there is no TEP (UNFCCC, 2015) and the CTCN does not have any projects in the country (Climate Technology Centre & Network, No date.).

The NGO and private sector participation is somewhat lacking in Angola, the Trickle Out Project has 9 companies and NGOs listed as engaged in environmental activities (Trickle out). DW Angola is one of the oldest NGOs in Angola which has been active since 1981. It has been active in many development areas and is currently acting for sustainability and against climate change (Development Workshop, 2018).

There are no initiatives submitted to NAZCA (Global Climate Action, No Date b), but there is one NWP which is submitted by an energy consulting firm called Ecoprogresso (UNFCCC, No Date g). Other environmentally focused companies include Angola Resources Consultants LDA, EcoTur Angola and Solar Cookers for Africa, which have all been identified by the Trickle Out Project (Trickle Out Africa, 2015b)

The Republic of Botswana

Botswana has a National Development Plan spanning from 2017 to 2023 which aims at achieving sustainable development in the country. The document covers most development sectors and has a section on the environment and climate change. It consists, inter alia, of

several programmes which are important for this essay which are the Environmental Protection Programme, Chemicals and Waste Management Programme, Clean Water and Sanitation Programme and the Renewable Energy Programme. To give a sense of what these programmes entail, some examples will now be presented. The Environmental Protection Programme put a focus on mainstreaming climate change in relation to both mitigating and adaptation and promotes environmental awareness and education, trying to engage the citizens, businesses and NGOs in environmentally friendly actions. The energy programmes partly promote efficient energy use and install small scale off-grid and grid connected solar technologies in the country

The NDP brings up some issues faced in the previous Development Plan, which include poor environmental management and practises in the construction sector and the lack of overarching legislation in the sustainable environment sector. However, the current plan is attempting to ensure all government sectors adopt eco-friendly practises and using all resources efficiently. To successfully implement all programmes and plan identified the government will engage stakeholders, such as civil society, development partners and the private sector. The government will also access global financing possibilities such as the GEF. As of now, the government has inadequate resources to face the impacts of climate change (Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, 2016, p. 133-148).

Botswana has had a total of 51 projects funded from the GEF, 28 of them are regional and 23 are national. The national projects are the most interesting for this essay and in Botswana they address biodiversity, chemicals and waste, Persistent Organic Polluters (POPs), international waters, climate change and land degradation. The inception phase of these projects stretches from 2001 to 2015, with the majority being implemented before 2010, which means there are no recent projects from after the submission of the INDC. However, many of the older projects are still active.

Within biodiversity, projects include the 'Improved Management Effectiveness of the Chobe-Kwando-Linyanti Matrix of Protected Areas' inaugurated in 2012, and a 2015 programme aiming at improving human-animal interference and deterring poaching. Examples of climate change projects are the closed projects 'Renewable Energy-Based Rural Electrification Programme' and 'Incorporating Non-Motorized Transport Facilities in the City of Gaborone' as well as two policy-oriented projects from 1995 and 2015 which assist Botswana with their responsibilities towards the UNFCCC. A water management and efficiency project which finished in 2012 and a sustainable land management project started in 2014 fall under the land degradation focal area (Global Environment Facility, 2018b).

Botswana has 3 projects in collaboration with FAO, one trust fund project and two TCP projects. The trust fund project relates to the decontamination of soils and the TCP projects address agriculture and food security, which relates to climate change adaptation (FAO, 2018c). The World Bank has contributed to the development work in several areas. Within the energy sector, the WB provided credit for the development of low-carbon energy alternatives and for an electricity generation project. Moreover, the WB provided funding for the Northern Botswana Human Wildlife Coexistence Project (World bank, 2017b). Since 2015, the World Bank has been involved in one project primarily relating to the environment. The 2017-2021 Emergency Water Security and Efficiency Project, which relates to adaptation measures counteracting droughts, is under implementation together with the Australian government (World Bank, 2018a).

The EU Commission has two projects relating to climate and environment in Botswana, the SADC-THEMA as mentioned in Angola's section above, and the 'Securing Rights and Restoring Lands for Improved Livelihoods' project which aims at providing livelihoods and thus increases resilience (European Commission, 2018d). USAID has been involved in the forest management of Botswana by supporting Forest Conservation Botswana, which is a collaboration with the Botswanan Government that provides grants for local NGO's to engage in forest conservation work. Additionally, USAID has a regional Southern African programme which promotes positive environmental practices (USAID, 2018c).

CTCN has one active project, it is a regional project which was started in 2016. It concerns the 'Development of a Regional Efficient Appliance and Equipment Strategy in Southern Africa' and is expected to promote relevant energy efficient products and enhance energy productivity and possibilities for the region by 2030 (Climate Technology Centre & Network, No date). Botswana has one TEP project which entails livestock research and development, this relates mostly to agricultural development and not climate change which makes it somewhat unfitting for this essay (UNFCCC, 2015).

As an example of missing policies and institutions without commitment in Botswana, Botswana does not have any NAMAs and no NAPA (UNFCCC No Date h; UNFCCC, 2018e) and the African Development Bank does not have any projects strictly relating to climate change in Botswana (African Development Bank Group, 2018b).

When it comes to the NGO and private sector involvement, Botswana enjoys considerable commitment. The Trickle Out Project identifies 66 non-profit organizations and businesses engaged in environmentally friendly activities, such as ecotourism, conservation and biodiversity promotion. Examples of NGOs are the Khama Rhino Sanctuary, Elephants

Without Borders and BirdLife Botswana. Engaged businesses include, but are not limited to, Geo Pollution Technologies, Solar International Botswana and Gendarme Santation Pty Ltd (Trickle Out Africa, 2015b). Additionally, there is a website which identifies some 20 different Environmental NGOs (NGO Environment Botswana, 2000). The site is managed by Kalahari Conservation Society which is one of the oldest NGOs in Botswana (Kalahari Conservation Society, No Date). In NAZCA, the climate action tracker, one project is identified. It is a cooperative initiative where the Botswana Railways have partnered up with other companies to produce low-carbon, sustainable transport by train (Global Climate Action, No Date c)

The Democratic Republic of Congo

A National Development Plan could not be located for this essay, but the National Communication identifies several goals and areas of interest within sustainable environmental management. It prioritizes land and forests, biodiversity and waste management, and amongst other things proposes a technological reinforcement project and environmental information, training and education (UNFCCC, No Date a). The DRC has a NAPA from 2006 (UNFCCC, 2018e) but does not have any NAMAs (UNFCCC, No Date j).

The DRC has 69 projects through the GEF spanning over a period between 1996 and 2018, where five were started after 2015 and four of those were started in 2018. The projects are evenly spread over the period and targets areas such as support for women, improved resilience and forestry (Global Environment Facility, 2018c). As the DRC is forest-covered, it is the only country in the thesis to have a project via the REDD+ platform and with it comes an investment plan that covers the period 2015-2020. It identifies eight sectors for intervention which are agriculture, fuelwood, forests, hydrocarbon resources and infrastructure, land use planning, land tenure, demographics and governance. These sectors will be implemented into various types of programmes including: sectoral activities, which address the causes of deforestation; enabling activities, which aims to create favourable conditions for the implementation of the sectoral activities; and national level activities, which focus on policies, research and planning (Democratic Republic of Congo, 2015, p.10). Funding for the REDD+ projects will partly come from the Central African Forest Initiative (CAFI). Any activities completed through CAFI will be performed with a respect of all involved stakeholders, such as local and indigenous people, and will promote gender equality.

The actions will also be consistent with the DRC's INDC. CAFI has decided in 2016 that a minimum of USD 200 million will be allocated to the implementation of the REDD+ framework strategy, starting in 2018 (CAFI, No Date, p.2-6).

FAO has some 20 projects in the DRC, 5 of which are Technical Cooperation Programme projects and 15 of which are trust fund projects, spanning over the period between 2016 and 2021. The trust fund projects target areas such as food security, forest management, support of smallholder farmers, diversification of livelihoods for resilience and support of south-south cooperation with China (FAO, 2018d).

The World Bank has had plenty of projects relating to the environment in the DRC, most of them started before 2015 but many of them are still active. Two examples of projects started after 2015 include the 'Strengthening Hydro-Meteorological and Climate Services' which was approved in 2017 and the 'Forest Dependent Communities Support Project' which started in 2016 (World Bank, 2018b). The EU commission is involved a few management and preparation projects in the DRC, also relating to forestry. The regional SADC-THEMA was implemented in the DRC as well (European Commission, 2018e.). USAID is also involved in the forest management sector and helps communities and the government plan for the sustainable usage of the land. They have satellite remote sensing technology which helps scientists and governments along with the local communities to understand the changes that are being caused by human activity (USAID, 2018d).

The DRC does not have a TEP (UNFCCC, 2015), however, the African Development Bank has a number of projects in the country which relates to climate change, some are in the energy sector, such as the rural electrification project, and some are the forestry sector, such as the deforestation reduction and poverty alleviation project in the Virunga-Hoyo region (African Development Bank Group, 2018c.).

The NGO and private sector presence is not overwhelming, but there are some big international organisations such as the WWF (WWF, 2017) and a number of smaller, local ones present in the country. The Trickle Out identifies 22 NGOs and companies engaged in the provision of some sort of environmental goods or services. Most of the 22 enterprises are NGOs, examples include Action pour la protection de l'environnement et du développement agricole et culturel des cataractes, Centre de Developpment Integre des Communautes de Base, Earth Action Congo and Femme et environnement. There are very few enterprises, and the ones that are present are mostly engaged in ecotourism, such as Katona Tours and Travel (Trickle Out Africa, 2015b).

The DRC has 4 registered initiatives in the NAZCA, including the the low-carbon train challenge and participation in a Compact of Mayors which focuses on GHG reductions and resilience (Global Climate Action, No Date d). The country has one registered NWP action, which is the African Women Network for Sustainable Development (UNFCCC, No Date i).

The Republic of Namibia

The country is currently implementing its fifth NDP which will be operating until 2022. It sets out a goal of achieving rapid industrialization while adhering to environmental sustainability and good governance. The environmental goal of the plan is to promote sustainable management and utilization of natural resources and the environment. Furthermore, the NDP recognizes that the development of the country should be a bottom-up exercise and should engage partners, stakeholders, civic organisations and the international community. The government is committed to providing effective service delivery to its people and will therefore need to engage in prudent and accountable practices (Republic of Namibia, 2017, p.xiii-xiv). Namibia does not have a submitted NAPA but does have one NAMA submitted for implementation, it aims to improve rural development in Namibia by electrifying communities through renewable energy sources and has received support (UNFCCC. No Date k; UNFCCC, 2018e).

The country also has its own fund called the Environmental Investment Fund of Namibia. It began operations in 2011 and aims as to be a sustainable source of funding for environmentally sustainable projects from both private and public-sector organisations aiming to develop green technology, improve resource management or develop low-carbon projects (Green Climate Fund, No Date c).

Namibia has had a lot of projects with funding from the GEF over the last two decades, with start dates spanning from 1999-2018. There is a total of 66 projects and the majority were started before 2015, however, many are still ongoing. 34 of the projects are regional and the rest are national projects focused on the areas of biodiversity, land degradation, climate change and POPs. 11 of the projects are biodiversity oriented, such as the ‘Namibian Coast Conservation and Management Project’ which was active from 2012 to 2015 and the project ‘Strengthening the Capacity of the Protected Area System to Address New Management Challenges’ which started in 2012 and is still ongoing. The climate change focal area has seen the largest number of projects which range from assisting the creation of National Communications and Biennial Update Reports to solar power technology transfer and

community resilience-building with a focus on women children. Land degradation projects include the ongoing ‘Sustainable Management of Namibia’s Forested Lands’ project and the recently inaugurated ‘Namibia Integrated Landscape Approach for Enhancing Livelihoods and Environmental Governance to Eradicate Poverty’ (Global Environment Facility, 2018d). Namibia also has a number of projects with the Green Climate Fund aiming at agriculture and resource management. One project focuses on resilient agriculture in three vulnerable regions (Green Climate Fund, No Date a) and another on ecosystem management skills for smallholder farmers experiencing the adverse effects of climate change (Green Climate Fund, No Date a)

Two Namibian projects are funded through the Adaptation Fund, one is a ‘Technical Assistance Grant for ESP and Gender’ (Adaptation fund, 2018a) and the other is pilot project for introducing the usage of desalination plants powered by renewable energy. The latter project was approved in 2017 and will span for 4 years, with a budget of almost USD 5 million (Adaptation fund, 2018b). The country has three projects in collaboration with FAO, one through the TCP and two through the trust fund. The two trust fund projects are currently being implemented and aims at improving the capacity of farmers to adapt to climate change and to better water accessibility in drought affected regions (FAO, 2018e). The EU Commission supports some of FAO’s projects in the country and the SADC-THEMA project as mentioned above (European Commission, 2018f).

Namibia has three technical assistance projects from CTCN which are engaged in technology transfer (Climate Technology Centre & Network, No date), for example in the regional strategy for efficient appliances and equipment. The country also has two TEPs, one focusing on ‘Private-sector participation in drafting the national rangeland management policy and strategy’ and the other ‘Community-based rangeland and livestock management programme’ (UNFCCC, 2015).

The World Bank only has a few environmental projects in Namibia, but they have all been closed before 2012, which means they are not relevant for this thesis (World Bank, 2018c) and the African Development Bank does not have any suitable climate change related projects in Namibia either (African Development Bank Group, 2018d).

The NGO and private sector engagement is tangible in country and there are plenty of active enterprises. Most of the non-profit organisations are targeting conservation and biodiversity issues, e.g. the Namibian Association of Community Based Natural Resource Management Support Organisations which consists of 8 NGOs engaged in sustainable resource management activities (NASCO, 2018) and Team Namibia which promotes

sustainable growth in the country (Team Namibia, No Date). In addition, the Trickle Out Project identifies 119 enterprises engaged in environmental work. NGOs found there include the Coastal Environmental Trust of Namibia, the Clay House Project and the Bicycling Empowerment Network Namibia while the business section partly consist of the Bumhill Campsite (ecotourism) and CCF Bushblok which produces sustainable wood fuel briquettes (Trickle Out Africa, 2015b). Namibia also has one NWP action pledge regarding community-based adaptation and 4 NAZCA commitments which focus on resilience and renewable energy (Global Climate Action, No Date e).

The Republic of South Africa

South Africa has a long-term NDP which aims to eliminate poverty and reduce inequality by 2030. The plan identifies a number broad goals which will help accomplish this and they are capacity-building, the growth of an inclusive economy, engaging its people and promoting partnerships throughout the South African society (Republic of South Africa, 2018). There is also a South African National Climate Change Response, the two main objectives of which are to effectively manage any climate change impacts facing the country and to make a reasonable and fair contribution to the global effort of reducing GHG emissions. The key mitigation elements will be the adoption of a flexible and cost-effective carbon budget approach, the requirement of emissions reductions in companies and economic sectors, implementing a variety of mitigation actions and policies as well as promoting a green economy. The response identifies the need to mobilise financial, human and knowledge resources and the intention of using existing instruments to develop new ones (Republic of South Africa, No Date, p. 5-7). While discussing policies, it is worth noting South Africa has no NAMAs and no NAPA (UNFCCC, No Date m; UNFCCC, 2018e).

The Department of Environmental Affairs of the South African Government has a 42 projects and programmes engaged in environmental activities. Some of these are the Youth Environmental Services Programme, Transfrontier Conservation Areas, Business and Biodiversity in South Africa, Green Economy for Sustainable Development, the Biomass Energy project and Environment Sector Gender Mainstreaming (Department of Environmental Affairs, 2018). USAID supports South Africa in their emerging leader role for promoting climate resilience and carbon emission reductions, helping them to pursue climate-

friendly development. USAID partners with both the government and civil society to create education and training programmes (USAID, 2018e)

The GEF has a large number of projects in South Africa, a total of 103 projects which are evenly disbursed over two decades (1998-2018). 53 of them are regional and the rest are national. A considerable number of the projects are closed but the majority are still ongoing. As previously mentioned for the other countries, the project areas include biodiversity, chemicals and waste, climate change and land degradation. South Africa has plenty of projects starting after 2015 and they cover biodiversity benefits, environmentally sound waste management, procurement of independent power producers, a capacity building programme and sustainable land management (Global Environment Facility, 2018e).

The Adaptation Fund has three activities in South Africa, including a technical assistance grant, a project which supplies the local level with adaptation grants and a resilience-building project (Adaptation fund, 2018a). FAO does not have any trust fund projects in South Africa but does have two TCP projects spanning between 2016 and 2018, one of which provides technical assistance to smallholder farmers (FAO, 2018f).

Once more, the EU commission has mostly been involved in the aforementioned SADC-THEMA management project but has also contributed to the Ecosystem Partnership Fund (European Commission, 2018g). Beyond this, the Eksom Investment Support Project is the only active World Bank lending operation in South Africa and it is close to reaching its goal, which is to supply the country with a stable, sustainable source of energy (World Bank, 2017e). The only projects relating to climate change from the African Development Bank are energy-related ones, including different power projects and support of the previously mentioned Eksom project (African Development Bank Group, 2018e).

South Africa has 21 TEP projects, which include renewable energy plans, water recycling programmes, biofuels and solar power plants implementation (UNFCCC, 2015), and there are three CTCN technical assistance projects, one of which focuses on GHG emissions reduction in the cement industry (Climate Technology Centre & Network, No date).

Despite all this, the Climate Action Tracker (CAT) rates South Africa's efforts as highly insufficient, as the emission reduction goal of South Africa is identified as weak and that the efforts currently under way have been delayed (Climate Action Tracker, 2017).

South Africa has an enormous number of NGOs and private sector enterprises participating in environmental goods and services. The Trickle Out project lists 762 different ones (Trickle Out Africa, 2015b) and examples of NGOs are Centre for Environmental Rights, WESSA and Groundwork (Centre for Environmental Rights, 2018; WESSA, No Date; Groundwork,

2018). The country also has 245 registered NAZCA commitments and 124 NWP action pledges, covering a multitude of different environment and climate change areas (Global Climate Action, No Date f; UNFCCC, No Date l).

The Republic of Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe has developed a document regarding the future economic and social development of the country by the name of the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio- Economic Transformation. It is primarily an economic blue print but does mention that growth has to be achieved in a sustainable fashion. The agenda mentions some main focal areas which need development work and they are food security, poverty eradication, social services, infrastructure and value addition (Ministry of Environment, Water and Climate, 2016, p.8-12)

There is no NAPA from Zimbabwe (UNFCCC, 2018e) but Zimbabwe has the largest number of NAMAs, there are four of them currently seeking support for preparation. The projects include lighting system optimization, efficient biomass stove development and a national solar water heating programme (UNFCCC, No Date o).

The GEF has funded a total of 42 projects in Zimbabwe, 26 regional and 14 national ones. They reach over a period from 1992 to 2015, which means they have no recently started projects. They cover the same focal areas as previously mentioned GEF projects: biodiversity, climate change, land degradation and POPs. The biodiversity projects emphasize conservation and the strengthening of ecosystems management while the climate change area consists of projects concerning adaptation and the preparation of documents such as the National Communication. Land degradation only has one project which supports Zimbabwe's National Action Programme and Reporting process (Global Environment Facility, 2018f).

FAO has twelve projects in Zimbabwe, three TCPs and nine trust fund projects. The TCPs focuses on management assistance and the trust fund projects cover areas such as resilience and support of smallholder farmers (FAO, 2018g). In addition, The World Bank has several projects in Zimbabwe, which include a National Water project and a biodiversity project (World Bank, 2018d).and the EU commission has been active in the country, by producing 15 000 ha of common land under wildlife management and providing 11 000 households with farming management training (European Commission, 2018h). Along with the SADC-THEMA, the EU has also been involved in the refurbishment of the Kariba Dam, which has provided power to the country for over 50 years (European Commission, 2018i).

The Adaptation fund only has one venture in Zimbabwe, which is a USD 50,000 grant which intends to promote south-south cooperation (Adaptation fund, 2018a.), and one TEP through the Africa Centre for Holistic Management, which targets cropland and grazing management (UNFCCC, 2015). The African Development Bank does not have any suitable, environmental projects in Zimbabwe (KÄLLA).

Lastly, CTCN has a number of technical assistance project in Zimbabwe, both regional and national, and some of them include 'Piloting rapid uptake of industrial energy efficiency and efficient water utilisation in selected sectors in Zimbabwe' and 'Developing a Climate-Smart Agriculture Manual for Agriculture Education in Zimbabwe' (Climate Technology Centre & Network, No date).

The NGO and private situation in Zimbabwe is not overwhelming, but also not non-existent. The Trickle Out project identifies 27 different enterprises, both engaged in not for profit and for profit activities. Examples of NGOs are Nhaka Afrikan Worldview Trust, AWARE Trust, Chibememe Earth Healing Association and ZERO Regional Environment Organisation. Business mostly cover ecotourism, such as the Imbabala Zambezi Safari Lodge, and smaller environmentally friendly business ventures, such as Handmade Papers of Africa (Trickle Out Africa, 2015b).

There are a few NWP action pledges regarding Zimbabwe, for example from UNDP, which has assisted the government in coping with water scarcity and climate change in the Chiredzi District (UNFCCC, No Date n). The NAZCA platform has 4 initiatives which covers resilience, energy efficiency, emissions reductions and renewable energy. An example of a submission is the Africa Clean Energy Corridor Initiative (Global Climate Action, No Date g).