MAKING AND KEEPING PROMISES: REGIME TYPE AND POWER-SHARING PACTS IN PEACE AGREEMENTS
by Anna Jarstad and Desirée Nilsson

Power sharing is increasingly recognized as an important tool for creating sustainable peace in war-torn societies. However, we have limited knowledge concerning why political, territorial, and military power-sharing pacts are reached and implemented. This article addresses this gap by providing a global study examining the signing and implementation of power-sharing pacts in intrastate armed conflicts. We focus on how the type of political regime can influence these choices and theorize about the strategic incentives for warring parties in different types of regimes to sign and implement different pacts. Our large-N analysis is based on data on power-sharing provisions in eighty-three peace accords in forty intrastate armed conflicts between 1989 and 2004. In line with our theoretical expectations, we find that political and military pacts are more likely to be signed in autocracies, whereas territorial pacts are more common in democracies. Somewhat surprisingly, we find no difference in the implementation patterns across regimes.

INTRODUCTION

A critical issue when negotiating an end to civil war is to identify solutions that can provide for sustainable peace so that people that have experienced civil war can live peacefully side by side in countries such as Bosnia, Lebanon, Sudan, and the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland). Power-sharing pacts in peace accords are increasingly recognized as a pivotal tool for creating sustainable peace in war-torn...
societies. However, no study so far has attempted to shed light on the question of why territorial, political, and military power-sharing pacts are reached and implemented. Undertaking such a study is crucial, because without a proper understanding of the conditions under which such arrangements are agreed upon and are put into place, our analyses of how power sharing may contribute to peace will remain incomplete or even flawed.

This article addresses this research gap by examining whether the type of regime matters for the choice of power-sharing pact (territorial, political, or military) in a peace agreement and the degree to which such provisions are implemented. The most well-known type of power sharing is perhaps a political power-sharing pact that provides for a broad coalition government where former enemies are guaranteed political positions. For example, in Liberia, the Accra comprehensive peace agreement reached in 2003 ensured political representation in a transitional government that included the warring parties (the former government and the rebel groups LURD and MODEL), political parties, as well as civil society representatives.

Territorial power-sharing pacts regulate claims on self-government and can result in autonomy solutions, for instance, in Mindanao in the Philippines, the peace accord signed in 1996 stipulated increased autonomy for the Mindanao region. Military power-sharing pacts refer to the integration of combatants into the military command structures and/or national armed forces, and such a military power-sharing pact was part of the peace agreement reached in 1999 to end the civil war in Congo-Brazzaville.

We propose that the type of power-sharing pact and its implementation may differ depending on the type of regime. Political actors in democracies and autocracies are likely to face different strategic incentives for agreeing to certain power-sharing pacts and also for implementing them. We expect actors in democracies to sign and implement territorial pacts to a greater extent than political and military pacts. The reason is that territorial pacts are in keeping with democratic norms, whereas political and military pacts are less so. According to democratic norms, people should have the right to rule themselves, which is in line with providing autonomy or other forms of territorial pacts. In democracies, voters should also have the possibility of holding politicians accountable and removing them in elections. Therefore, guaranteed positions provided for by political pacts are contrary to democratic norms. Likewise, military pacts that
ensure inclusion of former armed groups in the security forces can be seen as a way of rewarding violence, which is contrary to democratic norms.

The incentive structure in authoritarian regimes suggests that the previous warring actors will use any means to stay in power. We thus expect government as well as rebel actors in a dictatorship to reach and implement political pacts as a way of postponing elections, and in the meantime try to keep as much power as possible. For this reason, we anticipate that these actors are reluctant to permanently hand over power to local elites through territorial pacts, and instead implement pacts that do not pose a real threat to their authority, such as symbolic representation in a power-sharing government. Similarly, the former combatants in dictatorships also have incentives to sign military pacts where antagonists are brought into the military corps, which is in line with the patronage system of authoritarian governance. Overall, we expect that the former warring actors in democracies are more likely to follow through on their promises and implement the pacts agreed upon, as the political leaders in democracies are more constrained by public accountability to keep their promises and implement agreements.

For our empirical analysis, we rely on the IMPACT (Implementation of Pacts) data set, which includes information on the implementation of territorial, political, and military power-sharing provisions in eighty-three peace agreements in forty intrastate armed conflicts fought in thirty-eight countries worldwide between 1989 and 2004. The data set builds on previous data collections such as TOPAD (Terms of Peace Agreements Data), which includes information on the content of peace agreements and data on peace agreements and armed conflicts from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. We also use data on regime types from the Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited data set, which provides a binary variable that distinguishes between democracies and autocracies. It relies on a minimalist definition of democracy that focuses on contested elections: democracies are those regimes where contested elections are used to fill the executive and legislative offices. The eighty-three peace accords include in total ninety-eight pacts, and of these, there are thirty-six political pacts, thirty-three territorial pacts, and twenty-nine military pacts, which means that some peace agreements contain several different types of pacts.
In keeping with our theoretical expectations, we find that the warring parties are more likely to sign political pacts and military pacts in autocracies compared with democracies, whereas territorial pacts are more common in democratic states relative to autocratic regimes. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that there is no significant difference in terms of the implementation patterns across regimes. Overall, the former warring parties in democracies and autocracies are about equally likely to implement the pacts they have agreed upon.

PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON POWER-SHARING PACTS

Power sharing has been put forward as an alternative to majority rule and has also increasingly become important to research on governance after civil war. Arend Lijphart’s work is central to research on power sharing. He coined the concept of consociational democracy in 1968 to denote an institutionalized form of democratic conflict management for divided societies, such as in the Netherlands and Switzerland. Lijphart describes consociational democracy as “government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy.” Consociationalism is expected to shape a moderate attitude among the leaders by arrangements to share territorial, political, and military power. Lijphart’s work has given rise to a debate on whether or not consociationalism is the best form of democratic governance in divided societies, or if the alternative vote, for instance, is more suitable. This has also motivated research on civil war endings where it is recognized that warring groups often demand a share of power in order for them to lay down arms. Groups that have recently fought a civil war with the government often do not trust that their well-being is ensured even if a peace agreement is signed. Retaining administrative control over previously occupied territories to preserve a political base should there be negative repercussions of the settlement is one way to retain power. The Dayton agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1995 is such an example, which created a state with two entities, one controlled by the Bosniaks and Croats and one controlled by the Serbs. Participation in the new government regardless of the outcome of elections is another way to ensure power. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, this is ensured by ethnic quotas in all levels of government and a tripartite presidency. Groups are also likely to try to retain military power by, for instance, the formation of a new army combining both government and rebel forces. In this
A strand of research, territorial power sharing is commonly defined in terms consistent with Lijphart’s autonomy criteria, political power sharing corresponds to Lijphart’s grand coalition, and military power sharing builds on Lijphart’s proportionality principle for allocation of positions in the state administration either in accordance with the demographic relations between the former warring groups or overrepresentation of minority groups.

Territorial power sharing seeks to regulate the conflict by devolving some power to local government, like the terms of the 2001 peace agreement for Papua New Guinea which included autonomy for the island of Bougainville. This is a costly concession for the government, as any loss of territorial control can mean a loss in economic gains from extracting natural resources and taxes.

The main function of political power sharing is to reduce the uncertainty of actors in a context of severe distrust and vulnerability. Alexis de Tocqueville described power sharing as a school in democracy, where new political actors are socialized into the game of democracy. The lessons of power sharing have borne mixed results. Elections took place in Burundi 2005 and Comoros 2004 after periods of political power sharing, with peace remaining in place the year after the ballots were cast. However, after the political power-sharing pact was signed in Rwanda in 1994, the Hutu extremists in government feared that they would be excluded from power, and shortly after genocide began.

Military power sharing usually involves integrating the warring parties into a joint army. An example is the Bosnian case where, following the Dayton peace agreement in 1995, the Bosnian and Croat forces completed a merger in 1997. Military power sharing was also an important part of the peace agreement reached by the Philippine government and Moro National Liberation Front in 1996. Four years after the signing, a large number of the soldiers called for in the agreement had been integrated into special and auxiliary units of the armed forces and the national police. The 1992 peace agreement in Mozambique stipulated that the government and RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance) merge their armed forces and form a new national army with equal number of troops from each side.

Turning to the effects of power-sharing provisions in peace accords, a large number of studies have shown that power-sharing pacts in peace agreements may influence the durability of peace, although there is some debate concerning the effectiveness of certain
provisions. Overall, political power-sharing pacts have been found to be somewhat less effective than military and territorial pacts. But some researchers also question whether military power-sharing pacts enhance the prospects for peace. Most of the above studies, however, focus on the mere presence of power-sharing provisions and do not take into account whether the pacts are implemented or not. There are a few exceptions. Matthew Hoddie and Caroline Hartzell focus on the implementation of military power sharing. Based on an analysis of sixteen peace agreements, they find that the prospects for durable peace increase when provisions concerning sharing or dividing military power in peace agreements are implemented. Related, in a sample of comprehensive peace accords, Madhav Joshi et al. find the degree of security provisions to matter for the durability of peace rather than military power sharing as such. Moreover, our findings in previous studies show that while the implementation of territorial and military power-sharing provisions increases the likelihood of peace, implementation of political pacts has no significant effect on peace. We also find that political pacts are implemented to a higher degree, and more quickly, than the other types of pacts. Madhav Joshi and Jason Michael Quinn find that the degree of implementation of a peace agreement—including power-sharing provisions—matters for the durability of peace.

While these studies have added to our knowledge about the effects of power-sharing pacts, not much attention has been paid to why pacts are agreed upon, and the degree to which these are implemented. Regarding the conditions under which power-sharing provisions are signed, Isak Svensson has examined the effect of biased mediators on power-sharing provisions. He finds, for instance, that territorial pacts are more likely if the mediator is biased toward a government, whereas political pacts are more likely if the mediator is biased toward the rebel group. To explain peace implementation, Shanna Kirschner and Jana Von Stein conducted a study of four cases—Angola, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Mozambique. They come to the conclusion that implementation of peace accords is more likely when international support increases and when the balance of military capabilities favors the government side. This study adds to our knowledge about the causes of implementation, but it does not focus specifically on power-sharing provisions. Moreover, while not studying implementation of power sharing per se, Paulina Pospieszna and Gerald Schneider explore how the outcome of the conflict and prewar legacies affect
power-sharing institutions and whether the rebels are given increased power after a conflict. They find that democracies tend to “stick to their pre-war institutional setting” and conflicts ending in a peace agreement are more likely to develop de facto power-sharing arrangements. However, their empirical analysis is limited to democracies and thus does not speak to the issue of autocratic versus democratic political systems as such. We build upon and extend their work by exploring whether the type of political regime—autocratic versus democratic—influences the signing and implementation of power-sharing pacts in peace agreements.

**THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

In this section, we theorize about why the type of power-sharing pact and its implementation may differ depending on the type of regime: specifically, whether the system is democratic or autocratic. There are several important elements that set democracies apart from autocracies, where arguably a key defining feature is the selection of leadership through elections. In line with a large literature on political systems, this article employs such a minimalist definition of democracy. Democratic regimes presuppose altering political majorities by allowing the electorate to choose their rulers. This means that the incentive structures are different in democracies compared with autocracies and that political actors can be expected to act differently depending on the regime type. Thus, when faced with the option of different types of power-sharing solutions, we can expect the former warring actors in democracies and autocracies to have different incentives for agreeing to certain pacts. Both sides in a civil war are influenced by the prevailing political system that they operate within, and depending on the type of political system we can expect that these actors have different strategic incentives for agreeing to certain power-sharing provisions. As pointed out by Pospieszna and Schneider, decision makers have incentives to agree to solutions that allow them to remain or extend their time in power and are likely to stick to the rules that they are used to.

To begin with, territorial pacts should appear as an attractive solution for warring actors in democracies seeking a peace agreement. Such vertical power-sharing arrangements, in the form of decentralization, are common features in democracies. Decentralization is often seen as a way to strengthen democracy by vitalizing local
governance by (re)introducing elected local government.\textsuperscript{31} A territorial pact is thus compatible with elections and can work within the democratic framework in which the parties had previously been operating. To former belligerents within an autocracy, however, territorial pacts can represent a more immediate threat. In particular, the government side is likely to resent any efforts toward regional autonomy, which threatens their exclusive hold on power by ceding direct control over political events in that region.\textsuperscript{32} A territorial pact can even threaten the status of the autocracy at the national level by undermining existing systems of patronage. We therefore expect that in autocratic systems, rebels’ demands for such concessions would likely be met with resistance from the government. This leads to our first hypothesis:

\textbf{H1:} The warring parties are more likely to reach a territorial pact in a democracy.

We furthermore expect the political actors in an autocracy to be more likely to agree to a political pact than those in a democracy. In countries with experience in holding elections, large segments of the population are likely to want an elected government, which is something that the signatories to the agreement have to take into account. While democracies in general tend to include and cooperate with minorities, the situation after a civil war is different. In contrast to a consociational democracy where different democratic actors cooperate in a joint government, power sharing after civil war usually means inclusion of a former rebel group who often retains arms and capabilities for renewed violence. For example, after the Jalalabad peace accord signed in May 1993, which included a political power-sharing deal, the warring factions in Afghanistan soon resumed violence. Under a political power-sharing government, negotiations remain constant between former enemies, and the government may fear that the former rebels will take up arms when disagreements occur. While some political power-sharing pacts are transitional, and intended to be followed by national elections, it is not uncommon that political power sharing provides former rebels with permanent positions in the decision making at the highest political level. Consequently, there is both international and national reluctance to include such groups in government. Therefore, the former warring actors in democracies are likely to refrain from choosing a political power-sharing pact. Such agreements, which invest former warring individuals with shares of
power without an election, can be seen as rewarding violence and pro-
viding impunity for war crimes, which is clearly incompatible with
democratic norms and practices. Should the warring actors in a
democracy still choose such a political power-sharing pact, it is likely
to be a temporary solution with elections to be held after the transi-
tional period is over.

Autocracies are likely to face a very different situation. The gov-
ernment is unlikely to agree to any solution that forces its leaders to
step down and will therefore avoid any efforts toward democratiza-
tion. At the same time, they will face internal and external pressures
to end the war. In such a context, a political power-sharing pact is a
relatively attractive solution for the ruling elite as it provides guaran-
tees for positions in central decision-making bodies and thereby pro-
vides a certain degree of predictability absent in most elections. As
several authors have pointed out, political power sharing is a mecha-
nism that is often used to enhance the longevity of authoritarian
rule. Autocratic leaders need to co-opt potential rivals by offering
credible power-sharing deals that guarantee a share of power to mini-
mize the risk of being overthrown. In exchange for loyalty to the
regime, the opposition receives patronage. The rebels in turn should
have strong incentives for power-sharing pacts, which provide them
with guaranteed influence in the government, as well as access to
funds and resources. In contrast to democratic legitimacy, dictators
strengthen their power base by ensuring that all strong rivals benefit
from supporting the ruler. Hence, political pacts are likely to be seen
as a natural part of authoritarian governance. Based on this, we pro-
pose the following hypothesis:

H2: The warring parties are more likely to reach a political pact
in an autocracy.

Military pacts entail integration of commanders and/or combat-
ants into joint national armed forces. In a democracy, military pacts
are not very likely to be chosen, as this would imply that some of the
individual rebels would remain armed, in contradiction to democratic
norms. In an autocracy, military pacts are expected to be more com-
mon. The incentive structure in an autocratic regime suggests that they
will use any means to stay in power and disregard any principles of
nonviolence. In a military autocracy, the armed forces are key to
power as it constitutes the institution through which rulers govern.
In this way, a military pact is a method to consolidate power by including the antagonists in the military corps while promoting cohesion through keeping the top position in the hierarchy.³⁹ To stay in power, autocratic regimes cannot rest on repressive tools alone. They also use the typical instruments in patrimonial systems, such as perks, privileges, and spoils to gain support, or at least prevent rebellion.⁴⁰ By agreeing to a military pact, the rebels become employed by the regime and are expected to be loyal to the regime in return. As this is in line with the patronage system of authoritarian governance, we expect the former warring actors in an autocracy to be more likely than in a democracy to sign a military pact. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis regarding military pacts:

H3: The warring parties are more likely to reach a military pact in an autocracy.

We suggest that the type of regime is likely to be of importance not only for the type of power-sharing provision that is chosen to be included in the peace accord, but also for the likelihood that the parties implement the pact. The expectation that regime type matters in issues related to implementation of agreements is based on the wealth of studies on the impact of regime type in related fields. Several authors suggest that democracies are associated with making credible commitments in the international arena due to the electoral constraint. In democracies, leaders are held accountable and expected to keep their promises and implement agreements.⁴¹ According to Fiona McGillivray and Alistair Smith, the incentive structure for autocrats to keep agreements is weaker as they are not dependent on the voters.⁴² Former warring parties in a democracy face higher domestic costs of not upholding agreements than their autocratic counterparts do. Moreover, Kurt Taylor Gaubatz suggests that it is the particular and distinctive values in democratic states that explain why democracies uphold international commitments to a higher extent than autocracies.⁴³ In line with this research on democracies and international agreements, we expect former warring actors in democracies to also fulfill their commitments in peace agreements and to implement them to a higher extent than in autocracies.

We suggest that the type of political system also affects the implementation across different types of power-sharing pacts. While democracies should implement any pact they agree upon due to public
constraint, dictatorships try to hold on to power as much as possible. For an autocracy, the implementation of a political pact can be seen as a way to resist demands for democracy, postpone elections, and thereby remain in power. Therefore, we anticipate that dictatorships prefer to implement political pacts—which are perceived to be less of a threat of losing control—over territorial and military pacts. Even though we expect autocracies to follow through on their promises with regard to political pacts, democracies should overall see a higher degree of implementation of the various pacts due to the public accountability that democratic leaders face. Based on the above discussion, we thus propose the following hypothesis.

H4: The warring parties are more likely to implement power-sharing pacts in a democracy.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Data and Variables

For our empirical analysis, we rely on a global data set consisting of eighty-three peace agreements reached in forty internal armed conflicts in thirty-eight countries. We focus on the time period, 1989–2004, as the IMPACT data on the implementation of power-sharing pacts are limited to this period. We include all peace agreements that have been signed in an internal armed conflict between the government and one or more rebel groups that have resulted in at least twenty-five battle-related deaths in a calendar year. A peace agreement is defined as a formal agreement between the warring parties that addresses the incompatibility by settling all or part of it. The data on peace agreements and armed conflicts come from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP).

We begin by employing three dependent variables that capture territorial, political, and military pacts. The variable Territorial Pact is coded one if the parties are given regional autonomy, can continue to administer an area under their control, or if self-governing zones are put in place. The next dependent variable Political Pact is coded one if the parties are guaranteed seats at the cabinet level or above, or are given a quota of power in one or more of the main branches of government. Lastly, the variable Military Pact is coded one if the parties
are guaranteed positions in the national armed forces and/or command structures. These data come from the TOPAD data set, which includes information on the content of peace accords, and has been coded in line with Walter with some minor modifications.

Next, we use three dependent variables that capture the implementation of the power-sharing pacts. Consistent with previous research on this topic, we study if each pact (territorial, political, or military) is implemented within a period of five years. The first dependent variable in this analysis is Territorial Implementation, which is coded one if the territorial pact has been fully implemented within five years, and the variable is otherwise coded zero. A territorial pact is considered to be fully implemented if one of the following three criteria is fulfilled: (1) it was stipulated and the rebels retained control over their own territory, or (2) if territorial decentralization was stipulated and efforts were made to implement this, for example, by drafting legislation, or (3) if decentralization was stipulated and either law was passed and made into law, and/or institutions (such as local or autonomous assemblies or executives) were created.

We have also created a dependent variable Political Implementation, which is coded one if the political pact has been fully implemented within a five-year time frame, and if not the variable is coded zero. By full implementation, we require the following three criteria to be fulfilled: (1) the parties have claimed seats in the national assembly, (2) the government and/or assembly has been inaugurated, and (3) the new institutions have begun to function.

The dependent variable Military Implementation is coded one if the military pact has been fully implemented within a five-year time frame, and if not the variable is coded zero. A military pact is seen as fully implemented if the following two criteria were fulfilled: (1) if there was a complete integration of command structure, and (2) if the stipulated integration into the armed forces was completed. But if only one aspect was stipulated in the accord (i.e., integration of command structures or integration of forces), it is sufficient to have that aspect completed for the military pact to be seen as fully implemented. The data for these three variables come from the IMPACT data set.

The data for our independent variables come from the Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited data set, which builds on previous research by Michael Alvarez et al. and Adam Przeworski et al. As we rely on a minimalist definition of democracy, the Democracy and Dictatorship data set is suitable for our purposes. According to José
Antonio Cheibub et al., democracy is defined as a regime where the “... executive and legislative offices are filled through contested elections....” Hence, this measure gives precedence to elections as a defining feature of democracies. Our main independent variable is a dummy variable *Regime Type*, which is coded one if the regime is a democracy rather than a dictatorship and otherwise is coded zero.

We use cross-tabulations to assess whether there is any relationship between regime type and power-sharing pacts and their signing and implementation. In the first stage of our analysis where the focus is on the signing of pacts, there are in total eighty-three peace agreements. Hence, our analysis focuses on the inclusion of pacts given that a peace agreement has been signed. In the second stage where we study the implementation of pacts, we need to concentrate only on those peace agreements that include a pact to be able to study implementation. We thus begin by looking at the thirty-three peace accords that include a territorial pact to explore if these are being implemented. Next, we focus on the thirty-six peace agreements that include a political pact to assess their implementation. Finally, we study the twenty-nine peace accords that include a military pact and the degree to which the parties have kept their promises and implemented the pacts. While we need to study these different types of pacts separately from each other, some peace agreements include several types of pacts, something we elaborate upon in our discussion of our findings.

**RESULTS AND ANALYSIS**

*Type of Regime and the Signing of Pacts*

The results demonstrate that there is a striking variation between the signing of different types of pacts with regard to previous regime. We begin by looking at the likelihood of a territorial pact in democracies compared to autocracies. As we expected, only fifteen of sixty peace agreements reached in dictatorships included a territorial pact, whereas of the twenty-three peace accords reached in a democracy, eighteen included a territorial pact. This corresponds to 78 percent in democracies compared with only 25 percent in autocratic states (Table 1). These results are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Hence, territorial pacts are quite often signed in democracies, but much less so in autocratic states.
Indonesia is an example of a democratic state that has granted autonomy to five regions. The autonomy of Aceh was broadened in the 2002 peace agreement. It includes provisions for a democratic, inclusive process as well as the continuation of negotiations over issues that have not been fully resolved. It was also agreed that an international monitoring committee should oversee the process. Thus, the case of Aceh illustrates the potential mechanism involved where warring actors in democracies choose decentralization as a way of vitalizing and broadening the power of the elected local government.

Next, we present our results regarding political pacts (see Table 2). Theoretically, we expected it to be more difficult to reach a political pact in a democracy compared to an autocratic regime. In keeping with the theory, we find that it is very uncommon to agree on a political pact in a democracy. Of twenty-three peace accords reached in a country with democracy, only four peace agreements included a political pact (17 percent). In contrast, of the sixty peace accords reached in an autocratic system, roughly half include a political pact: thirty-two include such a pact, while twenty-eight do not. Hence, there is much higher likelihood that the parties reach a political pact in countries with an autocratic rather than democratic system. These results are statistically significant at the 0.01 level.

Afghanistan, which represents an authoritarian state where the warring parties have agreed on a political pact, can serve as an illustration of the potential mechanisms involved. A political pact was

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1 Regime Type and Signing of Territorial Pacts</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>No territorial pact</td>
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<tr>
<td>Territorial pact</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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| Pearson $\chi^2 = 19.6920, P = 0.000.$

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<th>Table 2 Regime Type and Signing of Political Pacts</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>No political pact</td>
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<td>Political pact</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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| Pearson $\chi^2 = 8.7450, P = 0.003.$
reached, and a joint cabinet was formed in 1993.\textsuperscript{52} In Afghanistan, the sharing of power between warlords is not an uncommon practice, and several individuals in government have committed war crimes. Such co-optation is a convenient way for the president to continue to ensure support by appointing warlords as governors: President “Karzai had to co-opt to survive.”\textsuperscript{53} In this way, Afghanistan confirms the research by Milan Svolík, Philip Roessler, and others who suggest that co-optation is a mechanism to avoid coup d’\textsuperscript{e}tat, and thus allow for the dictators to hold on to power.\textsuperscript{54}

As regards military pacts, we did not expect military power sharing to be a very frequent solution in democratic countries compared with autocracies. In line with the theory, of twenty-three peace accords reached in a democracy, there were only two cases in which the parties agreed on a military pact. Military pacts were a much more common solution in dictatorships. Of the sixty peace accords reached in an autocratic state, there were twenty-seven military pacts (Table 3). That is 9 percent in democracies compared with 45 percent in dictatorships. These results are statistically significant at the 0.01 level.

The case of Uganda can shed light on the potential mechanisms concerning military power-sharing arrangements in authoritarian states. In Uganda, co-optation has become an important instrument for the regime to remain in power. The Yumbe Peace Agreement was signed in 2002 between the government led by President Museveni and the rebel group UNRF II. The agreement provided for a military pact in which seven hundred rebels were to become part of the national army, while the remainder were to be given resettlement packages. In addition, all UNRF II commanders would retain their ranks, and the movement would also receive ten government posts. These provisions for military power sharing have been implemented.\textsuperscript{55} President Museveni’s rule has since then continued to rely heavily on co-optation of key persons and patronage in order to maintain control.\textsuperscript{56}

<table>
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<th>Table 3 Regime Type and Signing of Military Pacts</th>
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<tr>
<td>Autocracy, %</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>No military pact</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military pact</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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Pearson $\chi^2 = 9.6401$, $P = 0.002$. 
Type of Regime and the Implementation of Pacts

Next we study the relationship between regime type and the implementation of pacts. We hypothesized that democracies are more likely compared with autocracies to go ahead and implement their pacts. Surprisingly, if we look at the implementation of pacts in general, without making a distinction between the types of pacts, we can see that there appears to be no such relationship between regime type and implementation. In democratic regimes, 62 percent of the pacts are being implemented, whereas the corresponding figure for autocracies is 67 percent. This means that there is no significant difference between these two types of contexts. Hence, the track record in terms of keeping their promises is about equally good for both types of regimes (see Table 4).

We now disaggregate pacts and analyze their respective relationships to regime type. About half of the territorial pacts are being implemented, and there is no significant difference between democracies and autocracies, although the degree of implementation is slightly higher for democracies relative to autocracies. We can see that eleven of eighteen of the territorial pacts where the warring actors have a democratic background are being implemented, while seven of fifteen territorial pacts are being implemented in the dictatorships (see Table 5).

Table 4 Regime Type and Implementation of Pacts

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<th>Autocracy, %</th>
<th>Democracy, %</th>
<th>Total, %</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No implementation of pact</td>
<td>32.65 (16)</td>
<td>38.1 (8)</td>
<td>34.3 (24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of pact</td>
<td>67.35 (33)</td>
<td>61.9 (13)</td>
<td>65.7 (46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 (49)</td>
<td>100 (21)</td>
<td>100 (70)</td>
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Pearson $\chi^2 = 0.1932$, $P = 0.660$.

Table 5 Regime Type and Implementation of Territorial Pacts

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<th>Autocracy, %</th>
<th>Democracy, %</th>
<th>Total, %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No terr. implementation</td>
<td>53.3 (8)</td>
<td>38.9 (7)</td>
<td>45.45 (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terr. implementation</td>
<td>46.7 (7)</td>
<td>61.1 (11)</td>
<td>54.55 (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 (15)</td>
<td>100 (18)</td>
<td>100 (33)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson $\chi^2 = 0.6885$, $P = 0.407$. 
Regarding the implementation of political pacts, there is no difference concerning the implementation in democracies compared with autocracies. What is notable is that the degree of implementation is quite high, 75 percent in both contexts. Three of four political pacts in democracies are implemented, and in autocracies, twenty-four of the thirty-two political pacts are implemented (see Table 6). It is quite interesting that more political pacts are reached in autocracies and that so many of these are in fact being implemented.

Finally, military pacts appear to be the most difficult to implement. In dictatorships, only ten of twenty-seven (37 percent) military pacts were implemented, and none of the two military pacts in democracies were implemented (see Table 7).

**DISCUSSION**

Somewhat surprisingly, we find that autocracies are equally good at implementing pacts as democracies. One potential explanation for our findings on implementation is that although the incentives for signing agreements differ between regime types, the conditions for implementing them are similar. After a civil war, the security situation is fragile. Much of the infrastructure is destroyed, and unemployment is high. This puts a lot of stress on any government, and other

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**Table 6** Regime Type and Implementation of Political Pacts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Autocracy, %</th>
<th>Democracy, %</th>
<th>Total, %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No pol. implem.</td>
<td>25 (8)</td>
<td>25 (1)</td>
<td>25 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political implem.</td>
<td>75 (24)</td>
<td>75 (3)</td>
<td>25 (27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 (32)</td>
<td>100 (4)</td>
<td>100 (36)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson $\chi^2 = 0.000$, $P = 1.000$.

**Table 7** Regime Type and Implementation of Military Pacts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Autocracy, %</th>
<th>Democracy, %</th>
<th>Total, %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No military implem.</td>
<td>62 (17)</td>
<td>100 (2)</td>
<td>65.5 (19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military implem.</td>
<td>37 (10)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>34.5 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 (27)</td>
<td>100 (2)</td>
<td>100 (29)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson $\chi^2 = 1.1306$, $P = 0.288$. 
priorities can become more pressing than the implementation of the peace agreement. In addition, the democratic process as such means that any political decision usually takes longer to implement, as it has to be discussed and agreed upon in parliament. It is conceivable that part of the population in a democracy for various reasons may come to oppose the agreement signed, and thus pressure their democratic leaders to not go through with the implementation. This means that the implementation could be postponed, or not achieved at all. This could result in a similar implementation rate for democracies and autocracies.

With regard to the signing of power-sharing pacts, our results show that there is prominent variation between different regime types and the signing of territorial, political, and military power-sharing pacts. One might ask how the relationships identified here might be related to the characteristics of the civil war. This is a pertinent question, as we know from previous research that different regime types become engaged in different types of civil wars. Also, in our study, conflicts where the main incompatibility concerns territory are often resolved by territorial pacts. A reason for the greater number of territorial pacts in democracies compared with dictatorships could be that democracies are more often challenged militarily over territory, while issues of government are handled democratically in elections. Correspondingly, the pattern shows a correlation between dictatorship, conflict over government, and political pacts. It seems plausible that part of the explanation for why political pacts are more common in dictatorships than in democracies is that dictatorships more often face uprisings where demands for regime change or change of government is stated. Looking at our data, we do find that in our sample of peace agreements reached in democracies, seventeen of twenty-three (74 percent) agreements are signed in a conflict over territorial claims. Peace agreements in autocracies, on the other hand, are more often signed in armed conflicts over government power: fifty of sixty peace agreements (83 percent). See Table G, Appendix S1 (available online). Thus, our finding could partly be due to the fact that democracies more often are signing peace agreements where the incompatibility is over territorial claims. However, to further disentangle this relationship, we would need to look at which types of armed struggles democracies and autocracies become engaged in from the start. With our research design, we cannot account for how different types of regimes respond to armed or unarmed insurrections, and whether democracies
are more likely to go to war over territorial claims or if they are more often challenged over those issues. This is thus a pertinent issue for future studies to engage in.

Furthermore, we have also conducted an additional analysis where we disaggregate the regime type further into parliamentary, mixed, presidential systems, as well as civilian and military dictatorships, and we do this for the signing of pacts as well as their implementation. All these results are presented in Appendix S1 (see Tables A-F, Appendix S1). For instance, of the territorial pacts signed in democracies, we can note that the majority (eleven of eighteen) are signed in parliamentary systems, and more than 70 percent of these are in turn being implemented (see Tables A and D). In addition, among the authoritarian regimes, military pacts are equally common in civilian dictatorships and military dictatorships (see Table C). Hence, our finding concerning military pacts is not just due to these being less frequent in a context where the military already has a hold on power. Notably, though, the former warring actors in a civilian dictatorship have a higher rate of implementation than their military counterparts (Table F). Note, however, that the cases are few and should be explored further as additional data become available.

Several peace agreements contain more than one power-sharing pact. There are in total ninety-eight pacts among the eighty-three peace agreements included in the study, and thirteen do not contain any pacts. Hence, ninety-eight pacts are found in the remaining seventy agreements. This means that pacts often come as a package solution. Not all pacts are suitable for all types of situations. For instance, territorial pacts in combination with political pacts are often suggested in conflicts where there are geographically concentrated minorities. In other situations, negotiating parties rather agree on what type of pact is not desirable and then try to find a solution that can be tolerable, although not a first preference to any of them. While we have looked at these pacts separately in this analysis, the combination of pacts is something that needs to be further explored, for instance, with regard to the effect of regime type on different package deals.

While more research on this topic certainly is needed, our research so far demonstrates some interesting patterns with regard to type of regime across different power-sharing pacts. In short, it shows that in democracies, the most common provision is a territorial pact, while it
is rare that a political or a military pact is signed. In dictatorships, very few territorial pacts are signed, whereas political and military pacts are more frequent. Our explanation for these results is that there are different incentive structures for the former warring parties in a democracy compared with an autocracy. In democracies, the former combatants are constrained by their dependence on their constituents, and voters prefer solutions that accord with democratic norms and generally do not accept rewarding violence. We suggest that of the three types of pacts in the study, democracies find territorial pacts the most attractive for their alignment with democratic norms and practices. In authoritarian regimes, on the other hand, the parties have stronger incentives to sign political and military pacts, as these are in line with the patronage systems often applied in autocracies. Co-optation is a consistent practice in dictatorships where spoils are divided among powerful regional leaders in return for their support of the regime. Warlords seldom accept laying down their arms without a guarantee that they will have a position in the future government. Co-optation can serve as an important instrument for authoritarian regimes that want to pacify antagonists and may help explain why the former warring actors in dictatorships choose to sign political and military pacts.

CONCLUSIONS

Power sharing has become the standard solution to end civil wars. It is therefore of the utmost importance to analyze the different types of power-sharing pacts. While there is a large literature on the durability of peace and the particular content of peace accords, we know very little about the conditions under which certain pacts are signed and implemented. In this article, we present the first global study that explores whether regime type matters for such choices. We focus on the strategic incentives of the warring parties in different types of regimes to reach and implement different pacts. To analyze the relationship between regime type and the signing and implementation of territorial, political, and military power-sharing pacts, we use a data set based on power-sharing provisions in eighty-three peace accords in the post–Cold War period.

Our results demonstrate that the type of political system is of importance for the inclusion of different power-sharing pacts in peace accords. In line with our theoretical expectations, we find that warring
parties in democracies are more likely to sign territorial pacts, compared to warring parties in autocracies who sign political and military pacts to a larger extent. Contrary to our expectations, democracies do not implement pacts to a higher degree than autocracies. As democracies and autocracies are equally good at implementing pacts, this confirms that it is meaningful for mediators to continue to promote pacts regardless of type of regime. However, it also shows that it is important to consider the different incentive structures in the different regime types in order to design a pact that is most suitable for that particular country.

As this is the first study of these issues, more research is needed to further analyze the relationship between regime type and different types of pacts and move the research agenda forward. It would be valuable to further disentangle how regime type and the type of incompatibility may matter for the signing and implementation of pacts, which would require studying also the previous stage when democracies and autocracies are being challenged militarily or nonmilitarily. Another avenue for future research is to analyze how regime type and the role of third-party actors may interact. It could be the case that peacekeepers are invited to democracies to a higher extent, and peacekeepers are more or less effective in preventing conflicts depending on type of pact. It seems, for instance, more likely that the former warring parties are separated following a territorial pact, and that such a peace is less challenging to maintain than peace following military and political pacts. This could also make it easier to implement the pacts agreed upon. As most territorial pacts are implemented in democracies, peacekeepers could potentially be more effective in democracies.

Another area for future research concerns the mechanisms underlying our finding that most political pacts are signed in autocracies. This finding could potentially explain why such pacts fail to maintain peace to a larger extent than territorial and military pacts. Ideally, a political pact is transitional and followed by elections. However, in a state like Burundi, several power-sharing periods have been followed by violent conflicts. The transitional power-sharing arrangement was turned into a permanent one in the 2005 constitution, much out of fear of violence should elections in a system without reserved seats upset the stabilizing power balance provided for by power sharing. Such a radical change would be a great threat to the former warring parties who might risk losing their seats in government. We would
encourage further analysis of this issue to specify the mechanism at
work and the different incentive structures in the subtypes of regimes.
A better empirical understanding of individual cases of implementa-
tion of peace agreements could further develop our understanding of
the relationship between different regime types and implementation of
peace agreements. Such analysis could help us unpack and better
understand the incentive structures of different regimes and how they
reason around peace agreements.

NOTES

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ferences for many valuable comments and suggestions.

1. Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild, eds., Sustainable Peace: Power
and Democracy after Civil Wars (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,
2005); Caroline A. Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, “Institutionalizing Peace:
Power-Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management,” American Journal of
Political Science 47, No. 2 (April 2003): 318–332; Melani Cammett and
Edmund Malesky, “Power-Sharing in Postconflict Societies: Implications for
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1016.

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Isak Svensson, “Who Brings Which Peace: Biased versus Neutral Mediation and
Institutional Peace Arrangements in Civil Wars,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53,
No. 3 (2009): 446–469.

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Agreements Data (Topad) Codebook” (2006).

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101.

7. Arend Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy,” World Politics 21, No. 2

8. Timothy D. Sisk, Power-Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic
Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1996); Benjamin Reilly,
Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management
Regime Type and Power-Sharing Pacts in Peace Agreements


20. Madhav Joshi, Jason Michael Quinn, and Patrick M. Regan, “Annualized


26. Bekoe discusses power sharing but argues—based on an analysis of Mozambique, Angola, and Liberia—that the degree of mutual vulnerability of the parties is an important predictor of the implementation of peace agreements. Dorina Bekoe, “Mutual Vulnerability and the Implementation of Peace Agreements: Examples from Mozambique, Angola, and Liberia,” *International Journal of Peace Studies* 10, No. 2 (2005): 43–68. There are also several studies that focus on implementation of peace agreements more broadly; see, for example, Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, eds., *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2002).


32. Authoritarian regimes, like China, that nevertheless find it necessary to empower local officials in order to foster economic development, make sure that they keep their grip on the decentralized bodies by strict political control of the recruitment, promotion, and management of personnel. Pierre F. Landry, *Decentralized Authoritarianism in China: The Communist Party’s Control of Local Elites in the Post-Mao Era* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).


43. There are also those that question that there is such relationship between democratic systems and commitment to agreements; see, for example, Gaubatz, “Democratic States.”

44. Cases where peace process agreements are followed by a comprehensive peace agreement, which brings the previous deals into effect, such as in Guatemala, are analyzed as one peace agreement. We exclude peace process agreements that merely outline a process for how to resolve the incompatibility. This is in line with Desirée Nilsson, “Partial Peace: Rebel Groups Inside and Outside of Civil War

45. In the original dataset the variable *Military Pact* is coded one also if the parties are allowed to retain their separate armed forces, but in this article power-dividing measures are not seen as power sharing and thus do not qualify as military pacts.


47. Walter, *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars*.

48. Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland, “Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited”

49. Michael Alvarez et al., “Classifying Political Regimes,” *Studies in Comparative International Development* 31, No. 2 (1996): 3–36; Adam Przeworski et al., *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000). We think this data set is preferable to, for example, the Polity data, which can be problematic when studying countries that are experiencing civil war. For a discussion of problems with relying on different democracy measurements based on data sets such as Polity, Freedom House, and the Democracy and Dictatorship data set, see James Raymond Vreeland, “The Effect of Political Regime on Civil War: Unpacking Anocracy,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52, No. 3 (2008): 401–425; Matthijs Bogaards, “Measuring Democracy through Election Outcomes: A Critique with African Data,” *Comparative Political Studies* 40, No. 10 (2007): 1211–1237. More recently, the data set V-Dem has also become available; see Staffan I. Lindberg et al., “V-Dem: A New Way to Measure Democracy,” *Journal of Democracy* 25, No. 3 (2014): 159–169. Some of these limitations concern the use of the Polity measure in analyses of conflict countries, since the score for anocracies is partly based on whether the country is experiencing instability such as armed conflict. Hence, in light of this and our focus on a minimalist conceptualization of democracy, the Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited data set is suitable for our purposes.

50. Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland, “Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited.”

51. UCDP, “The Uppsala Conflict Database.”


55. UCDP, “The Uppsala Conflict Database.”


57. Roeder and Rothchild, “Dilemmas of State-Building.”
SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article:

Appendix S1. Making and Keeping Promises.