Protestant Migration from the West Bank of Derry / Londonderry 1969–1980

Dr Ulf Hansson and Dr Helen McLaughlin
Foreword

Why did members of the Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist (PUL) community leave the west bank of Derry in their thousands since the late 1960s? The PFC posed this thorny question in a multilingual Political Guide to Derry published by the Centre in 1992. Some have argued that Protestants living on the west bank of the river Foyle in Derry were intimidated out of their homes, schools and workplaces in a deliberate campaign of ethnic cleansing led by the IRA since the early 1970s.

The accusation itself, of ethnic cleansing, could not be more serious conjuring up as it does images of Bosnia or Burma. The perception that some of those making the accusation are themselves motivated by sectarianism has allowed the Catholic/nationalist/republican community in Derry to avoid the reality that thousands of our neighbours have left.

When the PFC first began to discuss the merits of a research project to look at this issue it was decided to focus on the extent of migration and the factors that caused it in the period 1969-1980.

Dr Helen McLaughlin, a native of Derry and Dr Ulf Hansson, a Swedish academic, agreed to carry out the research. The Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade in Dublin had the foresight to provide funding. An independent cross-community and multi-disciplinary Advisory Group was set up with terms of reference which stipulated that the authors of the report had final editorial control over their findings. They also had editorial control over the terminology used to describe the city. It is to the credit of the authors that they took on board the interventions of the Advisory Group with enthusiasm and diligence. Dr Helen McLaughlin and Dr Ulf Hansson have authored an important, academically robust and challenging study which we hope will stimulate further debate and discussion.

It was not intended that publication of this report would coincide with the 50th anniversary of the civil rights movement and the October 1968 march but it is entirely appropriate that it does. The city of Derry has, in a positive way, changed beyond recognition. But one of the negative and unforeseen changes that has occurred is the migration of the PUL population from the west bank.

As well as the grant aid from the Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade in Dublin, we acknowledge the financial support from the Good Relations team at Derry City and Strabane District Council which facilitated the publication and launch of the report. We thank also PFC interns Glenn McGarrigle, Sarah Bylsma and Genevieve Akins who trawled through the newspaper archives and Aime Gallagher who was involved at an early stage. Those who agreed to sit on the Advisory Group (see Appendix One) provided a vital role in challenging the research and asking the awkward questions. The final report is all the more rigorous for their input. Finally we wish to acknowledge the professionalism, attention to detail and balance that the authors applied to what they themselves describe as ‘a complex and sensitive issue’.

Hopefully this report will be seen as an uncomfortable but necessary contribution to a conversation that has at times been dominated by strident voices on one side and apathy on the other. This report provides a useful context for further debate on this issue.

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Chairman
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Dr Helen McLaughlin

Helen has been working alongside the voluntary and community sector in Northern Ireland for over 20 years, offering research, evaluation, facilitation and training. She has produced and contributed to a number of research reports and evaluations including: *Women and the Conflict: Talking about the Troubles and Planning for the Future for Women’s Centres Regional Partnership*; *Barriers to Women’s Participation for WCRP* commissioned by DSD; *Ethnic Minority Mapping Reports for Coleraine and Ballymoney (Peace III)*; *Decade of Anniversaries Toolkit with Healing Through Remembering for Community Relations Council*. She has designed and delivered extensive training to communities across Northern Ireland on a range of topics including Community Leadership, Managing Diversity, and Building Successful Partnerships.

Dr Ulf Hansson

Ulf Hansson holds a PhD from Ulster University in International Politics. Ulf has 20 years of research experience within the social sciences, as a research student and as a researcher within academia and the NGO-sector. Research interests include, among other things, children and young people’s understanding of the Troubles/History; youth participation in the wider civic society and the impact of conflict and division on education and young people’s lives.

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Section 1: Introduction

1.1 Background

In autumn 2016, the Pat Finucane Centre commissioned a piece of research to explore the phenomenon of Protestant / Unionist / Loyalist migration from the west bank of Derry / Londonderry, focusing principally on the period 1969 – 1980. Funding was received from the Department of Foreign Affairs in Dublin to support the work with an additional contribution from the Pat Finucane Centre itself.

The research questions were:

- To what extent did Protestant migration from the west bank take place in this period?
- What were the factors which led to this movement?

1.1.1 Why is this issue still being explored today?

The focus of this report is very much on the 1970s. This may raise questions as to why the issue requires further exploration today. Although the city is undoubtedly a more peaceful place than it was at that time, it remains deeply divided, and sectarianism has by no means disappeared. There are still cases of young Protestants from the Waterside being attacked in the Cityside, and there are still instances of young Catholics being attacked within the Waterside. Prior to publication of this report, in September 2017, an attack was carried out on Christ Church, the Church of Ireland Church on Infirmary Road.1 Foyle College, once perceived to be the Protestant grammar school in the city, is in the process of relocating to the Limavady Road in the Waterside, and as such represents the departure of yet another institution important once perceived to be the Protestant grammar school in the city, is in the process of relocating to the Limavady Road in the Waterside, and as such represents the departure of yet another institution important to the Protestant community.2 While much of the migration occurred in the 1970s, the city remains characterised by segregation today.

The report tackles a complex and sensitive issue. It is therefore recommended that it is read and considered as a whole – there will be little value in singling out any one section or paragraph as representative of the entirety of its contents.

1.2 Methodology

As many pieces of primary research have been carried out on this subject over the last 25 years and up until the present day involving direct interviews, surveys and / or focus groups with individuals affected, and as several decades have passed since the period under review, it was agreed that the main focus should be on secondary research, exploring information gathered to date. However, it was also recognised that some primary research might usefully be carried out on for example, contemporary newspaper coverage. The report aims to be a factually based study exploring in one document a number of the different narratives around the migration, and to add to information about and understanding of the issue, and of the factors which contributed to it. The research was conducted as follows:

- An Advisory Group was established which was cross-community and multi-disciplinary in background and profession (see Appendix One);
- A review was undertaken of contemporary newspaper coverage was conducted with the support of interns (see Appendix Two); and
- A limited review of public records was undertaken.

As well as exploring Protestant migration itself, it was also considered useful to point to contextual issues, albeit briefly. These include:

- The historical and political context in which this happened;
- Related contemporary events in and beyond Derry / Londonderry;
- The current situation.

While we are of course aware that Catholic migration also took place, both within Derry / Londonderry, and beyond it (see Appendix Three), the specific remit of this report is Protestant migration. There is no doubt that more research is needed on the extent and causes of Catholic migration.

1.3 Terminology

We use the term “Protestant” being fully aware that Protestants are not a homogeneous group (see for example Shirlow et al. 2005, p. 11; Murtagh et al., 2008, p. 55). We use it to mean a broad grouping of disparate communities and individuals who share a Protestant background and culture, who may be broadly aligned with the Unionist or Loyalist traditions. Similarly, when we talk about Catholics, we mean a broad grouping of disparate communities and individuals who share a Catholic background and culture, and who may be broadly aligned with the Nationalist or Republican traditions.

This document focuses principally on the Protestant and Catholic communities of Derry / Londonderry. The city has had longstanding communities from Indian and Chinese backgrounds, and, since the period under discussion, the city has become a place of greater diversity thanks largely, although not exclusively, to immigration from the European Union. This research, does, however, of necessity, focus on the two dominant communities, politically and culturally, at the time under consideration, and these were the Protestant / Unionist / Loyalist and Catholic / Nationalist / Republican communities.

Given the ongoing controversy about the name of the city of Derry / Londonderry / Doire, we use the term Derry / Londonderry. Where we are discussing the work of an author who has a clear preference for the use of Derry or of Londonderry, we retain the author’s usage both inside and outside of direct quotations.

1.4 The research context

The full reference list is attached. However, it is important to point here to some of the sources which have been invaluable in informing this work. The documentation consulted has revealed a range of narratives,
many of which coincide in a number of aspects, and also diverge to some degree. The one area on which there appears to be consensus is on the extent of migration. Where differences emerge, they tend to be around analysis of the factors which contributed to migration. This section gives a flavour of some of the most significant pieces consulted, spanning academic papers, community histories, political pieces and creative projects, and which cover a broad range of viewpoints and analysis.

The Templegrove Action Research (TAR) initiative, led by Marie Smyth with Collins and Moore, was perhaps the most thorough and focused exploration of the issue of migration and segregation in Derry / Londonderry. The project spanned 1994–1996 and focused on the Fountain estate, a small Protestant enclave on the Cityside, and Gobnascale, a Catholic estate on the Waterside.1 It involved qualitative and quantitative research including a review of census data, surveys with 378 residents of both areas, and focus groups with residents of both areas, as well as community engagement and follow-up. It highlighted the significant levels of population change within the Derry / Londonderry area between the census years of 1971 and 1991, and found a range of complex and often interrelated reasons among Protestant respondents who had made the move away from the Cityside. The project resulted in a research report, policy papers, and reports of public discussions, as well as a creative publication entitled Hemmed in and Hacking It.

Shirlow et al’s 2005 research, whilst carried out almost ten years after the Templegrove Action Research piece, was an intensive study which aimed to update the Templegrove findings, to review public policy in relation to the situation of the Protestant community in Derry / Londonderry and to “produce an envisioning document that seeks to establish the structures and policies needed to encourage new forms of co-operation and sharing in Derry / Londonderry”. The study included a survey of 399 Protestants in the Derry / Londonderry area, as well as a number of focus groups (Shirlow et al. 2005, p. 6).

Whilst undertaken after the period under review (1969 – 1980) the studies undertaken by TAR and Shirlow et al. involved at least 777 responses from people living in Derry / Londonderry from both communities, not including contributors to focus groups and community events.

Southern’s research between 2006 – 2009 offers perspectives on the experiences of Protestant clergy in the city, the issue of Protestant alienation more widely, and compares the experiences of the Protestant community in Derry / Londonderry to the experience of the white population of Pretoria (Southern, 2006, 2007, 2009).

Michael Hall’s 1999 pamphlet Are we not part of this city too? presents the findings of a series of interviews carried out with members of the Protestant community, including community workers, around the subject of Protestant alienation.

Much of the research above involved detailed studies and direct contact with individuals affected, and points to a complex range of often interrelated factors which influenced the decision of Protestant people to move away from the Cityside of Derry / Londonderry.

Not surprisingly, more politically driven pieces tend to have a different emphasis, and a small number (for example Kingley’s Londonderry Revisited, 1989) attribute the migration to a deliberate conspiracy to drive Protestants away from the west bank of the city. This is a theme that was subsequently picked up by politicians such as Jeffrey Donaldson and Gregory Campbell of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) who from the early to mid-1990s adopted the narrative of “ethnic cleansing” in relation to the migration. The Campaign for Social Justice’s (CSJ) pamphlets produced in the 1960s point to power-imbalance and a policy of non-investment as factors which stifled the city and its potential.

Some community and creative sources were also considered. Jonathan Burguess’ play The Exodus (2011) tells the fictional story of the events leading up to one family’s decision to leave the city side. Although it is a fictional work, Burgess also includes extracts from interviews with individuals conducted as part of his research for the play. Burgess describes the exodus as being akin to the 1689 Siege of Derry (Burgess, 2011, p. 4), and focuses on the direct and indirect impacts of violence and intimidation, both through the play and through the interviews which accompany it.

TAR’s Hemmed In and Hacking It (1996) contains transcripts of personal stories and poems highlighting the real lived experiences of people from both the Fountain and Gobnascale. Temple and Baker’s 2012 community history of the Brooke Park area of Derry / Londonderry, commissioned by Derry City Council, explores newspaper coverage and contains many personal stories and experiences, but remains unpublished to date, so appropriate care has been exercised in referencing it.

Peto and Cunningham’s BBC NI documentary Exodus (2007) features interviews with a number of largely Protestant people, discussing the movement of Protestant people from the west bank of the city, and contains many personal stories and experiences.

In addition to sources directly concerned with the subject of Protestant migration in Derry / Londonderry, a range of literature was consulted in order to provide wider historical, political and social context: these included Bartlett’s A History of Ulster (1992) and Susan McKay’s Northern Protestants (2000). Personal local histories were also consulted including Frank Curran’s Derry: Countdown to Disaster (1986) and Dr Raymond McClean’s The Road to Bloody Sunday (1983).

Because this report does not rely solely on academic sources, but draws on a number of different kinds of material, it is important to note that some sources, in particular informal ones such as community and personal histories and accounts, can be subject to factual error and misrepresentation. We have considered it important to include some of the personal accounts or comments contained within the sources reviewed, but we cannot take responsibility for their factual accuracy.

1.5 Structure of Report

The research consulted shows that Protestant migration from the west bank of Derry / Londonderry began before 1969, and gathered pace to a significant degree between the years of 1969 and 1980. As indicated above, existing work in the field points to a number of factors, both in terms of wider context, and direct local issues, which contributed to this movement. For this reason, the document is structured as follows. Section 2 summarises the migration figures. Section 3 provides an overview of the factors which the sources suggest contributed to the migration. Sections 4 – 8 are devoted to the factors which have emerged from the sources as the most significant: the shift away from Unionist minority rule in the city and consequent shift in position for the Protestant community; security and safety issues in the city at the time; the impact of changes in relation to housing; the impact of Northern Ireland wide economic planning and development, and the role of leaders. Section 9 offers conclusions and points to areas for further consideration and research.

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1 The term Waterside is frequently used to refer to the East Side of the River Foyle, as opposed to the terms ‘west bank’ and ‘Cityside’ used to indicate the opposite side of the river Foyle. See discussion under 2.3.
Section 2: Extent of Migration

2.1 Population decline and segregation

Historically, and across Northern Ireland, it had been Catholic population figures which were on the decline. For example, the 1969 Campaign for Social Justice (CSJ) report cites figures from HM Stationery Office, Belfast, showing that despite over 50% of the primary school population being Roman Catholic (CSJ 1969, p. 2–4), numbers decreased significantly for the Catholic population at around voting age and in young adulthood. ‘In effect, this meant a drop of only 8.1% of the total Protestant population under 30 in 1951, and contrasts with a drop of 16.7% for the total Catholic population under 30 in 1951’. According to the report, this was a result of migration outside of Northern Ireland, with 90,000 Catholics (21% of the 1937 population) emigrating between 1937 and 1961 and 69,000 non-Catholics emigrating (8% of their 1937 population) (CSJ, 1969, p. 4).

Alongside this decline in the Catholic population, it appears that segregation was also a feature of wider Northern Ireland society before the onset of the most recent conflict. According to Smyth (in TAR 1996, Public Discussions, p. 30):

Segregation is not new in Northern Ireland but predates the partition of the island and the creation of the Northern Ireland state: it therefore also predates the present troubles...and that Some areas of Northern Ireland have been predominantly Catholic or Protestant over long periods of time, due to a complex of economic, social and political factors.

2.2 Belfast

There is evidence that residential segregation was a feature of life in Belfast well before the conflict, with Jones (1956) and Barratt and Carter (1962) writing about widespread segregation in Belfast (referenced in Smyth, 1995, Borders within Borders, p. 28). Once the conflict began, segregation became more marked, as Murtagh (in TAR 1996, p. 23) notes:

Between the years of 1969 – 1974, 60,000 people left their homes, in the Belfast area alone, the result being segregated streets and communities, and the establishment of 13 ‘peace lines’

According to Bardon (1992, pp. 683–684), following the introduction of internment in August 1971, more than 2 per cent of the 45,000 Catholic households in Belfast and 0.5 per cent of 135,000 Protestant households were displaced. Altogether 60 per cent of the movements were made by Catholic families and 40 per cent by Protestant families. In short, this was the biggest enforced movement of population since 1945.

Many, Bardon (1992, p. 795) suggests, left Northern Ireland altogether:

The two years of intense violence following the introduction of internment prompted many to quit the region mainly for their own safety: the Registrar General estimated a ‘net outward migration’ of 44,100 in 1971–3. Thereafter the annual outflow averaged around 8,000 a year, dropping to 5,300 in 1979–80 and rising to 9,900 in 1981–2.

2.3 Derry / Londonderry

Historical division and conflict-related displacement meant that an ever more segregated picture emerged during the conflict. Derry / Londonderry has been of interest to researchers perhaps because its particular geography has made the segregation seem more marked. The city is situated on the River Foyle, with the medieval walled city and the city centre on the west bank having a predominantly Catholic population, and with residential and commercial development on the Waterside, on the east bank of the river, with a more evenly divided population – the Waterside is home to the majority of the city’s Protestant population. It is a border city, with much of the west bank of the river beyond the city falling into County Donegal in the Republic of Ireland.

2.3.1 Population change in the city as a whole

Smyth (in TAR Public Discussions, p. 10) comments on segregation in the city:

The overall trend of population movement over the last twenty years has been towards increased segregation. At the time the research began, that same trend - that of Protestants moving out of the city - had been apparent in Derry Londonderry.

Indeed, Fay et al. (1999) identify Derry / Londonderry as one of the most segregated areas in Northern Ireland together with Belfast and Craigavon.

It appears that the decline of the Protestant population on the west bank of Derry / Londonderry began before the period covered by this report. Kaufmann (2011, p. 391) refers to “…the demographic implosion of Protestantism in Derry City”. Over the period from the 1920s and onwards and as a result the composition of the population changed.

A comparison between 1961 and 1971 census gives us limited information. However, the number who saw themselves as Presbyterians in the South Ward dropped from 1,076 in 1961 to 601 in 1971, a difference of 475 individuals; similarly, in the North Ward, the number of individuals who saw themselves as Church of Ireland dropped from 3,097 in 1961 to 2,201 in 1971, a decrease of 896.¹

There was a total of 2,342 people who identified as Presbyterian, Church of Ireland or Methodist in the South Ward in 1961, as compared to 26,609 Catholics and 628 others and not stated, indicating that Protestants were already in a notable minority. By 1971, this had fallen to a total of 1,294 people identifying as Presbyterian, Church of Ireland or Methodist in the South Ward, a decrease of 1,045, or 44.7%. Alongside this change, the number declaring themselves as Catholic fell by 3585 (13%), whilst those declaring as others and not stated rose by 3,144, five times more than in 1961.

¹ The introduction of mass arrest and detention without trial in August 1971 of individuals suspected of involvement in the IRA (Irish Republican Army) and also members of the legal left-wing organisation known as People’s Democracy. The decision was taken not to include members of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), which had committed a number of acts of violence between 1969 and 1971 (see Margaret Urwin, A State in Denial, 2016, pp. 28–29).

¹ It is however worth bearing in mind the changing boundaries with regards to the wards.
Section 2: Extent of Migration

**Table 1: Religions, Census 1961**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Roman Catholic</th>
<th>Presbyterian</th>
<th>Church of Ireland</th>
<th>Methodists</th>
<th>Other and not stated denominations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Ward</td>
<td>5,005</td>
<td>3,426</td>
<td>3,097</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Ward</td>
<td>26,609</td>
<td>1,076</td>
<td>1,148</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterside</td>
<td>4,459</td>
<td>3,364</td>
<td>2,871</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on this limited information it is possible to establish that the number of Protestants in the two wards on the city side was already decreasing over the ten-year period from 1961 to 1971.

**Table 2: Religions, Census 1971**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Roman Catholic</th>
<th>Presbyterian</th>
<th>Church of Ireland</th>
<th>Methodists</th>
<th>Other/ non-stated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Ward</td>
<td>4,651</td>
<td>2,239</td>
<td>2,201</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>1,373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Ward</td>
<td>23,024</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>3,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterside</td>
<td>4,972</td>
<td>3,109</td>
<td>2,485</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>1,439</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The TAR Field Survey (1996, p. 78) present the changing population pattern between the census years 1971 to 1991 in Table 3 (below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Protestants</th>
<th>Presbyterian</th>
<th>Church of Ireland</th>
<th>Methodists</th>
<th>Other/ non-stated</th>
<th>Total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cityside</td>
<td>33,951</td>
<td>8,459</td>
<td>4,227</td>
<td>3,861</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>6,706</td>
<td>49,623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterside</td>
<td>7,708</td>
<td>7,849</td>
<td>4,167</td>
<td>3,063</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>2,709</td>
<td>18,812</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These tables show that in the Waterside in the period 1971 – 1981, the Protestant population rose from 7,849 in 1971 to 9,244 in 1981 (an increase of almost 18%). In the Cityside in the same period, the Protestant population fell from 8,459 in 1971 to 2,874 in 1981 (a decrease of 66%) (Smyth in TAR Public Discussions, pp. 36-37).

Over the twenty-year period 1971 – 1991, in terms of the Cityside, TAR’s research shows that there had been an increase of 14,282 in the Catholic population, from 33,951 in 1971 to 48,233 in 1991 (42%). They found that the Protestant population of the Cityside, on the other hand, had decreased over the twenty-year period from 8,459 in 1971 to 1,407 in 1991, a decrease of 7,052 (83%). Overall, Smyth (in TAR Public Discussions, p. 42) detected:

- a change in the ratio of Protestants to Catholics in the city, due to substantial decline in the overall total Protestant population in the city as a whole;
- an internal shift of Protestants from the west to the east banks;
- an increase in internal segregation in two communities, which we suggest may be indicative of a wider trend towards increased segregation.
Having looked at the census statistics for both Cityside and Waterside, the Tempelgrove Study then focused on two specific communities: The Fountain (a largely Protestant community on the Cityside) and Gobniscase (a largely Catholic community on the Waterside).

2.3.3 Population change in The Fountain

In terms of specific areas, the Tempelgrove research presents a snapshot of the situation in the Fountain over the years they studied.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population of the Fountain</th>
<th>% change 1971-1991</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1,282</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>-52.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>-63.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What is notable in this example is that across the twenty-year period, the population of the Fountain fell as a whole from 1,282 in 1971, to 668 in 1981 (the largest drop) to 467 in 1991, an overall decrease of 63.6% of residents across all categories. The 70%-4% decreases in all of the Protestant denominations in the Fountain was almost matched by a decline of 68.5% in the Catholic population, from 203 in 1971 to 64 in 1991.

For the period 1971 – 1981, the total Fountain population declined by 48% from 1,282 in 1971 to 668 in 1981. The Protestant population declined from 1,125 to 507, a fall of 55%, and the Catholic population declined from 203 to 75, a fall of 63%. In other words, a higher proportion of the Catholic population moved out, whereas a higher number of Protestants moved out, due to the much larger Protestant population residing in the Fountain in 1971. The unknown factor in this is the extent to which the 1981 census figures, which are accepted as flawed, have skewed the Catholic population figures.

The Fountain is of course one small part of the Cityside, and as we will consider later, members of the Protestant community lived in – and moved away from - various parts of the Cityside, including the Brooke Park area, Rosemount, Northland, Glen and Belmont areas.

2.4 Who moved and who stayed?

Some sources suggest that where migration took place, the demographics of migration, in terms of who moved and who stayed, were also significant. Shirlow et al. (2005, p. 22) explain:

...what is particularly damaging about this pattern is its selective nature. Murtagh (2002) shows that it tends to be the younger, more mobile and the employed and employable who leave first. Processes of exit can therefore begin a process of residualisation whereby the remaining minority community is more likely to comprise older, benefit-dependent and less socially or spatially mobile people, which further complicates the task of community development.

This suggests that migration, as well as reducing certain populations, can also bring about change in terms of demographic and social profile.

2.5 Where did people migrate to?

The TAR figures (1996, p. 54) suggest that there may have been some migration to the Waterside, which could possibly account for the slight rise in the Waterside Protestant population between 1971 and 1991. TAR (1996, p. 54) notes:

What is evident from an examination of the Cityside and Waterside figures is an internal shift of Protestants from the west to east banks of the city, in the context of an overall decline in the Protestant population of the city of between five to six and a half thousand people.

However, as the decrease in the Cityside Protestant population was not offset by the increase of 1,903 in the Waterside Protestant population, TAR (1996) concluded that the overall trend in population movement was of Protestant movement out of the city area completely. Smyth surmises that many may have moved to Eglinton, Limavady and elsewhere (Smyth in TAR Policy Paper on Planning, January 1996, p. 31). That said, Shirlow, et al. (2005, p. 27) make the point that it is difficult to speculate about the final destination of Protestants who left the Cityside:

For several reasons, it has not been possible to establish if exit from the Cityside has led to a growth in the Protestant population in the Waterside. There is no census data which allows a comparison of place of residence while the impact of non-stating of religion cannot be measured in previous censuses. Therefore, it cannot be determined whether or not there has been a decline of those from a Protestant community background in the Cityside since 1991. Finally, it is impossible to ascertain if the decline among those living in the Cityside who declared their religion as being Protestant is due to mortality, out-migration or a non-stating of religion. What can be stated is that the structure of the Protestant population in the Waterside was heavily influenced by the out-migration of Protestants from the Cityside between 1971 and 1991.

2.6 More recent patterns

Figures produced in more recent years suggest that the migration may have been a time-limited phenomenon, albeit with lasting effects. Murtagh et al. (2005, p. 20) state that:

A common perception exists that the minority unionist/Protestant population within the DDCA81 is in continuing decline due to a combination of out-migration and ageing. The three censuses of population in 1971, 1981 and 1991 all indicated a tendency towards greater segregation and, particularly in areas of the Cityside, clear signs of Protestant population decline.

By the time of the 2001 census, however, Murtagh et al. (2008) found that while the Cityside remained predominantly Catholic and the Waterside almost evenly divided between Protestants and Catholics, the decline of the Protestant population of DDCA had been halted and that there was what Shirlow et al. (2005, p. 21) refer to as “...some degree of convergence in demographic patterns between Catholics and Protestants...” They also refer to the reduction of violence as an enabling factor for Protestants to begin to re-engage with the shopping areas located within Derry/ Londonderry’s Cityside.

81 The project looks at small area statistics on a grid square basis from the 1971, 1981, and 1991 Census by taking into consideration grid squares. The first examination was of the population figures by religion for the entire city area, using a grid square which is approximately bounded by Termon House on the Letterkenny Road in the South West, Drumahoe Bridge in the South East, Thornhill College in the North East and the Sewage Works at Elagh Road in the North West.

82 Derry District Council Area

83 Murtagh et al 2005, p. 22 also outline three problems immediately complicate any comparison of the data from the 1991 and 2001 censuses, such as the an increase in 2001 of those refusing to state religious affiliation; the 2001 census included a question on community background which can be used as an alternative to religious affiliation but makes direct comparison with the 1991 data more difficult; and that the data collection units in 1991 (enumeration districts or EDs) were altered to output areas (OAs) in 2001 with consequent boundary changes.
Section 2: Extent of Migration

Shirlow et al., (2005, p. 4) state:

The study highlights two realities of change in more recent years. First, and despite certain caveats, it seems that the demographic decline of the Protestant population of DDCA has halted. The reduction in violence has also led to a re-engagement with the shopping areas located within Derry / Londonderry's Cityside. The majority of Protestants surveyed also work, and are content to do so, in predominantly Catholic workplaces. Many Protestants, around half, also socialise with non-Protestants on a regular basis. Most of the questionnaire survey respondents had not been direct victims of intimidation or other forms of hostility. Although qualitative information suggests that violence has created a strong sense of fear and intimidation. Secondly, previous violence, the legacy of long-term population decline, and political uncertainty, have all contributed to the reproduction of a strong sense of alienation and exclusion. Despite the halting of the demographic decline, there remains a general mood of cultural and political uncertainty. The overall context, therefore, is one of a powerful but more complex and nuanced sense of alienation and political marginalisation shared by the Protestant population of Derry / Londonderry.

Following the reporting of the 2011 Census figures, Russell (2015) notes that Catholics were outnumbering Protestants on both banks of the River Foyle, but that the Waterside electoral district contained a Protestant majority. Russell states that the 2011 Census showed that the Derry City area included 74.8% of people who belonged to or were brought up in the Catholic religion and 22.3% who belonged to or were brought up in a 'Protestant and Other Christian' religion, up three per cent from 2001.

These statements point to the possibility that the migration may have slowed or even be in reverse and that, in more recent years, Protestants may have begun to re-engage with the city centre. However, as six years have passed since the last census, further research is undoubtedly needed on population figures and behaviours in the present day.

2.7 Summary

In a context of increased segregation in Northern Ireland, the evidence reviewed points to a significant decline in the Protestant population of Derry / Londonderry as a whole, and a more marked drop in the Cityside. The census figures for 1961 to 1971 show that the decline had already started before the period covered by this report, with for example, the Protestant population of the South Ward dropping during that period by 44.7%. The most marked decline in the Protestant population of the Cityside took place in the period 1971 – 1981, and continued to decline in 1981 – 1991. In the Cityside between 1971 and 1981, the Protestant population fell from 8,459 in 1971 to 2,874 in 1981 (a decrease of 66%) (Smyth in TAR Public Discussions, pp. 36-37). The figures show that, over the full twenty-year period studied by TAR, the Protestant population of the Cityside decreased from 8,459 in 1971 to 1,407 in 1991, a decrease of 7,052 (83%). The sources suggest that Protestants who moved away from the Cityside did not all move to the Waterside, as the increase in the Protestant population of the Waterside does not counter-balance the numbers leaving the Cityside. Whilst there is caution in the sources about where Protestants moved to, some suggest destinations such as Limavady, Eglinton, and Craigavon. More recent research suggests that the trend has stopped or may be in reverse: further study is needed to assess the extent to which this is the case.

The next section of this report gives an overview of the factors which the sources suggest contributed to the migration.

Section 3: Why did it happen?

3.1 Introduction

The various sources suggest that the factors influencing Protestant migration from the west bank of Derry / Londonderry during the period under study are complex, multi-layered, and often interrelated. Whilst there is consensus on the figures for Protestant migration between 1971 and 1981, and 1981 to 1991, as noted earlier, there are differing narratives and differing emphases across the sources as to the factors contributing to it. This section gives an overview of those factors, whilst the remainder of the report takes the most significant factors and explores each in greater detail. First, we consider the state of community relations in the city prior to the conflict.

3.2 Pre-conflict community relations in Derry / Londonderry

As noted in Section 1, in Northern Ireland, housing segregation was not a phenomenon which started in 1969, nor indeed was it confined to Derry / Londonderry. That said, housing in certain parts of the Cityside was somewhat mixed from at least the early twentieth century. For example, Temple and Baker (2012) point out that according to the Street Directory 1961, it is clear that Fairman Place, off Academy Road, had a Protestant majority and that Nicholson Terrace, also off Academy Road, lists a mixed residency, with RUC officers named and occupations stated in the Directory (pp. 85-86). They point to a number of cross-community events in Brooke Park, including summer concerts in the early – mid 1950s which ‘attracted bands from both sides of the political and religious divide’ (p. 46) and observe (p. 84):

Clearly, from the in-depth interviews we have completed, there emerges a picture of the Rosedown area (around Brooke Park) as a very integrated community where for example Catholic and Protestant young people played together and socialised together.

Shirlow et al. (2005, p. 59) also point to the state of relationships between communities prior to the conflict: “Former Cityside Protestants often spoke warmly of the good neighbourliness that existed between them and Catholics before the Troubles”. Curran (1986, p. 27) also notes the positive aspects of pre-conflict relations:

One of the peculiarities about Derry was that the political cleavage was mitigated by surprisingly good personal relations between Protestants and Catholics. Through the forties, fifties and early sixties, the communities had their demarcation lines, but co-operated socially and in sport, and the sectarian riots that were endemic to other areas of the North were almost unknown in the city.

That said, there is no doubt that beneath the surface, divisions existed. Temple and Baker recognise that the sharing of streets, and even good neighbourly relations, did not equate to the full integration of people’s lives. They note (p. 86):

The picture presented by our interviewees of a neighbourly integrated (...) community breaks down somewhat when interviewees speak of where they were schooled, where they went to church and of their membership of separate institutions and organizations. Clearly each community had its own separate and significantly large institutions.

Community divisions were in evidence during the visit of Queen Elizabeth II to Brooke Park in 1953. Temple and Baker (p 44) note that the Derry Journal on Monday 7 July 1953 reported:

The visitors had little opportunity of seeing much of the city and none at all of discovering that two thirds of the
Section 3: Why did it happen?

Population took no part in the welcome extended to them. The main procession route was short. It lay from the Guildhall via Waterloo Place, a few yards of Strand Road, and Great James Street to Brooke Park and back to the Guildhall. Not very far away lay the Nationalist area of the city, un-decorated and unruffled by the British visitation, carrying on business as usual. / The force of R.U.C. on duty was bigger than ever before in Derry's history – and the city is not unfamiliar with large police concentrations.

Curran (1986, p. 12) notes that although there was something of a hiatus during the war, discontent continued amongst Nationalists throughout the 1950s. Protest marches in 1951 and 1952 were banned, and those who did march were batoned and dispersed by police. He notes that even by the end of the 1950s, relations within the Corporation were increasingly acrimonious (p. 18). By the mid-late 60s, this was evidenced in increasing public attendance at Corporation meetings, and interest was gathering from British MPs. For example, in November 1966, the Nationalist party launched ‘a citizen’s protest against the gerrymander’ (pp. 52-53).

Clearly, while there was some degree of street level integration, the communities remained separated both by institutions and by affiliation, and at the level of the Corporation, political tensions were building.

3.3 Overview of the factors contributing to migration

The TAR Field Survey notes the complexity of the issues in relation to Protestant migration, and cautions against presenting them as “straightforward or simple” (TAR Field Survey, 1996, p. 9):

Migration occurs for a variety of reasons, and sometimes a combination of several reasons: upward mobility; acquisition of better housing; employment; decline of the area due to vandalism, redevelopment, as well as fear, intimidation and sectarian issues.

In its Public Discussions report, TAR (p. 38) cites the results of the Londonderry District Analysis of the Regional Household Survey 1978 which outlined reasons why people (both Protestant and Catholic) moved house in the year 1978. According to that survey, the most significant reason for moving was that the existing dwelling was too small (44%). 42% stated that they moved in order to be in a better social environment. Only 2% (105 respondents) gave religious or political reasons for their move. Smyth (in TAR Public Discussions, p. 38) acknowledges that the 42% moving in search of a better environment could be influenced by sectarian division, but concludes that: “It is clear from Table 10 that economic reasons, or housing conditions predominate as reasons to move”.

The TAR’s own Field Survey (1996) found that around three quarters of respondents in both the Fountain and Gobnascale felt that their decision to stay in or leave their area was their own choice – although the percentage of respondents from the Fountain who felt they had a free choice was slightly lower than the percentage in Gobnascale (74% as against 76%) (TAR Field Survey, pp. 31–32). Regarding the Fountain in particular, TAR (1996, p. 81), found that social, economic and housing issues appeared to dominate people’s reasons for moving:

Our preliminary inquiries indicate that a variety of factors appear to be involved in this depopulation: redevelopment; the housing market; a particular form of housing blight; and sectarian issues including violence and intimidation.

Shirlow et al’s 2005 study present a different emphasis, in that they cite increased violence as the core contributor to out-migration, whilst acknowledging that there may be many other reasons, largely related to economic decline, which may have had an impact and Shirlow et al. (2005, p 20-21) write:

Between 1971 and 1991 the Protestant population of the Cityside declined by 83.4%, a process that was matched by a 27% growth of the Protestant population in the Waterside. This latter trend has generally been explained as being due, in the main, to out-migration of Protestants from the Cityside. The catalyst for such out-migration was usually increased violence and a subsequent deterritorialisation of spatially vulnerable population.

Whilst acknowledging the effects of Republican violence, Murtagh et al. (2008, p 47) also suggest that to solely focus on this, “...precludes other understandings of that decline due to social mobility and de-industrialisation, and also omits the nature of state and loyalist violence”.

Indeed few sources attribute the migration to one single underlying reason, with the exception of Kingsley, who in his Londonderry Revisited (1989, p. 266), attributes Protestant migration to one factor: “Republicans had their own solution: drive the Protestants off the west bank of the Foyle”.

This notion of an orchestrated campaign against Protestants by the Catholic / Nationalist population was later picked up by DUP politicians such as for example Jeffrey Donaldson and Gregory Campbell. Donaldson, in his 1994 article in the Ulster Review on Protestant migration in the border regions, recognises that “...there has been a similar impact upon Roman Catholics living in various parts of Northern Ireland” (p.8) but considers that (p. 9):

The Protestant population on the west bank of the Foyle has been deliberately and systematically purged to such an extent that there are not enough Unionist votes on the west bank to elect a single Unionist representative to the City Council.

Donaldson (1994, pp. 9–10) proposes one reason for this movement, “The violence and intimidation which drives these Protestants from their homes manifests itself in a number of ways” and he goes on to describe “...murder, and direct and indirect forms of intimidation”. He sees these as manifestations of “genocide”;

“a subtle campaign orchestrated and directed by the faceless mafioso which runs the IRA”, and as “ethnic cleansing” (p. 10). This is an opinion piece of course, and may well be based upon real experiences of real people experiencing violence and moving away. However, the article does not attend to any other factors which might impact on the choices people make on where to live. The theme of ethnic cleansing has also been adopted by Gregory Campbell for example in an article on the DUP website of 21 July 201310, and in Peto and Cunningham’s 2007 Exodus documentary, in which he speaks of a “...deliberate, co-ordinated and brutal assault on the community, their religious beliefs, their traditions and their outlook”.

Anderson and Shuttleworth (1998, p. 193) take a different view, and caution against what they refer to as “sectarian readings” of for example census statistics. They state that sectarian explanations of population change are often very partial and can be completely erroneous and that any serious explanation of migration would have to consider the impact of economic and social changes in production and consumption and the motives for migration, not necessarily covered in the Census of Population. Anderson et al. (2005, p. 1) state that analysis of census data in Northern Ireland has tended to emphasise

...sectarian political motivations and systematically down-played or excluded ‘non-sectarian’ socio-economic factors. Sectarian factors can be important but they rarely operate in isolation and it is often difficult to establish just how important (or unimportant) they are.

Southern, however (2007, p. 173) makes the point that the impact of sectarianism cannot be ignored:

10 Parades Commissioner in Denial over Protestant exodus from Londonderry. DUP.com. 21 July 2013

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The firm empirical fact of a significant movement of Protestants from the Cityside creates an important historical framework within which the issue of Protestant alienation in the city can be explored. Simply to conclude that the deluge of Protestants who left the Cityside did so for reasons unrelated to sectarianism would certainly lack plausibility.

Certainly, the role of conflict, fear and intimidation in influencing people’s decision to move away from the west bank has featured in a number of sources. For example, the interviews carried out by Burgess in advance of producing his Exodus play, and testimonies in Petó and Cunningham’s 2007 documentary (also entitled Exodus) and in TAR’s Hammered in and Hacking It (1996), point to personal examples of intimidation, violence, and an atmosphere of fear. These sources highlight the impact for many of close proximity to city centre rioting and violence, the anxiety caused by Bloody Sunday, and the fear generated by the targeting of members of the security forces, which many Protestants saw as the targeting of their own community.

In Michael Hall’s 1999 research, his contributors (members of the Protestant community, including community workers) discuss a range of reasons for what he describes as Protestant alienation in the city, including the perception that Protestant people, symbols and culture are made unwelcome on the Cityside, and they also point to poor Protestant and Unionist leadership, and low levels of community capacity within Protestant areas at the time. The discourse is one of unsettlement from what had been a secure position within the city, the loss of a sense of belonging, and an accompanying sense of alienation, even from locations within the city which held special significance for Protestants.

Connected to this is the political and contextual reality of Derry / Londonderry prior to the time under study, of which a range of sources have helped to paint a picture including Bardon (1992) and McKay (2000). The picture is one of the end of Unionist minority control over the city in terms of political representation and control over housing and planning, and linked to this, a failure of Unionist leadership to find ways to understand and constructively represent the Protestant working class people of the city. A further contributory factor appears to have been the re-calibration of power and control in Derry / Londonderry to democratically reflect the majority community, and the response to necessary reforms by the leaders of Unionism.

3.4 Summary

The evidence shows that a number of complex and often inter-related factors contributed to Protestant migration from the west bank of Derry / Londonderry from 1969–1980 in particular. They point to: a fundamental shift in the position of Protestants within the city; safety and security issues; poor and limited housing on the Cityside and the availability of better housing elsewhere; the policy of skewing economic development and investment away from Derry / Londonderry and towards centres east of the Bann, and the lack of constructive leadership which could bring about a positive and effective assertion of Protestant identity in a changing landscape.

Numerically significant studies such as TAR and Shirlow et al. indicate that direct intimidation does not feature in their research as the sole or main reason for migration. However, research which includes personal stories, by its very nature has sought out individuals who have experiences to share. For many of these, conflict related issues, whether proximity to violence or direct or indirect intimidation represented the central reason for moving. For others, housing redevelopment and upward mobility provided the impetus, and often combined with the spiralling conflict to provide a complex and multi-layered rationale for migration.

The next section of this report considers the situation and status of Protestants within the city in terms of the shift from minority to majority rule in Derry / Londonderry.

Section 4: A shift in position

4.1 Introduction

This section considers the changes experienced by the Protestant and Unionist community in Derry / Londonderry at the beginning of the period under review. Many of the reforms achieved by the Civil Rights movement in the late 1960s had repercussions for the position that Protestants had held in Derry / Londonderry for decades. These changes meant a change to electoral arrangements, and changes to control over planning and allocation of housing, as well as reforms to policing. This section considers the implications of such changes for the position of the Protestant community in Derry / Londonderry during this time.

4.2 The position of Protestants in Northern Ireland

Protestants had been in the majority in Northern Ireland since the foundation of the state in 1921. The vast majority of the sources consulted agree that prior to the outbreak of the conflict, and under Unionist rule at Stormont and at local council level, Catholics were significantly disadvantaged in relation to electoral practices, public and private employment, public housing, regional policy, and policing (see, amongst others Wichert, 1991, Ruane and Todd, 1996, Hennessy 1997). During that time many aspects of the operation of the state benefited Protestants more than Catholics. For example, Kaufmann (2011) refers to the Protestant domination of Stormont and a control of local government through gerrymandering which permitted them to direct the resources of the British Treasury toward Protestants. Whyte (in Gallagher and O’Connell, 1983) produced a list of fields where discrimination was practised and ranked them from the greatest level of discrimination to the least. These were: electoral practices, public employment, policing, private employment, public housing, and regional policy.

The Campaign for Social Justice (CSJ) (which foreshadowed the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association – NICRA) began to demand liberal reforms including the removal of discrimination in the allocation of jobs and houses, permanent emergency legislation and electoral abuses. The campaign was modelled on the Civil Rights campaign in the United States, involving protests, marches, sit-ins and the use of the media to publicise minority grievances. The government-established Cameron Commission in 1969 found that the Civil Rights campaigners were justified in their grievances and considered that their interest was in rights and equality, and that they were “...not concerned, as organisations, with altering the constitutional structure of Northern Ireland, and in this sense represent a quite new development among Catholic activists” (Cameron, Paragraph 12). In other words there were growing signs that Catholics in Northern Ireland were prepared to accept equality within Northern Ireland rather than espouse the more traditional aim of securing a united Ireland.

4.3 The position of Protestants in Derry / Londonderry

While Protestants remained a majority in Northern Ireland as a whole, in Derry / Londonderry, their position was different – they were in fact the minority community in a Catholic and Nationalist majority city. According to Patterson and Kaufmann (2007, p. 44):

A sense of being under siege and the imminence of an anti-partisionist assault on the state was by far the most strongly developed in the west and south of the province: in the city of Londonderry and in counties Tyrone, Fermanagh and Armagh. These were areas where the Protestant and Catholic populations were either finely balanced or where Protestants were in the minority and Unionist political control was only maintained by a mixture of the manipulation of electoral boundaries and a restricted local government franchise...Four of the
seven Unionist seats in Derry, Fermanagh and Tyrone were vulnerable to Nationalism and border Unionists were intensely concerned with any government policies on the attraction of new industries which might affect prejudicially the religious balance.

Despite Catholics being in the majority, Protestants had for decades controlled the Londonderry Corporation (the local authority) and matters related to housing. Deeply related to housing was the opportunity to vote. Control of housing, and denial of housing to Catholics, therefore had a wider significance as only householders and their wives were permitted to vote. Particularly in areas where the Protestant and Catholic populations were close in number, or where Catholics were in a majority, gerrymandering (manipulation of electoral boundaries) was used to ensure that electoral wards were drawn in such a way as to ensure a Unionist majority (Bardon, 1992, pp. 638-639; Curran, 1986, pp. 6-9).

4.3.1 Electoral control

In the time immediately leading up to the period under review, Derry / Londonderry was led and controlled by the Unionist minority. According to Bardon (1992, p. 638):

The most striking example of gerrymandering was Londonderry City – Unionist controlled, though, as the Cameron report pointed out, the adult population was composed of 20,102 Catholics and 10,274 Protestants in 1966. The restriction of the franchise to ratepayers gave 14,429 Catholics and 8,781 Protestants the right to vote. The careful manipulation of boundaries ensured Unionist control: in the South ward, 10,047 Catholics and 1,138 Protestants elected 8 Nationalist councillors; in the North ward, 3,946 Protestants and 2,530 Catholics elected 8 Unionist councillors; and in the Waterside ward, 3,697 Protestants and 1,852 Catholics returned 4 Unionist councillors.

As Bardon points out, control over a local authority meant control over making appointments to local authority jobs, so this had an impact on employment as well. The 1965 CSJ Report points to the composition of staff within what it describes as Derry County Borough as at 1 April 1964. All 15 heads of department, including Town Clerk, City Accountant, City Solicitor, were Protestant (CSJ 1965, p. 6). Protestants in the city therefore tended to have more and better employment opportunities in the period before 1969.

4.3.2 Allocation of housing

As well as voting and representation, allocation of houses tended to be to the advantage of Protestants, as highlighted by Cameron (1969, Paragraph 37) and CSJ (1969, p. 20), and as Bardon (1992, p. 648) puts it:

Housing rapidly was becoming the central issue in Derry, where local Unionists were resisting an unanswerable case for extending the city boundary for fear that the electoral balance would be tipped enough to lose them control of the corporation. Between 1946 and 1967 Derry had built only 70 new houses per 1,000 of the population compared with 144 for Newry, 109 for Coleraine and 140 for Larne. In the year ending May 1967 only seven corporation houses had been completed and the executive sanitary officer reported soon after that over one thousand homes in the city were occupied by more than one family; and in 1968 only four corporation houses had been built before the corporation was wound up in November.

References have been made to the power of the Unionist Mayor to allocate houses in accordance with his personal judgement (see for example, Melaugh, 1995 and O’Dochartaigh, 1999). Because of how allocations were made, Protestants had a better chance of being housed, although, as will be explored later, not all Protestants felt better off than their Catholic counterparts (see Section 6).

4.3.3 Policing

The police force in Northern Ireland in the late 1960s was almost exclusively Protestant. The 1969 CSJ report cites 1967 figures indicating that the RUC comprised 3000 staff, 10% of whom were Catholic. The Ulster Special Constabulary, known as the B-Specials, had 11,300 members, with all described as Protestants and mainly from the Orange Order (CSJ 1969, p. 7), a body which Bardon (1992, p. 478) describes as “...an officially sanctioned Protestant paramilitary force”. It was perhaps not surprising then that the police and associated security forces were seen by many as an intrinsic part of the Protestant community.

The impact of this imbalance was demonstrated to devastating effect during the policing of Civil Rights marches. The Civil Rights march in the city on 5 October 1968 is considered a turning point in Northern Ireland history with marchers set upon by police, the indiscriminate use of water cannon, and scenes of police brutality against marchers broadcast around the world (Bardon, pp. 654-655; Cameron, Paragraph 171). Worse was to follow as a Civil Rights march passed Burntollet Bridge outside the city on 4 January 1969. According to Bardon (1992, pp. 659-661), loyalist hordes, encouraged by Ian Paisley’s right-hand man Major Bunting, ambushed marchers with truck-loads of stones and crates of bottles prepared, and the police did nothing. As marchers proceeded to the Guildhall, Bardon (1992, p. 661) records:

As darkness fell police discipline collapsed: twenty constables burst into Welworth’s supermarket, smashed glass counters and batoned customers; and a large Reserve RUC force invaded the Bogsie, threw bricks through windows, smashed down doors, pelted people with stones and sang sectarian songs into the early hours of Sunday morning.

On Saturday 19 April 1969, a Civil Rights gathering in the Guildhall Square was attacked by missiles from Shipquay Street and rioting followed. That night the home of a local Bogside man, Sammy Devenny, not involved in the rioting in any way, was raided by members of the RUC and he was severely beaten, sustaining injuries which caused his death on 17 July 1969 (McClean, 1983, pp. 69 -73; Curran, 1986, p. 127).

The handling of the Civil Rights marches and demonstrations by the RUC and the B-Specials had an immediate impact on them. In August 1969, the Hunt14 report was commissioned. Its recommendations on policing were published on 10 October, announcing that the Ulster Special Constabulary was to be disbanded, the RUC to be disarmed, and the new part time force (eventually the Ulster Defence Regiment) to be established (Bardon, 1992, p. 674).

The 1969 Cameron report, authored by the Honourable John Cameron, D.S.C., J. Henry Biggart and J.J. Campbell, was the result of an enquiry into the circumstances and events surrounding the 5 October 1968 march. Cameron (Paragraph 178) is scathing in its criticism of the conduct of both RUC and B-Specials stating:

...the conduct of the police on this occasion in Londonderry was an immediate and contributing cause of the disorders which subsequently occurred, as well as providing a direct impetus for the setting up in the Bogside area of so called ‘Free Derry’ and its continuance for several days – itself a serious challenge to the authorities responsible for the maintenance of law and order.

The report urged substantial reforms, not only in policing but in a range of aspects of public life.

14 The Hunt Report, presented in October 1969, followed an inquiry into Northern Ireland’s police forces – the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the Ulster Special Constabulary (USC). The report made several recommendations, the most significant of which was that the B Specials should be disbanded.
4.4 Reforms and continued unrest

Bardon (1992, p. 657) refers to that prior to either report, and following pressure from Downing Street, on Friday 22 November 1968, Captain Terence O'Neill, the then Prime Minister, had announced a programme of wide-ranging reform consisting of:

- The introduction of a fair points system by local councils;
- The appointment of an Ombudsman to investigate grievances;
- The abolition of the ‘company vote’ on local government election;
- A review of the Special Powers Act; and
- The setting up of the Londonderry Development Commission to replace the Londonderry Corporation.

This was followed by a television broadcast by O'Neill on 9 December. However, many of the proposed reforms were considered not to go far enough by Civil Rights supporters (CSJ 1969, p. 18; McClean, 1983, p. 161) whilst on the Unionist side, the reforms faced a persistent vein of opposition. The Civil Rights movement became more polarized with some of the more moderate voices withdrawing and a stronger republican voice taking hold (Bardon, 1992, pp. 664-665). The Free Derry Wall was established, and the Bogside barricaded. The police were armed, and 500 soldiers were brought into Northern Ireland in April 1969 (Bardon, 1992, p. 665). As trouble grew in Belfast in July, the Derry Citizens’ Action Committee was supplanted by the more militant Derry Citizens’ Defence Association, and the Bogside was barricaded again, marking the beginning of the Battle of the Bogside (12-14 August 1969) which followed unrest at the annual Apprentice Boys parade. Missiles were thrown on all sides, and the RUC and loyalists tried to remove barricades blocking entry to the Bogside. During the battle, the police fired tear gas, Rosemount RUC station was set on fire, a Protestant street was barricaded at both ends and Bardon (1992, pp. 666, 668) writes “…inhabitants were forced to scramble for safety over back walls” and a Methodist hostel was petrol bombed.

4.5 Loss of symbolic position

Whilst it is now widely accepted that Unionist minority control and discrimination against Catholics had to be redressed, it is important to consider the impact that the Civil Rights movement, the reforms it had begun to achieve, and the response of their leaders had on ordinary Protestant people living in the Cityside of Derry / Londonderry. The Cameron report, whilst upholding the demands of the Civil Rights movement and recommending reforms, acknowledges Unionist fears (Cameron, Paragraph 150). The Protestant people in Northern Ireland occupied a position in society in which they were given to understand that the government was “their” government and that it looked after them. As Holloway (in TAR Public Discussions, 1996, pp. 49-50) states:

With the establishment of a Protestant state for a Protestant people – in opposition to a Catholic state for a Catholic people – the loyalist community was led to believe that the state was for them and bestowed meaningful privilege upon them.

The symbolic position in society inhabited by Protestants was embodied in a number of institutions and processes which were in the late 1960s and early 1970s being challenged and changed. The reforms meant more than better access to electoral representation or housing for Catholics: they also meant the disbandment of organisations such as the B-Specials, and the Londonderry Corporation, which, because of their imbalanced composition, had come to feel like important components of the Protestant community.

Furthermore, when the Stormont power structure was taken away in 1972, the symbol of Unionist power as the sole governing party since the Government of Ireland Act in 1920 had effectively disappeared (Bardon, 1992, p. 689).

Even as early as 1970, Protestants in the city were manifesting their concern about the intentions of the British government, given the proposed reforms. A Londonderry Sentinel (15/10/70) article regarding the visit of then Home Secretary James Callaghan, describes "Cheers in Bogside – Boos in Fountain for ‘Big Jim’", referring to the warm welcome he received in the Bogside. The article stated that he was "...left in no doubt about the feelings of the people on the Hunt Report...and he left without speaking to a soul." The article reports that people shouted "the Bogside gets everything" and that "You Mr Callaghan, are the modern Lundy".

When the Civil Rights movement achieved a number of reforms, framed by Unionist leaders as an assault on Protestant position and identity, a loss of symbolic position occurred, even for those working-class Protestants who felt that they were no better off in real terms than their Catholic neighbours.

And of course, on a local level in Derry / Londonderry, the reforms meant that the Nationalist majority city would move from Unionist minority control to Nationalist majority control of the city institutions. The British Government abolished both the Londonderry Corporation and the Londonderry Rural District Council, replacing them with the Londonderry Development Commission. A system of Single Transferable Vote (STV) was introduced which resulted in a majority of councillors from Nationalist and Republican parties being elected, with the SDLP consistently being the largest party in Derry / Londonderry throughout the 1970s.

The 1973 Sunningdale Agreement, which aimed to establish a power-sharing Executive in Northern Ireland and a cross-border Council of Ireland, added to Unionist fears that the Civil Rights movement was about more than equality, and was in fact a step along the way to a United Ireland. The city's Protestants also saw the loss of a key symbol in the topping of the Walker Monument, which had been erected in 1828, by an IRA explosion in the same year according to the Londonderry Sentinel (29/8/73). The pillar was an object of affection for Unionists, and had been the focal point for Relief of Derry celebrations, but was regarded by the city's Catholic majority as tangible evidence of Unionist and Protestant ascendancy.

In addition, some of the customs and symbols held most dear to Derry / Londonderry unionists were impacted by steps taken to avoid confrontation given the record of disruption and violence associated with previous demonstrations and counter demonstrations. For example, according to Deutsch and Magowan (1973, p. 72), the Apprentice Boys’ celebrations planned for Wednesday 12 August 1970 were banned:

The Apprentice boys’ celebrations ended in Derry with army units firing CS gas when some Protestant marchers climbed among the girders of Craigavon Bridge over the Foyle in an attempt to cross into the city, Nearly 2,500 troops and 700 regular police officers and UDR men were on duty”. They add that on Thursday 13 August "The RUC said that summorses had been issued against members of the Apprentice Boys who contravened the ban in Derry and Belfast.

In a city such as Derry / Londonderry, the necessary and inevitable redressing of inequalities meant an almost immediate change to the landscape of power and control – the position of the Protestant people was now less certain and secure, and may have felt like more than a symbolic loss. Combined with the civil unrest in the environs of the city centre, this shift in position must have had a tangible impact on the extent of Protestant Migration from the West Bank of Derry / Londonderry 1969-1980
Section 4: A shift in position

4.6 Protestants and Civil Rights

Whilst it is evident that Catholics bore the brunt of systemic disadvantage, many sources point out that some poor Protestant working class people felt no better off than Catholic working-class people in terms for example of housing conditions. In his contribution to the research by TAR (TAR Public Discussions, 1996, p. 11) Alistair Wilson said:

In my late teens, a new phrase was on everyone’s lips, - that of civil rights – and we, myself included, were told that we were privileged, that I had more opportunities and more benefits than others, because of my religion. I was informed that, because I was a Protestant, a unionist and by choice gave my allegiance to the British monarch, I had more rights than my counterparts on the nationalist side. This I found hard to accept, as, - living in a two up, two down house, in what would now be described as a ghetto which was shared with nine other family members, with no heating except a fireplace in one room, no running hot water, and a toilet at the back of the yard, - I certainly didn’t feel privileged...

However, some of the research hints at the possibility (and the difficulty) of the Civil Rights Movement becoming a cross-community movement, based on improving the rights of all those living in situations of disadvantage. Holloway (in TAR Public Discussions, 1996, p. 50) refers to Loyalist acceptance that there was anti-Catholic discrimination, stating:

That the government didn’t do right by its Catholic citizens is accepted, but what is being questioned by loyalism is the extent it did right by them. There is now a growing perception that if the state was for anyone, it was for the professional and ruling classes. This reflects one of the greatest tragedies of the troubles, that class inequalities have been ignored, while sectarianism has hogged the limelight.

He considers that for working class loyalists, the employment, housing and even the voting allocation system based on ability to pay rates, meant that they were almost no better off than Catholics. He considers that there was a missed opportunity to join with the Civil Rights movement before it became associated with sectionalism, in order to pursue working class rights (Holloway in TAR Public Discussions, 1996, pp. 50-51). Speaking of Hume’s emphasis on equality, Curran (1986, p 58) writes:

The hope was that a civil rights movement would be accepted as an honest attempt to create a society of equals without making an assault on the constitutional status of the state.

That said, Hall’s 1999 report is useful in highlighting a number of reasons for the Protestant working class’s unwillingness to throw their weight behind or trust the emergent Civil Rights movement in 1968-69 (Hall, 1999, p. 6). These include the centuries-long historical context in which the Civil Rights movement, and subsequently, the conflict, emerged. One of the contributors in Hall (1999, p. 6) commented:

In '69, once the street troubles began and Nationalists started to agitate, ordinary working-class Protestants, even if they could maybe identify with the social and economic demands, saw a hidden political agenda behind it all. We saw people trying to overthrow the state, trying to overthrow our community, and that posed a threat to us.

Another contributor (1999, pp. 18-19) stated:

...the Civil Rights Association wasn’t just seen as civil rights, it was viewed at that time as a Republican plot which was being orchestrated to try and destroy the state of Northern Ireland and that was why the Unionist people objected to those marches taking place.

This fear was exacerbated by the joining of the Civil Rights movement by more aggressive forces. Whilst the Civil Rights leaders were unequivocal in their condemnation of IRA violence, and distanced themselves from IRA activities, it was impossible for them to keep out more militant forces, and presented difficulties for more moderate Catholics. In Petro and Cunningham’s Exodus documentary (2007), Willie Temple remarked that Protestants saw the Civil Rights movement as a “Republican orientated movement”. Kingsley (1989, p. 136) considered that the distancing of the Civil Rights movement from the border issue was a ploy:

The tactical aim of the ‘civil rights’ leadership was to focus attention on non-constitutional issues to try and convince as many gullible British politicians and liberal Protestants as possible to support them.

These views were encouraged by the leaders of Unionism at a Northern Ireland level (see Section 8 for more detail). For leaders such as Ian Paisley, the goal was to stoke sectarian violence against the Civil Rights movement which they portrayed as a Republican conspiracy, a thinly veiled attempt to achieve constitutional change, and as an aggressive assault on Protestant identity and even existence.

The impact of this was that for many poor Protestants, their eye was taken off social issues, and placed firmly on the future of Northern Ireland. For any Protestant leaders who did seek to build bridges between the plight of poor Catholics and that of poor Protestants, the road was a difficult and unenviable one. McKay points to the experience of Ivan Cooper (McKay, 2000, pp. 310-312). Ivan Cooper entered politics, supporting a working-class Protestant from Drumahoe who was challenging the local UUP candidate because of a range of social issues including poor housing. Cooper recalled being called “a traitor” and “a Lundy” (McKay, 2000, p. 312) and remarked: “Overnight I was denounced and estranged” (McKay, 2000, p. 314). Cooper sums up the leadership of mainstream Unionism:

The Unionist establishment had so conditioned people into thinking that this was a republican communist plot, that Ulster was under threat, and in the middle of it all was this young Protestant man and he was a Lundy. They were conditioned into thinking that it wasn’t about social issues, or about the fact that you lived in a dump, all it was, was about Ulster and Ulster’s future.

4.7 Conclusion

The evidence indicates that the position of Protestants in Derry / Londonderry in the period under review was becoming less certain and less comfortable than it had been before, with power imbalances beginning to be redressed across a range of issues. Nationalists gained control of the Council, and the housing system was reformed to prevent discrimination and to permit development of new housing. The security forces
with which many Protestants strongly identified were exposed for their handling of Civil Rights marches, as a result of which significant reforms ensued. Symbolically, the close affinity which Protestants felt for the city centre was being challenged, and a sense of belonging and indeed ownership eroded. For those Protestants in poverty, any small possibility of joining with the Civil Rights movement in order to improve their living conditions was stymied by a leadership which framed it as a Republican conspiracy aimed at destroying Protestant identity, and further eroded by the increasing interest the Republican movement was taking in it. All of this amounted to a significant shift in position from minority rule and control over housing, employment and other issues vital to daily life, to a system of nationalist majority rule with a fairer system of housing allocation. This must arguably have challenged the Protestant community’s sense of ownership and belonging, particularly in the Cityside, where Catholics and Nationalists were in a more concentrated majority. In such a context, the decision to move away from the west bank was taken by many.

Section 5: Security and Safety

5.1 Introduction

This section looks across a range of indicators relating to safety and security. It considers major turning points, and direct and indirect violence and intimidation towards individuals, businesses and churches. The events outlined in this section will have had serious implications for the safety and security of all those living in and around the city centre, both Catholic and Protestant, and death, injury and suffering was experienced by people from all backgrounds at the hands of paramilitary organisations, and the security forces. Our focus in this report, however, is on the impact of these events on Protestant migration away from the Cityside.

5.2 Turning points – Internment and Bloody Sunday

The Bogside, a residential area close to the city centre, had already seen severe rioting in 1968 and early 1969, due to dissatisfaction with the banning or re-routing of Civil Rights marches and subsequent police mishandling of marches which did proceed, during which members of the RUC raided homes and, on 19 April 1969, caused fatal injuries to Sammy Devenny. The Battle of the Bogside (12-14 August 1969) saw days of further unrest again close to the city centre and other residential areas in which both Protestants and Catholics lived.

In Peto and Cunningham’s Exodus documentary, Jeanette Warke and Gregory Campbell recall Protestants being threatened and intimidated and thereby “put out” of their homes at the time. In the same production, Eamonn McCann recalls going around Protestant houses, and indeed going public to denounce the attacks and telling people they would stand beside them, but he notes that many Protestants asked him to stop drawing attention to the matter.

1971 saw a ramping up of the Provisional IRA’s15 violent campaign across NI, a move which was not roundedly supported by the whole nationalist or republican community, with, for example, the Central Citizen’s Defence Committee in Belfast collecting 50,000 signatures for a petition calling on the IRA to stop the war. Meanwhile the loyalist response was the torture and assassination of Catholics (Bardon, 1992, pp. 683-694).

The introduction of internment in August 1971 led to a spiral of events which were to set the course of the conflict in Northern Ireland for years to come, and which were to have a deep impact on the city centre of Derry / Londonderry. Internment targeted for mass arrest and detention without trial individuals suspected of involvement in the IRA and also members of the legal left-wing organisation known as People’s Democracy. The decision was taken not to include members of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), which had committed a number of acts of violence between 1969 and 197116. Bardon (1992, p. 682) points to the deep flaws in the policy: “Internment was entirely one-sided. No attempt was made to arrest loyalist suspects despite the UVF’s record of violence”. Only Nationalists were targeted. The introduction of internment was the catalyst for many middle-class Catholics to become more active in the Civil Rights movement (McClean, 1983, p. 118) and was a contributor to polarization of the communities.

The reaction to internment was severe, intercommunal violence heightened, the IRA stepped up its campaign of bombing and shooting, loyalist violence escalated across Northern Ireland with Catholics targeted, and the situation now had the hallmarks of a deeply dangerous conflict. There was an immediate impact in terms of population displacement across Northern Ireland. According to Bardon (1992, p. 683):

15 The Provisional IRA formed as a result of a split in the IRA in December 1969.
During the month of August there were thirty-five violent deaths and around one hundred explosions. About seven thousand Catholics sought refuge in Dublin and in Irish Army camps and several hundred Protestants moved to Liverpool for safety.

Bardon (1992, p. 683) notes the work of Francis Pinter and Bob Overy who studied residential displacement in the weeks following internment. They noticed a significant change in the way that population shifts were occurring in Belfast in that even mixed areas were beginning to segregate:

The nature of the movement of population this August has differed greatly from the major upheaval which unsettled the Belfast community in August 1969... On this occasion the Army 'Peace Line' dividing the strongly segregated areas appears to have been effective at least in preventing further significant displacement of population, and the major upheaval has transferred to the mixed areas which were formerly thought to serve as 'buffer zones' guaranteeing stability.

Whilst his focus here is on Belfast, the implications are clear – the once mixed areas which could be relied upon to remain stable in peace time, were now in fact on the front line. A contributor to Burgess (2011, p 97) described events of August 1971 which happened at the time of internment. As a result of a barricade being erected between Gordon Place and Windmill Terrace, Protestants in Gordon Place were unable to get in or out of their homes. The contributor states that "...by 4 o'clock in the morning, thirteen families had been evacuated".

In addition to the demands of the Civil Rights movement which had foregrounded housing and the franchise, new issues related to fairness in policing and justice were at the top of the agenda. On Sunday 30 January 1972, an estimated 15,000 people took part in a Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association march against internment, in defiance of a government ban, with a route planned from Creggan through the Bogside to Guildhall Square. Loyalists had planned a counter-demonstration in Guildhall Square to coincide with it, so the Civil Rights march was banned and organisers told that they would not be allowed to get to Guildhall Square. The Civil Rights Association were determined to proceed with a peaceful march, and had made their views on violence clear to the IRA. According to Raymond McClean who wrote an account of the day, it became clear that the IRA would stay away (McClearn, 1983, pp. 127–128).

The Parachute Regiment was deployed at the Bogside, firing rounds, and the deaths of fourteen innocent and unarmed people – all from Catholic / Nationalist backgrounds – resulted from their actions, as well as multiple injuries (Bardon, 1992, p. 687).

The event was immediately followed by violent protest and counter protest, and ultimately led to the British government provoking Stormont and installing a British Secretary of State. This was initially put in place for twelve months; in fact Stormont was not to be reinstated for over twenty years (Bardon, 1992, pp. 688-689).17

Whilst the truth about what is now known as Bloody Sunday and its impact and effects have now been exposed in the Saville Inquiry (2010), followed by a subsequent apology from the British Government, at the time, the event was publicly documented only in the now entirely discredited report of the Widgery Tribunal (April 1972). Widgery concluded that:

...there would have been no deaths if those who organised the illegal march had not thereby created a highly dangerous situation in which a clash between demonstrators and the security forces was almost inevitable.

...adhered to the "official" narrative established by the Widgery Tribunal; namely, that the soldiers of 1st Para had acted appropriately on Bloody Sunday to defend themselves against sustained attack by PIRA "gunmen and bombers" and to restore law and order in the Bogside and that... while many unionists recognized that some of those killed and wounded may not themselves have been armed when they were shot, most nonetheless considered the victims to be at least partially "deserving" of the Army's actions since they were engaged in illegal rioting and were otherwise suspected of providing support for republican paramilitaries operating in the area.

With one inquiry completed and the Unionist leadership misleading them, an objective understanding of what had really happened on Bloody Sunday must have seemed elusive. Added to the unrest following the introduction of internment, Bloody Sunday was a landmark event, not only for Derry / Londonderry's Catholic and Nationalist population, but for Protestants and Unionists in terms of the atmosphere of uncertainty and fear that it created.

These events were also significant turning points for the IRA as it is considered that they resulted in an increase in recruitment. However, there was also opposition to the IRA. Bardon (1992, p. 698) describes "The wave of horror and disgust running through Catholic Ireland, north and south" following Bloody Friday.19 The SDLP, the largest party in the Council, continued to condemn violence in the strongest terms. Some local community sources suggest that these events were key factors in causing Protestants to take stock of where they lived, and ultimately to move elsewhere. A contributor to Hall's 1999 report (1999, p 9-10) describes the impact of Bloody Sunday on Protestants' feelings of safety:

The biggest shift in Protestant population happened between '70 and '75, particularly after Bloody Sunday. That had a huge impact on the Protestant psyche in that they feared a Nationalist uprising and they began to retreat from the west bank. The week before Bloody Sunday there were two policemen shot in the Creggan, and a number of other people beaten up, and petrol bombs being thrown. Protestants in rural areas were burnt out and people living there felt they were going to be picked off in isolation, one by one. And so, as the circle closed around them and Nationalists moved into those areas, there was a sense that they were under siege again, and with the 'front line' being constantly picked at by Republicans this 'front line' withdrew and withdrew, to the extent that they crossed the bridge, and the last little enclave we have over there is the 'Fountain'.

Willie Temple, in the Petö's and Cunningham's 2007 Exodus documentary, remarks:

It was after Bloody Sunday that Protestants became apprehensive. Up until Bloody Sunday there were Protestants in areas like Abercorn Road and Barrack Street and Fergason Street who felt that they were behind the lines of the rioting and they were getting uneasy and there was a lot of disquiet there, but the real problem and chill factors didn’t come in until Bloody Sunday.

This was a view which Gregory Campbell’s comments in 2010 in light of the Savile Inquiry suggest was taken on board by Protestants:

The civil rights march had been banned - as were all such protests - and for unionists, anyone who took part in the march was acting illegally and should expect to be punished with the full vigour of the law. This was a view encouraged by Northern Ireland’s Unionist prime minister, Brian Faulkner, that "those who organised this march must bear a terrible responsibility for having urged people to lawlessness."18

Aiken (2015, p. 107–108) refers to Unionists in the main having

17 See also Mullan (1997) for eye-witness accounts of Bloody Sunday.

18 The Bloody Sunday Inquiry - the unionist view', (BBC 14/6/2010) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10205654:

19 Bloody Friday refers to Friday 21 July 1972 when the IRA carried out a bombing campaign which killed 9 people and injured 130 others.
Clearly, while both internment and Bloody Sunday were events which impacted principally and to devastating effect on the Catholic and Nationalist community in and around the city centre, they also had repercussions for the Protestant west bank population, and left many fearing uncertain and fearful of what the escalation of the conflict might mean for them.

### 5.3 Deaths in Derry / Londonderry

McKittrick, et al (2004, p. 1526) in Lost Lives list all of those who died as a result of the conflict in Northern Ireland between the years 1966 to 2003. Out of a total of 3,703 people killed, it states that civilians, i.e. those without affiliation to the security forces or paramilitary organisations, constitute the largest group – 56% (2074). 718 (19%) of the total who died were Protestant civilians, whilst 1252 (34%) were Catholic civilians. Members of the RUC, RUCR, Army and UDR/RIR account for 27% (1012). Republican paramilitaries account for almost 11% (396) of those killed, and Loyalist paramilitaries for 4.5% (166).

In terms of responsibility for deaths, McKittrick, et al (2004, p. 1534) refer to Republicans – 58.3% (2158); Loyalists – 29.7% (1099); all Security forces – 9.9% (365); unknown / other – 2.2% (81)20. With regards to what they term Derry City, McKittrick, et al (2004, pp. 1530-1533) list 82 civilians, 85 Army, and 64 RUC/RUCR/UDR/RIR. McKittrick, et al (2004, p. 1528) note: “The statistics reveal the intensity of the conflict in the early 1970s, with just over half of all troubles victims dying prior to 1977.” They point out that the year which saw the greatest loss of life throughout the conflict was 1972, with 497 lives lost.

These figures were of course collated at the end of the conflict. It is important to recognise that, at the time that the conflict was beginning to unfold, no-one in Derry / Londonderry or elsewhere could foresee how it would develop, and just how many deaths each side would suffer. Indeed, during the early 1970s, it may well have seemed that the city was to be worse affected than anywhere else. For example, Darby (1974) makes the point that the levels of violence in Derry / Londonderry had been:

“...proportionately higher than any other part of Northern Ireland. The strain imposed by bombings and gun battles on people, especially those suffering from nervous disorders or heart diseases, is sometimes almost unbearable, and frequently frightens families out of their homes.

Furthermore, in the intimate geography of the city centre and its immediate residential environs, it is impossible to measure with hindsight the impact of even one death, just streets away. In this section, we do not list all deaths and incidents that occurred, but do give examples of the events which appear to have impacted on the feelings of safety and security of the Protestant population.

### 5.4 Killings of members of the Protestant community

A number of killings of Protestants who were not connected with the security forces within the city centre and its immediate residential environs occurred in the early and mid-1970s.

These included the murder of William King who was one of the first victims of the conflict in Derry. He had been severely beaten by a nationalist gang in September 1969, and subsequently died. McKay (2000, p. 308) cites Alastair Simpson’s recollection that “They used to come up Bishop Street and shout, ‘We might not have got King William but we got William King!’”. Willie Temple speaks of William King’s death as having a similar effect on the Protestant community as the death of Sammy Deviney had on Catholics (Peto and Cunningham, 2007). In the same documentary, Jack Allen describes this as a turning point with many Protestants taking a harder line.

Two Protestant businessmen, Charles McNaul and Lexie Mitchell, were shot while having a coffee at the Dolphin Restaurant in the city centre on 2 December 1975. The Londonderry Sentinel (3/12/75) reported that they were not members of the UDR or the RUC reserve. Both the Derry Journal (5/12/75) and Londonderry Sentinel 10/12/75 reported that thousands attended their funerals. The INLA21 admitted responsibility, claiming that it was a case of mistaken identity. Gregory Campbell commented in the Exodus documentary: “That appeared to be stepping a gear up again and that was looked upon as just heaping the pressure on further”. A Protestant businessman, Joseph Glover, was killed at his place of work in Crawford Square by a Republican group (23/11/76). This inevitably had an impact on the Protestant community.

Shirvill et al (2005, pp. 60-61) found accounts of people feeling unsettled by what surrounded them, and that others saw direct violence and even the murder of people close to them, sometimes in the security forces, and in one participant’s case, for no known reason:

“We moved out in ’77 … it was probably the daily disruption through rioting, the bombing and to add to it in 1975 my wife’s father was shot dead for nothing by republicans – by the IRA. The only thing he was affiliated with was the Masonic Order.”

### 5.5 Killings of members of the security forces

In addition, throughout the 1970s, there were a number of IRA murders of members of the security forces who were either living in, working or worshipping in the city side. O'Dochartaigh (2005, p. 259) writes that UDR and RUC men were seldom targets until 1971 and that until the introduction of internment “…there had been little serious threat to the lives of URC or UDR members in Derry”. He also makes the point that RUC men however were not ordered to move, but that the slow ‘exodus’ of RUC men was a significant factor, more so than UDR men who tended to live in rural areas. O'Dochartaigh (2005, p. 260) suggests that RUC men felt impelled to leave and that this was “…not a sudden dramatic movement but one which began in 1972 and ended in 1982”. He refers to this as sometimes as a result of receiving bullets in the post or other threats. He talks of a ‘crisis of confidence’ among Protestants as RUC men left residential areas, and a fear of becoming detached.

Again, we do not list all deaths, but a sample of contemporary newspaper reports indicates the nature of the violence which was ongoing throughout the period. Some examples follow:

- **Derry Journal, 8/3/1973**: “Body Found in Hedge. Derry U.D.R Man Brutally Murdered”. The article refers to the discovery of the body of David Deacon, a full-time member of the UDR from the Glenbank Road. The body was found near the border near Bridgend.
- **Derry Journal, 15/11/74**: “Black week for Derry”. The article refers to the abduction and killing of Leonard Cross and Hugh Slater. Cross and Slater were civilian workers at Ebrington barracks; the IRA claimed they worked for military intelligence and belonged to the UDR. Cross, aged 18, was from the Glenside Road. Joseph Elliott, aged 21, from the Drumahoe area was shot dead in retaliation for these killings.

20 Others include people such as those who died in troubles related accidents or heart attacks.

21 Irish National Liberation Army, an Irish republican paramilitary group.
who had been deployed to the city or the city centre. These include for example:

There were also a number of murders of members of the security forces who may not have been local, but deceased_c/1973.htm. One of the officers was from the Lincoln Courts area.

22 Ulster Freedom Fighters, a loyalist paramilitary group which was considered by the government to be the UDA by another name, see

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Protestant Migration from the West Bank of Derry / Londonderry 1969-1980

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Protestant Migration from the West Bank of Derry / Londonderry 1969-1980

There were also a number of murders of members of the security forces who may not have been local, but who had been deployed to the city or the city centre. These include for example:

• Derry Journal, 28/11/75: Reports the death of a member of the UDR, Bobby Stott, who lived in the Fountain estate, killed on his way home from work. The article suggests fear of retaliation. The act was condemned by the SDLP.

• Derry Journal, 19/11/76: “Man gunned down in Derry”. The article refers to the killing of part-time UDR Corporal Kidd. The article also refers to the retaliation killing by the UFF23 of 36-year old James Loughrey, shot when he opened his front door.

• Derry Journal, 25/2/1977: “Killing in Derry”. The article reports the murder of Peter Hill at his home in February 1977, who was a businessman and the proprietor of shop on the Strand Road, and also a member of the UDR. The IRA issued a statement that he had been targeted, “not because he was a Protestant or a businessman but because he was a service member of the UDR.”

• Derry Journal, 8/4/1977: “Moderator calls for Protection for Protestants”. This article reports the killing of Gerald Cloete, a UDR man, at his home in the Glen Estate in April 1977. Roy Simpson noted “...the imperative more protection was given to the Protestant community in the Glen Estate”. The IRA in a statement referred to Mr Cloete as “...part of the war machine and members must accept consequences”.

• Londonderry Sentinel, 23/5/79: “RUC Man shot on his way to church”. 50 year-old Stanley Wray, a member of the RUC reserve, was killed while making his way to Claremont Presbyterian Church. The murder was condemned by Protestant Churches and the Catholic Church, as well as the SDLP.

• Temple and Baker (p. 117) suggest that “A group of women from the Creggan and Bogside sent a wreath to the home of the dead reservist. It was signed by ‘Christian mothers’ of the Bogside and Creggan”.

It was evident to the RUC hierarchy at least by the late 1970s that the attacks on the security forces were impacting on residential areas on the Cityside which had been mixed and in which RUC personnel had been living. In a note to the Secretary of State prepared by DC White, Development Officer in the city in 197824 he notes:

There is a good deal of apprehension on the part of remaining Protestants who feel increasingly isolated and very little would induce many more to leave. 25

Reference is also made to a “more overt political line in City Council affairs” and “...only two Protestant councillors returned from the West Bank”. Reference is also made to attacks on Churches (First Derry Presbyterian) and attacks on the Fountain estate.

Subsequently, in a report to Stormont [11 January 1979] White refers to the killing of UDR and RUC personnel as well as businessmen, in what he described as mixed areas, resulting in Protestant people opting to leave:

According to Jack Allen, in Peto and Cunningham’s 2007 Exodus documentary:

Once the killing started, the real fear got into people and I think that’s when the significant shift the population came from the working class areas because of that.

As well as killings, the residential environs of the city centre also experienced attacks and disturbances, such as:

• Derry Journal, 26/10/71: “Army Post Attacked”. The article refers to 75 petrol bombs used against Rosemount RUC station.

• Derry Journal, 29/10/71: “Gelignite Bombs Wreck Army Observation Post”. The article refers to an attack on army post in the Rosemont area.

• Londonderry Sentinel, 19/4/72: “Sectarian Disturbances”. The article refers to a crowd attacking Fountain Street, and an ‘onslaught’ on Abercorn Road (upper), with residents subsequently demanding better protection.

• Londonderry Sentinel, 10/10/73: “Fountain attack by mob”. This article refers to repeated attacks in the area.

23 See also the killing of two RUC men in a booby trap car bomb in Harbour Square, Londonderry. See http://www.royalulsterconstabulary.org/deceased_c/1973.htm. One of the officers was from the Lincoln Courts area.

25 See also the killing of two RUC men in a booby trap car bomb in Harbour Square, Londonderry. See http://www.royalulsterconstabulary.org/deceased_c/1973.htm. One of the officers was from the Lincoln Courts area.

24 ‘Londonderry - West Bank Problem: Note prepared by the Development Officer’, Memorandum prepared for a visit by the Secretary of State to the city, [12 May 1978], [PRONI Public Records CENT/1/722; 2 pages]

26 ‘Londonderry: Population Movement from West Bank to East Bank’, [11 January 1979], Memorandum by D. White, then of the Development Office, Derry, to K. Bloomfield, [segregation], [PRONI Public Records CENT/1/8/11A; 8 pages], [PDF; 148KB].
There have been several assassinations or serious personal attacks in "mixed" areas, e.g. of RUC, reserve police men, UDR, prison warders, businessmen. The result has been a gradual ebb of remaining P. While there has not been a great deal of overt intimidation there has been some e.g. at Belmont close to the large and growing Shantallow development and what was once “mixed” with a small P majority is now almost wholly R.

He continued:

...the very real concern of RUC men for the safety of themselves and of their families is appreciated the reaction of many P people is a very natural one. They reason that if the RUC "cannot protect themselves" then protection may not be capable of being afforded to greatly outnumbered P residents on WB in the event of a resurgence of violence. The movement of RUC personnel may well have been one of the strongest factors in the whole complex situation coupled with the existence for a long time of "no go" areas. 25

White, in his report, states that for some Protestants the Foyle formed a 'natural border' and that the government could easily cede the west bank. He continues:

Many P people who harbour such a feeling have moved from WB. Their views may seem strange and unreasonable but they exist and are strongly held by many.

This sentiment was echoed in a Derry Journal article, 20/6/78: "The Double Think". In the leader article, references are made to the retaliation killing by the IRA of Robert Struthers, part-time reserve constable in the RUC and a resident of Glen Estate. The retaliation was for the shooting of Denis Heaney by the army after trying to hijack an undercover officer's car (10/6/78). The leader states:

...one of the few Protestant concentrations left in the west side of the city, is bound to lead to an acceleration of the Protestant exodus to the other and this to the polarising of the city into two outsize ghettos in the end. And it continues 'How can this advance Republican objectives - a deepening divide between Catholic, Protestant and Dissenter'.

The movement of security force personnel impacted on areas such as Belmont. Darby (1974) 27 refers to the Protestant exodus from areas such as Belmont and its effect on the Protestants and the Catholic Nationalist communities. It is worth bearing in mind that, at the same time as the above attacks were going on, violence also impacted on the Nationalist/Catholic population, not least through significant events such as Bloody Sunday, and the threat, as one contributor (1999, p. 7) stated:

Aye, that's what brought us over here.

Individual testimonies for creative and local community pieces suggest that these events did indeed cause families to move. A contributor to Burgess (2011, p 4) research said of his family's move:

We came out of there in '72, just after April '77. My father was UDR and he was shot dead outside the house. Aye, that's what brought us over here.

It is worth bearing in mind that, at the same time as the above attacks were going on, violence also impacted on the Nationalist/Catholic population, not least through significant events such as Bloody Sunday, and the murder of five Catholics at Annie's Bar in Gobnascale in December 1972, but there were also a number of murders throughout the 1970s. For example:

Derry Journal, 9/7/71: "Two Die from Army Bullets in Riot". This refers and the death of a 27-year man (Seamus Cusack) and a 19-year old (George "Dessie" Beattie) at the hands of the Army during disturbances in the Bogside. The article refers to conflicting statements from the Army and local residents.

Derry Journal, 17/9/71: this article refers to the killing of Billy McGreanery, stating that British troops fired CS gas indiscriminately and shot Mr McGreanery when he was walking with friends to the junction of Westland Street and Laburnum Terrace.

Derry Journal, 21/12/72: "Derry Community Mourns Victims of Dreadful Murders". Reference to when Loyalist gunmen burst into Annie's Bar (Top of the Hill) and killing five people, of which four were Catholic.

Londonderry Sentinel, 4/5/77: "Derryman was shot 7 times". This article refers to the shooting and wounding of Brian McCloskey by the UDA, as a retaliation for the killing of a part-time UDR man.

5.5.1 Targets or not

The IRA throughout its campaign insisted that it chose only "legitimate targets" by which it meant members of the security forces or those associated with the British establishment. It is important to note that, whatever the IRA's declared strategy, the impact was felt across the Protestant community as a whole. As Willie Temple puts it in the Peto and Cunningham 2007 Exodus documentary:

It would have been seen as an extension of shooting Protestants because the UDR and the police would have been seen as fathers and brothers and husbands and uncles so it was a personal attack on the Protestant community.

While Lewis and McDaid (2017, p. 645) suggest that religion and ethnicity were not the sole reasons for targeting members of the Protestant community, they state:

Nevertheless, this violence was functionally sectarian in its impact upon the Protestant-Unionist community. It was ultimately understood in terms of sectarianism, sometimes to the extent of precipitating sectarian reprisals against the Catholic-nationalist community.

This also echoes the point made by Higgins and Brewer (1998, p. 4) when they deliberate on the Protestant Unionist identity and its link to Britain:

IRA violence against so-called "legitimate" targets of the state has been experienced by ordinary Protestants as ethnic cleansing and an attempt to remove Protestant witness from the island. So interconnected is Protestant identity with Britishness, that anti-Britishness easily blends into anti-Protestantism as Protestants perceive it. That Republicanism believes it can make this fine distinction is irrelevant to Protestants.

O'Dochartaigh (2005, p. 262) also makes the point that "Derry Protestants have regarded the killings of local UDR and RUC members as attacks on the Protestant community". Hall's research found that deep connections with the military and security forces in general meant that many Protestant families felt under threat, as one contributor (1999, p. 7) stated:

...one of the few Protestant concentrations left in the west side of the city, is bound to lead to an acceleration of the Protestant exodus to the other and this to the polarising of the city into two outsize ghettos in the end. And it continues 'How can this advance Republican objectives - a deepening divide between Catholic, Protestant and Dissenter'.

The movement of security force personnel impacted on areas such as Belmont. Darby (1974) 27 refers to the Protestant exodus from areas such as Belmont and its effect on the Protestants and the Catholic Nationalist communities. It is worth bearing in mind that, at the same time as the above attacks were going on, violence also impacted on the Nationalist/Catholic population, not least through significant events such as Bloody Sunday, and the threat, as one contributor (1999, p. 7) stated:

Aye, that's what brought us over here.

Individual testimonies for creative and local community pieces suggest that these events did indeed cause families to move. A contributor to Burgess (2011, p 4) research said of his family's move:

We came out of there in '72, just after April '77. My father was UDR and he was shot dead outside the house. Aye, that's what brought us over here.

It is worth bearing in mind that, at the same time as the above attacks were going on, violence also impacted on the Nationalist/Catholic population, not least through significant events such as Bloody Sunday, and the...
Don’t forget that a lot of the guys in the streets around here would have been in the B-Specials, the Territorial Army, or had fathers coming out of the army. There was a tradition of military service, every one of us here would have had relations in the military. So most Protestants felt they were targets.

5.6 Intimidation

It is important to note here what is meant by intimidation. The sources indicate that there are differing levels and kinds of intimidation. In her Researching Sectarianism conference paper, Smyth (Researching Sectarianism Conference Paper, p. 14, citing Darby, 1986) who describes it as:

the process by which, through the exercise of force or threat, or from a perception of threat, a person feels under pressure to leave home or workplace against his or her will. It can be considered within a framework of three categories…; (1) actual physical harm, (2) actual threat, (3) perceived environmental threat.

She goes on to cite her own previous work (1994) outlining the characteristics of intimidation as follows:

"Intimidation:

- is a subjective matter rather than an objective experience
- it is experienced independent of intentionality
- it has a wide range of effects on individuals, including severe trauma and avoidance of certain topics of conversations, as well as the avoidance of certain locations, physical injury and flight from homes or employment
- the accommodation of these effects which have become part of the culture of social exchange when operating in mixed situations. It is commonly regarded as inconsiderate or insensitive to discuss certain potential issues, to reveal one’s ethnic identity or inquire about the identity of others (Researching Sectarianism Conference Paper, p. 14, citing Smyth, 1994).

Clearly, intimidation can be direct or indirect, and can involve both the perception of insecurity, and actual physical danger. As Southern (2007, p 176) states:

Simply put, people do not need to be shot, punched, kicked or petrol-bombed to become fearful or feel that they are unwelcome and their presence (either individually or as a community) unwanted.

For some, the intimidation is deadly and immediate, as a contributor in Burgess (2011, p. 91) stated:

We came out of there in ‘77 just after April ’77. My father was UDR and he was shot dead outside the house. Aye, that’s what brought us over here.

For others, the intimidation is less direct, but could have just as great an impact on a family’s decision about where to live. As Marlene Jefferson, a former Unionist mayor of Derry commented in Peto and Cunningham’s 2007 Exodus documentary:

If you had family in the police someone didn’t have to come to your door and tell you to get out you know – they didn’t – they just let it be known they knew your son was in the police…

Anderson and Shuttleworth (1998, p. 193) write:

...because of real feelings of vulnerability and, even if not always warranted, these feelings may be real enough: people feeling threatened do not always wait to see whether a threat will actually materialize.

5.6.1 Direct intimidation of individuals / households

TAR’s study of the Fountain and Gobnacase found that direct intimidation did not feature as a significant reason for people moving away from the Fountain – although of course the Protestant population also lived in and moved away from other parts of Derry. Whilst it is important to recognise that this study was carried out between 1994 and 1996, they did ask some questions which pertained to the previous twenty years. It is notable that, despite the levels of violence in the city during the 1970s, for many respondents, their decision to move (to Gobnascale and to the Fountain as opposed to from them) was not impacted to a significant degree by this.

TAR asked respondents about factors related to the Troubles which influenced decisions to stay or move to their current residence in either Gobnascale, or the Fountain. They asked: “If you have moved into the area in the last 20 years [i.e. 1974 onwards as TAR undertook its research between 1994 and 1996] which of the following facts influenced your decision to move?” They provided a list of options which respondents could prioritise. TAR (Field Survey, 1996, p. 35) found the following:

On the first category, ‘attacks on my house / family’ there was a significantly higher response from Gobnascale residents (6%), than from respondents in the Fountain (4%). The second area of difference is in the response levels to between the two areas on ‘proximity to the town centre’ as an influence on the decision to move. Here, Fountain respondents indicated that this was a much more significant factor for them than for Gobnascale respondents, although it is somewhat unclear from the data whether proximity to the town centre is considered an advantage or not. The difficulties generated for Fountain residents by heavy traffic and car parking in the area, may counterbalance any inconvenience such proximity might have. The third area of difference is in response to ‘availability of suitable housing’. This was a bigger factor in Gobnascale (39%) than in Fountain (19%), and this is possibly related to the development of new housing in the Gobnascale area in the 1970s, which enticed people to live in a ‘new estate’…Proximity to family members is an important factor in both areas, as is ‘wanting to live among the same religion’. Fear of attack was rated further down the list in both areas. Although reported fear was lower in the Fountain (2%) than in Gobnascale (6%), this difference was not significant.

TAR also asked respondents to rate a number of Troubles-related factors influencing decisions to move. They found no significant differences between the two communities (Gobnascale and the Fountain). They found that a number of factors were shared in common between respondents from both communities, such as intimidation, threats, sectarian attacks on self / family or in the area, the need to conceal where you are from, negotiating problems with the other community, misunderstandings with the other community, tension due to marches and feelings of safety were experienced at similar levels by both communities (TAR Field Survey, 1996, pp. 36–37). Darby’s 1974 study found a small number of cases (75), of intimidation on the Emergency Housing List and those described as being of a serious nature being less than 20. However, he states:

In general, we believe that intimidation may be more widespread in Derry than is sometimes believed. Not too much emphasis should be placed on the relatively small number of families on the Emergency Housing List, because most people who move as a result of intimidation in the city find new accommodation without having recourse to the Emergency List…Nevertheless, there appears to be considerably less intimidation in Derry this
year than last. The reason for this may be that there are virtually no Protestants in Bogside and Creggan, nor Catholics in Waterside. (Darby, 1974).

This is also highlighted by Shirlow, et al. (2005, p. 60) who found that:

For many Protestant participants, the conditions under which they had moved from the Cityside possessed a sectarian dimension in some way connected to the Troubles. Accounts ranged from direct to indirect intimidation.

A number of sources contain examples of direct intimidation experienced by individuals and their families which caused them to move away from the Cityside. Examples include:

- Jeanette Warke, in Peto and Cunningham’s Exodus documentary (2007), spoke of her family’s reason for leaving their home at Mountjoy St:
  They were outside the house shouting ‘get out Orange Bs’ and they were baring the door with iron bars – now I was on my own in the house and at that time I had three kids and I remember sitting on the stairs and nobody could get in... I wasn’t the only one who was targeted that time...and I remember the next morning when David came home I was still sitting on the stairs with three kids and they were sleeping and we lifted them and we went down to the Housing Office - at that time it was down at the Guildhall and we just sat there and we said we couldn’t go back to our home much as we wanted to, and we didn’t want to leave our friends. And they were as upset as we were - I’m talking about our Catholic neighbours - they were just as upset that these Protestant neighbours of theirs was being put out.

- A contributor to Burgess (2011, p. 92) research stated:
  They actually carved ‘IRA’ into the front door. That was something! Just somebody had taken a pen knife or something like that and carved ‘IRA’ into the front door, about two or three inch-tall letters, but never the less. Obviously that’s the sort of intimidation, some would say non-violent, because it was not directed at people but it was obviously there as a threat.

- A woman, originally from the Fountain, told of her family’s experience of life in the Fountain in Hemmed in and Hacking It (1996, p. 25). She spoke of “bottles, stones and abuse being fired up the lane”. Her house was attacked, the windows smashed and an attempt to set curtains alight. They eventually moved.

- A contributor to Campbell’s Beyond the Silence (2016, p. 37) shared her family’s story:
  I’m a Protestant born and bred on the west bank in the Rosemount area of the city. My parents had a business there for many years before they moved out of the area in the mid-1970s because of the Troubles. Rosemount was peaceful for my sisters and me in those early years. It was a mixed area back then, but the Troubles had started and there was an influx of Roman Catholics to the district. With our proximity to the Creggan housing estate, it became apparent that, at that time, they were by no means sympathetic to us being Protestant. / Windows were broken in our house constantly; my father’s car windows were smashed, as well as the plate glass windows in the shop on an numerous occasions. We eventually fitted grills to the shop windows. My sister’s husband, who was in the RUC, was assaulted at gunpoint whilst visiting us in 1972 and the situation made it impossible for them to visit us again... / It seemed to me like all Protestants were being intimidated at that time. However, when word spread that my parents had put the house up for sale and were moving, quite a few mothers from Creggan and the Bog came to say how disappointed they were that we were leaving... / we often had bomb scares in the shop too. (Reproduced in original format.)

- A contributor to Temple and Baker’s documentary, summed up the sense of fear and threat:
  People did feel that the IRA wanted them to leave and many people stayed on but there was an awful lot left. One area in particular was down there by Hogg’s Folly and that – there was 40 people – families in one night got on the move and actually I’m not ashamed to say I assisted them to move, because they realised the situation you know and they were moving into semi-derelict bungalows, aluminium bungalows in Browning Drive, but they went in and fixed them up until they were re-housed they were considered then as squatters they left their legal home to become squatters. Well if that wasn’t fear, what was? If that wasn’t threat, what was?
5.6.2 Targeting of Protestant businesses and buildings

A further source of feelings of intimidation was the IRA bombing campaign against businesses in the city centre. Because many businesses were Protestant owned, Bertie Faulkner, Alliance Councillor 1973 – 1981 observed in the Peto and Cunningham’s Exodus documentary (2007):

People’s perception was these were all Protestant businesses as well, so there was this perception that they were now starting to target Protestant businesses.

Feeling that their city had been attacked, through bombing of shops and businesses and that the city took the brunt of violence – led to a call for protection of shops. O’Dochartaigh (2005, p 257) writes “...the ‘Protestant’ city centre became a focus for Protestant loyalty in Derry and attacks on these businesses were seen as sectarian and deliberately directed against Protestants”. O’Dochartaigh (2005, p. 258) refers to the bombing of the city centre...

...physically obliterating much of the city which Protestants had identified with, most famously Walkers Pillar, but equally importantly many old established Protestant businesses, it was the movement of population which really affected the way Protestants related to the city.

A Londonderry Sentinel article (22/3/77) entitled “Protestants are Prime Terror Targets” refers to Protestant businessmen and speaks of “pressures brought to them” as well as “extortion and intimidation”.

A contributor to Hall (1999, p. 8) said:

The other thing which happened in this city which must be noted is that the IRA bombed the centre of the city to pieces. They bombed the life blood of the Protestant community out of the city, so that there isn’t a major Protestant shop or concern within the city walls. Thompsons, Gordons, Cooks – all of those shops were bombed, and right around Magazine Street. The tactic was one of 'scorched earth' – if you want to remove people, you take away their livelihoods, take away their buildings and when you do that then they haven’t got anything left to keep them there.

A contributor to Burgess (2011, p. 89) stated:

The IRA campaign originally was between them and the British Army, but as time progressed they began bombing businesses on the west bank. Along the Strand Road, Thompson Edwards Motor Works, Craig’s Engineering, Heaton’s Bakery, Hill’s Department Store, Warwick’s paint shop, Cloakie’s Glassworks, Northern Ireland Electricity.

All the way up the Strand Road was targeted. They then started targeting Protestant civilians, under the guise of Methodist City Mission to close the People’s Hall in Barrack Street in January 1972 “because of the physical obliterating much of the city which Protestants had identified with, most famously Walkers Pillar, but equally importantly many old established Protestant businesses, it was the movement of population which really affected the way Protestants related to the city.

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All the way up the Strand Road was targeted. They then started targeting Protestant civilians, under the guise of attacking business men and it became increasingly obvious that anybody who was a Protestant living on the west bank, it wasn’t a good place to bring up your family, so a lot of people left.

5.7 Atmosphere of fear

It is clear from the sources that as well as direct intimidation, another factor came into play for many Protestants who made the choice to leave the west bank and it is more difficult to quantify. This might be referred to in a number of ways: indirect intimidation, perceived threat, or an atmosphere of fear. By this we mean the cumulative effect of living in an area in which levels of rioting, protest, targeting of businesses, state violence and attacks on members of the security forces are ongoing, and in which one finds oneself in the minority community.

Morrow et al. (1994) make the point that a ‘perceived threat’ can have a harrowing basis in reality and can lead to real action being taken. A contributor to Hall (1999, p. 9) referred to Protestants feeling a “threat of encirclement” and responded with “territorial retreat” as they [Protestants] envisaged “armed rebellion” and “maybe another civil war” an “it was the sense of safety which was their main concern, and the safety barrier became the river Foyle”.

Similarly, Southern (2009, p. 403) in his work on Protestant churches and church leaders in Derry/Londonderry found interviewees deliberating on the move of Protestants from the West Bank/City Side:

I am of the opinion that the migration of Protestants from the City side (West Bank) to the Waterside (East Bank) was in the first instance motivated by fear and lack of trust, and secondly the result of panic reaction at a time of uncertainty and intimidation of Protestant families living in the City side (Response to author’s questionnaire, 4 April 2005)

The Derry Journal (2/3/1976) in its article “Bridge Decision Worries West Bank Protestants” reports disappointment that the construction of a second bridge across the Foyle had been postponed, particularly because “for years steady erosion of the number of Protestant people living on the city side of the river”. It suggests that

while there have been some cases of intimidation and pressure, the largest number of cases of those moving to live elsewhere have been caused by an understandable desire to live in area where they can feel a greater degree of security.

There was in the article a reference to the hope for an “integrated and balanced community”.

In some of the research reviewed, contributors make a point of clarifying that they had never experienced direct intimidation, and many made the point that they had good Catholic neighbours, but that they nonetheless felt the urgent need to leave their homes. For example, Bishop Mehaffy, Bishop of Derry and Raphoe 1980 – 2002, commented in Peto’s and Cunningham’s Exodus documentary (2007):

I have talked to many families who moved, and I said what made you move? What caused it? Were you threatened? Did you have your windows broken? Did people give you an anonymous call or an anonymous letter? They said ‘not really’. Indeed they said ‘Our neighbours who were Catholic tried to persuade us to stay. But we got frightened. There was fear in the air, there was an atmosphere of fear and threat.

A contributor to Burgess (2011, p. 89) commented:

There was more intimidation, or fear ye know, peoples hearts were changing like as well, sort of scary too ye know because you think of Bosnia, ye know, ethnic cleansing, but this wasn’t ethnic cleansing like Bosnia, this was more like a sort of psychology. Intimidation by words and all, ye know, words, through a process of time.

Another contributor (2011, p. 98) described having to ask permission from masked men to proceed with the burial for a female relative. The Foyle Road barrier was opened at the appointed time to permit them to proceed with the burial, which had to be done within one hour, and the grave remained unvisited until the barriers were finally removed.

Temple and Baker (p. 98-99) feature a Londonderry Sentinel article (26 January 1972) regarding the decision of Methodist City Mission to close the People’s Hall in Barrack Street in January 1972 “because of the conditions now prevailing in the area”. The article points to the reasons for the move:

There has been no intimidation of any kind, but the conditions which have become almost impossible have
transformed the whole Barrack Street – Joyce Street area, once a Protestant stronghold.

Under the heading “Engulfed in Bogside” the article continues:

Demolitions in preparations for the Lecky Road flyover have added to the changes. They have forced many to anticipate... re-housing by leaving the area. Others, whose homes have been demolished or closed up in readiness for demolition, have, of course, been re-housed by the Development Commission. The net result of... strategy is that the Barrack Street – Joyce Street area is now effectively engulfed in Bogside. It appears as if the Army has pulled back from the 1969 line which extended along Bishop Street to the top of Abercorn Road to Bennet Street... The people in the Barrack Street – Joyce Street area have not been interfered with or intimidated, but they have decided to get out. The area is now part of the route for crowds of youths who arrange from Bogside at Barrack Street and demonstrate in Abercorn Road.

5.7.1 Responses to an atmosphere of fear

Some research has studied responses to such an atmosphere in detail. Boal (1981) has conceptualised minority responses to conditions of ethnic-religious segregation and cultural decline in terms of a continuum of “loyalty, voice and exit”. He suggests that members of communities who feel isolated or threatened may remain loyal to the area in which they live and there try to exist in as secure a position as possible. They however may voice their concerns in a number of ways, such as campaigning, demonstrating or even through violence. Others choose to exit and simply leave the locality and seek sanctuary within their own ethnic group. Southern (2007, p. 177) suggests that the

...enduring memory of conflict and the continual experience of unhealed injuries (at both individual and community levels) militate against the building of trust and instead function to generate alienation. An ‘alienated’ ethnic psychology of this type can make segregation a preferable social option and normalise a toughened sectarian outlook.

It is perhaps not surprising that the link between the place where sectarian crimes and incidents are committed and religious segregation has been observed all over Northern Ireland (Boal 1969; Burton 1978; Poole and Doherty 1996). Burton (1978) found that in Belfast the fear of being a victim of such attacks meant that people who live in conflict areas have developed a comprehensive knowledge of safe and unsafe places, something which has been highlighted in research throughout the conflict (see, for example, Shirlow and Murtagh 2006; Hamilton et al. 2008). Individuals might feel unsafe in areas dominated by the ‘other side’ and this affects many aspects of their daily lives such as housing, education, shopping and access to service provision.

Research by amongst others Doherty and Poole (1995) and Darby (1986) highlight that residential movement is a behavioural response to violence and where fear of violence induced large-scale residential de-mixing in the early 1970s.26 Lysaght and Besten (2003, p. 4) make the point:

Studies of residential movement implicitly suggest that individuals cope with fear of sectarian violence through a one-off decision: through moving house, into an area that is perceived to be safe.

Smyth points out that, ironically, segregation can both maintain safety, and it can also expose a community to outside attack, citing the examples of the Annie’s Bar killings in Gobnascale in 1972, and the killings of William King and Bobby Stott in the Fountain, meaning that “while it may feel safer to live in an enclave
Addressing the Easter vestry on Friday night, Rev. Canon H. A. McKegney, rector of St Augustine’s Church, Londonderry, said that during the last six years the congregation had lost 425 members, comprising 89 families, and the decline continued. / The new churches at Belmont and Strathfoyle had taken their toll, several families left to get a house and a job in Antrim or Craighaven, and, more recently, the rioting and terrorism had compelled some families to move to new and more distant estates, he said. / Some families sought homes for retirement or employment in other towns, and, finally, the redevelopment of the inner part of the city had meant the removal of many families to suburban areas. / …‘The past year has seen bombing, intimidation, shooting and rioting in our city as the IRA continue their fight against Northern Ireland,’ he said. ‘Our people have suffered material loss, sustained physical injury, have been terrorised out of their homes, have lost employment, and suffered mentally from the continued guerrilla warfare’… / He said the total average attendance at the three Sunday services last year was 340, compared with just over 500 six years ago.

While the figures in the final sentence do not tally with the headline, the message is clear: the congregation is leaving, and for a range of reasons related to the conflict, intimidation, and also to economic and housing opportunities elsewhere.

- **Londonderry Sentinel**, 19/4/72: “20% Families Leave Cathedral Parish”. In this article, the Dean of Derry referred to 20% of the congregation having left their houses and that violence caused a fair share of the exodus but that ‘redevelopment of the Fountain has been major factor’.
- **Londonderry Sentinel**, 1/11/72: “Population Move Creates Problems”. In this article, Rector Brian Hannon, Synod of Derry and Raphoe since 1969, made reference 400 families lost to the area, with numbers decreasing from 1,400 in 1969 to 950 in 1972.
- **Londonderry Sentinel**, 13/12/72: “Population Move Hits City-side Churches”. The article notes that there was talk of ‘grouped ministries’ as families had moved to the Waterside. It suggests that three Presbyterian churches had an average 34-38% of membership based on the Waterside and that the church was working on this challenge.
- **Londonderry Sentinel**, 20/6/73: “Cureties Won’t be Filled”. The article points to the loss of 200 families in the Christ Church congregation and 200 in St Augustine’s. Again, the option of ‘grouped ministries’ is suggested as a solution.
- **Londonderry Sentinel**, 12/3/75: “Families Move from City to the Waterside”. In the article, Reverend Bolton refers to the Presbyterian Church on Strand Road having a ‘greatly diminished congregation’ and that amalgamations might be necessary.

The **Londonderry Sentinel** editorial of 10 May 1972, featured in Temple and Baker, reflects on the “Moving population” and its impact on churches. It states:

**Future generations may regard the decade commencing 1968 as second only to the latter part of the 17th century as the period of greatest change in Londonderry**… It notes a “substantial amount of compulsory movement was to be expected as the re-housing and development programme got underway in various parts of the city but the disturbances have been responsible for a much greater volume that has to a much greater extent brought about changes in the population structure that have had repercussions on many facets of the city but that ‘redevelopment of the Fountain has been major factor’.

‘The past year has seen bombing, intimidation, shooting and rioting in our city as the IRA continue their fight against Northern Ireland,’ he said. ‘Our people have suffered material loss, sustained physical injury, have been terrorised out of their homes, have lost employment, and suffered mentally from the continued guerrilla warfare’… / He said the total average attendance at the three Sunday services last year was 340, compared with just over 500 six years ago.

The closure of the Baptist church, which was fairly small, is in line with what has been happening in the city over the last 23 years. The drift is due to a number of factors. It’s obviously related to the security position. Protestants feel safer on the east bank. They feel the west bank is ground which is not well-disposed to them. It’s alien territory almost.

DC White, in his 1978 note, makes reference to one congregation being without a Minister as well as a church (First Derry Presbyterian) having been attacked. He also refers to ‘reduced congregations’ but that people “…out of sense of tradition and in many cases because of the loyalty of members who have moved to East Bank but continue to attend their (former) Churches.”

While revisited the issue of the impact on churches in his 1979 note, stating that there had been “…a drastic fall in the membership of many P Churches on WB.” The note suggests that this had affected all six Presbyterian churches and that “nearly half of their existing membership measured by families who now live on EB, and of the WB families, many consist of 1 or 2 elderly persons”. Reference is also made to the closure of the GT James Street Presbyterian Church and the sale of the building. He mentions the Church of Ireland, which had also been affected, but “…here again ties of loyalty still bring persons across the River. The relatively new St. Peter’s Church built to serve an area of expanding population (Belmont) now finds itself in the midst of an area of very rapidly declining P population.” He refers to the only Methodist Church on the Cityside no longer having sufficient numbers to justify the services of a full-time Minister and the closure of two Methodist Mission Halls.

While church congregations clearly felt an impact, at the same time a number of sources note the determination of many congregation members who had moved away to remain loyal to their church on the Cityside, and to continue to attend services there. Southern (2006, p. 50) states:

**Protestant churches in the Cityside remain open because of the faithfulness and support of members who, although once in residence in the surrounding areas, are still willing to cross the bridge from the Waterside and farther afield in order to worship. However, the idea of the church as a building occupying a physical space near to the centre of its community is no longer a reality in the Cityside of Londonderry.**
Whilst the security situation undoubtedly had an impact, it is interesting to note that, at the time, Ministers and others considered that a range of additional factors had played a part in people’s decision to leave the Cityside including housing redevelopment and employment opportunities elsewhere.

5.9 Conclusion
Much of the evidence reviewed, especially research based on interviews and focus groups with individuals from the Protestant community, points to safety and security issues as a highly significant factor influencing migration. Derry / Londonderry, its city centre and its residential areas close to the city centre in particular, experienced a significant degree of unrest, rioting, killing, and bombing of businesses in the period from 1969 and throughout the 1970s. The evidence suggests that security and safety issues took a number of forms and that they were closely linked. The numerically significant surveys show that direct intimidation was not the only or principal cause of migration, but other evidence, in particular experiential evidence, shows that direct intimidation did happen, and where it did, it had a major impact on families.

In addition, ongoing unrest, violence and killings created an atmosphere of fear which caused people to move to areas considered safer. Factors such as the instability caused by major events such as internment and Bloody Sunday played a significant part. The targeting of security forces by the Provisional IRA created a sense for many of being a community under attack, due to the close connection between the Protestant community and the forces, a feeling reinforced by the shooting of Protestant businessmen unconnected with the forces, and the targeting of Protestant owned businesses.

Protestant churches, too, were impacted in a number of ways during the 1970s: as well as attacks on individual members of their congregations who were members of the security forces, there were some attacks on churches and church halls, and loss of congregation as Protestants migrated away from the Cityside. In many ways, churches, the size of their congregations and their survival, became a barometer of the strength of the Protestant community on the west bank of the river. As a major institution and a symbol of Protestant life on the west bank, the gradual decline of churches and their replacement in some cases by churches in the Waterside was also a factor influencing the Protestant community’s sense of security in the broadest sense in the Cityside.

Many sources suggest that housing also played a part in Protestant migration from the west bank of Derry / Londonderry, and this will be explored in the next section.

Section 6: Housing

6.1 Introduction
As noted earlier, the evidence shows that housing policy and practice in the city prior to and during the period 1969 – 1980 also played a part in the decision of many Protestants to move away from the Cityside. The TAR Public Discussions report (p. 39) states that:

Preliminary qualitative work indicates that a variety of factors appear to be involved in this depopulation: redevelopment; the housing market; a particular form of housing blight; and sectarian issues including violence and intimidation.

This section considers the role of housing in Protestant migration, and in particular, poor and discriminatory planning and development in Derry / Londonderry during the period, and the impact of subsequent housing reform and redevelopment.

6.2 Planning for housing
The 1945 Housing Act provided for the establishment of the Northern Ireland Housing Trust (NIHT) as a public housing authority established by Stormont to build housing alongside the Local Authorities. The Act increased the level of subsidies to local authorities to try to encourage more new housing. Despite these initiatives the level of new building was not sufficient to meet the demand, which was increasing due to obsolete stock and changes in population structure. Prior to 1968, local authorities had extensive powers, including powers to allocate public housing. It was clear that the NIHT had limited powers, and worked as an "auxiliary body to the local authorities" with "no powers to coerce them" and could only build at the invitation of local authorities (Brett, 1986).

The limited powers of the NIHT have been seen as a way of ensuring that the building of NIHT properties would not destabilise the delicate territorial arrangements which allowed Unionists to maintain control of several local government authorities where Protestants and therefore Unionist voters, were in a distinct minority. Gerrymandering housing policies and the building record of the various agencies with responsibility for housing during the period 1919 to 1970 resulted in a housing situation that had adverse effects for both communities in Northern Ireland.

In the case of Derry / Londonderry, Unionist control of the Corporation (the local authority) had been maintained in earlier years by the creative adjustment of ward boundaries (gerrymandering). In order to retain the Unionist majority, the Corporation restricted development in areas where a delicate Unionist balance could be upset. It reserved control of building, and thus of allocation, to themselves in the North and Waterside Wards where slim Protestant majorities needed to be maintained if Unionist control of the city was to continue. The Londonderry Corporation ceased building within the city boundary in 1966 – a move which had a knock-on effect for Protestants as well as Catholics seeking housing. Apart from building associated with redevelopment, the NIHT was allowed to build, and therefore control allocation, only in the South Ward which already had a Catholic majority and where an increase in Catholic numbers would not affect the political balance (Hennessy, 1997, O’Dochartaigh 1999).

Given that, according to Curran (1986, pp. 47-48), over 50,000 people were crammed into an area of just over 2,000 acres with a population density greater than in all other urban areas in Ireland, boundary extension became essential:
A bigger Derry was a must. Support came from the non-denominational, non-sectarian, non-political Londonderry Junior Chamber of Commerce in a pamphlet Thoughts on Boundary Extension. It said 'Londonderry requires urgent expansion and the best form would be an enlarged county borough'.

Curran (1986, p. 48) cites the 1961 census which showed that Derry had a population density of 25 people per acre, whereas Bangor, Larne and Lurgan had 9, Coleraine, 8, and Lisburn, 7. The Chamber said that this made it clear that "the rate of building is seriously out of pace with the demand for new homes".

Bardon (1992, p. 647) notes:

Deprivation was general in the city but most acutely felt in the Catholic districts: the percentage of people living at densities of more than two per room in 1961 was 21.1 per cent in the largely Catholic South ward, 5.7 per cent in the North ward, and 7.9 per cent in the Waterside.

Despite the pressing need for boundary extension to allow new housing, at the July 1966 meeting of the Corporation, Unionists voted as a block against extension. This was despite reports by Corporation's own Chief Officers, which recommended extension (Curran, 1986, pp. 50-51).

Recognising the unmet need in the city, Father Tony Mulvey created the Derry Housing Association (DHA) which aimed to support people to progress towards home ownership, and he was shortly assisted by John Hume. This gave Hume a direct insight into the human cost of the Corporation's failures in housing. The DHA proceeded to buy 50 acres of land at Pennyburn with the intention of building several hundred houses. But, says Curran (1986, p. 60), they encountered an insurmountable barrier:

The land was in the Unionist north ward, and the erection of a large housing development which would obviously have been occupied entirely by Catholics would have created a real threat to the artificially created Unionist majority in the ward. The Unionists reacted as they had throughout the past hundred years, turning down the planning application on the grounds that the land had been originally zoned for industrial purposes. The fact that no industrial development was remotely on the horizon did not cause them to retreat from this manoeuvre.

An appeal to Stormont failed and Curran (1986, p. 60) cites Hume at this time: "I knew we had reached another important cross-roads, that without doubt we would be forced to go on the streets for social justice".

The Pennyburn proposal was brought again to the Corporation, and again it was turned down (Curran, 1986, p. 61). The Housing Association continued with new proposals undeterred. In 1968 it approached the Corporation asking the Council to acquire land outside the city boundary at Shantallow. The Corporation refused on the basis that it was unable to acquire land outside the boundary.

In March 1968, Eddie McAteer at Stormont warned of an impending "permanent catastrophe to community relations" if injustices were to endure (Curran, 1986, pp. 62-63). Only when tensions mounted through the summer of 1968 did the Corporation announce the building of 505 new houses – but it was too little too late.

The Annual Report of the City Executive Sanitary Officer, Eric Drayson, showed that over 1,000 houses in the city were occupied by more than one family, and in several cases seven or eight families. The next meeting of the Corporation was disrupted entirely, and in September, the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association announced a march in the city on Saturday 5 October 1968, now recognised as a key turning point in the history of Northern Ireland (Curran, 1986, p. 79).

6.3 Allocation of housing

As well as inadequate and politically driven planning, the allocation of existing houses was also discriminatory and deeply flawed. In 1955, Councillor James Doherty challenged the Unionist's housing allocations, pointing out that of 228 houses allocated in January of that year, only 17 (7%) had been allocated to Catholics (Curran, pp. 15-16). At the July 1959 meeting of the Corporation, the issue of allocation of houses in the newly built Belmont estate was raised. Only nine houses were allocated to Catholics, out of 200 tenancies, with some given to policemen newly arrived in the city (Curran, p. 20).

Poor processes lacking in transparency enabled imbalanced allocation to continue, with reference made to the power of the Unionist Mayor to allocate houses in accordance with his personal judgement (see for example, Melaugh, 1995). O'Dochartaigh (1999, p. 5) states:

Effectively the Unionist Mayor of the city was free to allocate houses in accordance with his personal judgement. Those the Mayor chose were virtually all Protestants, (with the exception of those housed in NIHT-built houses owned by the Corporation in Creggan) while those the NIHT chose were virtually all Catholics. This suggests either that the allocation procedures of the NIHT in Derry, in direct contrast with their effect elsewhere, favoured Catholics to the virtual exclusion of Protestants or that the Unionist Mayor of Derry was allocating houses on a sectarian basis and leaving the NIHT with a housing waiting list which was almost exclusively Catholic. This writer would lean heavily towards the latter explanation.

An article in the Londonderry Sentinel (16 October 1968) regarding the events around the 5 October 1968 Civil Rights march disputes the allegations of discrimination in housing allocation, and calls for an inquiry to "clarify a lot of the misunderstandings that exist, and could also give to the world a completely new conception of what is happening". It goes on:

It could well be found that the Protestant section of the community has as much grounds as any other denomination for claiming that it is the victim of discrimination in the allocation of houses (Protestants got only 21 out of 316 allocated by the Northern Ireland Housing Trust at Shantallow) and in employment...

The article continues:

Between the Corporation and the Housing Trust, a total of 4,523 houses have been erected in the city since the end of the War, and 2,089 have been provided by the Corporation. The total represents nearly forty per cent of the 12,000 houses in the city today... The need is still great but the Area Plan has given the basis for planning the future housing schemes. The Corporation has about 100 houses currently under construction and plans are well in hand for another 300.

But, according to Bardon (1992, p. 790) once the Londonderry Corporation had been disbanded and the Housing Executive established, the imbalanced allocation continued until the last minute:

...the Housing Executive inherited a waiting list of some two thousand families, accounting for around one seventh of Derry's inhabitants. The local authorities there discriminated blatantly to the eleventh hour: Londonderry Corporation refused to allow building at Shantallow on the bogus grounds that proper drainage was impossible there; and Londonderry Rural District Council, with unedifying haste, allocated virtually all the Ballynagard estate off the Culmore Road to Protestants just before the Development Commission took over.

The gerrymandering practices of the Londonderry Corporation, whilst designed to disadvantage the Catholic population, was in fact to result in long term damage to the Protestant community on the west bank– their
policies and practices ensured a substantial Nationalist majority on the Cityside, and that Protestants living there would continue to be in a minority. In effect, the Unionist minority controlling Derry / Londonderry engineered the perpetuation of a considerable nationalist majority in the Cityside.

Smyth signals the significance of housing and planning policy in impacting on sectarian balance. Noting patterns of separation in Derry / Londonderry, Smyth (1995b, p. 33) observes:

This overall trend is mirrored in similar trends in the city of Belfast, where a similar exodus of the Protestant population to the North Down and Ards area has been documented. It is likely that the causes of such shifts are complex and composed of a number of interacting factors. The activities of planners and policy makers has impacted, whether intentionally or unintentionally, on many factors including the sectarian balance. Further, we know that policy in certain fields such as housing plays a significant role in shaping the sectarian geography of our cities and towns.

The 1969 Cameron Report (1969, Paragraph 10) recognised even at that stage how deep-rooted housing segregation was:

In this connection reference must also be made – and here the issue is essentially sectarian – to the segregation in housing which exists and persists. There is no doubt not only of the fact of segregation but also that many are not only content that this should be so but welcome and defend it on practical grounds – an attitude of mind found as readily among Catholics as Protestants. Even the Northern Ireland Housing Trust has found this reaction against integration in housing and in favour of segregation, powerful and something which has been to taken into account in the siting and an arrangement of their developments when these are permitted and undertaken.

The shortage of new housing and the substantial number of dwellings that were unfit or lacked basic amenities affected both Catholic and Protestant households in terms of shortage of adequate housing, and the state of existing housing. Because of the priority given to Protestants in housing allocation, Derry Catholics found themselves in worse conditions, generally with more people sharing one house.

6.4 Housing Reform

Faced with evidence of serious housing shortages and a housing stock which was in a very poor condition, the Westminster government initially pressured Stormont to introduce a series of housing reforms and later took direct control of them in 1972. On 22 November 1968, Unionist representatives were called to Stormont and told that the Corporation and the Rural Council were to be suspended, and a Commission was to be appointed to carry out a Derry Development Plan (Curran, 1986, p. 101). The Citizens’ Action Committee and the Nationalist party demanded a points system for allocating houses, the appointment of a Northern Ireland ombudsman, urgent implementation of the Derry Development Plan, and democratic governance (Curran, p. 102). Even as the Corporation sputtered to an end, at its December meeting, Unionist members voted down a proposal for new houses at the Glen Road (Curran, p. 106). At the last meeting of the Derry Rural Council, they allocated 45 houses, all but five to Protestants (Curran, 1986, p. 121).

McClean (1983, p. 65) describes the new dispensation thus:

Two days after the [1969] election, Brian Morton took over as Chairman of the new Londonderry Development Committee, the body which had been appointed to replace the disband Londonerry Corporation. Mr Morton said that the housing situation in Derry was ‘frightening’, and he immediately instituted a massive building programme, ironically enough in the old North Ward of the gerrymandered corporation area, and out into

Carnhill and Shantallow. The old city boundary, and with it the gerrymander, was gone for ever.

However, so great was the problem in the early-mid 1970s that Bardon (1992, pp. 39-40) notes:

A House-Condition Survey carried out in 1974 revealed the scale of the problem. In Northern Ireland as a whole 19.6 per cent of the total dwelling stock was statutorily unfit, compared with 7.3 per cent in England and Wales.

McClean (1983), who had been a local GP, speaks of his horror at the conditions he saw Catholic people on the west bank live in, with houses in multiple occupation and with entirely inadequate facilities, contributing to ill health.

The fact that decisions regarding the allocation of public rented accommodation were taken out of the hands of local councillors helped to reduce the extent of allegations of discrimination. In addition, a points system based on housing need was introduced and, after a period of rationalisation, a standard system of rents was implemented across the entire stock. Both measures helped increase confidence in the fairness of the Northern Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE). The essential ingredient was the financial commitment given to the various housing programmes that were introduced in the 1970s and 1980s. 32

It seems inevitable that reforms urging local authorities to operate a fair points system in the allocation of local authority housing, and the acceleration of housing programmes particularly in the city must also have had an impact on Protestant as well as Catholic populations seeking housing, leading to a different distribution pattern than that which would have emerged had the previous discriminatory system continued.

6.5 New estates and the redevelopment of the Fountain

The reforms in housing meant two things for Protestants. First, it meant that new and more attractive housing would now be available elsewhere. Secondly, for some, it meant redevelopment of the Cityside areas in which they lived, which would occasion “temporary” moves, which for some, would become permanent.

The Londonderry Sentinel from 19 April 1972, in its article entitled: “20% families leave Cathedral parish”, captures the way in which housing factors intermingled with security concerns, to influence people to move. It reports the Very Reverend George Good’s statement at St Columb’s Cathedral at Easter that over 20% of the families in the parish had moved, many of them out of the Templemore parish entirely. The article quotes the Reverend Good as saying: “Violence has caused a fair share of this exodus” he said, “but the re-development of the Fountain Street area has been a major factor.” Temple and Baker (pp. 92-93) note that “it must also be acknowledged that re-development and the prospect of new houses e.g. in Lincoln Court and Newbuildings plays a significant role in the movement of Protestant people from the West Bank”.

The redevelopment mentioned here refers to a major redevelopment of the Fountain which was undertaken in the early 1970s which required residents to move out to ‘temporary’ accommodation, with a view to moving back to the area once work was completed. It is evident from a range of sources that many of those who moved out did not move back:

Many residents of the Fountain moved out during the redevelopment of the area … and never moved back again. (Templegrove Survey, 1996, p. 57)
It appears that there were a number of reasons for this. One such reason was that, quite simply, residents did not like the new style of accommodation on offer, and preferred to stay where they were – often in a better standard of housing in the Waterside. The *Londonderry Sentinel* (19/6/68) in an article entitled “Tenants‘ Pressure Group” points to the unpopularity of the style of redevelopment on offer. It refers to a committee established in Foyle Park, New Street and Carrigans Lane, which it suggests represented a mixed community. It states that the committee was against “the provision of 100 percent maisonette accommodation” as part of the redevelopment. Residents also referred to hoping to be rehoused in the area.

A number of personal testimonies point to the impact of the redevelopment:

- A contributor to Burgess (2011, p. 99) stated: “I wouldn’t have moved, I didn’t want to move, but there was a re-development going on at the same time and we told that if we moved out of the Fountain, we would get housed in Lincoln Courts but because after six months we could apply to come back to one of the new houses that were built in the Fountain. So we moved over, but we were told you can’t paint the walls for six months until the plaster all dries and settles and settlement cracks were dealt with and all this, so we didn’t. We lived with grey walls for six months, in the knowledge that you were going to move back to the Fountain, but when the six months were up, we went down to the housing executive. I have to say me mother never settled in the Waterside, never ever. So we went back to the housing executive to say that we were told this. They said no, that we would be pointed now on the house that we were living in. We were told that we had no chance at all, so we never got back to the Fountain. But prior to this, between the bomb outside Woolworths and then shortly after that, Willie King was kicked to death in London Street and he, he lived just across the garden wall, our two gardens were separated by a wall and my mother took it really badly.”

- A contributor to Campbell (2016, pp. 44-47) recalled: “When we lived in the Fountain, we were often attacked by youths from the Bishop Street area and the street was petrol bombed and stoned. It was very scary at times, but it’s hard to remember details now…/ One by one, the people all seemed to move out of the Fountain. That old sense of community was taken away and they built a lot of flats and maisonettes…They knocked down the old houses, and ours was demolished during the big redevelopment for the new Fountain… / A lot of people didn’t have the patience to wait for new houses and moved over to Lincoln Courts in the Waterside, which had just been finished. We sat it out, waiting for the new house. But once they built the new ones, the spirit went – it just wasn’t the same”. “We loved the Fountain but the redevelopment ruined it in a way. It took away the community spirit we loved so much. About twenty-five years ago, the rents began to get too high for us, and my husband said we might as well make the move… / It was a wrench to move to the Waterside. It broke my heart moving over here because every time I go over that bridge, I’m back home.”

- Pam Mitchell in (p 14) shared her recollections in Hemmed In and Hacking It: “A lot had to move for the re-building, / They were told they could move back / when the houses were re-built. / There wasn’t enough built. / These houses destroyed the character. / It hasn’t done anything to enrich anybody’s life. / They are just concrete boxes, too closed in. / Young families didn’t want upheaval again, / didn’t want to come back into the town again - / the troubles were really bad”.

- Another contributor said (p. 38): “When they first redeveloped the Fountain, / they knocked down the terraced houses, / They put up maisonettes, / a monstrosity. / A lot of families moved then / because families didn’t want a house / on top of a house / especially with children. / They were dangerous.

This is borne out by the TAR Field Survey (p. 19) which found that self-contained flats or maisonettes accounted for 40% of housing in the Fountain.

They point to the fact that the figures point to a high level of new residents in the Fountain area, but not for positive reasons or to positive effect: “Over 70% of these new residents – those living in the area for less than a year – are male, and qualitative experience suggests that many of these males have alcohol problems” (TAR Field Survey, p. 12). McKay (2000, p. 308) notes that after many residents moved out, there was a view that “problem families” had been “dumped” in the Fountain and that there had been clashes between younger and older residents.

Hall (1999, p. 11) found that many of his contributors also blamed housing policy and planning for contributing to Protestant migration, for example: “I think the Housing Executive have a lot to answer for regarding the displacement, because initially when people in the Fountain were moved out to areas like Lincoln Courts they were told that redevelopment would happen soon and they would get the opportunity to move back. But because of the slow process of redevelopment people who arrived here became more settled and never felt the need to move back to the Fountain.

The Fountain was not the only area to experience redevelopment. Contemporary news articles from the early 1970s also reflect this theme, for example, the *Londonderry Sentinel* (28/1/70) reports “1,300 will have to leave re-developed Bishop Street”. The article refers to a redevelopment scheme in the area, which required residents to be relocated to Ballyarnett and Shantallow. McClean (1983, p. 111) notes: “While the rioting continued with increasing severity into 1971 the SDLP constituency representatives were making valiant efforts to achieve political progress, but were not meeting with any significant success. I knew that they had no alternative but to continue their efforts, but it was obvious that the overall situation was deteriorating. The Development Commission in Derry had instituted a massive housing programme and hundreds of families were being rehoused in Shantallow housing estates.”

6.6 Housing and upward mobility

There is also evidence in some sources that some migration occurred as a result of upward mobility. A man from the Fountain interviewed by Hemmed in and Hacking It (1996, p. 9-10) spoke about the drastic changes in the Fountain, from a young and thriving population to an aging population with few children. He said:

He said: “It started to change in the mid 60’s. / Houses were being built around Culmore Road, / Hampstead Park and Woodburn on the Waterside. / Westbank Protestant people started to move out / to private housing areas. The working class and self- employed Protestants / of the Dark Lane and the Fountain / moved out to the houses being vacated, up around the Northland Road. / You had a shift from the / densely populated Fountain into these areas. Protestants who were stepping up, / moving up-market. / Working class Protestants, educated, / coming in as professionals / would not be going back to their roots. / A natural shift – that wasn’t alarming."

Another contributor remarked (p 22): “We have lost the better-off families. / The people / with a few quid behind them / went”.

Hall (1999, p 10) found that Protestants in his focus groups also suggested:
...the wealthy moved out, to the leafy suburbs if you like, and they set the trend which others followed. If doctors and the professional classes were moving out of the city why should the working class stay behind?

Interviewees in More and Smyth (1996) also refer to moves across to the Waterside as a way for families to become upwardly mobile, something also encouraged by what one interviewee, Alistair Simpson, refers to as Protestant politicians making good houses available on the Waterside.

These are issues also raised by Shirlow and McGovern (1996), who discuss the issue of the Protestant middle class deserting working class areas, whilst a Catholic working class was in ascendency (See also Shirlow and McGovern, 1997). Orr (2008, p. 17) in his discussion on the role played by Protestant churches in Protestant areas, refers to some areas having been ‘left behind’ by middle classes who were ‘upwardly mobile’. He further refers to what he calls the ‘demographic shift’ in Protestant areas as church members “who could do so” moved away from working class areas to places and locations, “leaving behind communities…suffering the economic decline that attended the demise of the Ulster manufacturing industry”.

6.7 Keeping the area Protestant

There were some indications from Hemmed in and Hacking It in particular that for some Protestants, sharing their area with Catholics was not desirable.

For example, one of the contributors (p. 31) stated:

We had to show this / as a hard line area / in order to preserve the area – make Catholics frightened / in order to ensure that the remaining Protestants could stay. / There was manys a case, / where it was gradually two, three / until all the Protestants were forced out. / So we had to give this image that it’s not safe for yous to come in.

Another contributor to the same publication (p. 34) recalls the steps she was prepared to take to keep Catholics out of the Fountain:

We got word one night / that they were moving / twelve Catholic families / into the new houses getting built / in the Fountain. / They were looking to stop this / looking for people to squat in the houses. / We went over and squatted. / My father came over / all annoyed, / “I reared you better than that.

Also in Hemmed in and Hacking It, another Fountain resident stated (p. 43):

The Housing Executive wanted a mixed estate, but we did not. I believe there would have been murder done, and they were wise to listen to what we were all saying.

These examples are all from the same source, but they do point to an area for further study: the Protestant response to Catholics moving into streets or estates considered largely Protestant. What is not known is the extent to which Catholics moving in, contributed to the decision of Protestant families to move out.

6.8 Summary

The evidence shows that housing policy and planning in Derry / Londonderry in the late 1960s and early 1970s in particular had a dramatic impact on the segregated nature of housing in the city. Gerrymandering engineered a situation whereby the Cityside had a disproportionate Catholic majority, with other areas prevented from expansion and development. Poor attention to the housing stock meant that, when new estates were finally built for example at Lincoin Courts and Newbuildings, Protestant populations were displaced from their run-down places of residence on the Cityside on a supposedly temporary basis, but both the quality of the new housing, and the poor design of their redeveloped areas, meant that many were inclined to remain in their new Waterside homes.

Some sources point to the possibility that more upwardly mobile Protestants moved away from the Cityside before the onset of the conflict, in order to take up residence in suburban areas with better housing, and as we have seen, there is some suggestion that the prospect of sharing space with Catholics may have been unappealing for some. This may explain the fact that even before 1969, substantial migration of the Protestant community away from the Cityside was already taking place. However, on these last two points, more study is needed on the extent to which these contributed to the overall migration picture.
The Wilson Plan in 1965 proposed four centres for rapid industrial development in Northern Ireland, despite their greater access to employment opportunities in public agencies. A subject which has been less explored is the impact that this had on Protestant migration from the west bank of Derry / Londonderry, and possibly away from the city altogether.

There seems to be consensus among most sources that planning for the economic development of Northern Ireland in the 1950s and 1960s was skewed heavily towards the east of the River Bann and towards areas more heavily populated by Protestants. Whilst such a strategy may have benefited large portions of the Protestant population east of the Bann, it served to disadvantage counties west of the Bann, which had a concentration of areas more heavily populated by Catholics. There is no doubt that this impacted on the economic opportunities for Catholics. A subject which has been less explored is the impact that this imbalanced development must have had on Protestants living in the largest city west of the Bann too, even despite their greater access to employment opportunities in public agencies.

7.2.1 The Wilson Plan for industrial development

The Wilson Plan in 1965 proposed four centres for rapid industrial development in Northern Ireland, "all within a 30-mile radius of Belfast, and in western counties virtually nothing" (CSJ 1969, p. 15). The Wilson Plan was criticized even before publication by the head of the design team, Geoffrey Copcutt, and recognised as flawed due to the development of the new city of Craigavon, and the focus on Protestant areas over Catholic areas for development. The building of the new town of Craigavon was ultimately abandoned even by Copcutt as chief designer who suggested that efforts should be concentrated instead on Londonderry (Bardon, 1992, p. 625). The 1969 CSJ Report (p. 15) suggests that: "He suggested the abandonment of the New City and that the development of Londonderry should be concentrated upon in order to give the province a reasonable balance". The Government's industrial strategy included the pre-building of factories in order to stimulate industry. Again, this significantly preferred sites east of the Bann. For example, in March 1969, there were 59 factory sites set up in the predominantly Protestant east of the Bann, and 15 pre-built factories in the predominantly Catholic west of the Bann. New industries tended to be encouraged to locate in predominantly Protestant areas. For example, in 1967, a German factory was established in Bangor which had an unemployment figure of 245 people, as compared with 20% unemployment in Derry City and 25% unemployment in Strabane (CSJ 1969, p. 15). In the same year, the Birmingham Sound Reproducers (BSR) factory closed in the Derry / Londonderry with the loss of 1,700 jobs – a devastating blow for the city's economy.

7.2.2 The Lockwood Report on the University

In 1965, the government commissioned Lockwood Report rejected Derry / Londonderry as the site for a new university in favour of Coleraine. This decision was made despite the longstanding presence of Magee University (Bardon, 1992, p. 625) which had been endowed by Mrs Martha Magee in 1845 as a Presbyterian theological college, and which provided an already established base in terms of infrastructure and reputation and made an obvious choice for the development of university education beyond Belfast. Geoffrey Copcutt, the architect who had been chief designer of Craigavon, and who resigned, seeing Londonderry as a more viable option, reportedly said:

One of the best hopes for prosperity in the North is the swift expansion of university facilities and the presence of an additional centre of learning at Derry could complement the range of facilities open to potential development (Curran, 1986, p. 31).

Curran (1986, p. 27) notes that the proposal for a new university was an issue on which Protestants and Catholics could work together. Concern about the likely location of the university was growing by January 1965, with the churches joining together to make a joint declaration about the "justice of Londonderry's claim" and an inter-denominational "University for Derry" committee was set up (Curran, p. 30). The Corporation made a submission in support of locating the university in the city.

Despite the concerted efforts of a range of city stakeholders, the Lockwood report recommended sitting the university in the small Unionist town of Coleraine (Curran, pp. 32 – 33). As the report still had to be ratified at Stormont, a huge cross-community motorcade and rally proceeded to Stormont on 18 February 1965, with Albert Anderson the Unionist mayor, and Eddie McAteer the leader of the Nationalist party sharing the mayoral car. It was to have no effect (Bardon, 1992, p. 626; Curran, p. 33).

7.2.3 The closure of infrastructure links

The closure of the western railway line with no railway in Fermanagh, Tyrone and most of Derry / Londonderry had a major impact on the city. There had initially been four railway lines into the city including Lough Swilly and Foyle. When it became necessary to close one, the one that was closed was the one serving the western region, the Great Northern Railway line, which left the entire western area including Fermanagh, Tyrone and almost all the county of Londonderry without a railway, and no direct link to Belfast or Dublin (Curran, p. 40; CSJ, 1965, p. 2, p. 15).
In July 1966, the Burns-Laird Shipping Line closed the Derry-Glasgow passenger route, deeply impacting dockers’ jobs and tourism links (Curran, p. 52).

The 1969 Cameron Report (Paragraph 37, echoed in Paragraph 142) recognises skewed economic planning as one of a number of sources of grievance...

...which affected all sections of the community, and with the support of a substantial section of Unionist interests in the city, were directed rightly or wrongly against the central government. These were related to the closure of the Great Northern railway line, the closure of the Londonderry factories of Birmingham Sound Reproducers Ltd., the absence of any effective measure to replace employment lost thereby, the siting and establishment of a new town in Craigavon as opposed to a policy of industrial development in and around Londonderry and, most of all, the decision to site a New University at Coleraine and not in Londonderry. This last grievance caused a degree of unity in resentment and protest which was probably unique, at least in the recent history of the city, and united local opinion in a suspicion that the central government was deliberately discriminating against the city and its interests for political reasons.

Just as the absence of a major source of employment (the university) meant a dearth of infrastructure development, so did the dearth of road and rail infrastructure mean an absence of industry. And just as development was skewed towards the East of the Bann during the 1960s and 70s, so too within the city itself, it was skewed towards the Waterside. It is perhaps not surprising then that Smyth (in TAR Public Discussions, p. 38) found that when they explored reasons why their participants moved away from the Cityside that: “It is clear … that economic reasons, or housing conditions predominate as reasons to move”. In her chapter entitled “Derry: the Dawning of Realism”, McKay (2000, p. 306) says of the Waterside: “that is where the biggest housing estates are. (It is also where the hospital, the railway station, the port, the city’s main industrial area and some of its flashiest houses are to be found)”. When the new Altnagelvin hospital opened in 1966, it was situated in the Waterside, and the old hospital on the Cityside was closed. As well as the “push” factors causing people to move away from the Cityside, the Waterside and other economic centres further afield may have provided a significant “pull” factor.

It is important to note that the strategies in place in the decades preceding the 1970s were not a new phenomenon. Traditionally, rail and road infrastructure had been built in predominantly Protestant areas since the 19th century. The impact of the policies listed above was to cement an already imbalanced situation. A vicious circle had been created whereby Derry / Londonderry was starved of investment, as the “push” factors causing people to move away from the Cityside, the Waterside and other economic centres further afield may have provided a significant “pull” factor.

It should be remembered that the population problem is one which concerns the whole Province even under normal conditions. We understand that on the basis of present statistics the disloyalist vote may take charge very shortly after the year 2000 ... and it is probably a fair rider to that proposition to say that the latter stages of this process will be more speedy than the present trend of the figures. For example when a rural district council falls into disloyalist hands, the next step is that disloyalist officials are appointed wherever and whenever possible and that houses are allotted to disloyalists and so the process becomes cumulative. Therefore we feel that the turning point may be looked for not later than the year 2000 AD.

Belfast – suffered a rate of 18 per cent.

The sources show that it was Catholics who were more likely to bear the brunt of unemployment. Alderman James Hegarty carried out research into Corporation employment patterns, published in February 1956. According to Curran (1986, p. 16):

Hegarty told a quiet and attentive Corporation that 98 per cent of the employees in the electricity station were Protestants. In the Corporation fitting shop there were two Catholics out of fifteen employees. Of the Corporation’s sixteen drivers, only three were Catholics. That was a disgraceful position in a city two-thirds Catholic.

Curran also points to a motion placed by Nationalist members of the Corporation in March 1962 expressing concern about the low numbers of Catholics in municipal employment. Curran (1986, pp. 21-22) cites the Unionist response: “That we view with distaste any attempt upon whatever pretext to inquire into the religious beliefs of any of our employees”.

Whilst clearly Catholics were more affected by the limited economic development and by the discrimination in operation for the jobs that were available, this could never have been a sustainable economic model for a thriving economy for Protestants or Catholics living west of the Bann. A Protestant contributor to McKay (2000, p. 344) noted the impact on the city’s Protestants:

There was no willingness to develop the north-west. The north-west was chosen for transatlantic flights – the British blocked it. We could have had the main airport. The little bit of shipbuilding was bought out by Shorts. The M2 should have joined the two main cities, Belfast and Londonderry. The university should have been sited here. When the Unionists were in power we were left out because this was perceived as a nationalist town. They alienated the working class Protestants in the process. I remember when a Unionist politician would come to town you practically had to bow down before him.

It is not simply the case, however, that decisions taken centrally at Stormont impacted on the economic fortunes of Derry / Londonderry. There is also evidence that even the city’s own political representatives worked against its prosperity. Referring to the delicate population and therefore power balance in Derry / Londonderry, Patterson and Kauffman point to the lengths to which some Unionist politicians were prepared to go, in order to ensure an ongoing unionist majority. They point to a September 1956 delegation from the city which met the Prime Minister “to discuss their very deep anxieties about the government’s policies on the attraction of new industries to deal with the employment problem in the province”. Patterson and Kauffman (2007, p. 44) cite a memorandum drawn up by the MP for the city, Edward Jones, detailing their concerns:

It should be remembered that the population problem is one which concerns the whole Province even under normal conditions. We understand that on the basis of present statistics the disloyalist vote may take charge very shortly after the year 2000 ... and it is probably a fair rider to that proposition to say that the latter stages of this process will be more speedy than the present trend of the figures. For example when a rural district council falls into disloyalist hands, the next step is that disloyalist officials are appointed wherever and whenever possible and that houses are allotted to disloyalists and so the process becomes cumulative. Therefore we feel that the turning point may be looked for not later than the year 2000 AD.

Remarkably, the city’s MP went on to lobby the government against bringing industrial projects to his own constituency (Patterson and Kauffman, p. 45):
Industrial expansion in Ulster is a most dangerous thing unless it is watched from the constitutional angle... New industrial projects should be discussed and considered with responsible persons from the local Loyalist Associations before being imposed on any area and particularly before they are imposed on Londonderry City or County. Such discussion and consideration should be directed to the question of (a) whether and (b) how the labour force which such projects will involve can be supplied so as to maintain and safeguard the Loyalist majority. Any projects in which this is not possible should either be not proceeded with, or at least strongly discouraged.

This coincides with other accounts of the role of some leading unionists in the city’s economic direction. For example, Curran (1986, pp. 25-26) states that whilst organisations such as the Derry Unemployed Association continued to work for further development for Derry / Londonderry, Major Thomas Glass, a Unionist member of the Derry Employment Training Advisory Committee, declared that: “too much is expected of the government in the way of bringing employment to the workers. The workers should be more enterprising and go to the work.”

Curran points out that Edward Jones, the Unionist MP for the city, voted in favour of the Lockwood report, against the interests of his own constituency. Curran (p. 36) notes later:

*Rumours and innuendoes that a powerful clique of Derry unionists had been working against the city’s economic interests for some time and that they had actually urged the government to site the university elsewhere other than in Derry, spread widely. Nationalist MP Paddy Gormley, under the protection of parliamentary privilege, named eight unionists and coined the phrase ‘faceless men’ to describe them. The list included prominent men in the professional and business life of Derry.*

Curran (p. 46) goes on to add that the allegations were denied, but a Unionist MP, Robert Nixon said that he believed the allegations, and their actions were denounced by a Protestant church leader.

McKay (2000, p. 355) also raises the issue in connection with the failed university campaign: “Afterwards, suspicions arose that there had been Unionists who, behind the scenes, had been working to undermine the campaign they claimed they supported”. McKay (p. 355) cites Inez McCormack recalling the hanging of seven dummies from the cannons on the city walls. She commented: “They called them the seven faceless men. The people who betrayed Derry. I didn’t understand the connotations”.

Whatever the connotations, the implications and impact of the location of the university in Coleraine meant that considerable investment went with it, and away from Derry / Londonderry, in the form of jobs in construction, lecturing and administration, and in the form of road and rail infrastructure. It is perhaps not surprising that other parts of Northern Ireland began to look more appealing as places to live and work. Temple and Baker (p. 107) cite a Londonderry Sentinel article of 11 October 1972 which discusses declining Protestant numbers on the west bank and the impact on churches. The article points to the movement of Protestants to other more attractive economic centres:

>The general movement of Protestant population is not only in the Waterside. The idea that people are simply moving to the Waterside to live there is a fallacy - The Waterside does not reflect this movement which involves people going to Coleraine, Craigavon, Antrim and Britain... St Augustine’s has lost a considerable number of parishioners in recent years arising out of re-development and the economic situation in the city...*

In spite of the substantial challenges outlined above, the city did manage to attract industries such as Du Pont in the Campsie area of the Waterside, as well as the British Oxygen Company, and Birmingham Sound Producers in Creggan (Curran, 1986, p. 24), but continued to have the highest rate of unemployment for a city of its size in Western Europe. Nationalists felt that Unionists did not have the same impetus to push for growth in the city, as unemployment was considerably less amongst the Protestant population. In Autumn 1966, Monarch Electrical announced the pay-off of 450 workers, and in November a further 525. It finally closed in January 1967 (Curran, pp. 25, 53).

**7.4 Conclusion**

The evidence shows that economic and industrial planning and infrastructure development was skewed heavily to the largely Protestant eastern side of Northern Ireland, with Derry / Londonderry deprived of investment, jobs and opportunities. The impact on the Catholic population has been documented to some degree, but it appears that the full impact of this policy on Derry / Londonderry Protestants has not been explored in any depth, and would be an important area for further study. The sources reviewed show that the policies implemented at a Stormont level, and often supported and even encouraged by local Unionist leaders, either in public or in private, had far reaching implications for the economic wellbeing of the Protestant as well as the Catholic population of the city.

Whilst, by 1969, much of the damage had already been done to the city’s economic development prospects as a result of regional strategies, they could only have been further set back as the conflict gained momentum and as the city centre became characterised by unrest and both IRA and state violence.

The next section considers the role that leadership played in the Protestant migration.
Section 8: Leadership

8.1 Introduction

The issue of Unionist leadership during the 1960s and 70s, and its impact on the Protestant community, was raised across a number of sources, with nationalist leadership emerging to a lesser degree (e.g., TAR, McKay, Bardon, Cameron). This section explores the observations raised about leadership at the time, both at a Northern Ireland level and at a local level, and the possible impact of leadership on attitudes and behaviour which may have ultimately contributed to Protestant migration.

8.2 Unionist leadership

8.2.1 Denial

Many of the sources point to the failure of Unionist leadership to respond to the Civil Rights issues in a constructive manner, at both a local and regional level. An article in the Londonderry Sentinel 16 October 1968, recognises the significance of events around the 5 October 1968 march, refutes the suggestion of discrimination against Catholics in local voting, housing and employment, and calls for Unionist leaders to speak up:

"Throughout the period since violence erupted in Londonderry on Saturday week many speeches have been made, many interviews have been given by the representatives of many organisations and many parties but, to date, one party has remained silent in the face of provocative declarations. The Unionist party, which is being blamed by many organisations for conditions in the city - indeed, in the whole country - has uttered not a word."

The 1969 CSJ Report (1969, p. 13) points to missed opportunities for leaders to act on housing and electoral injustice: "British political leaders like Prime Minister Wilson, Lord Butler, Lord Brooke, Sir Alec Douglas-Home and many others before them have been given full details of these injustices, but so far nothing concrete has been done". CSJ (1969, p 17) concludes that: "It is not surprising, therefore, that many people think that progress will only be achieved by street demonstrations and civil disobedience".

Bardon (1992, p. 655) notes that despite clear television footage to the contrary, William Craig denied the use of undue force at the 5 October 1968 Civil Rights march, which:

"...only served to convince the British media that a reactionary regime had been caught in the act of suppressing free speech within the United Kingdom. At a stroke the television coverage of the events of 5 October 1968 destablised Northern Ireland, and as the sectarian dragon was fully reawakened, the region was plunged into a near-revolutionary crisis, characterized by bitter intercommunal conflict and protracted violence and destruction."

Strategic leadership failures continued throughout the 1970s. As well as internment and the handling of Bloody Sunday, the government failed to act when the Ulster Defence Regiment, designed to replace the sectarian B-Specials, was found to be deeply flawed in its make-up, paramilitary associations, and in its conduct (Urwin, 2016). This failure to take action, and a tendency to cover-up misconduct and misdirect blame, continued throughout the 1970s.

Alongside this, Northern Ireland leaders tended not to excel at reaching across the religious divide. Bardon (1992, p. 633) reports that O’Neill said of Brookeborough: "in twenty years as Prime Minister he never crossed the border, never visited a Catholic school, and never received or sought a civic reception from a Catholic town".

The research suggests that local Unionist leaders also consistently failed to recognise the realities facing them, and the extent to which meaningful reform was needed. The Cameron report suggests that “there appeared to be very obvious Unionist complacency in Unionist circles, and a belief that Roman Catholics had no real basis for complaints of discrimination in housing or in any other direction” (Cameron, Paragraph 75). He noted:

"It is easy to appreciate that in such circumstances, if tensions are not to be built up to a point where violent explosions may readily be caused a very high level of statesmanship and political foresight both in Government and among members of opposition groups, is required to deal with so delicate a political and social situation. The fact that these explosions have occurred is perhaps itself a sufficient criticism of the failures in leadership and foresight among political leaders of all sides."

Interestingly, there appears to be some disconnect between the public discourse of Unionism and what the Cameron Report (Paragraph 127) suggests that Unionist representatives were saying to them in the Enquiry:

"We should record however that in the evidence presented to us from many responsible individuals and bodies, predominantly Protestant and non-Nationalist in purpose or outlook, there was a frank recognition that this widespread sense of grievance among Catholic people in Northern Ireland was justified in fact and called for urgent remedy and further, Cameron (Paragraph 137) states:

In any event there can be no doubt that under modern conditions the electoral arrangements in these areas were producing unfair results. This was not seriously contested by several of the Unionist representatives who appeared before us.

As McKay (2000, p 315) asks “what were Protestant people to believe?” Without clear direction, different narratives have been constructed. Hall (1999, p. 11) for example points out that in his research, one Protestant contributor commented – with hindsight:

"I often wonder if it was politically motivated, was it done to an agenda, was there a plan to create an exodus of Protestants from the west bank? Certainly Maggie Thatcher at one stage seemed to have implied that she was quite open to dividing Ulster up and cutting off the two bridges and redesigning the border. So somewhere within government at a high level it seemed acceptable to do that, and we are the people who have suffered as a consequence of that hidden agenda."

8.2.2 Incitement and fear

In addition to a refusal to recognise that reform was needed, and to constructively engage in making change, a number of sources point to the decision by some Unionist leaders to invoke fear, to stir up anti-Civil Rights feeling, and to incite violence against Catholics.

Cameron points to the role of Paisley and Bunting in igniting Unionist passions, for example promoting the display of the following notices in Armagh in advance of a Civil Rights march which moved the focus away from issues of justice and fairness within Northern Ireland, and towards the emotive issues of identity and nationhood:

8.2.3 Unionist leaders and class

Any gains by the Civil Rights movement were cast as a win for the other side, and an assault on Unionism. It’s inevitable that people feel resigned and say it’s going to happen. Leaders who’ve marched them up to the top of the hill and marched them down again, and I think they just bit, but at least they were able to get their viewpoint across with Civil Rights, whereas Protestants just sat back.

A contributor to Hall’s research (1999, p. 24) states:

It is easy to recognise Paisley’s extremism. His opposition to the Catholic Church is explicit, and he has stated that Irish Catholics are united behind the ‘beast of fascism’, the IRA. But extreme statements from UUP politicians like John Taylor have attracted less attention. In 1979 he went so far as to suggest that if loyalist paramilitaries couldn’t desist from violence, they should restrict it to the South (Irish Times, 31 August 1979). In 1991 he told young unionists that the ‘harsh reality’ was that ‘one in three Catholics one meets is either a supporter of murder or worse still, a murderer’ (quoted in Fortnight; October 1991). Other unionists have contributed to the general idea that the enemy is the Catholic population.

The inclination of a largely more educated, middle class Unionist leadership to incite working class Protestants to fear and violence has been criticized in the sources not least by Protestant contributors. Holloway (1999, pp. 310-318), a generation of post-1948 Education Act leaders was giving the Nationalist community a growing sense of confidence, and a disinclination to accept the continuation of decades-long injustices. These included both political and community leaders such as Eddie McAteer, John Hume, Paddy ‘Bogside’ Doherty, Bernadette Devlin, Eamonn Deane, Eamonn McCann, Nell McCafferty, Raymond McLean, Martin McGuinness, Cathy Harkin, and Bridget Bond.

The leaders of the Civil Rights movement worked to ensure that its focus was on social change within Northern Ireland, rather than on constitutional change of the relationship between Northern Ireland and Britain. Their commitment was to achieving change through peaceful means. John Hume was singled out in the Cameron Report for calming marches and working to avoid violence (e.g. Paragraph 67).

Despite this, some sources suggest that it proved impossible for the nationalist leadership of the Civil Rights Movement to achieve cross-community engagement although there appear to have been moments in which a genuine cross-community engagement seemed possible.

The Cameron report (Paragraph 197) points to the early potential of People’s Democracy, formed at Queen’s University in response to 5 October 1968, as a body which was originally seen by itself at least as ‘non-sectarian – it is, as they put it, essentially a ‘working class’ movement, transcending what they regard as
the irrelevant and dangerous barriers of creed, and making its appeal to what they profess to regard as ‘the working class’ as a whole, unravaged or divided by sectarian hatred or bitterness”.

McClean (1983, p. 57) notes that in the early 1970s, there was still the potential for Civil Rights leaders to engage support from all backgrounds:

On 20 July [1971] a large number of British ex-servicemen burned their service medals in public, as a protest against British army actions in the Bogside area” (McClean, p. 113). He describes an idea proposed by Paul Grace and Len Green of the Civil Rights Movement aimed at attracting support well beyond the Catholic and Nationalist community: “They suggested that we should organise a Civil Rights March for ex-servicemen, and that we should march behind the Union Jack, the White Ensign, and the Royal Air Force Ensign.

A committee was formed and there was what McClean describes as an “immediate and varied” reaction (McClean, 1983, p. 57) and continues (pp. 57-58):

Unfortunately, many republicans in Derry were extremely angry at the idea of the march. Seán Keenan was particularly bitter and told me that if the march did take place, we would be attacked, and the march completely disrupted. We received several letters in a similar vein. We discussed this unexpected development at several meetings…Eventually the committee announced that in the overall interest of the Civil Rights Movement in general, it was our reluctant decision to cancel the proposed march.

Although attempts at a cross-community approach failed, the leadership of the Civil Rights movement is praised in some of the documents consulted as articulate, well-informed and as taking a dialogic rather than a violent approach: The Cameron report (Paragraph 11) states: “We were impressed by the number of well-educated and responsible people who were and are concerned in, and have taken an active part in, the Civil Rights movement, and by the depth and extent of the investigations they have made, or caused to be made, to produce evidence to vouch their grievances and support their claims for remedy”.

Despite their best efforts, however, it was difficult for the Civil Rights movement to be genuinely open whilst at the same time to keep more revolutionary or belligerent elements away. The Cameron Report (Paragraph 193) acknowledges: “There is no doubt that the I.R.A. has taken a close interest in the Civil Rights Association from its inception and members and supporters have been present at various of its meetings…” (Cameron, Paragraph 188). However, it later points out that the Civil Rights Association had, to that point, been able to keep these forces at bay and maintain its focus and its non-violent approach.

The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), the party that was to become for decades afterwards the majority nationalist voice in Northern Ireland and in Derry / Londonderry, was formed on 21 August 1970 with Gerry Fitt as leader. Although the reunification of Ireland was a primary goal for the party, Fitt said that he did not believe that Ireland could be reunited by violence (McClean, 1983, p. 108). John Hume saw the sensitivity of the situation in the early 1970s. Bardon (1992: 704) cites Hume’s comment at the 1973 SDLP party conference thus: “We must understand that we are asking a lot of the Protestant people of the North…The Anglo-Irish problem can be solved only when the fears of the Protestant community are stilled”.

John Hume was unequivocal in his condemnation of the IRA campaign and remained so after he became leader of the SDLP in 1979. The Irish Times of 8 March 1977 cites a speech he made in which he reflects on the impact of the IRA’s actions:

Never in the long history of Ireland had any organisation claiming to represent basic nationalist aspirations reduced itself to the level of the recent Provisional IRA campaign against a section of the Irish people. The leadership of the Provisional IRA have decided to murder people purely and simply because of the way they work for their living “because they are in business. Is there no one left in the ranks of the Provisional IRA who have even a spark of idealism and who has the courage to stand up to his colleagues and shout “stop”, Is there no one who will look back over the past seven years and ask himself: after 1,500 dead and 17,000 injured, after over more than 500 bombs, what has been achieved? It is no excuse to point to the atrocities of others. The Provisional IRA are responsible for their own actions and for the suffering they have brought on their own people. And what has the leadership of the Provisional IRA given in return to the thousands of young people who have ideologically joined their ranks and who now find themselves in graves or in jail? In our city anyone who looks back over the past seven troubled years will recognise at once that anything that has been achieved has been achieved by purely non-violent and political means. Derry Corporation has disappeared and been replaced by a democratically elected council. The last few years have seen a great improvement in Derry’s housing situation. On the employment front we have attracted massive new industry. Can anyone doubt but for the violence we would have attracted more?

Bardon (1992, p. 739) says of Hume: “under his direction the party’s commitment to peaceful tactics remained as firm as ever”.

8.4 Leadership at Council level

As part of the programme of reforms achieved by the Civil Rights movement, the British Government abolished both the Londonderry Corporation and the Londonderry Rural District Council, replacing them with the Londonderry Development Commission which then embarked on a substantial house building and road reconstruction programmes, and set about attracting investment to the city. A system of Single Transferable Vote (STV) was introduced which resulted in a majority of councillors from nationalist and republican parties being elected. Whilst nationalists now held the majority position in the Council, the strongest party remained the peaceful and non-violent SDLP who regularly condemned all acts of violence.

It is likely that the Council was aware of the issue of Protestant migration, as it is evident from the news articles featured in this report that it was receiving coverage from at least the early 1970s. It has proved difficult to establish what the nationalist-led Council did specifically in response to it: this should be a matter for further research. The sources point to a number of responses.

In 1978, Alliance Councillor Bertie Faulkner was calling for action on the movement of Protestants away from the west bank. In the Derry Journal [30/6/78] in an article entitled “City Councillor spells out Protestant Fears about West Bank”, he called for a conference to discuss this issue, and for organisations and groups to come together. He also referred to the “slow attrition of Protestants moving from such as the Glen, Belmont and Marlborough”, areas once mixed. Faulkner stated that Protestants were looking for reassurances and security, he also proposed that housing allocation needed to be looked at, but that it was important that various groups and organisations came together to discuss this issue, as a “first step to reassuring the Protestant community”.

The Londonderry Sentinel [22/6/75] features an article concerning the views of then Bishop Robin Eames, who became Bishop of Derry and Raphoe in 1975, entitled “Bishop Warns of a Tale of Two Cities”. In this article, Eames expressed concern over the drift of Protestants from the West Bank. The article also refers to
the Mayor of the City – Hugh Doherty – who stated that this was “one of the most serious problems in the city today – the population drift.” The Mayor said he found it “disturbing” how many people have crossed from one side to the other and that if it was to continue the city would be “totally divided”. The Mayor also reportedly said “…he knew there had been intimidation”.

Temple and Baker (p. 111) suggest that there was some disappointment at the Council’s response to the bombing of Gwynn’s Institute in Brooke Park, in 1973. Temple and Baker note that for one of their interviewees:

…this attack on an iconic building with multiple use that attracts a wide variety of people, in modern parlance, ‘users’, into the Park was a highly significant moment in the history of the park. The travesty of the attack on Brooke Park was later compounded when Derry City Council decided not to re-build but to take full compensation for the building from the civic authorities and to level the site. This abandonment of the dream to rebuild Gwyn’s meant that the park had lost its heart/central feature and this loss contributed to the steady decline of Brooke Park over the subsequent years.

There are however indications that the Council made attempts to build community relations. Once the nationalist majority Council was in place, it immediately took action to introduce a power-sharing model which was more open and fair than that practiced by the former Unionist-led Corporation, in that key posts such as the mayor and deputy-mayor were rotated, in an attempt to ensure that the minority community had representation at the highest levels in Council. There is evidence that a majority of Councillors supported measures to improve reconciliation and integration between the two communities. For example, in 1977, Colm Cavanagh and Eamon Deane put forward a proposal to the Council on Integrated Education. This was passed by a majority with 21 in favour, out of a total of 27 councillors. However, the power to plan education did not lie with the Council, and the opportunity was lost.

However, in terms of policies designed specifically to target segregation in Derry / Londonderry, it appears that it was only in the 1990s that a raft of strategies emerged (see Shirlow et al. 2005).

8.5 Leadership by churches

As noted earlier, at a local level, Ministers who were experiencing impacts on congregations were taking action, by for example, issuing statements to the press, and by working with other Ministers on the idea of shared ministries.

Bishop Robin Eames, who became Bishop of Derry and Raphoe in 1975, also went public on the issue. In the Derry Journal (21/6/77) in an article entitled “Derry Could Become a Divided City” Bishop Eames referred to the “drift of Protestants from the west bank to the East is nothing but a tragedy”. Eames stated that “fortunately the intimidation incidents are very few but the fact is that the fear remains”. He also stated that people had “spelled it out loud and clearly to the elected representatives”.

Eames made the point in a meeting he and William Ross, MP, had with the Permanent Secretary in 197835 that they did not want to make a sectarian point, but wanted the city to be genuinely integrated, but that this seemed unlikely as in “…the next 10/15 years there would be a large Roman Catholic majority West of the Bann”.

Bruce (1994) indicates that Catholic Church leaders too were prepared to speak out on IRA violence, and its impact on Protestants. Bruce (1994, p. 48) states:

Put simply, though the IRA may see its terror as being directed against individuals who in their view deserve it and against the institutions of the state, Protestants see it as a murderous attack on Protestants, and even Catholic leaders are coming to see it like that. Cardinal Cahal Daly in April 1993 used a lecture at the Queen’s University of Belfast to say: I want to voice my condemnation of murders of Protestant farmers and workers, which have been a feature of the IRA campaign since it began. This campaign cannot but be seen by Protestants as a concerted campaign on this whole community, intended to drive them from their homes, particularly in exposed areas.

As noted earlier, at the funeral of Joseph Elliott, Bishop Edward Daly appealed for peace; “Almost 140 people have died over the past three years through violence. Surely it must be obvious by now that the way of violence is the road to misery and suffering and grief”.

Churches in the north-west have a history of working together on an ecumenical basis to build positive relationships: further research is needed into the leadership shown by churches, both in terms of public-facing initiatives, and quieter behind-the-scenes work, aimed at addressing the conflict and building better relationships.

8.6 Leadership by community groups and individuals

Many of the sources which include transcripts of interviews with individual Protestants cite examples of good neighbourliness and caring relationships between themselves and their Catholic neighbours during the period studied. It is also clear that after the main population drift had happened, in the 1990s, specific efforts were made by some individuals and groups in the Catholic community to reach out to the Protestant community. For example:

- Donations of £1250 were raised from the Catholic community as a goodwill gesture, in order to support the First Derry Presbyterian Church to fix dry rot in the roof of the building;

- The Come Back! Campaign in the 1990s led by Holywell Trust. This campaign aimed at welcoming Protestants back to the west bank of the city and involved placing an advertisement in local papers including the Londonderry Sentinel asking Protestants to come back to the West Bank. It was signed by 1500 perceived nationalists. However, in APR’s Public Hearing on Minority Experiences in Derry / Londonderry one contributor from the Fountain Area Partnership whilst welcoming the Come Back! Campaign added that the signatories were “not the people who are perceived as a threat by the people of the area” (IAR Minority Experiences, p. 29).

More research is needed into the role played by community groups in the city particularly in response to Protestant migration during the 1970s.

8.7 Alienation and belonging

While it is clear that considerations such as safety and security, as well as issues such as housing and employment, played a part in people’s decision to move away from the Cityside, a further factor emerged...
from the sources as playing a part in where people lived. The suggestion is that a phenomenon known as Protestant alienation is deeply connected with the Protestant psyche and has contributed in some way to Protestants “excluding themselves” and that this was not unconnected to the discourse of Unionist leadership over decades. Based on his study, Hall (1999, p. 4) observes:

While most of the discussants alleged that the Nationalist community had done little to ameliorate the Protestant sense of alienation – and the Republican movement had done all it could to reinforce it – there was an acknowledgement that much of the problem lay within the Protestant community itself. Furthermore, the Protestant community’s reticence to engage with the Nationalist community was increasingly being seen as counter-productive. In particular, those community activists striving to confront socio-economic issues besetting the city’s Protestant working class had found that engaging with Nationalists offered the best way forward to addressing those issues.

A contributor to Hall’s report (1999, p. 11) described how their decision to send their children to Limavady (16 miles away) rather than to the “Derry Tech” (due to childhood experiences of sectarian abuse) had led them to conclude: “so in a way I’m excluding them as well”. Research such as Shirlow, et al. (2005, p. 9) refer to the sense of alienation among Protestants and indeed a lack of capacity which may impact on willingness and ability to engage. They point to:

...a perception, articulated by community leaders and unionist politicians, that the Protestant population is incapable of articulating the means by which it might encourage its own cultural and political renewal. This notion emerged as early as 1992, in the report of the Opsahl Commission (Pollak et al. 1993). Pollak, et al., (1993, p. 410) cites Marlene Jefferson’s input:

Though concurring that Waterside Protestants were ‘marginalised’ and ‘alienated’, she urged her neighbours to take up an active part in all Derry, and to cross the river rather than stock up on rashers in Coleraine.

References were made in the Opsahl Report to “the two Derrys” – i.e. the Catholic west bank and the Protestant Waterside. Various testimonies ranged from referring to Protestants having chosen to “marginalize themselves” and that people opted to move out as Catholics moved in. However others referred to being driven out and having “fled to the Waterside” and that [at the time of writing] the rotation of Mayoralty/power sharing in the council “meant nothing to Protestants” and that the “other side had won”. There were also amongst Protestant a reported sense of loss (Pollak, et al 1993).

In January 1984, when the Council voted to change the name of the Council to Derry City Council (dropping Londonderry), the DUP walked out of Council, followed by the Official Unionists, resulting in a four-year Unionist withdrawal. That said, although it happened after the period being studied, the Council name change is cited in a range of sources such as the research carried out by TAR, Hall and others, as a significant development for Protestants, adding to feelings of alienation from the city.

8.8 Summary

The evidence suggests that the approach of Unionist leadership could have contributed to a growing sense of what is described as Protestant alienation in Derry / Londonderry. Particular issues suggested in the research were:

- The decision by some Unionist leaders to invoke fear and stir up anti-Catholic feeling and anti-Civil Rights feeling;
- The readiness of Unionist leaders to adopt the narrative of loss, so that any gains by the Civil Rights movement were cast as a win for the other side, and an immense loss for Unionism.

Some sources also suggest a failure on behalf of the Civil Rights movement to achieve cross-community engagement, and a failure of Nationalist leaders to act in relation to the situation of the Protestant community. The sources suggest that these factors contributed to a sense of alienation which led to a tendency for the Protestant community to gravitate inwards, and away from the other community – and therefore influenced people to move away from the largely Catholic and nationalist Cityside.

In this report we have only been able to make brief mention of other leaders including the role of community leaders, individuals, churches and the Council itself and the part they may have played (or failed to play) in Protestant migration away from the west bank. This should form the basis of further research.
Section 9: Conclusions and observations

9.1 Conclusions

Protestant migration away from the Cityside of Derry / Londonderry happened to a significant extent between the years of 1969 and 1980. It was part of a wider trend which had begun at a much earlier stage, and part of a pattern of increased segregation across Northern Ireland. However, in Derry / Londonderry, divided by the River Foyle, the impact appears more stark with an almost exclusively nationalist population on the west bank, and only a tiny minority Protestant community left on the west bank.

In a context of increased segregation in Northern Ireland, the evidence reviewed points to a significant decline in the Protestant population of Derry / Londonderry as a whole, and a more marked drop in the Cityside. The census figures for 1961 to 1971 show that the decline had already started before the period covered by this report, with, for example, the Protestant population of the South Ward dropping during that period by 44.7%. The most marked decline in the Protestant population of the Cityside took place in the period 1971 – 1981, and continued to decline in 1981 – 1991. In the Cityside between 1971 and 1981, the Protestant population fell from 8,459 in 1971 to 2,874 in 1981 (a decrease of 66%) ([Smyth in TAR Public Discussions, pp. 36–37]. The figures show that, over the full twenty-year period studied by TAR, the Protestant population of the Cityside decreased from 8,459 in 1971 to 1,407 in 1991, a decrease of 7,052 (83%). The sources suggest that Protestants who moved away from the Cityside did not all move to the Waterside, as the increase in the Protestant population of the Waterside does not counter-balance the numbers leaving the Cityside. Whilst there is caution in the sources about where Protestants moved to, some suggest destinations such as Limavady, Eglinton, and Craigavon. More recent research suggests that the trend has stopped or may be in reverse: further study is needed to assess the extent to which this is the case.

The evidence shows that a number of complex and often inter-related “push” and “pull” factors contributed to Protestant migration from the west bank of Derry / Londonderry from 1969–1980 in particular. They point to: a fundamental shift in the position of Protestants within the city; safety and security issues; poor and limited housing on the Cityside and the availability of better housing elsewhere; the policy of skewing economic development and investment away from Derry / Londonderry and towards centres east of the Bann, and the lack of constructive leadership which could bring about a positive and effective assertion of Protestant identity in a changing landscape.

Statistically significant studies such as TAR (1994 – 1996) and Shirlow et al. (2005) indicate that direct intimidation does not feature in their research as the sole or main reason for migration. However, research which includes personal stories, by its very nature has sought out individuals who have experiences to share. For many of these, conflict related issues, whether proximity to violence or direct or indirect intimidation represented the central reason for moving. For others, housing redevelopment and upward mobility provided the impetus, and often combined with the spiralling conflict to provide a complex and multi-layered rationale for migration.

The evidence points to a range of factors influencing migration, and these are summarised below.

9.1.1 A shift in position

The evidence shows that the position of Protestants in Derry / Londonderry in the period under review was becoming less certain and less comfortable than it had been before, with power imbalances beginning to be redressed across a range of issues. Nationalists gained control of the Council, and the housing system was reformed to prevent discrimination and to permit development of new housing. The security forces with which many Protestants strongly identified were exposed for their handling of Civil Rights marches, as a result of which significant reforms ensued. Symbolically, the close affinity which Protestants felt for the city centre was being challenged, and a sense of belonging and indeed ownership eroded. For those Protestants in poverty, any small possibility of joining with the Civil Rights movement in order to improve their living conditions was stymied by a leadership which framed it as a Republican conspiracy aimed at destroying Protestant identity, and further eroded by the increasing interest the Republican movement was taking in it. All of this amounted to a significant shift in position from minority rule and control over housing, employment and other issues vital to day to day life, to a system of nationalist majority rule with a fairer system of housing allocation. This must arguably have challenged the Protestant community’s sense of ownership and belonging, particularly in the Cityside, where Catholics and Nationalists were in a more concentrated majority. In such a context, the decision to move away from the west bank was taken by many.

9.1.2 Safety and Security

Much of the evidence reviewed, especially research based on interviews and focus groups with individuals from the Protestant community, points to safety and security issues as a highly significant factor influencing migration during the period 1969 – 1980. Derry / Londonderry, its city centre and residential areas close to the city centre, experienced a significant degree of unrest, rioting, killing, including members of the Protestant community and members of the security forces, and bombing of businesses, in the period from 1969 and throughout the 1970s. The evidence suggests that safety and security issues took a number of forms and that they were closely linked. The numerically significant surveys show that direct intimidation was not the only or principal cause of migration, but other evidence, in particular experiential evidence, shows that direct intimidation did happen, and where it did, it had a major, and in some cases immediate impact on individuals and on families and on where they felt able to live.

In addition, ongoing unrest, violence and killings created an atmosphere of fear which caused people to move to areas considered safer. Factors such as the instability caused by major events such as internment and Bloody Sunday played a significant part. The targeting of security forces created a sense for many of being a community under attack, due to the close connection between the Protestant community and the forces, a feeling reinforced by the shooting of Protestant businessmen unconnected with the forces, and the targeting of Protestant owned businesses.

Protestant churches, too, were impacted in a number of ways during the 1970s: as well as attacks on individual members of their congregations who were members of the security forces, there were attacks on churches and church halls, and loss of congregation as Protestants migrated away from the Cityside. In many ways, churches, the size of their congregations and their survival, became a barometer of the strength of the Protestant community on the west bank of the river. As a major institution and a symbol of Protestant life on the west bank, the gradual decline of churches and their replacement in some cases by churches in the Waterside was also a factor influencing the Protestant community’s sense of security in the broadest sense in the Cityside. With regard to Protestant migration which occurred before 1969, further research is needed on the factors explaining the significant decline in the Protestant population on the Cityside which occurred before many of the factors mentioned in this report became a reality.

9.1.3 Housing

The evidence shows that housing policy and planning in Derry / Londonderry in the late 1960s and early
1970s in particular had a dramatic impact on the segregated nature of housing in the city. Gerrymandering engineered a situation whereby the Cityside had a disproportionate Catholic majority, with other areas prevented from expansion and development. Poor attention to the housing stock meant that, when new estates were finally built for example at Lincoln Courts and Newbuildings, Protestant populations were displaced from their run-down places of residence on the Cityside on a supposedly temporary basis, but both the quality of the new housing, and the poor design of their redeveloped areas, meant that many were inclined to remain in their new Waterside homes.

Some sources point to the possibility that more upwardly mobile Protestants moved away from the Cityside before the onset of the conflict, in order to take up residence in suburban areas with better housing, and as we have seen, there is some suggestion that the prospect of sharing space with Catholics may have been unappealing for some. These factors may go some way to explain the fact that even before 1969, substantial migration of the Protestant community away from the Cityside was already taking place. However, on these last two points, more study is needed on the extent to which these contributed to the overall migration picture.

9.1.4 Economic Development

The evidence shows that economic and industrial planning and infrastructure development was skewed heavily to the largely Protestant eastern side of Northern Ireland, with Derry / Londonderry deprived of investment, jobs and opportunities throughout the 1960s and before. The impact on the Catholic population has been documented to some degree, but it appears that the full impact of this policy on Derry / Londonderry Protestants has not been explored in any depth, and would be an important area for further study. The sources reviewed suggest that the policies implemented at a Stormont level, and often supported and even encouraged by local Unionist leaders, either in public or in private, had far reaching implications for the economic wellbeing of the Protestant as well as the Catholic population of the city.

Whilst, by 1969, much of the damage had already been done to the city’s economic development prospects as a result of regional strategies, they could only have been further set back as the conflict gained momentum and as the city centre became characterised by unrest and both IRA and state violence.

8.5 Leadership

Many of the sources suggest that the approach of Unionist leadership contributed to a growing sense of what is described as Protestant alienation in Derry / Londonderry. Particular issues suggested in the research were:

• A tendency for Unionist leaders to be disengaged from the grass roots and therefore to fail to recognise Protestant working class living conditions;

• The decision by some Unionist leaders to invoke fear and stir up anti-Catholic feeling and anti-Civil Rights feeling;

• The readiness of Unionist leaders to adopt the narrative of loss, so that any gains by the Civil Rights movement were cast as a win for the other side, and an immense loss for Unionism.

Some sources also suggest a failure on behalf of the Civil Rights movement to achieve cross-community engagement, and a failure of Nationalist leaders to act in relation to the situation of the Protestant community. The sources suggest that these factors contributed to a sense of alienation which led to tendency for the Protestant community to gravitate inwards, and away from the other community – and therefore influenced people to move away from the largely Catholic and nationalist Cityside.

In this report we have only been able to make brief mention of other leaders including the role of community leaders, individuals, churches and the Council itself and the part they may have played (or failed to play) in Protestant migration away from the west bank. This should form the basis of further research.

It was also evident from the literature that many of these issues were deeply interrelated, so it is important to read them as such. A desire to move to a new property can be exacerbated by a lack of economic opportunities, a sense of fear can be exacerbated by events both direct and indirect, but also by a lack of constructive direction from leaders. Feelings of alienation can be related to the uncomfortable shift in position experienced by Protestants as Civil Rights reforms changed the landscape of power and control in Derry, and so on.

9.2 Areas for further exploration

It was clear in undertaking this research that there are many issues which would merit further exploration.

The 1961 – 1971 census figures show that a significant level of migration was underway, even before 1969. More research is needed into the reasons for this.

Whilst the report focuses on Protestant migration, it was evident that Catholic migration also took place in other parts of Northern Ireland and also in Derry / Londonderry during the period 1969 – 1980. However, less appears to be known and written about Catholic migration away from what are now largely Protestant estates in Derry / Londonderry. It would be useful to explore the extent of that migration, and to examine whether the framework of factors suggested above might be equally applied to Catholic migration, or whether different factors came into play.

The areas of housing and economic development could both provide important avenues for further research. The impact of specific spatial planning could be further explored, along with the quality of housing. Much more remains to be explored on the impact of skewed regional economic planning during the 1960s on Protestants in Derry / Londonderry.

Jonathan Burgess’ comment in the introduction to his Exodus play suggests that the departure of Protestants from the Cityside continues to hold great significance, even for generations who do not have a direct memory of moving. Burgess (2011, p. 4) states:

The term of the exodus has always been one that has conjured instant memories for me, although these were not my own, as my parents’ decision to leave Abercorn Road was taken when I was less than a month old when my father witnessed the shooting of a soldier not far from our front door… / In my opinion the exodus would rival the Siege in terms of significance towards the Protestant community within the city and has become as momentous to the Protestant heritage in the city as those events of 1689.

The wider psychological impact, including the transgenerational aspects of the migration, could provide another avenue for further study.

In terms of leadership, a further project could examine the extent of Council knowledge and awareness of the issue of Protestant migration, and identify the actions taken by the Council as the city leaders to address it. Much more remains to be said about the role of community and church leadership.
9.3 The current picture

Whilst the conflict has officially come to an end, and the city looks very different today than it did in the period 1969 – 1980, challenges continue to the present day. Sectarian issues have continued to punctuate life. In recent years these include:

- Attacks on Protestant school children on the Peace Bridge and attacks on Catholic homes in the Waterside (see for example the Irish News 23 August 2017);
- The death of Paul McCauley in June 2015, who had been the victim of a sectarian attack by loyalists in the Waterside in 2006;
- Graffiti in Newbuildings during summer 2017, warning that new homes were not for Catholics;
- The attack on Christ Church, Church of Ireland church on Infirmary Road in September 2017.

Today, Derry City Council has become Derry City and Strabane District Council, so the boundaries are no longer aligned to the previous Council area. However, Wilson in the 2016 Peace Monitoring Report shows a Council facing challenges:

- The highest claimant count of the 11 new councils – 8% as compared to for example 2.7% in Lisburn and Castlereagh;
- The lowest median earnings of the 11 new councils – £16,580 as opposed to £20,246 in Lisburn and Castlereagh;
- The third lowest levels of educational attainment (children achieving more than 5 GCSEs A*-C including English and Maths);
- By far the highest level of pupils claiming free school meals – 28.7% as compared to the lowest level (12.9%) in Ards and North Down (Wilson, p. 153, citing The Detail, 2015).

Challenges endure too at a wider Northern Ireland level. These include:

- Suspension of the NI Assembly;
- Disenchantment with the NI Assembly (Wilson, p. 12);
- Greater polarization in voting patterns which came to a head in the 8 June 2017 Westminster election, where seats went to the DUP (10) and Sinn Fein (7) exclusively, with no representation from the SDLP who lost all seats, as did the Ulster Unionist Party, and Alliance also failing to win a seat;
- Wilson’s Peace Monitoring Report 2016 suggests that different attitudes to Brexit threaten to deepen the fault line already evident (Wilson, p. 11);
- Continued segregation in communal terms and in education (Wilson, p. 13).

On a more positive note, Shirlow et al. (2005) point to the raft of policies initiated by the Council, often in partnership with other agencies, aimed at addressing segregation and improving relations within the city. In addition, the Council has had a Community Relations Officer and related funding and initiatives in place since the early 1990s. As highlighted earlier, the trend of Protestant migration appeared to have stopped by 2005, with a possible re-engagement of Protestants with the city centre, at least to some degree. In addition, Derry / Londonderry emerged as a model for the use of dialogue in dealing with contentious parades, with local community workers, businesses and Council working with the local Apprentice Boys to reach accommodation on their annual parades.

In Peto and Cunningham’s 2007 Exodus documentary, ten years ago, glimmers of hope were expressed by some contributors. Willie Temple commented:

Relations between Protestants and Catholics were never better than what they are now even in the 50s and 60s where there was an apparent community spirit – I think there’s a lot of hope… It may be slow but I would foresee the day when Protestants would be happy and feel comfortable to come back to the West Bank.

9.4 Derry / Londonderry – the future

Although the report’s focus is on a specific historical time period, Protestant migration from the west bank of Derry / Londonderry has been going on for some considerable time, with population decline evident prior to 1969, and after 1980, and it leaves the population make-up and character of the city changed to this day. In other words, this was not a historical event, but a phenomenon which continues to leaves its mark as the movement of people was accompanied by the movement of churches, schools, clubs and institutions, including in the present day the movement of Foyle College, based on the Cityside since its foundation in the seventeenth century, to the Limavady Road in the Waterside.

We hope that drawing together in one report the complex combination of factors which caused this population shift will provide information which might present opportunities for leaders of the city, and for the population more widely, to reflect on the forces which can cause people to uproot in numbers over time, and indeed to reflect on what they might do to create environments which better retain and support diverse populations.

We close with some questions for consideration:

- To what extent have migration patterns changed in more recent years?
- Do the city’s people and its leaders want a more integrated city?
- Is a more integrated city possible – can Protestants be encouraged to move back to the west bank – and what might it look like? (i.e. what spaces, institutions and services have the potential to become more integrated?)
- How might a more shared and integrated city be nurtured?
- How might the city approach the issue of symbolic monuments and memory sites, in relation to the idea of developing the city as a shared space?
- What role might current social, economic and planning policies play in bringing about increased integration? What part, for example, might Council-led Community Planning play in planning for integration in public, residential and educational settings?
- How might a more integrated city take account of the needs of a population which is now more diverse than it was in the period 1969 – 1980?
- What part can Protestants, Catholics and others living in Derry / Londonderry play in planning for integration in public, residential and educational settings, and in the social, economic and cultural life of the city?

We hope that in presenting the evidence on Protestant migration from a wide range of sources, this report will add to understanding of the phenomenon of Protestant migration from the west bank of Derry / Londonderry, and that the questions we pose can provide a framework for the city’s leaders and all its stakeholders to build towards an inclusive future.
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APPENDICES

Appendix One: The Advisory Group

An Advisory Group was established to provide advice to the researchers. Members were:

- Maureen Hetherington, the Junction
- Dawn Purvis
- Professor Paddy Hillyard (QUB and Pat Finucane Centre Board Member)
- Garbhan Downey (Journalist and Author).

The Advisory Group met with the researchers at the beginning, middle and end of the project. It was agreed at the outset that they would not be bound by the findings of the research and would be independent of the Pat Finucane Centre.

Appendix Two: Newspaper review

The researchers were assisted in their work by the following PFC interns who explored the newspaper archives for us for the period under consideration:

Glenn McGarrigle, Sarah Bylsma, Genevieve Akins.

Appendix Three: Catholic Migration

This report is concerned with Protestant migration. Some initial notes follow, but there is no doubt that more research is needed on the extent and causes of Catholic migration.

In terms of responses to intimidation, direct or indirect, the Catholic population of certain parts of Belfast, and of areas such as Newbuildings and other parts of the Waterside, have had a similar response to their Protestant counterparts, often choosing to leave for the sake of safety. It is important to recognise that, as Murtagh points out, at the same time as the Protestant population was beginning to decline in the West Bank, an estimated 60,000 people left their homes in Belfast as a result of what he describes as “ethnic turmoil”, leading to the establishment of 13 Peace Lines, whereby communities are physically separated by a high wall (Murtagh in TAR 1996, p. 23). Shirlaw et al. (2005) explain:

*‘Exit’ from the circumstances that cause insecurity in the first place has often been the principal response in both Catholic and Protestant areas of Northern Ireland. For example, exit of Catholic populations has been characteristic of parts of the Moyle, Carrickfergus and Larne District Council areas in recent years...However, what is particularly damaging about this pattern is its selective nature. Murtagh (2002) shows that it tends to be the younger, more mobile and the employed and employable who leave first. Processes of exit can therefore begin a process of residualisation whereby the remaining minority community is more likely to comprise older, benefit-dependent and less socially or spatially mobile people, which further complicates the task of community development* (e.g. Shirlaw et al, 2005, p. 22).

Bardon (1992, p. 671) cites disturbances in Belfast in 1969 during which “despite the arrival of British troops, more violence ensued, with almost every house in the Catholic Bombay Street destroyed, as well as houses in Brookfield Street, and a Protestant rioter was killed in Ardoyne”. Bardon (1992, p. 671) states that in the violence of July and August 1969:
Catholic-owned or occupied premises accounted for 83.5 per cent of the damage, estimated at £8 million. These figures take no account of the rapid spread of fear and intimidation. The Scarman Tribunal, set up to investigate the disturbances of the summer of 1969, reported that in Belfast alone, 1,820 families fled their homes during and immediately after these riots; 1,505 of these families were Catholic, making up more than 3 per cent of all Catholic households in the city. / Except for the middle-class suburbs, Belfast had become a war zone.

According to Bardon (1992, pp. 683-684), this continued following the introduction of internment in August 1971, in that:

...about 2 per cent of the 45,000 Catholic households in Belfast and 0.5 per cent of 135,000 Protestant households were displaced. Altogether 60 per cent of the movements were made by Catholic families and 40 per cent by Protestant families. In short, this was the biggest enforced movement of population since 1945.

As Protestants were migrating from the Cityside, so too were Catholics moving away from predominantly Protestant parts of the Waterside. McKay (2000, pp. 308–309) characterises Newbuildings in the late 1990s, which had been a mixed village on the outskirts of the city as "...a village of Loyalist housing estates across the river. Newbuildings was a fractious place with red, white and blue kerbstones." McKay (2000, p. 316) describes Protestant resentment of new middle-class grand developments on the west bank and their attacks on such homes on the east bank: "And it was Newbuildings youths who had attacked the big houses owned by Catholics in the Waterside. They left the Protestant mansions well alone." Bardon (1992, p. 769) points to direct intimidation of Catholic families out of Newbuildings. He cites Paul Johnson of the Guardian who commented that the pressure to move had not been accompanied by "...dramatic petrol bombings and shootings" but rather was "a gradual but incessant build up of a more insidious pressure."