Mediated Europes
Discourse and Power in Ukraine, Russia and Poland during Euromaidan

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Mediated Europes
In memoriam
Mykhaylo Horban
Abstract

This study focuses on mediated representations of Europe during Euromaidan and the subsequent Ukraine–Russia crisis, analysing empirical material from Ukraine, Poland and Russia. The material includes articles from nine newspapers, diverse in terms of political and journalistic orientation, as well as interviews with journalists, foreign policymakers and experts, drawing also on relevant policy documents as well as online and historical sources.

The material is examined from the following vantage points: Michel Foucault’s discursive theory of power, postcolonial theory, Jürgen Habermas’s theory of the public sphere, Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory, Jacques Derrida’s hauntology and Ernesto Laclau’s concept of the empty signifier. The methods of analysis include conceptual history (Reinhart Koselleck), critical linguistics and qualitative discourse analysis (a discourse-historical approach inspired by the Vienna school) and quantitative content analysis (in Klaus Krippendorff’s interpretation).

Historically, the national narratives of Europe in the aforementioned three countries are characterised by dependence on the West that also sparks periods of its rejection. These narratives vacillate between three major poles: idealising admiration, materialist pragmatics and geopolitical demonising. They are not exclusively endemic to one country and have been present in each to some extent. However, weaker actors have tended to lean towards the idealist side because Europe is perceived as a source of important technological and social know-how. Authors in all three countries struggled with defining Europe’s limits, and whilst this problem became intertwined with their own identification, Europeanness is typically constructed as a shock wave fading as it travels eastward from an epicentre located somewhere in north-western Europe.

These discourses were reactivated and developed in 2013–2014. In the analysed newspapers, Europe is often understood as a continent (most often in Poland) or identified with the EU (Russia and Ukraine), but there is also a strong pattern of using Europe in reference to values which is weakest in Poland and strongest in Ukraine. Ideologically, the liberal publications in all
three countries focus on positive values, whereas the conservative and business newspapers are preoccupied with negative values. Among the positive values, the humanistic ones dominate the Ukrainian newspapers, and the rationalist-technocratic are typical in the Russian sample. The Ukrainian press account for most of the positive coverage of a successful Europe, whereas the Russian press provide most of the negative coverage (Europe as a failing entity and an enemy). Ukrainian and Russian discourses differ sharply on whether the country should adopt European reforms (Ukraine) or not (Russia). The Polish coverage is polarised between positive and negative values.

During and after Euromaidan, Ukrainian journalists used the powerful Europe-as-values concept to actively intervene in the political field and recontextualise this narrative of Europe as the official foreign policy narrative. This was enabled, paradoxically, by weak professionalism that made a wavering from a neutral stance possible. Compared to this, in Russia the strong discourse on journalist objectivity constrained journalists in their social practice; rather, it is the official discourse that is recontextualised by the media. Polish journalists, ambiguous about their own influence, work in a loop that recontextualises discourses from the media sphere to the political field and vice versa.

**Keywords**: media, discourse, power, postcolonial theory, foreign policy, journalists, politicians, Europe, Ukraine, Russia, Poland, Euromaidan
Denna studie undersöker hur Europa framställs i medier under Euromajdan och den efterföljande ukrainska-ryska krisen genom att analysera empiriskt material från Ukraina, Polen och Ryssland. Materialet omfattar artiklar från nio tidningar med olika politisk och journalistisk orientering samt intervjuer med journalister, diplomater och utrikespolitiska experter. I analysen ingår även relevanta politiska dokument, historiska texter och webbkällor.

Materialet studeras utifrån en kombination av olika teoriperspektiv: Michel Foucaults diskursiva maktteori, postkolonial teori, Jürgen Habermas offentlighetsteori, Pierre Bourdieus fältteori, Jacques Derridas ”hauntology” och Ernesto Laclaus begrepp ”empty signifier”. Analysmetoderna omfattar begreppshistoria (Reinhart Koselleck), kritisk lingvistik samt kvalitativ diskursanalys (diskurshistorisk metod inspirerad av Wienerkolan) och kvantitativ innehållsanalys (i Klaus Krippendorffs tolkning).


Dessa berättelser har reaktiverats och vidareutvecklats under 2013–2014. I de analyserade tidningarna uppfattas Europa ofta som en kontinent (främst i Polen) eller identifieras med EU (särskilt i Ryssland och Ukraina), men det är också vanligt att använda Europa som uttryck för en uppsättning värden (mindre vanligt i Polen och mest vanligt i Ukraina). Ideologiskt fokuserar de liberala tidningarna i alla tre länderna positiva värden medan konservativa tidningar och finansblad associerar Europa med negativa vär-
Bland de positiva värdena dominerar de humanistiska i de ukrainska tidningarna och de rationalistisk-teknokratiska i det ryska urvalet. Den ukrainska pressen har mest positiv bevakning av Europas framgångar medan den ryska pressen innehåller mest av negativ bevakning där Europas ses som fiende och förlorare. Ukrainska och ryska diskurser skiljer sig mycket åt i frågan om det egna landet bör genomföra europeiska reformer (Ukraina) eller ej (Ryssland). Den polska bevakningen polariseras mellan positiva och negativa värden.


**Nyckelord:** medier, diskurs, makt, utrikespolitik, journalist, politiker, Europa, Ukraina, Ryssland, Polen, Euromajdan
Анотація

Ця студія присвячена медіарепрезентаціям Європи під час Евромайдану та дальшої українсько-російської кризи, аналізуючи емпіричний матеріал з України, Польщі й Росії. Отої матеріал охоплює статті з дев’яти розмаїтих своєю політичною і журналістською орієнтацією газет, а також інтерв’ю з журналістами, дипломатами та експертами зі зовнішньої політики, користаючи при тім із доречних політичних документів, онлайнових та історичних джерел.

Матеріал розглянуто з перспективи дискурсивної теорії влади Мішеля Фуко, постколоніяльної теорії, теорії громадськості Юрґена Габермаса, теорії полів П’єра Бурдьє, “hauntology” Жака Дерріди та поняття «порожнього означника» Ернеста Лякляу. Методи аналізу охоплюють історію понять (Райнгарт Козелек), критичну лінгвістику та якісний дискурс-аналіз (дискурсивно-історичний підхід під впливом Віденської школи) і кількісний контент-аналіз (в інтерпретації Клявса Кріппендорфа).

Історично національним наративам Європи у цих трьох країнах притаманна залежність від Заходу, яка також стимулює періоди його відштовхування. Ті наративи вагаються між трьома головними полюсами: захопленого ідеалізму, матеріалістичного прагматизму та геополітичного очорнення. Вони не є винятково притаманними якість одній країні і певною мірою присутні в кожній. Проте слабші актори схиляє до ідеалізації, бо Європу сприймають за джерело важливого технологічного й соціального інструментарію. Авторам в усіх трьох країнах трудно визначити межі Європи, і, тимчасом як ця проблема переплелася була з їхньою власною ідентифікацією, европейськість зазвичай конструйовано на кшталт хвилі, що згасає в міру руху на Схід од епіцентру, розташованого десяті ото в Північно-Східній Європі.

Оці дискурси посилилися й розвинулися в 2013 – 2014 рр. В аналізованих газетах Європу асоціюють із цілим континентом (найчастіше в Польщі) або з ЕС (у Росії та в Україні), але розповсюджена й схема, де Європу використано на позначення певного набору вартостей, зрідка в Польщі, але найчастіше в Україні. Ідеологічно
ліберальні видання в усіх трьох країнах зосереджені на позитивних вартостях, тоді як консервативні та бізнесові газети схиляються до негативних. Серед позитивних якостей в українських газетах переважають гуманістичні, тоді як раціонально-технократичні типові для російської вибірки. Українська преса має найбільше позитивного висвітлення успішної Європи, а російські газети мають найбільше з усіх негативного (Європа як ворог чи невдаха). Українські та російські дискурси найдужче різняться щодо того, чи своя країна мусить здійснювати європейські реформи (Україна) а чи ні (Росія). Польське висвітлення розривається межи позитивними а негативними вартостями.

Під час та після Евромайдану українські журналісти використали впливове поняття Європи як гуманістичних вартостей, щоб активно втрутитися в політичне поле й реконтекстуалізувати цей наратив Європи як офіційний наратив зовнішньої політики держави. Цьому парадоксально сприяла слабка професіоналізація, що дозволяє ігнорувати вимогу неупередженості. Порівняно з цим, потужний дискурс газетарської об'єктивності в Росії стримує журналістів у репертуарі соціальної дії, відтак то радше медії реконтекстуалізують офіційний дискурс. Польські ж газетарі, непевні щодо власного впливу, працюють у замкненому колі, де політичне поле реконтекстуалізує наративи медіасфери і навпаки.

Ключові слова: медії, дискурс, влада, зовнішня політика, журналісти, політики, Європа, Україна, Росія, Евромайдан
Acknowledgements

My most vivid memory of working on this doctoral dissertation is not real. Once when taking a break from my intensive writing one hot Ukrainian night in the summer of 2016, I had a dream that I was on a bus from Tiraspol to Donetsk, two capitals of unrecognised states I had never been to. I was thinking about the excellent interview I had just conducted with an obscure Transnistrian insider. Then suddenly, still sleeping, I realised this was a dream. I spent the rest of the trip contemplating how I could possibly make a valid and rigorous academic reference to an interview carried out in the dream reality. The answer was found while still asleep: once awake, I would repeat the interview; I only had to remember the interviewee’s name and phone number, and I was sure I certainly would. Needless to say, I could not recall either when I woke up.

Like most doctoral students, I have put my heart and soul into my dissertation, so much that it became the stuff my dreams were made of. But, citing another classic, none of us is an island, and I have surely given lots of other people many nightmares, and, such is my hope, some of them have maybe been given pleasant dreams. And many others have worked hard so that I could sleep better.

I owe an immense gratitude to my academic supervisors. Johan Fornäs has always had just the right balance of the best qualities that make a principal supervisor. It would take another book to describe all the critical and inspiring advice and practical help I have received from him; I could not have dreamed of a better guide for the beginning of this road. My second academic supervisor, Patrik Åker, has also always given me both thorough and incisive comments as well as much advice on organisational matters. Patrik and Johan have different but equally effective styles of supervision, and it was a privilege to have this balance, which helped produce a better end result.

I have also been fortunate with the external reviewers I have had, namely Anna Roosvall and Michał Krzyżanowski. Their feedback helped me notice and create new opportunities for my project I would not have seen otherwise. I was also fortunate to have this text edited by Simon Moores, whose
professionalism and commitment I greatly appreciate. Of course, none of it would have been possible without the material to study. Regardless of their views and allegiances, I tip my hat to all the anonymous interviewees and the authors whose texts I analysed. I am indebted to them.

I am grateful for the generous financial support from the Foundation of Baltic and East European Studies (Östersjöstiftelsen), which enabled me to carry out this study. It funded too a bigger project I was part of, namely “Narratives of Europe”, also led by Johan Fornäs. I am thankful to my project colleagues for stimulating me in so many ways. Carl Cederberg went the extra mile (rather literally too, when he met me at the airport when I first arrived in Stockholm) to help me acclimatise to the new environment. The time spent with him, Ewa Schwarz and their wonderful children was priceless. My other project colleagues Anne Kaun and Katarina Wadstein MacLeod were always ready to discuss my ideas as well as their own, and Stefan Jonsson gave me important feedback.

I was just as blessed with the colleagues I have at Södertörn University’s Department of Media and Communication Studies, most of whom helped me at some point with something. I am particularly thankful to those who provided academic feedback or tips: Linus Andersson, Stina Bengtsson, Göran Bolin, Staffan Ericson, Michael Forsman, Ingrid Forsler, Alberto Frigo, Heike Graf, Carina Guyard, Jockum Hildén, Karin Hoffstedt, Peter Jakobsson, Sofia Johansson, Ekaterina Kalinina, Lars Lundgren, Isabel Löfgren, Karolina Olga Nord, Signe Opermann, Paola Sartoretto, Philipp Seuferling, Fredrik Stiernstedt, Per Ståhlberg, Liisa Sömersalu, Matilda Tudor, Julia Velkova, Liudmila Voronova, Espen Ytreberg. I would not have coped without the professional help provided by the administrative personnel, who spent many an hour struggling together against the Swedish Migration Agency and other paper tigers of bureaucracy: my warm thanks to Jenny Degerholm Langsmo, Ewa Rogström, Lena Casado, Jenny Karlsson, Remberto Salazar, Olcay Yalçın, Marianne Mosesson and Henrik Blomberg!

The overall environment at Södertörn was also uniquely inspiring. I am indebted to the wonderful teachers I had, including Irina Sandomirskaja, Hans Ruin, Sven-Olov Wallenstein, Charlotte Bydler, Mark Bassin, Joakim Ekman, as well as my fellow doctoral students and postdocs affiliated to the Baltic and East European Graduate School and the Centre for Baltic and East European Studies (CBEES), particularly Irina Seits, Iwo Nord, Natalya Yakusheva, Alina Zubkovych and Maria Brock. I am also especially grateful to the researchers and personnel at CBEES (led by Rebecca Lettevall and now by Joakim Ekman) for their patience and openness. I managed to
organise interesting events there together with my fantastic fellow Ukrainian doctoral students, namely my friends Yuliya Yurchuk, Olena Podolian and Julia Malitska. I appreciate the friendship they and their families have shown and the help they have given me in everyday life too.

This project has received much positive attention and assistance from established and up-and-coming scholars worldwide. I am thankful to Vitaly Chernetsky, Tamara Hundorova, Serhy Yekelchyk, Serhiy Vakulenko, Volodymyr Kulyk, Matt Pauly, Marina Pavlikova, Yevhen Fedchenko, Sigrid Kaasik-Krogerus, Niklas Bernsand, Masumi Kameda, Olena Palko, Irysia Sakivska, Olha Poliukhovych, Kateryna Karunyk, and the late Ihor Mykhaylyn. I am indebted to Ivan Mehela and Nataliya Sydorenko, my early academic mentors in Ukraine, my mentor in journalism Vitaly Portnikov, and Irene Neverla and Uwe Hasebrink, who supervised my master’s thesis at the University of Hamburg. Walking this road would have also been impossible without the support of my friends outside academia, including Andriy Borets, Oleksiy Buhlak, Olha Kravchenko, Volodymyr Krekotin, Viktoriya Herasymchuk, Yury Efimov, Olga Mikhaylova, Art Kaufman, Rick Burton, Kajsa Nyholm, Lilia Matviiv, Kateryna Onykiyuchuk, Róża Smolak, Ihor Sakivsky, Nataliya Pasichnyk, Fredrik Jönsson, Kirsten Holzhüter and Anette and Sebastian Bartsch.

One of the most important thank yous goes to my wife, Kateryna Boyko, who is among the strongest and brightest individuals I have ever known. Without her support at critical moments as well as her willingness to assist me as a second coder, this work could not have been done. I am thankful to my mother, Olena, for raising me the way I am and for standing by me all this time (ďakuju, mamo!), to my father, Oleksandr, for inspiring me and sharing his experience on how to complete and survive a doctoral programme and enjoy it, and to my grandmother Nadiya for being there for us. I am grateful to my son, Myron, my hope and joy, for making me the happiest father in the world.

During the years of work on this project, I received help, feedback and tips from many colleagues, first and foremost my supervisors, but I would like to stress that any mistakes or shortcomings in this study are solely my responsibility.

I would like to dedicate this work to the memory of my grandfather Mykhaylo Horban, who taught me to read and would have rejoiced at where this has taken me.

Stockholm, 3 November 2017
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Note on transliteration and conventions

This work uses the Board on Geographic Names and the Permanent Committee on Geographical Names (BGN/PCGN) romanisation for Russian and Ukrainian. The Ukrainian and the Russian final -ий were simplified as -y (e.g. Khmelnytsky; Medinsky), whereas the softness signs (and the hardness sign in Russian) were generally preserved in transliterated direct quotations from the source language but not in proper names for simplicity's sake. Diacritics and special letters have been fully preserved for Polish and other languages that use Latin-based alphabets. The proper names and place names are mostly transliterated from the national language they are identified with (e.g. Yuriy Nemyrych rather than Jerzy Niemirycz or Yuriy Nemirich); in a few cases, established traditions of rendering a particular person’s or place’s name in English were followed (e.g. Herzen; Maidan).

I have used many sources in languages other than English; whenever possible, I tried to use available English translations. For the inaccessible translations and the untranslated texts, I provided my own translations (indicated in each such instance).

The translations of the newspaper texts and interview transcripts cited in my analysis are always my own.

Throughout the text I have used several abbreviations for recurrent concepts; they are given in full the first time they appear in the dissertation. Thereafter, they are referred to as:

CDA – critical discourse analysis
DHA – discourse-historical approach
MFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs
QCA – quantitative content analysis
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

For many Ukrainians, 21 November 2013 will be forever memorable. On this day, the government in Kyiv surprisingly announced its decision to reverse the nation’s external course, from seeking an association agreement with the European Union to striving for closer integration with Russia.

On that same day, the first protest against this decision gathered in the capital’s main square. It was the result of just two Facebook posts by the investigative journalist Mustafa Nayyem; together they were shared over 3,000 times (Nayyem, 21 November 2013). Nayyem was at that point the most followed Ukrainian on Facebook with over 30,000 followers (Zaliznyak, 2014, p. 181). The next day he spoke from the stage of what had already assumed the name of Euromaidan, along with Viktoria Syumar, director of the Institute of Mass Information, the renowned publicist and opinion leader Vitaly Portnikov and the weekly Dzerkalo Tyzhnya’s observer Serhiy Rakhmanin (Szostek, 2014, p. 6). All of them were among the protesters’ most favourite speakers for the weeks to come.

As the government crumbled and the president fled three months later, Mustafa Nayyem had a picture of himself taken just outside the empty presidential office, a stone’s throw from the place where he had started the first rally. Again on Facebook, he posted the picture, with the caption: “It’s done. Time to build something new” (Nayyem, 22 February 2014; my translation).

A few days later, Russia began the annexation of Crimea, culminating in the Donbas war shortly thereafter. Ukraine found itself facing hostilities, severe economic crisis and the ultimate necessity to finally reform its post-Soviet institutions, all at the same time. A number of journalists, including
Nayyem, ran for parliament in the 2014 elections and many became MPs with a direct influence on decision-making. This well-known story of one person comprises several themes I would like to problematise and investigate here. These themes are power, media and Europe. The Euromaidan arc in the biography of Mustafa Nayyem is a beautiful storyline, ripe for the writer of fiction, but no less fascinating is that this journalist managed to project his professional influence onto the political field thanks to a powerful narrative of Europe. I believe that a systematic investigation of how Europe is constructed in the public discourses in Eastern Europe can cast new light on the interplay of media and power. Ukraine, with its recent massive pro-European movement and equally fierce opposition to it, is a proper example to study.

The imminence of the “unnecessary war”: A background

Ukraine’s European integration before 2014 was anything but successful. Since the early 2000s, if not earlier, it has been described as “declarative Europeanization” (Wolczuk, 2000), with a splash of enthusiasm between 2005 and 2009. It was linked to the Orange Revolution and followed by the triumph of democracy in the 2010 presidential election won by the oppos-

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1 On the opposite side of the spectrum, another journalist, Artem Skoropadsky, who previously worked in the Ukrainian office of the Russian Kommersant and was actually a Russian citizen, became involved in radical politics and became a spokesman for the ultra-nationalist Right Sector, instead of joining the parliamentary establishment.
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ition, which was, however, pro-Russian rather than pro-European. Therefore, by the mid-2010s, the curtailing of electoral rights and civil liberties and the imprisonment of opposition figures instead indicated a failing integration.

For those pro-integration groups in Ukraine and the European Union in 2010–2012 which asked why Ukraine and the EU had failed to carry out this integration (except for some “technical” progress in certain limited areas), the answer may have been that both their political elites were strategically interested in it. This was especially sensed in Ukraine, where a general mood of fatigue and desperation marked the years of the Viktor Yanukovych presidency. Yet the Ukrainian business and political elites felt very much at ease in the in-between buffer position between Russia and the EU. On the one hand, many options were open with regard to the EU: obtaining aid, enjoying personal integration, moving shadow capital to offshore zones, investing in luxurious property and leading lavish lifestyles in Europe. On the other hand, remaining within the post-Soviet grey zone allowed for countless intransparencies, selective rules and highly lucrative and corrupt deals with Russia, particularly on natural gas. From the Eurocrats’ perspective, with Ukraine remaining in the grey zone rather than integrating into the EU, Brussels was saved the headache of dealing closely with yet another uncertain transition society. Hence, the EU could continue the same amicable and equally lucrative collaboration and gas trade with the Kremlin while exploiting Ukraine’s weaknesses so that it maintained its role as a brain-drain country, a source of physical and seasonal labour and a market for lower-end and some higher-end European goods desired as status symbols by different Ukrainian social groups.

It was this semi-colonial condition, subservient to both Russia and Europe, that Ukrainian civil society tried to abolish, often against the will of its own elites. While external factors and explanations, including the above strategic considerations, may be interesting, my own curiosity is driven by this sudden outburst of agency, clearly motivated by a particular idea about Europe. Although this imaginary can be seen as a sort of interface between East and West, the essential semantic work has been carried out internally through the transformation of native discourses. This is why it is so important to primarily focus on the domestic dimension.

This discursive domestic dimension determines the interface that is central to the Orange drama of the 2000s, namely the interface between the political fantasies of people, information flows, public reasoning and government policies. It is also the space where it is most difficult to distinguish
between them. It is this space Jürgen Habermas called the public sphere, which for Michel Foucault (and to some extent also for Pierre Bourdieu) was simultaneously a space of power rather than (or not only) rational deliberation. The mandate for European integration clearly emanated from the public in the broadest sense ever since the Orange Revolution, and even before. Even though in public opinion polls pro-European groups were a minority at times, they were the most active and dynamic parts of Ukrainian society. The media created an environment where these opinions could be forged, discussed, expressed, reinforced, crystallised and lain down as a challenge for the government to live up to, and the government pragmatically cherry-picked the opinions it needed for the moment; thus, the broad public, the media and the authorities together formed the group action essential to the power system.

Focusing solely on Ukraine would nonetheless produce an incomplete picture. Although I have emphasised the importance of this domestic dimension, analysing it on its own appears counterproductive and even meaningless given that the ideas about Europe formed in permanent contact with, and under the attentive gaze of the Ukrainians directed at, Poland as the largest and the closest EU neighbour on the one hand, as the successful version of “us”, and on the other in a direct challenge to the Russian meta-narrative. I am also interested in a region-wide dynamic in order to move away from any reification of Eastern Europe and towards more adequately representing it as a complex, composite and contradictory phenomenon. Moreover, the comparison with the two other key examples of Poland and Russia offers a proper reference framework, generating comparative material and locating a place for Ukraine within the current set of possibilities. Russia and Poland did not just watch the events of Euromaidan as bystanders; both had links to the Ukrainian movement in many profound ways.

The impact of Europe on life in these countries “east of Eden” is huge. For the middle-class elites in Ukraine, Europe represents a plethora of individualistic opportunities, such as travel, education, and careers impossible to find at home, while the lower classes definitely prioritise access to the labour market. For the pro-European political and business camp, it is a strategic opportunity to seek out better ways of enrichment, i.e. a cow to be milked. But it is rare for these motivations to be honestly propagated in public discourses. More often than not, they suggest some elevated reason, and it is not necessarily only a legitimation mechanism, as strategic motivations can often go hand in hand with sincere idealism. Being refused the same true “Europeanness” as the rest of the Continent, East Europeans
often long for Europe as a redemption. Europe is the answer to the post-colonial predicament of Ukrainian nationalism. The Ukrainian identity is seen as weakened and in many social spheres erased or never developed because of the centuries-long foreign domination. Russia’s aspirations to continue controlling Ukraine as its “sphere of interests” or “soft underbelly” are taken as a serious and very real threat to this identity’s continued existence. At the same time, tolerant and liberal Europe is perceived by the participants of Ukraine’s belated nation-building project as a safe haven for it to rebuild itself, the only hopeful and viable alternative for Ukraine to survive. On the other side of the Ukrainian national question coin, there is an understanding of Europe as a recipe for the social and political plagues debilitating the state and society, an example to follow because it is so much more successful than any East European entity has ever been, and it is success people wish to repeat, and not failure. This double logic is characteristic of all Central and East European nations. Even a most superficial overview suggests that Polish discourses on Europe historically had many similarities with how it is seen in Ukraine nowadays. Russia also officially pays homage to it: while Europe must be challenged by Russia, who aspires to be its rival and equal in everything, European goods and ideas are still imported en masse, although, metaphorically speaking, Russia looks like Lucifer, who rejects the redemption offered by Europe and which it secretly seeks. In the words of Brudny and Finkel (2011, p. 829), “contrary to Russian liberals, for Ukrainian national-democrats the desire to be like the ‘civilized’ Europe meant not only the achieving of European standards of life but also the endorsement of European political values as an important component of Ukrainian national identity”.

Without taking this into account, the meaning of the 2013–2015 developments in and around Ukraine may be puzzling to an outside observer. For some, it looks like a chance coincidence of circumstances, something that was not meant to happen and that could and should have been avoided: a chain of unfortunate events that triggered other unfortunate events almost blindly, with both sides violently venting their unreasonable hatred – “an unnecessary war”, to use the expression of Peter Rutland (2015, p. 129). This is an absurdist reading of the conflict; its weakness is its reliance solely on chaos as an explanation. For others, the conflict was (and remains) a well-orchestrated and smoothly executed puppet drama with the real actors pulling the strings from behind the curtain; the rebellious Russia rising against US and Western dominance, with a few oligarchs making a quick buck in the back. This version denies agency to both sides of the con-
flict. These two interpretations are understandable as an immediate reaction, but both are epistemologically flawed and have to give way to better ones. However, to understand and potentially solve the conflict, its meaning must be understood rather than dismissed. Although this study does not directly deal with the conflict and its solution, my hope is that it may contribute to a better international policy based on a deeper understanding of the conflict’s root causes.

The outline of the so-called “Ukrainian crisis” – or more properly the Ukraine–Russia crisis or the Russo-Ukrainian war as it has been recognised by the International Criminal Court on 14 November 2016 – begins in the first half of 2013 when the Yanukovych administration intensified its contacts with Brussels and the signing of the Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area was in sight. This agreement was a product of the 2008–2013 negotiations and originated in the recognition of Ukraine’s European choice after the 2004 Orange Revolution. Russia responded to this with a “trade war” when, beginning from July 2013, it limited Ukrainian imports dramatically. After a period of nerve-racking negotiations with the EU and a bitter reaction from the Kremlin, the Ukrainian government decided to change its external policy overnight, announcing a reorientation to Russia. This was the moment of truth that not only revealed but also actively shaped the realities: with millions of Ukrainians demonstrating with European flags in the streets, and the government unable to contain the protest regardless of the means used, Euromaidan (literally Euro Square) became first an agora and then a battlefield between the pro- and anti-European sides. This initial setup was not carved in stone whilst the protest was increasingly focusing on the domestic social agenda, but Europe still blended in naturally. The battlefield expanded when Russia annexed Crimea and went on to support the irredentist rebellion of the Russian nationalists in the easternmost regions of Ukraine. But the clash did not fundamentally disappear at the same time as the vortex of the conflict sucked in new motives and meanings. In March 2015, the then Polish prime minister Ewa Kopacz admitted Ukraine was “really for the first time spilling blood for the European Union, or for the attempt to integrate with the European Union” (Polskie radio, 10 March 2015; my translation). The people in Maidan Square were dying under European flags: why? For José Manuel Barroso and Brussels bureaucrats? For the benefits and neoliberal free trade that so many in Europe – including recently Greek opponents to austerity and English Eurosceptic Brexiteers – are ready to die fighting against?
A year after Maidan, the prominent Ukrainian writer Yuriy Andrukhovych wrote the following in an essay for Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: “I have recently seen a TV report from Spain where the farmers, annoyed by the EU trade sanctions against Russia causing them problems with sales of their products – perhaps, oranges – burned the EU flags as a sign of protest. It was exactly with such flags that the murdered were enwrapped by our people in Maidan before putting the corpses in coffins” (Andruchowytsch, 2014; my translation). This heart-rending contrast and its depth of misunderstanding could be an answer, but I believe it has to be turned into a question of what the meaning of Europe was for those who fought for it, for those who fought against it, and for those who watched from afar with either compassion or indifference.

Narratives of Europe are omnipresent in the political debates in East European countries (such as Ukraine) and in Central European states that have been EU members for a while now (such as Poland). As already stated, Europe is used in both these two countries as a key to defining their own identities, in a complex dynamic of seeing themselves as part of Europe and opposing it. This dynamic is unstable by definition. The narratives that define these countries’ external policies greatly focus on the central questions: are we in Europe? And if so, where exactly? Russia, which can alternatively be seen as East European or Eurasian, is dealing with pretty much the same existential question, also when it substitutes Europe for the entire “West”. Russia may act globally, for example when it deals with China or conducts air strikes in Syria, but these actions are nevertheless short-circuited to “the West” and are meaningful as long as they constitute statements in a dialogue or confrontation with Berlin/Paris/London/Brussels and, above all, Washington. Similarly, Poland may have its Central Asian or Latin American policy, but it remains secondary to the European one and always runs along the line of thinking “how would this affect our position in Europe?” The same logic is taken to the extreme in the case of Ukraine, where everything outside the axis “the West–Ukraine–Russia” all too often seems irrelevant.

The narratives of Europe are also imbedded in broader identification narratives. Following Brubaker and Cooper’s criticism (2000) of the concept of identity as fuzzy and contradictory (mixing essentialist and hybrid or fluid qualities), I agree that the “identification” (like “self-identification” and “self-understanding”) can be a more precise and useful alternative that

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1 I use the German transliteration of the name as given in the article’s by-line.
emphasises processual and actional aspects. This conceptual apparatus helps construe the Ukrainian crisis as Ukraine’s effort to identify itself as belonging to Europe rather than to the “Russian sphere”, which, in turn, leads to Russian attempts to thwart this identification. Another aspect of this conception is the unreciprocal and unilateral imbalance in this identification process: Ukraine is the subject of this process, while Europe is its object, creating a discrepancy between Ukraine’s longing to belong to Europe, and Europe’s hesitance to identify itself with Ukraine. Ukrainian narratives of Europe are primarily narratives of Ukraine, identifying Ukraine in relation to Europe. In a similar vein, Poland, having already achieved much of what Ukraine yet seeks to accomplish, is now caught in contradictions between redefining itself as “truly” (i.e. Western) European or challenging Europe from “a third way” – both these discourses are being sustained chiefly by elites. Likewise, Russian elites are struggling to identify Russia vis-à-vis Europe as part of it, as its leader or saviour, or as a challenger to its dominance. All this self-identificatory work is entangled with narratives of Europe, and so they smoothly blend into narratives of the self, and vice versa. Often Europe is used effectively as a powerful legitimation device as well.

Therefore, one of the most interesting and important aspects of “the national meanings of Europe” (Malmborg & Stråth, 2002), especially used for the purposes of identification and legitimation, is constituted by the power effects of their production in public discourses. From a discourse theory perspective, the “form” of European narratives inevitably contains the “content” of power relations. Therefore, I am using this vantage point to try and unpack this political content of the European archive. It makes it possible to analyse condensed material in depth and in a number of limited cases while dealing with diverse discourses on one of the most important issues for each of these countries. This approach also has its limitations. By focusing on the narrative aspects of relations with Europe, the study chooses to ignore other aspects of the domestic agendas, where complex power dynamics may be at play as well. However, the effect of this limitation is less detrimental once it is assumed that power relations are channelled homogenously through public discourses in the political field and that much of the domestic agenda is reflected in the external policy field as well (as evidenced by the material).

Studying the interaction between journalists and public figures on the one hand and external policymakers on the other is a productive way to understand the Ukrainian crisis as a phenomenon at the intersection of the political, social and cultural fields. The meaning of Europe could be recon-
structured by studying how the influential and popular Ukrainian media have represented Europe against the backdrop of corresponding media discourses in two other particularly significant countries, namely Poland and Russia. Such a comparison helps to draw justifiable inferences from individual findings, by taking into account parallel developments, mutual influences and the development of similar phenomena in different conditions and different phenomena in similar conditions. Comparative research minimises these potential shortcomings and has also seen a major upswing since Hallin and Mancini’s conceptualisation (2004) breathed new life into it, but it matters much more than the short-lived topicality, for as Downey and Mihelj (2012, p. 89) reminded: “there can be no emancipation […] without explanation”. Moreover, as the Ukrainian historian Andrii Portnov noted (2013, p. 9; my translation):

in order to understand Polish–Russian, Ukrainian–Polish or Russian–Ukrainian discussions regarding nearly all questions of history, politics and culture, it is vital to remember and take into account that they always have a third side. Or, in other words, a bilateral dialogues and bilateral (mis)understandings in the region are actually neveral bilateral, even if their participants keep forgetting about it.

Alongside Ukraine, Russia was from the very beginning an active agent in the conflict, and a great many Russians were also emotionally attached to the Ukrainian situation with their sympathy or hatred. Poland soon became an active supporter of Ukraine and had been considered even before that one of its major advocates in the EU. Apart from their close involvement in the crisis, these three also make an ideal case for comparison. With their intertwined histories and cultures, their political and social systems shared enough common or similar features between 1945 and 1989. However, their paths after the collapse of Communism and the Soviet Union have taken different directions, with their choosing divergent policies, reforms and approaches to democratisation and European integration, and this has also created dissimilar media systems. Also, their political relations with the EU differ vastly. Poland enjoys an insider’s view, whereas Russia and Ukraine are applying two kinds of outsider’s optic: for Moscow, EU accession is not on the political agenda, while Ukraine has seen many U-turns on its long and winding road to European integration. At the same time, relations with Europe have top priority in all three countries. Moreover, they perceive their own identification of Europe as the key to defining their own place in the world, for example Poland’s ideas of “the West’s betrayal” or “coming
back to Europe”, Ukraine’s Westernising and nativist projects, and Russian Eurasianism. All these similarities and differences provide a background for finding parallels in the media–politics interaction of the three countries.

The differences in the perception of Europe correspond to each country’s current political stance. While Poland is an EU member state and one of its important economic and policymaking actors, Russia has gone through a set of friendlier and more reticent phases in its relations with Europe, equally based on economic interest and a great power fantasy. Ukraine’s European integration remains half-hearted, with the country being apparently closer to the EU than Russia, yet without achieving any definite success and facing a number of problems. These differences may be interpreted from several perspectives: geographical, cultural, economic and political. One option not explored yet is looking at media narratives blending into external policy, which would open up a fresh avenue for further research on the media’s role and place in these societies.

On a more general and at the same time more private level, my personal reason for conducting this project has been my keen interest in helping to explain why the current positions of these three countries have turned out so different and to highlight the agency of journalists – not just their passive reception of whatever happens to themselves and the societies they live in.

From the perspective of previous research, this project originated as an attempt to critically reconsider what is known about the media in Eastern European, particularly post-Soviet, countries. What is generally known about the press in post-Soviet countries, best exemplified in media representations, numerous democracy indices and the body of media research, too often refers to them as restrained by censorship and under pressure from various external actors like governments or big businesses (de Smaele, 1999; Belin, 2002; Pasti, 2005; Kratasjuk, 2006; Rogerson, 2007; Lauk, 2008; Gromadzki et al., 2010). This empirical knowledge, however, does not correspond to the most commonly accepted theoretical knowledge, which suggests that the press and journalists play a more active role in society; they are active agents complicit in domination (from Michel Foucault’s perspective) or as forums for public deliberation and influencing policies (in the view of Jürgen Habermas) rather than as passive recipients of oppression. The underlying problem this research is seeking to tackle is to bridge the gap between empirical knowledge and theory by either supplying alternative empirical evidence supporting the theories or revising them and proposing a more adequate understanding on the basis of field research. The comparison between these three countries can lead to a deeper under-
standing of the media’s role and the realities in which it operates; but the comparison can also help realise that overgeneralising different countries as representatives of the same abstract “East European”, “post-Communist”, “post-Soviet” or “transitional” media system is less productive than a more nuanced approach.

Defining the field: Aim, research questions and design

The aim of the project is to find out how Europe is portrayed in the mediated public discourses in the Ukrainian political field, compared to those in Poland and Russia. This requires a) mapping such narratives and b) studying the interaction between journalists and policymakers. Three principal research questions are thus defined and are examined in the following order (chronologically and with increasing complexity):

1. How did the concept of Europe develop historically in Ukraine, Poland and Russia?
2. How was Europe narratively constructed in Ukraine’s news media before, during and after Euromaidan, in comparison to Russia and Poland?
3. How do these constructions relate to power relations within the interaction between journalists and makers of Ukrainian foreign policy in comparison with Poland and Russia?

These questions will be tackled based on the theoretical foundations delineated by Foucault’s conceptualisation of power as discourse created by truth-generating institutions and dispersed across social structures and environments. Even though I am here focusing on a clearly delineated case of media narratives in the political field, thus related to political authority, such an approach does not contradict that specialised sites of power may co-exist and cooperate with the more broadly understood “dispersed” power. Furthermore, my focus on political authority is driven by a Foucauldian concept of governmentality that entails this dispersed micropower and more clearly confined power of political authority. Through analysing the relationship between political authority and the power of public discourses, I also show how they connect and interact. A more detailed overview of the theories applied here is given in Chapter 2 (first section). Figure 1 also visualises the relationship between narrative, power and politics and the
focus of this study, once again, on one political aspect of the stories about Europe: their power in the political field.

Different research methods have been used to answer different research questions. I have addressed the complexity of these tasks with a multi-level approach targeting the analytical sites of texts and actors (cf. Krzyżanowski, 2010b). The textual research in relation to research questions 1 and 2 was based on a mixed-methods approach across the qualitative-quantitative continuum in order to gather as rich data as possible (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003), whereas interviews constitute the principal method with which to answer research question 3. The detailed overview of the research design is found in Chapter 3; however, I will also give an extremely brief outline below. I have (1) identified key historical continuities and discontinuities in the three countries’ narratives of Europe by combining the existing historical literature and my own research and hermeneutical reading of historical documents; (2a) performed qualitative thematic analysis to indicate
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the narratives of Europe present in the influential press of the countries in question around the time of Euromaidan. Based on these contextualised categories, I have (2b) applied quantitative content analysis to a much larger body of texts; (3a) enriched these results with a closer look at individual cases of interest, including prominent articles by notable authors as well as policy documents, inspired by approaches such as hermeneutics and reception history; and (3b) situated the previously mapped discourses within the interaction between journalists and policymakers based on qualitative, semi-structured, in-depth interviews with journalists and diplomats; meta-research and secondary sources were also consulted at all stages.

In both text and interview samples, I have focused on the most influential and respectable “elite” news outlets that are more likely to host the discourses of power while also including more “oppositional” – though not completely outside the mainstream – voices for a more diverse and fair sample (such as Russia’s rather anti-Kremlin Novaya Gazeta or Ukraine’s somewhat pro-Russian Segodnya).3 Despite the much-hyped and in many ways real and tangible decline of the print media, newspapers (also read online) still seem more relevant as political opinion-making tribunes than television or web-based multimedia platforms such as news aggregators. The newspapers analysed here are Gazeta Wyborcza, Polityka and Rzeczpospolita (Poland); Dzerkalo Tyzhnya, Korrespondent and Segodnya (Ukraine); and Kommersant, Izvestiya and Novaya Gazeta (Russia). Their formats are not identical, but the idea behind this sampling was that they should be functionally comparable. Thus, Dzerkalo Tyzhnya and Novaya Gazeta, both weeklies, can be seen as structural equivalents of the daily Gazeta Wyborcza because they represent progressive, independent journalism and often have

3 Both the terms “mainstream” and “oppositional” are colloquial rather than academic concepts (moreover, in a functioning liberal democracy, mainstream and oppositional camps are supposed to often change). However, outside the electoral policy context, dominant and peripheral voices seem resilient. Taking the example of Russia, anti-Soviet discourses arguably had a potent momentum in the 1990s, reflected in the official rhetoric perspective of the largest media available to the majority of the population and the middle and upper classes. These discourses can be seen as mainstream, while the communist and anti-Western ones moved to the fringe post-1991. Later on, nativist and protectionist discourses developed from within the anti-Soviet mainstream and sidelined the liberal-democratic discourses within it, which then moved to the periphery, practised and consumed by rather disempowered minorities today. Sometimes the “mainstream” is evident in the majority view expressed in public opinion polls. When 55% of Ukrainians favoured Ukraine’s accession to the EU back in 2003 (Stefan Batory Foundation poll, quoted in Konieczna 2004), it established the continuity of the prevalent pro-EU narrative well before Euromaidan. This explication makes clear my somewhat commonsensical application of the terms “mainstream” and “opposition”.

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the same engaged style, far from disinterested objectivity. The Polish Polityla is also a weekly, and historically known as a weekly newspaper, thus also similar to those Ukrainian and Russian newspapers, but its current magazine format as well as its more centrist slant put it on a comparable footing with Korrespondent. Rzeczpospolita, a conservative and business-oriented daily close to the Establishment, is very much like Kommersant (both dailies). However, in Ukraine, it is perhaps again Korrespondent that is the most similar to it while also having a functional similarity in its importance for the Establishment (in fact, rivalled by Dzerkalo Tzynnya, but complete equivalents are impossible to find in any two media systems). Izvestiya and Segodnya stand out as rather much like tabloids or extremely tabloidised compacts. They were included to make the sample more diverse as the former is known for its less subtle and more explicit ties to the Kremlin, while the latter has been owned by the Donetsk oligarch Rinat Akhmetov, who has links to Russia. There is no approximate equivalent of such a format in Poland, and sampling the tabloid Fakt as an equivalent would be incorrect from the political economy perspective since it is German-owned. Therefore, the sample’s diversity called for some sacrifices in terms of identical representation from every country (a utopian project in any case).

The sample includes articles published in these newspapers between the 16th Ukraine–EU summit in February 2013 and the first Minsk agreements in September 2014. Also, this journalist coverage is contextualised by comparisons with such resources as the Russian Snob.ru, the Polish Natemat.pl, or a Ukrainian blog section on the Ukrayinska Pravda website where many public figures, from writers and artists to politicians and businessmen, regularly exchange their thoughts in a very free manner. Interviewees were sampled mainly among the journalists who are affiliated to, associated with or very frequently contribute to the sampled newspapers. In the case of the policymakers, they were sampled among the diplomats who have recently worked or are currently working in their nations’ ministries of foreign affairs (MFAs).

It is important to note that the interviews were by no means used as a corrective to the analysis of the texts. The interviews had to provide insights into the power dynamic of the analysed media (perceived from the perspective of key stakeholders, journalists and policymakers, explicitly and implicitly through indirect statements). Another reason for this is my general methodological acceptance of Stuart Hall’s encoding/decoding scheme (1980/2006), which postulates that the meaning is constructed at the moment of both its expression and reception, enabling in this way a multi-
tude of possible understandings and negotiated uses of texts. With this in mind, to understand the power exchanges going on between the media and the public authorities, it was necessary to comprehend the specific kinds of encoding and decoding employed by the journalists and the policymakers. This was to be done most efficiently by talking to the people directly.

This research is media-centric as it focuses primarily on the role, practices and functioning of the news media. However, although the point of departure is rooted in the media, as is this study’s starting point, the journey in between has to make long deviations along the way to achieve genuine interdisciplinarity and to synchronise the study with the broad spectrum of contemporary humanities, which helps to validate and verify the findings. In addition, addressing the problem from multiple perspectives, such as historical, political and social science, cultural studies and linguistical, helps mitigate the effects of media-centrism and situate the work within contemporary epistemological practices.

Methodological nationalism is another challenge and a potential pitfall. Transnational, supranational and subnational networks can often be more formative for many nationally observed social phenomena, as is ever more widely recognised. Therefore, any research focusing on the national level primarily risks overlooking these links. I am sensitive to the spillover of collective fantasies and sentiments, for example of the irredentist nationalism from Russia into Ukraine, of revolutionary anti-dictatorship discourse from Ukraine into Russia, and of Euro-optimism from Poland into Ukraine again. However, my primary interest is in phenomena still conditioned by nation states (such as national legislation and government practices, diplomacy, national education and the type of a specific culture it spreads, media audiences that only insignificantly expand beyond the national communities). Furthermore, the presence of nation states is also a determinant for the very existence of the nation’s external policy. Although I am here thus sticking to a long-standing, and perhaps short-sighted, trend by mainly focusing nationally, this is justified by my research questions.

Furthermore, as Sabina Mihelj noted, the importance of national contexts is often underestimated.

[N]ation states and national identities continue to function as the main building blocks of worldwide systems, and are in fact responsible for making the global interactions possible despite the diversity of cultural assumptions and attitudes. Their very presence imposes a globally intelligible grammar of
nationhood onto virtually every form of transnational governance, trade and communicative exchange [...] (Mihelj, 2011, pp. 3–4)

Mihelj suggested seeing nationalism as a vision and a division of the world along national lines and also as a principle of legitimation that lends legitimacy to any institution with a well-founded claim to represent a national community; this also includes media systems. “This understanding of nationalism and mass communication can help us bridge the gap between text-based, cultural analysis of nationalism in the media, and the more sociological concerns with the impact of media institutions and their political and economic background” (Mihelj, 2011, p. 3).

This doctoral dissertation consists of seven chapters and a number of appendices. As presented in this text, it is logically and narratively structured around the methods used and respective sites of analysis where they have been applied. First, I explain and discuss the theoretical aspects and interpretive schemes relevant to the problem outlined here. After the study’s general outline in the Introduction, Chapter 2 deals with its theoretical framework (focusing on the aspects of combining Bourdieusian, Foucauldian and Habermasian concepts as well as postcolonial theory and a theoretical exploration of Europe). This discussion goes from a most general level of abstract grand theories to conceptualising Europe and concludes with a postcolonial theory that focuses on both the problem of Europe and social theory in one approach. After the theoretical discussions, the methodological problems are discussed and then the particular methods and procedures applied to the material (Chapter 3). Altogether, this forms the first, i.e. theoretical and methodological, part of the study.

The second, namely empirical, part presents the results of those methods applied and interpreted through those theoretical schemes. Chapter 4 provides a historical timeline for the different narratives of Europe in Ukraine, Russia and Poland, – in essence a hermeneutical conceptual history that spans from the earliest attempts in the three countries to conceptualise Europe to the present day. Chapter 5 contextualises their media systems and foreign policy traditions including a consideration of their current differences and similarities, and enters the field of current public discourses by analysing notable individual cases as well as informal yet important blogs. The analysis of the contemporary policy documents and notable individual texts and authors in today’s blogosphere and public discussion has in essence been carried out on the same basis as the analysis of the historical documents.
1. INTRODUCTION

Within the empirical part, there then follows the qualitative-quantitative content analysis of the newspaper texts, again rooted in the methodological approach: first, the texts are analysed with the help of qualitative thematic analysis (a discourse-historical approach in critical discourse analysis), and then larger samples are analysed using content analysis and a code book developed from the thematic analysis (Chapter 6). The third, and concluding, element of the empirical part is the interview study (Chapter 7). It presents first the interview data on the journalists’ involvement in Euromaidan and the resulting social power dynamic. It then interprets the results of the interviews with Ukrainian, Russian and Polish journalists and policymakers, constructing their sense of own power and mutual relations.

The conclusions in Chapter 8 offer a summary and discussion of the key results as well as point out possible avenues for further research. In the Appendices, more information on specific procedures (such as the sampling and reliability tests, the content analysis coding scheme or the interview questionnaires) is provided.

Lastly, a few words on what this research is not and what it does not claim to do. As already stated, it does not seek to measure the media impact. Neither does it suggest, in the spirit of the administrative research tradition, practical solutions to the question of what form the policies should take and how they need to be pursued. Problems such as the Western European perception of the eastern half and the need for a critique of mistaken, unfair or biased representations are also outside the scope of this research. Although paying sufficient attention to how social movements and crises impact the media and are impacted by them, the focus here is specifically on that interaction rather than on social movements and crises as such. This is not a study of protest and/or social movements, although they have their place in this project. Instead of focusing on them primarily, I have chosen only partly to include considerations of how journalists relate to them and bring about their potential of agency and power in a situation of tectonic social debates and tensions and ultimately a breakdown of public authority. But I am not dealing with these tensions and this breakdown per se; the focus is entirely on representations and media power. I have no intention of contributing to theories of democracy, neither in a normative nor descriptive spirit. I will also just mention the problems pertaining to the hypothesised European public sphere in passing. Many interesting questions, for example how the public discourses on Europe echo in ordinary people’s narratives of Europe, were considered in the process but had to be discarded to stay
within the practical limits of this research. They will remain unanswered and invite further investigation into representations of Europe.
CHAPTER 2

Between panopticon and the public sphere:
Theoretical aspects

This study is based on two theoretical encounters that occurred at different stages of the research. The first one served as a starting point before the actual inquiry and was rooted in the tradition of sociologically and historically oriented media and communication studies. At the most general level, I took my point of departure from the field theory of Pierre Bourdieu without necessarily sticking strictly to it in all respects. Bourdieu suggested a division of society into different fields where actors compete for limited sets of resources, including different forms of capital (material but not least also symbolic). Each field thus creates, and is created by, its own habitus, a set of norms, conventions and conditionalities that differentiate the field or the subfield and qualifies or disqualifies participants. The media field can be seen as having a relationship with varying degrees of autonomy or heteronomy with other fields, primarily the political.

From the Bourdieusian perspective, the imperatives and representations apparent in the mediascape can be viewed as occupying a middle position between purely linguistic acts and “performativ utterances” (Bourdieu, 1991/2012, p. 74) that constitute a social act in itself and are invested with symbolic power. Unlike performativ utterances, these public statements have no legal consequences (as in a swearing in or a naming of a ship); however, their importance is greater than in any other statements. This is also the grammar that governs the political field, which reconfirms the overlapping of the two. However, the heteronomic relations between them seem much less obvious.

There is clear link between Bourdieu and Habermas in their common interest towards communicative rationality (Crossley, 2004, p. 91). Similar to the Foucauldian perspective to be presented below, Bourdieu sees knowledge as an integral condition of power:
Specifically political action is possible because agents, who are part of the social world, have a (more or less adequate) knowledge of this world and because one can act on the social world by acting on their knowledge of this world. This action aims to produce and impose representations (mental, verbal, visual or theatrical) of the social world which may be capable of acting on this world by acting on agents’ representation of it. Or, more precisely, it aims to make or unmake groups – and, by the same token, the collective actions they can undertake to transform the social world in accordance with their interests – by producing, reproducing or destroying the representations that make groups visible for themselves and for others. (Bourdieu, 1991/2012, p. 127)

Although when formulating this problem this general outline guided my basic conceptualisation of possible relations between the fields, I nevertheless searched for theoretical alternatives more specific and less general and thus better suited to interpreting the findings of my study. I will now turn to the theories more useful during the interpretation of my findings.

Power and the public sphere

“Maidan”, an Arabic (maydan “distance, space”) or Persian (mejdan “square, arena”) loanword in Ukrainian that came via Ottoman Turkish (meidan “square, area, open space”), today means literally “a car-free public square”. Hence, Euromaidan is a kind of “European square”. Historically, the noun was used to describe any open space, later a marketplace, and even gave rise to a verb, maydanyté, used to describe the whirling or boiling movement of water (Etymologichny slovnyk, 1989, p. 361). Another historical meaning was an excavated tomb (open on top, like a little square; ibid.), which makes it tempting to think of Maidan as the opening of a history thought long buried.

The key site of the protest giving the name to the protest itself, similar to Cairo’s Tahrir or Istanbul’s Taksim, predicates collective action through a particular place: a city square, an agora where not only debate is boiling but also in which the common interest was articulated through acts of denial and defiance. This invites interpreting Maidan as a “public space” belonging to the “public sphere”, which Habermas defined as “the sphere of private people come together as a public” (Habermas, 1962/2011, p. 27; 2006) – a spatial metaphor for theorising this kind of open interaction at a more abstract level of the entire society. Indeed, the Ukrainian protests, where the media played an outstanding role, can be interpreted as a rebellion of the
public sphere against the government, which tried to ignore it. I find the “whirling” or “boiling” connotation especially attractive: an unstable, chaotic public space, yet still with a potential for a self-governing critical mass and a deliberative process, albeit a specific one, juxtaposed against the opened tomb of suppressed historical potentialities. Even in rather extreme situations, such as the one that unfolded in the Ukrainian capital during the winter of 2014, the media strove to project their influence when conventional political means appeared ineffective or exhausted. As mentioned in the Introduction, the protest was literally arranged by a prominent journalist via Facebook, and many journalists participated in Euromaidan and then ran for parliament.

Habermas’s theory is useful here as it links discourse and political practice in the concept of discursive or deliberative democracy (cf. Figure 2). Habermas connects what could be treated as specific, individual and structurally more or less isolated communicative acts with specific institutions or actors they are directed at. This perspective makes it possible to study how the latter are influenced by the former, and how discursive actors have a role in setting the political agenda.

Yet, although “Habermas remains centrally engaged in the project of identifying the still-valuable normative ideals of modernity” (Calhoun, 1992, p. 40), the concept of the public sphere has often been criticised. Nieminen (2009) summarised these criticisms as attacking several principal aspects of the theory: (1) its supposed idealism and impossibility to be tested in empirical history; (2) its West-centric bias; (3) its suppression of internal differences in the public sphere; (4) its inadequacy as a model of the situation characterised by the functioning of many public spheres rather than the one single bourgeois or civic public sphere; and 5) its gender blindness, vulnerable to feminist critique.

Notably for this study, some have argued for an end to the “private/public” divide (Sheller & Urry, 2003); others have revised the concept so that it can be applied to the media systems in regions such as southern Europe which do not always quite correspond to the Habermasian model of the public sphere (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). This is especially true of Eastern Europe, where constellations of private and group interests were proposed as an alternative explanation for how the media function. Slavko Splichal has in particular criticised a simplified understanding of the public sphere that assumed its existence was possible without a critical public (Splichal, 2003; Olsson, 2010). In Eastern Europe, as Splichal rightly noted, the dominant mode of change is imitative in that the media imitate either a foreign,
typically a US or European model, or its own idealised past, which is exclusionary and nationalistic (Splichal, 2000, 2001). This prevents the development of genuine publics. While Habermas’s theory works well for setting the standards of normative models and checking just to what extent reality corresponds to them, it may have weaknesses in explaining realities that do not fit with what is considered the norm for democracy. Despite such criticisms, the public sphere concept is still widely used in both normative and descriptive approaches, for example in Salovaara-Moring’s edited volume (2009). According to Lunt and Livingstone (2013), the numerous revisions of the concept, including those by Habermas himself, do not allay the doubts about whether its normative vision is “valuable, sufficient or sustainable” (p. 95).

An overview of the literature suggests this normative/descriptive duality is not the only way to operationalise this concept. There seems to be, in fact, a double duality in conceptualising the public sphere: (1) descriptive versus normative approaches and (2) agonistic versus deliberative approaches. Concerning the latter duality, Kari Karppinen (2009) distinguishes the radical-critical approaches (for instance Chantal Mouffe’s and Ernesto Laclau’s), which have an agonistic view of the public sphere, from those that understand it as a means to reach consensus and commonality (deliberative democracy theories, for instance those of Habermas). The main criticism from the agonistic end of the spectrum is that the deliberative public sphere is a rationalist conception that fails to explain relations of power. Karppinen also observed a “pluralist turn” within public sphere theory, suggesting that instead of one unified public sphere, plural public spheres tend to become more fragmented and dispersed. This approach, in turn, is criticised by some who believe pluralist public spheres undermine democracy by meshing it with identity politics.

In view of these considerations, I have concluded that the most productive approach does not limit “the public sphere” to some particular structural element of society. It is true that Euromaidan especially had the spatial dimension of an agora, but it is equally valid that the discourse of protest was not limited to it and penetrated different levels of life, institutional as well as quotidian, and in this respect, it was dispersed rather than structurally or geographically focused. The public sphere, I believe, exists not as a permanent inhabitant of certain social sites but as a fluid cluster of discourses swarming around particular public policy issues; it is a focus rather than a clearly defined basis. Online networks only added to this fluidity and heterogeneity. Sheller and Urry make the following insightful re-
mark: “the new hybrids of private-in-public and public-in-private do not automatically imply a decline in politics or a collapse of democracy, but may instead point to a proliferation of multiple ‘mobile’ sites for potential democratization” (2003, p. 108). It goes without saying that I am using the concept descriptively rather than normatively, as I am interested in connecting theories with empirical research instead of constructing prescriptive arguments.

To clarify the relationship between politics and the public sphere, Figure 2 visualises some of the key links between them. I see politics (a political process of competing actors with rival group interests and ideologies) as overlapping with the public sphere but only partly. This is because there are elements of politics that remain beyond the scope of public representation (such as covert negotiations and agreements), non-discursive public political acts, and those that are both public and discursive but not deliberative. At the same time, the public sphere includes elements unrelated to the political field and concern other spheres of social life (this is, for instance, the case in the cultural public sphere), or political discourses that do not relate immediately to a daily political struggle. However, the intersection of the public sphere and politics is the location of public deliberative politics. As much as the public sphere seeks to project influence on the political process and decision-making (only part of which is ever made public), political actors also frame public sphere debates and discourses.

I see the authorities as a structurally separate element external to, but not isolated from, the media or the public. The media and the public merge even more, enabling the very existence of each other. And still, there is a difference between the agency of an active citizen and that of a journalist, who systematically and professionally creates representations of the world. While these roles are not rigid and can often be assumed by the same persons at different moments or even simultaneously, their positioning in the social and political fields is different and produces varying effects.
There is essentially no contradiction here with Habermas’s own later revisions of his conceptualisation of the public sphere. He updated his concept once again to account for current changes, this time towards a non-structuralist perspective which claims that the public sphere is part of the citizen’s lifeworld and is bound to a social space produced by communicative action rather than to a specific physical space. He thus redefines the public sphere as “a communication structure rooted in the lifeworld through the associational network of civil society” (Habermas, 1996, p. 359). Such a model seems more appropriate and workable but also unmistakably drifts towards Foucault’s understanding (although it stops short of admitting in the Foucauldian spirit that any agency is only agency within structure). The concept of “lifeworld”, in particular, establishes a good connection to that of micro-power. Habermas’s continuous revisions and compromises are themselves an interesting example of communicative action; they also show that his and Foucault’s understandings are not quite incompatible in that the concept of the public sphere can also be applied from a Foucauldian position.

Foucault’s and Habermas’s models can be organised in such a way that exposes their structural equivalence (see Figure 3). Both seek to tackle a constellation of factors at several levels, such as the mode of governance (democracy vs governmentality), the definition of power (local or dispersed), the link to speech acts (communicative/strategic action vs discourse) and the cognitive foundations of political action (deliberation vs power/knowledge). Their concepts of discourse clearly differ: if for Foucault, it is primarily the mechanism for producing domination by verbal means,
Habermas sees it in the context of communicative ethics aimed at communicative action.

Foucault’s theory can potentially be connected to Habermas’s model and mitigate potential critiques of it as a “one-sided analysis” (Roberts & Crossley, 2004, p. 10). Foucault’s later view was that “power is exercised both in intersubjective relations and through objectivised institutions: the micro-power of everyday life and the institutional macro-systems mediate each other” (Fornäs, 1995, pp. 64–65). This approach admits the omnipresence of power but at the same time leaves room for the macro-systems that may exercise different kinds of power while establishing the presence of a kind of loop between the micro and macro levels. This approach seems most productive as it allows us to see how micro-actions (in my specific case, a journalist/public figure publishing a newspaper article or a blog online, for example) are built into larger power games but also keep an eye on individual interaction.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Habermas</th>
<th>Foucault</th>
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<td><strong>Political mode</strong></td>
<td>Democracy</td>
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<td><strong>Power</strong></td>
<td>Structurally isolated</td>
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<td><strong>Role of speech</strong></td>
<td>Communicative vs strategic action</td>
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<td><strong>Cognitive basis</strong></td>
<td>Deliberation</td>
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Figure 3. Comparing the Habermasian and Foucauldian models

Given the Foucauldian approach’s greater flexibility, I interpret my results within a Foucauldian rather than a Habermasian context. Hence, “public discourse” is emphasised rather than the “public sphere” and non-institutionalised practices and statements are included in the research (even though I do use the concept of the public sphere in relation to a plethora of discourses on policy issues). The narrative of Europe is seen as endowed with a different power potential in the three countries under consideration, and discourse as such is viewed as a function, manifestation and realisation of power. Finally, as Fornäs admits (1995, p. 66), the divide between the two outstanding thinkers can be bridged “not by just combining them but by using the strengths of each to rework the other’s weaknesses”. Indeed, there is a wealth of literature on ways of combining these two differing approaches.
(Richters, 1988; Cronin, 1996; Kögler, 1996; Ashenden, & Owen, 1999; Biebricher, 2007; Kelly, 1994; Stocker, 2009). James Curran (2002) has also summarised some key points concerning the interrelations of media and power in the context of both Habermas’s normative model and Foucault’s problematics. For example, Flyvbjerg (1998) suggested that the tension between what should be done (Habermas) and what is actually done (Foucault) holds the key to understanding the problem of modern democracy, therefore it is only useful to triangulate their theories in a common framework. Similarly, Both Foucault and Habermas point to one issue and frame it on similar terms (Callewaert, 2006, p. 96). Fornäs et al. (2007) rather elegantly combined Bourdieu, Habermas and Foucault when distinguishing three principal categories of power: economic, political and symbolic.

The different forms of power are intertwined in everyday media consumption, giving rise to intersecting sets of resistance along the corresponding axes. Yet different schools of thought have continued to overemphasize either structural power or the agency of individual or popular resistance. [...] In order to avoid such pendulum swings between extreme positions, it is necessary to distinguish between weak and strong forms of power and resistance. [...] Economic, political and symbolic power are [...] each linked to corresponding forms of resistance. (Fornäs et al., 2007, pp. 62–63)

In a similar fashion, I have developed the understanding of power adopted here as stemming from John B. Thompson’s analysis of two principal interpretations of power:

On the one hand, taking the locution ‘power to’ as basic, some authors construe power as a facility for the attainment of predetermined goals. On the other hand, focusing upon the expression ‘power over’, other writers analyse power into a particular type of intersubjective relation. However, the framework sketched above suggests that these two views are neither wholly incompatible with one another, nor jointly sufficient to account for the phenomenon of power. I shall maintain that the principal locus of power is at the level of institutions, for power is primarily an institutionally endowed capacity for the pursuit of specific ends. (Thompson, 1981, p. 146)

For the purpose of this project, it is most productive to avoid making a rigid differentiation between the two interpretations while focusing on the institutional and institutionalised dimension of power. This is because in the context of the media and foreign policy power is clearly positioned within certain institutions. Further, such power can be analytically divided into administra-
tive (political), symbolical (communicative) and economic power. I am here focusing primarily on the link between administrative and symbolic power.

Based on its empirical findings, this study also wishes to contribute to the discussions on the relevance of Habermas’s theory and its compatibility with Foucault’s.

One of the key problems with Foucault is his method developed and changed over time. There are in fact at least three distinct Foucaults, marked – in the fashion the philosopher himself would admire – by theoretical discontinuities in History of Madness, Discourse on Language and The History of Sexuality (Foucault, 1964/2013, 1970/1972, 1976/1990). Here I adhere to his later formulations of the basic problematic.

“Truth” is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation, and operation of statements. “Truth” is linked in a circular relation with systems of power that produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it – a “regime” of truth. (Foucault, 1976/1997, p. 132)

In the same text, Foucault argued this is characteristic of both capitalist and socialist (at the time) countries. He also intimated how his perspective was developed in the early 1950s after observing the Stalinist version of Marxism and the place of science in the politico-ideological structure of society, particularly in the instance of the Lysenko affair. Perhaps I should also mention that Jeremy Bentham’s project of a perfect prison, which so much inspired Foucault, was initially conceived by the British philosopher’s brother, Samuel. He developed the idea based on controlling the labour of a large and unskilled workforce in the present-day Belarusian town of Krychaw (known under its Russian name as Krichev), where Prince Potemkin’s factories were placed under his management and where Jeremy visited him in 1786–1787 (Semple, 1993, pp. 99–100). This, I believe, sufficiently justifies the Foucauldian perspective on Eastern Europe, almost by virtue of returning the theory to its historical origins, although his other concepts have certain limitations. Similarly, the Foucauldian interest in early modern thinkers strengthens my reason for following the discursive construction of Europe to its beginnings in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

In “Two Lectures”, Foucault explicitly defines three ways of understanding power (the second and the third are subtypes of the same approach). The one inherited from the eighteenth-century political theorists is a juridical or economic interpretation, whereby power is seen as a possession
every citizen partially cedes to the state in exchange for the benefits it brings (a contractual perspective on society). The other umbrella approach suggests power is not a possession but action: it exists only when it is exercised and not as an asset passively awaiting its time to come into play. This idea of power gives life to two perspectival approaches (related and intertwined): one sees power as repression, while the other suggests it is “a war continued by other means” (Foucault, 1976/1994, p. 28), in an elegant reversal of Clausewitz’s well-known formula.

Furthermore, if it is true that political power puts an end to war, that it installs, or tries to install, the reign of peace in civil society, this by no means implies that it suspends the effects of war or neutralises the disequilibrium revealed in the final battle. The role of political power, on this hypothesis, is perpetually to reinscribe this relation through a form of unspoken warfare; to reinscribe it in social institutions, in economic inequalities, in language, in the bodies themselves of each and every one of us. (Ibid., pp. 28–29)

This entails seeing “politics as sanctioning and upholding the disequilibrium of forces that was displayed in war” (ibid., p. 29) and “that the basis of the relationship of power lies in the hostile engagement of forces” (ibid.). He urged to focus, instead of on grand-scale and obviously power-driven institutions, on microscopic exchanges that form the network of this ontological power that permeates society, constructing the grid for all social structures and even creating an individual, a subject as its effect (the one who can exercise the power).

In the same text, however, Foucault co-opted two interpretations in a single scheme of society determined by a double grid of (institutional) sovereignty and (dispersed) disciplinary power that “cannot possibly be reduced to each other” (ibid., p. 43):

Modern society, then, from the nineteenth century up to our own day, has been characterised on the one hand, by a legislation, a discourse, an organisation based on public right, whose principle of articulation is the social body and the delegative status of each citizen; and, on the other hand, by a closely linked grid of disciplinary coercions whose purpose is in fact to assure the cohesion of this same social body. (Ibid.)

In other words, “sovereignty and disciplinary mechanisms are two absolutely integral constituents of the general mechanism of power in our society” (ibid., p. 45). This idea of a simultaneous co-existence (or, rather,
collaboration) of the sovereignty-based juridical-economic and the knowledge/surveillance-based disciplinary power is further developed in the concept of governmentality, which fuses it with the disciplinary power. Based on his analysis of the treatises on the art of government, Foucault pointed out how early modern European thinkers gradually developed the idea of government as the control over things and people, with a positive result in the end (unlike sovereignty, which is its own end), no longer founded on coercion but on rational knowledge of the reality and service to those governed.

[W]e need to see things not in terms of the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a disciplinary society and the subsequent replacement of a disciplinary society by a society of government; in reality one has a triangle, sovereignty-discipline-government, which has as its primary target the population and as its essential mechanism the apparatuses of security. (Foucault, 1978/1997, p. 219)

Foucault gives a threefold definition of governmentality:

1. The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses, and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security. 2. The tendency that, over a long period and throughout the West, has steadily led toward the pre-eminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline, and so on) of this type of power – which may be termed “government” – resulting, on the one hand, in the formation of a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses, and, on the other, in the development of a whole complex of knowledges. 3. The process or, rather, the result of the process through which the state of justice of the Middle Ages transformed into the administrative state during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and gradually becomes ‘governmentalised. (Ibid., pp. 219–220)

Governmentality has become the only political issue and the sole space for political struggle – it is all about what the state should and should not do. Governmentality is “the tactics of the government that make possible the continual definition and redefinition of what is within the competence of the state and what is not, the public versus the private, and so on” (ibid., p. 221).

Apart from these similarities, the difference between Foucault and Habermas boils down to the understanding of power, which the former sees
as “productive of both knowledge and practice” (Kelly, 1994, p. 1), while the latter views power rather as an external force that has to be kept in check and harnessed for liberation purposes by communicative action and rational critique. Foucault would deny this suggestion simply because there is no liberation and no rational critique outside power. “Foucault challenges not so much the presence of such presuppositions [communicative action theory] as Habermas’s attempts to establish them as unavoidable universals” (ibid., p. 2). The separation of power and discourse/critique or their unity seems to be the essence of the disagreement between the two theoretical standpoints.

Habermas mounted a criticism of Foucault along three principal lines of attack. First of all, he wrote, the French philosopher eschews a hermeneutical understanding, substituting it with a discursive analysis that does not require an understanding of the phenomena it analyses. Instead, it can be satisfied with their positioning in historical shifts of power relations, which creates a meaningless version of history. Secondly, Foucault’s critique of knowledge can be applied to undermine his own theory so that he falls victim to a performative self-contradiction. Lastly, he sounds as if he writes from a position that distinguishes between right and wrong, but these distinctions cannot be deduced from his own theory. “Foucault cannot adequately deal with the persistent problems that come up in connection with an interpretative approach to the object domain, a self-referential denial of universal validity claims, and a normative justification for critique” (Habermas, 1985/1994, p. 98). Habermas questions the tenability of Foucault’s theories by putting them to the test. He does so by checking whether they can explain how social order can at all arise, which he concludes is impossible within a Foucauldian framework. Habermas also thinks Foucault simplifies complex phenomena and commits the intellectual sin of cherry-picking with his unsystematic choice of examples.

In my own application of Foucault’s theory, I have tried to alleviate the first shortcoming by consciously employing hermeneutical analysis. As for the second criticism, I have taken a more productive perspective on the power/knowledge characteristic of late Foucauldian writings, and with regard to the third criticism, I have avoided normative questions. At a general theoretical level, the response to these Habermasian criticisms could be that Foucault intended his own approach to instead be a toolbox so the lack of structure and cohesion may be less problematic. Overall, the currently observed outcome of the Foucault/Habermas debate can be reduced to a sort of middle ground where Foucault is seen as generally caught up in
his own loophole of discourse and power, and thus failing to develop a theory of critique that would avoid its identification with power itself and as a consequence self-annihilation, while Habermas is held accountable for his *malentendu* of the real Foucauldian weaknesses and strengths. In other words, Foucault is criticised for not being normative enough, and Habermas for being too normative. This leaves contemporary thought with a relative vacuum that is addressed here. As regards the site of discourse and critique, I deal with different kinds of public discourses that inhabit East European mediascapes and their interaction in power. By setting up the launch pad for my research in this fashion, I may seem more Habermasian in my initial disposition, seeing discourse and power as separate identities that only have the potential to overlap. However, I believe my approach is more nuanced than that. Following Foucault, I distinguish between different kinds of power (juridical and disciplinary). While public discourses are certainly infused with the ontological power, it is absurd to suggest they all come from the position of juridical power (which is limited and not omnipresent). Thus, my interest, as seen from Foucault’s perspective, lies in the analysis of the relations between agents of ontological power and governmentality and understanding how governmentality appears in the societies I am examining (which agents are promoting it and what are the differences between the governmentality discourses, etc.). This interaction, I believe, is happening across a plethora of social institutions in many interactions at micro, meso and macro levels. But the focus of my interest is specifically on what Arjun Appadurai (1990/2011) called the mediascape, encompassing both the materiality of a media system and the images it produces. The mediascape, which is not identical to the public sphere, can of course be flawed and dysfunctional, lacking rational deliberation and critical debate and therefore lacking a normative ideal. It can also have a varying fullness of existence: it can be nascent, advancing its early elements in a modernising society, fully fledged or in decline. I will not be incorporating Habermasian normativity into this project, but I am interested in testing elements of his approach (as well as the agonistic alternative) and eventually seeing what explanatory opportunities it can bring to the material used for this research.

Therefore, as a critical follower of Foucault, I am first and foremost interested in how the media become an actor in this “hostile engagement” and how the “disequilibrium of forces” that power stabilises into a society changes as a result of it, especially thanks to the “power effects” the media’s agency in the production of truth entails. Aware of the differences between
the legal-sovereign authority and the disciplinary power of knowledge and surveillance, I am interested in how the latter (as it is particularly exercised by the media) translates and transforms into the former (in its field of foreign policy), forming a single governmentality complex, however not bereft of the conflicts and rifts that are characteristic of power struggles. The fact that the problem of Europe, the definition of it, the relation to it and the self-definition vis-à-vis it are the focal point or the magnetic field to which these power lines gravitate and through which they focus appears typical for the context of Eastern Europe. It is fully in line with what Foucault envisaged in the notion of a “society of normalisation”:

[…] I believe that in our own times power is exercised simultaneously through this right [of sovereignty] and these techniques [of discipline] and that these techniques and these discourses, to which the disciplines give rise, invade the area of right so that the procedures of normalisation come to be ever more constantly engaged in the colonisation of those of law. I believe that all this can explain the global functioning of what I would call a society of normalisation. I mean, more precisely, that disciplinary normalisations come into ever greater conflict with the juridical systems of sovereignty: their incompatibility with each other is ever more acutely felt and apparent […] (Foucault, 1976/1994, p. 44)

At the same time, as a critical reader of Habermas, I am sensitive to the media being an arena through which other actors strive to project an influence on the government.

By way of conclusion, my relationship with theory may be summarised as thus: methodologically, I am rooted in the Foucauldian theory of discourse, yet when interpreting the findings, I still prioritise Foucault’s theory but remain open to potential alternatives (such as Habermasian, Mouffian or Bourdieusian). I thus expect my results to lead me to the most viable explanatory theory rather than letting the theory lead me to the results. Habermas’s conceptualisation of the “public sphere” as “the sphere of private people come together as a public” could be used outside this principal theoretical frame as a point of reference for the field into which public opinion, public information and reasoning, and government policies fuse, determined by “people’s public use of their reason” (Habermas, 2011, p. 27). As Foucauldian ideas can be adopted in a way that allows for discerning different systems of power, it should be possible to view the public sphere as largely identical with truth-generating institutions, while the discourses it produces indeed permeate all of the society. The media system is therefore
seen not only as a heteronomic field or a by-function of the political field (as in Bourdieu, 2005; Mancini, 2008) but also as a lever that can influence politics itself.

My openness to different theoretical complexes in interpretation (while I am methodologically situated within the Foucauldian discursive framework) is an advantage when researching Eastern European societies, which Western European theories may have difficulty interpreting as has been pointed out countless times; being omnivorous and eclectic at the interpretative stage helps by rationally combining the most relevant elements and perspectivations of different theories to craft a theory that would, however patchwork, explain the basic material better than any self-standing theory, and thus taking a step towards provincialising West European knowledges and creating a more indigenous theory.

The conceptualisation of a specific kind of power, namely a media power, may regard the media either as dependent on the political field or as increasingly influencing other fields through processes of mediatisation, or else it takes a type of middle, negotiating position (cf., among others, Couldry, 2005; Curran, 2002; Krotz, 2001/2013; Hjarvard, 2008; Mancini, 2008). What role do journalists play in power relations? Under which conditions is the power of the media likely to expand?

Audience studies have traditionally assumed that journalists held sway over the minds of the audience. This assumption later gave way to the idea of active users and approaches that emphasise the negotiation of meanings between media texts and media users. Likewise, the relationship between the media and politicians has been conceptualised in all possible ways, and the question is one that must be asked time and again, for every specific case and context, without any hope of it being answered universally, except ontologically. In this, it is similar to a problem of agency and structure that ponders the issue of primacy between the individual’s own choices and institutions, structures, resources that enable or disable a specific type of action. The focus on public discourses and communication depicts the picture of this field as divided between adherents of Habermas, who emphasises the agency of deliberative communication in the public sphere, Foucault, who supposes actors as enactors of discourses, and Bourdieu, who tries to reconcile the opposition through the habitus–field dynamic. Likewise, Anthony Giddens (1984/2013) dialectically stipulates that agency and structure both enable and are enabled by each other.

If we look at Euromaidan as one of the prominent recent examples of massive social movements at a time of extreme political crisis, calling for
agency and exposing the limitation of structure have a strong explanatory potential for how power relations transform when everything is at stake. In dealing with this problematic, one tradition within journalism studies theorises journalism as an “interpretive community” (Zelizer, 1993), essentially, based on its self-ascribed authority to interpret events. Quite on the contrary, Mancini (2008) argued using the Bourdieusian field theory that the media are heteronomous in relation to the political field and hardly have any agency independent of it. Being structurally built into the system of political clientelism in the countries where traditional authority dominates, or serving the political system as an information hub in societies based on rational-legal authority, media systems give up their autonomy as they ultimately depend on what is going on in the political field. Journalism can also similarly be seen as encroached upon by other fields. Alternatively, in an interesting move beyond Bourdieu, Bolin (2014) suggested that, in the convergence of journalism and entertainment on television, journalism is not being subsumed by entertainment but rather entertainment is assimilated by expanding journalism. Can something similar be observed in the dynamic between the journalist and the political field?

Perhaps much depends on the chosen perspective. Curran (2002) as well as Couldry and Curran (2003) analysed the problem based on the political economy and concluded that they did not favour expanding media power. The impact of “big money”, vested interests and political influences erode the power of the media, which both authors see as identical to “empowering people” (Curran, 2002, p. 247); hence, once again, depriving the media of their autonomy. Couldry (2005) lambasted traditional approaches in media studies that are based on the “myth of the mediated centre”; they work on the assumption that only the biggest media matter or that the media are central at all to explaining all kinds of social dynamic “in an endless self-fulfilling prophesy”. Yet a more technology-focused perspective would flip this around by arguing for the increasing cumulative influence of the media thanks to mediatisation, an ever-growing adoption of media logic by other fields, including, for example, politics, that have to adjust to the media’s rules, and not vice versa. Conversely, in political communication, “the new era of minimal effects” (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008) has been inferred from the same premise, namely the omnipresence of the media.

I am pragmatically interested in examining the case from multiple standpoints that take into account cultural, technological, economic and interactional aspects of this interaction. I have therefore tried not to restrict myself to just one point of view on agency and structure. Based on the case
of Euromaidan, I am convinced that the media, and in particular journalists, aggressively entered the political field as power actors and even took over some power functions traditionally the province of the authorities, changing the structure by altering the balance between two traditions, or habitus, in the journalistic field. But they were typically journalists from smaller, oppositional or self-funded publications, often crossing the line into political activism. Emphasising this situates my subject position at the intersection of several approaches favouring a dialectical perspective.

In the context of this study, this problem can be reframed in terms of the autonomy vs. heteronomy debate initiated by Bourdieu: either the journalistic field is heteronomous and subordinated to the political field, or it is autonomous and governed by its own objectives and hierarchies. The current situation, with an accelerating mediatisation and the political field increasingly being invaded by entertainment and media figures (not least in the 2016 US presidential election), suggests that there are indeed ties and channels between these fields, but at the same time there is hardly either a purely autonomous or a totally heteronomous relationship. While every field preserves structural elements that possess a high degree of autonomy, the borders are increasingly blurred and several hybridised fields emerge on these borders. The flows within these fields are far from unidirectional. Thus, journalism’s initial heteronomic dependence on the political field may at times turn into a heteronomy of politics in relation to the media field. Therefore, in the empirical chapters, particularly Chapter 7, I am looking for signs of such a relationship and hybridity.

The East European media should hardly be seen differently in this respect than any other media systems. Karol Jakubowicz (2012, p. 16.), for example, argues for a flexible scheme of establishing the dialectic of media power by examining “the scope of political and administrative control over the media”, exposing the links between political and media systems, and “the behaviour and normative attitudes among the political elites”. He also underlines the limitations of such an approach and urges us to look closely for other cultural and economic factors. From this perspective, the East European media tend to look like a case of a rather universal trend of media power, according to Jakubowicz:

The media may and do affect political developments, but at the same time their impact is predicated on the existence of favourable political conditions without which they could not perform that function. To express this dif-
ferently, the relationship between socio-political factors and media systems is one of non-equivalent or asymmetrical interdependence. (Ibid.)

Theorising Europe: The Continent as a concept

Europe – its meaning and identity, its historical and political role – has been debated many times. The word “Europe” is linked to an obscure set of myths, including that of princess Europa and Zeus disguised as a bull. Quite likely, the earliest conceptualisation of the Continent came externally, from the Levant and the Middle East, and was related to the cults of the setting sun and/or moon goddess. “The origins of the name and myth of Europe are opaque, as are their core meanings. It is even hard to know for sure in which order the word, the myth and the identification of the specific territory appeared and were linked to each other” (Fornäs, 2012, p. 9).

The ideas of Europe’s mixed origin and heritage, its movement from the East to the West, its roots in migration, exile and (sexual) desire and its sense of almost divine elevation all come from the Europa myth but still continue to give it “much more of a mythical background than any other continent” (ibid., p. 37). Several traditionally European narratives talk of a terrible past that needs to be overcome, of a “golden age” followed by a permanent quest for rebirth and change.

The modern conceptualisation of Europe dates back to Immanuel Kant (1795/1983) and his shorter political works “Ideas for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View” and “Towards Perpetual Peace”, where he formulated the idea of “a universal civic society which administers law among men”. Here he offered the idea of European superiority and exceptionalism, claiming that European countries achieved a higher development level compared to all other societies and therefore would lead humanity and reform it according to its own benchmark. Elden and Białasiewicz (2006) remark that the Kantian cosmopolitanism became a departure point for the later theorisation of Europe. Carl Cederberg (2017) similarly agrees that Kant was the first to conceptualise Europe as a universal idea. Departing from this initial effort, he unfolds a fascinating narrative of philosophers’ (re)invention of Europe, including Hegel’s transformation of this Kantian universality into a dialectical universal history model; Paul Valéry’s attempt to return to a humanistic universality; Edmund Husserl’s project to inclusively expand this European universality to encompass the entire world; and, finally, Jan Patočka’s reframing of the problem of Europe as the problem of “care for the self/the soul”.

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This fascination with Europe continues today, as the images of Europe in the last two or three decades before the Great Recession were often over-imposed with images of prosperity and democracy. In *The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe* (1992), Jacques Derrida used the urgency of the moment when the Eastern bloc had just collapsed and Europe had undergone the first of its dramatic enlargements to address the same problem of European identity. Like the rest of Derrida’s project, the answer to this problem is informed by understanding that what the rationalist “-centrism”s (be it “logo-”, “phallo-” or “Euro-”) have to give way to are more sensible alternatives. The *Other Heading* expresses the need to reformulate the problem, to avoid being caught in the trap of either Eurocentrism or anti-Eurocentrism. This reformulation must be based on a critical reflection upon universal values respectful of differences. In 2004, Derrida revisited the theme in an essay in *Le Monde Diplomatique*. Reflecting on the newspaper’s anniversary and its work in advancing *altermondialisation*, he called for “a Europe that sets the example of what a politics, a thinking, and an ethics could be, inherited from the passed Enlightenment and bearing the Enlightenment to come, which would be capable of non-binary judgements” (Derrida, 2004/2006, p. 410). This exemplifies a key trend in the writings of the last decades: reinventing Europe by harnessing the traditional universalism to strive for more emancipatory, egalitarian and progressive goals in a “non-binary” way, avoiding a sharp polarisation between the (European) self and the (non-European) other. It is this context that framed the collection of studies titled *Europe Faces Europe: Narratives from Its Other Half* (2017), edited by Johan Fornäs and based on the project of which I have been part. Taking as its starting point the idea of Europe as a narrative characterised by its self-ascribed universality and conventions such as ideas of rebirth, a terrible or golden past, the contributors point to cases such as Jan Patočka’s dissident thinking or indeed Euromaidan’s progressivist zeal, when people from Central and Eastern Europe proposed narratives of their own, often more just than those widely used.

Similarly, Étienne Balibar (2004, p. 221) reflected on how much the aporia of politics and power are inscribed in the idea of Europe and its identity. Addressing the challenge to simultaneously “individualize and desubstantialize Europe”, he proposed changing the way we look at the power of a sovereign state subject (something the united Europe has longed for acquiring) to a perspective “where power does not predate action but is rather its result” (ibid.). For Balibar, a collective identity is infinitely more than some set of ethnocultural characteristics, some rigid cast of any given
historical situation, but inherent in it is the collective transformative agency that brings together “those who, not long ago, were ignoring or fighting each other” (ibid.). He comes up with several “lessons” formative for Europe: those of tragedy (Europe’s tragic history), otherness (migration as inherent in Europe’s history and the concurrent hostility) and the transformation of conflicts into possibilities (the Continent’s striking capacity for renewal and rebirth). Thanks to these three key lessons, Europe is capable not so much of becoming a new great power but of constituting “a new type of power” (ibid., p. 225), one that no actor could appropriate. However, the remedies Balibar suggested in 2004 seem even farther away today: collective security, unilateral Western disarmament without profound changes in the periphery and coercive humanitarian interventions seem both more necessary and more discredited than ever, pinpointing an interesting collective schizophrenia of today that has made the Ukrainian crisis possible. Balibar advocated a role for Europe as a mediator in the world, but the success of this European mediation is yet to be seen. At the end of the day, Europe can be viewed as a translator, an interpreter of world cultures and an interpreter for them – this is the ultimate utopian myth of Europe, not a valid description of what today’s Europe de facto is. As a “vanishing mediator”, Europe frames its own identity in terms of the new political possibilities of non-identity-based entities in politics.

Drawing, among many others, on Balibar, Zygmunt Bauman, in his concise and polemical “Europe: An Unfinished Adventure” (2004), conceptualised Europe as the part of the world that always resisted borders in its outward expansion. He simultaneously criticised the current “inward-looking” Europe. Bauman did not call for an outward European expansion; rather, he believed that providing an alternative to geopolitical thinking and spreading welfare state practices are the primary tasks of the political Europe.

In the case of Europe, always struggling to come nearer to a state it believed to be good and desirable, rather than settling for the state it was in (let alone failing to ask how good that latter state was and so failing to find out just how much is left to be desired), the link between values and identity is arguably still more intimate than in other cases: identity is more fully defined by the values Europeans cherish than by any other of their characteristics. (Bauman, 2004, pp. 124–125)

Throughout history, Bauman informs us, Europeans have been adventurously driven to an outward expansion by overpopulation and lack of resources; even the foundational myth of the rape of Europa implies a quest
for the unattainable that nevertheless yields other, unexpectedly positive returns. “[…T]he ‘essence of Europe’ tends to run ahead of the ‘really existing Europe’: it is the essence of ‘being a European’ to have an essence that always stays ahead of reality, and it is the essence of European realities to always lag behind the essence of Europe” (ibid., p. 5). Thus, geographical Europe is separated from its supraterриториal, “free-loading” identity, which endows the geographical Europe with an obligation and a mission to stimulate further progress. With that, Bauman condemns both European Isolationism (to migration and non-intervention in affairs outside Europe), which he calls un-European, and American neo-liberalism, which pursues the logic of imperial domination rather than open-ended exploration. He sees the “social state”, or the welfare state, despite its recent demise, as a particular European legacy to the world. He follows Tsvetan Todorov in defining the following values as European: rationality, justice, democracy, and liberty. Instead of Europe’s “global retrenchment”, Bauman advocated “global responsibility and aspiration” (ibid., p. 135)

Not everybody has linked the concept of Europe to emancipatory hope. Gerard Delanty (1996) argued that the idea of Europe, marginal at first, started gaining traction thanks to a marginalisation of its Other and a history of violence that discourses of civilisation and culture had to mask, more or less successfully. Since Europe is so closely intertwined with modernity, the critique of the latter often entails a critique of the former. One example is Reinhart Koselleck’s theory (1959/1988) of “critique and crisis”: foundational for modernity was the existence of secret societies and conspiratorial critique, carried out in the private sphere, and protected from the absolutist state. In sharp contrast to Habermas, European modernity was in such discourses characterised as a conspiratorial sphere rather than a public sphere, while the critique of the state prepared and conditioned the recurrent crises, rooted in modernity’s inherent contradictions. In this perspective, it may be concluded that one such crisis is unfolding right now. Schmidt-Gleim and Wiesner (2014) particularly suggested there is a tension between associating Europe with ideas and institutional forces. The polysemic concept of Europe is permanently challenged and renegotiated and “relate[s] to means of power” (p. 11). Europe is subject to a permanent invention and thus also inclusion and exclusion.

The growing body of literature on the European public sphere has within the Habermasian paradigm contributed much to the understanding of Europe as a concept and of the public sphere as its potential manifestation. First of all, Habermas himself is a frequent contributor to the debate, advo-
cating the need for the pan-European “state” based on a pan-European public sphere and pan-European “constitutional patriotism”. However, Schlesinger (2009) noted the discrepancy between the statist and global approaches to the public sphere. My own focus on Eastern European nations also remains within the limits of a mainly statist approach. This theoretical dichotomy reflects the tension between Europeanness and the pull of the national within the media practices of the European countries. Schlesinger is not unique in his conclusion about the tendency “to over-read the EU’s post-nationalist possibilities” (ibid., p. 68), which is among the most common criticisms of the European public sphere. Splichal, whose sceptical treatment of the European public sphere I have already mentioned earlier, took this criticism even further, namely to a normative perspective:

Any formula of exclusion – related either to class, race, gender, sexual orientation, nation, culture, or any other collective identity or category such as Europe – is opposed to the universalist discourse supposedly constitutive for the public sphere. […] The idea of a European public sphere as a cohesive and unitary space is thus not only a replica of a national public sphere, suggesting that Europeanization is a process similar to that of establishing nation-states, but in a sense even quasi-theoretically legitimizes the territorial constraint as constitutive of a (European) public sphere, which was formerly assumed by proponents of national public spheres as being of no inherent nature or right, as Dewey put it. (Splichal, 2006, p. 709)

Pfetsch et al. (2008) saw an emergent European public sphere in the coverage of conflict lines caused by EU integration, while Trenz (2009, p. 48) defined it “as an unfinished project of collective will formation”. Machill et al. (2006) performed a meta-analysis of media research on the European public sphere and found that there is in fact a deficit in the European coverage. Also, Olsen (2002) took a critical view of how Europeanisation affected the media. Inka Salovaara-Moring has noted that while some argue the European public sphere may already have some elements in place, the project of European unification has unevenly engaged societies:

[T]he efficacy and legitimacy of public opinion in the supra-national constellation have been repeatedly questioned by a large part of the citizenry of EU member states. The EU itself has not escaped its fundamental predicament: that of being a project that first and foremost engages a narrow layer of political elites, who in turn criticize democratic and media practices because of their territorial fixation on individual nation states. Thus, the
problem for member states is also that national conceptions of democracy have remained fixed. (Salovaara-Moring, 2009a, p. 10)

The attempts to deal with the problem of the European public sphere led to the conceptualisation of Europe as a network. Hannu Nieminen (2009) summarises well the criticisms of the European public sphere, which boil down to essentially two alternative suggestions: either considerable work is lacking in order to bring it about or the very concept is invalid and inapplicable. Instead of continuing with these lines of thought, Nieminen focuses on the fallacious thinking that treats the EU as a state actor. He proposes a network approach as an alternative; in this sense, Europe has always been united by many Continental, regional and local networks and, eventually, “Europe was created by networks” (ibid., p. 26).

The concept of Europe made up of social and cultural networks is a way of overcoming these problems by abandoning the embedded normative mode of criticism derived from the ideal notion of the public sphere, yet trying at the same time endeavouring to save its democratic core. (Nieminen, 2009, p. 27)

This leads to structural inequality as some networks are more powerful than others. Such power disparity impacts the balancing and negotiation of interests that takes place in the public sphere.

Thus, instead of an open, ideal-type of public sphere and a critical debate aiming at consensus, what we have on the national level is a space for public negotiation among organised interests, restricted and regulated according to the issues and themes which are of national character. From this perspective, public political structures – such as local governments and nation-states – can be seen as nodes or intersections between the networks that operate on that particular geographical level: there are issues that need to be coordinated among different networks – economy, social security, energy, immigration, environment, and so on. (Nieminen, 2009, p. 30)

Hence, “the public sphere could be perhaps understood as a space or spaces of negotiation among different networks” (p. 31). In the same volume, Trenz (2009, p. 35) stresses the critical aspect of the public sphere in relation to Europe: “The European public sphere can be defined as the communicative infrastructure used for debating the legitimacy of the project of European integration”.

Krzyżanowski (2009a) suggests that Europe as a concept and a European public sphere have been in development long before the EU came to being.
Based on the analysis of media discourses during several European crises since 1956, he finds that Europe is increasingly discussed, especially as an ethical community, yet the national “filter” remains very strong. The values associated with Europe form three groups around key concepts “freedom” – “humanitarianism” – “democracy”. However, these “European values” are almost never are discussed in detail. Based on this, Krzyżanowski concludes that some form of public sphere may already exist but it is only European because of its location rather than its character; it is also international rather than transnational.

Karppinen (2009, p. 60) criticises the Habermasian idea of a pan-European public sphere founded on constitutional patriotism for its rigid attachment to an outdated model of political and social organisation. He instead supports Zygmunt Bauman and others who believe the European public sphere eschews freedom and suppresses dissent for the sake of consensus. Karppinen looks for an alternative in radical-pluralist theories such as those developed by Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau. There is clearly a missing link here between debate and institutions. The idea of the public sphere also loses its critical potential because it is used ever more widely by the EU official language, according to this critique.

On a similar basis, Mouffe has suggested an alternative conceptualisation of what Europe could be. Following Carl Schmitt and the idea that collective identities are always based on an us/them opposition, antagonism is unavoidable and the task of democracy is to mitigate it into agonism, thus turning potential enemies simply into rivals. Agonistic adversaries “share a common symbolic space and they recognise, at least to some degree, the legitimacy of the claims of their opponents” (Mouffe, 2012, p. 633). Mouffe rejects any attempt at constructing “a homogenous postnational ‘we’” (p. 634) and imagines the future Europe as literally “united in diversity”:

> While acknowledging the need for some form of European identity, and while making a distinction between insiders and outsiders (a requisite of any form of federal union, which always refers to a spatial entity with determined borders), a federal union also conceives of the diversity of the component states as something which is valued and must be maintained. (Ibid.)

For Mouffe, this is coupled with the recognition of the role of “affections and passions” in politics, using them for constructive and democratic ends rather than trying to eradicate or neutralise them (as Habermas tends to do, in her view). In terms of foreign policy, this leads to the “pluralisation of
hegemonies” (ibid., p. 639) among alternative centres that would maintain the same agonistic relationship between themselves. Mouffe’s idea of Europe is dramatically different from those proposed by other thinkers, notably by abandoning the imperative for the European public sphere. Seen in context, she suggests a more realistic but also more conservative model of Europe and the world, which substantially rejects any special place for Europe other than one of many “hegemonic centres”, as much as it rejects the optimistic and progressivist view of humanity and human society.

I admit the unconventionality of Mouffe’s argument, but I am sceptical about its theoretical basis and practical usefulness. First of all, it is based on conservative and pessimistic assumptions deduced from Sigmund Freud’s speculations and Carl Schmitt’s questionable ideas. Whether or not human nature is impossible to change is subject to belief, not empirical or rational exploration. This is therefore a hypothesis impossible to test. Even granted humans never improve, there is a long way to go from this tenet to the one that they cannot improve their social reality and build a better democracy where collective passions would be held in check. Mouffe’s pessimism is understandable given the failure of twentieth-century radical, revolutionary communism. She rightly questions the nature of the Soviet project, which indeed was far from the communist ideal. However, the argument that this questioning necessarily leads to rejecting any possibility or normativity of progress has disturbingly conservative undertones, and this plays out in the practical realm of politics, specifically international politics. Even if we assume that antagonism has been replaced by agonism between states, this would recreate the same deeply unequal international system organised around regional blocs, a system so many are weary of today. Also, replacing antagonism with agonism would mean that progress in the social world is possible, which by itself removes the limitations for attempting to go even further than that, to controlling passions better. Given these criticisms, I find Mouffe’s agonistics a weaker theoretical alternative than Habermas’s public sphere, which I therefore prefer, along with Foucault’s theories of discourse and power. At the same time, an important conclusion from Mouffe’s work is the role of collective emotions in politics, which is undeniable and must be analysed and taken into account. As of late 2017, the recent developments in Eastern Europe, the United Kingdom and the United States testify to a fundamental truth in this approach.

Even though I am using the concept of the public sphere, I do not here deal directly with the problem of a European public sphere. Yet this idea provides an important context for the national public spheres of Eastern
Europe. What is their relation to the hypothesised pan-European one? To what extent do their infrastructures and contents overlap with it? Such questions are at least indirectly and implicitly highlighted in this study.

As de Vreese and Boomgaarden (2012) showed, if the European public sphere is anywhere close to existence, it is in the national public spheres. Their empirical research found there was no single pan-EU public sphere but instead a growing Europeanisation of national debates. The more people exposed to the news, the more likely they were to discuss European issues. The analysis presented in the following chapters makes it clear that the actual European public sphere remained distant to the image of Europeanness constructed in Ukraine during the crisis. The journalists whom I interviewed systematically pointed to the perceived lack of understanding in the West and the international media, an indifference to everything but the spectacle of suffering, a refusal to view the situation as truly grave – these complaints about the “global” public sphere are heard in all three countries. The European public was by no means simultaneously isolated from the Eastern European debates. The Polish elites had a direct stake in EU policy-making; some of the Russian “Europhobic” discourses were taking hold among the more extreme left- and right-wing political currents in Europe, while Ukraine, as a result of the crisis, literally imposed its agenda on the EU ruling elites. The situation adds plenty of fuel to the continued theoretical debate. As regards the definition by Trenz (2009), Euromaidan was either a violent turn within the supranational public sphere(s), or it took place outside of the European public sphere because the legitimacy of the integration process was never discussed; it was assumed. Together the government’s active stance and Russia’s incursions practically blocked any discussion on it, as this automatically disqualified the Euro-sceptical position as anti-Ukrainian. This again points to an intricate and intimate interweaving of the European and Ukrainian issues in the collective imagination in Ukraine.

Eastern Europe: “Second-world” postcoloniality

A few words should be said about the rather ambiguous term “Eastern Europe”. Since Larry Wolff’s influential *Inventing Eastern Europe* (1994), it is fashionable to place the East European periphery in some kind of Western colonial limbo. According to this approach, the West imagined Eastern or, indeed, “Oriental” Europe as its internal Other in a similar way
to how the Muslim world and Asia were imagined as the external Other of Europe proper.

The issues of backwardness and development in Eastern Europe were broached and defined in the eighteenth century, not essentially as economic issues, and they continue to frame our conceptions of these lands. It was Eastern Europe’s ambiguous location, within Europe but not fully European, that called for such notions as backwardness and development to mediate between the poles of civilization and barbarism. In fact, Eastern Europe in the eighteenth century provided Western Europe with its first model of underdevelopment, a concept that we now apply all over the globe. (Wolff, 1994, p. 9)

It is this East European liminality Kovačević (2008) criticises for positioning the post-Communist Europe in the West’s colonial goods shop, although Eastern Europe’s inherent diversity and difference clearly contradict this line of thought. As seen by Jan Grzymski (2013), Europe is ceaselessly constructed discursively as a metaphor that functions as a power switch between the West and the East, crafted by the legacy of colonialism and the opposition towards the Other. Merje Kuus (2004) argues that Eastern Europe, in comparison to Western Europe, was discursively constituted as “not yet European” during the accession process and had to compensate for it by projecting an even greater Easternness on its Eastern neighbours, of which Kuus sees only Russia. Central Europe thus becomes a fabrication called to make its bearers more fashionable in the company of the self-styled hegemon of Western Europe. In all of these readings, Wolff’s basic tenet still holds today: West European intellectuals did a good deal to “other” Eastern Europe and make their newly found Enlightenment values stand out in greater contrast, but Eastern Europe was just as much invented by East Europeans themselves, and the Western colonisation of it has always been limited and ambiguous. East Europeans championed the colonisation of the neighbouring lands. What makes Eastern Europe really different is that it was fought over by many powers from the west (such as the Habsburg Empire or even Germany during WWI and WWII), the north-west (Swedish expansionism during the Thirty Years War), the south (the Ottoman Empire), the east (the Mongol Empire back in the Middle Ages) and the north-east (the Russian Empire). This pluricolonial experience was formative for Eastern Europe, a periphery of all and often a periphery of a periphery. For example, the Ottoman and Russian empires constituted a periphery of modern Europe, while Belarus, Georgia, Estonia, Ukraine and
even partitioned Poland – to cite but a few examples – became the periphery of what was in turn the periphery of Western Europe. Tlostanova (2012) aptly calls this “a second-rate empire” and a “Janus-faced empire”, with one face turned jealously towards the more powerful West, and another with contempt for the less powerful eastern peripheries. One consequence of Russia being a second-class empire was also that its colonies were also second class often even not recognised as such. In this, it is also similar to the Ottoman and, to some extent, the Austro-Hungarian empires, which informs a better understanding of East European imperialism and coloniality.

Other attempts have been made to define Eastern Europe. Yaroslav Hrytsak (2004) tried to conceptualise Eastern Europe historically. According to him, it was defined by “a blurring of the religious and secular powers” as well as by the development of essentially anti-imperialist and in many ways progressive nationalist movements that suffered and often failed thanks to the weaknesses of the local civil institutions (Hrytsak, 2004, p. 241). However, Eastern Europe can be best conceptualised within the framework of postcolonial theory: “The imperial/colonial chronotope is characterised by in-between-ness, the protean nature, the constant state of transit, non-finality, parallel deterritorialisation and dehistorisation (i.e., falling out of space and time) – in short, by everything that Salman Rushdie called ‘being elsewhere’” (Tlostanova, 2010/2013, p. 260). This experience of East Europe “being elsewhere” in relation to “Europe proper” is, I agree with many researchers, a defining moment of postcolonial theory, a hybrid product of Marxist, psychoanalytical and Foucauldian traditions. Called into being by the post-WWII anti-colonial struggle and the collapse of colonialism, it has developed a critical potential for analysing imperial and colonial situations, including anti-colonialism itself. The theoretical amalgamation is already evident in Fanon (1952/1975, 1963), one of the founding figures, who combined his political activism and Marxist methodology with a psychoanalytical perspective and existentialist pathos in the analysis of the colonised subject. However, today part of his legacy remains overshadowed by its controversial treatment of the problem of violence. As a liminal figure on the brink of the anti- and postcolonial, he did not have the necessary distance to observe all the consequences of the position. This is something Fanon shares with the Indian school of subaltern historians, who tried to give voice to the silent colonised masses by writing history from their perspective. The next generation of authors who took the problematics from the anti- into the postcolonial discourse decisively discarded such an approach as a kind of wishful construction of what has always been an
ultimately silent subject erased by both imperial and indigenous agencies, as Spivak (1988/2006) famously argued. Bhabha (1994) also pointed to the hybridity and complex relationship between the colonising and the colonised subjects as a primary problem for the postcolonial condition.

Yet in terms of impact and resonance, the best-known work remains Said’s critique (1979/2000) of orientalism as an academic discipline, artistic practice and discursive operation. Drawing from both Foucault and earlier anti-colonial writers, Said based his approach on a critique of representation, exposing how the West, motivated by its will to power, typically objectifies Eastern subjects as dysfunctional and deficient, devoid of agency and knowledge, amusingly exotic and dangerous at the same time. Said’s approach became an instant classic, but it was also criticised for its methodology, liberal interpretations, internal inconsistencies and factual mistakes. The core argument, however, holds true.

Said focuses on different aspects of ascribing a rigid, reified and essentialised identity to the East, both idealised and demonised, as two sides of the same coin. Historically, the representation of the Orient both as a profound and spiritual cradle of civilisation and as an exotic and eroticised location of danger was used to justify Western colonisation. The study of languages, histories and cultures was susceptible to producing generalising and essentialist images of the East at the disposal of the imperial powers, supplying them with expertise and ready-made interpretations. Literature and visual arts particularly revealed an exoticism of the Orient, using it all too often as an exploitative background for its own spiritual journeys and quests. But the key point of the critique of orientalism perhaps lies in the Foucauldian understanding of power relations. Ultimately, Said sees any representation as, by definition, incomplete, thus conferring a moral responsibility on the agents of representing: called into being by a will to domination rather than an emancipatory agenda, they will be complicit in representational violence against the object of representation.

The similarities between this approach and Foucauldian theory are evident in Hall (1992/2006), where Said’s problematics were phrased in terms of Foucault’s theory of discourse as a text making certain statements about reality that it claims are true and seeking the power to enforce their veracity. Hall calls attention to Foucault’s idea of the archive, a collection of previously known texts that govern a certain topic. This creates “a regime of truth”, a system of representation that dominates and obscures alternatives. As far as the orientalist mode was concerned, Hall found that “in transformed and reworked forms, this discourse continues to infect the language
of the West, its image of itself and “others”, its sense of “us” and “them”, its practices and relations of power towards the Rest” (p. 173).

In his important chapter “The Spectacle of Others”, Hall paid more attention to how othering works, arguing that the construction of difference (specifically, the racial difference but potentially also any kind of representation of Other) is defined by “the set of representational practices known as stereotyping”, with such effects as essentialising, reduction and naturalising (Hall, 1997, p. 257). It is connected to typing as a simplification and reduction of real phenomena to make sense of the world and stereotyping as a simplification and fixation of difference, splitting the normal from the abnormal, enmeshed in the relations of power. “The racialized discourse is structured as a set of binary oppositions” (Hall, 1997, p. 243).

The critique of orientalism stimulated many scholars to rethink intercultural communication, for example in the concept of occidentalism. It can be understood twofold. One understanding is that occidentalism produces idealised, cargo-cult-like adoration of all things Western (see Carrier, 1992, 1995; Lindstrom, 1995). However, occidentalism can also produce partial, biased and hostile representations of the West infused with resentment and a rejection of anything associated with the actual or perceived coloniser, including positive Western achievements (Buruma and Margalit, 2005; Fazlhashemi, 2005). Precisely like orientalism, its twin, occidentalism, objectifies what it represents, transforming it into a target of either worship or phobia (or both at once). The concept of occidentalism, which Venn (2000) turned into an elaborate history of the West’s becoming the epitome of modernity, will be of relevance to my own analysis of those discourses in Poland, Russia and Ukraine that either attack Europe and the West or represent them as objectified embodiments of wealth and luxury goods.

The postcolonial theory and critical perspective on orientalism also expanded to embrace ever-new concepts and new fields of application. By the time Communism and the Soviet Union collapsed, postcolonial theory had established itself as a literary studies field and had made significant advances in history and philosophy, stimulating interdisciplinary exchange. It has been applied to a vast array of African, Asian, American and other societies (including such European countries as Ireland).

It was also the literary studies field through which postcolonial theory flowed into East European intellectual life. The Ukrainian debate was stimulated by Yuriy Andrukhovych’s postmodernist prose, which became a point of departure for Hundorova (1993) and Pavlyshyn (1993) to expose the post–Soviet Ukrainian social situation and psyche as very similar to the
postcolonial situation. Both scholars’ analyses of Andrukhovych’s novels underlined how the writer bid farewell to the empire and its culture by a carnivalised mockery of imperial Russian, Soviet and nationalist Ukrainian myths in the context of the highly hybridised post-Soviet society. Their commentaries set the literary criticism fashion in 1990s Ukraine.

This approach soon took off in other fields. Riabchuk (2000, 2003, 2007, 2010) became a notable advocate of postcolonial explanations of the contemporary Ukrainian situation. In particular, he drew attention to how the prolonged Russian domination over ethnically homogenous Ukraine had created a societal rift by creating a group of Russian-speaking locals (“creoles”) who, together with the Russian migrants, formed a privileged class in comparison with those Ukrainians who identified themselves as such or did not engage in any national identification (typically villagers who thought of themselves as “locals” or “Christians”).

International literary studies were quick to catch up, with the turn of the century marking the beginning of a wider application of the postcolonial approach to Eastern Europe. Bakić-Hayden (1995) coined the term “nesting orientalisms”, which captures the situation where various East and South European nations tend to represent themselves as more “Western” than their neighbours in the East, who, in turn push the undesirable identification further to the East, something I am very curious to see in the Polish, Ukrainian and Russian material I am examining. Thompson (2000), in her important book Imperial Knowledge, reviewed two centuries of Russian literature, with authors such as Pushkin and Tolstoy shown to be champions of Russian imperialism not only in Central Asia and the Caucasus but also in the Baltic states, Poland, Ukraine and Belarus. Moore (2001) also applied postcolonial theory to post-Communist and post-Soviet countries.

After this worldwide momentum, postcolonial theory received in Russian studies further impetus through such works as those by Schimmelpenninck van der Oye (2010), Tolz (2011) and Tlostanova (2012), who focused on Russian imperialism and oriental knowledge in Central Asia, carefully avoiding East European material. The main conclusion of these works was to recognise Russian imperialism as such and the ambiguous nature of Russian orientalism, often driven by emancipatory incentives as many Russian orientalists were of an indigenous origin themselves (Tolz) or that Russia sensed itself to be different and at times identified itself with the East (Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, 2010). Tlostanova, instead, called for reflection on how the Soviet discourses were imposed on the earlier more
straightforward imperial ones, creating a specific “mind-colonisation” and building its own version of modernity:

[Russia] chose a doomed way of catching up with Europe and proving that it can out-West the West. This wish has alternated periodically with a rejection of everything European and a retreat into jingoism that we also witness today. The Janus-faced empire always felt itself a colony in the presence of the West […]. This empire then compensates its inferiority complex in the non-Western colonies by projecting the image of the Russian/Soviet coloniser as a true European and a champion of civilization, modernity, socialism. (Tlostanova, 2012, p. 135)

This was often contrasted with a probably unique situation where the coloniser and the colonised stood at similar levels of development or even with a greater advancement of the colonised:

At the same time the cultural, religious, ethnic incompatibility of the colonisers and the colonised in the space of Russian/Soviet or Ottoman empires has never been clearly asymmetrical in favour of the more modernised coloniser, as it was in case of Great Britain or France. On the contrary, in Russian empire it was often the logic of interaction of two or more subaltern and marginalised cultures, often on a similar or same stage of modernisation, or it could be the logic of subordination of the more Europeanised people, e.g. the Baltic countries by a less European Russian coloniser. (Tlostanova, 2010/2013, p. 262)

Others such as Adamovsky (2005) took Wolff as their starting point, arguing that Russia, too, was orientalised by the West for the purposes of economic and political domination. Despite all these academic achievements, the postcolonial perspective on Russia still plays a rather small role within Russian studies (the largest field within East European and Slavonic studies by the sheer number of publications).

The field continues to grow within Ukrainian studies, however. “Second-world postcoloniality” became a key point of debate for Chernetsky (2007), who examined Ukraine and Russia from a comparative perspective across a spectrum of contemporary literature, art and cultural practices to find out how a range of historical experiences (including those of an imperial encounter) overlap differently in these two countries. In 2008, a volume edited by Korek marked a notable effort to boost the postcolonial reading of Poland and Ukraine. Another milestone was a 2012 thematic issue of the Journal of Postcolonial Writing that assembled a range of established experts.
on the subject, many of whom I have already mentioned (from Pavlyshyn to Tlostanova). The approach concurrently expanded into other fields such as media studies. In my own earlier work (Horbyk, 2013a), I looked at how the Russian and British press covered Ukraine and India during 2009. I found that virtually all orientalist frames were present in the Russian narrative on Ukraine in much greater numbers; Ukraine was seen as dangerous, incapable of independent agency and failing without Russia but also as exotic and Russia’s civilisational cradle. Unlike the British cultural stereotyping, Russia’s view was more political and economic, which suggested its orientalism was more at the service of the state. Belafatti (2014), in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis, criticised the Western commentators who repeated the Russian mainstream perspective on Euromaidan, Crimea and Donbas, based on realpolitik and a denial of Ukraine’s agency, whereby Ukraine was seen as a failed state in an essentially orientalist way. This led to a broader discussion and a conference held in Vilnius in August 2015. Here many leading figures came together to explore postcolonial Eastern Europe.

I have now provided a general theoretical framework for the study of East European postcoloniality as well as a brief historical outline. After this, I would like to organise the field’s landscape into a few typological groups and then review them in some more detail before discussing the particular application of this theory in my project. As I have said, it is possible to speak of several currents in this burgeoning subfield: Western orientalism against Eastern Europe (including or excluding Russia), such as in the works of Wolff (1994), Adamovsky (2005) and Belafatti (2014); Russian orientalism against Eastern Europe (the Ukrainian and Polish tradition, including Hundorova, 1993; Pavlyshyn, 1993; Thompson, 2000; Riabchuk, 2000, 2003, 2007, 2010; Chernetsky, 2007; Horbyk, 2013); Russian orientalism against Central Asia (Thompson, 2000; Tolz, 2011; Tlostanova, 2010/2013, 2012); and Polish orientalism against Eastern Europe (Bakuła, 2007). My study briefly examines the Western representation of Eastern Europe. However, I will be looking at the direct consequences of mostly the Russian colonising of East European countries, the colonial experiences of Poland and Ukraine under Russian and Austro-German colonisation and Poland’s expansionism. This makes the approach relevant to this study too.

Some examples from previous research on Russia have already shown the justification for using the “colony/empire” terminological apparatus. Poland offers an intricate dialectic in this respect too. Throughout its history, Poland was both an expansive coloniser and a victim of partition and colonisation. Neuger (2007) and Fiut (2007) pointed out how German dis
courses among authors ranging from Fichte to Heine to Musil constructed Poland as the oriental Other, let alone the fact of very physical, not only discursive, German and Austrian domination in their respective parts of the partitioned Poland. Russian rule in Poland was only becoming more and more brutal as a result of unsuccessful uprisings. Moreover, classical Russian literature undoubtedly constructed the Pole either as an enemy or as a transparent non-being barely noticed in the recently conquered Polish lands. Bakula (2007) showed as well how even when Poland was under foreign domination, it continued to develop an essentialist, aggressive and orientalist discourse on the so-called “Eastern Borderlands” (including the present-day Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania). This was accompanied by an active settler policy, especially in the second Polish Republic (1918–1939).

To give justice to a truly nuanced perspective, it is important to note that Ukraine was not the innocent victim (as in any other colonisation process). First of all, its drive to the south-eastern steppes, the proverbial Loca Deserta, from the fifteenth through to the early nineteenth century amounts to looking surprisingly colonial. It is only partially mitigated by the fact that the lands were only sparsely populated by nomadic Turkic people before the arrival of the Cossack colonisers. Similarly, Shevelov (1954/2009) showed not only that the partition of Ukraine between Russia and Poland resulted from internal weaknesses and the vested interests of the elites, which kept drawing external actors into the domestic policy, but also that the Russian Empire’s early years were the product of a Ukrainian cultural imperialism towards a Russia less Westernised than Ukraine and flooded with Ukrainian intellectuals occupying most of the official positions and absolutely dominating the Church and ideology. The very idea of Russia as an empire (proclaimed so in 1721) was enabled by the inclusion of Ukraine as the gateway to Constantinople; the actual notion of the East Slavonic Orthodox empire was born in Kyiv, the Orthodox spiritual capital.

Ukraine was exoticised early on in Polish literature, and when Russia began dominating increasingly large parts of Ukraine, the story repeated itself. Coupled with what Marxist historians of the 1920s termed the policy of colonial-type economic degradation and exploitation, Ukraine was represented as a historical cradle of Russia, a site of exoticism and danger (this type of representation is a typical orientalist device used by many European intellectuals to place the spiritual roots of the West in Egypt or India, equally seen as exotic and dangerous, too). Eight years before Said’s work, the Ukrainian historian George Luckyj wrote:
Ideal havens of peace and tranquility were usually located in Greece, Tuscany or the Orient. [...] In Russian literature the Ukraine was the chief of these idyllic places. [...] During the early 19th century the Ukraine was the favourite topic of travelogues [...] in which the country was advertised as flowing with milk and honey and possessing all the enchantments of natural beauty and spiritual enjoyment. (Luckyj, 1971, p. 75)

At the same time, the outright hostility towards the Ukrainian language and Ukraine as a political project combined with this idealisation in a typical orientalist twist: Tolz (2002) looked at how the Russian classical writers Pushkin and Belinsky created the image of the savage and backward Ukraine as opposed to the modern and civilised Russia.

Mockery of the language and culture (and as a result ever more widespread mimicry of Ukrainians, who, given their similar physique and closeness of culture, which invited assimilation, ever more often chose to self-identify as Russians) gave way to outright bans on them as the national movement grew. Apart from that, as Chernetsky (2007) argued, Ukrainians were under Russian rule racialised according to ethnic stereotypes. The Soviet era might raise more eyebrows if defined as another form of imperial hegemony.

In the darker colonial side of Soviet modernity a second-rate type of Soviet citizen was constructed in spite of the proclaimed internationalist slogans and the overt goal of racial mixing in order to create a future Soviet Mestizo/a with an erased ethnic element brought up on Russian culture and on Soviet ideology. Proclaiming the goal of making everyone look identical and erasing their colonial status was not the same as actually allowing the colonial to claim his/her equality in the sphere of education, job opportunities, or self-realization in general. [...] Soviet language policies, as all other discourses, were based on contradictory double standards – officially promoting the flourishing of national languages and literatures, while at the same time erasing or rewriting all non-Russian traditions in accordance with the linguistic and cultural master-narrative created by Soviet scholars and scientists with a particular teleology in mind. (Tlostanova, 2012, pp. 137–138)

So, as has been demonstrated, the postcolonial approach to Eastern Europe has over the last two decades had a considerable impact, and the backgrounds of the three countries examined are legitimate material for the application of postcolonial theory. Yet what exactly do I intend to take from it? Which elements? And how are they to be used? Some initial clues are
offered by the most recent discussion of the Ukrainian crisis in *Slavic Review*, where postcoloniality has figured prominently.

Snyder (2015) reconceptualises European history by introducing the perspective on both Nazi and Soviet projects as essentially colonialist, their aims being to turn different European countries into colonial possessions. For Hitler, war was both a decolonial (liberation from the perceived Jewish hegemony) and a colonial (the conquest of new lands and the extermination of the locals) project; for Stalin, likewise, the need for an imperial expansion was dictated by the urge to catch up with the hostile West. The current situation sees Russia repeating the dual logic of the colonial (a land grab in Ukraine and its destabilisation) and the anti-colonial (a struggle against American hegemony) war to dismantle the European project as a post-colonial settlement to the anti-imperial struggles in Europe of the last two centuries. Todorova (2015), the scholar who previously applied the concept of Orientalism to the Balkans (Balkanism), responded critically to this theory on a number of points, notably warning against using the post-colonial as too general a metaphor or too liberal and too distant an analogy. Gerasimov and Mogilner (2015) also criticised Snyder’s approach for its representation of Ukraine as an object historically shaped by the imperial contestations, as if having no historical agency of its own. This leads to a criticism of the entire postcolonial approach:

> [T]he main limitation of modern postcolonial theories stems from their genealogical dependence on the phenomenon of colonizing empire and hence the inability to contemplate a truly postcolonial reality that is indifferent to the imperial past (not obeying imperial legacy or constantly struggling with it). Inasmuch as empire is perceived as a monolithic, hegemonic force, the postcolonial future is construed as equally monologic and predetermined. (Gerasimov and Mogilner, 2015, p. 718)

The critics argue that the key problem for a postcolonial society is finding an effective model of internal integration (in the Ukrainian case, not based on an interaction with external actors, such as the EU or Russia), and thus the task to reinvent a country’s identity and agency under conditions of suppressed individual subjectivity and continued imperial hegemony. They also suggested that Russia too is a postcolonial society faced with reinventing itself, although taking a very different course of “nominating the West to the role of the colonial hegemon” (ibid., p. 722). The current stage is seen as a farewell to the imperial legacy and a move towards the nation state, albeit with “an ugly face” in the absence of a collective effort to work out
common principles (as it was, the authors believe, in Ukraine) and thus having to rely on structural factors of territory, history, ethnicity, etc.

Hrytsak (2015) pointed out the limitations of the postcolonial perspective as applied to Ukraine. He mused that the Russian administrations saw the country as part of the core Russian mainland, and it simultaneously participated in Russia’s colonising efforts elsewhere (at one time, also representing much of the ruling Soviet elite). Western Ukraine under Habsburg rule fits the definition of a colony better, although paradoxically it existed in a more liberal political culture. “The Ukrainian case”, Hrytsak writes, “represents a wide variety of colonial experiences that are hard to group together under the umbrella of postcolonial theory” (ibid., p. 733). He sees particularly Soviet collectivisation as a form of “internal colonisation” of peasants and puts the formation of modern Ukraine in the European context, portraying it as a result of intensified continental and global interaction and warfare.

Where is my research situated in this debate? Apparently, postcolonial theory is applicable and productive (though with some limitations) within the East European context. Some of the counterarguments do not hold up on closer examination. For example, the fact that Ukrainians took part in empire building is no surprise in comparison with other examples of a European “colony-at-home”, such as Ireland and Scotland. This does not invalidate postcolonial questions. It is hard to deny that the Ukrainian situation, with its deeply ingrained hybridity and sporadic sparks of conflict, where national and social issues are framed by ethnocultural power imbalances, is an example that begs a postcolonial analysis. At the same time, it is equally important to avoid the pitfalls of vulgar anti-colonialism, which I see as reducing complex realities to mere xenophobia and the essentialisation of entire groups as “coloniisers” used as enemy effigies or scapegoats to justify each of one’s own failures. Applied uncritically, the recognition of Ukraine’s colonial experience may be used to justify seemingly redemptive violence and foster genuine conflicts within society, with disastrous consequences. For example, a significant part of the ideological struggle within the Euromaidan camp was between the ethnic nationalist activists, the most extreme of whom framed every single issue in national terms, and those moderates and various progressives who opposed them. Euromaidan saved its dignity by largely avoiding the narrow ethnic nationalism label its adversaries had tried to pin on it. Likewise, I am absolutely against turning my research into an arena for pointing the finger of blame at the guilty ones and the unmasking of the actual or presumed
ordeals of either Western or Eastern colonisation. Instead, I strive to apply a critical and self-reflexive strand of postcolonial theory, distanced from the vulgar postcolonialism that unfortunately sometimes finds its way into academia, too.

For different reasons, I am also critical of Walter Mignolo’s (2010/2013) “decolonial option” and “de-linking” theories. I find his idea that epistemes of coloniality have to be discarded in favour of more indigenous knowledges interesting but difficult to realise. When applied by Mignolo, this task is reduced to lambasting neo-liberalism (well-deserved and witty but hardly something specific to the unique tasks of postcolonial theory) and playing into the hands of the regimes that capitalise on the critique of the “Western ideal of society” to safeguard their own repressive projects as alternative, traditional and indigenous:

De-coloniality, then, means working toward a vision of human life that is not dependent upon or structured by the forced imposition of one ideal of society over those that differ, which is what modernity/coloniality does and, hence, where decolonisation of mind should begin. The struggle is for changing the terms in addition to the content of the conversation. (Mignolo, 2010/2013, p. 313)

A much more fruitful way of using this combination of theory and material productively is to examine the philosophical problematic, for at the heart of postcolonial thinking lies the problem of subject. My approach has been inspired by Mbembe (2002), who attacked the dead-end currents of African historicising, those of instrumental Afro-radicalism and nativism. The fallacy of nativism, which tries at any cost to affirm the uniqueness of the colonised society by conserving tradition, is easier to avoid. The radical option, however, has more hidden dangers in its lack of self-reflexivity, its instrumentalisation of knowledge and its mechanistic and reified perspective on history, which robs Africa of its responsibility and victimises it as a spoil to foreign predatory forces. This is not the direction in which I would like to take my postcolonial analysis of Eastern Europe, as it reifies the figure of the native and with it the borders between authentic and inauthentic. The “privileging of victimhood over subjecthood is derived, ultimately, from a distinctively nativist understanding of history – one of history as sorcery” (Mbembe, 2002, p. 245). The victimisation of Africans and the postulation of their cultural uniqueness were mobilised to wrest “raw power” as a redemptive force from the hands of colonialism. “At the heart of the postcolonial paradigm of victimisation, we find a reading of the
self and the world as a series of conspiracies” rooted in “both Marxist and indigenous notions of agency”.

In African history, it is thought, there is neither irony nor accident. We are told that African history is essentially governed by forces beyond Africans’ control. The diversity and the disorder of the world, as well as the open character of historical possibilities, are reduced to a spasmodic, unchanging cycle, infinitely repeated in accord with a conspiracy always fomented by forces beyond Africa’s reach. Existence itself is expressed, almost always, as a stuttering. (Mbembe, 2002, pp. 251–252)

This, in my opinion, is reminiscent – in a more graphic and extreme form – of the situation of Eastern Europe, where the stuttering of modernisation – repeated, yet unsuccessful, attempts to “reform itself” – has created a sense of inferiority to the West, the “true” West. Paul Gilroy (1993, p. 19) noted a similar “double consciousness” of those who attempt to be both Black and European, pointing out that “black political culture has always been more interested in the relationship of identity to roots and rootedness than in seeing identity as a process of movement and mediation that is more appropriately approached via the homonym routes”. He suggested instead a strategy of “dealing equally with the significance of roots and routes [that] should undermine the purified appeal of either Africentrism or the Eurocentrism it struggles to answer” (ibid., p. 190).

Chakrabarty (1992) focused on the problem of the disproportionate importance of Western, particularly West European, history. The centrality of Europe lies in its capacity for producing explanatory theoretical generalisations, something that subaltern histories do not possess. This is indeed very similar to the case of East European histories. Chakrabarty criticises the readings of Indian history that represent its subject as defective or incomplete, which also facilitated the native nationalism’s claim that the colonial rule was a sort of schooling, a preparation for something better, typical of East European subjectivity looking up to Western Europe with the same kind of awe. The difference is noticeable in the quality of Indian subjectivity – an example Chakrabarty highlights – that is directed more outwards to the public than to the inner, private life; but in comparison with a default European perspective, it is all too easily perceived as a lack. Similarly, the Indian subject interiorises the European ideal as the epitome of modernity and develops an awareness of its own present “as the site of disorder” while trying to move away from it. Thus, the history becomes a process of splitting the Indian subjectivity. At the same time, freedom and
emancipation become excluded from this construct seeing as the nationalist discourses negotiate their ideal as “truly modern”, i.e. benefiting from the practical advantages the advanced Western practices give but getting rid of their undesired “selfish”, “lenient” and “self-indulgent” effects that threaten the nationalist project of society. The uncritical adoption of this perspective blinds to what was another part of the authentic subjectivity – the non-modern part based on traditional ideas and practices. The Indian subject is thus on the one hand split into the subject and object of history (the modernizing elites versus the peasant masses to be modernised) and on the other hand speaks from the position of a nation-state metanarrative that derives from Europe and constructs Europe as the theoretical role model. This subject can only practice a “mimetic” (Bhabha) self-representation that positions itself as a modern European subject which, because it is not entirely modern and European, appears, however, to be failing and never complete. This seems to relate closely to the “mimetic change” East European societies, including media systems, experience.

This splitting of the subject is at the heart of most discourses on Europe among East Europeans, as I will demonstrate in the empirical analyses below. Therefore, I intend to approach Mbembe’s rejection of uncritical postcolonial radicalism and Chakrabarty’s theory of the postcolonial subject as key aspects in the postcolonial perspective on Eastern Europe developed in this study.

Considering the historical dimension of this split subject, I suggest there is an interesting opportunity in the concept of hauntology. Jacques Derrida (1994), responding to the decline of Marxism following the Eastern bloc’s demise, suggested that the original “spectre of Communism”, which had haunted Europe since the times of the Manifesto of the Communist Party, is a useful concept for understanding history itself. With the ostensible collapse of his ideology, Marx himself was to become a ghost, something that, referring back to Hamlet, demanded justice from its ghostly, spectralising position of neither living nor dead. History is thus read as spectrality, and its experience is tantamount to living among and with voices from the past which are not fully dead (because they are heard) nor alive (because they belong to the past and have to be actively reproduced and enacted). Derrida argued that the contemporary technological situation, “the medium of media” (ibid., p. 63), fosters and enhances this experience.

Hans Ruin (2016) explained that the idea of hauntology implies “human historicizing as a reciprocal being-with-the-dead” (p. 70). He pointed out how Derrida’s analysis of the ghostly, the phantoms of history that demand
justice and refuse to be put to rest, or the ancestral, as Ruin himself terms it, is connected to Martin Heidegger’s “ethical and political relation to the dead” (p. 62) because “justice is somehow always tied to a relation to the dead” (ibid.). I should perhaps remind here that from Benjamin’s perspective the redemption of the oppressed should also be redemption for their preceding generations. “The dead – as the having-been-there – are the source of the meaning of the historical, precisely by not only being simply past, but by somehow lingering on in that ghostlike region of perfective being” (ibid., p. 67). Based on these concepts, I assert that the current discourses on Europe are essentially a continued re-enactment of and an ongoing conversation with the narratives of the past; therefore, it is crucial to reconstruct their line – even marked with discontinuities – in order to understand the present discursive constellation.

**Summary**

Theoretically, this research combines Bourdieu’s concept of social fields with Foucault’s concepts of power and discourse. At the same time, I use elements of the revised Habermasian concept of the public sphere, yet moving away from the structuring approach and instead seeing power as dispersed in society (hence, once again, the importance of Foucault). I also find it is more productive to maintain a conceptual distinction between different types of power exercised by different actors and in different contexts: administrative power, symbolic power, discursive power, etc. This necessitates a certain theoretical eclecticism. However, it also brings a number of benefits, such as a flexibility in applying West European concepts to East European realities, potentially foreign to them; an openness in interpreting results and the necessary room to manoeuvre when doing so; and an ability to estimate the explanatory power of different theories (or elements thereof). As this research is driven primarily by a specific problem rather than by theoretical issues, those benefits surpass the downsides, which do not devalue the results and should be seen as acceptable.

Another important element of the theoretical framework lies in the conceptualisation of Europe, which in modern times came to be associated with universalist, rationalist values. In addition, Europe is often urged by thinkers such as Balibar and Bauman to put its power to an equally universalist use. Europe becomes an important concept in the contemporary political communication of the European Union, in particular through the debates on the European constitution, the Continental public sphere, or
Europe’s international role discussed, among others, by Habermas, Mouffe and Derrida. An important conclusion is the polysemic and fluid nature of the concept of Europe since its earliest origins (cf. analysis by Fornäs, 2012) but also its open-ended, unfinished and debatable character, a drive towards abstraction and universality, and multiple contradictory “neighbouring concepts” that modify the meaning across a very broad spectrum.

The use of the concept of Europe and Western Europe’s relationship with Eastern European countries are seen through the lens of postcolonial theory applied to the analysis of this region. Here it is interpreted twofold: first, it helps recognise the experience of the periphery as fundamental to the “making of Eastern Europe” through Western expansion. The periphery/centre relations in Eastern Europe must be grasped in their complexity and dialectically characterised by, among other things, the presence of empires that were themselves peripheries of the West, and thus the formation of “double peripheries”. Second, East European postcoloniality has a psychological or psychoanalytical dimension of a specific hybrid subjectivity and personal identity, defined by simultaneously being European and sharing certain elements of the postcolonial condition in Africa, Asia and elsewhere. Combined with the experience of Jacques Derrida’s hauntology (interpreted by Hans Ruin), this approach is likely to make the analysis of East European narratives of Europe subtler.
CHAPTER 3

From concepts to tools:
Methodology and methods

Methodological foundations

The concept of discourse serves to link the different theoretical pillars of this study together. Foucault’s theory is built on this notion, also discussed by Habermas, while postcolonial theory draws heavily on discursive practices. This motivated the methodological choice of a critical-linguistics-inspired qualitative text analysis based on tools from the repertoire of the discourse-historical approach (DHA) in critical discourse studies: the thematic categorising and analysis of argumentation (topoi). They have been further enriched by quantitative mapping through a well-tested method of content analysis. Analysing the historical development of the concept of Europe was performed based on the conceptual history approach.

To answer the third research question, I conducted semi-structured, in-depth interviews with policymakers, which were then analysed using hermeneutical, thematic- and discourse-analytical methods to find out how discourses in the public sphere come into play with the policymakers’ decisions, setting the agenda for them or shaping specific perspectives on European policy. (“The public sphere” is here understood in a narrower sense as a debate focused specifically on public policy.) How these policymakers perceive Europe, the public discussions about foreign policy and the dynamic between mediated discourses and decision-making were of interest at this stage. The interviews with journalists were used to delineate the power dynamic between actors in the media field and the political field, including the negotiation of objectives, the justifications and the professional boundaries drawn by the journalists.

I employed an overview of previous research, strongly linked to my own findings so as not only to prevent repeating already existing studies of the
perception of Europe but also to shape this study’s results and strengthen their validity. This “meta-research” of sorts was especially useful for historical narratives, public opinion polls or existing work on news journalism practices in Eastern Europe as well as relations between media and institutionalised power. Also relevant were research on institutions and studies in political science and international relations in order to check the analyses of recent policies and political and social structures in Ukraine, Russia and Poland.

As for specific procedures, the project has been carried out in the following steps:

1. I refined and calibrated the theoretical and methodological base, and a review of the existing research was compiled and critically reassessed.
2. A qualitative categorical thematic analysis helped map representations of Europe in nine notable newspapers from the three countries. Interviews with target group representatives from each country were carried out. On this basis, the research design was altered.
3. I consulted both historical works and original sources to construct the outline of the three countries’ conceptual history of “Europe” since early modern times, within which the current developments were to be interpreted.
4. Using categories developed at stage 2, the quantitative content analysis (QCA) of the newspaper content was performed to determine which of these discourses and narratives prevailed. Notable individual examples, including from blogs and visual representations, as well as policy documents, were analysed qualitatively.
5. I conducted and interpreted interviews with relevant informants.
6. The findings of the textual and interview research were juxtaposed to see how discourses on Europe are recontextualised and flow between the sites of discourse production and reception.

Even though this format has something in common with the “bricolage” study design, itself a viable option for an “eclectic form of generating meaning – through a multiplicity of ad hoc methods and conceptual approaches” (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015, p. 267), I chose for pragmatic reasons the methods to be different within a single qualitative methodology, dictated by what the research questions required and a need for cross-validation. All approaches in critical text research are inevitably problem-oriented, which
therefore makes them “necessarily interdisciplinary and eclectic” (Wodak & Meyer, 2011/2009, p. 3).

In conclusion, it should be noted that media power is a rather difficult material for an empirical study. It is hard to trace it, let alone “measure” it (and measuring the impact is something I have not done here).

Media institutions do not influence attitudes and behaviours in isolation from extra-media structures that have their own causal powers. If we wish to understand why people believe the things they do and act in particular ways we need to situate media as one cause amongst others […] [and] the extent of media freedom and independence depends crucially on the behaviour and normative attitudes to democratic values […]. (Downey & Mihelj, 2012, pp. 189–191)

Yet in many specific cases, lines of interaction and influence can be reconstructed. Such individual stories appear to provide important additions here, even though they might seem weaker. However, I adhere to the research principles that, in the words of Eriksson (2006), follow the deep structures of social processes. These structures can only be exposed using qualitative, synthetic procedures and yet must be generalised differently from a purely numerical study. For example, I decided to rely on qualitative text research and in-depth interviews and use quantitative text analysis for precision and to advance the findings. However, complex processes of representation and action could be represented only through a close, sensitive, deeply contextualised procedure, which I hopefully have accomplished through historicising the background, producing examples from outside the main sample (namely bloggers’ posts and popular visuals) and connecting my empirical findings with existing research.

I will now turn to particular issues of applying each of the above methods in this study.

From language to discourse: Basic conceptual apparatus

This study is first and foremost a study of texts in the broader sense: articles, cartoons and photographs, policy documents and interviews. Such texts make use of various forms of (verbal and non-verbal) language, which is the most general methodological frame for my research. In this section, which outlines the theoretical foundations of my research design, I begin first by laying out fundamental conceptual building blocks from linguistic theories. Further, I use Pierre Ricoeur’s version of hermeneutics to ensure a valid
analysis of the speech utterances I define as texts on Europe. I treat the
problem of language in a general sense, developed since the so-called
“linguistic turn”. One could trace the discovery of the fundamental role of
language back to Wilhelm von Humboldt:

[T]here resides in every language a particular world-view. As the individual
sound stands between man and the object, so the entire language steps in
between him and the nature that operates, both inwardly and outwardly,
upon him. (Humboldt, 1836/1999, p. 60)

This implied not only that language mediates the world like a grid inserted
between the subject and reality but also that it structures perception and
impacts the mind by infusing it with a particular world view. Such an idea
corresponds well to the plurality of languages thought to embody the
national spirit – “it is no more possible to conceive of the starting-point of a
nation than it is that of a language” (ibid., p. 56) – and influence the mind
by stimulating certain ways of thinking and inhibiting others. This idea was
developed and complemented by Saussure’s first principle of linguistics:

[T]he linguistic sign is arbitrary. There is no internal connexion, for
example, between the idea ‘sister’ and the French sequence of sounds s-ö-r
which acts as its signal. The same idea might as well be represented by any
other sequence of sounds. (Saussure, 1916/2013, p. 78)

While this stems from a Humboldtian premise, it also debunks his key
tenet: once all signs are arbitrary, rather than each originating from a dif-
f erent and unique spirit, ontologically it makes little difference which
arbitrary signs to use in each particular instant; it only matters pragmati-
cally. However, this shift – characteristic of the shift from nineteenth- to
twentieth-century thinking – created too a contradiction noted by Emile
Benveniste. The word “sister”, he suggested, has indeed nothing to do with
any actual female siblings who ever lived, but the connection between the
signifier (the sound form “s-i-s-t-e-r”) and the signified (the concept of
sister) is in a given language a sine qua non: “One of the components of the
sign, the sound image, makes up the signifier; the other, the concept, is the
signified. Between the signifier and the signified, the connection is not
arbitrary, on the contrary, it is necessary” (Benveniste, 1971, p. 45).

I use this idea when observing to the connection between the signifier I
am studying (“Europe”) and its signifieds – multiple and potentially count-
less references – by recognising that the links between, say, “Europe” and
the “rule of law” or “Europe” and “moral decay” are not at all arbitrary but a
direct consequence of the culture’s or language’s system of concepts and
relations between them: a result of the places the “rule of law” and “moral
decay” occupy in it and the extralinguistic context of this constellation. Of
course, such systems are unstable and permanently in flux (as the history
chapter in particular shows); however, the meaningful links they establish
are not totally arbitrary. Such a position seems to have an explanatory
potential beyond both shallow cultural relativism (suggesting that once all
cultures are equally legitimate, which I believe too, culture does not matter,
which I do not believe) and rigid cultural determinism.

This is linked to the version of the linguistic turn formulated by the
young Walter Benjamin, and it is fundamental to my own understanding of
the situatedness/objectivity dynamic. He drew a line between “languages of
men” (the plurality of various human languages) and “language of the men-
tal being” (a languageness inherent not only in humans but also in all things
in the world). This “language” of a higher order is also communicated in the
very structure of the human language, and “the German language, for
example, is by no means the expression of everything that we could – theo-
retically – express through it, but is the direct expression of that which com-
municates itself in it” (Benjamin, 2002a, p. 63; nota bene “in” and not
“through”). This language of the mental being is objective as the “creating
word of God” from which all other languages emanate and which they fall
short of and, quite hopelessly, try to recreate. Benjamin sees this Ur-
language as the sole possible expression of all relations between all things.
In this capacity, it is an objective language, whereas multiple human
languages are subjective. It is the transcendental Truth.

Objectivity, therefore, remains the (insurmountable yet inevitable) task
rather than reality, the task identical to the liberation of the mental being
through the practice of languages. “The language of things can pass into the
language of knowledge and name only through translation – so many trans-
lations, so many languages – once man has fallen from the paradisiacal state
that knew only one language” (ibid., pp. 70–71).

Although Benjamin speaks of traditional languages (“the German
language”), he apparently ascribes language-like qualities not only to
national languages but also to dialects, dead and unknown languages, as
well as anything that can carry meaning. His approach is Humboldtian, but
he radically transgresses the Romantic framework by his anti-nationalist
extension of the idea of language onto anything at all, creating a peculiar
kind of semiotic theory that makes it possible to speak of the languages of
social groups and movements (the bourgeois language or the language of revolution), individuals (the language of Baudelaire) and even things (the language-lamp in his own example), even though these are defined as different kinds of language. “Every expression of human mental life can be understood as a kind of language” (ibid., p. 62). The essentially Humboldtian logic of this becomes obvious when compared to Humboldt’s words, that “in language the individualization within a general conformity is so wonderful, that we may say with equal correctness that the whole human species has but one language, and that every man has one of his own” (Humboldt, 1999, p. 53). But this logic is thus also radically transgressed by Benjamin. Unlike Humboldt, who would subscribe to the idea that every language communicates its own unique mental being, Benjamin would instead say – and has said this actually, therefore contradicting what he has written elsewhere – that there is one mental human being communicating itself in all languages, and not in a single one does it communicate itself fully.

My own analysis is informed by this perspective: similarly, I am treating the speech acts I am analysing as facts of separate national languages but also of more individuated languages of the newspapers (why not the language of Izvestiya or Gazeta Wyborcza?), all subjective and situated and contributing to the – unavoidably partial – allegedly universal language that speaks about Europe. This softens strict national boundaries and allows a more nuanced approach, for example to Russian-language texts written and published in Ukraine that construct Europe from the territory demarcated by Ukrainian tradition and the Ukraine-specific hierarchy of discourses.

Having established this general theory of language perspective, it is now necessary to outline the methodology applied to the social uses of language. In this study, it is primarily founded upon the critical linguistics developed in the 1970s, mainly in the United Kingdom, and on the premises that the task of a critical linguist is “isolating ideology in discourse” and revealing “how ideology and ideological processes are manifested as systems of linguistic characteristics and processes” (Fowler et al., 1979, p. 155). In van Leeuwen’s account (2008), it became difficult to explain utterances without recourse to their social context and the separation between linguistics and sociology, blurred since the 1970s. According to the seminal work of Fowler et al. (1979), speech has three functions: ideational, interpersonal and textual. While the ideational function entails describing the phenomena of the world, the interpersonal function reveals the aspect of modality and the evaluation of those phenomena as well as establishing (power) relations between interlocutors. These two functions are enabled by the third, the
textual, function, which makes it possible for the interlocutors to produce coherent utterances. From this perspective, “language is an integral part of social process” (ibid., p. 189). As a social act, every speech act also envisions inevitable lexical, grammatical and syntactical choices that are “principled and systematic” (ibid., p. 188) rather than arbitrary, and driven by ideology as the “relation between form and content is not arbitrary or conventional, but […] form signifies content” (ibid.).

A major role in this process is played by the concept of retextualisation, introduced by Basil Bernstein (1990) as “the transfer of main arguments from one text into the next” (Wodak & Krzyżanowski, 2008, p. 2). “Recontextualisation as a process that not only entails the ‘movement’ of certain discourse parts/strands (arguments, ideas, concepts), but one that, first and foremost, is a strategic process of establishing a certain hierarchy of discourses” (Krzyżanowski, 2016, p. 314). The regulating discourse instrumentalises the recontextualised discourse for instrumental purposes, and thus, in Bernstein’s view (1990, p. 184), “any recontextualised discourse becomes a signifier for something other than itself”.

As Krzyżanowski (2016) noted, one of the key aspects of critical discourse analysis (CDA) has been a focus on actors and their representations in discourse, but this may be less relevant to the contemporary ideological situation, where discourses tend to focus on concepts all the more often and are inclined to position themselves as conceptual discussions. This, according to Krzyżanowski, calls for a more extensive application of conceptual history as well as the concept of recontextualisation:

[R]econtextualisation is a description of a certain movement of various elements of language and discourse across different social loci – most prominently between so-called ‘sites of production and reception of discourse’ (Van Dijk, 1991). It serves as an umbrella term encapsulating the fact that, as viewed especially in CDS, social functioning as well as spread and diffusion of discourse relies on intertextual connection between various articulations of social order in different contexts and at different moments in history. (Ibid., p. 314)

Since this study focuses largely on conceptual discussions about Europe, the use of conceptual history appears even more justified. I likewise address how discourses on Europe are recontextualised from one field of social practice to the other and back: from the production of discourse to its reception.
In the qualitative analysis of texts, the quantitative mapping of discourses and the analysis of the interviews, I also gained my insights and interpretations of meanings from the hermeneutical approach. Hermeneutics is a dramatically different, and yet also closely related, solution to the problem of the subject and truth. Dealing with a specific kind of object, namely texts, Georg Gadamer drew on Heidegger to construct the subject as a set of prejudices, or precursory knowledge, in a “back-and-forth” movement between text and self, through which texts co-create an understanding of the self. The axiomatic impossibility of approaching a text without a prejudice, however, does not preclude the possibility of understanding through testing the original prejudice against the otherness of the text. Supposedly, this is the process whereby truth may be born: “Here there is no other ‘objectivity’ than working out that pre-opinion which meets the test” (Gadamer, 1960/1989, p. 270).

But this conditional truth is also a plurality determined by the plurality of possible prejudices (individual situations and positions from which the interpretation is carried out). This makes truth highly individualised and dependent on the prejudices in the point of departure and at the same time preserves the possibility for some intersubjective agreement. Thus, Gadamer sees an opportunity in the vulnerable position of the interpreter and encourages openness and open-endedness of understanding.

[T]he person who wants to understand a text is ready to be told something by it. So a hermeneutically trained mind must from the start be open to the otherness of the text. But such openness presupposes neither “neutrality” about the objects of study nor indeed self-obliteration, but rather includes the identifiable appropriation of one’s own pre-opinions and prejudices. One has to be aware of one’s own bias, so that the text presents itself in its otherness and in this manner has the chance to play off its truth in the matter at hand against the interpreter’s pre-opinion. (Ibid., pp. 271–272)

The situatedness is not a downside but an upside that in fact enables rather than prevents knowledge. Paul Ricoeur (1981) added yet another dimension to this, that of the social critique borrowed from Habermas to enrich the hermeneutical approach. It is particularly important to mention the fundamental open-endedness of meaning, which never conveys the final truth but rather develops constantly as part of a spectrum of meanings whereby different interpretations clash, offer new readings and make the development of meaning possible. This was not an easy task as the concept of prejudice effectively invalidated the idea of universality, which could serve
as a convenient platform from which to attack power-induced social deformities. Likewise, hermeneutics was “too” ontological for Habermas’s theory, somehow suggesting that dialogue and understanding either predate or are simultaneous with being (rather than posterior to it). The tension between them originates in the gap between the Enlightenment (Aufklärung) in Habermas’s case and Romanticism in Gadamer’s. However, this is not irreconcilable as “nothing is more deceptive than the alleged antinomy between an ontology of prior understanding and an eschatology of freedom. We have encountered these false antinomies elsewhere: as if it were necessary to choose between reminiscence and hope!” (Ibid., p. 100).

I have aligned my analysis of the texts according to these and other hermeneutical principles. Particularly during the qualitative analysis of themes and topoi, one of the fundamental tools employed was the well-known hermeneutical circle, which prescribes analysing the parts in the context of the whole, and the whole in the context of the parts, so that the text itself is treated holistically and contextualised while serving to derive context for understanding other concurrent texts. The coders during the quantitative analysis phase were also instructed to approach the texts during the quantitative coding stage with the hermeneutical circle in mind. Another principle used was openness to the horizon – a sum of knowledge and beliefs – of the text, which may well be different from the interpreter’s and rather than objectified and unmasked should be accepted and merged with the interpreter’s background “prejudice” to produce a new meaning. The permanent back and forth between the text and the interpreter took place until “a good Gestalt”, an inner unity of the text free of contradictions, was achieved (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015, pp. 238–239), sometimes quickly, sometimes less so.

From rhetoric to politics: Metaphor and empty signifier
Paul Ricoeur outlined a significant part of his hermeneutical project in the context of conceptualising metaphors. This approach is especially relevant to my study because Europe in general is made sense of and recontextualised through a set of metaphors and similar rhetorical devices. Metaphor could be defined as “seeing, experiencing or talking about something in terms of something else” (Ritchie, 2013, p. 8). According to the milestone work of Lakoff and Johnson (1980/2008), which posits the defining role of this form of speech for human activity, “metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action” (p. 3).
There is a certain lack of clarity and consensus as to the relation between metaphor and neighbouring categories, such as synecdoche and metonymy (all with numerous subspecies). Different authors consider them separate figures, forms of each other or parts of an umbrella concept. This disagreement is of minor importance for my analysis as long as we accept there is a categorical distinction between them and they represent different ways of perceiving certain phenomena. I largely accept Lakoff and Johnson’s conceptualisation (1980/2008); they say “the essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another” (p. 5), while metonymy is defined by “using one entity to refer to another that is related to it” (ibid., p. 35).

Metaphor and metonymy are different kinds of processes. Metaphor is principally a way of conceiving of one thing in terms of another, and its primary function is understanding. Metonymy, on the other hand, has primarily a referential function, that is, it allows us to use one entity to stand for another. But metonymy is not merely a referential device. It also serves the function of providing understanding. For example, in the case of metonymy ‘the part for the whole’ there are many parts that can stand for the whole. Which part we pick out determines which aspect of the whole we are focusing on. (Ibid., p. 36)

As seen even in this example, synecdoche, defined as using one part of a whole to stand for the entire whole, can also be viewed as a subdivision of metonymy. I prefer to look upon it, however, as a rather separate concept, leaving the question of its specific relation to metaphor and metonymy unanswered: for the purpose of this study, it is unimportant whether synecdoche should be included in the broadly understood metonymy or metaphor; what matters is that they are sufficiently different to distinguish between them.

Ricoeur (1978) focuses specifically on the development of meaning in metaphor, suggesting the transfer of meaning entails in fact shrinking the logical space between two concepts that transform from the distant ones into the near ones. However, it does not mean that the remoteness disappears; on the contrary, it is caught up in its tension with nearness, and the concept is produced not in spite of, but thanks to, this tension. The combination of literal meanings is absurd, but interpretation produces a new meaning: “metaphor does not exist in itself, but in and through an interpretation” (Ricoeur, 1976, p. 50). At the same time, Ricoeur sees the metaphor as a special case of linguistic reference he calls “a second-order re-
ference”, alluding to the situation where the literal meaning is suspended and collapses, and a new, indirect meaning is constructed over its “ruins” (ibid., p. 153). As such, it belongs not only to forms of thinking but also to forms of imagination and feeling.

Metaphorical meaning does not merely consist of a semantic clash but of the new predicative meaning which emerges from the collapse of the literal meaning, that is, from the collapse of the meaning which obtains if we rely only on the common of usual lexical values of our words. The metaphor is not the enigma but the solution of the enigma. (Ricoeur, 1978, p. 146)

Unlike the enigma-eliminating metaphor, the symbol is characterised by creating the enigma with a surplus of meaning that remains open to active and creative interpretation (Ricoeur, 1976, p. 55). I find this “collapse-of-meaning” reading to be in an intriguing interplay with Ernesto Laclau’s concept (1996, p. 36) of the empty signifier, or “a signifier without signified”. I have in my critique of Mouffe already discussed the role of emotions in politics; however, this specific aspect of her theory correlates with Laclau’s ideas and his theory of language in politics, which to me seems more attractive.

The empty signifier differs from the floating signifier, which can be attached to different things, now one and now another. Unlike the floating signifier, an empty signifier refers to something that does not exist and is politically perceived as a lack: “The emptying of a particular signifier of its particular, differential signified is [...] what makes possible the emergence of ‘empty’ signifiers as the signifiers of lack, of an absent totality” (ibid., p. 42). For example, in the Hobbesian condition of the natural state, “‘order’ as such has no content, because it only exists in the various forms in which it is actually realised, but in a situation of radical disorder ‘order’ is present as that which is absent; it becomes an empty signifier, as the signifier of that absence” (ibid., p. 44). “Order” is one example, but other empty signifiers could include liberation, revolution, progress, change, etc. The concepts of metaphor and empty signifier explain recurring linguistic patterns of different figures of speech in rhetorical discourses on Europe. At the practical level, I used insights from the metaphor theory during the qualitative interaction with the material, employing the concepts interpretively and basing them on my own sensitivity to the data; the empty signifier only came into play later when interpreting the data.
Doing comparative research: Opportunities vs pitfalls

This study concerns discourses in three countries analysed comparatively against one another’s background. While the interface between discourses in the media and foreign policymaking was the most interesting to me, somewhat similar to an early attempt by Desmond (1937) to see how cultures and political systems have an impact on foreign news production, I wanted to partly reverse this relation and see how public discourses on Europe, shaped, among other things, by foreign news, infiltrate into the discourses and self-perceptions of policymakers. I preferred not to focus on hypothesis testing and revealing connections between different variables for several reasons, including not least the feasibility of the research, but also to position the project farther away from the structuralist theoretical model, which posits the existence of rigid boundaries between social structures and unidirectional flows or relations between them, for example a “flow of messages [that] operates top-down from political and media actors to the public, horizontally through linkages among political actors through the media, and also bottom-up from public opinion towards government authorities and legacy media organisations” (Pfetsch & Esser, 2012, p. 31).

Rather, I wanted to explore the problem and arrive at a critical and more hermeneutical understanding thereof. This also places the research within the “nation as a unit of analysis” approach (Livingstone, 2003, p. 493) because of its focus on relations between national variation dimensions, diversity within a common (regional) framework, a combination of both etic (outsider) and emic (insider) approaches.

I took into account as well the critique of the comparative nation-state-centric framework by Hepp and Couldry (2009). As the authors note:

[i]t is not that we rule out such cultural consequences of Hallin and Mancini’s model; our argument however is that such consequences need to be argued for on a stronger basis than the assumption that each nation has a distinctive and territorially bounded culture, including a distinctive media culture. (Ibid., p. 9)

There are reasons why “container thinking” and “territorial essentialism” have been avoided in my study despite the obvious focus on national contexts. First, this focus has nothing to do with binary semantics as it is not geared towards juxtaposing two examples in a binary logic. However, it looks at the differences and similarities in a broader regional context with three distinct national elements to compare, thus identifying deeper under-
lying lines of diversion and conflation that sometimes unite all three countries, more often making them stand out against each other or two against one in different combinations.

Second, my focus on foreign policy as discussed in the public discourses makes it necessary to revert to the national plane of analysis since foreign policy remains one of the few almost purely nation-state-bound elements (because regions, subcultures or other “cultural thickenings” have no link, typically at least, to foreign policies of their own).

Also, in so doing I am denying that the transnational or deterritorialised aspects are unimportant or not discussed; on the contrary, I accept Couldry and Hepps’ suggestion (2009) of cultural thickenings rather than national containers with rigid boundaries. I accept too that, in the context of national external policy, such thickenings are necessarily focused on the nation state as a power centre. While more attention to regional differences would be relevant in a study of regional media, the focus on capitals and the diplomacy/journalism interface unique to them justifies a more classical nation state and politics focus. At the same time, I have tried to remain sensitive to how the historical hybridity shaped the current situations (for example analysing the all-pervasive Polish influences in seventeenth-century Ukraine, the impact of Europeanised and prestigious Kyiv elites on their Muscovite counterparts from ca. 1650 to ca. 1750, or the reverse dominance of Russia over Ukraine in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries).

Examples of deterritorialised thickenings were certainly analysed in my project, for example with Russian anti-Europeanism seeping into Ukraine and Ukraine’s pro-Europeanism influencing the dynamic of the Russian opposition’s pro-European discourses. However, these thickenings are still thicker on their national territories because they are linked to self-identification. The widespread Ukrainian leaning towards Europe seems an important part of its national self-identification as much as one of the Russian patterns of self-perception vis-à-vis Europe is focused on being an assertive power that often challenges the rest of the Continent. Equally, given the rise of nationalism across Europe and the three countries’ own difficult relationship with nationalism, it may be helpful to assume that deterritorialisation is at the very least concurrent with some form of reterritorialisation.

Focusing on social movements is typical of the transcultural approach described by Hepp and Couldry, and I analysed precisely one such example, namely Euromaidan. Still, this example shows that social movements in Eastern Europe are nationally and even spatially contextualised, with the
focus in this case on one square (even though with regional and international implications).

Given these considerations, I believe it was justified to choose a comparative perspective with a focus on national patterns of discourse recon-textualisation.

Inside the toolkit: Practical procedures

Now that I have explained the study’s methodological foundations, I will review how they were applied in practice. The following subsections highlight the key methods in the order they are encountered in this text: how the historical narratives were approached, what the qualitative procedures were in the analysis of text and visuals, how QCA unfolded and supplemented them, and on what procedural basis I carried out in-depth interviews. Here I discuss issues like positionality, generalisability, validity and reliability.

Analysing discourses of the past: Begriffs- and Wirkungsgeschichte

When examining historical sources, I drew on research traditions rooted in intellectual history, conceptual history (Begriffsgeschichte) and hermeneutically inspired reception history (Wirkungsgeschichte) to construct a historical timeline for the key East European discourses on Europe. This was done using previous historical studies and my own research into historical sources.

The methods of Begriffsgeschichte […] derive from the spheres of a philosophical history of terminology and historical philology, semasiology and onomasiology; and the results of its work can be continually evaluated through the exegesis of texts and is based on such exegesis. (Koselleck, 1982, p. 409; see also Koselleck, 2006)

By tracing the genealogy of the idea of Europe, how it first entered Ukraine, Russia and Poland, how its definition and perception developed and changed, and what connotations and meanings were associated with it, I have constructed a conceptual history of the European idea in these East European countries, punctuated by discontinuities but also bound together by recurring patterns of the haunting past that, according to Jacques Derrida, time and again resurfaces in the present.
Reinhart Koselleck, the key theorist and practitioner of conceptual history, suggested that while speech and action, logoi and erga, represent two types of historical event (especially different in their pace), historical experiences can only be made sense of through language, and language represents the primary tool and one of the prerequisites for history’s very existence. Such understanding corresponds almost completely to this study’s foundation in theories of language assuming the language’s fundamental role. Linguistic concepts always structure the present historically:

The concrete concepts around which the political debate turned were bound to the historical experiences that had made their way, at one time or another, into these concepts. Put differently, in each specific discursive situation the greater durability that language in general possesses [...] reveals distinct deep structures which are temporally stratified. (Koselleck, 1989, p. 659)

Essentially, historical actors’ use of language and concepts embodied in language drags earlier historical experiences into contemporary moments thanks to the layered temporal structure of concepts, especially defining concepts (Leitbegriffe). At the same time, there is a certain threshold period (Sattelzeit) that represents a break and discontinuity with the previous uses of concepts, before which a translation into the modern language is required (Koselleck, 1972/2011), an idea very similar to the Foucauldian theoretical frame. Thus, taking ”Europe” as one of East Europe’s defining political concepts, I have reconstructed its diachronic layering and identified such threshold moments.

Other relations such as between defining concepts, neighbouring concepts and counter-concepts are also crucial to writing a conceptual history:

Concepts acquire their charisma in the process of building context-specific relations with other concepts. For that reason, BG differentiates between (a) the so-called basic or key social and political concepts (Grundbegriffe), (b) their neighbouring or sister-concepts (Nebenbegriffe) and (c) their adversary or counter-concepts (Gegenbegriffe). (Krzyżanowski, 2016, p. 312)

Methodologically, Koselleck (1972/2011, pp. 16–22) envisaged the following key principles for a history of a concept; principles I adhered to when working with the historical material. First, it must be historical-critical and geared towards reconstructing the specific historical situation of a particular word use, its addressees and underlying intent, its social context and function in establishing or severing connections between social groups or
classes. Second, it must provide a retranslation of the concept’s “vanished content” (ibid., p. 17). It has to represent a diachronic analysis of how the words change their meaning. Third, the method must remain essentially historicist while borrowing from linguistics without becoming a linguistic study. The discursive parameter is what prevails thanks to the emphasis on a speech act’s relation to social reality. Fourth, the pragmatic distinction between words and concepts must be maintained, with a concept defined as a word containing “the full range of meanings derived from a given socio-political context” (p. 19), the requirement that “Europe” fully meets as this study shows. Finally, concepts should be seen theoretically as not only reflecting but also enabling history. As regards source material, there are three potential groups (Koselleck, 1972/2011, pp. 22–23): “representative authors”, “everyday life sources” (from newspapers to personal letters and diaries) and dictionaries and encyclopaedias. I predominantly relied on the first group given my focus on the political effects of mediation; however, the quotidian discourses have also been occasionally used. I have for the most part not consulted dictionaries because Europe as a concept is most often overshadowed by its primary geographical meaning (the Continent), while its secondary, derived meanings have political implications. Rather than different definitions of Europe, I was interested in the different meanings associated with the Continent in the first place. The first two groups of sources are the best ways to reconstruct these meanings. Owing to the fact that I was fortunate to study a concept whose development other historians have partly investigated, I was in many cases able to benefit from secondary sources.

_Begriffsgeschichte_ works well both Foucault’s and Habermas’s theories. Both used early modern European experiences to develop conceptual frameworks for present-day realities. Although Habermas’s interpretation of modernity was at odds with Reinhart Koselleck’s, he followed similar principles in his actual analysis. Foucault’s legacy is also characterised by a profound interest in genealogy. As Michał Krzyżanowski (2010a) pointed out, there are many interfaces between conceptual history and the discourse-historical school of CDA that make them compatible and genealogically intertwined.

To pinpoint these historical continuities and disruptions, I have relied in part on other historians’ published work (mostly on the sophisticated studies in the history of ideas by Natalia Yakovenko and Andrzej Walicki), but I have also built on this work to extend the scope of their analyses with material they had not covered. While my aim was not to review the entire corpus of historical documents dealing with Europe, I chose to focus on the
texts that stood out thanks to their impact or the unique standing of their authors as educated and influential figures more likely to have agency in the increasingly important matter of narrating Europe. However, it was not an individual text that I analysed in every single case but rather an intertextual concept that fluctuates and takes on new nuances in every individual utterance. I have attempted to untangle the sub-concepts and accompanying concepts, conceptual history’s Neben- and Gegenbegriffe, that enable the concept to dynamically change. While much of the material comes from the texts that sought to embody a certain ideological construction of Europe, the text was as important as the context. The idea was to approach the concept of Europe broadly, including not only coherent discursive constructions but also episodic and even banal everyday exchanges partially preserved/constructed by memoirs and other witness statements (such as those of highly interesting conversations between Charles XII and Ivan Mazepa), and take into account relevant biographical, politico-economical and class aspects (such as those in the life stories of Yuriy Nemyrych or Pylyp Orlyk). Personal networks, networks of correspondence, education and career paths, even personal style and performative subjectivity (theorised by Judith Butler) all served as important circumstantial and validating evidence that had the potential to enrich today’s reconstructions of how Europeanness was imagined at a certain point in time. Texts alone have their limitations; their explicit or implicit definitions of Europe often depend on the text’s intended audience (which the author struggled to reach) and strategic effect (which the author struggled to achieve) – as is too evident from the letter hetman Samoylovych sent to the co-regent tsars in Moscow. Hence, in essence, the extralinguistic components I addressed in my own narrative of the historical constructions of Europe helped to reconstruct the situatedness of the texts while still based on verbal, textual evidence treated hermeneutically.

Finally, Koselleck in Futures Past (1985/2004) outlined the dynamic relationship between the “space of experience” (Erfahrungsraum) and “horizon of expectation” (Erwartungshorizont), which seems to be applicable also to how the experiences of Europe may dictate the expectations of it among agents of discourse. The space of experience in all its diversity orients the expectation that never comes about exactly as expected, thus creating new experience and expanding its space. Yet this imprecise expectation remains the only way to deal with the future.
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[...] it is the tension between experience and expectation which, in ever-changing patterns, brings about new resolutions and through this generates historical time. [...] Thus, space of experience and horizon of expectation are not to be statically related to each other. They constitute a temporal difference in the today by redoubling past and future on one another in an unequal manner. Whether consciously or unconsciously, the connection they alternately renew has itself a prognostic structure. This means that we could have identified a characteristic feature of historical time which can at the same time make plain its capacity for alteration. (Koselleck, 1985/2004, pp. 262–263)

Qualitative text analysis: Thematic analysis and a discourse-historical approach

I decided to begin my examination of the material with a qualitative approach, and thus following the advice of Creswell (2012, p. 48) to use qualitative methods when a new problem is to be explored, mechanisms are to be explained, contexts are to be understood and theories are to be developed. To ten Have (2004), one of qualitative research’s defining features is that it works “within a relatively small number of cases of which many aspects are taken into account” (pp. 3–4); he also suggested an open approach and sensitivity as fundamental qualities for such a study (ibid., 4), which I too strived for in this project. Rather similar to the method practised here, “analysing discourse is understood as the systematic attempt to identify patterns in text, link them to patterns in the context, and vice versa” (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 124). As outlined by John Richardson (2007), a CDA perspective is optimal for analysing newspaper content and can include examining its lexis (choice and meaning of words), syntax, transitivity (how actions are attributed to actors) and modality in sentence construction, presupposition, rhetorical tropes and narrative. Wodak and Krzyżanowski (2008, pp. 37–44) also recommended investigating modality, such as personal attitude and strength of commitment, non-verbal parameters and the presence of a different “voice”.

The initial research procedure was a close hermeneutic reading of a limited number of texts from the sampled newspapers in the given period. Here I applied a DHA in CDA, creating a semantic map of content and use of topoi, highlighting the power aspects of the text, with attention paid to linguistic detail. The mapping was done through thematic coding, which Jensen (2004, p. 247) called “a loosely inductive categorization [...] with reference to various concepts, headings, or themes”, which is the basis for
CDA as “a combination of coding, primarily for heuristic purposes, with in-depth linguistic analysis of selected meaning elements” (ibid., p. 251).

DHA has the most salient feature in its endeavor to work interdisciplinarily, multimethodically and on the basis of a variety of different empirical data. Depending on the object of investigation, it attempts to transcend the purely linguistic dimension and to include more or less systematically the historical, political, sociological and/or psychological dimensions in the analysis and interpretation of a specific discursive event. (Wodak & Krzyżanowski, 2008, p. 12)

The principle of triangulation DHA establishes through the concept of context has four levels: 1) the immediate internal co-text, 2) intertextual and interdiscursive relations, 3) extralinguistic and institutional factors, and 4) broader socio-political and historical contexts or fields of action (Bourdieu) that could be defined in this study as the formation of political opinion and the link between it and governance (Wodak & Krzyżanowski, 2008, p. 17).

More specifically, DHA consists of thematic and in-depth levels of analysis, and it is precisely the thematic mapping of content that I used primarily to address the problem of how Europe is covered in the press of the three countries. It also helped me develop categories for further quantitative analysis. As noted by Krzyżanowski (2010b), topics are defined by way of inductive analysis, i.e. by means of decoding the meaning of text passages – usually taking place via several thorough readings – and then ordering them into lists of key themes and sub-themes. It is important to note that the analysis here concerns discourse (and not text) topics, i.e., the aim of the exercise is to decode the ‘limits’ of discourses – understood in a DHA way as bound and limited thematically [...] – by defining their constituent topics (their contents and their hierarchies) embedded in the analysed texts. (Ibid., p. 81)

I started by reading the texts from a smaller but relevant sample taken from the “population”, the “universe of discourse” or the “universe of possible texts” (Wodak & Krzyżanowski, 2008, p. 35), locating the instances of discourse mentioning Europe and reconstructing the texts situated, localised representation of Europe (superficially by asking: “What does this text say Europe is?”) as isolated categories, each of which would contain a single statement about Europe. These categories were created whenever a new statement about Europe appeared. If the statements could be classified
under already existing categories, they were simply added to them as examples. This analysis stopped when no new categories appeared in the 10–15 texts, and they were thus seen as sufficiently saturated. The results were represented in tables showing the outcome of the study, as is common in QCA and DHA.

It was also important to pay attention to intertextuality given “the fact that all texts are linked to other texts” (Wodak & Krzyżanowski, 2008, p. 2), both within and beyond the sample. A twin concept of interdiscursivity suggests likewise that discourses are connected akin to texts, and in this particular case an interdiscursive continuum dealing with Europe included links to such discourses as, for example, those on progress, tradition, modernity, internal politics, human rights, etc. Establishing these interdiscursive links was also an important tool during the qualitative analysis.

A particular approach advanced by van Leeuwen (2008, p. 105) defined six types of authority: (1) personal, (2) impersonal, (3) traditional, (4) conformity, (5) expert, and (6) role model. Another dimension included an analysis of the text’s moral evaluation by direct evaluation, abstraction, analogy, as well as rationalisation provided by scenarios of instrumental, theoretical, or mythopoetic (rewards and punishments for actions) rationalisation. Similarly, every text has a grammar of purpose (legitimating or non-legitimating) that can be classified as one of the following groups: goal-oriented, means-oriented and effect-oriented (ibid., 131). Another, and somewhat simpler, van Leeuwen’s method (2007) suggested analysing four categories of legitimation: 1) “authorization” (by authority of tradition or people invested with authority), 2) “moral evaluation” (by reference to values), 3) “rationalisation” (by reference to goals), and 4) “mythopoesis” (by narratives of punishments and rewards).

These methods are also reasonably similar to the “politolinguistic approach”, where pretty much the same toolkit (analysing nomination, predication, argumentation) leads to perspectivation (deducing the perspective of a certain political actor). Overt and covert, mitigated and intensified meanings are of special interest in this approach, and a small-scale qualitative pilot before a more in-depth exploration and/or a quantitative study is likewise recommended (Wodak & Krzyżanowski, 2008, pp. 97–101). I oriented my study of policy documents towards this current of thought within CDA.
Analysing visuals

Apart from the linguistic and cultural turns in humanities, Wodak and Krzyżanowski (2008, p. 2) speak about the visual turn, which necessitates the need to “incorporate toolkits for the analysis of the visual (multimodality; hypermodality)”. I see visual analysis as an important component of this study. It is easily compatible with CDA because, as I understand it, it seeks reflections of social organisation and the position of the speaker in acts of expression – just pictorial rather than linguistic expression. Multimodal visual analysis is, in particular, based upon systemic functional grammar and rooted in linguistics and semiotics (Machin, 2007). Essentially, multimodal analysis is a linguistic methodology (CDA) applied to non-verbal communication (often but not only visual), which is perfectly harmonious with my methodological disposition, which draws on Benjamin (cf. Machin, 2013). The assumption is that visual communication, like spoken or written language, is a sign-making activity and therefore is governed by a set of rules not unlike grammar (Kress & van Leeuwen, 1996).

My analysis focused on cartoons and user-generated images that connoted general ideas rather than denoted specific situations; this is what dovetails precisely with my intention to study the imaginary and abstract general ideas about Europe. Rose (2012, p. 16) outlined three necessary foundations of the critical approach to visual methodology: 1) taking the effects of images seriously, 2) paying attention to social conditions, and 3) being aware of your own positionality. There can be different sites of analysis (the site of the image production, the site of the image and the site of perception) as well as different modalities (technological, compositional and social) (ibid., pp. 16–17). Compositional interpretation is at the heart of my approach here in that I have concentrated on the site of the image and on its compositional as well as social modalities.

The images were selected based on relevance sampling (what was deemed to have important information for the research problem and thus having relevance to it); the analysis concerned the visual’s internal composition and the hermeneutic analysis of the meaning produced by it. The focus on composition stems from its obvious importance for the creation of meaning, but it was supplemented by the analysis of cultural connotations and other significant elements whenever they acquired a meaning-generating function. Given the clearly ideological character of the images analysed here, the number of such features was limited and easily interpretable.
Speaking of specific aspects to observe, van Leeuwen (2008, p. 141) proposed focusing on how human figures are depicted, particularly in relation to the viewer, with respect to “three key factors” of “distance, angle, and the gaze”. The analyst should interpret these factors as representing social distance (wide shot versus close-up), social relation (the angle from which we see the people pictured), and interaction (direct address, looking at the viewer, or indirect address, looking elsewhere). Other options include examining the image for exclusion (who is not shown), transitivity roles (agents vs patients), depicting specific individuals versus generic groups of people, and essentially how people are categorised into groups.

Following this advice, I also remembered that “[v]isual language is not transparent and universally understood, but culturally specific” (van Leeuwen & Kress, 1996, p. 3). However, this limitation was somewhat mitigated by all three countries’ belonging to the European scopic regime and having enough regional similarities. My familiarity with all three cultures allowed me to remain sensitive to differences and variations as well. Apart from that, there is a growing global uniformity in the visual grammar of all kinds of media.

The dominant visual language is now controlled by the global cultural/technological empires of the mass media, which disseminate the examples set by exemplary designers, and, through the spread of image banks and computer-imaging technology, exert a ‘normalizing’ rather than explicitly ‘normative’ influence on visual communication across the world. (Ibid., p. 4)

In the context of this study, this fact facilitates the comparison across a cultural spectrum that generally follows the same design trends and utilises very similar expressive devices.

Qualitative/quantitative triangulation

From the project’s outset, I consciously decided to organise it within a qualitative framework with a significant quantitative component. This created several tasks, such as remaining as close as possible to the data and at the same time being able to speak about the numerical findings as well. I preferred this not because it would give my research more credibility or objectivity but because quantifying readers’ experiences could actually generate the data that allow the cross-comparison of results and establish which kind of representation, in the given researcher–material continuum, is prevalent, and which is less so. QCA, however, rather than used auto-
nomously, was devoid of a hypothesis (typically a standard part of its methodological complex) and instead subordinated to the main qualitative framework, whereby CDA provided the categories for counting. The basis for QCA was formed as the themes, the rhetorical figures, the aspects of transitivity and the argumentation qualitatively interpreted from the data created a coding scheme for content analysis.

Therefore, this research paradigmatically belongs to the “third methodological movement” “primarily working within the pragmatist paradigm and interested in both narrative and numerical data and their analyses” (Teddle & Tashakkori, 2003, p. 4). According to these authors, practice proved the viability of such mixed-methods research design. The given research work implies a sequential mono-method and mixed-methods design (as described by Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003), with both methods taking place chronologically one after another. All in all, such an approach helps with “avoiding ‘cherry picking’ (choosing the examples which best fit the assumptions) by integrating quantitative and qualitative methods” (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 11). Despite the common perception of QCA and CDA as divergent, there are, in actuality, a lot fewer contradictions between them, and their uses can also be very similar. For example, both are frequently chosen in research on nationalism and imperialism, which is rather relevant to this study. Consideration is given by the study to particular stereotypic portrayals of Europe as the Other, which represents difference, superiority or threat.

Using QCA should not be seen as taking a positivist stance; on the contrary, QCA is a form of qualitative research, as Klaus Krippendorff (2004) stated, albeit less interpretive than, for example, many forms of CDA described above. Or, to quote from Norman Fairclough, “[t]here is no such thing as an ‘objective’ analysis of a text, if by that we mean an analysis which simply describes what is ‘there’ in the text without being ‘biased’ by the ‘subjectivity’ of the analyst. […] By itself, textual analysis is limited” (Fairclough, 2003, pp. 14–15). I thus accept a post-positivist approach and consider meaning constructed rather than transmitted by the text. Bertrand and Hughes (2005, p. 173) define this tradition as assuming that “a text is not a vessel into which meanings are poured for transmission to others, but a structure (or a ‘system of signification’) by which meanings are produced within cultural context”.

It should perhaps be reiterated: QCA today does not necessarily need to be positivist and hence to score low on compatibility with qualitative approaches. There are difficulties in constructing a viable mixed-methods
research design, which might be accused of ambiguity between objectivist and relativist poles, i.e. of taking an unclear cognitive position characterised by eclecticism and omnivorous pragmatism. Yet it should also be said that the results obtained by paradigmatically different, and even contradictory, methods (even though CDA and QCA are not that contradictory) gain in providing a more complex and multidimensional view which depicts the object from multiple perspectives. What is particularly valuable about this approach is the strengthening of validity that comes with different methods and the mutual confirmation of findings. Validity, unfortunately, is rarely discussed in qualitative studies; however, it remains a central requirement for a proper research design. One of the best and least disputable ways of ensuring validity in a qualitative, post-positivist study is to provide a cross-method check. I see this gain as a reasonable compensation for its downside. As also noted by Neuendorf (2002, p. 15), the triangulation of qualitative and quantitative methods can only strengthen the claims for validity and mutual confirmation of results; moreover, the best way to approach a multidimensional problem is with a variety of methods. And while the qualitative methodology should provide for understanding what representations there simply are and where they are located, the quantitative part could be expected to produce an understanding of the relative extent of the discerned representations. In the end, “since methods go with theories, there really are no grand categories of research like ‘quantitative research’ and ‘qualitative research’” (Gee, 1999, p. 6).

One of my initial reasons for choosing content analysis as a methodological starting point was indeed to minimise the consequences of the researcher’s subjectivity. And while Europe may also be a less clearly defined, and more politically polarising, concept in itself, content analysis generates less biased data by adhering to a rigorously systematic procedure. As Krippendorff (2004, p. 40) stated, “content analysis is an unobtrusive technique”. However, this potential should be taken with a grain of salt as the foundation for QCA was developed through interaction with the text. Besides, there are also other major reasons for its use: not simply finding out that the texts were characterised by such and such traits but looking more widely and identifying the sheer relative number of such traits in the media coverage.

As Krippendorff (2004) explained, in contemporary research – even in QCA – one can no longer employ the notion of “content” as an objective data contained in a vessel of text. While it objectifies human judgement and makes it procedurally replicable, the core of the method remains qualitative,
so the contrast between the “qualitative” concept and the “quantitative” methodology may prove untenable. In Krippendorff’s opinion, “the components of content analysis [...] are undoubtedly present in qualitative research as well, albeit less explicitly so” (ibid., p. 87).

Krippendorff’s classic version of QCA methodology gives a broad and theoretical definition thereof as “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use” (ibid., p. 18). The principal properties of quantitative text research are thus stripped to the bone, so even the quantification could be omitted. Here what distinguishes content analysis from other methods of textual analysis is its bridging of the text under study with extratextual factors on a reliable, replicable basis. An important aspect is to make such inferences replicable within the same or different contexts, which is of paramount importance given the fact it is deeply politically embedded and subject to bias and speculation.

Thus, the task was to break down the categories developed at the first stage into very easily understandable and uncomplicated constructs so as to form a coding instruction without internal contradiction. “Analytical constructs, if reliably executed, warrant the intended inferences (guide the analyst along a logical path), but they must in return be backed by knowledge of the context of the analysed texts (assure the analyst that the path leads to valid conclusions)” (ibid., p. 171).

Instead of the traditional QCA premise of objectivity, my research relied on a pursuit of intersubjectivity: a degree to which different subjects could agree on a given concept, fact, result or interpretation. Numerical data, combined with a qualitative approach, help avoid biases of investigation while also distancing this study from a metaphysical, “pre-given” objectivity and substituting it with an idea of intersubjective agreement. In the words of Neuendorf, “there is no such thing as true objectivity – ‘knowledge’ and ‘facts’ are what are socially agreed on. According to this view, all human inquiry is inherently subjective, but still we must strive for consistency among inquiries. We do not ask ‘Is it true?’ but rather ‘Do we agree it is true?’ Scholars refer to this standard as intersubjectivity” (Neuendorf, 2002, p. 11).

The intersubjectivity of this research was ensured in several ways. It involved two coders, often considered a minimal standard for reliability in content analysis. I elaborated on definitions that arguably made the analytical categories more precise and clearly delineated so different people with various backgrounds could in principle agree on whether or not they are included in the text in question. The coding scheme went through a
total of five rounds of revision, which refined and calibrated the coding scheme questionnaire and the operational definitions.

Quantitative content analysis: Operationalisation, sampling and procedure

The operationalisation of the theoretical concepts and approaches adopted here was one of the greatest challenges of this research, as is usually the case with concepts mainly based on qualitative observations. The researcher should not only explicitly explain the operational concepts but also convert them into easily quantifiable, reliable and valid variables, each of which is “a definable and measurable concept that varies; that is, it holds different values for different individual cases or units” (ibid., p. 95). With most concepts being subjective and positional, it seemed at times very hard to rework them into more objective deductive schemata of categories to be construed more or less similarly by different coders. According to many handbooks, “the more abstract the concept, the more difficult it is to achieve a reliable and valid measure” (Priest, 1996, p. 88).

Theorists are in agreement on the approach to operationalisation. Berger (2000), Titscher et al. (2000), Neuendorf (2002) and Krippendorff (2004) all concur that the categories (which are operational functions of the concepts) must be exhaustive and mutually exclusive. Berger (2000) calls for a precise operationalisation of the categories that should not be too broad or too narrow. It is vital to carefully formulate these category definitions.

As Neuendorf recommends, the first step undertaken towards operationalising a concept is providing conceptual definitions for the variables. First of all, when conducting the qualitative analysis of the newspaper texts, I thematised different representations of Europe, aspects of transitivity (Europe as an actor), the use of rhetorical figures (such as metonymy or synecdoche), and argumentative strategies, and then took each such aspect as a variable. Based on these, I outlined definitions for every variable. They became the basis for the code book.

One of the key stages of any study is sampling, namely “the process of selecting a subset of units for study from the larger population” (Neuendorf, 2002, p. 83), and responsible and efficient sampling was a priority for my project.

These authors also speak about “a multi-stage process of selection: (a) selection of sender, (b) selection of documents, and (c) selection of a subset of the documents” (Titscher et al., 2000, p. 58). Neuendorf (2002) emphasises two stages: (a) sampling individuals or groups and (b) sampling their
messages. Jensen (2004) also suggested sampling as a procedure that often consists of more than one step. Most of the theorists state explicitly that combinations of different sampling techniques are possible at different stages.

In this research, the sampling took place on four levels and stages: (1) the initial step was to do stratified sampling.

Stratified sampling recognizes distinct subpopulations (strata) within a population. Each sampling unit belongs to only one stratum, and the researcher carries out random or systematic sampling for each stratum separately. Thus stratified samples represent all strata either in equal numbers (i.e., in proportion to their actual size) or according to any other a priori definition, whereas the properties within individual strata are sampled without a priori knowledge. Newspapers, for example, may be stratified by geographic area of distribution, by frequency of publication, by size of readership, or by audience composition as obtained from readership surveys. (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 115)

After choosing the countries for analysis, which was part of posing research questions rather than sampling in a true sense, three newspapers from each country were stratified by the type of publication (a respected, influential media outlet that, according to the initial interviews with the policymakers, they do read) and keeping the sample diversity in mind (some “oppositional” mainstream publications had to be included). Next, articles containing explicit references to “Europe” were sampled from each newspaper. Krippendorff (2004) terms this “relevance sampling. …Thus the size of a universe of possible texts is reduced to a sample containing, ideally, a manageable number of relevant texts” (p. 119).

(2) For the second step, the articles were randomly selected for qualitative analysis, which went on until saturation (i.e. until no new categories emerged). Here relevance (or purposive) sampling was used, selecting “all textual units that contribute to answering given research questions” (ibid.). In practice, the texts that, according to the researcher’s opinion, represented some typical discourses or specific features that seemed interesting were chosen for in-depth analysis. The results obtained at this stage were certainly not generalisable or replicable. For both qualitative and quantitative analysis, it was decided to sample the items published between February 2013, marking the beginning of a more intensive rapprochement between Ukraine and the EU (an EU–Ukraine summit), and September 2014, when the first Minsk agreements initially ended the war in Donbas. For the first stage, no strict sampling procedure was performed given the qualitative
methodology applied here. All in all, about 200 articles from 9 newspapers were analysed, plus 17 blog entries from 3 blog platforms. I tried to avoid any preconceptions and instead develop categories directly from the material; while reading the articles closely, I marked the themes and frames that construct Europe as reported; the recurring themes were then put into categories. If new semantic constructions appeared later on, a fresh category was established. The articles were read and analysed until no new categories appeared and the results demonstrated the expected saturation. The analysis was qualitative, not quantitative, and did not use any statistical data.

(3) The next stage involved non-proportionate stratified sampling, that is, fifty-two articles from each newspaper had to be selected for further content analytical procedures.

In nonproportionate stratified sampling, the sizes of the sample groupings are not proportionate to their relative sizes in the population. As a result, the sample groupings become like samples of separate populations and may not be pooled for a full-sample analysis unless statistical adjustments are made. But that’s not usually a problem, given the goal of stratification. (Neuendorf, 2002, p. 86)

As long as certain temporally or spatially bound phenomena (for instance, articles from a certain period or a certain country/newspaper, which is precisely the case here) are to be compared, non-proportionate sampling is relevant.

(4) However, to ensure an acceptable level thereof, I performed completely random sampling at the last stage, when specific texts were chosen for analysis (ultimate sampling units and coding units):

For a content analysis to be generalizable to some population of messages, the sample for the analysis should be randomly selected. The requirements are identical to those for conducting a random survey of individuals. Randomness may be defined as follows: Every element (unit) in the population must have an equal chance of being selected. This process typically requires itemizing all units in the population. This list is called a sampling frame. (Ibid., p. 83)

To summarise the process of stratified sampling, here is the chronological sequence of its stages for the QCA used:
1. Ukrainian, Russian and Polish newspapers were selected (Dzerkalo Tyzhnya, Korrespondent, Segodnya, Novaya Gazeta, Izvestiya, Kommersant, Gazeta Wyborcza, Rzeczpospolita, Polityka); relevance sampling.

2. Articles in the newspapers selected (52 from each, 468 in total); random sampling.

After these sampling stages, the selected articles were analysed in the following three major stages:

1. The coders read the articles, and after each one, the questionnaires were filled in with answers to the code book’s questions, and thus every article was assigned to the code book’s categories, or codes, which constituted the coding procedure; at first, this coding was done as a pre-test study with only ten articles in order to check the viability of the code book. The pre-test was repeated five times, each time after having made changes to the code book to account for the shortcomings of an earlier version detected during a previous pre-test.

2. After the code book was calibrated, the coding was repeated with a bigger sample of forty-five articles in order to check both intra-coder and inter-coder reliability.

3. The coding was applied to the entire sample of 468 articles.

Interviews and research ethics

The narrative construction of Europe, a focus of this project, was studied using a combination of textual research methods. Yet for finding out how these diverse representations enmesh themselves in power relations as they go between sites of discourse production and reception, among journalists and political elites within the political power field, personal in-depth interviews became an important supplement. This approach is similar to that employed in the “anthropology of media”, which is focused equally on sites of consumption and production and on sociocultural aspects of media as social practice, discovering “how media enable or challenge the workings of power and the potential of activism” (Ginsburg et al., 2002, p. 6). Moreover, this approach – bringing qualitative methods developed within ethnographic studies, such as participant observation or interviews – is well-accorded with postcolonial theory and Habermas’s public sphere concept (ibid., pp. 5–6). It also works specifically when studying various non-Western cultures as well as the phenomena of visual culture (cf. Askew & Wilk, 2002).
And while indigenous media is not a label easily applied to the media here, for instance some aspects of Ukraine’s grassroots media come relatively close, the dominant media must become the subject of study as well.

Texts have their own power webs partly discovered at the preceding research stage, but much of the interaction at the meso- and micro levels happens outside this intratextual dimension. As is known both from the hermeneutical approach developed by Gadamer (1960/1989) and Ricoeur (1981) and from Hall’s (1980/2001) theory of encoding/decoding, texts can be interpreted and used at a plethora of levels. Moreover, the specific interpretation and social role of a text are determined by the recipient’s prejudice, attitude to the text source, and social position – everything that contributes to forming the text user’s decoding apparatus. All these subtleties of positions, daily experiences of interaction, hierarchies and lines of action and thought form a context for a nuanced understanding of the function of these texts and the representations they offer (of Europe, in this specific case) within the power matrix of society.

To unravel the web of this context in the area most interesting for this study (the overlap of the mediascape and the external policymaking), I decided early to interview the key participants of this process: the key actors behind the texts (journalists) and the policymaking (diplomats). This was intended to help comprehend how these actors themselves view this interaction, what is its meaning for them, what they choose to prioritise and what to play down, and thus to recreate how the texts and the interpretations made of them (and of the idea of Europe) enable the power games and partake in them. This is why the interview stage is strictly supplementary and not corrective to the text research. In fact, it is fully autonomous, focusing on the social function of representations instead of somehow making a better rendering of the representations themselves, although of course any such supplement would also deepen and sharpen the understanding of the texts.

These interviews had the characteristics of cultural interviews, which “probe for the special and shared meanings that members of a group develop, the kinds of activities that group members typically do, and the reasons why they do them” (Rubin & Rubin, 1995, p. 28) or “phenomenological life-world interviews” carried out “with the purpose of obtaining descriptions of the lifeworld of the interviewee in order to interpret the meaning of the described phenomena” (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015, p. 6). Such interviews tend to be descriptive, open to ambiguity and change as the research unfolds; they emphasise the interpersonal dynamic in conversa-
tions, and there is even some deliberate naivety on the part of the researcher (ibid., 32–35). They are often characterised by an interpretive approach concerned with “figuring out what events mean, how people adapt, and how they view what has happened to them and around them” (ibid., pp. 34–45). In Brinkmann and Kvale’s own model, the scope of such an interview is on understanding specific circumstances, which makes “knowledge in qualitative interviewing […] situational and conditional” (ibid., p. 38). This flexibility, openness to conditionality and willingness to change direction rather than a fixed design became important aspects of this study, where, for example, the questionnaire evolved. As Brinkmann and Kvale point out, “[q]ualitative interviewing design is flexible, iterative, and continuous, rather than prepared in advance and locked in stone” (ibid., p. 43).

One of the lessons of the critical feminist interviewing tradition is that “[t]he personality of the interviewer counts in social research” (Rubin & Rubin, 1995, p. 40). In the interview part of the study, I relied on my experience of doing in-depth research interviews with Ukrainian journalists (Horbyk, 2013b) as well as my extensive professional background in journalism. My journalist experience served the study in two ways: first of all, it allowed me easier access to journalist communities thanks to my personal network and past contacts as well as the ability to use professional identification as a common reference point to establish an understanding, a rapport and trust with many of the interviewees. Moreover, I was spared having to explain many things, which saved time and further solidified the interviewee’s confidence in me as a competent person to talk about the questions I was asking. Second, I was able to draw on my interviewing experience: arranging appointments, entering conversations and maintaining them. This was because I had been a journalist for about a decade and had interviewed several dozens of prominent public figures and gathered hundreds of vox pop.

Hammersley and Atkinson (1983/2009, pp. 49–53) describe the problem of accessing more or less closed environments controlled by “gatekeepers” and/or governed by unspoken codes. At the same time, precisely these “enculturated informants”, who know the internal situation well (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015, p. 66), were of special interest to me. As has been mentioned, I had very little problem sampling and arranging interviews with journalists who also had very little to hide and were willing to share many of their experiences. Their identifying me as “one of them” was a real gate-opener in this respect for me. I did not have to encounter the typical problems of such situations where latent identities take over the formal researcher–informant
roles. I was one of them, but I asked questions about something I had not experienced personally (the media work during Euromaidan or the journalist work in Poland), so there was a need to formulate things explicitly rather than leave too much in unspoken insider hints. Thus, I believe, I was able to maximise the advantage of my personal situation.

However, this is only part of the story. At one point in my research, I realised being a Ukrainian citizen (who also publicly supported the democratic transformation of the country and condemned the Russian aggression) could also create problems for me when conducting research in Russia. Not only did I want to minimise the risks to my own personal safety when asking questions somewhere in central Moscow about how Russian officials process information, I also believe that the answers given to me would differ from those furnished to a Russian researcher and would be affected by my own identification as an interlocutor. Therefore, I employed a local assistant in Moscow to conduct those interviews. Of course, this decision has also influenced the results since not being at the interviews limited my ability to make inferences from the informants’ mimic, reactions, body language, environment, etc. Moreover, the follow-up questions I would have asked may have differed from those actually asked by my local assistant. This was partly mitigated by the fact that I personally conducted two interviews on Skype. Yet I believe these difficulties were not decisive for the results of the study. Moreover, they were for some respondents compensated by the benefits of a more open conversation with a Russian or for others there was no need to give the answers a Ukrainian would like. It is quite possible that friendlier informants would have tried to answer in such a way which would have portrayed them more critical than they actually were, or they would have felt compelled to encourage me or compensate for the Russian state’s actions with extra niceties or wishful thinking. More aloof informants could instead have tried to criticise or annoy me, or revert to trolling (I had previously experienced this even with well-educated Russians), which would have been a less than optimal situation too. By removing myself from the obviously conflicted situation altogether, I believe I have avoided many problems – and encountered less serious ones in return. All in all, remembering that perfect conditions are impossible in any research, I have accepted the limitations and opportunities of what I believe was a wise decision.

The policymakers in all three countries were not equally easy-going. I had often been denied access, for instance, to one Ukrainian diplomat, citing his heavy workload. He also found a meeting between us unnecessary.
and such research redundant and therefore would not sit down with me. While the Polish policymakers were the most open to communicating, the situation in Russia was extremely difficult. Despite my employing a local researcher, it is hard to find the words to express the levels of suspicion this project faced at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Virtually all diplomats refused to collaborate, citing Sweden’s “unfriendly actions” against Russia. It was therefore decided to target retired diplomats, but this should in fact be even seen as a significant advantage, as officials who have left office are known to often be more willing to share insider information and perspectives (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983/2009, p. 107). This strategy was also partly used in the other two countries in order to receive better information, and so the flaws are minimal. But even the retired diplomats were unwilling collaborators. For example, one former Russian ambassador suggested to my assistant outright that this project was directly linked to espionage (which is most certainly not true) and openly refused to talk about what media he would use in his work, saying literally, “And why are they so interested in my sources?” As a result of this, I nearly lost my assistant, who sent me a worried letter demanding “all the information on why this project is being carried out, what its results will be, and how this information will be used”, and informing me that she would not participate in any “anti-Russian” activity. I had to use all my powers of persuasion and give the answers I did not have myself (such as the results of an unfinished piece of research! – I wrote honestly about this, adding that whatever the results the only purpose is to create a better understanding of Eastern Europe). Eventually, I received good material, and we managed to finalise this fieldwork successfully, but I believe these difficulties testify to the situation in Russian society just as well as the research does.

Of course, there is nothing new in this, as similar problems have always plagued social research. My personal collection of “vignettes” is far more humble than that in the milestone study of comparative media studies by Almond and Verba (1963, p. 49):

Interviewers’ reports are full of vignettes of attempts to trace respondents who are difficult to find; of the receptions interviewers received – usually friendly, sometimes hostile; of interviewers in Southern Italy travelling with sleeping bags because of the uncertainty of accommodations, and of interviewers jailed in Mexico and Louisiana because of suspicion about their purposes.
Most of the interviewees were, nevertheless, friendly and easily accessible. When the meetings took place, the policymakers were more distant than the journalists were. However, my experience of interviewing politicians and prominent figures, as well as the fact that my own profile and situation allowed me to impress the people without grandstanding and in a friendly way (such as by speaking Polish to the Polish diplomats or presenting myself to Ukrainian diplomats as a Ukrainian living in Sweden who explains what is going on Ukraine), helped tremendously. I was thus able to target some key gatekeepers who later led me to other very helpful informants. Also, one or two foreign policy experts were interviewed in every country as an intermediary figure between the journalists and the policymakers; these experts often published articles in the media and offered advice to the government.

At times, the interviewees were easier to meet than to talk to. One Ukrainian journalist was especially scornful of me and my project and started questioning me without giving me a chance to actually ask him. His retorts showed he held my project in contempt, believing it a waste of time and money and regarding me as a shallow, Westernised, opportunist kid. That forced me to adopt an aggressive interviewing strategy: interrupting him and asking unplanned and very blunt questions on how Europe is defined in his work. He was quick to realise that his own understanding was full of contradictions, which immediately raised my status and that of my work in his eyes. Thanks to my ability to fight back intellectually, I received in the end interesting and enlightening responses, and we parted ways certainly not best friends but on good terms. This less usual technique of confrontational interviewing or critical Socratic interviewing, also practised by Bourdieu (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015, pp. 40–43, 184), was used by me only once, but it was appropriate and productive.

The field research was carried out using individual semi-structured interviews (the general interview guide approach). Individual interviews were preferred to group interviews because of the anonymity and openness they offered in this kind of environment. The semi-structured questionnaire appeared preferable too because the conversations needed focus but were not supposed to be organised very rigidly, which would limit what the informants would say and the opinions they would express. The conversations were face-to-face, except for a Skyped interview with a Russian expert. All the interviews were recorded and transcribed. Additional follow-ups were done via e-mail. The in-person interviews took place in different environments: from the respondents’ offices to cafes. The interviews were
conducted in Ukrainian with the Ukrainian participants, and in Russian with the Russian interviewees; as for the Poles, one was in English, one in Ukrainian and the rest in Polish. Minor distractions (such as cafe background music) and different locations might have had a slight impact on the answers, but they could hardly be seen as decisive, partly due to the relatively low secrecy of the information requested. Offices and cafes are in many ways a natural environment for the respondents, who themselves sit down together in these places to interview others or have a business meeting or an informal chat. Hence, this variety of locales, rather than a sterile and neutral single location for all of them, can be seen as a strength of the study. Of course, the expectations for what was feasible in this respect should also be realistic. All in all, I tried to have a truly qualitative approach and did not adhere to a set of mechanistic rules, avoiding a fetishism about rigid algorithms and methods and instead choosing an open-ended journey, something Brinkmann and Kvale (2015, p. 71) curiously call “an anti-method approach”.

In interview research, there is always a question mark over the quality of the data collected. It is widely recognised that during interviews respondents may not be able to formulate what they think or feel, they may lie deliberately, or they may misinterpret the questions. Given this, Bertrand and Hughes (2005) recommend that interviews are thought of as constructed narratives rather than accounts of actual experience. In the same spirit, David Silverman (1993/2011) suggests that researchers decide whether they consider the responses they get as giving a direct insight into the external reality which constitutes the informants’ daily experience or rather into the internal one comprising their feelings and perception of that daily life.

Should the collected data be taken at face value as an actual account of what is really taking place in reality or as a subjective and constructed version useful only to reconstruct further discursive dispositions? There are many possible positions between these two extreme poles, but I would instead like to turn the problem on its head. Of course, every account I have collected is partial, subjected and censored according to its author’s interests and stakes, but this is exactly what should be understood as “real” in social reality. Subjective, constructed and self-serving accounts are just as much part and parcel of the social reality because they form it. So, while viewing the factual statements with a reasonable level of doubt and critique, I accept that the informants’ positional perspectives are actually what I am most interested in, because they not only “reveal” the power relations regarding the representations of Europe, they constitute them.
All accounts must be interpreted in terms of the context in which they were produced. The aim is not to gather 'pure' data that are free from potential bias. There is no such thing. Rather, the goal must be to discover the best manner of interpreting whatever data we have, and to collect further data that enable us to develop and check our inferences. (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983/2009, p. 102)

Also, Brinkmann and Kvale (2015) recommend contemplating why the person had to lie in the first place. The same applies to the problem of the facade political actors so often put on for the interview, which sees them provide only official statements and avoid direct answers (most typically the strategy of the Russian informants).

On gathering the interview material, the problem then becomes what to do with it. I approached the fully transcribed interviews in the same way as I dealt with the journalistic texts, especially given that both phenomenological and discourse-analytical approaches could and should be reconciled (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015, p. 53). Moreover, analysing discourses on social action with the help of DHA is a productive strategy (Krzyżanowski, 2014).

Therefore, I coded the interview transcripts following such steps as “identifying initial categories based on readings of the transcripts; writing codes alongside the transcripts; reviewing the codes and revising the categories accordingly; and looking for themes and findings in each category” (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015, p. 228) and trying to attain a “meaning condensation” that “builds on coding and entails an abridgement of the meanings expressed by the interviewees into shorter formulations” (ibid., 233). The next step was to interpret this condensed meaning. As much as possible, I tried to distinguish between primary (what the interview questions proposed) and secondary topics (suggested by the respondents in their answers) (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015, p. 171, 174).

Although some of the statements are treated here as factual testimonies and reliable evidence (“factual interviews” or “conceptual interviews” clarifying the concepts of the interviewee’s lifeworld [ibid., 176]), many of the normative discussions I have had with the respondents (for example, on the boundary between journalists and activists or the role of their own institution in society) invited them to construct complex meanings negotiated between their interiorised norms and the realities of power relations. Therefore, such statements were analysed precisely in this context of discursive power relations.
In recent years, the DHA has embraced different types of analyses of institutional settings – most notably in the context of the European Union […] – where a combination of in-depth analyses of organisational contexts has been tied with a thorough examination of discourses which form those contexts from everyday practices as well as contribute to transformation and circulation of meanings across different institutional spaces, scales and genres. (Krzyżanowski, 2011, p. 232)

This is not only an argument for a discursive interpretation of the interview results but also a further argument in support of the combination of a linguistic study of discourses and more institution-focused interviews, highlighting the discursive nature of the institutional context.

I opted for the “narrative” stance in general despite Silverman’s advice (1993/2011, p. 202) to avoid complex and thus rather obscuring analytical approaches while dealing with a clear social problem. The respondents’ accounts were mainly regarded as more or less reliable renditions of their subjectively perceived reality (especially of the issues concerning their professional routines and social profile), whereas also keeping in mind that even distorted information provides knowledge of people’s views and ideas (especially in the sections where they had to make estimations and confess their feelings). Therefore, as recommended by Brinkmann and Kvale (2015, pp. 63–65), I chose to see the interview knowledge generated by this research as produced, relational, conversational, contextual, linguistic, narrative, and pragmatic. This pragmatism is, I believe, the most productive approach for studying the complex, yet clearly outlined, problem I am dealing with in this study.

Whatever their form, interviews must be viewed as social events in which the interviewer (and for that matter the interviewee) is a participant observer. […] The accounts produced by the people under study must neither be treated as ‘valid in their own terms’, and thus as beyond assessment and explanation, nor simply dismissed as epiphenomena or ideological distortions. They can be used both as a source of information about events, and as revealing the perspectives and discursive practices of those who produced them. (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983/2009, p. 120)

As for research ethics, I have taken a “situationist” approach (ibid., p. 219), namely staying within ethical limits but remaining very sensitive to the needs of the research and admitting that such research is impossible without at least minimal intrusion. However, there were few really serious ethical considerations to take into account. The questions concerned neither
the interviewees’ personal lives nor sensitive information regarding their identities but were focused on their professional fields. Still, I made sure I explained to the participants what the interview was about (without going into too much detail about the project itself so as not to contaminate the data by their potentially calculated responses). The informants were told they would be taking part in an academic study on the condition of anonymity. I used the informed consent principle and respected the informants’ privacy by assigning them pseudonyms and revealing only very general bits about their social profile so that it would not be possible to find out who they were. This minimised any potential harm to the informants who, for example, disclosed insider information. I clearly distanced myself from exploitative research by choosing to study people either on a roughly similar power and status level as me (more or less, the journalists) or more powerful and influential and enjoying a higher status (the diplomats) since “[…] the prevailing power asymmetry of the interview situation may be cancelled out by the powerful position of the elite interviewee” (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015, p. 171). It is also to be hoped that my research will take the knowledge of the media and societies in Eastern Europe in such a direction which would be beneficial to all the study participants. By default, I have assumed a respectful attitude to the informants regardless of their political views, social profile, status and any other personal or professional details. I have also interviewed people with very different views in order to make my sample more diverse, and I did my best to treat them with the same level of respect. Some of the conversations (for example, concerning the interviewees’ own experiences during Euromaidan) were much more personal and sensitive than others, involving details of torture, bodily injuries and other forms of abuse. So it was especially important that the anonymity and informed consent principles were adhered to in order to protect my informants. At the same time, I decided to limit the informants’ ability to react to the study results and my interpretation because of their higher power position, which could have, mistakenly in my view, led them to pressure me or threaten to prevent the publication of the results; their diverse ideological positions would make the feedback too polarised and ideologically motivated, while sharing the results with only some of them would have been unfair to the rest. This was also part of my strategy to avoid co-option with my informants (ibid., p. 91), which included focusing critically on their possible hidden agendas and during the interpretation phase considering the wider contexts of their activities.
Snowball sampling was used to find the actual respondents. Although for a qualitative interview study like this, sampling is not desirable (Priest, 1996), some basic sampling of the journalists took place to obtain a reasonably balanced mix of respondents with different genders, ages and backgrounds. In sum, this qualitative and theory-driven sampling targets the most typical representatives of a given professional culture (journalists or diplomats).

The informants make up two large groups: journalists and policymakers. I have conducted 33 in-depth interviews with journalists (10 in Ukraine, 4 in Poland and 4 in Russia) and makers of foreign policy (4 in Ukraine, 4 in Poland and 2 in Russia) as well as foreign policy experts (1 in Ukraine, 2 in Poland and 2 in Russia). In Ukraine, the main criteria for selecting journalists were their actual presence at Euromaidan or an otherwise professional experience of it as well as having worked for the publications sampled for textual research. With the diplomats/experts, I had to talk to the people available, but most of them had worked for some time in the MFA department responsible for European policy. In Poland and Russia, the criteria were twofold: they had worked on the foreign news desk of the media analysed here (for the journalists) and had participated in the decision-making (for the diplomats).

Generalisation and validity

One of the more important issues to consider here concerns the generalisability of the findings. This is rather self-evident for the QCA results as the use of statistical methods in the construction of the sample allows generalising the findings to the entire population. Krippendorff (2004, p. 117) has paradoxically noted that “generalization is not a very important issue in content analysis”, but it seems more pressing to discuss this issue in relation to the qualitative research results. Are they generalisable in any way?

The problem of generalisation is rather serious for a study at least partly (in fact, in large part) modelled qualitatively. As Halkier (2003, p. 115) noted, while quantitative samples “can be statistically generalised back to the entire population”, qualitative sampling is analytically rather than statistically constructed, and therefore “the sample results are considered to systematically conceptualise socio-cultural dynamics and relations” (p. 116). Instead of a generalisation from the sampled unit to the whole population, there is a generalisation from the variable to the analytic category. This is a core difference between qualitative and quantitative generalisation.
I agree with a model suggested by Eriksson (2006), who posited that qualitative media research (he speaks about audience studies, but the idea is easily applicable elsewhere) “should make general claims in the sense that it aims at identifying and gaining knowledge about the transfulctual conditions or fundamental structures of the objects of study” (ibid., p. 42) by taking into consideration “the domain of deep structures of reality” when generalising (ibid., p. 32); “it should aim at identifying and gaining knowledge of the structures and constituent mechanisms of the object under study […] qualitative media audience research has an inherent capacity to gain such knowledge” (ibid.).

In the qualitative research design, I have largely used narrative generalisation, defined by Halkier (2003, p. 122) as “orderings of patterns of communication dynamics in story-like ways, reflecting the potential plurality and non-finality of the generalisations”. Halkier argues that “if researchers assume, and are able to demonstrate empirically, that phenomena and relations are formed by people’s practical use of language in shifting and complex socio-cultural contexts, then this potential plurality and non-finality should be reflected better in our generalisations” (ibid.). Typical of this approach, I am trying to highlight the complexity and non-finality of the generalisations, combined with analytical semantics as well as rather direct representations of the subjects/analysed texts, “as a recognition of the polyphony involved in the first-order constructs of the socio-cultural processes in question and thus in creating second-order constructs” (ibid., p. 121).

The reliability of content analysis is either very high or acceptable for all analytical categories, which my coder and I guaranteed by way of double intra- and interreliability testing with an interval of three weeks (see Appendix for details). It is also worth mentioning that when processing the interviews, transcriber reliability was ensured by repeatedly checking selected transcripts against their respective sound recordings (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015, p. 211).

Aside from reliability and generalisability, most authors emphasise that for quantitative methods, unlike qualitative ones, the key problem is validity, “the extent to which a measuring procedure represents the intended, and only the intended, concept” (Neuendorf, 2002, p. 112). “Validity refers to whether you are measuring the things you think you’re measuring – those that interest you on a theoretical level” (Priest, 1996, p. 87). Jensen (2004) has a more statistical, yet similar, approach to quantitative research: “[v]alidity indicates whether a measure properly captures the meaning of the concept or construct it represents” (p. 212). “Validation reduces the risk of making deci-
sions based on misleading research results” (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 315). This is not the only way to prove the validity of the research, albeit one of the most often referred to. Neuendorf (2002) also called it “face validity”.

Theorists and practitioners talk about many types of validity that are difficult to systematise or even enumerate exhaustively. I will now touch on three more general levels of validity according to Krippendorff (2004) and then turn to narrower types thereof. Among those three levels, the first aims to justify the treatment of the text (discussed here under the rubric of justification for the methods selected for the project); the second intends to justify inferences (it is considered below); and the third one strives to justify the results. Following this understanding of validity, this research project closely concentrated on the empirical material, from which the main categories were derived. The research project thereby consolidated its face validity.

However, validity as such is not bound to the appropriateness of the measurement.

Validity is that quality of research results that leads us to accept them as true, as speaking about the real world of people, phenomena, events, experiences, and actions. A measuring instrument is considered valid if it measures what its user claims it measures. A content analysis is valid if the inferences drawn from the available texts withstand the test of independently available evidence, of new observations, of competing theories or interpretations, or of being able to inform successful actions. (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 313)

Alongside those three levels where validity can be applied, there are also qualitatively distinct kinds of validity. While “face validity” verifies that the variable measures the concept (ensured here by way of developing the variables from a close qualitative analysis), “predictive validity” implies the ability to predict a future event related to the concept; “construct validity” tests the validity of a concept in relation to the previously tested concepts (Jensen, 2004). I do not find the predictive validity concept relevant to this study, which did not preoccupy itself with establishing causal links. The construct validity can be judged by the productivity and novelty of the interpretations in this project. Krippendorff also speaks about social validity; in other words, why this knowledge is valuable to society. I deal with this issue in the conclusion.

Empirical validity is the degree to which available evidence and established theory support various stages of a research process, the degree to which
specific inferences withstand the challenges of additional data, of the findings of other research efforts, of evidence encountered in the domain of the researcher’s research question, or of criticism based on observations, experiments, or measurements as opposed to logic or process. (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 315)

The empirical validity of this research was particularly enhanced by drawing on previous research on the topic as well as on general literature on the media and political systems of the three countries. Finally, there is also structural and functional validity.

[If] evidence on structural validity demonstrates the structural correspondence between available data or established theory and the modelled relationships or the rules of inference that a content analysis is using […], evidence on functional validity demonstrates a functional correspondence between what a content analysis does and what successful analyses have done, including how the chosen context is known to behave. If these behaviours covary repeatedly and over a variety of situations, one can suspect that they share an underlying construct. (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 320)

These types of validity have been ensured through integrating theoretical constructs into the methodological design of the study and incorporating the material, the theories and the methods within a single researcher-driven qualitative framework (structural validity) and testing the results against previous studies and my own findings yielded by different methods.

The last type of validity mentioned here is correlative validity, which validates results when different methods are combined. This validity is highly relevant here and could be expected to be strong in this study given that a multi-method approach has been used.

At the same time, I should note that there is also another perspective which suggests instead of validity and reliability in qualitative research, one should talk of transparency, consistency/coherence and communicability. This is done by opening up materials for others to access, checking materials and interpretations for incoherences and explaining them, and equally dealing with consistency in other cases (e.g. explaining why the same themes occur), and, finally, by communicating the results persuasively with a richness of detail and the informants’ lifeworlds emerging from them (Rubin & Rubin, 2004, pp. 85–92). While having tried my best to provide the latter, the requirements of openness have been met by adding as much research material as possible to the appendices and publishing the complete
interview transcripts and the content analysis data sheets on a MediatedEurope.Wordpress.com website for public access.

Positionality

The question of my own perspective and position as regards the material is unavoidable in a project like this that looks at contemporary history, politics and discourses, where the researcher has a local background. I find it almost redundant to say that I see the knowledge generated by this study as positional, even though all knowledge is positional by definition. An observer is part of the system he observes, an active part. Where is the position located, then, from which the voice of the author is speaking in this text; the position in which the author listened to other voices represented here? I would demarcate this place somewhere on the outskirts of Euromaidan, distanced from the violent mêlée but not any closer to the seemingly apolitical “not-part-of-the-fight” position.

For a long time during the protest, one of Euromaidan’s barricades was adorned with a large placard featuring the words of the US-Ukrainian linguist George Shevelov (1907–2002): “the world will only accept us as modern”. As a man born in Kyiv some thirty years ago, these words are my motto, as they are for many young men and women of my generation. These words pretty much encapsulate my own position: there is an acute sense of my active presence in the world rather than in a narrow national or regional context (often seen as provincial). At the same time, it expresses an unwillingness to abandon one’s own identity after centuries of peaceful and violent assimilation by many empires, as virtually any book on Ukrainian history will testify to. And finally, there is a no less acute awareness that such acceptance is, and should only be, possible on rationalist, modern terms, which creates a progressive perspective eschewing all things backward, conservative, nostalgic, xenophobic, patriarchal, or aggressively nationalist.

It is this perspective that also helps develop a perspective which can reflect critically on my own bias. Whereas any observer inevitably taints the object of observation, there can be different degrees of intrusion, and there are several ways to reduce it. My tool of choice was adherence to hermeneutical principles that consider prejudice (understood as the subject’s knowledge prior to an encounter with the text) a precondition for rather than an obstacle to understanding. In accordance with this principle, I have been open about my prejudice and strived to merge it with the prejudice of the text in order to achieve an understanding of it in a proper context. It was equally important to preserve enough of the author in this study to
make use of my sensitivity to nuances and subtexts, something lauded by feminist ethnography, which inspired me to be open about my presence in the study (cf. Rubin & Rubin, 1995).

Summary

This study’s methods are organised here around several groupings of material. The conceptual history of Europe in Ukraine, Russia and Poland is followed by a discourse-historical analysis of contemporary texts (such as foreign policy statements, articles by notable authors and bloggers, visuals, and newspaper articles), a QCA of a much larger sample of newspaper texts, an interpretivist thematic and discourse-historical analysis of interviews with journalists and policymakers.

The project was conducted based on an overall qualitative methodological framework in keeping with its theoretical foundation, which focuses on speech acts as social acts in the context of power. As I take, very generally, as my starting point the theories postulating language’s decisive role in structuring perception (Humboldt, Benjamin, Benveniste), the assortment of methods applied was inspired by critical linguistics, which sees speech acts as dictated by specific choices related to interpersonal and intergroup social relations. This aspect stands out in the key concept of discourse, namely language in the extralinguistic context.

Therefore, a combination of thematic coding and a DHA within CDA was used to categorise the spectrum of discursive practices relating to Europe in the key policy documents and the nine selected newspapers from Ukraine, Russia and Poland. Attention was paid to the conceptual discussions generated by using the notion “Europe” and the recontextualisation of discourses from the media sphere to the foreign policy sphere and vice versa. This qualitative analysis rests upon a mixture of hermeneutics (based on Gadamer and Ricoeur) and discourse-historical analysis (Ruth Wodak and the Vienna school) and is preoccupied with the use of metaphors and other linguistic devices, the identification of the texts’ thematic structures, and the argumentative strategies. A close reading of selected texts by notable authors and bloggers as well as a multimodal visual analysis of hand-picked visuals helped enrich the understanding of subtler nuances. As a logical continuation, I employed conceptual history (Begriffsgeschichte) methods in the tradition of Koselleck, with attention paid to historical critique, a diachronic change of concepts, and the social contexts of this change in order to reconstruct that history of breaks, continuities and
semantic transitions in the development of the idea of “Europe” in the three countries which contextualises and focuses current debates.

On the basis of the categories developed from the qualitative analysis of the newspaper texts, I created and repeatedly refined a code book and performed QCA, here defined as a non-positivist methodology following Krippendorff (2004), whereby the sample was constructed as representative of and generalisable for the analysed media outlets. These findings allowed me not only to catalogue discourses on Europe, their recontextualisations, aspects of transitivity, rhetorical figures and devices but also to say how often each one was used and which ones dominated in the randomly sampled corpus of newspaper texts on Europe during 2013 and 2014, the key period of Euromaidan.

Finally, the interviews with journalists and policymakers and their thematic and discourse analysis link these results to the interactions (often interpersonal) between the political field and the media field, which actively participate in a recontextualising exchange of discourses. I followed the interview component of the study as an open-ended and flexible process of interacting with the informants and their statements, making changes to the interview guides in the process. Their power position, similar to mine or superior, mitigated some potential ethical shortcomings, whereas I strictly followed other elements of the ethical protocol, such as informed consent and the anonymity of the respondents. Although some political actors were difficult to contact and communicate with, these minor problems are themselves very telling about the situation in their respective countries.

Reliability tests ascertained the generalisability of the study’s quantitative element and the trustworthiness of the overall results, while the study’s validity is ensured by a mutual verification of the findings attained through different methods as well as their testing against theoretical touchstones and previous research. My own positionality, that of a progressive Ukrainian residing in Western Europe, has been admitted and considered in the spirit of hermeneutics as a precondition for the merger of the horizon between the researcher and the material.

All in all, these different, but essentially compatible and qualitative, methods combine together to highlight a complex problem, that is the political context of the mediated representation of Europe in the three countries.
CHAPTER 4

Europe in history: National contexts

This study focuses on the specific timeframe of 2013 and 2014. Yet the narratives of Europe have not just appeared recently; they go back centuries. It is impossible to comprehend their present-day meaning without some understanding of how they were formed and where they come from. For example, speaking of the historical memory of the post-Socialist Europe, Sabina Mihelj (2014) suggested that, contrary to the focus on the generational change, the generational continuity in it is significant and unduly overlooked. Notably, there has been an increase in interest towards the mediation of the Communist past (cf. Mihelj, 2017). However, I argue there is a need to go even deeper in the past in order to understand the haunting environment in which Europe comes to being as a narrative. In this chapter, I use the concepts Begriffs- and Wirkungsgeschichte to construct a genealogy of the idea of Europe in Ukraine, Russia and Poland in which to situate the analysis of both the contemporary press and the interviews with journalists and policymakers. This is done by constructing a hermeneutical horizon for it, briefly characterising key differences and similarities between these media systems.

East European Studies, both within the region and beyond, has over the years generated a vast pool of knowledge necessary for understanding local realities. However, many internationally acclaimed commentators – even experts – still struggle to find an adequate picture of these realities without internal contradictions and too radical swings of opinion. The connection between these experts and the current knowledge on the region seems weak at best. This seems to be the case with Francis Fukuyama. In a public lecture at Aarhus University in October 2009, he spoke about civil society and democratic institutions emerging virtually out of nowhere in Ukraine during the Orange Revolution. Only a couple of years later, he adjusted his estimate in the book based on the same Aarhus series of lectures and was as bold as to admit that Ukraine provided an example of a “failure to deliver
on the promise of democracy” (Fukuyama, 2011, p. 25; repeated in Fukuyama, 2014, p. 81). Throughout this very same book, which received a very favourable response from the reviewers and the media, Fukuyama finds himself at home using the standard Western reading of Russian history. He does not really distinguish between the Rus’ and Russia, saying that “the Russian state originated in the area around Kiev (Ukraine)” (p. 585), which was “the original Russian area of settlement” (ibid.), thus applying eighteenth-century concepts to realities of nearly a thousand years earlier. While regrettable as a superficiality per se, reading the region’s history in the same way as reviewing what has been written about the contemporary representations of Europe is an explanatory opening that makes it possible to see deeper into the roots and causes of the current discursive constructions of Europe in Ukraine, as well as both its neighbours considered here, since they are the top of the iceberg with regard to different and interwoven histories.

Hauntologically, I adhere to the Derridean understanding of the “spectralised” present as populated by ghosts: voices, ideas and narratives, which are inherited from the past and (re)enacted for a variety of reasons (not least ethical; cf. Derrida, 1994; Ruin, 2016). Ontologically, I do not adhere to the model of homogenous, empty time, where the now is a movement through a progression of identical moments characteristic only by their chronological locations in sequence. It is this model Walter Benjamin has criticised in his final theses “On the Concept of History”. Seeing the now as “shot through with the splinters of Messianic time”, the now that grows out of seeds of the past and contains the seeds of the future is much more productive and complex, reflecting the complexity of reality and our historical experience significantly better. The relevance of history is not something to be disputed for media research either:

[W]e need to investigate broader historical and cultural reasons if we are to explain why media are as they are. […] Cultural factors enable and constrain the room available for political manoeuvre, they provide the cloth out of which the suit is cut. This has quite profound implications for comparative media analysis generally in that the political is often taken to be primary and sometimes the only cause. (Downey and Mihelj, 2012, p. 192)
4. EUROPE IN HISTORY, THE MEDIA AND POLICY

Kyiv Rus’, a medieval feudal and commercial empire with its centre in Kyiv, adopted Christianity in 988 from Constantinople, part of the West that “was considered to be the East in the eyes of the West and which on occasion did not consider itself to be a part of Europe” (Ševčenko, 1992, pp. 175–176). However, large parts of Ukraine were exposed to the influence of West European culture through Poland, which, after its 966 baptism, gradually became a predominately Roman Catholic country. Both Polish and Western sources always saw Poland as belonging to the West until Ottoman cultural influences moved it farther to the Orient in the European imaginary geography in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Ševčenko, 1992, p. 178). Whereas Western influences on Kyiv were mediated through either Byzantium or Poland, Moscow received them from Kyiv in a doubly mediated form until the Petrine reforms (Shevelov, 1954/2009). With its eighteenth-century rise, Russia obtained direct access to Western culture and technology for the first time, while short-lived independent Ukraine was partitioned between Russia and Poland and the situation reversed: the West was now coming to eastern Ukraine in Russian dress.

Europe in Ukraine: Semantic adventures

Early modern Ukraine was part of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth since Halych-Volhynia, a direct heir to Kyiv Rus, fell under its influence. Even though politically subordinate, “[t]he autochtonous population of Ukraine had kept a strong sense of identity and had its own nobility, some of whom,

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4 It has become commonplace for Russian historiography to associate Kyiv Rus’ with the Russian state (helped very much by the identical Russian adjectives rусский ‘Rusian/Ruthenian’ and русский ‘Russian’). Western historians have largely adopted them and they have also been overlooked by non-specialists such as in the case of Fukuyama. In the Ukrainian tradition, Kyiv Rus’ is more often taken to be a predecessor of the Ukrainian state (the early modern Hetmanate, which followed the post-Mongol invasion, the Halych-Volhynia Principality and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania); hence, also Mykhaylo Hrushevsky’s emblematic decision to call his first systematic narrative of Ukrainian history *The History of the Ukraine-Rus*. An alternative third view suggests that Kyiv Rus’ was a supranational feudal and commercial empire made up of numerous princedoms, and it is equally distant and close to modern Ukrainian, Belarusian or Russian polities (developed as a mixture of the original Ruthenian substrate with an adstrate from the west/south in the first instance, west/north in the second, and east/north in the third). On the discussion of the development of the concepts of Russian/Rosian/Ruthenian/Russian, see Yakovenko (2009). The linguist G. Shevelov summarises it as follows: “it was the imperial aspirations of Kiev which made the term рус’кий (then русский) ambiguous in application to both the language and the state” (1979, p. 31), thus giving the stately medieval Kyiv the ultimate historical responsibility for much of the drama as a result of this semantic ambiguity.
like the Ostrogski and Zaslavski, were descended from the former rulers of Kiev” (Zamoyski, 2009, p. 138). Poland was the first to become acquainted with Europe (as I will demonstrate in the respective section), and thanks to the Poles’ assistance, Ukraine soon became aware of this novel concept. It was helped by the fact that, whereas foreigners in Moscow were isolated to a ghetto, Polish, Lithuanian and Ukrainian cities were not unlike “a Babel in which German predominated in the streets over other languages, while patrician circles rang with Polish, Italian and Latin”.

Foreigners from as far afield as England and Spain came to study or teach in its halls, while native graduates went abroad to widen their learning […]. Grzegorz of Sanok, Archbishop of Lwów, who had studied in Germany and Italy, established at his residence of Dunajów near Lwów a small court modelled on that of Urbino, nurtured by a stream of visitors from Italy” (Zamoyski, 2009, p. 53).

Natalya Yakovenko (2012, pp. 205–206) found the earliest Ukrainian record of the word “Europe” – three times in one text already – in a panegyric written in 1591 as a reference to the Continent, within which the anonymous author confidently positioned himself and his native city of Lviv. However, in the following decades, Ukrainian sources very rarely mentioned Europe, which hints to the unique situation of the said author, an Orthodox citizen of the most Westernised Ukrainian city. The frequently mentioned West was portrayed as the enemy of the Orthodox faith and a source of heresy, lies and moral corruption, for example in the anti-Catholic Zahorovsky collection. Yakovenko finds a surge in the number of references to Europe in the second half of the seventeenth century, but her sources are rather indirect, for example the works of the scholars at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy had reference lists with almost exclusively West European material. This surely indicates the presence of Europe on the mental map as a frame of reference, yet at the moment there is nothing to suggest the existence of a widespread and systematically practised discourse on Europe. At this time, roughly between 1650 and 1690, Ukraine broke away from Poland-Lithuania and entered a union with Muscovy, but its degree of independence was still significant, and clerics as well as other elites frequently travelled to Western Europe in an attempt to improve their knowledge. The idea of Europe becomes commonplace between 1690 and 1708; these were times of intensive social and cultural development under the hetman (a military and political commander) Ivan Mazepa. It was also facilitated by the rise of Continental politics during the early years of the
Great Northern War (1700–1721), which also shook Ukraine, as well as the Ukrainian elite’s intensive cultural interaction with the West.

This change from sporadic to omnipresent references to Europe can be traced in several key sources. If we look at earlier documents, in the decrees (universally) by Bohdan Khmelnitsky (1595–1657), a Ukrainian hetman and the leader of the uprising that broke Ukraine away from the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, Europe is never mentioned (although he corresponded in Latin with the Hungarian and Swedish monarchs, as he did with the Polish king, the Ottoman sultan and the Moscow tsar). Yet the chronicle by Samyiło Velychko (1670–after 1728) attributes passionate speeches to the hetman, in all likelihood creations of the writer, an educated member of the new Ukrainian elite formed in the synthesis of the old nobility and the new upper class of Cossack commanders elevated by Khmelnitsky’s uprising, which shook the entire region. It is important to note that Velychko had a rather pro-Russian outlook and was certainly not a supporter of Mazepa whom he depicts in a rather negative light (Shevchuk, 1991). In the speeches, the European realm, focused on “the famed European rivers of Vistula and Oder”, is defined as a geographical denomination and the space where “the Ukrainian glory” is spread as much as it is in the Asiatic lands whose location is given as “lying across the Black Sea” (Krypyakevych & Butych, 1998, p. 252). Moreover, Velychko’s pseudo-Khmelnitsky claimed that Ukrainians were behind the AD 476 takeover of Rome, which “can be called the mother of all European cities” by suggesting a “Ruthenian” identity for “our ancestor” Odoacer (ibid., 256), a Germanic king whose assault on the capital of the Western Roman Empire is now widely used to mark the watershed between antiquity and the Middle Ages. In Chapter 1 of Part VII of his history, Velychko directly places Ukraine and Poland “in our European part [of the world]” (Velychko, 1991, p. 235; all translations from Velychko my own). It is important to note that he was basing his half-factual/half-fictional writing partly on Polish sources, so it could be hypothesised that his awareness of Europe was likewise to some extent inspired by the Polish material.

How do we know that Europe had little currency in Ukraine earlier? On 22 January 1686, one of Khmelnitsky’s successors, the hetman Ivan Samoylovytch (?–1690), wrote a lengthy – and this time very real – epistle to the co-regents of the Russian throne, Peter I and Princess Sophia, in response to their declared intent to negotiate a peace with Poland. Samoylovytch gives an incredibly detailed account of the political situation at the time well beyond his sphere of influence; he mentions not just Vienna, where “the
Turk” was defeated a few years ago, but also Venice, papal Rome, France, the Holy Roman Empire, Hungary, Walachia, all involved in a complicated political game. But although he already gives an early example of setting the normativity of the European ways (by suggesting the tsars should follow the conduct of the French king), he finds no place for “Europe” in this analysis. He sees many rival players; he sees Poland, the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Empire as a geopolitical chessboard and his general frame of reference, which is dominated by religious differences (Christian vs. Muslim and Western Church vs. Eastern Church); yet he still does not see Europe as something that would arise out of the emerging national borders, neither does he use this very word (Butych & Rynstevych, 2006, pp. 510–524). As of 1686, a leading member of the Ukrainian upper classes with a standard education seemingly showed little awareness of the Continent as an entity in itself. Of course, it is important to note the context. The epistle was addressed to the Russian tsars, therefore Samoylovych – a skillful politician versed in public rhetoric – was inclined to use the concepts that would resonate with his addressees. At the very least, this shows that, even if Europe as a concept was familiar to Samoylovych, the new political context (common with Russia) made this concept less relevant than it was in the older context, common with Poland.

Deposed by the Russians and sent the following year to Siberia to die in exile, Samoylovych was born, in all likelihood, around 1640 (his military career only started around 1660). This was an entirely different generation to Khmelnytsky, the generation too young to participate in his war but had witnessed it first-hand. Now, Velychko, born in 1670, belonged to yet another generation. While Samoylovych was writing his letter, Velychko was still busy getting an education; probably, his teachers shared Samoylovych’s perspective, and it was not in the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy where he learned that there was such a thing as “Europe”. Since 1690, Velychko occupied an important position in the Hetmanate, performing diplomatic and possibly even secret missions, even though he probably never travelled beyond Eastern Europe (Shevchuk, 1991).

By the early eighteenth century, a specific court and civic culture had formed in Ukraine, shaped by the ideology and practices of the European baroque; at this very time, Peter I brought his obsession with the West to his dominions, and the much older Mazepa, who had spent his formative years at the Polish royal court, became a key advisor and a close friend of the tsar. West European influences have been found in the recently excavated remnants of Mazepa’s palace in Baturyn (Dimnik & Mezentsev, 2016). It
4. EUROPE IN HISTORY, THE MEDIA AND POLICY

must have been at this time that the awareness of the Continent which transcends the boundaries of the individual countries first takes hold among sections of the Ukrainian elites (perhaps the more politically flexible, highest aristocratic and administrative elites rather than the religion-centric clerics preoccupied with reinforcing Orthodoxy as the basis of their power). It could hardly have happened later seeing as the Russian authorities had dramatically restricted the Hetmanate’s autonomy post-1709, which also seriously affected the culture by undermining its Westernising tendencies. Moreover, Velychko was imprisoned between 1708 and 1715; he started writing his historical work after his release and most likely already had a fully formed worldview. If Europe took such a prominent place in it, it had to have occurred before 1708. The years between 1686 and 1708 were the time of invention – or, rather, transplantation – of Europe in the Ukrainian context. The timing seems consistent with the West European chronology. Likewise, in the West, “the word ‘Europe’ remained rarely used until the fifteenth century […] some kind of European identity became discernible first in the sixteenth century, as the idea of Europe was gradually liberated from that of Christianity and given a secular meaning” (Fornäs, 2012, p. 11). The concept first developed in the secularising sixteenth-century Europe was adopted in Ukraine at the turn of the eighteenth century, which suggests that Ukraine’s status within the Continent was on the periphery of other European peripheries.

It is important to note, however, that what makes Velychko’s case so interesting is that he had little immediate interaction with Western Europe, having, in all likelihood, never travelled outside the Hetmanate, the Polish-controlled Right-Bank Ukraine and Russia. Earlier examples include people like Yuriy Nemyrych (1612–1659), one of the richest Ukrainian aristocrats at the time. Born into a princely Protestant family, he received the best possible education of the time in Leiden, Amsterdam, Basel, Padua, Oxford and Cambridge thanks to his religious connections. Like all old nobles, he was firmly rooted in the Polish milieu. At the beginning of Khmelnytsky’s uprising, Nemyrych fought on the Polish side; however, as the tide of war changed, he switched allegiance to the Ukrainian side and even converted from Socinianism (Anti-Trinitarianism or Polish Arianism) to the Orthodox faith. His high birth, wealth and experience catapulted this member of the old nobility immediately into the crème de la crème of the nascent Cossack nobility as a top diplomat and lawmaker (but it also made him hated among the commoners, which was one of the reasons for his eventual downfall and murder after a few tumultuous years). European references
are dotted all over his *Discursus de bello Moscovitico...* (Nemyrych, 1634/2014), published in Paris. His arguments for the continued war against Muscovy and the best tactics for winning it focus on examples of classical antiquity and contemporary European politics and warfare. Poland-Lithuania is identified with other Western lands, and together they were opposed to Muscovy, portrayed in the book as the enemy of liberty. Nemyrych never uses the word “Europe” but apparently knows it as a concept when he says that “our lands” have an export advantage over Muscovy in both the quality of the grain and a “proximity” to an unnamed entity, apparently the European markets (ibid., p. 27). However, Nemyrych’s case is best understood in isolation because of its uniqueness; while people like him, Mazepa or Mazepa’s émigré successor Pylyp Orlyk (1672–1742) had a very personal and immediate connection to Europe, Velychko’s case is indicative of Europe’s image of expanding beyond a few people to wider circles of the elite.

Ivan Mazepa’s switching sides in 1708, from Peter I to Charles XII, is especially interesting to analyse in the light of his apparent familiarity with Europe and his belief in its superiority. Charles entered Ukraine with a greatly weakened army, yet Mazepa’s faith in its strength must have been such that he believed in its success even under such pitiful conditions. His opinions have at times been preserved in the well-kept diaries of Swedish officers. When, shortly after Mazepa had joined the Swedes, one of the Swedish units was defeated in a minor skirmish with the Russian army, in which Mazepa narrowly avoided being captured, he reportedly uttered “*non putavi suecos fugam dare*” [I did not think that the Swedes would flee] (Weihe, 1902, p. 32). Two months later, on 13 February 1709, the Swedish–Ukrainian force marched towards a location called Kolomak on the border of the Hetmanate and Sloboda Ukraine, where Mazepa had been elected to rule Ukraine in 1687. The hetman rode alongside the king and flattered his accomplishment of reaching within “8 lieu of Asia”, or roughly 30-40 km (“que l’on n’étoit plus q’à huit lieues de l’Asie”); Charles replied that geographers would not agree (Adlerfeld, 1740, p. 420). It is apparent that they both saw Ukraine, where they were marching, as being clearly in Europe, and the source of disagreement likely concerned the interpretation of Ptolemy’s *Geography* that put Europe’s border at the river Don. It is of

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5 The book’s full title occupies several lines, so it is customary to refer to it by the first words only.
interest, though, that Mazepa may have referred to the Russian lands a few dozen kilometres away from this place.

This story has an interesting continuation in another Swedish source. General Gyllenkrook recalled:

In Kolomak, the King ordered me to investigate the route to Asia. I replied, “Asia is far from here and lies in a different direction”. The King objected: “Mazepa told me that Asia is near. We must go there to be able to say that we have been in Asia”. I responded, “Your Majesty must be joking with me and is surely not contemplating a campaign in Asia”. The King said: “I am not joking. You must ask about the route to Asia”. I replied that I would immediately do it but added that Asia was a few hundred miles away. From the King’s headquarters I went to Mazepa and asked him to tell me about the route to Asia. Mazepa enquired, “Why would you need to know the route to Asia?” I responded, “Your Lordship has told the King that Asia is near here, so His Majesty has ordered me to inquire about the route to Asia and is intending to go there”. Mazepa was very frightened and said he was jesting with the King. […] He promised to go to the King and ask him to change his mind. (Gyllenkrook, 1844, p. 77; my translation)

The case of Orlyk is equally noteworthy. Having escaped the Russian army with Charles XII and Mazepa, who was nearing his death, Orlyk became the first Ukrainian leader in exile. He tried to continue the struggle by endeavouring to get the European powers to fight alongside Ukraine in the war against Russia. He carried out a botched but famous raid into the Russia-controlled Hetmanate. He then went and resided in Stockholm, and his travels included Germany, Poland, Austria, and the Ottoman Empire, where he was eventually put under an honourable house arrest until his death. In the words of Daniel Beauvois (2004), Orlyk was “a typical representative of Eastern Europe, significantly closer to the Sarmatian baroque, in whose spirit he was educated, than to the Enlightenment that was only nascent then” (p. 324; my translation). He bequeathed an enormous diary that only these days is entering the academic current and gives a precious insight into the mindset of an early modern educated Ukrainian. The diary is a document of Orlyk’s sophisticated diplomacy and his travels, which included Vienna, Istanbul, Stockholm, Warsaw, St Petersburg, Paris, London and other capitals. This was a truly Europe-wide endeavour to persuade Europe of Ukraine’s existence and importance and to get it embroiled in Ukraine’s struggle for independence (which luckily coincided with Orlyk’s personal interest and claim to power). Not only is this diplomacy intricate
but also devilish and Machiavellian; he does not eschew the idea of selling his correspondents’ secrets if it suits him or switching sides by making sharp U-turns.

The diary’s form and style that beyond personal notes resembles a spacious baroque chamber dominated by copies of received or sent letters not only in Polish or Latin but also in French with Turkish, Serbian, Greek, and Ruthenian expressions seems to be the most trustworthy cast of his inventive mind. A cosmopolite by birth, this strange “European” is a chameleon that assumes the hue of whoever he is writing to. [...] The diary] is a testimony to the awareness of the Ukrainian idea in Europe that was based exclusively on the belief in Orlyk’s statements” (Beauvois, 2004, pp. 325–326; my translation)

Regarding the Ukrainian elite’s idea of Europe, the figure of Orlyk was an equally eloquent witness: while deeply integrated into Europe at the personal level, they were Europeans of the past. The baroque people were led by rationally pursued opportunistic self-interest rather than by rational ideological principles. They were light years from the Enlightenment and its value-based European discourse, whereas lower classes such as administrators of Velychko’s status were much closer to it.

In the next decades, the bourgeois classes followed suit, thus giving early examples of an East Europe viewing the West with positive envy. One such example was the encounter Vasyl Hryhorovych-Barsky (1701–1747), the son of a wealthy merchant family, had with both Europe and Asia. In 1724, he left on a practically lifelong pilgrimage. Even one of his first stops, namely the Central European city of Košice, receives a favourable mention in his lengthy travelogue; Naples is admired for its regular street planning and the beautiful marbled facades hiding “affluent and noblemen drinking coffee and liquors [vodka] and other expensive drinks from dawn till dusk at the pharmacies” (Hryhorovych-Barsky, 1748/2000, pp. 66–67; my translation). The bourgeois traveller enters Vienna on 1 June 1724, perhaps missing out on meeting the aristocratic and scheming Orlyk on the same street by several months. The former sees it thus:

...like a beautiful paradise, as there stand orderly and very beautiful mason houses, each adorned with a lamp hanging from a piece of iron. [...] I have also seen finely crafted stone wells or fountains from which water flows in many directions. [...] Every house there has a separate well fitted with a pump [smok]; some are in view and some are concealed within a wall
It seems a likely conjecture that Kyiv’s first public water supply network, based on the famous Samson fountain, was constructed in 1748 by the writer’s own brother, the architect Ivan Hryhorovych-Barsky (1713–1791), only one year after his vagabond sibling had finally returned to their home city to die a few months later, bequeathing the manuscript I have quoted from. If Vasyl’s stories inspired this urban infrastructure development, it would be one of the early examples of Western Europe taken by Ukrainians as a standard to directly follow. To give justice to this extremely interesting account, it must be said that the Ukrainian traveller found many wonders (such as a clever ventilation system) in Egypt, Palestine and Syria, the destinations of his pilgrimage; but he was definitely not fascinated by chaotic street planning and a lack of water, which became a commodity for sale in Cairo (a big surprise to the author). Strangely, Vasyl’s stories of passport (or rather “patent”) misfortunes in pretty much every city strike a worrying tone for many an East European ear nearly three centuries later.

Picture 2. The Samson fountain in Kyiv (1748), the main hub of Kyiv’s first water supply system, likely inspired by travels to the West
At the end of the eighteenth century, whose beginning marked the arrival of the concept of Europe, one sees a perspective on Europe as an entity completely shaped under the Enlightenment’s influence. The speech by Khmelnytsky⁶ that Velychko crafted is quoted word-by-word in one of the foundational documents of Ukrainian nationalism, *History of the Rus* (written between 1769 and 1809). The anonymous manuscript penned by a member of Ukraine’s old Cossack elite resurfaced in the late 1820s and became widely read among the Ukrainian and Russian intelligentsia and nobility. It had a tremendous influence on those who developed a modern Ukrainian project, and through them it became part of the Ukrainian cultural DNA. Besides this speech, the text mentions Europe well over a dozen times; there is a discernible idea about Europe, although many of the references concern wars between European countries. Europe is a geographical locus, a family of monarchies and monarchs indeed interrelated but also a gaze that observes the events and in front of whom the dramatic historical play unfolded. As one, Europe respects the Swedish king and fears the Turks; in a few places, European courts speak to Khmelnytsky, the Ukrainian leader, directly on behalf of the entire community, expressing its common interest, for example in preventing Ukraine’s alliance with Moscow for fear of the disproportionate rise of Muscovy. Europe also acquires the meaning of “the civilisation per se”. Describing the Cossack massacre of the Polish troops who attacked them despite the ceasefire, the author says “their slaughter was cruel and ruthless like that of the filthy predators rather than the European troops” (Anonymous author, 1991, p. 151; my translation).

The early nineteenth-century rise of Ukrainian nationalism was first linked to pan-Slavism, with the St Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood’s project to reunite Slavonic lands in a loose federation with its centre in Kyiv. In their foundational text, “The Books of Being of the Ukrainian Nation”, Europe is not referred to even once, although the text reveals a multi-layered geographic imaginary where Slavs are a separate, and the most important, group, with West European nations such as Germany and France somewhat in the background. Taras Shevchenko (1814–1861), the national poet of Ukraine, hardly mentions Europe, while his key points of reference seem to be Slavdom and wider humanity. He was, however, bit-

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⁶ The absence of references to “Europe” in Samoylovych’s documents merely supports the understanding that the speech was indeed invented or heavily rewritten by Velychko rather than coming from some contemporary sources (he did use numerous various authentic documents, also known independently of his text, unlike the Khmelnytsky speech).
terly critical of the Germans, whom he used as a byword for all things foreign and whom he saw as an external colonising force used by the Russian Empire to settle and subdue formerly Cossack lands. In his texts, the Russians and Germans often act as one, using the effects of education and Enlightenment to dominate poorly educated peripheries forced into backwardness. As Pakhliovska (2013) showed, his main external focus remained on the empire and other subaltern nations (Poland, Bohemia, Caucasus and Central Asia). Because the Slavophilic idea was becoming more and more objectionable, Ukrainian nationalism later drifted towards socialism, and the two merged in the political programmes of Mykhaylo Drahomanov (1841–1895) and Ivan Franko (1856–1916). It was Drahomanov, an offspring of a noble Cossack family and a professor at the newly founded University of Sophia in Bulgaria, who is credited with drafting the first consistent Ukrainian political programme. He also invented Europe as a political idea in and for Ukraine. His well-known formula taught young Ukrainians to “stand with your feet and heart in Ukraine, keep your heads in Europe and embrace all of the Slavdom [Slov’yanshchyna] with your hands” (Prykhoda, 2007, p. 143; my translation). Drahomanov saw Europe as an epitome of modernity and progress: “the language must be made the organ of a genuine European culture”. Comparing the Polish publications more favourably to the Ukrainian ones, he noted that in them “you sense contemporary Europe”, while in the Ukrainian ones “you sometimes would not know in what year they were printed” (Drahomanov, 2013, p. 385) – he had of course an anti-traditionalist perspective. Drahomanov also was among the first to credit Europe with the potential to solve Ukraine’s problems when he spoke about “the need to put the Ukrainian movement on a foundation that is European in ideology and geography – only on such a foundation can the Ukrainian cause in general succeed and in particular survive the present reaction” (Drahomanov, 2013, p. 378).

Through the eyes of the founding father of the Ukrainian socialist liberation movement, Europe was seen manifold. It was something different to both Ukraine and the Russian Empire as such, something against which both could be examined very critically. At the same time, Drahomanov clearly put the political Russia among the European powers, and his Ukraine was an even more integral part of Europe. However, this process was seen dialectically: Ukraine’s Europeanness was not only something to be admitted but also to be proved, affirmed and even actively created; for Drahomanov, this was because his country, while being European, also very obviously lacked Europeanness. This is the tradition that, as will in the
following be evident from the analysis of today’s press in Ukraine, remains alive. In the words of one of his letters, “if we say that we are part of Europe, we must not forget this Europe, which knows only from our lips who we are” (Drahomanov, 2013, p. 454); hence, his ceaseless appeals to “remind Europe about us”, “to acquaint Europe with us”, “to make Europe remember us”, etc. He had a pragmatic geopolitical perspective on Europe, too, urging the like-minded to try to interest Europe in Ukraine with concrete political issues of international importance. Moreover, he found it obvious that “Ukraine cannot interest Europe from the national diplomatic point of view – even Poland does not interest anyone now from that point of view” (Drahomanov, 2013, pp. 368–369).

At the same time, the value-based view on Europe co-existed, often infused with the continued materialist admiration for the Continent, or its part that lay to the west, echoing the eighteenth-century narratives by Hryhorovych-Barsky. In 1857–1858, one of the finest hotels in Kyiv was built in what was then known as Theatre Square, and it was christened Hôtel l’Europe. The square thus began to be referred to as “European” until it was renamed in 1869 as Tsar Square. Rebranded once more, this time as the Third International Square, by the Bolshevik authorities in 1919, it was renamed Adolf-Hitler-Platz by the Nazi occupiers between 1941 and 1943, after which it was again renamed Stalin Square. After another Communist-themed change, it was finally renamed European Square in 1996 in tribute to the nineteenth-century hotel and the square’s short-lived name. Its close proximity to Maidan (Independence Square) played a role in the 2000s–2010s protests being held in this part of the city. Occupying European Square was a symbolic act, as symbolic as the number of renamings itself, each in support of the changing powers: the Tsar, Hitler, Stalin (see Cybriwsky, 2014, p. 152).
It is important to note that the idea of Europe was propagated in Ukraine by the people of middle class origins: administrators (such as Velychko),burghers (such as Hryhorovych-Barsky) or petty gentry (such as Drahomanov). This is in contrast with Russia where the main Europeanising class was aristocracy (cf. the next section), numerically small and concentrated in a few larger cities and thus out of touch with the masses, and in a closer parallel with Poland where the principal participants in the discourse on Europe where representatives of gentry. However, while the Polish gentry (szlachta) made up around 7 per cent of the population (Zamoyski, 2009, p. 79), Ukraine’s pro-European classes were much smaller. Even though they were better poised to convey the European message to the general population, their smaller number limited the effect of this activity (more like in Russia).

Towards the late nineteenth century, Ukraine was often thought of not only as part of Europe but also as the most European part of the Russian Empire but often in a would-be mode. “Our nineteenth-century Ukraine, having become a ‘province’, lags behind the progressive [peredovoyi] Europe more than it would have done if it had followed its path of the seventeenth century; what is more, it lags behind even Muscovy” (Drahomanov, 1996, p. 403; my translation). Still, this ambiguous self-identification persisted until 1917 (Borets, 2012), sometimes coupled with a ruthless critique of the national self-identity and a yearning for Europeanness expressed negatively through the rejection of Asia (later, in the twentieth
century, the Asiatic label was passed on to Russia as opposed to the idea of Ukraine as integrally European). In 1881, the writer Panteleymon Kulish (1819–1897) addressed his fellow countrymen in his “Do ridnoho narodu (podayuchy yomu ukrayins’ky pereklad Shekspirovykh tvoriv)” [To My Own People (On Entrusting Him With the Ukrainian Translation of Shakespeare’s Works)] as “Ye people sans reason, sans honour, sans respect” and “Barbar”, and encouraged them thus (in my translation):

Take this universal mirror, see thyself therein,
Grasp what a miserable Asian thou art,
Find no pride in thy fierce unrule,
Forget the filthy way of violence,
And return to the family of the cultured.

In another poem dedicated to the start of his work, he also addressed Shakespeare – emblematic of the Western European culture turned universal – as “Father” and “Homer of the modern world”, begging to “Let us rid ourselves of barbarity in thy temple” (Kulish, 1994, pp. 385–386; my translation).

Ivan Franko, a West Ukrainian writer and intellectual, lauded Kulish’s translations by complimenting that this translation “can be shown without any reticence in the concert of the European interpreters of the great Briton” (Franko, 1899/1986, p. 169; my translation). A lot more famous and influential than his teacher, Franko became one of the most stubborn Drahomovians in his treatment of Europe. As a scholar of his work noted (Prykhoda, 2007), Franko reserved the greatest praise for anyone he was writing about who thought and spoke like a European, as “the European” was for him synonymous with being highly cultured or developed, also urban, rational, regular, well cared for. National difference was a frame that should have been filled with the content of European achievements. One of his more important articles is unambiguously titled “We too are in Europe” (Prykhoda, 2007, p. 144). The Ukrainian nation “also lives undoubtedly in Europe”, where it is “a living flame among the family of the European nations and an active collaborator in the European civilisational work” (Franko, 1896/1986, p. 340; my translation). Franko’s political programme included not only transplanting entire genres, poetic and academic forms, onto Ukrainian soil but also contrasting with the Russian experience, where Europeanness was superficially and forcefully imposed without properly digesting it.
The next milestone in the history of the Ukrainian perception of Europe was set after the events of 1917 to 1921, when the ambiguity in identifying Ukraine as either European or Russian had catastrophic consequences for another short-lived independent Ukrainian state. In 1920s Soviet Ukraine, a group of classically educated intellectuals and poets, led by Mykola Zerov (1890–1937), called for an orientation on the classical and modernist European culture in a tone subversive to the dominant politicised Bolshevik programme. They found an unexpected ally in Mykola Khvylov (1893–1933), an ethnic Russian, and a Ukrainian by choice, a passionate communist and a follower of the James Joyce school of writing. He preached a global revolution that would free the colonial nations, and he spoke of “the Asiatic renaissance” a few decades prior to Frantz Fanon’s revolutionary writings and about ten years before Aimé Césaire invented the concept of Négritude. Ukraine, situated between Europe and Asia, seemed a natural platform to launch such a project, but this was prevented by its provincialness caused by Russian imperialism, omnipresent also in the Soviet Union. So Khvylov (1983, pp. 172–174) coined slogans like “Leaving Moscow” and “Towards the psychological Europe”. For him, Europe was associated with technical, cultural and civilising achievements the proletariat had to inherit and develop rather than destroy. Of course, such ideas did not serve the Soviet leadership well, and after a few years of ceaseless public penance, Khvylov lost faith in the Left idea and committed suicide in 1933, likely influenced by the Great Famine. Zerov’s group almost entirely perished in the Gulag. For decades after the Stalinist purges, the discourse of Europe was appropriated by propaganda, and any other approach could only be practised in diasporic and underground circles. The use of the Aesopian language was also typical just as in the Soviet Russia (cf. Sandomiskaja, 2015a). The only possible way of speaking publicly about Europe was in accord with a 1931 poem by Pavlo Tychyny (1891–1967) that marked the forced transition of its author from symbolist and expressionist experiments to equally experimental propagandist slogans (quoted in Hrabovych, 1997, pp. 372–373):

let Europe croak
we have one thought
we have but one troublation
traditions’ uprootation
and collectivisation\(^7\)

Meanwhile in Western Ukraine under the Polish rule in the Interbellum period, a fascinating case is illustrated by Count Andrey Sheptytsky (1865–1944), Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church for over four decades, effectively being the uncrowned monarch for Ukrainians in Austrian and then Polish Galicia. In his sermons, the idea of Europe developed in an interesting direction. Early on, he often constructs Europe as a dynamical system of oppositions where “we” may not be European in comparison with West Europeans but most certainly are compared with those further east. For example, he wrote, “too often many among us forget what socialism in Europe is” (Sheptytsky, 1904/2007, p. 518), thus clearly differentiating “us” and Europe. As he shared his impressions of a Middle Eastern journey, he called the locals’ “movements, gestures, walk, talk, customs so different from ours, in Europe” (1906/2007, p. 592). In 1910, when advocating the establishment of a Ukrainian university in Lviv, he called upon the Austrian parliament to once again use Europe as a legitimation device, constructing it as a threat to us (Austrian subjects rather than Ukrainians): “…in times when some powerful and great stately organism of Europe is building its existence upon one-sided and unjust nationalism, Austria alone lays […] a stone under a structure of a higher order…” (1910/2007, p. 721). Towards the end of his life, he becomes more certain of Ukraine’s place in Europe. Reacting to Soviet Ukraine’s Great Famine, the Holodomor, he called the country “the richest land of Europe” (Sheptytsky, 1936/2009, p. 306). Also, he expressed the aspiration that Ukrainians “earn such a position amidst the nations of Europe, in which it could develop all its God-given forces” (Sheptytsky, 1941/2010, p. 114). Before and during WWII Europe became an important frame of reference not only in his works. On the one hand, nationalists such as a fascist sympathiser Dmytro Dontsov (1883–1973) used European imperialism to preach intolerance and ruthlessness to his young followers but also to portray the current situation as “the conflict between Europe (to which Ukraine belonged) and Russia as a clash of civilizations” (Shkandrij, 2015, p. 81). On the other hand, liberal figures and critiques of Dontsov, such as

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\(^7\) My own translation — equally experimental — reflects the Ukrainian original’s neologisms, which sound just as weird, awkward, idiotic and ridiculous in the language in which they were coined, reflecting the fracturing of language that was happening along with the destruction of social structures and the severing of social ties.
George Shevelov (Hundorova, 2015), also applied Europe as a frame of reference to debunk those theories.

At a both more popular and more private level, Europe and the United States started to flood the Soviet Union with their pop culture and mass-produced quality goods since the 1960s, creating what Oleksandr Hrytsenko (2001) has highlighted as cargo cults. In the post-Soviet environment, the “creolisation” of the imported Western-looking goods (so-called “euro-things”: “euro-windows”, “euro-doors”, “euro-renovation”) gave them new quality and new meaning, comparable to the ones existing within aboriginal worship of the foreign, typically Western, things. It is this melange of a consumerist cargo cult, rediscovered earlier discourses and the success of neighbouring Poland and other Central European countries that elicited the urge to move “towards Europe” and to understand one’s own European identification and its deficiencies, something that set the stage for Ukraine’s European choice, peaceful between 2004 and 2014, and militant from 2014 onwards. In the context, the media, working to report and “domesticate” the other (Riegert & Åker, 2004, p. 86), fulfil this mission. However, during this domestication the homeland experience does not become a “yardstick” the foreigner is to be judged against (ibid., p. 85); on the contrary, the homeland is measured against the yardstick of Europe, a bit like a savage looking up to a civilised person, the Eastern European media form a perfectly complementary symbiosis with their Western European counterpart’s orientalising coverage of Eastern Europe (cf. ibid.).

According to Andreas Widholm’s study (2011), “a ‘true’ European”, as seen on BBC World and Euronews, “lives inside, not outside, the borders of the European Union” (p. 229). These TV channels showed considerable ambiguity in identifying Ukraine during the Orange Revolution. History and the East–West divide were the key elements of their coverage. According to Andreas Widholm’s study (2011), “a ‘true’ European”, as seen on BBC World and Euronews, “lives inside, not outside, the borders of the European Union” (p. 229). These TV channels showed considerable ambiguity in identifying Ukraine during the Orange Revolution. History and the East–West divide were the key elements of their coverage.

Kuzio (2001) showed how the political parties of the day constructed Ukraine’s Other as either Europe or Russia, depending on their preferred project of national identity. Ola Hnatiuk (2003) pinpointed the Westernising and Europeanising project as one of the key identity-building projects in Ukraine in the 1990s and 2000s, competing against the Soviet and the nativist ones. Faced with not having a unifying national project, Ukraine as a “nationalising state” opted for this Europeanisation, this reaffirmation of its European identity as a compromise between democratic nationalist groups and the ruling post-Communist elites, as Wolczuk (2000b) posited. Still, the same author (Wolczuk, 2000a) found that this Europeanisation could also be called “declarative”, and nothing has really challenged her
account until recently; perhaps the fatal November decision by the Yanukovych government marked the zenith and the turning point of this declarative Europeanisation. The events before, during and after the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in November 2013 confirmed this observation once again. Yet they also revealed a major discrepancy between conventional policymaking in Ukraine and civil society’s aspirations, which Pachlovska (2004, p. 41) had noted some ten years earlier by pitting the Idealpolitik of the progressive pro-European intelligentsia against the ruling elites’ cynical manipulation of the independence to reconstruct it as “mafia-like space [spazio di stampo mafioso] on the axis Moscow–Kyiv”.

Arguably one of the most interesting pieces of research on the representation of Europe in Ukrainian public discourses was produced by Dariya Orlova (2010), and it can also be applied to other Eastern and at times even Central European contexts. She focused mainly on the EU as a normative model in the most popular Ukrainian live political talk shows from 2006 to 2010. According to Orlova, in the mediatised political discourse,

‘Europe’ is largely referred to as embodiment of normality and development, advanced social and political practices. However, this reference frequently constitutes part of the discursive strategies employed by actors of discourse to legitimise or delegitimise certain practices and decisions within the Ukrainian context. […] Therefore, ‘Europe’ is mostly referred to as a reference point, which evidences that the symbolic aspect of references dominates over institutional” (ibid., pp. 26–27).

Thus, Europe could in the Ukrainian discourse be constructed twofold: as a final destination point and a separate geopolitical entity.

As the Ukrainian movement in both empires was gradually realising its potential, it became aware of the resource Europe’s prestige and prowess could give Ukraine once it could jump on the European bandwagon. Ukraine’s Europeanness, from this perspective, had to be proved rather than, as in Drahomanov’s progressive programme, constructed from scratch. Such a logic led to an array of historical myths and falsifications that began in January 1882 with an exaggerated publication by the reputable historian Oleksandr Lazarevsky (1834–1902) in the newly established journal Kievskaya starina. In it, he purported, without much critical consideration, that a fragment he had found, with as much as three lines of address to the hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, copied by some Polish nobleman into his notebook, was in fact the beginning of an unknown letter by no other than
Oliver Cromwell, as the notebook’s owner believed (Lazarevsky, 1882, p. 212). This was later readily accepted by a number of twentieth-century historians who went as far as to speculate about fully fledged embassies and imaginary details of potential alliances between the two military leaders from the far west and the far east of Europe. Lubomyr Vynar (1958) disproved this, asserting, rather curiously, that the addressing must be false because, among other things, unlike all contemporary English sources, it transliterates the hetman’s name correctly. Yet even as late as 2002, one of the respectable newspapers I am analysing here published an article that repeats a century-old myth (Dzerkalo Tyzhnya, 26 July 2002). An even more dubious legend about the Scottish origin of one of Khmelnytsky’s most ruthless generals, Maksym Kryvonis, plays well into this context after it was championed by several historians in the 1920s who went as far as citing his roots in the Campbell clan and calling him “an English agent”, all of which the tireless Vynar (1972) unmasked as utter fiction based on a single dubious source. Yet another “English” legend concerns the so-called treasures of Pavlo Polubotok (ca. 1660–1724), another member of the Cossack elite who died in prison. Peter I had incarcerated him for his independent stance. In January 1908, his distant descendant, the academic and musician Oleksandr Rubets (1837–1913) gathered a few hundred other potential heirs and announced that he knew a tightly guarded family secret. Before his demise, Polubotok was said to have deposited part of his proverbial riches in an English bank. The descendants now started planning the return of the money. Nothing came of it, but over time the legend became more interesting. By the 1980s, the accumulated interest was reported to be either bigger than the UK’s GDP or all the money in the world; another detail was that the gold was cashed in on the condition that it was payable only to the independent Ukrainian state. This version was instrumentalised by the pro-independence campaigners in 1991; politicians were seriously calculating the number of kilos of gold every Ukrainian would receive. Others went as far as to suggest that “Britain owed its rise to the Ukrainian gold”. The only tangible outcome of this was a postmodern comedy film, Vpered, za skarbamy het’mana! [The Hunt for the Cossack Gold] (1993), by Vadym Castelli, that ironically renegotiated this national myth.

There are, of course, myths endowed with less comedic potential and actually only partly mythical. One of the most championed historical facts in Ukraine is that one of the daughters of the Kyiv prince Yaroslav the Wise married the French king and later ruled as a regent for their son; she is still remembered in France as Anne de Kiev. Kyiv was probably a bigger city
than Paris, and Ukrainians often imagine her to be a civilised ruler among barbarians. There is a widespread belief that she had brought with her from Kyiv the Gospel of Reims used in the coronation ceremony of French royalty, and thus “the Ukrainian book crowned French kings for centuries”. Not even considering the fact that the princely family of Kyiv was mostly of Swedish extraction at the time and had only very little Slavonic blood, the book itself is in reality a compilation only partly in Cyrillic, and even that comes from fifteenth-century Moravia. Moreover, she was never a regent.8

However, the falsification of Ukraine’s Europeanness assumed truly mythical proportions in the works of the once-reputable historian Elie (Ilko) Borschak (1892–1959), one of the key Slavists in France. A Ukrainian Jew, he was a Social Democratic politician and the secretary of the Ukrainian delegation at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, where the European powers completely ignored the Ukrainian issue. This must have been a traumatic experience for Borschak, who never returned to the now-Soviet-controlled Ukraine (although his left-wing sympathies earned him a better reputation in the Soviet Union at more liberal times). Borschak remained in France, where over the next few decades he found and published dozens of documents, many or most of them tampered with or simply his own inventions (the extent of his fraud is only now becoming evident, although not completely). He chose to follow the successful case of Poland, which had just been recognised at the Paris Peace Conference. He began by creating an archive that would persuade the French there had already been an established discourse of Ukraine in France, by Napoleon and his entourage no less. Some of these documents were authentic but mistranslated, others misattributed on purpose to more significant authors or hypothetical Ukrainian advisors to the emperor; others were even filled out with Borschak’s own lengthy eulogies; and finally, some were totally made up. All this to create an impression that Napoleon respectfully saw Ukraine as a legitimate state project, while in reality he was only marginally interested in it as an offshoot of his Polish and Russian plans; in fact, it was the Poles who tried to persuade the emperor of its importance (see Adadurov, 2005, for a full account of Borschak’s Napoleonic project). The scholar, whose invent-

8 I cannot help but mention an anecdote as evidence of the importance of Anne de Kiev’s story (the subject of a great many plays, ballets and an opera) for the construction of Europe in Ukraine. One of my lyceum teachers, otherwise an author of popular historical novels and a journalist who in his time got me involved in the media sphere, once recited his own poem on the subject during a lesson, describing Europe as a “content lion” who was reprimanded for not helping Ukraine enough “although we were giving you your queens!”
tions were welcomed as serious discoveries, did not stop here; he produced a document that would haunt Ukrainian history for decades, *Deduction des droits de l’Ukraine* [“Devolution of Ukraine’s Rights”]. Borschak reported he had found the original manuscript in a French castle that once belonged to the descendants of Pylyp Orlyk (rumoured to be the author of the text). By a strange coincidence, nobody else has ever located the manuscript, no matter how hard they have tried. Europe is on every page of the text. It is an elaborate defence of Ukraine’s right to independence, advocating the country’s rights vis-à-vis the European governments – the subject and the audience are telling. In this forgery, the opportunistic aristocrat Orlyk writes from the fully enlightened position, using terms that would only appear decades later as the French revolution approached. Likewise, Borschak entirely falsified another source, a 1705 letter by the French ambassador in Russia that is still cited as the best description of Ivan Mazepa. Borschak, in this case, very clearly references the coordinates of the non-existent document in the National Library of France in Paris; however, a recent attempt to find it revealed there is nothing remotely similar in the folder (Adadurov, 2013, p. 15, n33). The letter (recently reprinted in Mackiw, 1988) paints a very flattering picture of the Ukrainian leader as an extremely refined and cultured person at home in Europe; he ceaselessly quotes ancient classics in Latin, speaks in German to his German court doctors and in Italian to Italian artists, reads newspapers in Dutch and French, and is something of a Francophile who “unlike the Muscovites follows and knows what is happening in foreign countries”. Borschak made all this up (although Mazepa was undoubtedly a properly educated and very affluent person like his older peer Nemyrych or the younger Orlyk).

What seems to be at work here is a compensatory discursive activity of a postcolonial subject who is denied existence, both politically, in terms of his nation’s independence, and as a subject with an autonomous power status, relegated to the standing of an uninteresting object or “part of…””. Faced with the fact of his own second-ratedness and political defeat, this subject can only endeavour to overcome it by proving it belongs to the realm of the real, the successful subject which happens to be Europe. It is Europe’s conceptual openness that makes it possible: one can be both Ukrainian and European, while reinscribing themselves as a more successful Russian or Polish subject is incompatible with the preservation of the original identification. Therefore, narrative legends come into play and soon acquire a sacrosanct status to show that “we, too, corresponded with Cromwell”. This can have more vulgar, material forms, focused on the materiality of
Europe’s achievement (such as demanding “our hetman’s treasures” back), in line with the cargo-cult thinking and an obsession with the West’s material riches. It can be even used to make the inverse argument and proclaim that “we” have in fact orchestrated the success of Europe, which owes “us” dearly. It can also lead to a rather well-written and inspiring fictitious prose as was in Borschak’s case, which consciously replaces the actual history with a fascinating narrative that makes the subject – at least in his own imagination – an equal to the “real” subject again, more fluent in languages, more affluent, better educated, more sophisticated than even most European elites of the time, and certainly a greater European than the Poles and Russians. This compensatory European discourse of the colonised subject is one of the two key Ukrainian narratives of Europe traced throughout history, the other one being Drahomanov’s narrative of Europe as a more progressive social system yet to build on the basis of rationalist and humanist values.

The maximal realisation of this European fantasy of a traumatised subject is to live this European dream for real, which gives rise to not only totally middle-class “Euro-windows” and “Euro-renovations” but also to the most expensive urban development projects in Kyiv, which, like the recent Vozdvyzhenka neighbourhood (a mutilation of the authentic old borough), are built in what Cybriwsky aptly calls “Faux-European style” (“mostly new construction that is done in styles and at a size-scale of individual buildings to suggest historical urban landscape”).

The architectural style is supposed to be Europe at the end of the 19th century – maybe pan-European, because we see a mix of elements: baroque, modern, gothic, as well as more than a little French romanticism. Something smack of Holland, too. Here and there we come across classical columns. All of this is brightly painted: we see blues, yellows, greens, avocados, ripe bananas, unripe bananas, hues of orange, beige, brown and others, all different one building from the next, and often with multiple colours per building. The paint is still fresh and the look is one that we might find in a collection of neatly arranged dollhouses, or in a gingerbread Victorian neighbourhood. […] We are also reminded of a Disneyland-type theme-park […], but instead of a ‘Frontierland’, ‘Tomorrowland’, or ‘Main Street, U.S.A’ we are in a constructed fantasyland that might be called ‘Europeland’.

Ironically, this imitative “Europeland” (compared to luxurious developments in Dubai or Shanghai for its hype and artificiality) is also of
extremely bad quality and barely liveable, with crumbling plaster and a botched electricity network, the result of the developer’s desire to cut costs and speed up the construction.

Europe in Russia: Competition and complexity

Russia has developed its own very complex relationship with Europe as an idea, a relationship unlike the Ukrainian one thanks to the differences in the status, the power, the social structure, the political economy as well as the cultural experiences of the two countries. This section focuses on the peculiarities of how Russian stories about Europe developed. It does so by examining key milestones in the debate, but it starts with a particular episode that knits together Russia and Europe, highlighting the quite early awareness of the Continent in the Russian discourse of power.

On 25 June 1770, the Russian navy, partly manned by British officers, entered the Bay of Chesma in the Eastern Mediterranean. It started bombarding the Turkish fleet taking refuge in the bay following their shorter engagement the previous day. This was the first time in history that the Russian Empire, proclaimed some fifty years earlier by Peter I after incorporating Ukraine and defeating Sweden, was projecting its military power way beyond its borders. The victory was impressive enough for it to be dubbed “the Russian Trafalgar” (Cross, 1998, p. 271). As the Russian flagship had exploded the day before, the admiral’s flag was hoisted on another ship of the line called the Europa,9 which boasted sixty-six canons (Officer…., 1772, p. 16, 88).

At the very least, Europe was an idea prominent enough to name a large man-of-war after. Significantly enough, Russian shipbuilding started in 1696 as part of Peter I’s Westernising activity; at first, it was overwhelmingly dominated by technologies, expertise and traditions imported from Western Europe. Also, the earliest Russian ships either came from Europe, where they had already seen some service, or were built in Russia by foreign shipwrights, and thus were named after West European places (the London, the Portsmouth, the Oxford, the Stratford, the Devonshire, the Rotterdam, etc.) or had foreign names to describe their qualities, such as Le Ferme (French) or the Friedemaker (Dutch). Even the ship considered to be the first completely Russian made was christened in 1700 in the macaronic mix

9 Fittingly, she was extensively repaired in Western Europe, in the British docks on the way (Anderson, 1952, p. 154).
of German and Latin as the *Gotto Praedestinatio* (God’s Predestination). However, as the local workmanship improved, the foreign names quickly became a rarity, giving way to local versions (see Chernyshev, 1997, for more details).10

Does this, however, indicate Europe’s special status in the Russian imaginary? A brief look through the lists of the Russian ships of the lines reveals that only three years after the Battle of Chesma, the Russian navy received two newly built ships called the *America* and the *Asia*. The latter name proved especially popular: between 1768 and 1810 at least four ships named the *Asia* were built. Besides the 1768-built *Europa*, which fought at Chesma, another ship with this name first sailed in 1796. And in that fateful encounter with the Turks – the victory at Chesma and subsequent ones sealed the fate of the Crimean Khanate, incorporated in the Russian Empire for the first time in 1783 as a trade-off for the Russian gains in the Middle East – the *Europa* was joined by the *Africa*, in which Sergei Yakobson (1939) saw a symbolic quality.11 This naming pattern reveals that the reference to Europe was most likely a tribute to the contemporary naming convention of the second half of the eighteenth century. Continents were fashionable because they were tokens of the builder’s grandeur, imperial aspiration and mere awareness of the scope of the world and newly discovered global interconnectedness (the last mentioned, perhaps, in the same way that the name of Shakespeare’s *The Globe* did).

The post-Petrine eighteenth century up until the reign of Alexander I (1725–1801), after the top-down reforms, marked the beginning of Zenkovsky’s emotional but well-researched account (1926/1997) of how Russian elites developed their own idea of Europe. The interest in the West, to which Russia was opening up at the expense of its once more European but now provincialised peripheries like Ukraine, was genuine and respectful, if superficial, as is also evident from the aforementioned ship-naming

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10 Popular options ranged from the names of the cities of the Russian Empire (the *Moscow*, the *Poltava* or the *Revel*); saints (the *St Andrew* or the *Panteleimon-Victoria*, also the *Divine Transfiguration* or the *Conception of St Anna*); threatening mottos (the *Touch Me Not*, the *Fight*, the *Brave*); beasts thought to be formidable (the *Eagle*, the *Turtle*, the *Scorpion*); former princes of Kyiv (the *Svyatoslav*); royals (mostly Russian as in the *Peter I and II* – this was actually one ship – or the *Empress Anna*, and occasionally foreign as in the *Prince Gustav* or the *Sultan Mahmud*); or abstract ideas (the *Glory to Russia*, the *Foundations of Welfare*); all the data comes from Chernyshev (1997).

11 “Russia on her side actually began from now on to take an even greater and more permanent interest in the shaping of the situation in Africa. The fact that one of the Russian frigates taking part in the Battle of Chesme already bore the name of ‘Africa’ acquires an almost symbolic significance”. (Yakobson, 1939, pp. 631–632)
Prior to Peter’s reign, even high-class Muscovites would not travel to Europe for education because it was seen as a hotbed of heresy, in stark contrast to Poles and Ukrainians (the latter would often convert to Catholicism) to acquire valuable Western knowledge. Per-Arne Bodin (1993/2006, p. 87) noted in his *Ryssland och Europa* [Russia and Europe] that in Russia “the Western influence really came for the first time in the mid-seventeenth century and especially in the early eighteenth century”, and “this is the influence that came to them mainly from Poland via Ukraine” (ibid., p. 96). The scholar noted Ukraine belonged to the European cultural realm:

Under the Polish influence, West European ideas established a strong foothold in this part of the old Kyiv Rus. Schools were founded and in 1631 also a precursor of a university, an Academy in Kyiv. Monks had begun to study Latin but also systematic Catholic theology. […] In the realm of culture, Ukraine was strongly influenced by the Baroque, especially its architecture but also its literature. When Russia conquered Ukraine, these Western European ideas also partially conquered Russia. (ibid., pp. 98–99)

One of the Muscovites first to study in the West (in his forties by then) was Petr Tolstoy (1645–1729), the founder of the count dynasty that would produce several famous writers. His travel diaries show both astonishment at and curiosity about the spectacle of Western Europe sharply perceived as different from Muscovy. While Peter’s other emissaries were particularly shocked at the sight of nude paintings (characterised as “naked wenches” by Andrey Apraksin, 1663–1731), Tolstoy was reported to keep both a traditional icon and an imported nude painting in his study, a meaningful image of Russia at the time (Offord, 2006). But the naked truth of the Western art was taking over. As Bodin (1993/2006, pp. 103–104) summarised the eighteenth century in Russia, “Europeanisation continued among the higher classes and Catherine the Great could proudly state at the end of the century: ‘Russia is a European country’”.

And yet already in the mid-eighteenth century, a more assertively critical perspective appears and becomes strong enough for Offord (2006) to call his book about the many Russian trips to the West *Journeys to a Graveyard*. For example, Denis Fonvizin (1744/45–1795), a key figure of the Russian Enlightenment, produced the bluntly anti-French and anti-European *Pisma iz Frantsii* [Letters from France] (1777–1778), both a reaction against the imitation of Europe at the Russian court and a manifesto of early Russian nationalism. Others, though, like the writer and historian Nikolay Karam-
zin (1766–1826) continued looking to Europe for the most recent intellectual fashion. Having travelled around Europe at the time of the French Revolution and met Kant, he wrote a completely pro-European *Letters of a Russian Traveller*. In 1802, he wrote the introduction to the first-ever issue of the liberal publication *Vestnik Evropy* [The Herald of Europe]. In the first sentence, he refers to the desire for peace in Europe and goes on to use Europe as a justification for his publishing endeavour: “Already all the monarchs in Europe consider their duty and glory to be patrons of learning. (...) In one word, if the taste for Literature may be named a fashion, then it is the common and the principal such fashion in Europe” (Karamzin, 1802, pp. 4–5). He continued developing this argument by counting the number of presses and bookshops in Europe. He also admitted that his residence in central Russia lay “in Asia, across the distant steppes”.

How many a time, reading curious European Journals, where so to speak all the best Authors’ minds are on stage, did I desire inside me that some Russian writer considered and could choose the most pleasant of these foreign flower beds and planted them on the fatherland’s soil! (ibid., p. 6; my translation).

Thus, despite the strong opposition to Europe early on, the impact of Peter I’s turn to the West was lasting. It comes as no surprise that the classical poet most responsible for the invention of modern Russia, Aleksandr Pushkin (1799–1837), put in his 1833 poem “The Bronze Horseman” these words in the mouth of the tsar, who is contemplating the future construction of St Petersburg: “By nature are we destined here / To hack the window into Europe” (Pushkin, 1960, p. 285). The “window to Europe” became a proverbial, almost idiomatic, expression in modern Russian. Pushkin attributes the expression “St Petersburg is the window through which Russia looks at Europe” to Francesco Algarotti (1712–1764), a Venetian polymath whose *Viaggi di Russia* [Travels in Russia; also customarily known as Letters on Russia] (1739) also contains such a phrase. The “window into Europe” proverb suggests an intricate semantic dynamic. On the surface, it is a Russian adoption of a European’s view on Russia’s relations with Europe, a type of internalisation of the European perception of the positions of the two as its own authentic interpretation. But a deeper

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12 This is my own literal translation because the many English versions do not quite convey the intricacies of the original (some going as far as to substitute “Europe” with “the West”).
hermeneutical reading hints at Russia’s separateness from Europe (by a wall that can be hacked through), and they are in no way identical or close enough; there cannot be a window inside a homogenous whole, nor can there be one between the rooms in the same house. Europe is also perceived passively by Russia, whose gaze may project literally anything on to what is seen from the window, from admiration to envy, from desire to enmity. The window is also easy to control; it has a regime. It can be closed or wide open, depending on who manages this regime. Likewise, windows are dramatically different to doors, which are portals of physical movement, a flow of people walking in and out. The meaning of window presupposes the existence of an obstacle that cannot, and should not, be passed under normal circumstances. Moreover, it stands even farther from the metaphor of the bridge, which is always open to passage and cannot be closed. In the end, the window prescribes the scopic regime; Georg Simmel (1909/1994, p. 8) wrote in his essay titled “Bridge and Door”:

[The window], as a connection of inner space with the external world, is […] related to the door. Yet the teleological emotion with respect to the window is directed almost exclusively from inside to outside: it is there for looking out, not for looking in. It creates the connection between the inner and the outer chronically and continually, as it were, by virtue of its transparency; but the one-sided direction in which this connection runs, just like the limitation upon it to be a path merely for the eye, gives to the window only a part of the deeper and more fundamental significance of the door.

This metaphor sets the stage for the change in the Russian discussion about Europe, which around the time when Pushkin was writing the poem started to be dominated by two belligerent camps, the militant anti-European nativists, or Slavophiles, and the more moderate Westernists (Bodin, 1993/2006, pp. 105–113). The Napoleonic Wars, Russia’s military incursions into Western Europe and its participation in the post-1815 settlement and the Concert of Europe had made the Russian elites especially alert to the experiences of European reformist movements and the injustices of serfdom, which created the situation in which the 1825 Decembrist revolt could take place. The events made the intellectuals discuss projects for improving society, projects that could either look to the West or back into Russia’s own idealised past for inspiration. One of the key Slavophiles, Nikolay Danilevsky (1822–1885), wrote his influential _Rossiya i Yevropa_ [Russia and Europe] (1869/1995) from a racial perspective; he suggested that Europe was Russia’s enemy and, since Russia’s intervention in Europe
had never yielded successes, the country should act as a counterweight to
the “adversarial” and arrogant Europe. Both Slavophile and Westernist
discourses, however, agreed on the general idea of the West’s decline and
cracy. Few, such as Petr Chaadayev (1794–1856) in his legendary Philo-
sophical Letters (1828–1830), lambasted Russia for lagging behind and
praised Catholicism as a “political religion”, but his works were banned and
he was certified insane. Even such staunch Westernists as Aleksandr Herzen
(1812–1870) wrote that “the role of today’s Europe is entirely over: since
1826, its decay has grown with every step” (Zenkovsky, 1926/1997, p. 58).
The West’s perceived terminal crisis (nativists formulated this in much
harsher terms) forced many authors to subscribe to the Messianic idea that
Russia was supposed to save the West from its moral corruption and lack of
spirituality. The anti-European sentiment intensified especially after the
Crimean War, when the European countries were accused of fostering
hatred towards Russia and the Slavonic populations of the Ottoman
Empire. As the early 1900s approached, however, there was a trend towards
reconciliation and some kind of middle way between the nativists and Wes-
terners; this evolution was cut short by the 1917 Revolution, which revived
the old critique of Europe and sprinkled it with new communist elements.
As Kerstin Olofsson suggested (2003, p. 116), both Tsarist-era Russian
nationalism and Russian communism were united in their imperialism,
resentment of the West and special nature of Russia’s path. Contrary to the
traditional representation, the Bolsheviks not only destroyed cultural
heritage but also selectively preserved it (Sandomirskaja, 2015b); similar to
this, their narrative politics included as well preservation and the use of
elements from the earlier tsarist narratives.

The émigré philosopher Nikolay Berdiaev (1874–1948) continued this
line of development in France. In his The Russian Idea (1946), he praises
and criticises both camps and clearly sees the difference between Europe
and Russia (a question he addresses specifically in this book).

But the type of Russian thinking and Russian culture was always very
distinct from that of Western Europe. Russian thinking was much more
totalitarian [totalitarno] and integral [tselostno] than the thinking of the
West, which is more differentiated and divided into categories. […] There is
enshrined deep down in the Russian people [naroda] greater freedom of
spirit than there is among the more free and enlightened peoples of the West
(pp. 71–72, 75–76).
While Soviet Russia was typecast by its leaders and docile intellectuals as the Communist enemy of the capitalist West, Berdyaev’s views have enjoyed a resurgence in the post-Soviet era and still define the perspective of some Russian intellectuals. Equally popular were the views of another émigré, the linguist and prince Nikolay Trubetzkoj (1890–1938), one of the principal figures of the Eurasianist movement. In 1920 in Sophia, where the Ukrainian Drahomanov had some three decades before been developing his ideas of Europe as progress, the exiled nobleman published the first of his several books on the subject, aptly called *Europe and Humankind*, where he attacks Europe for universalising itself as the universal spirit and thus enslaving the spirit of the other, non-European peoples. Trubetzkoj defined Europeans as “Romano-Germans” and believed that only an open revolt against them could bring about liberation, which led to his praising Genghis Khan and calling once again for the uniting all or much of Eurasia under one power. The continuation of a modified anti-European Slavophilic sentiment seems rather clear, as is the difference with his contemporary Berdyaev. It may be interesting to note that the Russian Berdyaev was born in Kyiv, and his brother, Sergei/Serhiy (1860–1914), was a Ukrainian poet and activist.

From the postcolonial perspective, the relationship with the West created in Russia was what some call an “inferiority complex” (Sahni, 1997, p. XIV). “Whereas the British mimicked no one but themselves, the Russians were mimicking the French and British, to whom, again, they had long felt culturally inferior” (Moore, 2001, p. 120). Dwyer (2011, p. 83) focused on how Russian writers such as Nikolay Leskov and Fedor Dostoevsky conveyed different images of Europe in their travelogues: Leskov’s were more open and multicultural but peripheral, whereas Dostoevsky’s were rooted in resentment and “a sense of inferiority before the west”. The change in this complicated dynamic of representations did not come in earnest after either 1917 or 1991, as the same logic seems to have been recreating itself in Russia’s self-positioning in relation to Europe. In the early Soviet era, traditional Slavophilic anti-Westernism was given a fashionable Spenglerian polish; just by way of an example, the Russian theatrical producer Vsevolod Meyerhold adapted Ilya Ehrenburg’s 1923 bestselling novel, *Trest D.E. Istorija gibeli Yevropy* [Trust D.E.: The History of the Demise of Europe], for the stage. This production made some impression on Walter Benjamin during his stay in Moscow: “Meyerhold uses a map in *Daioch Evropu* – on which the West is a complex system of small Russian peninsulas. The map is almost as close to becoming the center of a new Russian icon cult as is Lenin’s portrait” (Benjamin, 1985, p. 51).
Whether or not this was related to Trubetzkoy’s and other Eurasianists’ ideas about Europe as a mere peninsula of Asia is of secondary importance; if they arose independently, it only testifies to the idea’s “imminence” in the Russian cultures of this era. In the post-Soviet Russia, since at least the first Putin presidency, the West in general, the EU less so, is again perceived as a rival, as an adversary, and again quite often under the auspices of a different, more aggressive Eurasianism.

The turn of the millennium, as Madeleine Hurd found (2003, p. 7), brought back “the current – or is it century-long? – crisis of identity among Russian intelligentsia. The group is torn [...] between being pro- or anti-West, international or nationalist, self-hating or self-celebratory”. Moreover, the inherent ambiguity of the West in the Russian perception leads at once to desire for and fear of Europe as well as both desire for and fear of the Russian subject’s own authenticity (constructed as fundamentally non-Western) (Olofsson, 2003, p. 120). This is also instrumentalised by the authorities’ political games. “The spread of fear of alleged Western subversion carried out by opponents of the Kremlin has”, Yablokov noted (2014, p. 633), “served as the main tool of social cohesion” during Putin’s third term. The Russian political scientist Dmitri Trenin (2006) recognised already eleven years ago that “Russia’s leaders have given up on becoming part of the West and have started creating their own Moscow-centered system. [...] In the past year, Russia has begun acting like the great power it was in tsarist times” (p. 87, 92).

Bodin (1993/2006, p. 132) justly attributed this “re-imperialisation” (återimperialisering) of Russia as early as the first Chechen war. In the 2000s, fewer Russians claimed a European identity than in the 1990s, and Eurasianism was on the rise in the ideological mainstream and on the fringes (ibid., pp. 137–138). Meanwhile, the internal situation in Russia qualifies the country as what in political science is called a “hybrid regime”, combining elements of authoritarian rule and a democratic facade with ineffective political opposition and low political participation (Ekman, 2009). Sparks and Reading (1998) emphasised that despite many transitional processes the changes in Eastern Europe were in many cases less significant than the continuities, and it is perhaps in Russia this is most clearly the case.
Europe in Poland: A difficult romance

Poland’s encounter with Europe has been more intimate but no less complicated. Kyiv Rus, which became the foundation for the medieval Ruthenia-Ukraine and later fledgling Muscovy-Russia, adopted its political organisation from Vikings, who were nevertheless a periphery of the West themselves and weakly linked to Christianity (a Byzantine import for Eastern Slavs). Contrary to this, Poland’s medieval rulers derived their royal authority directly from the West thanks to the adoption of Christianity from Germany and the crowning of prince Boleslaw the Brave by Otto III, the Holy Roman Emperor (Zamoyski, 2009, pp. 5–6). Nevertheless, “the divergence from European norms is significant”.

“Unlike Bohemia, which had faced similar challenges and choices, Poland had not been fully absorbed into the framework of European states. One consequence of this was that it remained more backward. But it maintained a greater degree of independence. (Zamoyski, 2009, p. 18)

The first mentions of Europe came in the 1517 geographical treatise by Maciej of Miechów (1457–1523), *Tractatus de duabus Sarmatiis, Asiana et Europiana* [The Treatise on the Two Sarmatias, the Asian and the European]; unlike in Ukraine, already in 1530s Poland, Europe became fashionable as a geographical frame of reference (Yakovenko, 2012, p. 204). Early Polish narratives of Europe (summarised, among others, separately by Walicki, 1994, and Wierzbicki, 2010) focused on the country’s own role as a natural barrier and a defender of the Continent from the Asian threat. One figure associated with the early modern representation of Poland as “the bulwark of Christianity and refuge of freedom” was Wespazjan Kochowski (1633–1700). For example, in his 1695 collection of poetry, he described the Polish king Jan III Sobieski as “the bringer of health to the entire Europe” (Kochowski, 1695/1856, p. 43). This was the king who led the victorious Christian army in Vienna in 1683 against the last major invasion by the Ottoman Empire into Central Europe.

However, while Poland in the Renaissance era had close and vibrant relations with Western Europe, enabled by travels of nobility and intellectuals and the discovery of the Roman legacy, which affected attitude to government, hairstyle, architecture and “[a]t the psychological level […]”

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13 My translation. The original archaic quote is as follows: “Jan III zdrowie dla wiary niesie, w którego zdrowiu było zdrowie całej Europy”.
gave the Poles a sense of belonging to a European family, based not on the Church or the Empire, but on the Roman civilisation” (Zamoyski, 2009, p. 94), in the Baroque age the Sarmatism fashion of borrowing from Turkey or Persia made Poland “…a hybrid of East and West, increasingly exotic but also baffling to western Europeans” (ibid., 105).

Therefore, the assumption of their own importance in Europe did not make early modern Poles very sympathetic towards Europe. In fact, the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth at the time was not much more “pro-European” than the post–Petrine Russian Empire. As Walicki noted, early modern Poland was actually suspicious of absolutist monarchies, which were seen as “autocratic”. The concept of Sarmatism embodied the idea of liberty and Poland’s “special way”. The crisis of the state based upon this idea led to the first barely successful attempts at the Westernisation of Poland in the second half of the eighteenth century. At the same time, a loss of independence and the late eighteenth-century partitions of Poland stimulated Polish thinking towards fashionable pan-Slavism (to which both Ukraine and Russia also subscribed) and the idea of a European confederation, which, however, never resulted in any detailed project proposal. For a long time, anti-Western Slavophilism was as widespread among Polish thinkers as in Russia; this changed only with the upswing in support for an economic and social modernisation agenda based on Westernist premises.

The dramatic experiences of the partitions of Poland between Prussia, Austria and Russia, as well as the failure of the 1831 uprising, together with the spread of Romantic idealism and a strong indigenous Catholic tradition, inspired the line of thought known as the Polish Messianism. According to this ideological doctrine, Poland was betrayed and “crucified” by other European nations just as Christ had been at the hands of humanity; but just as Christ had been resurrected and had redeemed all of humanity, Poland would be reborn and bring salvation to the sinners, namely the nations of Europe. Poland was imagined as “the Christ of nations” or even “the Christ of Europe”, and its national poet Adam Mickiewicz in his “Dziady” [“Forefathers’ Eve”, 1822–1833] rendered recent Polish history literally in terms of the biblical story:

My People is tied up,
The entire Europe drags him, and ridicules –
“To the tribunal!” – the innocent is drawn here. At the tribunal, there are mouths, without hearts, without hands – the judges,
These are his judges!
They are shouting: “The Gall, the Gall shall be judging!”
The Gall found no guilt in him, and washed his hands…
O Lord, I am already seeing the cross, oh how long, how long
must he carry it – Lord, have your mercy on him,
Give him strength, for he will fall on the road and die,
he has a long cross, with a crossbar spanning the entire Europe…
(Mickiewicz, 1833/2009, p. 247; my translation)

Likewise, in his *The Books and the Pilgrimage of the Polish Nation* (1832), Mickiewicz continued along the same lines:

For the Polish nation is not dead! Its body, indeed, is in the tomb, but its
soul has ascended from the surface of the earth; that is, from public life to the
abyss, or domestic life – to the homes and hearts of those who endure distress
and oppression in their country, and far from their country, in order to be
witness there of their suffering, and of their misery. And on the third day, the
soul shall return to its body; and the nation shall rise from the dead, and
shall free all the nations of Europe from slavery. (Mickiewicz, 1833, p. 20)

This type of discourse is in many ways similar to the Russian Westernists’
contemporary discourses. Just as they saw Russia’s greatest historical role in
salvaging Europe’s alleged moral and ideological decay by religious fervour,
the Polish Messianists believed Poland, having experienced defeat and the
mass exodus of its elite to the West, would revitalise Europe by returning it
to true Christianity. However, heavy defeats in the uprisings of 1831 and
1863 forced the Polish elites to focus on “integral work”, part of which was
Europeanisation and social as well as political modernisation.

The Polish narrative was at times considerably more practical than those
of its eastern neighbours: pan-Europeanism and regional or subregional
projects of European cooperation became popular towards the early twen-
tieth century (Wierzbicki, 2010). This period was also characterised by the
spread of geopolitics and the Jagiello and Piast models of relations with
neighbours, epitomised by the more accommodating patriotic socialism of
Stanisław Brzozowski (1878–1911) and Józef Piłsudski (1867–1935), in con-
trast to the more intolerant integral nationalism of Roman Dmowski (1864–
1939). In post-war Communist Poland, the context for the West and Europe
was strictly negative, albeit freer than in the rest of the Eastern bloc (see
by Jerzy Giedroyc (1906–2000), developed a perspective on Poland as both
reconciled with its Eastern neighbours and an integral part of the West.
Poland’s protest movement in the 1980s differed from Euromaidan in many ways, but it is interesting that the idea of Europe, and of Poland’s return to it, figured prominently in the protest against the Jaruzelski regime, during and after martial law. Just as in the other Central European countries, this helped Poland to take the lead in the post-Communist camp’s “democratic transition” (Carothers, 2002, p. 9). But the contemporary perception of Europe and Poland’s place in it could be directly linked to the changes in symbolic geography that take us back to the Solidarność movement and John Paul II’s famous visits, which offered the Poles a view of “their country as an outpost of Western Europe. They were no longer an extension of the Soviet Union, but the somehow decentred heart of Catholic Europe” (Dayan & Katz, 1994, p. 166). It has since become commonplace that Poland’s view on Europe is determined by identity politics (see Cordell, 2002). Poles often controversially feel they are both Europe’s “unwanted child” and the “creators and defenders of the European values” (Törnquist-Plewa, 2002, p. 239). Poles perceive Europe as part of their own lived familial experience: the history of Poland was marked by a feeling of being a severed part of Europe that strove for reuniting with the ‘rest of the West’ while viewing it critically and acting pragmatically (Michnik, 2003). The emotional link, however, is perhaps best represented in Czesław Miłosz’s 1959 book, Rodzinna Europa (Native Realm in the published English edition but meaning literally “The Familial Europe”).

Krzyżanowski (2009) sees Europeanisation as a discursive change in the language’s post-1989 social functioning that was wrought by discourses of Europe. As Grzymski noted (2010), Poland’s position was ambivalent in the 1990s because it was seen as both European and “not quite European” and in need of overcoming this lack of Europeanness in practices, ditto backwardness and irrationality. Poland’s response to this challenge was founded on pushing the oriental label further to the East, which Grzymski notices in the Polish construction of Russia (although completely ignoring the Polish construction of Ukraine). This created a gradation of Eastness, a similar notion to the “nesting orientalisms”, whereas a relationship between the Western centre and the Eastern periphery was conceptualised as that of teaching and learning, endowing its participants with unequal power positions. Summing up the research on Polish constructions of Europeanness, Grzymski (2009) draws the conclusion that Poles as well as other post-Communist nations reconceived the concept of Central Europe (famously revived by Milan Kundera in 1986) as more European than Eastern Europe but still “not yet European”. This was reinforced by EU conditionality as the
particular manifestation of Western Europe’s power over the East and the willingness of the Central European countries to join the EU and be finally accepted by Europe as equals. In Horolets’s analysis (2006), the myth of Europe was pragmatically applied to political means in the Polish media debate during the country’s EU accession using powerful feelings such as hopes, fears and shame, thus reproducing and reinforcing social myths.

However, the process may have been less unidirectional and more complicated. As Krzyżanowski (2009b) noted in his analysis of political speeches and semi-private views held by members of the Polish political elite pre-2004, the sense of a gap between Poland and the West and of the need to catch up have also co-existed in their discourses with the urge to bridge the differences and preserve Polish uniqueness. Likewise, the EU was presented as one of many options which require “that Poland must always remain watchful of its national interests” (ibid., p. 105). Poland was equally seen as a valuable contributor to the common Europe and with a European mission of its own (ibid., p. 109). This puts the discourses rather far from an unambiguously orientalist paradigm. All in all, the EU adopted some discursive strategies previously used in the discursive construction of the national community and state, which also highlights a Poland-centric discourse rather than a representation of one’s own inferiority. As Krzyżanowski (2010b) remarked:

…the meaning of Europe shifted in post-1989 Polish from being a national project in political discourses produced within the Polish national political arena, to becoming a supranational/European reality in those discourses which have been produced by Polish politicians at the ‘European level’. Hence, the Europeanisation of Polish discourses of political identities is a discursive change which changes the national meanings of Europe: from the latter being a ‘nation-external’ object of national identifications, to becoming the object and point of reference of strictly political and institutional European identifications. Importantly, as a result of the dynamics of national-political discourses, the features traditionally ascribed to the nation-state (such as, for example, its identity, history, culture etc) are becoming multi-directionally recontextualised at the level of discourse and are now also increasingly used to portray the political reality of Europe/EU. (Krzyżanowski, 2010b, pp. 58–59)

Most recently, Święs and Skwark (2014) studied the representation of Europe on the Gazeta.pl website during the Ukrainian crisis, thus constituting the closest research to my study in terms of the questions examined
(the scope of this study was limited to one media outlet over a four-month period). According to this study, 36% of the publications on Ukraine (which was during this period featured in 14% of the articles overall) “contained references to the European Union or Member States in the context of the Ukraine crisis”. Of them, 76% portrayed the attitude and actions of the European actors unfavourably (Święs & Skwark, 2014, p. 109). The researchers found that the most negative frames were related to Europe’s lack of unanimity, poor responsiveness and conflict prevention, fear of Russia and feeble leadership (ibid., pp. 111–112). From this perspective, the crisis has significantly weakened the image of Europe in Poland, creating “a picture, where although formally and in most cases Europe is united, it is not integrated enough to react swiftly and consistently in the face of a serious crisis” and “where national interests are still placed higher than those of the community” (ibid., p. 112).

What all these previous inquiries have yet to answer is how Europe was shown and seen during Euromaidan in the East European press, where a serious debate was taking place – the media outlets that can have the strongest influence on policymakers and the most active and empowered social classes. Equally neglected have been the “people’s” perspective and more ordinary, everyday discourses. Therefore, such research is of considerable importance as it not only explains to some degree the media’s role in the large-scale protests in Ukraine and the subsequent war with Russia but also puts it in a wider regional context and contrasts it against the differences with Russia, which has neither experienced European integration nor anti-government protests on such a scale. It also allows an understanding of what changes occur once a country becomes part of the EU (the Polish case).

**Summary**

Europe has always been present in the histories of Ukraine, Russia and Poland – as a reality, but not quite that often as an idea. While Poland became familiar with the concept a little earlier, it appears in Ukraine around 1700 and only a little later in Russia. It is important to note that it is not always possible to separate “Ukrainian”, “Polish” and “Russian” discourses completely. People, texts and ideas travelled from culture to culture, not always and not in every direction with ease, but still blurring the lines. Roughly over a two-century period (1550–1750), Polish was the language of prestige and secular literature in Ukraine, which, in turn, was the arbiter of
things Western and modern for Muscovy between ca. 1620 and 1700. For decades, Poland and especially Ukraine lived in Russia’s shadow or under its rule. But some key lines of argument developed differently in the three cultures; the logic was different even if the elements were often the same. Principally, both Russia and Poland experienced a clash of Westernism and anti-European Slavophilism, yet the Poles, facing the problem of national liberation and hampered by a social and economic gap, had to embrace the pro-European discourse more widely after the failure of the 1863 uprising. At the same time, anti-European discourses were prioritised in Russia by tsarist and later Bolshevik governments. The anti-European sentiment was supported in the Soviet Union and in Putin’s Russia, after a largely pro-Western intermezzo of perestroika and the early 1990s. However, the moderate line of thought lived on in the Russian emigration; while not explicitly anti-European, it was busy highlighting the essential differences between Europe and Russia. For Ukrainian intellectuals and ideologists, the task has been historically to identify Ukraine with Europe. It has been established that the decades around 1700 were when Europe as an idea first attracted attention in Ukraine.

While some of the early narratives about the West concerned anti-Catholic rhetoric, they did not refer directly to Europe, and when Cossack Ukraine was incorporated into the Russian Empire, this narrative tradition became monopolised by the religious mainstream. The builders of the Ukrainian nation had to discard this tradition and invent new ones. I have managed to identify two major narratives of Europe. One consists of a more instrumental, pragmatic perspective on Europe as an affluent and technically superior civilization with better standards of living, while the other, a late nineteenth-century development, associates Europe with progressive values of modernity.
CHAPTER 5

Media systems, policies and voices:
National comparisons

The historical experiences and narratives highlighted in the previous chapter blend in the present-day representations, social systems and policies, and this part will suggest a closer analytical look, based on earlier research and my own empirical findings, at the interplay between political and media systems, especially focusing on the narratives of Europe as they are produced, received and recontextualised in foreign policy and the public meaning-making process. In the first section, I systematise the complex, and often contradictory, developments regarding the “post-Communist” or “Central and Eastern European” media at the media system levels before looking specifically at Ukraine, Russia and Poland in the following sections, where I begin by reviewing the origins of the press in the three countries to give a taste of the historical differences of the national media contexts. Then an overview of the most recent developments in the Ukrainian, Russian and Polish media systems is presented, and I proceed to analyse their foreign policies and their official narratives of Europe thereafter. This is complemented by listening to individual voices from the mediaspheres, including the quality newspapers selected for analysis and the blogosphere. Finally, a qualitative multi-modal analysis of the visuals found among different publics and counterpublics in the three countries concludes the part on the more remarkable, outstanding representations of Europe. Chapter 6 then goes on to analyse the daily coverage.

The East European media in transition:
A “rude awakening” for strange bedfellows

Before analysing the narratives of Europe in Ukraine, Russia and Poland, it is necessary to outline each country’s systemic media and policy differences and similarities. Although I provide an overview of the countries’ foreign
policies, the focus – just as the overall focus of this study is on the media – is on media systems from the perspective of the seminal work by Hallin and Mancini (2004). In their book, East European experiences were largely ignored; however, in their later attempts to expand the theory beyond the Western world, they admitted the need for developing a comprehensive model for the post-Communist media, but is it even possible to ever find a model for such a diverse region? Even the three countries analysed here, if sharing similar features (especially providing they are compared pairwise rather than as a triad), their media systems prove significantly different. Speaking of a homogenous “post-Soviet”, “post-Communist” or “East European” media system therefore seems confusing rather than explanatory (cf. Mihelj & Downey, 2012, p. 7).

While most countries in the region have adopted a formally democratic political system, implemented new legislation and developed the institutions necessary for a functioning democratic system, the actual operation of political institutions and the media varies significantly from country to country, and in many cases continues to display important continuities with the pre-1989 period. To explain these diverse outcomes, we may need to move beyond political factors, and take into account economic and sociocultural variables. (Mihelj & Downey, 2012, p. 7)

One of the things the East European media systems have in common after the collapse of Communism is that they have been in transition since then. However, from what to what – and from when to when – was this transition exactly? Salovaara-Moring (2009b) found that the transition of the media systems of the post-Communist and/or post-Soviet countries (she looks at Hungary and the Baltic states) implied not only a process of learning and acquiring something new but also of forgetting and losing something old. She argues there are parallel narratives that describe the processes that went on in the media systems in the 1990s and 2000s: the transition narrative (politically correct and oriented towards Western benchmarks) and the alternative capitalist narrative whereby journalists tried to negotiate between local environments and Western ideals.

Sparks (2008) has found elite continuity a much better explanatory device than the transition narrative (now almost universally discarded). The “post” in post-Communism is defined by the enormous and traumatic transformations as well as by the continuity of the key actors, who proved effective at changing their spots. Another defining factor for the Central and East European media was, according to Jakubowicz and Sükösd (2008), that
it faced simultaneously all the changes the Western European media had undergone over two centuries, from the early media differentiation and professionalisation to demonopolisation, globalisation, etc. A difference arose between competitive and non-competitive regimes marked by the dominance of public policy demand or social demand in the media field, with the market demand pressing practically everywhere; the mimetic (imitation of the West) and atavistic (continuity of the old system) responses in the media prevailed over the idealistic approach of the Communist-era dissidents (ibid.).

One of the more pronounced professional traits of journalists in Eastern Europe is their frequent involvement in political activism. “By covering issues of the day as well as longer term trends, media democratization often had spillover effects (or trickle-down effects) regarding democratization of particular institutions” (Jakubowicz & Sükös, 2008, p. 11). This was frequently reinforced by “media wars” for achieving greater independence from political and business actors, where the journalists’ resistance set the example for the rest of society (ibid., pp. 12–13). This politically active or even engaged position assumed by East European journalists foreshadows the active power-forming role of Ukrainian journalists during Euromaidan and subsequent events – as well as the sense of responsibility among Polish journalists for promoting the European institutions or the same kind of responsibility among the Russian media for furthering the goals of the state during the entire Ukrainian crisis.

In East Central Europe the role of the journalist has traditionally been regarded more as a political activity than as a content producer or manufacturer of “objective” news for the market. The traditional role of a journalist has been closer to that of an intellectual, artist, or writer – someone who spoke on behalf of the people and to the people. […] Those journalists who were part of the intelligentsia of East Central Europe have often been deeply divided by national dependence and need to foster a sense of responsibility for one’s own nation […]. Earlier, this self-confidence often led to the Eastern European intelligentsia fulfilling the role of a non-existent political opposition, the position taken by the intelligentsia always had significant consequences for revolutions or national liberation movements. (Salovaara-Moring, 2009b, p. 99)

In the 1990s, a new generation often found itself detached from both the native traditions of journalism and Western standards. Young journalists have constituted a specific group: on the one hand, better prepared to cope
with the technological and cultural challenges, and on the other, more vulnerable in the market and prone to editorial manipulation despite their “pragmatic detachment from institutions” (Salovaara-Moring, 2009b, p. 110).

Generational shifts in values and narratives, flexible negotiations where different values coexist, professionalisation, cosmopolitanism, Europeanisation and self-organised criticality have, Salovaara-Moring found (ibid.), determined the temporal and spatial contexts of journalist agency in terms of large trends and economic organisational changes. Importantly, “new journalistic agents were seemingly able to foster both patriotism (nationalistic sentiments) and European and cosmopolitan outlooks as part of their evolving strategies in the new situation” (Salovaara-Moring, 2009b, p. 101).

Among the traits the countries of Eastern Europe appear to share are commercialisation, the concentration of markets following massive privatisation, growing competition and then market saturation. The quick adoption of Western norms led to the normativity of the marketisation of media content, but many old structures remained in place, as did the societies’ cynicism. The new era was marked by “the co-evolution of different values: the normative ideals and those that had to be accepted under the prevailing economic realities” (Salovaara-Moring, 2009b, p. 108). The pressure exerted by owners and managers and the unspoken agreements not to touch certain issues were typical of these post-Communist East European media systems.

In her review of the literature on Estonia’s European integration, Sigrid Kaasik-Krogerus (2016, pp. 42–46) has found that it was framed twofold: either based on the “return” model which presupposed that Estonia was a European country or the transformation model according to which Estonia was different to Europe and in fact had to adapt itself to European norms. Her analysis of the narrative construction of Estonian identity in the leading daily Postimees during the accession process confirms not only that the debate concentrated around the country’s position regarding Europe but also that journalists played a key role in shaping the debate, marginalising those without access to the public sphere and revealing “the general closeness of the media and the political elite of the country” (p. 235). The discursive agents may have seen Estonia as being integrally European, as humbled by its inferiority to the EU or as a subject equal to it; the nation was redefined by what it is or should be relative to Europe. At the same time, they considered their role in the accession process as that of actively forming the audience’s attitudes.

Karol Jakubowicz (2012) specifically addressed the problem of media power and influence in post-Communist, post-Soviet countries and found it
5. MEDIA SYSTEMS, POLICIES AND VOICES

subject to a constellation of internal and external factors. He defined two major indicators for assessing the interdependence of the media and political transition: media ownership and general media policy orientation. While in Ukraine a true demonopolisation never happened, as “the owners may be part and parcel of the political elite and use those media outlets to further its goals”, in Russia “privately owned outlets are often owned by industrial groups either controlled by the State or with close connections to the government (i.e., Gazprom)” (Jakubowicz, 2012, pp. 20–21). As for the media policy ideology, it was “mimetic”, i.e. aimed at the mechanistic “transplantation” of the elements of the Western media system. And although this may be similar to the Polish case, the Russian one is that of a so-called “soft censorship”, where the authorities put the media under subtle pressure, leading to “a high degree of monopolization by the power elite of all the media” (ibid., p. 22).

In line with the concept of non-equivalent or asymmetrical interdependence of social and media change, liberalization of the media is made possible by the collapse of the old system. Once the old system of media and content control weakens, the opening up of the media is very fast. It both precedes and promotes other processes of inter-systemic transition. For a time, until a new system of control is introduced, the media enjoy extensive freedom from government interference, though not necessarily independence, if they are controlled by political forces. [...] Because of the importance of the media, political elites will seek to retain as much discretionary power over the media as possible and to accept as few effective restraints on their power as possible. (Jakubowicz, 2012, p. 34)

The presence or absence of formal institutions in these cases matters much less as they can easily be manipulated, and their very existence does not mean, however, that they will function properly and contribute to development. The formally “Westernised” institutions all too often fall prey to cultural and behavioural inertia, produce Potemkin institutions just for the show or end up serving the winners only. As the new EU member states such as Poland had to explicitly introduce Western standards, any potential deviation, in Jakubowicz’s opinion, comes from culture and behaviour. The political class uses the institutions against the civil society, extracting and appropriating collective resources for private ends, in clientelist systems based on loyalty not merit (ibid., pp. 30–31). Likewise, Örnebring (2012) suggested that a broader understanding of clientelism explains the use of
kompromat and advertorials in the Central and East European media in the struggles for and negotiations about resources and influence.

The activist media are from this perspective actually part of the problem rather than its solution, and specifically so in Poland (ibid., p. 32). For Russia, but also across the region and notably for Ukraine, corruption is another bane of the media autonomy. The civil society response to that ranged from active opposition to desperation and cynicism as a reaction to the “low journalistic ethics, including a willingness to serve as ‘pens for hire’, i.e. to accept zakazukha (also known as ‘hidden advertising’), to call it by its Russian name, meaning simply bribes for positive coverage of politicians and businesses” (ibid.). At the same time, the significant and politically active role of the media, for example in the Baltic countries (Lauk & Jufereva, 2010), creates a “reverse censorship” whereby the criticism of journalists and the media is silenced, demands for accountability are ignored, and the freedom of expression ideology is used to maximise the power of the media.

In a somewhat normative spirit, Jakubowicz classified the countries across this vast space as democratic, semi-democratic or authoritarian, based on the scope of state control exercised over the media system. In reality, different countries mix these basic elements in various ways, as even the democratic countries that borrowed more heavily from the West respect media freedom with notable cases of “selective atavism”, i.e. remaining under the control of the previous system, where it suits the needs of the powerful. In what Jakubowicz sees as semi-democratic countries, the government and the political class are more active players in the media field. Officially, the media’s independence is recognised, but the government often reacts negatively to criticism.

The methods of pressure on the journalists and thus of curbing their potential or actual influence have included informal guidance (temnyky), no use of the state-controlled infrastructure by the opposition groups, restricting the disloyal from accessing information and adverts, only allowing the loyal media to abuse subsidies, an abuse of the regulatory function, an in-house censorship and an outright physical assault. The list is apparently not exhaustive.

The elites are determined to regain control in the absence of restraint and effective punishments for such intrusion. In an efficient system, this function is institutionalised, but when the democratic process is deeply flawed, social upheaval may perhaps carry out such a function, just as it did with Euromaidan (further discussed below in Chapter 7).
Summing these discussions up, I believe it is important to stress the following: the only basis for speaking of some “post-Communist” media model, thus lumping together countries, from the Czech Republic to Turkmenistan and from Slovenia to Belarus, is the common experience of the collapse and re-emergence of social structures post-1989/1991, something I would call a post-Communist reorganisation. The processes, however, played out very differently and led to contrasting results that can be compared on several levels: change/continuity, control/competition, idealism/mimetism/atavism, etc. All the people in every post-Communist country experienced in their own ways a “rude awakening”, in the words of Jakubowicz, yet they woke up in their beds, which were drifting apart at an increasing speed, perhaps because they were strange bedfellows from the very beginning. A single “post-Communist” or “Central-Eastern European” media system is, I believe, an artificial and mythologised concept that has too little grounding in reality and has to be deconstructed. I will now examine the specific differences and similarities in the three countries, which is the focus of my study.

Ukrainian, Russian and Polish media systems
in a comparative perspective

Instead of the simple unificatory model of post-Communist media change, there are, as I have just demonstrated, complex webs of pronounced differences and similarities that I will try to unravel in the case of the three countries, starting with the historical beginnings of their press.

The past is not dead: Origins and historical differences

The historical explanation for the media systems evolving differently is obvious and used by scholars (as is evident from the previous section). However, a systematic comparison, say, of the Russian imperial tradition of journalism and Ukraine’s harshly censored and systematically banned publications may prove an insurmountable (and even meaningless) task, especially for a work whose main focus is elsewhere. In the spirit of media archaeology, a more impressionistic look at the origins of the media in all three countries may speak volumes about the divergent national traditions as well as the what-could-have-been alternative media histories. Moreover, such an approach was successfully practised by Hallin and Mancini (2004),
who emphasised the importance of different roots of journalism in various media systems.

In a nutshell, I suggest taking a look at three isolated histories of what each nation considers its first national newspaper. Instead of piling up facts and overviewing entire national media histories, such an impressionistic perspective may allow seeing how the different beginnings of the press correlated with the varying inceptions of the modern nations as “imagined communities” setting the tradition for the elite press and its role later on in some form to the present day. Not least, the fact that such beginnings, even though rooted in fact, are constructed and chosen in a rather deliberate way among several potential alternatives says a lot about the self-perception of journalists and media historians, who chose a specific departure point for their tradition for a reason.

In 1661, Poland got what is seen as its first-ever newspaper, *Merkuryusz Polski Ordymaryny*, published by local printers in Krakow, then in Warsaw; its team included several local contributors, led by a migrant from Italy, Hieronim Pinocci, a merchant and the king’s secretary. According to Łojek and Paczkowski (1976), the founding and publication of the newspaper was the project of the royal court, though support was provided indirectly via King John II Casimir’s queen consort. The content of the newspaper was dominated by the news of the European royal courts, wars and marriages, and internally sought to promote the absolutist monarchy and reforms that would facilitate it. However, the newspaper turned out to be rather short-lived and ceased publication after only forty-four issues; the king’s reformist project had failed.

As a leading Russian media scholar noted,

> the modern Russian media system has deep roots in Russia’s national history. Its origins were laid down by the birth of the first Russian newspaper, *Vedomosti* (1703), when the Russian political elite realised the potentials of print periodicals as an essential means of social management. *Vedomosti*, set up by Tsar Peter the Great after his European trip, was intended to become a tool for elite communication. For centuries thereafter, the Russian political system was managed in a top-down way by the ruling bureaucracy, and Russian power structures did not include political parties. (Vartanova, 2012, p. 127)

Unlike in Poland, the tsar did not hide behind anyone when he founded his country’s first newspaper; he even was the editor of several issues and a regular contributor (notably, he wrote a report of his own victory over
Charles XII and Mazepa at Poltava). *Vedomosti* was often given away for free to the people. Despite its commercial unviability, the project was successful and long-lived, as it continued publishing (on behalf of various state institutions) until 1917. In 1991, the newspaper was one of the first old newspaper titles to be “relaunched”. The content of the early *Vedomosti* was not much different from *Merkuryusz*, namely news about foreign monarchies and the tsar’s routines.

The advent of the Ukrainian print press was greatly delayed in comparison with its neighbouring centres of power, which were much faster to develop the press to cater to their own needs. However, *Gazette de Léopol*, published in French in Lviv in 1776 by Chevalier Ossoudi, has been routinely described as the first newspaper published in Ukraine (Krevetsky, 1927; Narizhny, 1934). In contrast to the Polish and the Russian court newspapers, it was a completely bottom-up commercial venture. Its content, apart from the latest European monarchic news, was dominated by local events (such as city fairs, church events or news about the local noble families) but especially by classifieds and commercial advertisements, which defined its wholly bourgeois character. The newspaper even ran its own advertisement agency located in the heart of Lviv’s Old Town. The newspaper was published just for a year before the venture ceased operating (Narizhny, 1934). Although its counterparts in the Ukrainian lands under Russian control followed only in the early 1800s and 1810s in Odesa and Kharkiv and were published in Russian, their character as local business-oriented bourgeois publications makes a curious case of a deeper cultural homogeneity that crossed the borders of the Austrian and Russian empires.

These three very dissimilar stories epitomise the initial and in many ways resilient different conditions and circumstances that made the national traditions so divergent. Firstly, one may note the state-centric origin of the press (Russia and Poland) versus the merchant-centric origin (Ukraine). Whereas the Russian and Polish early newspapers were created in a top-down fashion near to and by the centres of power aspiring to absolutism, the early Ukrainian publications were bottom-up bourgeois initiatives distant from the imperial capitals. This made both the early Polish and Russian newspapers ideological initiatives, whereas the Ukrainian one was motivated by private commercial interest. Then there is also a remarkable contrast between the continuity of the publications (Russia stands out here) versus their discontinuity (Ukraine and Poland), which indicates the strength of the state and its central role in organising the early press. Finally, it is necessary to mention a contrast between openness, even subordination
to foreign actors and languages (Poland and especially Ukraine) and self-centredness (Russia).

Ever since those early experiments, the press and later the media in these three countries closely followed Western European examples. Yet they were marked by profound differences, such as rather harsh censorship and state management in the Russian Empire (where the Ukrainian press faced additional bans and persecution) and relatively more freedom in the Austrian–Hungarian Empire. The publishing activity expanded dramatically during uprisings and revolutions, especially in 1917–1921, before becoming totally centralised under the Bolsheviks towards the end of the 1920s. Meanwhile, in interwar Poland, both the Polish and West Ukrainian press could develop relatively freely.

“Influential rather than popular”: The Ukrainian press and contemporary media system

The Soviet media system was largely common to Ukraine and Russia. It was characterised by vertical structures and centralised control, whereby a number of “central” newspapers published in Moscow were paralleled by local publications in the republics, regions and urban communities; this was also repeated for radio and television (Kulyk, 2010, p. 179). The printed media were very cheap and easily available; radio and television were free, with advertising a non-existent institution. The content was subordinated to many levels of control. A media independent of the state could not be established and exist apart from within the dissident samizdat (which was actually thriving during particular periods). There was also a certain parallel with the Baltic Soviet republics, where even the state-controlled press and journalist training became a refuge for the language and some form of national identity (cf. Lauk, 2008, pp. 196–197); likewise, the journalist or writer career was the most prestigious one, where the use of the national language could be a precondition for success, and this path generated a permanent stream of dissidency.

Similar trends were also observed in Ukraine and Russia in the years during and immediately after the breakup of the Soviet Union. With the formal abolishment of censorship and the rise of the free market from 1990 onwards, when the artificial constraints were removed, the media systems of the republics grew exponentially. This was prematurely curtailed by the economic crisis and paper shortages, which made the printed press landscape rather barren and also helped prioritise television as the number-one medium for broader audiences. The tabloids dominated the printed press
while several quality publications were trying to fill the niche market together with business and finance dailies and weeklies. Similar to the Baltic countries, many Russian newspapers continued to publish their Ukrainian editions with some local content.

The first years of independence were marked by a sharp rise in pluralism in the mediascape, which came under attack during the Kuchma presidency, resulting in the deaths of a number of journalists, trials, and crackdowns on critical outlets as the media were subject to “clanisation” (Kulyk, 2010, p. 204). “Temnyky”, i.e. censorship by the owners, became typical in 2000–2004. “In Ukraine, temniki (press advisories) issued by the presidential administration with “suggestions” as to how particular events or issues should be covered have no legal status or binding force, but have proved an effective means of guiding media coverage” (Jakubowicz, 2007, p. 307). This led to a journalist revolution when a number of television journalists went on strike, thus disrupting the government-sponsored campaign against the Orange Revolution participants (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2008, p. 94). At the same time, greater independence from both the government and the owners, coupled with self-regulation, was at the heart of the journalists’ struggle with the Ukrainian government in the post-Gongadze era (ibid., 353).

Jakubowicz’s view (2007, p. 105) of Kuchma as a national Communist is questionable; he was more of an opportunist and populist who abstained from nationalist rhetoric while cementing his personal power. Equally problematic is the statement that Ukraine had no dissident movement, since it did have a rather large movement which was of course under pressure and a permanent crackdown forced it to go underground. However, the Helsinki Group activity, a samizdat Ukayinsky Visnyk, [The Ukrainian Herald] (cf. my account thereof in Chapter 7) and the exemplary resistance by the poet Vasyl Stus, which became a universal truth for young Ukrainians, all testify to the strength of Ukrainian dissidence under conditions much harsher than in Poland or Yugoslavia. At the same time, it was nothing like the Polish “alternative public sphere” of 1976–1989 (cf. Sparks, 2008).

Although critical of Kuchma’s censorship, Marta Dyczok (2009, p. 378) admits that during his tenure a separate Ukrainian “communicative space” formed, primarily through the privatisation of broadcasting frequencies and the creation of both a Western- and Russian-style national television which catered to different audiences (Dyczok, 2016, p. 10). Ideologically speaking, in the Kuchma–Yushchenko years, the media professed “a moderate ethno-nationalist ideology in the representation of interethnic relations and simultaneously in essence continue the Soviet tradition of interpreting Ukraine as
Kulyk also draws a conclusion about the uncritical and normalising character of the media discourse towards the elites (ibid., p. 562), which, he finds, hardly corresponds to the highly critical perceptions among the population. Moreover, he found a clear “predominance of the reports about the West over the reports about Russia” (ibid., p. 564; my translation) at the time of writing in the late 2000s – an interesting implication for the role of the European narrative in Ukrainian politics. At the same time, the Russian cultural context prevailed in tabloids and popular television shows.

Viktor Yanukovych’s 2010 presidential victory against the incumbent Viktor Yushchenko was seen at the time as a triumph of democracy and yet another peaceful transfer of power in the independent Ukraine, but it heralded darker times for the country’s civil society and journalists. “Corporate pressures remained and state pressures returned” (Dyczok, 2016, p. 11), in particular, temnyky. The public sphere, as a result, was increasingly pushed out onto the Web (ibid.).

Overall, as noted by Orlova (2016), the defining challenges the Ukrainian news media faced in the two decades of post-Soviet transformation were the murky ownership structure (in particular, the state’s continued control over a part of the mediasphere), the skilful manoeuvring by media oligarchs, recurrent censorship problems, low professionalism and compromised standards, economic hardships and the declining quality of the content. In particular, the last two problems became more complicated as a result of Euromaidan and the subsequent war. However, as I intend to demonstrate in this study, while these criticisms largely remain valid, a comparative perspective allows for a more balanced estimate of the achievements and failures of Ukrainian journalists. Some of the problems they faced were a
rather universal trend (a decline in funding, revenues and content quality), whereas some were also local and varying. For example, how can one compare the more financially capable but politically restricted political economy of the media under Yanukovych with the less resourceful but a lot more diverse mediascape after 2014? I see such reductive estimates as rather unproductive for all three countries and focus instead on power relations and discursive power, and thus trying to judge media systems by what is present in them rather than by what is absent.

Other research into the Ukrainian media system, for example Kulyk (2010), points to its commercialisation as well as to the strong role of the state and the emergence of new independent and potentially subversive media outlets. While the local press market remains underdeveloped and marked by a strong presence of local authorities, television, still the most important political and electoral tool, is nearly completely controlled by oligarchs. However, this did not stop a number of guerrilla projects from appearing very recently, literally right before and during Euromaidan (such as Espreso TV and Hromadske; cf. Dyczok, 2016).

The Ukrainian printed press is pluralist but with about the smallest figures for annual newspaper sales per capita in Europe, approximately 27 (calculated based on data from the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, see Derzhavny Komitet [...], 2017). This is lower than even the lowest data for European countries in 2000 cited by Hallin and Mancini (2004, p. 23): 77.5 in Greece, while the Nordic countries accounted for the highest figures (e.g. Norway with 719.7). It must be said that the Ukrainian mass press developed late, mostly because of harsh censorship and bans throughout most of the 1800s, and in the Soviet era, control was a lot stricter than in Poland (see below) and even, to some degree, in Soviet Russia. The Ukrainian tabloids developed their mass readership during the 1990s and 2000s, although it is hard to compare with countries whose press institutions are older and stronger.

The free newspaper market in Ukraine was actively developing but was devastated in the wake of the 2008–2009 financial crisis, so tabloids once again dominate the press horizon (this was also a reason for my sampling of Segodnya). The rise of the online media has driven many printed publications onto the Web, in a local version of a rather universal trend; hence, it is also important to look at the online media and the blogs of the most respectable publications. Last, but not least, the quality press remains my

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14 Formerly State Committee for Information.
main focus, and this is why it was important to choose *Dzerkalo Tyzhnya* among others:

The role of ‘an influential rather than popular’ publication (as defined by its deputy editor-in-chief Yuliya Mostova), i.e. concerned mainly with the problems of authorities and property and important to politicians, officials, businesspeople and other elites thanks to its well-informed and analytical presentation, was won by the weekly *Zerkalo Nedeli*, founded in 1994, published also in the Ukrainian version as *Dzerkalo Tyzhnya* since 2000. (Kulyk, 2010, p. 193; my translation)

The Ukrainian online media are usually oppositional, and political parallelism is in general quite typical for them. All in all, the system has strong clientelist foundations and an average level of professionalisation (although journalism schools are numerous and spread across the country, and several journalist unions are competing for membership).

A notable post-1991 trend of the Ukrainian media system is an increasing feminisation of the journalist profession (as much as the prevalence of young people). Young women constitute most of the journalist workforce in the country, and it is difficult to accept, for the Ukrainian and possibly the Russian case, the conclusion of Mihelj and Downey (2012) about “the decline of female participation in the labour force” (p. 7) in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Jakubowicz (2007), following Kuzio (2002), found many postcolonial challenges to Ukraine’s post-Soviet transformation, where ethnocultural cleavages slowed down or halted meaningful reform under a feeble state and weakened nation; Ukraine differed greatly from Poland, where over 92 per cent of the people claimed that they belonged to the same nation, which facilitated what many see as a successful transformation (pp. 57–58).

One thing that makes Ukraine stand out compared to the strictly monolingual Russian and Polish national media contexts is the language situation. The Ukrainian-language press struggled in the shadow of the Russian-language national press throughout the 1990s and was thoroughly marginalised. Since the early 2000s, it has managed to rebuild itself and win a bigger share of the market, although if the publications that have two language versions are not included, the Ukrainian-only dailies and weeklies are aimed either at a mass countryside readership or a narrower urban niche of intellectuals and a still somewhat small patriotic middle class (this class is probably significantly increasing in numbers right at this moment). As of 2001, the share of Ukrainian-language newspapers in the total circu-
lation was only 34 per cent, and 19 per cent among magazines, with almost no specialised subjects on offer in Ukrainian (Kulyk, 2010, p. 195). In 2014, the Ukrainian language merely accounted for 29 per cent of the newspapers and 9.9 per cent of the magazines (Media Sapiens, 2015), even though the 2017 statistics imply an increase in the use of Ukrainian, with close to 47 per cent of the newspapers (based on the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, 2017) and 27.5 per cent of the magazines. This may have resulted, however, from the loss of Crimea and the occupied Donbas, where Ukrainian has been virtually absent in the local printed media. Similarly, the Russian language dominated television, with 61.4 per cent versus 38.6 per cent in 2006 (Kulyk, 2010, p. 202). The figure for 2015 shows a further decline, with 30.3 per cent of broadcasts in Ukrainian, 26.2 per cent bilingual and 43.5 per cent in Russian. This is aggravated by the fact that Russian-speaking audiences in Ukraine, as evidenced by multiple empirical studies, almost never choose Ukrainian-language content, whereas Ukrainian-speaking readers freely choose content in both languages (see Kulyk, 2010, p. 190).

This striking difference once again links back to the idea of the three countries being three separate polities, which implies the effects of difference in political and media systems, cultures and last, but not least, linguistic communities are “product[s] of political domination” (Bourdieu, 1991/2012, p. 46). The issue of Ukraine’s factual bilingualism is of secondary importance here given the practically postcolonial language situation in the country, where two languages struggle for domination from unequal positions (with Ukrainian still occupying a minority of the printed press; it had previously been reduced to a folkloric status and the language of the countryside, whereas Russian dominated most of the urban linguistic exchanges). It is worth noting that Modern Standard Ukrainian, unlike most other European modern standard languages, developed not around a certain centre of power and its dialect but rather crystallised in many centres located in different states and surrounded by different neighbouring languages. As a consequence of this, it developed several literary standards (up to nine) that were difficult to make into one official codification. When this had finally happened in 1919–1928, the resultant unificatory code was soon banned in 1933, and the dictionaries, purged of words not found in the Russian language, were filled with artificial Russianisms (see Vakulenko, 2009; Horbyk & Palko, 2017). The bilingual situation in Ukraine, in Bourdieu’s reading, is a consequence of its underdeveloped “linguistic market”, its belated development as a state, and the previous structures of
political domination being linked to Moscow (or, in the case of Western Ukraine, Vienna and then Warsaw), which was committed to a project of constructing a different linguistic community. According to Bilaniuk (2009), in the 1990s and 2000s, Ukraine’s linguistic market became open to contestation, but the actual change was slowed down by Russian hegemony and Ukraine’s vulnerable position.

It is also important to warn against an essentialist reading of the ethno-linguistic groupings in Ukraine, where identifications tend to be rather situational and fluid. In their critique of the concept of identity, Brubaker and Cooper (2000) used the case of Russians in Ukraine as one example where their closeness to Ukrainians and their facility for moving between the two groups makes it impossible to determine their relationship as that of “majority/minority”. Indeed, Ukraine is one place where national, ethnic and linguistic identifications do not necessarily coincide. Kulyk (2001) has criticised Brubaker’s assertion (2000) that Ukraine was a “nationalising state” preoccupied with assimilating Russian-speaking minority groups for fear of their instrumentalisation of the “kin country” Russia. In Kulyk’s estimation of the 1990s processes, Ukraine abandoned early hopes of nationalisation as a “state of Ukrainians and for Ukrainians” so as to avoid civil conflict.

Apart from linguistic differences, structurally divergent fields stipulate different representations. Bourdieu says that Heidegger’s writings would have been impossible in the Germany of 1890 or today at Yale (1991/2012, p. 139), and the same can be said of discourses on Europe in different media cultures: distinct fields will produce distinct representations. The field itself constitutes a censorship that alters the form and content of the activity carried out within it. Therefore, this perspective lends even more justification to the focus on national rather than on local or supranational networks, which has already been advocated in the Introduction.

**The taming of the shrew: The Russian media system and the perils of statism**

The Russian media system is best understood within the larger context of Russian society, which Ledeneva (2006) describes as “trapped in its own dependence on unwritten rules, the nontransparency of the rules of the game, and the selectivity of law enforcement” (p. 194). According to one leading Russian media scholar, the country’s media model is “statist commercialised” (Vartanova, 2012, p. 142), combining the decisive role of the state and the effects of a market-driven economy. Despite the multifaceted changes of the last decades, even the young generations of jour-
nalists inherited the traditional concept of journalism “as a derivative of power” (Pasti, 2005, p. 103); in addition, they typically reject the ideas of neutrality and objectivity (Oates, 2007). This facilitated the situation whereby the “integrated state-business elite has supported the use of political media in new circumstances as traditional instruments of political elite management” (Vartanova, 2012, p. 129). Based on the mass-scale surveys of journalists in Russia, Poland and Sweden, Nygren et al. (2015) concluded that

the old differences […] are still clearly visible in the evaluation of political influence, limiting professional autonomy in Russia and also partly in Poland in radio and TV. Russian journalists are under a strong political pressure that limits external autonomy for the media, but at the same time they feel an increasing internal autonomy in, for example, multitasking and audience influence. (p. 93)

Jakubowicz sees Russia as an example of a country where the old political culture remains strong and creates a demand for a strong leader. It rests on three key elements: an underdeveloped state where the authority is “personal and informal” and the civil society is weak; patrimonialism that assumes political authority is connected to ownership and thus fosters corruption; and the culture of the imperial court, which focuses on the central figure, who balances the different interests of the decision-making close inner circle (Jakubowicz, 2007, p. 163). This is despite the fact that in 1986 Russian publications were much freer and liberal and often “exported” oppositional ideas to ideologically stagnant peripheries, such as Bulgaria and Poland, the latter of which was tightly controlled by martial law (ibid., 168). However, reform in Russia was top-down rather than driven from below, and the system was restructured by a wing within the party rather than by an opposition against it (Sparks, 2008, p. 55). The liberalisation and privatisation of television were also much more controlled in the 1990s than the press (ibid.). And, as Hutchings and Tolz (2015) noted, the new media technologies reinforced rather than diminished the impact of television in Russia.

Notably, the policy of tightening media control has intensified during the rule of Vladimir Putin and especially since 2012, which marked the beginning of his third term in office. Lipman (2014) paints a gloomy picture of media “taming” by advertisement revenue manipulation and “control through ownership” (p. 185). Top executives of many “niche” outlets for a critically minded and politically concerned minority” (Lipman, 2014, pp. 181–182) were reshuffled, including RIA Novosti, Kommersant vlast, Bolshoy gorod, Ekho Moskvy, TV Dozhd and Lenta.ru. The launch of new state
news agencies Rossiya Segodnya (based on the restructured RIA Novosti) and Sputnik – with budgets in the billions – marked the completion of a vertikal (a Soviet-era term denoting a strictly hierarchical and monolithic power apparatus) in the media system.

The Russian media market is divided primarily between the state-owned Gazprom Media and National Media Group, controlled by Putin’s personal friends. While some individual online outlets may remain at least partly critical of the government (which has in response introduced ever harsher Internet control measures), TV has remained the leading medium, with 94 per cent of Russian audience watching it daily (Vartanova, 2012, p. 125). At the same time, since National Media Group “now controls 11 of Russia’s 17 largest TV networks” (Lipman, 2014, p. 186), “the TV networks have”, with the beginning of Euromaidan and especially after Russia’s open intervention in Ukraine, “been turned into raw propaganda machines, and dissenting voices were condemned as natsional predateli (“traitors of the people”)” (ibid., p. 180).

The consolidation of a state-controlled Russian mediasphere had been going on immediately before and during the events of Euromaidan and the subsequent Ukraine–Russia crisis. The adversarial image of the West is also the image the Russian media were projecting, too, throughout the 2000s (see Zassoursky, 2005, 2010; Kratasjuk, 2006). Zvereva (2014) in particular highlighted how Russian discourses construct Russia as a stronger actor by casting Europe as its Other. This was much facilitated by the country’s media model, in which “integrated state–business elite has supported the use of political media in new circumstances as traditional instruments of political elite management” (Vartanova, 2012, p. 129). The social profile of Russian journalists is often that of impoverished youth: 43 per cent say they need, or can only survive with, income from other jobs; the average age is, according to different estimates, between 32 and 41, and close to 60 per cent of all journalists are women (Nygren et al., 2015, p. 83, 85). The prevalence of women indicates a feminisation of the profession (NB the parallel process in Ukraine!), linked to a lower power status in an overall patriarchal society. Age and low income are also factors that weaken the journalists’ position and autonomy.

From the “alternative public sphere” to new conflicts:

The Polish media system

The social profile is not only similar in Ukraine and Russia; in Poland, the average age of journalists also varies between 34 and 37, and the income is
even lower, with 49 per cent on the brink of subsistence. The key difference in
the social profile is gender, with predominantly (ca. 60 per cent) male jour-
nalists (ibid.). In general, the differences go deeper and further than these
similarities. Dobek-Ostrowska (2012, p. 30) noted that after a period of stag-
nation under foreign rule, interwar Poland saw a booming development of all
kinds of press, an early development of the professionalisation of journalists
as well as a rather polarised media system with democratic corporatist
elements (a German influence). This, however, was cut short by the war and
the subsequent establishment of the Communist state-centric model.

However, Poland remained the most liberal and commercialised of all
Eastern bloc countries; there were some independent and even privately
owned media and the quality of the mainstream press was not as low as
elsewhere; here “a kind of external pluralism existed in a clandestine way”
(Zamoyski, 2009, pp. 364). Unlike the USSR, the Polish government freely
borrowed from the West and cooperated with Western businesses (ibid., pp.
364–366). The authority of the Communist Party was more limited in
Poland as it was perceived as a foreign imposition unlike in Russia (Sparks,
2008, p. 49). As a result of all of the above, Poland experienced “open,
protracted and intense opposition to the regime” and “an alternative public
sphere from at least 1979” (ibid., 52).

Periodicals of every kind and underground presses began pouring forth a
torrent of literature. […A] Flying University began operating in Warsaw,
and discussion clubs burgeoned. The police arrested individuals, raided
premises and confiscated materials, but the dissidents were well organised
and protected by the sympathy and cooperation of the public. They were
also given a tacit support and facilities by the Church, which played an active
part in defending human rights and helping sacked workers. (Zamoyski,
2009, p. 368)

The post-1989 Polish media underwent a metamorphosis. The 1990 re-
moval of censorship and the authorities’ control over the media was fol-
lowed by the proliferation of media pluralism, “legalisation” and the expan-
sion of the underground public sphere, and quick market concentration,
which had until then been governed by an obsolete Communist-era media
legislation (Klimkiewicz, 2017, p. 199). This represents a similar pattern to
both Russia’s and Ukraine’s development in the 1990s. Rather unsur-
prisingly, the Polish media system became one of the most commercialised
in all post-Communist countries while moving closer towards the Italian or
Mediterranean model with relatively strong political parallelism and polari-
sation (Jakubowicz, 2007). Dobek-Ostrowska (2012, p. 49) agrees with that only partly, emphasising the influence of the liberal model over the last decade, the post-Communist legacy and elements of the democratic corporatist model. Similar to the other post-Communist countries, deregulation was seen as the silver bullet. Like in Russia and Ukraine, the 1990s were marred by political chaos, corruption and the revanche of the old, now “post-Communist”, elites (Zamoyski, 2009, pp. 388–394).

Like in many European countries, interpretation, commentary and “advocacy” journalism dominate the media coverage (Dobek-Ostrowska, 2012, p. 36). Still, political parallelism may be quite strong, and especially the highbrow quality newspapers tend to favour one party over another. At the same time, the Polish media system is becoming ever more commercialised and even perhaps “colonised” by major German and Swiss companies, whereas local newspapers remain rather depoliticised.

This “foreign” domination has been a reason for the Law and Justice (PiS) government’s grudge since 2015. At the same time, rather high levels of clientelism and a relatively strong professional culture complete the picture of the present-day media system in Poland. The media reform that the more conservative government has pushed through since 2015 in the form of the “Small Media Act” (2015) and the as of yet not passed “Big Media Act” has been promoted as the recipe for overcoming the media system’s defects. Yet it addressed the problems, Klimkiewicz (2017) found, from the wrong end, focusing on establishing governmental control over public service broadcasting instead of, for example, finding a remedy for its meagre revenue from licence fees (around only 30 per cent). The government is also committed to bringing back the national character and patriotic values to the media system, which has faced a negative reaction domestically and internationally but has been “legitimated by a support of the significant part of the divided society and journalistic community” (ibid., p. 212). This demand for a state-controlled media system may be one similar feature in all three countries, expressed in Russia and Poland the most emphatically at the moment.

**European policy-making in relation to the media**

Before addressing the interfaces between public discourses and foreign policy, it is vital to outline clearly what these policies actually are. Therefore, it is time to turn to the problem of how the state actors in charge of these countries’ foreign policy formulate their political agenda as regards Europe.
The answers to these questions will enable a comparison of mediated representations, official discourses and political practices. Such a comparison may help establish a link between on the one hand the “weak” public sphere, which can discuss a wide range of issues from different perspectives but not implement its decisions, and on the other, the “strong” governance sphere, which allows for decisive action but little open debate. To this end, I will consider official documents that express the foreign policy goals.

Let me just briefly remind that Ukraine’s foreign policy has since 1991 focused on the international recognition of Ukraine and cementing its security, while the European choice was declared as early as 1998 (with the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement), and in 2002 Ukraine’s objective was legally defined as accession to the EU. After a period when this policy had a counterweight in the shape of integration into the Russia-led Eurasian structures (the so-called “multi-vector policy”), Ukraine became after 2004 more committed to European and Euroatlantic integration, which were, however, halted by a lack of internal reform and Western interest and by Russia’s counteraction. In 2010–2013, the Yanukovych administration tried to continue integrating with the EU while returning to certain elements of the multi-vector tradition. This failed with the foreign policy reorientation in 2014 and Euromaidan, resulting in Ukrainian policy shifting to the current firm commitment to European integration.

Poland’s foreign policy has been more linear and since democratisation in 1989 oriented towards Europe, which was interpreted as a return to the family of European nations. Marked by accession to NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004, this development culminated in Poland’s being a major EU stakeholder thanks to the size of its economy and population as well as its significant stability after the 2008 financial crisis, contrary to many expectations. Russia after 1991 seemed to be becoming Westernised, but these generally cooperative relations suffered many blows from both sides and it soon became clear that integration into the EU or NATO was not a possibility. Since Vladimir Putin’s coming into office, Russia has opted for a more assertive and confrontational policy, although wars and internal conflicts have marred Russia’s post-Soviet existence both before and after he was elected: South Ossetia (1991–1992), Transnistria (1992), Abkhazia (1992–1993), Chechnya (1994–1996, 1999–2000), South Ossetia and Abkhazia (2008), and now Crimea and Donbas (2014–). In all these conflicts, challenging what was perceived as the West’s Cold War victory – insignificant at first – has grown to be an important component. Despite many moments of hope, cooperation in many areas, and attempts to “reset” rela-
tions (such as the former US secretary of state Hillary Clinton’s effort in 2009), Europe’s relationship with Russia remains the most difficult and conflictual one.

While actual policies are most openly revealed in the steps political actors take, my focus on discourses makes it suitable to analyse policy documents where the goals and priorities of national foreign policy are narratively constructed. Differences and similarities in what objectives are declared and how they are accomplished make it possible to compare the policies, even though other aspects of them may be difficult to compare given differences in influential factors such as the institutional setup and capability, the resources, the security situation, the economy, etc. Comparing official narratives is an effective way to operationalise such a complex term as “policy”. In this section, I compare the foundational foreign policy documents that each country claims are guiding their international actions (see Figure 4).

Ukraine has the thinnest collection of statements that guide its foreign policy: a rather short parliamentary act, On the Foundations of Domestic and Foreign Policy, passed in 2010 during the early “pro-European” phase of the Yanukovych administration (Verkhovna Rada, 2010). As is obvious from its title, the act determines what the executive power has to do not only in foreign relations but also domestically. It is in the latter part, which comes first in the text, that “European standards” are mentioned several times as an example for the government to orient itself towards in accord with the media discourses analysed in the previous chapter, which associate Europe with normative and progressive practices. The second half of the act begins with a statement amended at the end of 2014, and it declares that “Ukraine is a European state”. Halfway through the list of foreign policy priorities, integration into the European Union is mentioned as the ultimate goal of Ukraine’s relations with the European countries. Curiously, “Europe” and “European” are mentioned more often in the domestic policy section: seven times out of a total of ten, which indicates the role of the idea of Europe in Ukrainian domestic politics.

Even though the document is short and does not say much, the Ukrainian MFA’s website is notable for having a separate section dedicated to European integration, obviously created to highlight it as the country’s priority (Ministerstvo Zakordonnykh Sprav, 2016). Another thing that makes Ukraine special among the three countries’ MFA websites is that an even bigger section on civic control and interaction with NGOs and civil society is on the Civic Council’s subsite within the MFA website; this
The council was specifically created after Euromaidan to direct the influence of the civil society and experts towards the MFA. This is something Russian and Polish diplomats alike do not have.

The economy and security dominate the official Polish foreign policy agenda, “Polish Foreign Policy Priorities 2012–2016” (Council of Ministers of Poland, 2012; henceforth referred to as “Priorities”). This twenty-nine-page-long text mentions “Europe” (including the adjective “European”) a whopping 122 times. In this text, the coalition government (consisting of the liberal Civic Platform Party [PO] and the Polish People’s Party), headed by Donald Tusk, declares Europe as the main focus of its foreign activities, to which about a third of the text is dedicated. The text’s authors see Europe as a value, even though they do not shy away from the crisis developing on the Continent, seen from the perspective of 2011 as threats rather than as an already ongoing process: “Europe in particular faces a tough dilemma: it must choose between deeper integration of the European Union or being downplayed, and as a result downgraded, in the international arena” (Council of Ministers of Poland, 2012).

In response, Poland advocates the strengthening and development of European institutions and a deeper integration going as far as a political union:

Poland’s vision of a united Europe can be described by three catchwords: competitiveness, solidarity, and openness. Pursuing deeper European integration, both economic and political, is important. European institutions should also be strengthened so that they can effectively implement their tasks. Hopefully, the European Union will eventually become a political union. (ibid.)

Europe is seen as an asset that Poland will project further eastwards as an element of its soft power:

Poland can make available its experience of uneasy systemic transformation and offers its support to its eastern neighbours. Reform-oriented measures in Eastern Europe and in South Caucasus are necessary not only as a goal in itself. Bringing stability and the rule of law across the Eastern border, they provide security and implement Poland’s and the EU’s interests. They are an element of building a peaceful European order. (ibid.)

Even though the new conservative government formed by the PiS has a discourse on Intermarium (the countries between the Baltic and the Black
Sea) as an alternative to deeper European integration, it had not changed the “Priorities” initially, and the document had been valid during the period analysed here. However, it was replaced by the new concept paper “Polish Foreign Policy Strategy, 2017–2022” in 2017, where “Europe” and “European” are mentioned even more often, in fact 140 times. In this new document the perception of Europe seems to be more preoccupied with threats to the EU and its crisis, and it is discussed as one of the policy directions but not as the most prominent priority as in the previous document. The Polish MFA’s website had continued to bear the motto “To serve Poland – to build Europe – to understand the world” for some time, which had predicated European integration as beneficial for Poland and at the same time as a gateway to the broader “world”, until the motto was changed sometime during 2017 to the obviously more nation-centred “Faithful to my Homeland, the Republic of Poland”.

Russian foreign policy is formally guided by “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation” signed by Vladimir Putin on 12 February 2013 (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, 2013). This is a document of comparable size to the Polish “Priorities”, but it mentions Europe much less frequently, only thirty-one times. All in all, Europe is rather at the periphery of this strongly Russia-centric document. The vision of Europe in this text is to become a part of a larger entity, a single space from Lisbon to Vladivostok, expressing a foreign doctrine based on Eurasian ideals: “In its relations with the European Union, the main task for Russia as an integral and inseparable part of European civilization is to promote creating a common economic and humanitarian space from the Atlantic to the Pacific” (ibid., 2013).

Russia aims to safeguard its sovereignty and even achieve domination over this single space. Thus, although the narrative is that of a latent conflict, it does not target the destruction or annihilation of Russia’s rival, the West; instead, it is aimed at forcing the West to accept Russian terms and sovereignty. Rather than a clash of different civilisations, it is a clash within one civilisation about who will define its future and its priorities.

Although accorded no official status, an article by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, “Russia’s Foreign Policy: Historical Background” (Lavrov, 2016), published on 3 March 2016, is a more informal declaration of Europe as the foreign policy priority. It starts from the very inception of Russian foreign policy, which according to Russian convention begins in Kyiv and Ukrainian lands. Lavrov invokes Kyiv-Rusian, Ruthenian relations with European monarchs as foundational for Moscow’s later international activity. Europe is everywhere in this text. Judging by its title, one would
expect it to be about Russia’s global foreign policy. Yet the only vector mentioned is that of Europe. Lavrov recounts that the times when Russia acted in concert with West European states and sometimes took the lead were high points of European history. However, the occasions when the West clashed with Russia are portrayed as times of discord and everyone’s loss. Reading between the lines, the following conclusion can be drawn: forget the sanctions and return to business as usual, which neatly incorporates the logic of Russia’s aspiration to work in concert with the West without, however, conceding anything.

Figure 4. Themes and argumentation in Ukrainian, Polish and Russian policy documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Poland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key actors</strong></td>
<td>European institutions</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Frame of reference</strong></td>
<td>Entering “European space”</td>
<td>Europe from the Atlantic to the Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Values</strong></td>
<td>European model, standards, approaches in Ukraine</td>
<td>Freedom of movement for Russians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part of Europe?</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Problems</strong></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Crisis in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key tasks</strong></td>
<td>Reform</td>
<td>Gas and oil trade, security (blocking NATO),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Own agency</strong></td>
<td>Backgrounded</td>
<td>Foregrounded</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All three states selfishly pursue their interests proclaimed in the documents reviewed here, but these interests themselves differ drastically. If Ukraine wants to complete the straightforward process of becoming fully admitted to Europe, Poland’s priority is to strengthen itself by bolstering Europe as well as its own position within Europe. Russia, rather, wants a piece of the European pie and be included in the Western world on its own terms, without adapting to “European standards”, hoping instead in the process to
change these standards to become more like “Russian standards” and allowing Russia a leading role in a Eurasian super-region that would also include Europe.

I cannot prove that media discourses have had an obvious impact on these policy documents, even though in each society public discourses tend to be in accord with the official statements. It is clear that these government declarations are dictated by each country’s actual political, military, economic and cultural circumstances and result from a complex negotiation between the action demanded in the public discourses and that preferred by the government. However, it is important to note that the public discourses are not only intertwined but also follow very similar patterns, as has been demonstrated. A plausible explanation is that this similarity is the result of the government’s interaction with the public sphere (in the language of Habermas) or of governmentality, where the government and the public discourse work together (in the language of Foucault). To untangle some of the links between them, I will review a few cases where notable texts written by relatively important figures came into contact with the field of political action.

Bloggers and notable authors: Approaching narratives of Europe at an individual level

In the previous sections, I have demonstrated the key differences and similarities between the three media systems as well as between the official foreign policy discourses on Europe, which clearly belong to the realm of political power and governmentality and represent something Bourdieu would classify as performative utterances assumed to have a binding effect on reality. To approach public discourses on Europe that do not have this particular status, I will begin by looking at individual texts and authors before turning in a more generalising fashion to my sample of newspapers. The concept of discourse implies a significant anonymity or, rather, intertextuality, whereby those who participate turn themselves into talking heads through which discourse is spoken. Yet it is only in the form of individual utterances that discourses come into being. Moreover, such an individual-centric beginning would set an inductive tone for the analysis. Many of the texts analysed here, coming from a position of authority, played a role not so much in reproducing a discourse as in shaping or transforming it, while others had a special reception history and were used beyond their discursive function, playing a more significant role in extralinguistic reality.
Firstly, I consider more informal texts circulating in the blogospheres of the analysed countries. While these blogs have not been sampled systematically, I target the most prestigious blog sites in each country, concentrating on a number of cases where the contributors discussed Europe. The results delineate the contours of Europe as it is pictured in these more spontaneous and less formalised exchanges than those happening on the (web) pages of those newspapers that are worried about their reputation. These exchanges are nevertheless almost as highly valued by their authors for being endowed with prestige and a public tribune quality. These differences in register, coupled with functional similarity, make a good entry into and an extra validating counterbalance to the more conservative, regulated and controlled discourses in the press. After presenting an overview of the blogs, I will turn to notable individual cases in the chosen newspapers.

During the autumn and winter of 2013–2014, Ukrayinska Pravda’s blog section became a hub of discussion on the association with the EU. The site itself is where many public figures (politicians, analysts, writers, artists, lawyers, activists and journalists) publish their diaries; to some extent, it sets the agenda for the political and cultural debate. What is seen here is the use of Europe as a “reference point”, in the words of Orlova (2010). Vadym Kolesnichenko (2014), one of the most hated pro-Russian MPs and a staunch Yanukovych supporter, titled one of his many blogs “The future belongs to the united Europe” (Kolesnichenko, 2013). In a later posting, he demanded, based on the European Parliament resolutions, that Ukraine’s rightists, who celebrated the birthday of Stepan Bandera, a historical figure associated with their movement, should be punished. On the opposite side of the political spectrum, pro-opposition journalist Serhiy Andrushko (2013) explained “Why our politicians do not want to integrate into the EU”:

> Being in the EU means transparent tender procedures. [...] Buying raspberries for 70 euros [per kilo] or a subway bench for the price of an inexpensive car will be impossible. [...] Look at how MEPs report the gifts they receive.

One of the protest leaders, Yuriy Lutsenko (2013), summarised this more sharply: “Europe is a system of relations where an individual [lyudyna – literally, ‘a man’, ‘a human being’] is the centre of power. Everything works for the individual [lyudyna]”. Note the parallel with Donald Tusk’s “Citizens are Europe” adage, which I am quoting in Chapter 6 from an

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15 All the quotes in this section are provided in my translation.
interview in Polityka: both suggest Europe is such a form of politico-social organisation that it gravitates towards the citizen.

The trend was, however, unfortunate for Europe. As the protest went on without any tangible support from the EU, the discussions in January 2014 became more sober and sombre.

‘Europe is responsible for the violence in Kyiv because of its inaction and silent observation’, one activist and journalist exclaimed. ‘Neither the government nor Europe hears us; people are forced to resort to insurrection as the last option. So we urge Europe to intervene and impose sanctions. If Europe just stands by watching, we can repeat Munich 1938’. (Sokolenko, 2014)

In the final line of a song, the frontman of one of Ukraine’s leading rock bands sings: “Stop referring to the protest as ‘pro-European’. Europe doesn’t give a shit about us. And it’s not about it anyways” (Yarmola, 2014).

Bloggers on the important Russian blog platform Snob.ru reiterated the same apocalyptic and agonistic discourses as their country’s mainstream media. Anecdotic evidence – such as the analysis of the visual circulated on LiveJournal in the next section – suggests that Russian webspace is already full of half-invented stories about the West’s moral decay, juvenile justice, gay pride parades for kids and other symptoms of the “Untergang” of, to transliterate from Russian, Geyropa (“Gayrope”, an ironic reference used by Russian ultraconservatives for the European understanding of human rights). On Snob.ru, one could recently see entries on Europe being destroyed by the United States and Russia, an open question on whether Jews are really fleeing Norway because of xenophobic migrants, reflections on the geopolitical epic battle for Ukraine between the EU and Russia and on French neocolonialism in Africa. Interestingly enough, after the annexation of Crimea and the deepening of the Ukrainian crisis when the Russian authorities began to tighten the screws, Snob.ru closed down free access to many of its pages and private blogs for non-subscribers, so some of the texts cited here are no longer available without a subscription.

As for the openly hostile and anti-European statements, Eduard Limonov (2013), the leader of Russia’s National Bolsheviks and an almost modern classic writer, suggested: “In fact, it would be good for us if Europe collapsed. It is in our interests, in the interests of Russia to support the migrants in Europe against the European indigenous populations to weaken Europe”. This statement echoes his words from an interview he gave to Izvestiya on 22 February 2013:
Europe is exsanguinated, uninteresting. Perhaps an uprising by the migrants who asked no one before settling down in it [samovolno tam poselilis] could resuscitate it. It [Europe] makes a bad impression; the passion is lost, the ardour [azart] is lost.

At the same time, the online media can find examples of the symbolic use of Europe as the source of values and righteous practices, something that is also present in Russia’s printed oppositional media such as Novaya. One blogger dwelled on how the idea of Europe corresponds to that of political modernisation. Importantly, the website launched a series of articles titled Pochemu Rossiya otstala ot Yevropy [Why Russia lags behind Europe].

Poland may lack a very prestigious blog platform that helps set the agenda and frame the most important issues. Nearly all the blogs on the news outlets’ websites belong to the journalists who work for them. The more popular blog platform Natemat.pl reveals a strong identification with Europe among its authors. In many cases, whenever Europe is mentioned, Poland is also included in the pan-European or pan-Western “we”. This, however, does not make the bloggers’ stance less critical. The journalists and bloggers attack Europe (and very often Poland itself as a part of it) whenever possible, from its insufficient to its over-the-top reaction to the events in Ukraine.

Ukrainians have a notable place in the blogs: the lawyer and politician Bartłomiej Ciążyński (2014), while criticising the EU’s lack of internal unity, quoted from a Ukrainian activist’s address to Europe: “You are too old, blind to what is happening; you are deaf and can’t hear screams. […] Above all, you don’t want to help anybody until it brings you profit”. Similarly, one blogger, the self-styled “conservative punk” Maciej Borowicz (2014), supported the prominent writer Andrzej Stasjuk in his criticism of “Poland becoming part of the overly calculating West” too quickly. The participants discuss the crises in Europe and question its adherence to its own values. Sometimes the conservative discourse occurs similar to in Russia, for example when the journalist Kamil Sikora (2014) cited an ironical comment by a right-wing MP: “Europe is a brothel where everything is allowed. With a goat, with a horse, with an ape, with another woman, a child, with anybody”.

I will now turn to cases of special significance. If one looks at Ukrainian media developments in 2013–2014, there are prominent cases such as Mustafa Nayyem’s historic Facebook posts, as mentioned in the Introduction. This Kabul-born engineer turned investigative journalist (b. 1981), renowned for his muckraking work, had revealed the scope of corruption in
Ukraine. In his Facebook post, he expressed his shock and anger at the government’s decision to reverse Ukraine’s foreign policy, from that of European integration towards Eurasian integration into the Russia-led Customs Union. He called upon other upset pro-Europeans to follow his example and make their way to Maidan Square, where they would discuss further options. As he had the most followers on the Ukrainian Facebook pages, he succeeded in gathering about a thousand-strong protest at extremely short notice. This case is exemplary in terms of projecting a journalist’s power and agency: thanks to his journalism, Nayyem was in the position to speak to tens of thousands, so his professional identification and previous work empowered him and entrusted with a means to address his audience directly. Apart from that, the call had a rather direct mobilising effect in tune with those Ukrainians who made up the bulk of his followers (i.e. those by default interested in social and political life, otherwise why follow an investigative journalist?). Yet such cases of an extremely clear-cut and direct journalist influence are rare. More typical are those where the impact is not straightforward; they may fail in some aspects but help the situation in some others.

Yevhen Sverstyuk (1928–2014) is another notable case here – and a totally different one. His age, background, profile and genre of writing are the polar opposite to Nayyem’s. A philosopher and psychologist by education, Sverstyuk spoke out against human rights violations and the persecution of Ukrainian culture in the Soviet Union, for which he was expelled from his jobs in 1959, 1960, 1961, 1965 and 1972, until he was finally arrested and sent to the Gulag in 1972, where he was imprisoned until 1979. In the independent Ukraine, he became one of the few absolute moral authorities. Although his media presence and influence on the wider public were limited, he was highly respected by high-profile journalists and other civil society figures. At the time of Euromaidan, Sverstyuk became a member and a rotating head of the First of December Initiative Group, comprising senior intellectuals whose specific purpose was to provide Ukrainians with some kind of moral authority during the period of post–Orange Revolution disarray.

On 11 October 2013, when the country was still on Yanukovych’s European integration track but pressed hard by Russia, he published an article, Problema vyboru napryamku [The Problem of Choosing the Direction], in Dzerkalo Tyzhnya (quoted also in Chapter 6. Apparently, the text was written with the intention to influence the choice between the European and the Russian vectors, so in some ways it was also addressed to the
responsible authorities, not only to Ukrainian civil society or the general public. Sverstyuk consistently advocated choosing the European option in spite of the ongoing hardships. A strongly religious person, he argued from a Christian perspective (perhaps also bearing in mind Yanukovych and his allies’ demonstrative allegiance to Orthodoxy) that although the real, flesh-and-blood Europe is controversial, its values are morally superior. The appeal to religion (in an ethical rather than cultic sense) also enabled the author to push Ukraine’s pro-Western vector back to the country’s adoption of Christianity in AD 988. Later on, Sverstyuk continued, as the West fought for its rights and freedoms, Russia was stuck in its traditions of selective justice. Many people fled from Russia to the West in a quest for personal safety and freedom, he writes, but hardly the other way around.

The European choice is a choice of values [vartosti]. In the Ukrainian language, the word “values” [vartosti] slightly differs from the word values [tsinnosti]\(^\text{16}\), because the latter one relates to material goods. When someone says “European choice”, they typically mean political orientation and material abundance. In fact, the basis for this notion is the choice of fundamental values, the choice of freedom, human rights, law [zakonu], the rule of law [prava].

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\(^\text{16}\) This is an untranslatable pun based on two Ukrainian words, one common with Polish (Ukr. *vartosti* and Pol. *wartości*) and another with Russian (Ukr. *tsinnosti* and Rus. *tsennosti*). The two words are commonly confused by native speakers too as the difference in connotation is very slight indeed.
Picture 4. Ukraine getting fit for Europe (courtesy of Ihor Lukyanchenko/the Institute of World Policy)

Picture 5. Ukraine faces the choice between the decadent West and traditional Russia, a.k.a. I Choose Freedom (courtesy of Ruslan Smak)

Picture 6. Affluent Old Age (courtesy of the Institute of World Policy)
Picture 7. *Which Treatment Is Better?* (courtesy of the Institute of World Policy)

Picture 8. *Clear Water!* (courtesy of the Institute of World Policy)

Picture 9. *Police with the People* (courtesy of the Institute of World Policy)
5. MEDIA SYSTEMS, POLICIES AND VOICES

Picture 10. Berkut wallpapers (courtesy of Rammist/Look.com.ua)

Picture 11. Gay pride parade for kids in Bergen (LiveJournal)

Picture 12. “Is Russia part of Europe? No, Europe is part of Russia” (courtesy of Geopolitics.ru)
Picture 13. Modern Russian tanks in a European city: digital drawing (courtesy of Anaga.ru)

Picture 14. Małgorzata Lazarek. Untitled (courtesy of the Museum of Caricature and Cartoon Art in Warsaw)

Picture 15. Marek Racykowski. Untitled (courtesy of the Museum of Caricature and Cartoon Art in Warsaw)
5. MEDIA SYSTEMS, POLICIES AND VOICES

Picture 15. “Faux-European” renovation in Ukraine (Wikimedia Commons)

Picture 16. Disco-club “Europe” in Pryluka (Vkontakte)
Sverstyuk thus explicitly contrasted the cargo-cultic and the value-based narratives of Europe (both of which I traced back to the eighteenth century in the historical section above). His call to choose values not because they bring material well-being but because they bring ethical dignity fell on deaf ears, however. In a notable failure of an intellectual to use public discourse and project influence on the powerful, a month after this article was published, the government rejected the European vector and opted to head in the pro-Russian direction, citing precisely its material advantages. Yet Sverstyuk’s call equally fell on many open ears too. Maidan – with its de-facto centrum, which combined a demand for rights and dignity with republican non-ethnical nationalism and could accommodate religious ethics and the church – looks very much like a brainchild of Sverstyuk’s and a realisation of his programme in that text: away from Russia and lawlessness, and towards Europe and mutual respect. This text, published in a leading weekly by a prominent author positioned at the intersection of several levels of authority, was undoubtedly read by most of those who became Maidan leaders: both civic and political actors.

Another notable case is a non-fiction bestseller by the Hromadske journalist Natalya Humenyuk (2015), the title of which, Maidan Tahrir, plays on the linguistic ties between Ukrainian and Arabic. In this book, a collection of travelogues from the Middle East, Humenyuk used Europe to construct a special position for Ukraine as a subject/object of orientalising discourse. While Ukrainians easily resort to stereotypes and simplistic schemas when discussing the Arab world, they are subjected to the same simplification in the eyes of Western observers. The journalist thus uses this tension between observing the Middle East and being observed by Western Europe to create an opening for solidarity and understanding.

A complicated case from Russia is related to the newspaper Izvestiya, which has been staunchly pro-government since the late 1990s, when it was acquired by the oligarch Mikhail Potanin, who, unlike Khodorkovsky or Gusinsky, made a pact with Putin’s group (mostly consisting of former siloviki who had been friends since their time at the KGB in the 1970s and 1980s). In 2011, the newspaper was purchased by the News Media Group owned by Aram Gabrelyanov, a tabloid tycoon notorious for his non-ethical concept of journalism as well as his unconditional support for the authorities. He finds “enlightened” authoritarianism the best form of government for Russia and openly says that “power comes from God”. In turn, his News Media holding has since 2008 been majority-owned by the National Media Group, which belongs to, and is owned by, Putin’s close personal friends, in
particular, the ex-gymnastics star Alina Kabayeva, widely rumoured to be Putin’s mistress (Lenta.ru, 2012).

In October 2013, right in the middle of Russia’s campaign to block Ukraine’s European aspirations with a trade embargo, Boris Mezhuyev was appointed the new deputy editor of Izvestiya (Lenta.ru, 2013). Born in 1970, he studied philosophy at Moscow State University and had a meteoric career as a journalist and political pundit, often capitalising on his theory of the clash between Russia and the West and the need for Russia to rely on its modernised “new Eurasianism” project as an alternative to “Western democracy” (Mezhuyev, 2004). He also assembled his own team of conservative analysts and essayists, more liberal than Aleksandr Dugin’s Eurasianists but certainly ultraconservative in their belief in the clash of civilisations and managed society while also allowing for a dose of Western technical modernisation.

Mezhuyev had earlier worked for the newspaper as a popular columnist. And he continued, his editorial duties aside, by publishing a total of five columns on Europe (each in the context of Ukraine) during the autumn and early winter of 2013. Apparently, he was one of the writers specifically entrusted with the task of covering European problems. Some of these texts, like Sverstyuk’s, will also be quoted in Chapter 6. Mezhuyev developed a concept of Europe that was rather accommodating and aimed at achieving a cohabitation between these two “different systems”, on condition that Europe leaves Russia’s neighbours in the Kremlin’s sphere of influence. Later in 2013, as the Ukraine situation began to escalate, Mezhuyev’s writing became a lot more conflictual. On 8 November, he published a text titled Smena tsivilizatsionnykh prioritetov [Change of Civilisational Priorities], which today reads like a list of talking points for the Russian official position since February 2014. Having explained that there are “several Europes”, the author goes on to accuse the broadest one, the Council of Europe, of attacking Russia’s sovereignty (which he regards as its greatest value), whereas the EU enlarges by spewing “commanding shouts” at the supposedly reluctant integrating states. Mezhuyev celebrates Russia’s leaving the Council of Europe because “it is somewhat shameful for a great state to be in purgatory while it understands it will never be admitted to paradise, and paradise itself is in a less than paradisiacal state”. He then concludes that “several Europes” are all the same in fact, striving to “tame Russia” and “take our closest friend and neighbour [Ukraine] from us”. Mezhuyev concludes: Russia must “protect its civilisational self-standing”. Throughout the crisis’s hot phase, he continued by providing a Hunting-
tonian analysis of the annexation of Crimea as a takeover of the peninsula, “not from our brotherly Ukraine, albeit confused in its feelings towards us, but from the not quite friendly Euroatlantic…the incorporation of Crimea is not only a unification of the Russian nation, but it is also the beginning of the geopolitical division of Europe” (*Izvestiya*, 18 March 2014). A month later (*Izvestiya*, 17 April 2014), he corrected his views after doing “political hermeneutics” (his own expression) of Putin’s press conference, stating that Russia and Europe belonged to the same larger entity and that Russia would “liberate” Europe from its anti-traditionalist mistake. “Europe for Putin is not an alien civilisation; Europe is a kind of battlefield between liberal individualism alien to Russia and Eurotraditionalism, which is close to it [Russia] but until now taken hostage by the Atlantic”. On 7 September 2014, after the Minsk agreements, Mezhuyev once again returned to the “clash of civilisations” tenet by interpreting the ceasefire as one achieved on favourable terms for Russia in a lasting cold war against the West, thereby also indirectly admitting that Russia is a side in the conflict, which is not an internal Ukrainian war!

Is this an example of media influence on politics? Given the changes of opinion that follow rather than lead the government’s actions and also taking into account the number of ties connecting together Mezhuyev, Gabrelyanov, Kabayeva and Putin, it has to be judged rather a case of the authorities’ impact on the Russian media, which was called upon to serve as a mouthpiece and a soldier of the informational front while intellectuals such as Boris Mezhuyev are asked to serve up the messages and discourses the state needs, also “correcting” their own previous views in order to fall in line with what the leader says. The political economy of this individual example reveals a typical scheme of media management by the Russian authorities. The outlet is financially and administratively controlled by a company run by people with very close informal and personal ties to those in power. These managers then appoint the staff to run the newspaper and write for it, selected on criteria such as ideological suitability and not least personal ties again. The enterprise may be either showered with financial bonuses or run as a fully profitable business. Such a system may not even need conventional censorship as certainly ideologists like Mezhuyev believe in what they write. On 22 April 2014, for instance, the owner of the News Media holding, Aram Gabrelyanov, received the Order of Honour from Vladimir Putin for “professionalism and objectivity while covering the situation in Crimea” (BBC Russian Service, 5 May 2014).
A contrasting example from Russia is found in the coverage of Euromaidan by the young photographer and journalist Yevgeny Feldman, who was present at the protests and clashes and wrote about the protesters’ agenda in their own terms. Another pro-Ukrainian voice in Russia was Novaya Gazeta’s Olga Musafirova, who was also in charge of covering the Europe/Euromaidan/Ukraine crisis theme. Her case is a good illustration of how difficult it is to attribute certain authors to a specific national context. Ironically enough, Musafirova emigrated from Russia to Ukraine in 1989 and should be considered a Ukrainian journalist publishing in Russia. Her emotional narratives were penned from the protest perspective, while Feldman tried to write impartially. These examples show that dissident voices can surely be found in Russia, but they have little or no interaction with state policy. This is reminiscent of the Ukrainian situation before the victory of Euromaidan, when writers like Sverstyuk criticised the course adopted by the authorities, which treated such discourse with indifference, though the dissident writing resonated with oppositional groups in Ukrainian society, also represented on social media. This may be one of the few areas where the Russian media’s independent agency has the strongest reverberation.

Similarly interesting is a text by the well-known writer Lyudmila Ulitskaya where she is trying to contextualise the current crises, not least the Ukrainian crisis, within the experience of the past European crises. In this essay published on 26 August 2014, Ulitskaya compared the current situation with 1914, concluding that “my country has declared war on culture, on humanist values, on the idea of personal freedom, on the idea of human rights”, and summed up: “Farewell, Europe, I am afraid we will never be able to join the family of European nations”. Another commentary text, where the notable author Yuliya Latynina discussed the necessity to emphasize the European element of the Russian culture (being one of the great powers and cultures of the nineteenth century), decried the present-day anti-Western Kremlin rhetoric and opined that “Russian culture became great when Russia became Europe”. Unlike Ulitskaya, Latynina ignored the value dimension; for her, Russia’s Europeanness is superficial and mostly evident in the number of English-language street signs, in looking and sounding like a Westerner, and in partaking of the Western domination over the world. Yet it is this text which became subject to censorship and was partly blacked out by the state body Roskomnadzor (Picture 17).
There is a strong current of debate on European crises in the Polish newspapers’ articles by scholars, public intellectuals and notable journalists. Adam Krzemiński on 26 February in Polityka reviewed some of the key statements in the intellectual discussion on Europe’s future, and Sergiusz Kowalski in Gazeta Wyborcza (20 May 2014) warned about the populist right, “The European anti-Europe”, seeking to dismantle the current order and promoting an alternative, nationalist version of Europe. As Aleksander Smolar concluded (Wyborcza, 9 March 2013), Europe is no longer a utopia to bring about dreams but a necessity to “save what we have”. And Ziemowit Szczerek in Polityka (27 April 2014) noted the West’s fascination with opposing itself to “Europe B” – second-rate Europe of the East – in popular narratives of fictional East European states (Ruritania).

The Polish media supported Ukraine’s European integration throughout 2013 and continued to back Euromaidan in particular. Suffice to mention the prominent case of Adam Michnik, a leading Solidarność (Solidarity) figure and editor-in-chief of Gazeta Wyborcza but also a fervent supporter of Ukraine and particularly Ukrainian civil society. On 2 November 2013, less than three weeks before the equilibrium in the region started to implode with the initially negligible Ukrainian protest, Michnik published an article Ukrainiska Lady Hamlet [Ukrainian Lady Hamlet] on the writer Oksana Zabuzhko. He linked Ukraine to Polish experiences, inscribing the country in the historical destiny of Eastern Europe by referring to Czesław Miłosz’s definition of it as permanently and tragically having to sacrifice certain values for the sake of the others. Michnik’s ideas enjoyed currency in the circles of the then ruling PO Party, which created
the Eastern Partnership project, designed to give Ukraine an incentive, even under a pro-Russian government, to carry on with European integration. In such a way, the PO-PSL government hoped to establish stronger Ukraine–EU ties at the expense of coming to terms with Ukraine’s post-2010 democratic failure somewhat mitigated by hopes to democratise the country in the longer run. Facing the failure of their support for Yanukovych’s European choice, the media quickly found a new object of support, namely the protesting Ukrainian masses, literally on the next day after the reversal of the country’s foreign policy direction, and the government followed suit. The Ukrainian voice was strong in *Wyborcza* thanks to the articles by the well-known Kyiv journalist Vitaly Portnikov (one of Euromaidan’s leaders), praising Europe of values and lambasting the EU’s inaction, particularly on 30 January, 22 February and 26 March 2014.

It is interesting to note that already in the articles published on 22 November 2013, at the beginning of the protest, as the first reaction to Kyiv’s U-turn, “Yanukovych has overturned the table” and “Ukraine escapes Europe”, the journalists (accurately) predicted that the situation would drastically change but agreed with the statements from politicians that Yanukovych could not be dealt with after what had happened. This became the pillar of the Polish (and European) policies towards Kyiv before the escalation of the events of 18–20 February 2014. It reflects the then consensus among different political actors, a consensus which can be interpreted in many ways but most likely worked thanks to the media confirming the position of the policymakers and the policymakers repeating the media discourses.

Interestingly, according to a confidential tip-off from one of my informants with behind-the-scenes knowledge, a 20 June 2016 publication by Paweł Smoleński in *Gazeta Wyborcza* where he harshly criticised the PiS government’s lack of policy towards Ukraine resulted in a major intergovernmental conference and a visit by the Polish president to Kyiv to mark the 25th anniversary of independence on 24 August 2016. This is another of the relatively rare examples of a direct media influence on the government’s actions.

**The Russo-Ukrainian war of visuals**

This initial and entirely qualitative approach to the material shows to what extent the mainstream discourses in the three countries differ in constructing three very dissimilar narratives of Europe. A look beyond the widely
read newspapers suggests that these perspectives on Europe are far from just applicable to the influential and/or popular printed media sampled here. At the very least, such is the case of Ukraine, where conflicting narratives also clashed in a standoff of strikingly different visual representations. The analysis of these visual representations can offer an extra dimension to the results as well as validate them. Moreover, this is an important part of blogging and of what is spread fast and far on social media; an analysis of online communication is hardly possible without examining some visual representations, even though briefly.

One of the most interesting examples originated in the autumn of 2013, when Ukraine’s civil society campaign was supporting the signing of the Association Agreement. The network of activists and activist-run NGOs in Ukraine is largely coordinated by the informal elites often linked to state institutions through a network of personal ties but also very much able as an oppositional force. Their thinking in the weeks before Euromaidan is pretty much summarised in a blog by Alyona Hetmanchuk, director of a Kyiv-based advocacy centre called the Institute of World Policy and a frequent blogger on *Ukrayinska Pravda*. In the months leading up to Maidan, the NGO team toured Central and Eastern Ukraine with a series of street events aimed at promoting European integration. The influential blogger and activist noted the level of resistance to their activities from the local authorities controlled by the then declaratively pro-European Party of Regions. According to her, these street debates highlighted the locals’ pragmatic attitude towards the EU, and the most frequently heard question “What will Europe give us?” was being answered by the same ordinary locals: “Our children at least will have a better life”.17 Sceptics, interestingly, were producing the examples of Belarus as an ideal haven for clean streets and an effective state – a fact worth closer consideration as it possibly highlights the existence of no less than two kinds of ideal political imaginary among prospectively oriented pro-Western (pro-Ukrainian) and retrospectively oriented pro-Soviet (pro-Russian) Ukrainians.

Hetmanchuk summarised her impressions thus:

This is the case where we – experts, journalists, diplomats – have to be clear and understandable rather than smart and good-looking. Clarity is needed to explain the upsides of European integration without both manipulation and frightening potential supporters. For example, one does not need to be pathetic and claim there is no corruption in the EU. Rather, it is better to

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17 All the quotes in this section are provided in my own translation.
explain that corruption is a matter of choice in Europe, while it is unavoidable in our country. Or just to produce a fact: the EU member states are ranked highest in the corruption indices, while Ukraine is ranked joint 144th with Syria, Cameroon and the [Democratic] Republic of the Congo. We have to be understandable because many Ukrainians in the regions are impressed not so much by a certain statement by some EU member state ambassador but by the fact that he speaks Ukrainian (this was particularly discussed by a crowd of locals after the speech by the EU ambassador Jan Tombiński in Mykolaiv). Or the fact that he just went to talk to the people out in the street on the main square of a regional capital rather than came to a state-owned venue [aktova zala] with forced attendance before another election and with another set of propagandist slogans. Without any bodyguards. Yes, it is very important when the officials talk about European values and behaviour models. Even more important is not to demean these values by going out to talk to the people with a small army of bodyguards and shaking hands with people long enough for two photographs to be taken. In such cases, European talk is too dissonant to a post-Soviet visual. (Hetmanchuk, 2013)

The Institute of World Policy also commissioned a number of political cartoons, one of them, drawn by a well-known professional cartoonist from Kyiv called Ihor Lukyanchenko, epitomises the view of Europe typical of the one found in the news media (see Picture 4). A traditionally clad Ukrainian Cossack seems to be cycling towards Europe, which he sees in front of him, yet the image is no more than a simple framed picture; he is sitting on an exercise bike that only simulates movement. Or has he put the poster on the wall to motivate himself to become fitter? In any case, the core ideas Ukrainians associate with Europe are here: movement forwards and progress, improvement and an idyllic picture of a successful urban modernity. All of them are symbolic of the longings of a once-peasant nation, nearly destroyed in the past and forced backwards. The image, no matter how ironic, still connotes the values of progress and Enlightenment.

This picture, originally a part of an exhibition, was not the only such cartoon. In the wake of the Vilnius summit, another set of pictures was commissioned from multiple cartoonists to help improve the image of the EU among Ukrainians (as if much improvement was needed). Limited in reach and embodied in absolutely not the most powerful form of propaganda, it hardly helped foster pro-European sentiment. Although it does indicate the dominance of a simplistic sender–receiver communication and influence model in the post-Soviet perception of the media. But this set of
pictures also gives an intimate, albeit ironic, view of the Ukrainian perception of Europe on the eve of Euromaidan (see Pictures 6–9).

The cartoons focus on the most explicit comparison of a number of everyday situations that allow us to peep into the daily lives of Ukrainians and Europeans: police practices, the living standards of the elderly, corruption, concern for the environment – in these and the other cartoons (they number around twenty in total), the grim Ukrainian reality is contrasted with the image of a better way strongly bound to the European location (note the use of iconic landmarks from European capitals). The different cartoonists’ obsessive use of the Eiffel tower is in particular reminiscent of Roland Barthes’ conceptualising (1964/1997, pp. 4–5) of the Parisian landmark as a “pure – virtually empty – sign […]that] means everything […] a kind of a total monument”. Even though somewhat occasional, this parallel suggests a further validation of the application of the empty signifier concept (see Chapter 8).

I would like to suggest a deeper psychoanalytical and postcolonial interpretation. These supposedly pro-European cartoons honestly intend to portray Europe favourably, but the focus on comparing it with the gloomy domestic picture organises the set of visuals around a number of the most painful social issues for Ukrainians. They represent, therefore, a corpus of discourse not so much on Europe and its achievements (some of them illusionary) as on Ukraine and its problems. The “bright” side of the pictures is thus not a representation of Europe but that of Ukraine’s own lack: “how we would like to see ourselves”; “who we would like to be (or become)”. The subconscious fantasy of a perfect, flawless self – the ultimate drive for a psyche painfully aware of its imperfection through a postcolonial trauma – becomes a jouissance, a source of permanent desire and fear that this desire will be satisfied and, in a very Lacanian way, destroy the subject by the fullness of its completeness and finality. Indeed, if those from the dark side by some magic moved to the light side, the impossibly radical character of this transformation would leave them in a rather hopeless situation, with nothing to strive for or – literally – to hope for. This arguably creates a state of neurosis for liberal, pro-Western East Europeans, between the impossibility of bringing about the desired and the impossibility of remaining in an unchanged situation. The projection of the fantasised self onto Europe has, however, one powerful and desirable effect: the reality of the geographical Europe – the Eiffel Tower really exists, as does Big Ben – bestows some of its own reality on the fantasised ideal self, which starts to seem to be really existing but just not here, spatially separated and removed from
It is interesting to note that the 2013 Ukrainian political cartoon project by IWP had a very similar setup to a 2011 project run by Eryk Lipiński Museum of the Caricature and Cartoon Art in Warsaw, the exhibition titled Europejskie impresje [European Impressions], and was perhaps closely modelled on it. Both exhibitions sought to provide ironic representations of Europe, and both, in effect, used Europe as an opportunity to discuss national identities. However, the pragmatic intentions and the targeted audiences were completely different. The Ukrainian street exhibition was meant to furnish the broadest public, especially outside the capital and the biggest cities, with an idealised and somewhat saccharine version of Europe explicitly compared with Ukrainian flaws. Moreover, it was managed by a think tank established by former journalists with the explicit goal of having an impact. The Polish exhibition, however, was organised by the Polish MFA at a prestigious cultural institution in the capital; one of its key intended audiences was in fact foreign diplomats. It purported to convey, therefore, a more popular perception of Europe in Poland (represented by cartoonists) to political elites, whereas the Ukrainian situation, rather, implied a didactic discursive setting where the average citizen is addressed by the elite interlocutors, namely artists and journalists, the would-be political influencers.

This determines the differences in the contents of both exhibitions. While the Ukrainian offers only a sympathetic perspective on Europe, the Polish one presents a variety of reflections on the Polish experience of seven years within Europe (identified with the EU). The key poles may be represented by two cartoons. One, by Marek Raczkowski (Picture 15), shows a smiling man in a suit who is holding a document folder with the EU symbol on it while leaning to measure flowers with a ruler. The main message is clear: the EU as a promoter of uniform standards. The overall style of the picture is cheerful; it conveys an idyllic ambiance with pastel colours and rounded, pleasant shapes. A Europe that checks the size of flowers must be a good thing, we should assume. This direct meaning is very close to that of the pro-European Ukrainian cartoons. Yet just like them, it betrays an underlying uncertainty. Who has authorised Europe – gendered as a man, to be sure – to perform this check? Why is it needed and what happens to the flowers that fail to pass the measurement? The connotation of a gardener reminds of cultivation and culture but also of eugenics and the past experiments at improving society by culling.
On the other end of the spectrum is a cartoon by Małgorzata Lazarek (Picture 14). In a striking compositional parallel to the Ukrainian cartoons, it juxtaposes two images next to each other. But Poland is not compared with some faraway Europe: while the left image shows Poland before the accession, the right one shows it after. The images are nearly identical: a vast plain, a run-down countryside house. The only difference is the presence of the EU flag and the clothes of the scarecrow in front of the house. Before the EU accession, it is clothed in rags; after the accession, it is wearing a morning dress, complete with top hat. The emphasis on this temporal rather than spatial shift allows the cartoonist to focus on the Polish transition’s superficiality and preoccupation with outer appearance. Internal national problems become the subject of conversation even more than in the self-flagellating Ukrainian cartoons, and in a more self-sufficient way, without recourse to comparisons with a utopian elsewhere. Europe, however, is a vanishing presence in this conversation, echoing its practical absence in the pictured landscape but for the flag and the scarecrow’s suit. It may be indicating Europe’s growing irrelevance to Poland that is now included in it; taken together, these two different Polish examples foreshadow the polarisation of Europe in the Polish newspapers (see Chapter 6).

There were also other takes on Europe in Ukraine, which bring Russia into the picture. In the autumn of 2013, the Communist Party of Ukraine (an heir to the defunct Communist Party of the Soviet Union, arguing for the latter’s restoration and at the same time supporting the then ruling Party of Regions as part of the parliament’s oligarchic lobby) launched a costly TV ad campaign under the slogan My govorim na odnom yazyke [We speak one language] In a number of adverts, people posing in front of the same recognisable European landmarks addressed the audience in untranslated English, German and French, narrating terrible stories of the economic and social woe engulfing the EU, where starving Asians are not welcome. Interestingly, the advertisement meshed this fairly widespread EU criticism with an identity turn when it ended with a Russian jingle: “You didn’t understand a word? The Customs Union – we speak one language!” This implied, of course, that the EU is a foreign, alien and perhaps hostile entity, while the Russia-dominated Eurasian Customs Union is where one would feel at home. The campaign apparently did not seek to convert any pro-Europe supporters but rather to mobilise the Soviet-nostalgic and pro-Russian population.

The campaign nonetheless angered pro-EU activists, and they responded to it in September 2013 with an amateur video that had notched up 86,000
views as of March 2015. The video consists of a number of cuts from earlier user uploads filmed at different times and locations, showing people saying “Fuck you” in Russian and ending with the same jingle: “We speak one language!” Thus, the EU supporters returned the identification reading suggested by the anti-EU campaign back to where it started, inscribing backwardness and brutality into the Russian identity just as failure and indifference were inscribed into the European identity by the original campaign: a narrative harbinger of the more physical clash to come.

The basic ideological disposition before, during and after Euromaidan, from 2014–2015 to the time of writing, namely the start of the Donbas war, is extremely clear in a comparison of the cartoons commissioned by the IWP and a user-generated cartoon (Picture 5), possibly by an amateur cartoonist from Donetsk called Ruslan Smak. Here the same neurosis of a fantasising subject plays out completely differently. Once again, we see a male Cossack figure symbolising Ukraine (a warrior but a rustic one, rotund and supposedly well-fed on rustic food). Yet again, there is a comparison of two pictures. However, this time, everything is reversed: the dimly lit European side is curiously depicted by Hitler, gay men kissing, drugs, the LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender) and EU flags and the devil himself. Opposite him is an angel in a Russian folk costume – different from the Ukrainian one, so there is a subtle but clear dynamic of the Russian national domination over the Ukrainians here; the devil, however, has no national designation, perhaps a logical continuation of European cosmopolitanism. The angel is defending shining traditional values, including the large nuclear family, religion, reverence for the history and veneration of the victory in WWII (symbolised by the period tank mounted on a pedestal), space exploration and military power. While things that may be associated with unbridled personal freedom (drugs, fulfilled homosexual desires, a Satan worshipper in the bottom corner) are on the left, the author’s title, “I choose freedom”, obviously points to the right side, where discipline rather than freedom prevails (patriarchal family, military, space exploration). Thus, the text ironically dismantles itself, undermines its own narrative and creates the potential for erratic, ironic readings.

Once again, the fantasmatic and neurotic component plays out in a comparison: the wretched Cossack is confronting two choices that, at least given the amount of space they occupy in the picture, are equally possible. The very fact that the drawer’s urge to create this picture was strong enough that it was created testifies to their fear and incentive to warn against the bad choice, to eschew it demonstratively. Thus, the Cossack is facing more
than just choices imposed on him externally; he is indeed facing his repressed desires, which are strong enough to make him contemplate them as an option over family life, the helmeted Yuri Gagarin, tanks on a pedestal, ancient Russian knights and other pleasures the angel has to offer. The cartoon is a representative of a Manichean worldview where good and evil are, in some sense, equal and mutually indestructible because they are embedded in the individual himself as integral parts of this subjectivity. The Cossack will remain forever in a state of seduction that he will have to permanently fight off, just as the characters of the pro-Western cartoons will remain in their own Manicheistic conundrum of eschewing their “wrong” selves in favour of the ideal ones.

This cartoon could be accompanied by a later post-Maidan wallpaper picture (dated 12 April 2014) by a so far unidentified author whose barely legible signature can be seen on the shield second from the right (Picture 10). The visual literally puts the infamously brutal and subsequently disbanded Berkut riot police lined up in front of Kyiv Rus princes framed as guardians of history, tradition and possibly native soil, almost in the *Blut und Boden* tradition.

These images, taken in the context of the pro-European visuals, may be reminiscent of the popular representation of Ukraine as a cleft country (often used to explain, in particular, the current conflict), especially if one accepts their (East) Ukrainian provenance. They indeed highlight the diversity of opinions present among the Ukrainian population and the existence of different identifications (as Brudny and Finkel, 2011 suggest). Russian online debates historically began with minor developments in the 1990s and became rather massive when the popularity of the LiveJournal platform, a US-originated early form of social media principally successful in the post-Soviet countries, reached its zenith in the 2000s. Even though the state took measures to control it, it remains the haven for diverse thinking (Facebook, however, is taking over increasingly). Many liberal and pro-Western bloggers are active on LiveJournal or elsewhere online; an interesting recent trend is related to the rise of personal journalism and contemporary *samizdat*, as the institutional context becomes ever more controlled and managed. The prominent Russian journalists Oleg Kashin and Arkadiy Babchenko have turned their blogs into an online media funded by their own savings and their readers’ donations. As of now, this crowdfunded model retains the greatest possible independence and critical optics in Russia. At the same time, social media has become a convenient platform for spreading anti-European statements.
Another typical example massively shared in the Russian blogosphere in several waves was a series of pictures (see Picture 11) that portray a supposed “gay pride parade for kids” in Bergen, Norway. In all likelihood, the information was first posted by the user alabayuka and then shared by many others, including the vocal anti-gay and anti-EU activist una-ragazza-o and a community focused on chronicling the decay of Europe nemytaya_eu (literally the “Unwashed EU”).¹⁸ The commentary on the latter website, in particular, says that “Norwegian gays, lesbians and transgenders [sic] find the propaganda of their untraditional values at multiple gay parades in Europe’s largest cities insufficient” and “this is why the adult gay movement activists decided to start involving their own children in such events”; they held “the placards propagating the homosexual values of same-sex marriage”. While the commentary is almost neutral in its tone and chooses to be rather factual, the whole following discussion in the comments focused nearly exclusively on the interpretation of the event as an attempt to “convert” children to homosexuality (or, in native terms, “homosexualism”, “sodomy” and “buggery”); this is also reinforced by the initial frame of “gay propaganda”. In the meanwhile, the contextual meaning of the event as building and expressing support within families regardless of sexual preferences (note the sign “Proud rainbow grandma” held by the woman in the picture) is completely removed from the picture even though mentioned in passing (“own children”). This is very similar to the use of catachresis, a rhetorical device that violently robs an utterance of its context. (This device is rather typical of the Russian discussion on Europe; see the final section of this chapter.) Two further examples from the digital “underground” are of interest: a digital drawing showing a conquering Russian tank on a square of a European city, juxtaposing the military might and show of force and the stereotypical look of an old town market and thus emphasising the theme of anti-European aggression in the Russian narratives, and a map that echoes both prince Trubetzkoy’s interwar Eurasianism and the Russian foreign policy doctrine of “Europe from the Atlantic to the Pacific” by suggesting that it is not Russia that is part of Europe but rather “Europe is a part of Russia” (pictures 12-13). These examples yet again highlight the fact that the anti-European narratives in Russia are not against Europe per se but rather against progressive, modernist Europe of humanist

values and in support of a vision of Europe where Russia and the anti-modern traditionalism it claims to support would dominate. These narratives, even though wildly different in form, are recontextualised between the foreign policy field, the intellectual/ideological quasi public sphere and the radical nationalist “underground” on the web and social media.

The striking difference between pro-European and pro-Russian online imagery offers some basis for an explanation for the later armed rebellion in Donbas as a war between not so much two different identity allegiances as two incompatible ideological positions and perspectives on the world as embodied in the Maidan and anti-Maidan communities (as the East Ukrainian rebels like to call themselves, especially in less warfare-framed, more peaceful contexts).19 Hence also the imminence of the clash and its continuation in a war in the conditions of the recent violent experience (bloodshed in Maidan) and the active Russian support for one of the sides. Europe is at the core of this clash as a geopolitical actor and a symbol of the stakes and choices and at the same time an empty signifier into which each side reads its own agenda, values and objectives.

Summary

As different as the historical narratives of Europe were in these three countries, their media systems have also formed differently. Poland combines pluralist, polarised and commercialised traits with elements of a corporatist model, meaning that the development of commercial media coincides with the news outlets’ increasing association with rival political forces against the background of the perspective on journalism being at the service of society under conditions of relatively strong professionalisation. Russian media scholars define the country’s media system as commercialised statist, whereby journalism is most often seen as at the service of the state, which is easily combined with elements of the commercialised media system. Ukraine displays traits of pluralist, polarised and commercialised media systems with a low degree of professionalisation.

The analysis of policy documents informs that Ukraine has prioritised European integration since the 1990s, and the aspiration to identify with

19 It is important to note that as such these discourses are neither Ukrainian nor Russian. Pro-European cartoons could well be created or shared by liberal pro-Western Russian cartoonists or bloggers, just as some of the anti-European pictures shown here likely come from Ukraine. However, the pro-European discourses are not hegemonic in Russia, nor are the anti-European ones in Ukraine.
Europe, understood as the EU, stands out in the texts, which practically continue the value-based interpretation of Europe. The discourse on Europe here has an almost exclusively domestic dimension (European reforms) and a vision of Ukraine’s own foreign policy in Europe is absent; own agency is equally backgrounded. By contrast, both Russia and Poland actively pursue their own visions of Europe in their official foreign policy narratives, foregrounding themselves as subjects of international politics. Poland has a more developed and versatile foreign policy discourse while keeping Europe and Poland’s position in Europe at its centre. Russian policy documents and semi-official statements reveal a contradictory dynamic: a desire to be admitted to “the European family” and to extend Europe’s borders all the way to Vladivostok while doing it on its own terms without adapting to the value-based European ideal.

The texts published in influential media outlets and on popular blogs by some of the countries’ opinion-makers delineated an initially more positive and idealising perception of Europe among Ukrainian authors who became more disappointed and angry due to Europe’s perceived inaction; in Poland, an identification with Europe as a whole (including the responsibilities it entails) and both a critique of Europe from within and worries for its future seem more important themes. The Russian examples are rather polarised, with some being close to the Ukrainian idealisation (Ulitskaya, Latynina), yet others portraying Europe negatively and hoping for its demise (Mezhuyev). The Ukrainian voices were heard during Euromaidan in all Polish newspapers (particularly thanks to Vitaly Portnikov and Oksana Zabuzhko), while they were also present in the oppositional Russian Novaya thanks to the Ukraine-based journalist Olga Musafirova. These voices, however, did not spread to all sampled newspapers, inlike in Poland.
CHAPTER 6

The media construction of Europe: Themes, categories and dominant representations

This chapter presents the findings of the research into the textual construction of Europe in the public discourses of Ukraine, Russia and Poland as found in traditional media. In the previous chapter, I have outlined key differences and similarities between these countries’ media systems as well as their official foreign policy narratives in legal documents and diplomats’ official statements. One could also see the interplay and recontextualisations between these narratives and the texts of interest by more noticeable public figures as well as some remarkable visuals purporting to represent Europe. Now armed with these premises for comparison and early interpretive findings, I will systematically examine the qualitative and quantitative representations of Europe in the sampled newspapers before Chapter 7 (which focuses on the interviews) addresses the perspectives of the actors in this process of representation: journalists, experts and diplomats.

The findings in this chapter are presented as follows:

1. The results of the discourse-historical analysis show what themes and arguments can be found in texts on Europe from the analysed media outlets.
2. A qualitative overview outlines the mapping of the more formal public sphere.
3. QCA shows how often the categories found during the discourse-analytical mapping appear in the analysed newspapers, which of them dominate and which are rather marginal.

This structure also reflects the chronological sequence in which these stages of research have been carried out.
Thematic patterns: Qualitative analysis

The study of themes and arguments in the representation of Europe may be seen as a pilot or preparatory study of sorts for the QCA, but its results have their own value and should be viewed as the original exploratory investigation of a vast corpus of material. Rather than “simply” a pilot or preliminary study per se, I consider it a separate research stage that has yielded important and independent results. However, these results were pragmatically used as the basis for developing a more sensitive coding scheme that would instead be rooted in native terms and linked to a qualitative interaction with the material. Although not a preparatory study, its results were used to prepare the next leg of this journey. It also came first chronologically as a way to connect to the material quickly, directly and intimately.

The qualitative thematic analysis results provided an initial entry point into the material and were a precondition for developing the categories (variables) for the QCA as well as for understanding the recontextualisations of discourses moving between the media field and the foreign policy field. The methodology applied here has been described in detail in Chapter 3.

The concept of Europe is polysemic and has two semantical planes: the direct and the metaphorical. The direct is tied to understanding Europe as a place and a space. Even though it is the direct meaning, there is certainly an ambiguity concerning what “Europe” means in the analysed articles, even in the narrower and most immediate sense (see Figure 1). To deal with this ambiguity, journalists employ a few ad hoc, contextual reductive devices. First of all, Europe can be simply a geographical entity: a continent with indefinite, yet somehow negotiated, limits that define whether or not any particular country is European according to an unspoken agreement between journalists and audiences. Such is the context in Dzerkalo Tyzhnya (6 Dec. 2013): “We are second in Europe […] in terms of HIV prevalence”.20

20 All quotes from the newspapers analysed in this chapter are provided in my own translation.
This fundamental concept may also be spatially limited by institutional criteria. The wider institutional meaning is associated with the member states of the Council of Europe (this is what is meant in the article “Russia responds to Europe” from the business daily Kommersant, 1 Oct. 2013). One step closer to a narrower Europe is of course reducing Europe to the EU countries. In Kommersant, “Europe” occasionally comes to mean the European market, which is probably also thought to be synonymous with the EU. And then there is an even more reductive definition virtually endemic to the Polish newspapers, which sometimes meticulously define the eurozone as the European core. It is occasionally also present in Kommersant, but, from a qualitative analysis perspective, the Ukrainian and Russian newspapers do not favour this approach. It is as if one has moved from the East to the West and Europe has drifted simultaneously westwards and always remaining ahead of them; Europe is invariably to the west of “us”.

Apart from this direct spatial interpretation, Europe has a metaphoric interpretation as an abstract system of rules and standards. The two definitions can combine, but one can also dominate the other. The Ukrainian newspapers seem quite keen on decoupling Europe from its spatial component and instead representing it as an abstract value complex that is recurrently affirmed as the positive example for Ukraine. The symbolic aspect is also repeatedly present in the Polish media, which overall tend to show patterns of identifying Europe with institutions, paying a great deal of
attention to their internal functions and combining both the insider and identity-based perspective on Europe. Europe can also be a metaphor in the Russian publications, where, however, it stands rather for civilisation in general, technical efficiency or moral decay, thus serving as a negative example or no example at all (unlike in Ukraine).

Some categories are found in every single analysed newspaper in all the countries. One such theme is “Europe in distress” and includes a depiction of an EU beset by economic and social troubles. Another fundamental narrative of Europe present in every newspaper is Europe acting as a unified political subject. In phrases such as “Europe is seriously concerned” (*Dzerkalo Tyzhnya*, 13 Dec. 2013), or “Europe begins to understand that its Ukraine policy, inflexible and declarative, proved ineffective” (*Kommersant*, 19 Dec. 2013), it is anthropomorphised and portrayed as a consolidated entity pursuing its own ends, with a will that controls the means to bring about what it dictates. Such individualisation is typically found in international news or geopolitical narratives.

Nearly in every newspaper, we can find the theme of Europe as being affluent, modern and advanced; so it is safe to assume that this pattern is present in each country. However, the Russian newspapers reveal a pattern of strong criticism of Europe due to its moral decay. Unlike the Ukrainian newspapers, they refrain from expressing the argument that Russia should orient itself towards Europe.

The qualitative analysis also suggested a hypothesis that different types of metaphor are associated with Europe: metonymy, synecdoche and catachresis.

I will now look at the specific themes and arguments from particular newspapers in each country. Before I do so, it is interesting to contextualise the profiles of the newspapers by looking at the editorial offices of some of them. There is clearly a spatial dimension to the media in the sense how space structures and reflects social organisation, and the media houses tend to reflect the media’s social place and their self-constructed centrality (cf. Ericson & Riegert, 2010; Åker, 2010). Similarly, the premises of the newspapers are indicative of their politico-economic standing. Whereas all editorial teams tend to reside in separate buildings, the Polish editorial teams typically sit in the recently built modern media houses of steel, concrete and glass, but Ukrainian newspapers have as their home more decrepit, post-Soviet-looking premises (*Segodnya*) or more conservative villas (*Dzerkalo Tyzhnya*). The Russian newsrooms also stick to older Soviet buildings (especially *Izvestiya* that until recently occupied a Soviet construc-
tivist building as if highlighting the continuity of the pre-Perestroika experiences).

Ukraine: Europe as a self-imposed task

The narrative of a conflict between Europe and Russia is to some extent present in the Ukrainian media, at least in Korrespondent, which portrays external reactions to the Ukrainian situation as a clash between Brussels and Moscow. It is interesting to follow the longitudinal dimension of this, as the weekly changed owners just before the events of Euromaidan, and there could have been a significant shift in editorial policy. The new owner, the infamous and at the time 27-year-old “tycoon” Serhiy Kurchenko, had direct links with the Yanukovych clan, while the previous owner was a rather liberal media entrepreneur who had chosen not to directly intervene in the journalistic work.21

A pro-European picture is observed even in the Russian-language tabloid Segodnya, which saw the situation before Euromaidan in terms of a conflict and would strike a somewhat Eurosceptic tone every now and then. The newspaper chose to compare the potential gains and losses of European integration but eventually saw more benefits than disadvantages, although the multi-vector foreign policy received its share of praise. However, its suspicion of and disappointment at the EU reveal themselves in the negation forms typical for the headlines and highly unusual in the other analysed media: “EU requirements not realistic” (4 Dec. 2013), “Europe won’t go to war because of Ukraine” (17 Jun. 2014), “EU won’t grant Ukraine a visa regime” (12 Dec. 2013), “Barroso: EU not ready to accept Ukraine” (7 Apr. 2013). This type of framing and choice of phrases connotes an idea of denying, an unwelcoming Europe, something sought after by the Eurosceptic part of the Ukrainian audience seeking confirmation of the idea that “no one awaits us in Europe”. Alternatively, one pattern rather saturated in Segodnya and present in the other Ukrainian publications is that of portraying Europe as the wealthy and abundant abroad, a place where a migrant worker may find better pay and working conditions and a student may get a real education (not to even mention the living conditions). Some articles give explicit advice on how to avoid the pitfalls of working abroad.

21 Borys Lozhkin, who started out as a journalist during Perestroika, later led Petro Poroshenko’s presidential administration between 2014 and 2016.
Picture 18. Media houses. Top row: Dzerkalo Tyzhnya (L), Segodnya (R). Middle row: Izvestiya (L), Kommersant (R). Bottom row: Polityka (L), Gazeta Wyborcza (R). Courtesy of Roman Horbyk (top L, bottom L&R); Segodnya (top R); Wikimedia Commons (middle L&R)
But what really defines the dominant Ukrainian view of Europe are the less materialist categories of a simply successful and advanced society, a symbolic Europe of values which imposes “attaining Europe” as both a task of and a path to modernisation. Europe is a vessel of “European standards” (*Dzerkalo Tyzhnya*, 15 Nov. 2013) and an investment “resource” (Korrespondent, 26 Nov. 2013). One Korrespondent columnist, a chief executive of a news agency, on 31 May 2013 compared the EU to a bourgeois family that had “renovated its apartment in a European way, with comfortable furniture and good household appliances, and lives peacefully and safely” unlike Ukraine and Russia, which resemble down-and-out dysfunctional families living in filthy slums.

However, this idealisation of Europe is present in the Ukrainian media alongside criticism, sometimes in the same text. For instance, the prominent Soviet dissident Yevhen Sverstyuk, whose text was analysed in the previous chapter, wrote in *Dzerkalo Tyzhnya* on 11 October 2013:

> When we say “European choice”, we mean political orientation and material abundance. In fact, this implies the choice of the most vital values: freedom, human rights, the rule of law. The Western world is far from ideal. It is diverse. Its freedom often borders on lewdness. Its democracy is sometimes a caricature. Its liberalism often means a lack of principles.

The EU’s inability to act decisively against Russia in the Ukrainian crisis has further embittered many critics of the EU who, nevertheless, still remained sympathetic to the Europe of values while targeting political, commercial and bureaucratic elites who “either do not grasp what Russia and its energy policy are or have a very flexible consciousness” (*Dzerkalo Tyzhnya*, 8 Aug. 2014). In the words of another journalist, published against the background of heavy fighting in eastern Ukraine, “no matter how Europe threatens [Russia over Ukraine], no matter its formidable pose, it is all but clear that it is scared and backs off” (*Dzerkalo Tyzhnya*, 15 Aug. 2014).

Yet this bureaucratic Europe is still thought of differently compared to the Europe of values. Against this background, Ukraine is perceived as not sufficiently European, its condition being defined by a lack of Europe:

> Europeans and the people from the Pechersk Hills [Ukraine’s ruling elite] speak different languages. They are not from different worlds; they are from different planets. ‘We’re absolutely incompatible!’ one European diplomat admitted in despair. Of course you are! Some [the Europeans] speak of
principles and values and are used to trusting each other’s word. Especially
the one given at the presidential level. The others [the Ukrainian elite] only
believe in and act according to the laws of the criminal world. (Dzerkalo
Tyzhnya, 15 Nov. 2013)

These values constitute the symbolic Europe and thus empower those who
can associate with them to speak from a position of authority. By “right of
birth” these are Western European countries and the EU is their alliance
and the fulfilment of those same values. Europe controls and monitors the
actions of Ukraine’s elite; in the EU’s eyes, Putin wants to discredit Ukraine
(Dzerkalo Tyzhnya, 13 Dec. 2013). Europe is also empowered to decide how
well Ukraine completes Europe as its self-assigned task.

Europe is, in some cases, also the centre where the most interesting and
topical trends are to be found. They could be linked as well to the work of
the European institutions. For example, in November 2013, Dzerkalo
Tyzhnya discussed the European common energy policy and the strategy of
creating hubs as an example to follow and something of interest to energy
companies and regional integration initiatives anywhere.

Russia: Fortress Europe, the enemy

The Russian newspapers analysed here tend to disagree with the Ukrainian
ones on a number of issues regarding how their authors see Europe. While
the similarities in the coverage have already been outlined a few paragraphs
above, I will now focus on what makes both these two narratives special in
their own way.

The differences between the countries are already evident in how the
newspapers report the crisis. This topic arguably occupied varying amounts
of space in the different newspapers, which can be seen in the range of
subcategories. While the Ukrainian media only report some aspects of the
financial crisis and internal EU disagreements, the Russian newspapers
paint a full-scale apocalyptic picture for their readers. A Spanish court,
under pressure from the European Court of Human Rights, grants fifty-four
dangerous terrorists an early release and financial compensation: “In Spain,
2013); the use of cocaine is spreading in Europe due to the crisis; a Roma
girl on a school trip was arrested by the French police and then deported;
member states perceive the authority of Brussels as illegitimate (Izvestiya,
13 Sep., 23 Oct., 22 Oct. 2013). While Europe’s troubles are presented in
Ukraine as elemental by nature (floods, hurricanes and uncontrollable
economic cycles), the pro-Kremlin Russian newspapers see them as by-products of Europe’s inferior social order: too liberal and not traditional enough.

Figure 6. Semantic map of the Ukrainian media

Izvestiya, despite portraying Europe in some articles as trendy, efficient and more civilised than Russia, was especially prone to negative and sensationalist coverage of Europe in many others. Although Kommersant’s reporting seems more balanced on the surface, it also focused on the EU’s migration problems, crisis of leadership and gloomy economic figures in a way more sombre than any other sampled newspaper: “the EU comprises 28 member states, but none of their citizens are content or happy” (Kommersant, 22 Jan. 2014). This is one such typical formulation.

The crisis of Europe has many dimensions, ranging from economic to social to political, but the alleged moral crisis is a particularly significant part of this “Europe in distress” discourse. The journalist Mikhail Shakh-
nazarov wrote in *Izvestiya* on 11 May 2014 following the Austrian Conchita Wurst’s Eurovision triumph:

> The contemporary Europe has unlearnt to choose. In any case, it has unlearnt to choose the right thing. “The old woman” [Europe] is increasingly reminiscent of a sexless creature who at the end of its days has decided to offer its withered body for acts of abomination by sodomites.

It is worth noting that the discourses in the Russian newspapers tend to avoid identifying Russia with Europe or as a part of Europe. It can often be hidden in a complex wording that initially admits Russia’s “Europeanness” but resolves the issue ambiguously at the end. In an interview published in *Kommersant* (15 Apr. 2014), Russian Minister of Culture Vladimir Medinsky responds to the journalist’s question “Russia is not Europe, what is it?” in the following way:

> Russia is not just not Europe. Russia is actually a half of Europe. But it is way broader than just Europe. […] Rather, when it comes to values, the West is turning into the opposite, and Russia has to protect itself from this “anti-Europe” in order to protect at least for itself Shakespeare without paedophilia and *The Little Prince* without homosexual body language [*plastika*].

This is a rather confusing passage indeed: Russia is neither in nor out as regards Europe; it may seem, from Medinsky’s statement, that it is actually Europe which is or should be seen as part of Russia (“Russia […] is way broader than Europe”). When Europe “betray” its “genuine” values (sexually unambiguous classic works by white male authors), Russia steps in to protect them and takes over European conservatism. Russia is thus seen as simultaneously being in Europe, greater than Europe and overtaking Europe; such confusing thinking reveals how much of the pro-Kremlin discourse exploits catachrestic figures of speech that tear logic apart and in which mutually exclusive concepts and traditions can coexist (such as the amalgamation of Orthodox, monarchist and Bolshevist traditions in the Donetsk People’s Republic; cf. also the analysis of the “I choose freedom” cartoon in Chapter 5).

In a marked and striking difference from the journalists from the two other countries, Russian newsfolk often choose to portray Europe as an

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22 Medinsky is himself a rather controversial figure. A close ally of Putin’s, he has been a protagonist of several scandals, involving his allegedly plagiarised thesis, his extremely simplistic treatment of Russian history as well as his rude and radical public utterances.
adversarial agent, as a threat. Brussels and Strasbourg act as authoritarian centres that command and exploit both member states (Izvestiya, 25 Oct. 2013), the EU “feels it is an empire” (Izvestiya, 1 Nov. 2013), and even non-EU countries, such as in the article on difficult gas talks between Ukraine and Russia: “Europe will force Ukraine to pay” (Izvestiya, 26 Sep. 2014) – note the link that establishes a patron–client relationship between the EU and Ukraine in line with the geopolitical “spheres of influence” narrative championed by the Kremlin.

It is no coincidence that the same newspaper interviewed French far-right populist leader Marine Le Pen during her visit to Moscow (25 Jun. 2013). “European bureaucrats are obsessed with a messianic idea of a common home, erased borders between nations, genders, etc. These people perceive themselves and their task very pathetically, so most likely they will sulk over the renegade Ukraine for a long time” (Izvestiya, 25 Nov. 2013). When Yanukovych rejected the association with the EU, “Europe’s political elite lost face. Pandemonium [vakhkanaliya] broke out. Yanukovych was openly teased, humiliated, and literally threatened [derzili, khamili, bukval’no ugrozhali]” (Izvestiya, 2 Dec. 2013). Brussels “corners the Eastern Partnership countries” to force them into choosing between Russia and the EU (Kommersant, 18 Oct. 2013).

Closely related to this “aggressive Europe” category is the narrative that depicts the EU as being in a conflict with Russia. It occupies a prominent position in Kommersant. The EU has “an objective to outplay [pereigrat’] Russia” in Ukraine (19 Dec. 2013); the Council of Europe seeks to humiliate Russian pride with its requirements and if the Vilnius summit fails, “we will celebrate another diplomatic victory” (Izvestiya, 29 Nov. 2013). Europe, depicted as a weakling in most Russian newspapers, seems virtually doomed to fail everywhere: over Ukraine, the US spying affair, Syria, the South Stream project or just anything else. In the end, “the most admired European”, according to Izvestiya, is Vladimir Putin himself (15 Jan. 2014).

It is especially worth noting that the Russian newspapers are keen on using emotionalised language when speaking about the EU, and thus constructing Europe as unsure of itself and almost hysterical: “the experience of Uruguay scares Europeans” (Izvestiya, 23 Jan. 2014); “Europe is afraid of Russia” (Izvestiya, 15 Jan. 2014); “shock and anxiety [trepet], disappointment and irritation in European capitals”, Europe “sulks” (25 Nov. 2013); “entire Europe embittered against the US” (Kommersant, 26 Oct. 2013); and “Europe doesn’t want to serve in Afghanistan” (Kommersant, 22 Oct. 2013) [my emphases].
The oppositional Novaya Gazeta, regarded as more “highbrow”, is a notable exception on a number of positions. While it also assumes Europe is a
geopolitical actor and dedicates column space to covering its frail economy and political weakness – “the conflicting thinking [raznomysliye] in [Europe’s] capitals” (14 Feb. 2014) – it nevertheless chooses to portray the conflict between Russia and Europe in less dramatic terms. Instead of the discourse of European threats, what I call a “phantom menace” discourse is found here: Europe as a fictional threat, a paper tiger of sorts. Although the threats are listed once again, they are much more critically assessed and in many cases rejected. The symbolic approach to Europe is also to be seen within Ukrainian contexts (specifically those of Euromaidan); the writers are aware of the symbolic task Europe represents for Ukrainians. Yet they seem unwilling to accept this task for themselves, or at least to speak about it, whether openly or “between the lines”. Novaya suggests another discourse, instead concentrating on the differences between Europe and Russia. In many articles, the journalists devote dozens of lines to comparing the levels of corruption and the treatment of the opposition in Russia and Europe/the West. At the same time, this comparison is left hanging in the air as a statement on the order of things rather than a call for action to change backward practices. Europe appears from this comparison as Russia’s sheer Other, a completely different – and sometimes but not necessarily better – system of rules and norms. In this normalisation and thus justification of difference, “progressive” Russian journalists differ from their Ukrainian counterparts. In some way, this echoes a conclusion by Gudkov and Dubin (2009), namely that “obsessively reproduced attempts of various intellectual circles ‘to distance themselves from the power’ eventually reveal a most profound connection to it, dependence on it” (pp. 5–6).

Poland: Europe is us

While portraying Europe as a self-assigned task seems endemic to both the Ukrainian mainstream and popular media, Russian discourses on Europe reveal much more in common with the anti-EU sentiment that is marginal for the Ukrainian context. It is not unlikely that the consumption of – or, rather, trust in – either the Ukrainian or Russian media is related to creating such different images of Europe as seen in Pictures 4, 6–9 versus Picture 5. In the analysed Russian newspapers, only two cases initiated such discourse, also characteristic in a Ukrainian context, stating that “many Ukrainians wish to integrate into Europe with its greater stability, better-developed institutions, welfare and security” (Kommersant, 3 Dec. 2013) and mentioning Europe as Ukraine’s final destination (Novaya, 13 Jan. 2013). For the Polish news-
papers, Europe often appears in its symbolic dress in articles on EU enlarge-
ment and suggested solutions to the perceived European crisis.

The Polish newspapers do not shy away from what they portray as the
European crisis, which is seen not only as an economic and social one but
also as a deeper crisis of trust, ethics, values and even narrative. On 31
August 2014, Jacek Żakowski wrote in *Polityka* to the EU president-elect,
former Polish prime minister Donald Tusk, criticising Europe’s “excess of
bureaucratic pragmatism and deficit of meaning”:

> You can do a lot to return the European spirit to the Europeans, [the spirit]
> that has been disappearing for years, replaced by the spirit of various ego-
> tisms. To accomplish that, you would have first of all to offer a new Euro-
> pean narrative. Such [narrative] that would be an equivalent, at least during
> the first half of the XX1st century, to the narrative created in the second half
> of the XXth century by Robert Schuman that lasted until the end of the
> 1900s but has now exhausted itself. (*Polityka*, 31 Aug. 2014)

This echoed the words of Tusk himself in an interview given to *Polityka* a
few months earlier, on 19 April 2014. Analysing the institutional impli-
cations of the decision-making process for Poland, the politician admitted
the gravity of the crisis facing the EU and acknowledged that “Europe
ceased to be the source of hope”. “If you are asking me about my Europe, I
will answer very briefly: political liberty and the rule of law, constitu-
tionalism and the idea of human dignity. The citizens are Europe”, Tusk
said; these two passages reflect to what extent the Ukrainian and the Polish
perceptions of Europe as a symbolic, political and citizen-oriented value
complex have come closer together in recent years.

The symbolic Europe also helps Poland distinguish itself from Russia:

> That state [Russia] did not have the Middle Ages, gothic architecture, nor
took part in the Conflict of the Faculties. It developed neither the respectable
bourgeoisie nor the nobility. The Tsar looked on everything from above,
besides God, keeping his people in fear and obedience. (*Rzeczpospolita*, 18
Jan. 2014)

European–Russian relations, however, are seldom portrayed in conflictual
terms; more often the newspapers refer to the Russian influence without the
framework of an open conflict, for example:

> By overturning the table on which the association agreement must have
been signed, Ukraine’s government confirmed the opinion of those Euro-
pean politicians who believed Yanukovych led Europe a merry dance in order to get as much as possible from bargaining with Russia. (*Gazeta Wyborcza*, 22 Nov. 2013)

Figure 8. Semantic map of the Polish media

What the Polish newspapers bring in the way of new to the sample of the press from the three countries is perhaps some, albeit limited, attention to history and culture, mainly in the form of entertaining life stories (e.g. the one on Europe’s most famous cemeteries; in this case, a death story rather than a life story). More significant is another Poland-specific category,
namely the European institutions. It is already on the periphery of some of the Ukrainian articles and items from Novaya Gazeta, but in the Polish newspapers, it is much broader and enriched with an internal EU perspective. Polish journalists indeed report on Europe in considerably greater detail and with attention to many more subtleties than their Eastern colleagues do. They not only mention internal EU divisions and disagreements but also explain at great length where common interest prevails, where particularism is stronger and what is the most likely final outcome. In Rzeczpospolita, Europe was fortunate to receive a rather optimistic reportage on the early signs of recovery from the 2008 financial crisis, the EU’s huge potential (mostly seen as unrealised) and its successes, such as the new space mission (25 Jan. 2014).

While Russia isolates itself from Europe and Ukraine accepts it as a task, Poland often reports the EU events with a sense of shared responsibility; yet in many cases, it also chooses to oppose Europe. Such an example is the article “Europe opens, Poland closes” (Rzeczpospolita, 25 Oct. 2013) on the different closing hours of the retail industry in various European countries, or, as we can see in another text, “Poland is one of the few countries not to sell passports” (Rzeczpospolita, 21 Dec. 2013).

Europe as a rhetorical device and a figure of speech: Synecdoche, metonymy and catachresis

My observation of Polish blogs and newspapers had led to an interesting hypothesis I tested during the content analysis stage. One practice extremely typical for both Rzeczpospolita and Gazeta Wyborcza is the generalisation of Europe. The article often contains a story from just one or maybe two countries that are generalised as representative of Europe in the headline and/or lead. Such examples are the Gazeta articles “Europe Homo+” (24 Apr. 2013) on the legalisation of gay marriage in France or “Europe protects its culture from the US” (5 Jun. 2013) on new French measures to close its markets to American cultural products. Although these stories may have some significance for other European countries as well, nothing in them allows us to assume that they are applicable to more than just one European nation (in this case France). The “Europe” of these articles is rather a figure of speech: a synecdoche, which substitutes the whole with its part or vice versa. This approach is untypical in my material, and it is actually almost unknown in both the Ukrainian and Russian sources.

One of the primary differences between the three countries’ narratives of Europe, judging purely from the qualitative data, is how they use Europe as
a linguistic device. Overloaded with different meanings, the word “Europe” functions as a semantically empty trope; Europe is not “what”, it is “how”. Broadly speaking, it is most likely a metonymy, i.e. something is called by the name of something else closely associated with it, instead of being called by its own name. This hypothesis continues as follows:

1. Ukraine prefers an ordinary metonymy, using Europe as a shorthand for the values and practices it sees as important, useful and vital for its own survival, just because the values originated in Europe and are associated with it. When a blogger writes “Ukraine has to become a European country”, he does not mean it should be recognised as a geographical part of the Continent – this has already happened a long time ago; rather, he establishes a category of advanced, affluent, developed, democratic societies to which Europe belongs (or even, which it itself gave birth to), thus using a metonymic device to refer to the political goal in a more concise spatial rather than ideological context.

2. For Poland, an EU member, any part thereof can more easily substitute the whole in a synecdoche (which is indeed often seen as a form of metonymy – again, the question of classificatory hierarchy is really secondary for this analysis as long as we agree to distinguish between the concepts). In a typical use of “Europe allows same-sex marriages”, the Polish journalist reveals in an article about France the perception of Europe as a whole (which invalidates the question of the exaggeration in the article – if it is a whole, it does not really matter which part of it does something), whether this perception is a reflection of an actual or desired reality.

3. Russia, it seems, pushes the limits of metonymy further to the brink of extreme forms of metaphor where anything at all can substitute for anything else, such as in a catachresis, literally “an abuse” of a word used arbitrarily without any connection to its semantic context, therefore facilitating the construction of metaphoric, if not hyperbolic, stories of decline and fall or epic battles. Many authors (including Jacques Derrida) discuss catachresis as a violent form of metaphor that tears the concept out of its common use surrounding to denote a concept for which no word exists; this also hints to the arbitrariness with which Europe has been ripped out of its context to signify the concepts of geopolitical enemy and “decadence of progress”. According to Derrida (1982), catachresis includes

first the violent and forced abusive inscription of a sign, the imposition of a sign upon a meaning which did not yet have its own proper sign in language. So much so that there is no substitution here, no transport of proper
signs, but rather the irruptive extension of a sign proper to an idea, a meaning, deprived of their signifier. A ‘secondary’ original. (p. 255)

The cartoon lumping together LGBT flags and Hitler to signify “the European choice” (see the analysis in Chapter 5) defines Europe using an arbitrary association with what Russian conservative ideology sees as wrong and adversarial, thus committing conceptual violence that is at the heart of catachresis. The article claiming terrorists walk free from prisons in Europe, which is based on a particular case of the granting of amnesties in Spain, does pretty much the same thing. Both cases also demonstrate the use of synecdoche and hyperbola, but they are used in this specifically catachrestic way, which is very foreign to, say, Polish discourse. Naturally, the Russian case also allows for more variation compared to the two others. And still, the examples highlighted earlier in the text indicate that the catachrestic use of Europe, when it happens, is virtually endemic to Russian discourses while extremely unusual in Poland or Ukraine.

This somehow mirrors the conclusion by the Russian philosopher Mikhail Ryklin, who analysed the writings of Marquis de Sade and Mikhail Bakhtin based on Deleuzian premises. In his opinion, they epitomise a striking difference in the relations between language and body in Russian and Western traditions. While the West instrumentalises the language used mainly to instruct and manipulate the body, the Russian narrative breaks the ties between the language and the body, thus annihilating the real body and creating a virtual body in the realm of language that is severed from its signified so the world “is created through interpretation” (Ryklin, 1992, p. 199). Certainly Ryklin’s theory comes from a particular perspective and agenda, and his homogenisation and essentialisation of the West seem quite problematic. Still, it is interesting that his philosophy of language has conceptualised something I see in these specific everyday texts. Notably, Ryklin has been vocal in his social and political critique of contemporary Russia, warning that it is slipping towards an updated version of the fascist mode of existence. His conceptualisation also seems a good theoretical framework for understanding how the propagandist forms of mediated communication function in Russian contexts, something very topical since the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis.

There is of course a more down-to-earth explanation for this. Polish newspapers see Europe from within and have a more precise idea about it; this is perhaps one of the reasons for the presence of institutional and market aspects (they entail a more exact definition of Europe). What
Europe is, is clearly defined and demarcated (see Figure 4). In Russia and Ukraine, these criteria are more blurred and therefore more metonymic and even catachrestic per se. If the aspect of values and authority dominates in Ukraine, Russia sees Europe from the conflict perspective; it also views Europe as being on the losing side of the geopolitical game.

This hypothesis was tested and confirmed in part during the QCA, which also made it possible to conclude which themes and arguments are dominant in the coverage. I will now turn to these results.

A quantitative mapping of the narratives

Now that the qualitative analysis has established the set of categories which comprise the semantic construction of the notion of Europe in the three countries’ public discourses, it is time to quantify them and see which categories and narratives dominate the coverage, which ones are less widespread and which ones appear only occasionally. This section presents and interprets the results of the quantitative part of my study. It seems appropriate to begin with the simplest results, which were obtained before the main stage of the research began, namely the pre-analytical data on the number of published newspaper articles mentioning Europe.

To begin with, the articles were identified by searching for “Europe” in the online resources that house the content of the printed newspapers, for example an online archive for newspapers that keeps them separate from their websites or simply a newspaper website if it duplicates the printed output. The complete list of search words is found in the first section of the coding instruction (see Appendix). In all three languages, which belong to either the West or East Slavic languages, declensions were fully taken into account to present a holistic, valid and reliable picture of what is written about Europe. The sampling was random, which allows the generalisation of the results to the entire corpus of the newspapers’ texts on Europe in the given time frame, namely between the February 2013 EU–Ukraine summit and the first Minsk agreements in September 2014 (see Appendix for more details).

All in all, in 607 days between 1 February 2013 and 30 September 2014, all nine newspapers published 21,110 articles about Europe (nearly 34.8 articles per day for both weeklies and dailies). This signifies a fairly strong interest in Europe and a recognition of its status as one of the key global actors and regional forces. Altogether, Polish newspapers account for well over a half of all articles in the sample, which is an indicator of a con-
siderably stronger interest but also potentially of a more developed newspaper culture, with thicker newspapers appearing more often and containing more texts. Overall, the Russian newspapers cover Europe less intensively, but the number of articles is still significant, especially for *Kommersant* and *Izvestiya*. The Ukrainian publications are compactly grouped at the bottom and in total account for less than a quarter of all publications. The Polish newspaper *Rzeczpospolita* topped the list with 7,544 articles; in second place by quite some distance was the Polish broadsheet *Gazeta Wyborcza* with 4,088. The third most prolific reporter of all things European turned out to be the Russian paper *Izvestiya*. But it is important to remember that this comparison strongly favours dailies over weeklies, and indeed the top three outlets all are dailies. Also, the politico-economic implications (once again, the strength of the market in Poland, compared with Ukraine, and state support in Russia result in a numerically more vibrant journalism). However, it is likely that both factors play some kind of role, i.e. the journalists'/publics’ interest in European affairs and the scope of the media system itself.

The other newspapers followed closely behind as reflected by the breakdown below:

*Figure 9. The number of articles mentioning Europe (total sample) (1)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Rzeczpospolita</em></td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>7,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Gazeta Wyborcza</em></td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>4,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Izvestiya</em></td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Kommersant</em></td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1,748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Polityka</em></td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1,726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Novaya Gazeta</em></td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1,322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Dzerkalo Tyzhnya</em></td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Segodnya</em></td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Korrespondent</em></td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>568</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The number of articles per day, although not uninteresting in general, is meaningless here as the sample contains both dailies and weeklies. But the number of articles mentioning Europe published in every issue of each newspaper, an indicator which to some extent may be thought as bracketing the media system differences, shows that Polityka, a centre-left Polish weekly magazine, has a very dramatic lead and seems to be the periodical most interested in Europe, mentioning it in probably virtually every article. Russia’s oppositional Novaya Gazeta comes second, and the Polish newspaper Rzeczpospolita third, but now Ukraine’s Dzerkalo Tyzhnya almost manages to tie for third place. In this more comparable breakdown, the national differences are less sharp, but the weeklies – particularly, the group at the top of the table (four weeklies from all three countries) – are certainly more interested in Europe than the tabloids.
Figure 12. How often Europe is mentioned per issue

(For a discussion of the sampling and its reliability, please see the Appendix, where all the information, including formulas and calculations, is provided.)

In the following paragraphs, I present the results charts and a concise discussion of each variable (category) coded.

Figure 13. Genre (no. of articles in the sample coded)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Information</th>
<th>Report</th>
<th>Interview</th>
<th>Analysis</th>
<th>Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dzerkalo Tyzhnya</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korrespondent</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segodnya</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kommersant</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestia</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As for the genre, what most likely comes into play is the newspaper’s format: the Establishment-oriented *Dzerkalo Tyzhnya*, which is heavy on analysis, and the weak analysis profile of *Izvestiya*, with its focus on interviews and a mix of news and opinionated articles, seem quite logical. The following are of note: *Novaya’s* inclination to have reportages (alongside far fewer analytical articles), very few opinion pieces in *Kommersant* and *Polityka*, and the tabloid *Segodnya’s* heavy reliance on information.

Figure 14. Topics (total sample)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic Type</th>
<th>DT</th>
<th>Korrespondent</th>
<th>Segodnya</th>
<th>Kommersant</th>
<th>Izvestiya</th>
<th>NG</th>
<th>GW</th>
<th>RP</th>
<th>Polityka</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic politics</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign news</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics (foreign + domestic)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lifestyle/travel</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celebrity</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results showing what topics dominate the coverage of Europe are especially interesting. First of all, across national lines, the economy strongly dominates the coverage in *Kommersant, Rzeczpospolita* (half of the articles mentioning Europe) and to a lesser extent *Dzerkalo Tyzhnya*, all
three newspapers that market themselves as publications for decision makers. Moreover, a mixed discussion of national and foreign politics is universally more typical for articles on Europe than a purely domestic context. In Ukraine, *Segodnya* stands out for its heavy focus on it (which suggests that the discussion on Europe was limited to EU–Ukraine relations in 2013–2014). The more conservative and Eurosceptical *Kommersant* and *Izvestiya* tend to mention Europe considerably less in articles about trends and problems in Russian society, unlike other more pro-European publications, including also the Russian newspaper *Novaya Gazeta*, which hints to Europe being a normative social reference for “liberals”. However, the two Russian newspapers mention Europe considerably more often on the apolitical arts pages, where they are likely to prefer to discuss European examples as opposed to social practices. Finally, the Polish newsmagazine *Polityka* stands out as the only outlet that associates Europe with historical topics (almost a third of all its European coverage), which may be explained by its format (weekly in-depth texts and less information); however, it is important to note that the Russian and Ukrainian weeklies are much less historicising in their discourse on Europe. A possible factor here is a perspective on Europe through the lens of a shared identity that is weaker in Ukraine and Russia.

Figure 15. Pictorial component (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>No. of articles with pictures</th>
<th>No. of articles without pictures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Dzerkalo Tyzhnya</em></td>
<td>49</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Korrespondent</em></td>
<td>47</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Segodnya</em></td>
<td>49</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Kommersant</em></td>
<td>45</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Izvestiya</em></td>
<td>43</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Novaya Gazeta</em></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Gazeta Wyborcza</em></td>
<td>38</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Rzeczpospolita</em></td>
<td>41</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Polityka</em></td>
<td>49</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There is no clear-cut pattern in the difference between weekly magazines and dailies, yet it is peculiar that it is found along national lines, with the Ukrainian publications tending to rely on pictorial material in their texts about Europe slightly more than their Russian and Polish counterparts. It may be conjectured that the political economy comes into play again since the Ukrainian media might be more willing to rely on Internet audiences where illustrative material can be employed as part of a clickbait strategy. Also, a smaller number of texts make it easier to provide more illustrations. However, this does not explain why the Russian press differs, as its print readership is also quite weak; still, a stronger financial position might make it less consistent in its pursuit of an audience. Alternatively, more illustrations in texts on Europe may testify to the topic’s greater importance in Ukraine. My conclusion from the overview of this category is that here national specificity overrides the format and intended audience as well as the political orientation.

Figure 17. Content of the picture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DT</th>
<th>Korrespondent</th>
<th>Segodnia</th>
<th>Kommersant</th>
<th>Izvestiya</th>
<th>NG</th>
<th>GW</th>
<th>RP</th>
<th>Polityka</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People: politicians</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People: public figures</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
People in general dominate the illustrations in articles about Europe, while landscapes and historical buildings are relatively unimportant for reporting current events. Interestingly, public figures featured in the Polish press more often than elsewhere, while *Izvestiya* stands out for its significant interest in this category. Politicians feature more typically in the Ukrainian media and *Kommersant*, whereas ordinary people are most often visually portrayed in the European coverage by the more highbrow Ukrainian outlets (especially *Korrespondent*, where nearly half of the texts contain their images). News photography (event category) is quite important but more so for *Kommersant*, *Novaya* and *Gazeta Wyborcza*. Some such as *Izvestiya* and *Korrespondent* tend more often to include pictures of their authors, and among the texts under the “other” category, one can find close-ups of various material objects: flags and logos, maps, and charts in rather small numbers, except for 13 charts in the business-oriented *Rzeczpospolita*. Overall, it is of note that the Polish media have a predilection for depicting non-political public figures and the Ukrainian ones for focusing on ordinary people.

Figure 18. Europe identified with a continent, the EU or symbolic abstraction (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>No. of articles using “Europe” as a continent</th>
<th>No. of articles using “Europe” as the EU</th>
<th>No. of articles using “Europe” as a symbol</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Dzerkalo Tyzhnya</em></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Korrespondent</em></td>
<td>32</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Segodnya</em></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Kommersant</em></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Izvestiya</em></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Is Europe understood in the texts as a purely geographical notion, the European Union or some abstract semantic complex? The results suggest that there is some sort of balance between referring to “Europe” as the Continent and to its most powerful political union. However, there is a certain tendency among the Polish media to use “Europe” in a broader meaning, namely as the Continent, which is not synonymous with the EU (except for the Establishment-oriented and supposedly more EU critical Rzeczpospolita). The Ukrainian media, on the other hand, slightly prefer to use “Europe” as a shorthand for the EU, especially in the tabloid Segodnya, which is in keeping with its oversimplifying style. Europe is so rarely identified with the Council of Europe that it is not included in the table (only one time in Novaya, Kommersant, Korrespondent and Segodnya). While not totally absent, the Council of Europe features marginally in the discourse about Europe.

Associating Europe with values and other abstract symbolic complexes is not a dominant feature of the bulk of the coverage, but it is firmly entrenched and present in each country. While the Ukrainian media are more uniform in this respect, the Russian business newspaper Kommersant is
almost entirely ignoring Europe’s “free-floating essence” (Zygmunt Bauman). Also, the less liberal Polish publications are not so interested in this aspect. However, what is very interesting are the results as to whether the values ascribed to Europe are positive or negative (next figure).

Figure 20. European values: good, bad or neutral?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Good values</th>
<th>Bad values</th>
<th>No values or neutral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dzerkalo Tyzhnya</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korrespondent</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segodnya</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kommersant</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestia</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novaya Gazeta</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gazeta Wyborcza</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rzeczpospolita</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polityka</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 21. Good vs bad European values

There seem to be two value cores: that of rationalist technocratic modernity (efficiency, modernity, quality, standards) and that of humanistic values (rights, justice, fairness, etc.). What emerges from these results is that a cluster of publications (*Dzerkalo Tyzhnya, Korrespondent, Novaya, Gazeta Wyborcza, all liberal*) are quite positive about European values. The pro-
Kremlin *Izvestiya* also seems to fit into this group, but on closer inspection, it can be determined that the values it praises are those of a successful technocratic civilisation or more traditional values (“virtue”), while, for example, gender equality is simultaneously condemned as a harmful value. In general, the set of values is relatively uniform from nation to nation, with all countries longing for values such as civility (in everyday communication, public debate, interpersonal relationships). Despite some national differences, political sympathies seem more important here.

Figure 22. Particular values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Positive/Neutral</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Dzerkalo Tyzhnya</em></td>
<td>rules (2), modernity (2), culture (2), efficiency (1), openness (1), life quality (1), urbanism and industrialism (1), human rights (1)</td>
<td>experimentation (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Korrespondent</em></td>
<td>human rights (3), civility (2), democracy (1), technologies (1), efficiency (1), ideals (1), high quality (1), freedom (1), culture (1), equality (1), the rule of law (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Segodnya</em></td>
<td>justice (2), modernity (1), transparency (1), standards (1), efficiency (1), equality (1), order (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Kommersant</em></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Izvestiya</em></td>
<td>modernity (2), culture (2), virtue (1), high quality (1), cosmopolitanism (1), unity (1), sustainability (1), human rights (1), bourgeoisie (1), sociality (1)</td>
<td>gender equality (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Novaya Gazeta</em></td>
<td>civility (2), order (2), culture (1), tolerance (1), humanism (1), peace (1), democracy (1), disobedience (1), solidarity (1), freedom (1), transparency (1), standards (1), human rights (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Gazeta Wyborcza</em></td>
<td>justice (2), fairness (2), culture (2), tolerance (1), sustainability (1), civility (1), humanism (1), idealism (1), human rights (1), equality (1), security (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Rzeczpospolita</em></td>
<td>Human rights (1), efficiency (1), human dignity (1)</td>
<td>anti-democratism (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Polityka</em></td>
<td>European mindset (1), market economy (1), peace (1), feminism (1), democracy (1), unity (1)</td>
<td>racism (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The theme of differences and conflicts between Western and Eastern Europe features rather marginally in the newspapers, typically figuring in one or two articles (sometimes none), the sole exception being Korrespondent, four of whose articles look at this problem. Central-Eastern Europe is very rarely mentioned in the Russian media and only slightly more often in the Ukrainian press; however, it has a more significant presence in the Polish media (five articles in Rzeczpospolita, two in Gazeta Wyborcza, four in Polityka). This is clearly a concept that has some currency in Poland, from where it spills over into Ukraine thanks to its legitimating potential (cf. analysis by Merje Kuus).

Figure 23. Europe as the Other

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>No. of articles describing Europe as the Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dzerkalo Tyzhnya</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korrespondent</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segodnya</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kommersant</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestiya</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novaya Gazeta</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gazeta Wyborcza</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rzeczpospolita</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polityka</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 24. Europe as an actor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>No. of articles showing Europe as a united actor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dzerkalo Tyzhnya</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korrespondent</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segodnya</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kommersant</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestiya</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novaya Gazeta</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gazeta Wyborcza</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rzeczpospolita</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polityka</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of more interest is looking in greater detail at the number of texts that perceive Europe as the Other. While in all three countries a discussion of
inherent, essentialist differences between themselves and Europe has been going on from time to time (with the notable exception of the staunchly pro-European Gazeta Wyborcza), it seems that the Russian journalists have a penchant for this discussion more than their colleagues in the other two countries.

All the newspapers analysed in all three countries ascribe actor-like qualities to Europe; they made it the subject of a sentence in about one-fifth of all texts on Europe, with the notable exception of Segodnya, where Europe is mostly treated as a single unified actor. It may be interpreted as a consequence of Segodnya being most like a classic tabloid where such a simplification (using the word “Europe” as if it is one person) would likely be format-specific.

Figure 25. Europe as a threat and adversary (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>No. of articles referring to Europe as posing threats to the readers</th>
<th>No. of articles depicting a struggle with Europe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dzerkalo Tyzhnya</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korrespondent</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segodnya</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kommersant</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestiya</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novaya Gazeta</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gazeta Wyborcza</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rzeczpospolita</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polityka</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In this category, there are significant differences between the newspapers but especially in the national cross-section. The first thing which becomes evident is that the Polish newspapers practically see no threat coming from Europe, and they do not find Poland to be in a conflict with Europe (as of 2013–2014 – the situation has probably changed significantly during the Andrzej Duda presidency!), while the Russian newspapers see Europe as both a threat and an opponent in roughly 10% to 20% of the articles mentioning Europe. This category is also temporally compact: most of the texts in this category (not all, however) come from the 2014 part of the sample and are related to the EU and US sanctions following the annexation of Crimea and the Donbas unrest. In the case of the Ukrainian newspapers, Segodnya’s frame on Europe posing a threat belongs to the 2013 period when the EU was pressuring Ukraine over Yuliya Tymoshenko’s imprisonment, and Dzerkalo Tyzhnya’s few Europhobic articles come from the period July to September 2014 and are about the EU’s perceived lack of action to protect Ukraine from Russia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>No. of articles depicting Europe as a goal</th>
<th>No. of articles implying that their readers have to adopt European ways</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dzerkalo Tyzhnya</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korrespondent</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segodnya</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kommersant</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestiya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novaya Gazeta</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 27. Europe as a goal and an example to follow (1)
Figure 28. Europe as a goal and an example to follow (2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>No. of articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gazeta Wyborcza</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rzeczpospolita</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polityka</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The national differences come to the fore regarding the question whether the “we” in the texts has to orient itself towards Europe. The three Polish outlets sometimes reminded their readers about the areas where Poland still lags behind, but overall this was not a very popular topic. In contrast to this, the Ukrainian press strongly believed that Ukraine should adopt more European practices and had a concrete programme for it: Europe should be the goal of these reform processes. Somewhat less often the Russian journalists wanted to see more European practices in Russia, but even when they do, it is hardly ever suggested this should have political consequences.

Also, the Polish newspapers never mentioned that Europe should adopt more practices from their home country; in the case of both Russia and Ukraine, only one to two texts in each outlet expressed this.

Figure 29. Europe depicted as rejecting and unwelcoming

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>No. of articles depicting an unwelcoming Europe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dzerkalo Tyzhnya</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korrespondent</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segodnya</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kommersant</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While journalists from the three Polish newspapers only rarely portray Europe as rejecting Poland or creating barriers to interaction with the Poles, such a perception is present in both Russian and Ukrainian texts. This is related to the Russo-Ukrainian war, where Ukrainian journalists sometimes felt that Europe betrayed them and their Russian counterparts took the view that Europe was rejecting Russia.

Figure 30. European troubles vs successes (1)
The Ukrainian outlets tended simultaneously to pay more attention to European successes and less attention to troubles in Europe. The Polish newspapers were especially keen on reporting about problems in Europe while noticing its successes somewhat more. The Russian media tended to prefer reporting on Europe’s failures much more than on its success stories. In all three countries, Europe is certainly portrayed as rather troubled (this is likely to do with both the economic crisis and the specifics of a media coverage that favours negative events).

The national differences are especially very discernible in the following juxtaposition.

Figure 32. Europe seen as successful and the land of plenty (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>No. of articles describing Europe as successful</th>
<th>No. of articles describing Europe as the land of plenty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dzerkalo Tyzhnya</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korrespondent</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segodnya</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kommersant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestiya</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novaya Gazeta</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gazeta Wyborcza</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In this breakdown, the Ukrainian outlets are quite uniform in their portrayal of Europe as successful in well over 10% of the texts about Europe, while Dzerkalo Tyzhnya and Korrespondent also construct Europe as a place that has material abundance and the best living standards. The Polish media, all to very different degrees, but with the exception of the more critical Gazeta Wyborcza, see Europe as successful. The Russian media are notably either more sceptical or less interested in reporting this subject.

Figure 34. Europe’s common identity (1)
A common European identity (including in the form of a European civilisation or a pan-European culture) is not a popular subject, yet it is present on the periphery of the coverage. Particularly the Russian oppositional *Novaya Gazeta* is the most interested in it, and the Polish newspapers seem to have a systematic, albeit peripheral, interest in referring to it.

A detailed explanation of how the European institutions work is not the most popular theme but is firmly rooted in the coverage and mostly practised in the Ukrainian and Polish media (it went under the radar of the qualitative analysis of the Ukrainian media). While the more pro-Kremlin outlets seem indifferent to this, the oppositional *Novaya* rather follows the Ukrainian and Polish example.
Figure 37. Chronology (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>No. of articles referring to Europe’s past</th>
<th>No. of articles referring to Europe’s present</th>
<th>No. of articles referring to Europe’s future</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dzerkalo Tyzhnya</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korrespondent</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segodnya</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kommersant</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestiya</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novaya Gazeta</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gazeta Wyborcza</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rzeczpospolita</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polityka</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 38. Chronology (2)

The references to current, past or projected events seem rather uniform in the texts; it is worth noting, however, that the tabloid Segodnya almost exclusively focuses on the present, while the weekly Polityka tends to write about Europe in the past rather than in the present (quite unique). The past is also relatively more important for discourse on Europe in the Russian newspapers. It seems that the more highbrow and expert-like the newspaper’s perspective is, the more prominent the historical context will be
(except for Izvestiya perhaps). The future is represented to a somewhat lesser degree in Poland.

Figure 39. Europe’s terrible past, golden age and golden future (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>No. of articles referring to Europe’s terrible past</th>
<th>No. of articles referring to Europe’s golden past</th>
<th>No. of articles referring to Europe’s golden future</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dzerkalo Tyzhnya</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korrespondent</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segodnya</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kommersant</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestiya</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novaya Gazeta</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gazeta Wyborcza</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rzeczpospolita</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polityka</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 40. Europe’s terrible past, golden age and golden future (2)

Overall, terrible events from European history are discussed alongside Europe quite often, but it seems that the Polish newspapers have the most systematic approach to it in particular thanks to Polityka’s huge interest in history in general. Some nostalgia for the golden past is also evident in the Polish newspapers as is some reflection on Europe’s possible future golden age. This optimism sometimes occurs as well in the other two countries. However, in these two countries, there seems to be considerably less nostalgia for the Europe of the past. The Russian oppositional newspaper Novaya
Gazeta and the Ukrainian weekly Dzerkalo Tyzhnya have very much the same approach as the Polish newspapers in this category.

Figure 41. Europe in the context of Ukraine (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>No. of articles mentioning Ukraine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dzerkalo Tyzhnya</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korrespondent</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segodnya</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kommersant</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestiya</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novaya Gazeta</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gazeta Wyborcza</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rzeczpospolita</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polityka</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 42. Europe in the context of Ukraine (2)

It is predictable that the Ukrainian media top this category, with Europe almost always mentioned in the same articles as Ukraine. The Russian newspapers also seem to mention Ukraine alongside Europe more often than their Polish counterparts; in both Poland and Russia, the winter of 2013–2014 (Euromaidan and the Ukraine–Russia crisis) marked a water-
shed which saw a sharp rise in the number of texts about Europe that mention Ukraine too.

Figure 43. Europe as a figure of speech (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>No. of articles using “Europe” as a metonymy</th>
<th>No. of articles using “Europe” as a synecdoche</th>
<th>No. of articles using “Europe” as a catachresis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dzerkalo Tyzhnya</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korrespondent</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segodnya</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kommersant</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestiya</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novaya Gazeta</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gazeta Wyborcza</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rzeczpospolita</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polityka</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 44. Europe as a figure of speech (2)

Finally, it was vital to check the hypothesis from the qualitative analysis, namely that every country’s press associates and uses “Europe” with a particular figure of speech. The hypothesis was that Ukraine would have a predilection for metonymy, Poland for synecdoche and Russia for catachresis. The results here seem rather interesting and significant as the hypothesis has only partly been confirmed. Ukraine indeed has the most pronounced use of Europe as a metonymy. However, it also has the highest scores for the other two rhetorical devices. While metonymy seems more or less common
in the other two countries’ newspapers, the Ukrainian media more often use
synecdoche and even catachresis. The suggested interpretation of this is that
the sampling time frame represents a particularly dynamic moment for the
Ukrainian public sphere, with much debate and many outpourings of out-
rage. This probably called for an extended repertoire of rhetorical figures. It
may also be related to the journalists’ imagined audiences, as the two
business-oriented dailies, Russia’s Kommersant and Poland’s Rzeczpospolita,
also show the least use of rhetorical devices, instead speaking about Europe in
a more direct, straightforward way. The Ukrainian journalists may semicon-
sciously be trying to appeal to the emotional perception of their readers,
shortly a possible specific trait of a national media culture.

Summary
The qualitative analysis suggested that in the analysed newspapers Europe
functions in its direct (spatial/geographical) and metaphorical meanings (an
abstract set of values). However, both the geographical and metaphorical
content of Europe are vague and defined on an ad hoc basis. As a result, in
the mainstream media of the three countries, Europe is constructed dif-
ferently. While the Russian coverage is very diverse in its negative portrayal
of the EU and the West, the Ukrainian one is largely positive and focused
on Europe as a task to achieve. Poland’s unique position is found in its
adoption of the insider perspective on the European institutions, which also
brings a more critical point of view.

The quantitative analysis suggests that contradictory trends often coexist
and much is dependent on the newspaper’s profile. All newspapers report
extensively on negative events in Europe. However, the Russian media,
much more than the newspapers in the other two countries, are defined by
their alarmist coverage of Europe being in trouble. They also tend to see
fewer successes in Europe and almost never suggest that Russia should
follow the European example.

In striking contrast to this, the Ukrainian newspapers tend to see the EU
as a normative example and speak much more about Europe’s successes and
material abundance. This has parallels in the online visual representations
of Europe. A closer look at the linguistic structures may suggest that dif-
ferent types of metaphor are more or less endemic to each country’s co-
verage of Europe: synecdoche in Poland, metonymy in Ukraine and catach-
resis in Russia. Nevertheless, my quantitative analysis has disproved this,
suggesting instead that Ukraine has a considerably broader use of rhetorical
devices than the other two countries, possibly explained by the dynamic period it was undergoing at the time. Still, the presence of various rhetorical devices in the more notable texts from different countries suggests that the distinction may even then work in some types of discourses.
CHAPTER 7

Locating media power:
Journalists and politicians

In the preceding chapters, I traced the historical dynamic of how Europe has been constructed in each country, identifying key traditional narratives and then tracing contemporary discourses as represented in some of the most influential weeklies and dailies as well as individual voices in the online and print media at the time of Euromaidan and the Ukrainian crisis. Now I will turn to the journalists’ and policymakers’ perspectives on their own interaction, comparing what is present in the official declarations and media portrayals of Europe with how the participants of the exchanges between the media and the policymaking construe the nature of these exchanges, often between the sites of discourse production and reception and how the recontextualisation of discourses extends to motivations, justifications and practices. The combined understanding of all these components – media narratives, official narratives and individual testimonies of interaction and power relations – enables me to discover patterns of media interplay with the political field, focused on one of the region’s crucial problems: identifying the meaning of Europe.

Ukraine, Russia and Poland are different examples of the coexistence of the media and the authorities, with varying distributions of social and political power between them. In this chapter, I will first explain the immediate context of Euromaidan and the situation in which journalists found themselves before the protests started. I will then empirically analyse the in-depth interviews with journalists and policymakers about their experiences during Euromaidan, supported by other relevant evidence where needed. I also include several interviews with foreign policy experts that add yet another perspective to the complex post-Euromaidan developments. Altogether, this contributes to the previous analysis of discourses with valuable information on how these major social actors make sense of their own agency, which helps explain how discourses on Europe correlate with the
structure of relations between the media and the political sphere, and not only are these discourses shaped by them but also vice versa.

Particularly with respect to the journalists’ self-perception of their work, I am interested in how they derive legitimization for their power, especially under extreme civil unrest (in Ukraine). The negotiation of legitimacy has been studied by Krzyżanowski (2014), who found that “journalistic identities and mythologies are very strongly reliant on discursive construction of legitimation of different actions – those actually undertaken as well as in the majority of cases, those just imagined – predominantly by means of references to values and standards of journalistic work” (Krzyżanowski, 2014, p. 346). Rather than grounding their legitimacy in the actual journalistic practice, as a profession based on knowledge and power, journalists instead often use imaginary abstract scenarios and vague references to values and codes. Moreover, there is a growing disconnection from practice and a self-removal from positively powerful positions in society. “Thereby, practically irrespective of (the experience of) practice, journalists always negotiate a certain existent template of what they should do and know. This template is sustained by the value-laden discourse about journalistic principles and ethics […]” (ibid.). It is interesting to compare my findings with these conclusions derived from interviews with Polish journalists.

Euromaidan and journalists: The media interregnum

Euromaidan as a protest action and social movement is rooted in the well-known 2004 Orange Revolution and, long before that, the 1990 so-called Revolution on the Granite, virtually unheard of in the West. It was the first political protest in this square in Kyiv (then known as the October Revolution Square before it was renamed the Independence Square, or Maidan Nezalezhnosti in Ukrainian, in 1991). Early twentieth-century political actions gravitated to St Sophia Square, a few hundred metres up the hill from Maidan (Yekelchyk, 2015). In 1990, Maidan was for the first time occupied by protesters (they were also on hunger strike); they demanded the resignation of the then chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, Vitaly Masol. This was one of the first and most prominent attempts to put the authorities under pressure using street activism, in a period when Ukraine was still part of the USSR.

In September of 1990, around 100 students gathered in the center of Kiev to support miners strikes and declared that they named this area as the “com-
munism-free” zone. They started to express their support for the economic
demands of Donbas miners. The miners openly demonstrated their deep
disappointment connected with a poorly paid and bad working conditions.
[…] Head of the Supreme Council at the time, Leonid Kravchuk, played a
key role in the turmoil. […] He decided to meet with the students on
October 6, 1990, and during this meeting invited them to the Supreme
Council to explain the causes of their protest. […] Finally the protest
resulted in the resignation of Vitaly Masol… (Sasinska-Klas, 2014, p. 77–78)

The success of this protest – Masol did resign – reinforced by the overall
victory of the national-democratic forces in the collapsing Soviet Union
made the square synonymous with a positive story of protest. Thus, Maidan
was one of the earliest places of choice for protesters against President
Leonid Kuchma following the kidnapping and murder of the journalist
Heorhiy Gongadze in 2000, and then a series of rallies in the lead-up to the
Orange Revolution. Since 2004, it has been the place to protest in Kyiv, also
forcing the authorities to support attempts to convert it into a place that can
be used for entertainment purposes (the filming of popular television
shows; Cybriwsky, 2014). The media once again became involved both as
the initiator of the protest (the Kuchmagate protest of the early 2000s
centred around the murder of the journalist) and the obstacle to it (distrac-
ting entertainment and the occupation of the square). As already noted in
Chapter 5, the Ukrainian media system is characterised by a split between
the conventional/commercial and independent media. While television is
traditionally controlled by oligarchs, a number of “guerrilla” TV projects
came into being on the eve of Euromaidan, such as Espreso, Hromadske.tv
and UkrStream. There was also a pluralist and, using Hallin and Mancini’s
categorisation (2004), moderately polarised printed press, a vast regional
media network mostly dominated by the state, and largely oppositional
online media.

At the same time, the Yanukovych government had a consistent policy to
reduce the space for public expression; in 2013, Ukraine’s “free country”
status was changed to “partly free” in Freedom House’s list (Zaliznyak,
2014, p. 182). Among the initiatives discussed and nearly undertaken by the
government was, for example, a bill that would require the online media to
follow the same (relatively restrictive) registration rules as the print media
or even the news agencies. Viktor Yanukovych found himself entangled in a
number of media scandals and frequent altercations with journalists; this
and the authoritarian and pro-Russian tendencies of the Party of Regions
made them fall out of favour with the media and the pro-European core of journalists early on.

Euromaidan was from the very first days driven by the critical and oppositional media outlets (typically web-based) and popular journalists who posted on social media. Tomasz Goban-Klas (2014, p. 169) sees Euromaidan as “the latest cause célèbre of the mediatization of the present-day political protest”. Notably, the “media were there both the observer, promoter, amplifier and even the organizer” (ibid., p. 170). The media, in this perspective, served as the political opposition hub and coordinating platform, the producer of symbols and content, as well as the opposition’s watchdog. However, it is difficult to accept such a rigid division between the media (“form”) and the protest (“content”), because, as I intend to demonstrate below with the empirical data from my interviews with journalists, rather than simply opening up to the protests as a transmitter of its message, journalist activity had become an integral part of social activism – of practice, indeed. For journalists who supported and promoted Euromaidan, doing media work grew to be synonymous with a protest activity.

Journalists and protest were not simply strange bedfellows; they had gravitated towards each other since 1991 and even before then if one includes the earlier experiences of anti-Soviet samizdat and dissidence. An example is *Ukrayinsky visnyk* ([The Ukrainian Herald], 1970–1972, 1987–1989) published by Vyacheslav Chornovil (1937–1999), a long-time Gulag inmate and independent Ukraine’s first opposition leader. Many other dissident publicists also point out underground journalism as the opposite pole of the top-down party-controlled “official” media system. Even at its very roots, late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Ukrainian journalism (for example publicist articles by Mykhaylo Drahomanov and Ivan Franko, analysed in the historical chapter above) was the product of political opposition to the Russian and Austrian imperial governments and the mainstream, pro-government mass publications, typically published in hegemonic languages and often critical of the nascent Ukrainian national identification. In the Soviet era, publicly writing against the authorities was a political act resulting in persecution and one of the few available protest tools, so the post-Soviet Ukraine inherited this fundamental politicisation of journalist activity as well as the opposite tradition of a “servile” pro-government or apolitical press. This dichotomy, I argue, has continued into the two strains of journalism in present-day Ukraine, the activist and the conformist one, a contrast never as striking as during “the winter on fire” in 2013–2014.
Yuriy Zaliznyak (2014, p. 180) has positioned Euromaidan in the context of the Arab Spring and the Occupy Wall Street movement. He noted that, unlike the Orange Revolution, which was “a television revolution”, Euromaidan became “a new media revolution”, though both were organised thanks to networked, decentred activity.

The official EuroMaidan page on Facebook after 8 days only had 76,000 fans and nearly 90,000 people who interacted with the page (commented, liked, distributed content). That was a new Ukrainian record. During the first days of the demonstrations the page appeared in the top 20 of Ukrainian Facebook pages and became the most “talked about”, with almost thousands of people who commented, liked or shared the page’s content. Twitter [...] finally became an important source of information [...]. On Nov. 26, every one or two seconds a message with the hashtag #euromaidan was posted [...]. On Nov. 21–28, the average number of Twitter posts that mentioned the hashtag reached 1,500–3,000 per hour. (Zaliznyak, 2014, pp. 181–182)

Live streams from Maidan sometimes attracted as many as 2.7 million simultaneous viewers (Goban-Klas, 2014, p. 172). Euromaidan became one of the “critical junctures in media and communication” that combine new communication technology, the illegitimacy of the conventional media system and a breakdown of the existing order (Zaliznyak, 2014, p. 185). Indeed, this is also part of the journalism transformation; for example Lotan et al. (2011) suggested, based on their analysis of the use of Twitter during the Arab Spring, that the social media narrative is co-constructed by journalists, bloggers and activists, which transforms social media journalism essentially into conversation. While this line of argument seems quite interesting, the very success of the social media is not to be taken for granted, for social media can also be used to subvert social and revolutionary movements, to which particularly Christensen (2011) particularly drew attention. Moreover, the claim made about the illegitimacy of mainstream journalism is clearly exaggerated; this assertion is contradicted by representative public opinion polls cited below. Szostek (2014, p. 2) found that even the oligarch-owned large TV channels had a rather sympathetic coverage of Euromaidan and conveyed the protest agenda to the general population, to the point that Yanukovych’s prime minister Mykola Azarov had to complain that the government’s voice was not being heard.

The blurring of boundaries between journalism and activism, between media professionals and civil society, is a striking feature of EuroMaidan. If
Yanukovych thought that opposition journalists operating in the ‘less influential’, lower audience spheres of internet and print media posed little danger to his regime, their role in the events of late November [2013] may have changed his mind. (Szostek, 2014, p. 6)

The scholar, however, tried to interpret the contradictory trends in the domestic TV coverage of Euromaidan by the oligarch owners, who schemed to ensure their peaceful post-Yanukovych future (ibid., p. 12). This view does not take into account the potential of journalists and editors as political actors; in many cases, at the very least, the positive coverage of Euromaidan is better explained by the fact that entire editorial teams, even though employed by oligarchs, were at heart supporters of the social movement (as evident from the interviews presented below).

This was how things were before the mass protest events and within their earlier, relatively peaceful stage. Moving on to the interview research results, I shall briefly run through the interview study outline. I have conducted thirty-three in-depth interviews with journalists (ten in Ukraine, four in Poland and four in Russia), former or current MFA staff (four in Ukraine, four in Poland and two in Russia) as well as foreign policy experts (one in Ukraine, two in Poland and two in Russia), where I asked questions about their professional routines, the impact of Euromaidan on their work and their perspectives on the interaction between media and politics in their countries. I have personally carried out interviews in Ukraine and Poland, while I had help from a local research assistant in Russia. Being a Ukraine national, I decided that given the conflict between these two countries, my background would have affected the informants’ answers too much. Moreover, it may have provoked a hostile reaction from the authorities since some of the questions related to the MFAs’ internal, non-public procedures such as information gathering. Two of the Russian interviews were nevertheless conducted over Skype by me. The interviews, including several follow-up sessions, were carried out in 2014–2017, significantly overlapping with the text research sample and coinciding with the timeline of the Ukrainian crisis. In this analysis, I have assigned different fictional names to the informants to protect their anonymity; the first letters of their names indicate the order in which I interviewed them. I briefly describe the social and professional profile of each interviewee whenever I mention them for the first time; however, the reader should bear in mind that a few of my informants were more concerned about safety than others, and given the limited number of professionals in some areas (such as foreign policy-
making), which makes it possible to establish their identities with relative ease, I was forced to limit and sometimes even consciously alter their biographical details. This relates to very few cases though. The informants’ profiles are also provided in the Appendix.

One of the typical starting points of these conversations was how the media system changed during Euromaidan in 2013–2014. Some respondents mentioned the extremely intensified exchange of information as a result of these developments. As Alina, at the time of the interview a 30-year-old society page editor from a leading news website, mentioned to me: “I became really popular on social media. Many people [journalists] became popular during the revolution because the demand for information increased. People [followers] also started messaging me; I received fifty messages a day”.

Davyd, a renowned middle-aged publicist associated with the Euromaidan leadership and who has published his articles in a number of outlets, including Dzerkalo Tyzhnya, shared his memories of meeting his audience immediately after a live broadcast from one of the attempts by the riot police to clear the square.

After the broadcast, I went to have breakfast here in the downtown and was approached by a colleague from Espreso who said there were hardly any people and the Maidan [protesters] was likely to be forcefully removed. I was upset; what else could I do. I had my breakfast and went to Maidan, and I suddenly see a mass of people, and every single one I passed said hello and thanked me for reporting [on the violence]. It was a one-of-a-kind moment in my life. There were hundreds of people, and everyone was saying hello, so they had all seen this morning’s broadcast because TVi had already been included in Volya [a cable package]; it was easy to watch it in Kyiv.

There was also a significant change in practices related to Euromaidan: streaming, night shifts in newsrooms, night-time coverage at the protest sites were all introduced then as a reaction to the critical situation. Some novelties (such as night shifts) continued well into 2014–2015 for some media. Some informants emphasised movement (between the protest sites and the newsroom) as the key experience, combined with being permanently “connected” to the events in the square through the web and

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23 All quotations from the interview material in this chapter are provided in my translation.
social media. This created at the protest site a remote presence that made the physical distance less critical.

But it was not only the physical space that contracted; the informants experienced the same thing in the social space. The perceived distance to the oppositional politicians decreased considerably. According to Danylo, a 30-year-old TV journalist who would often freelance for Korrespondent, “Journalists got closer to the oppositional politicians. They spent much time together in Maidan. You could easily grab Parubiy’s hand, or even Klitchko, whatever part of the body”. At the same time, Maidan was characterised by shorter distances between participants in general, a stronger authority enjoyed by journalists and higher levels of trust. A number of interviews with the Ukrainian journalists indicate that they perceived that Euromaidan not only strengthened the traditional journalist influence but also gave media workers more traditional power roles typically performed by the administrative authorities. Alina expresses this in the following way:

The attitude towards the journalists improved. Before, people would always blame journalists for being corrupt, scandal-thirsty and selling their services for money. When people saw journalists in Maidan, their work, the risks they were taking, they realised they are citizens like them; they saw the real enemy and understood it was not the journalist, that the journalist works for them.

It is all the more interesting to contrast this personal impression with the polling data that suggests that people’s trust in the media had hardly changed; they were the second most trusted institution in Ukraine both before and after Maidan (Tsn.ua, 2013; Gazeta.ua, 2014). Davyd confirms that his perceived sense of the journalist’s authority was not affected by the popular disillusionment with politics: “There was disillusionment with politicians but not with journalists. In general, people regard my texts as independently written”. It can be hypothesised that perhaps the prevalence of trust remained the same (just as many people as before would trust/not trust the media); however, the strength of trust had increased, and people expressed a more open and profound trust; they not only trusted passively but also sought active interaction. This is how Alina saw it: “They were telling about something happening or asking to verify somebody else’s information. It all peaked after the revolution, in the end of February”. There was clearly a drastic increase in communication exchanges between journalists and non-journalists, which is a piece of circumstantial supporting evidence that, as much as in the journalists’ perception, the relationship
between them and the general public saw either an increase in trust or an increase in acting based on the existing trust.

Oksana, a young journalist from Hromadske’s founding team, was one of the most active and most frequently present journalists in Maidan during the protest, carrying out live streams and reporting the skirmishes as the situation unfolded. She also finds the power dynamic positive for journalists:

We had a very specific situation. We were a little idealised; and we kind of felt like rock stars. I am telling you the truth! We were always greeted, followed – “this is Hromadske, make way for them” – applauded, asked whether we had got some sleep, supported. We were very easy to recognise ’cause Maidan [the protesters] was watching us. I remember very well the day Yanukovych was toppled and everyone got going; those first days were like paradise. I was extremely sad, but from a journalist’s perspective, we were pursued! People pursued me in the subway to tell some story, like there is a patent bureau that has been plagued by corruption for 15 years and ‘we are ready to tell you everything’. A couple ran after me in the subway, telling me they lost a child in a road accident and the corrupt official responsible for it was not imprisoned. They had long hidden their pain and had never said anything until now. We explained that we could not tell every story. There weren’t very many of us in fact. We cannot take responsibility for all these social stories because everything is still going on.

Not all the journalists were happy about the direction the mediasphere has taken. One of those is Eduard, a journalist with a leading weekly in 2013–2014 who now works as an independent commentator. His opinion of Euromaidan, the post-Maidan Ukrainian government and society has been generally critical. “A moment came”, Eduard confessed, “when some of the journalists, partly thanks to the journalists who began positioning themselves in this way, started to be perceived as agents of either side in the conflict. And if the journalist does not meet this universally accepted model, he is ostracised”. Here he invokes the professional values of neutrality and impartiality as the ones that govern his work. “In the weekly where I worked, we tried to cover everything more or less objectively, namely without this so-called position of absolute acceptance and support, because, in my opinion, balance and journalist standards should be adhered to”.

The journalists’ participation in politics (including street politics) made them first a vulnerable target for their camp’s opponents but also, as the strength of the protest grew, put them in an increasingly empowered position. Traditional power roles – surveillance, investigation and even
policing – also began gravitating towards the media as the only (perhaps apart from the church) remaining authority in Ukrainian society while the three branches of power, especially the executive and its law enforcement, were increasingly losing their legitimacy in the course of many attempted violent crackdowns on the protest.

The power of surveillance is very graphically shown by the instances where the media assumed such typical power roles in very specific individual cases. For example, during the blockade of the riot police units by local activists in the town of Vasylkiv in the Kyiv suburbs (5 December), an eyewitness reported how the protesters described their needs when they were clashing with the authorities: “They didn’t ask for anything, just two things: 1) tell the journalists they are waiting for them; 2) leave your phone numbers and be ready to help if required” (Ukrayinska Pravda, 2013). Informants admit that this power was not always enforced; for instance Davyd believes that mainstream television could have played a greater role in preventing the bloodshed in Maidan by covering it more meticulously.

Journalists also had a stake in the decision-making regarding Euromaidan. In their blogs on Ukrayinska Pravda, Dmytro Hnap and Serhiy Leshchenko (who later became an MP alongside several prominent journalists who had entered politics as a result of Euromaidan) acted as agenda setters for what Maidan should do. The Council of the Maidan People’s Union was one of the social movement’s key institutions that linked the protesters and the oppositional politicians, who represented them. The council was therefore extremely instrumental in bringing the crowd’s influence to bear at the negotiation table between the opposition and Yanukovych (apart from the more immediate and powerful but not very sophisticated tools such as shouting, booing, etc.). Out of the council’s forty-six members, nine can be defined as primarily journalists or writers (under one-fifth, which is still positively disproportionate given the percentage of journalists and writers among the general population). However, at least twenty of the members, almost half, maintained an active media presence, blogged for the media (such as on Ukrayinska Pravda’s blogs, which I have analysed in the section on online discourses) and thus participated in producing the mediated narratives that in 2013–2014 focused virtually exclusively on Ukraine and Europe; it also pinpoints the degree of the mediatisation of politics, as media visibility went hand in hand with activism for almost half of these Euromaidan leaders and was likely among the factors that led to them being council members: a notable intervention of the media in politics.
Not all journalists felt empowered in the same way. As Alina said, “Journalists had very little direct influence on [events in] Maidan. But it is fair to say that journalists’ work led up to Maidan because journalists had informed the people about what the government was doing. The government gave us a lot of material”.
Figure 45. Discourses in the interviews with Ukrainian journalists and policymakers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JOURNALISTS</th>
<th>POLICYMAKERS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quantitative changes (more work, austerity and optimisation)</td>
<td>Distance to the public reduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualitative changes (new focus, need for new comments, permanent moving, Ukraine-centrism, more censorship, less censorship, exhaustion, no privacy)</td>
<td>Merger with Ukrainian civil society</td>
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<tr>
<td>Violence against journalists and increased professional solidarity</td>
<td>Merger with Ukrainian civil society</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUROMAIDAN IMPACT</td>
<td>Division within the diplomatic community</td>
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<td></td>
<td>MFA bureaucrats have not changed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Relation with political actors: distant vs close (accessibility, interaction, fear of media)</td>
<td>Dependence on President’s Office as foreign policy hub</td>
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<td>The public’s improved attitude (help from volunteers, idealisation, calls for help)</td>
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<td>The public’s deteriorating attitude (lower trust, journalist corruption, censorship)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conditionality of activism (separation from work, greater good)</td>
<td>Poor information gathering</td>
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<td>Denial and condemnation of the merger of activism and journalism</td>
<td>Poor knowledge of languages</td>
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<td>Controversial perspective on freedom (both decreasing and increasing)</td>
<td>Active media monitoring</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conformism vs activism</td>
<td>Conditionality of activism (exceptional circumstances)</td>
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<td>Solving problems through publicity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lobbying</td>
<td>Experts as agents of change and power</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEDIA POWER</td>
<td>Press mediates public opinion’s</td>
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</tbody>
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Davyd was one of those journalists on the Council of Maidan People’s Union as well as one of the most recognisable personalities with an overwhelming media presence (several articles daily with dozens and hundreds of shares among tens of thousands of his followers). This is how Davyd construes the limitations and opportunities that the journalists were presented with during Euromaidan:

There were two groups of journalists, the first covered the events and the second participated in them. [I was] a member of the Council of Maidan…an activist…I would not exaggerate their impact on decision-making. We could influence conceptually. For example, I had proposed the very idea of creating Maidan People’s Union and the Council of Maidan. It was my own idea taken up by the politicians. […] All the real decisions were related, first of all, to the defensive capacity and, secondly, to the negotiating capacity. So, the core of the decisions remained in the politicians’ hands. In any case, I believe that all journalists and civic activists could play a supportive role in this situation. Because Maidan itself, unsympathetic to the leaders of the opposition, directed them as its own representatives. We could only take part in warming up public opinion. At a crucial moment, Yatsenyuk, Klitchko and Tyahnybok had to address the people anyway.

Of note here is perhaps the ambivalence between using first- and third-person plural pronouns to refer to the council; this possibly reflects an ambivalence between being a member of an activist association and being a journalist at the same time. When describing his typical pattern of interaction during the protest, Davyd also offers a unique example of the real and far-reaching capability of a popular and well-connected journalist to enter the political field and take the lead in the power relations influencing the politicians:

I cannot say that I was spending my day in Maidan, because actually I would spend most of my time in the Trade Unions Building. We had a headquarters there, as you know. And we did different work: meetings, discussions with politicians; I did not speak at press conferences because I am a reporter. There were some briefings for diplomats which we held as mem-
bers of the Council of Maidan; there were meetings [zasidannya] of the Council of Maidan. I mean, [this was] an ordinary day. On critical days, we were in the square, speaking from the stage, but not every day, obviously. […] There were a few more places that I may talk about in the future because they were the offices of the leading politicians, where we could meet not only opposition activists but also people who were, so to say, neutral and who could walk into the offices of the authorities while simultaneously communicating with the opposition. It was a circle of people where Petro Poroshenko could show up; people who had left the Party of Regions such as Inna Bohoslovska. From the first days of Maidan, we had our own meetings there about our work to form the majority in order to vote back the parliamentary-presidential republic.

That was, as Davyd believes, one of the main reasons why he started receiving threats and thus had to flee to a neighbouring EU country. He was targeted for his attempt to project power through lobbying and trying to influence decision-makers. “I began to be considered one of the factors in the creation of this majority. And it was not quite a journalist activity, but it was important because I had firmly established the contacts which helped me [abroad] to influence the sanctions lists, which also changed the situation very dramatically”; this is evidence that it was possible for journalists to influence foreign policy even beyond their country.

In another quote on the international dimension of media power, Davyd explains the following:

Among the people I knew in Moscow, I had some sources of information who suddenly found themselves in the centre of Russian special operations. Some of them decided to maintain contact with me. This contact has also continued when the war broke out because there are always people, in any set-up [aparat], who believe that a hotline should be maintained at least to understand for themselves what is going on.

In the Ukrainian journalist Sonya Koshkina’s account (2015) of Euro-maidan, her colleagues, however, had little room within which to operate. This resourceful book collected unique and invaluable evidence from the prominent people on all sides who participated in the events, including top government figures. But the author’s political connections are also a weakness of this account in that they make it biased towards politicians. Romanticising the politics, Koshkina is fascinated by “the role of the individual in history”. Still, her politician-centric account raises several important points.
1. Euromaidan was initially fragmentary and organised around multiple “preaching sectors”, each led by one of the many political camps represented. The key role in unifying and directing the protest was played by the central stage and sound system, social media and oppositional streams and news websites. This was one of the journalists’ roles: strengthening the protest.

2. On 20–22 February 2014, activist journalists also took an active part in the decision-making as members of the Maidan Civic Council, a very important powerful body.

3. Journalists sometimes acted as the protest’s “cannon fodder”, such as when Tetyana Chornovil bound herself with metal wires to police cars, thus immobilising them (any movement would have cut her body in half), or when she was kidnapped and severely beaten up, which created a media scandal that once again galvanised the protest. Others simply fought on the barricades as “regular” protesters.

Taking these into account, it is important to shift the understanding of Euromaidan and similar protest movements beyond the narratives of either complete decentralisation or total manipulation. Rather, it was a complex dynamic of centralisation and decentralisation, and a division of labour between the vertical structures and the decentralised collaboration. This compromise formation proved to be one of the keys to the movement’s resilience and eventual success but also a source of certain limitations, such as its eventual co-optation by the vertical structures.

My own interviews point to the existence of a few intermediary positions between the two extreme poles of an activist journalist and a conformist journalist (such as an activist conformist or a conformist activist). One notable example is Kurchenko’s holding, where a lot of oppositional and activist journalists worked in the media outlets controlled by “the Family”. According to Borys, a 35-year-old TV journalist and a contributor to Korrespondent:

There is a difference between journalists who have strong opinions and those who don’t. In the latter case, they just do whatever they can to satisfy the owner. In the independent media, all journalists have their opinions and they are present in the texts. It’s stupid to pretend we didn’t hate Yanukovych, for a good reason, I mean.

At the same time, in Alina’s words:
We also tried to become engaged in more traditional activism. We spent one weekend [in Maidan] trying to find where we could help, in the kitchen or with the wounded. We quickly realised we were better at something else. But many folks [journalists] did that after work; some hurled Molotov cocktails at the police.

Eduard, a critic of Ukraine, also emphasises the distinction between mass-produced journalism and a “journalist’s journalism”:

There were big media; television channels that covered all of it. There the role of an individual journalist is not so big. It is rather a machine that works depending on how the manager and the directors [rukovodstvo] run it all. While more independent journalists, like, for example, people from Hromadske, have to be seen as standing out, or the journalists from some influential Western publications; it is a different group of journalists. […] They participated in creating the image of these events. Their influence was rather significant.

This has an interesting parallel in the work of Robertson (2013, p. 15), who suggested “many AJE [Al Jazeera English] reporters on the ground […] covered, and indeed participated in, the uprisings there, in Tunisia, and throughout the region” and “were participants as well as observers and reporters, with obvious consequences for their performance if the task is to provide ‘objective’ coverage”. Of course, partiality was clearly evident not only among oppositional journalists or the rank and file of the news industry. Eduard called attention to the fact that some journalists willingly cooperated with the government.

When on the eve of Maidan, the opposition was, as we remember, rather influential in the country as were the authorities in the shape of the Party of Regions, there was a whole range of journalists who directly worked with the Party of Regions, advancing their agenda. The same with the opposition. Generally, the closer in time we get to Maidan, the stronger the sense of this involvement by journalists in a political game.

While Eduard sees deriving journalist legitimacy from professional norms as a detrimental development, Aleksandra, a journalist from the Segodnia newspaper, proceeds directly from practice and is rather positive about being politically involved. She thinks that journalism in Ukraine has become a social lift that recruits new and capable people into politics in a situation where the only ones who progress formally through the party
ranks are the leaders’ relatives and associates. Activism is a fairly normal activity for a journalist, Aleksandra believes, and it is possible to combine what she sees as neutral and balanced writing with an activist position manifested in the choice of the issue to cover as well as in a physical presence and action at the protest site. A journalist’s activism thus becomes pretty much a function of the body and acquires a corporeal dimension.

Aleksandra’s words are echoed by her significantly younger colleague Oksana from *Hromadske*:

In Ukraine, social lifts never really worked. It was not possible for someone to earn some public social capital without money. If you look at all the activists who became politicians, they all used to be journalists and write somewhere. Although not everyone was a journalist, except for Mustafa [Nayyem] and [Serhiy] Leshchenko. Some of them were public people who wrote. But it was easier to call yourself a journalist. We had no normal lawyers or judges. Just how could Ukraine have normal lawyers? The circle of human rights activists was also a little weird, as well as the business community. In fact, it strangely happened that the mediasphere was for some reason more pluralistic, there was more space to earn some political capital than elsewhere. In reality, if you wanted to accomplish something – dunno, like become an anti-nicotine activist – you [had to become], however, a journalist. It was a strange sphere where you could be active and become known because you had access to the media, to the public, which eventually worked out. These people simply no longer felt they could exert an influence this way or felt there are others too. They probably felt like, “I can’t make any difference any longer”.

Some were sceptical about journalists making a bid to get into government. Davyd, a key Maidan figure, believed that “those who had swapped journalism for politics and continue to pretend they keep doing journalism are doing an even greater disservice to this profession”, apparently hinting at Mustafa Nayyem and Serhiy Leshchenko. He went on to talk about negotiating a special space for journalists who may influence politicians but not the key unofficial actors:

From the Westerner’s perspective, we may be seen as influential people. We write texts; we influence public opinion; we may enter the president’s office on the same standing as ministers and MPs. They can even be sitting in the waiting room while we speak to him. But, in reality, these ministers and MPs may be in Poroshenko’s office today and in Akhmetov’s office tomorrow, and this is what their influence rests on. We are not allowed into this second parlour, so we have no real influence. […] Look, why have people like Mus-
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tafa Nayyem or Serhiy Leshchenko swapped journalism for parliament? Because being an MP allows you this “let’s-go-and-have-a-coffee” attitude, a contact with oligarchs. No matter how influential you are as a journalist in this country, you cannot see those people. It is possible to meet Poroshenko, Yatsenyuk, Turchynov, Groysman. It is not difficult for me. Moreover, I have even turned down invitations to meet ministers in group meetings because it does not interest me; we can meet one to one if they really want to. But I cannot, or maybe I could if I asked, meet the people who are the real manipulators of the political process.

The final sentence in this quote (“maybe I could if I asked”) highlights the actual unspoken boundary of journalist authority in Ukraine, namely that of contact with oligarchs. While there is nothing “unjournalistic” in interacting with politicians and high-ranking dignitaries, asking to meet with oligarchs does not feel quite right for Davyd because the political field itself is perceived as distorted, with journalists, ministers and even the president on almost the same standing as public figures, whereas the responsibility for the “actual” politics rests with the private dealings that go on behind closed doors between a few politically interested tycoons (“the real manipulators of the political process”).

Media activism has mostly taken place in the online media, with limited financial, yet notable human, resources. For such activist journalists, it was all about taking sides: streaming, documenting, informing and mobilising. Borys was very outspoken about being an activist journalist:

When I covered illegal construction work in Kyiv, I was there not to get a good story, but to actually prevent the destruction of a historical building in the city I love. I think many other journalists saw their work as killing two birds with one stone: you do something useful for society and you work and get paid.

But not all of those who sought political action agree with describing themselves as activists. Davyd who participated in Maidan’s steering group describes his involvement as that of a concerned citizen rather than that of an activist: “I have never in my life seen myself as an activist. Let’s put it this way, I have never planned to participate in any protest movement”. Having written extensively on the benefits of European integration for Ukraine, he felt it would have amounted to a betrayal if he had not spoken in defence of the people who took to the streets for it and were severely beaten. This, he believes, distinguishes him from those who, like Mustafa Nayyem, initiated
the protest as primarily activists and used it later to change their role to that of politicians, while he himself joined Euromaidan when civic action was needed, but he refused to become a parliamentarian or a government figure.

All in all, these examples point to the special position of the media and journalists as an active player in the political field with the capacity to have a notable influence that grew during and thanks to Euromaidan (which, in turn, managed to gain momentum due to the media and activist journalists’ empowered position). Once again, the political field is perceived as open to influences from neighbouring fields, most notably oligarchs and civil society, where journalists function as the key voices and influencers on behalf of Ukrainian society, although they of course have their own interests as a group. Politics is chiefly contested by these two influential groups, and journalists often try to act as counterweights to the oligarchs’ influence and certainly like to cast themselves as such.

Some journalists tried to firmly establish their status by making direct references to professional values, combined with their pessimist outlook on the situation, where doing journalism is politics by another name. Others, however, have simply bypassed the issue of values in an effort to negotiate such a position for themselves that would justify their social action in the political field without losing their abstract professional legitimation. Most of them constructed a professional identity as a mask or a hat that could be put on and off at will, bearing the face of an activist, a “citizen” or an influencer and thus oscillating between professional autonomy and immersion in politics. The only factor that governed the use and disuse of this mask seemed to be the journalist’s own will to direct social action and, by doing so, the will to power. This will and this double identity of the journalists peaked following the climax of the crisis.

Another of the most common tools involved constructing a safe position for themselves: a typical response was that the respondent did not consider themselves an activist but knew plenty of colleagues who did volunteer; that their newsroom had never practised censorship, but they knew of many examples from other newsrooms, etc. The journalists perceived the activist role as detrimental to their status, pointing out the fact that their authority comes from the media field, and it is perceived as being separate from the political field. At the same time, the universal pattern of admitting the politically interventionist activism of Ukrainian journalists in an impersonal form (“not me but everybody else”) once again indicates a will to power among more independent journalists in terms closer to the political rather than the journalistic field.
Similarly, one of the most interesting findings is how the respondents negotiate with themselves justifications for their own standing with regard to the current events, for example such a position that would allow them to carry out activist work without being considered outside the profession. It highlights the finding that while journalistic professional standards are real and deeply internalised, they are always used ad hoc and never taken as unconditional. The act of leaving the journalistic field will most often be justified for the following reasons: civic obligations, a threat to society, the downplayed nature of the action taken, and so on.

This will to power – perhaps not completely legitimate in the journalists’ own perception as it ubiquitously needs to be retouched or justified – can be seen as a typical bourgeois, middle-class group’s attempt to establish a regime of domination favourable for it. However, Ukrainian journalists are mostly from the lower-middle classes: there is not much of a gap between them and the lower classes, and their legitimacy in this struggle draws from the low legitimacy of the rival ruling groups (oligarchs and officials broadly perceived as “corrupt”). The journalists’ professional activity, such as investigative work and muckraking, serves to erode that legitimacy further. At the forefront of this struggle, when this legitimacy is finally destroyed like it was after Euromaidan, its key destroyers suddenly become one of the few groups pushed into the evacuated position thanks to their legitimacy, which had grown precisely because of their role in destroying the old elite’s legitimacy. As they tried to hold the crown that fell into their hands and keep the position in the political field they had entered, the journalism field became somewhat weakened by the blurring boundaries, and its legitimacy started to decline (for example in the Leshchenko apartment scandal). Moreover, the journalistic field, where many actors are driven in part by this will to power, has already become dysfunctional, for its tasks are more similar to those in the political field proper. Thus, Ukrainian society is left with only partially functioning political as well as journalistic fields, while a new hybridised space appears where the two overlap, where politics becomes the equivalent of publicity and media presence (especially evident in the Ukrainian culture of political talk shows), and publicity and media presence are seen as an entry ticket to politics.

There is a well-known picture of two self-defence activists, armed with shields and clubs, guarding the entrance to the Ukrainian parliament. This picture encapsulates what I argue was the tendency of the power dynamic during these few days: the power effectively resided in Euromaidan in two key aspects: the monopoly of violence symbolised by the protesters con-
trolling the physical space and the entrance to a key site of power, and the power of surveillance symbolised by the photographer taking the picture of them and translating it to the world in a show of power. The third aspect was that of decision-making, and it was the weakest faculty as also demonstrated by the surrender of power to the traditional institutions (primarily the parliament). At the critical moment when power collapsed following the deadly clashes of 18–20 February 2014, the media were among those institutions that remained stable and continued functioning without interruption, thus helping mitigate the disruption of the public space. They prevented its disintegration and ensured the continuity of the social fabric, solidifying it while the shattered political sphere took time to regenerate. In the hours between Yanukovych’s escape and the emergency sessions of the parliament, the capital was essentially controlled by self-defence units/groups of concerned citizens patrolling the streets, and the journalists who followed them sometimes, along with other activists and rather unpopular opposition leaders, told them where to go.

As is already known (see Monroy-Hernández et al., 2015) people in conflict areas begin to rely on social media in lieu of damaged state and media apparatuses. In Ukraine, however, the activist self-positioning of journalists put the media apparatus in a similar situation. It is tempting to conclude that in a revolutionary situation, when traditional power collapses and can no longer fulfil its functions, society still cannot be left in a vacuum. In a modern society, especially one with a vague dividing line between politics/the public sphere, such a political vacuum can be filled by media and journalists (provided the levels of trust in them allow it), as it is a (sub)field of the political field (in Bourdieu’s language) or a part of the power apparatus (in Foucault’s terminology). This is particularly relevant in situations where social actions in the media and political fields have become strongly intertwined. Researchers noted the rise in initiatives such as StopFake, the Ukraine Crisis Media Center and Ukraine Today, suggesting that “the boundaries among (nation) branding, (public) diplomacy, soft power and journalism are increasingly blurred and actors are now moving freely among these spheres” (Bolin et al., 2015, p. 14). However, as journalists’ legitimacy in modern society is still seen as emanating from an autonomous professional identity based on standards, norms and values, this power function lacks that legitimacy in the political field, which is necessary for decision-making, thus allowing for the political power to regenerate. Journalism is then truly just king for a day, and it cannot help yielding the
crown in return for an improved position under the new regime, in a newly
reconstructed political field.

If in a normal situation, the media act in the service of social power (the
king). When the king’s head is chopped off, the closest servant assumes
control for a while until order is restored and a certain Fortinbras figure
claims the throne. This media “regency” was evident in Ukraine during the
revolutionary period, with its peak around the transition between the old
and the new government, when the Maidan self-defence units took over the
violence monopoly and the media and civil society/journalists took charge
of other power functions (20–21 February 2014). I was lucky to be there in
person and experience this situation in terms of physical space and personal
interaction.

Oksana from Hromadske has an interesting testimony that completes the
puzzle of the media’s influence in Ukraine. She basically apportions res-
ponsibility for breaking the backbone of the regime to the media: “Sikorski
[the then foreign minister of Poland] told me openly that they were
watching Hromadske’s streams from the streets when these killings started
on 18th [February]. So they packed up and got off [to Ukraine]. We were
really projecting influence then”.

It is interesting that Davyd, who was in Poland at the time, offers an
alternative explanation for the surprise visit of the three foreign ministers to
Kyiv, which played a role in sealing Yanukovych’s fate. Even more
interesting is that this version still credits the visit to a journalistic impact,
this time to the lobbying effort of one journalist rather than the stream of
media coverage:

When they started shooting people in Maidan, nobody in Poland under-
stood what was happening, from journalists to politicians to diplomats. I
had to literally persuade my colleagues and people in the higher echelons of
the Polish authorities that the destruction of Maidan was underway. Per-
suade using tantrums. Because the Poles worked all the time towards en-
suring the events were constructively negotiated. They acted in concert with
the Western countries. And I believe that these persuasions resulted in the
trip undertaken by Sikorski, Steinmeier and Fabius to Kyiv. I do not even
know what would have happened but for this trip. I am not trying to claim
all the credit myself, but I’m just saying that this information failure
regarding Maidan may have been fatal.

Regardless of what account is correct (or both – they are not mutually
exclusive), the key here is that journalists did not shun their direct inter-
vention in politics; they did not shy away from their self-perceived influence on politicians, even abroad, and they constructed themselves as figures of power. This is in sharp contrast with the Russian journalists, who insist on being neutral and on the impossibility of combining journalism and political intervention, and the Polish journalists, who rather tend to complain about their disempowered role.

Journalistic power in Ukraine came at a price: 270 journalists were beaten and 7 killed during 2014 (IMI). A total of sixty-three journalists were kidnapped by the Donetsk rebels (IMI), and throughout 2014, anti-Maidan forces specifically targeted journalists perceived as enemies responsible for orchestrating Maidan, which was implicitly a way of recognising their power. Journalists were (and still are) attacked for being the source of social power by those seeking to undermine this power and affirm their own. Severe measures were taken against journalists during the Crimea annexation and the current eastern unrest (no Ukrainian or local media were allowed into the rebel-held areas; local editorial teams were attacked; a number of journalists were kidnapped). Also, Oksana remains very critical of what happened afterwards: “Our Facebookocracy... In our country, likes became political capital. It directly impacts on your publicity. And it is a part of the populism; a dark side of all this fun [vsioho tsioho shchastya]”.

There are also two notable cases of high-profile murders: firstly, that of the Ukrainian commentator and pan-Russian nationalist Oles Buzyna (known for his anti-Europe opinion articles in Segodnya), shot dead in broad daylight in Kyiv, allegedly by radical Ukrainian nationalists, and secondly, that of Pavel Sheremet, a Belarus-born journalist with a high-profile career in his home country, Russia and lastly Ukraine who was blown up in his car in central Kyiv by an explosive device (planted allegedly by the Russian or Belarusian secret service because of his investigative work in those countries). This highlights that journalists are still being attacked because of their central position in society, similar to high-profile politicians in other countries.

The influence of journalists continued during the war. For example, a journalist named Kateryna Venzhyk recounted a story on her Facebook page about a chance meeting with a soldier on the Kyiv metro; this encounter begins with a typical exchange of war realities and the overall tragic situation. However, the conversation takes a different turn when the author’s professional identity is revealed:
When he learned I was a journalist, he began to ask me fervently [s zharom]: what’s up and how are things going, what are people saying, how many people were in Maidan on 21st [the first anniversary of Euromaidan], and “what the fuck they [the parliament] are thinking”. He was going to leave; I gave him my card and said, “Drop me a message if you need anything; I'll try to help”. (Venzhyk, 2014)

This once again highlights a micro-power situation in which a journalist is in an empowered position to help and is perceived by both the participants of the interaction as such. When the soldier learns of the interlocutor’s journalist background, this sparks an interest in interaction and prompts a more intensive contact, resulting in the reduction of social distance. While one may remain sceptical about the accuracy of this Facebook post in describing how the encounter actually played out (or even whether it did happen or is fictitious), it is yet another testimony to the (self-) construction of journalists in Ukraine as agents of power.
Eduard recalls:

When I was in Crimea [during the annexation], as soon as I posted on Facebook and other social media, I would attract huge interest. But it was such interest that... I mean, I was seen as some medium who had to express support for the Ukrainian troops, send them regards, give assistance, and so on. But all I did was write that they feel uncertain, abandoned and betrayed. People took this very literally and started writing, via me, hundreds of messages and so on. I mean, generally, I felt such pressure in the sense that I felt what the audience wanted [from me]. How it wants to have this reported. Any controversial things that cause criticism or show the Ukrainian side in a critical light were not exactly in high demand.
This informal censorship by the pressure exerted by Ukrainian society or the audience was, in some accounts, completed by a more traditional “information management”:

At the time when the military conflict had already become hot, there were of course many such cases. I encountered it personally because I had left the magazine by then and had got a job on television, so I saw how it worked. There were facts of direct... I mean, we hadn’t had it in the magazine, everything could be solved in a discussion this way or another. You do not come under direct pressure when you are told how to do it. On television, it was done openly. I mean, not to me personally, but I saw how the management worked with my colleagues. They were given some instructions openly.

With its lack of specific details, this testimony can of course be challenged, but it is difficult to doubt that the Ukrainian mainstream media (mostly television) adopted informational protectionism and refrained from criticizing the military or the government, thus practically committing self-censorship at the very least. Ukrainian society co-opted the newly discovered media power by channelling some of the latter’s influence into the more traditional fields of politics and activism while reintroducing censorship elements in the realm of conformist journalism.

**Journalists and diplomats: Ukraine’s weaknesses**

Foreign reporting is particularly susceptible to aligning with foreign policy, at least in terms of what is regarded as newsworthy, but social and cultural factors weigh in as Kristina Riegert (1998) showed. While this can be changing, the national pull is still strong, especially in the television coverage (Riegert, 2011). Foreign reporting is often plagued by what Jan Ekecrantz noted in petrification of journalist discourses, collective journalistic memory, resilient patterns of coverage and “methodological nationalism” (2004, pp. 62-63). The question, however, is whether this national pull is dictated by the state or by other actors. Simon Cottle (2008) has pointed out that mediatisation gives rise to media-oriented and spectacular protests driven by a need for visibility and media audience; on the other hand – as was clearly the case with Euromaidan – expectations of violence at protest events tend to drive the public away from further participation in these protests. Another trend in Cottle’s analysis that was discernible in the Euromaidan situation was the impact of geopolitics on reporting and signification of the protest as either “good” or “bad”. This also led to a
polarisation of segments of the public in the West. Anna Roosvall (2014) looked into how international media represented demonstrations in other countries. She found that reified identity constructions determined the coverage and made it focus on national differences. In an earlier work, Roosvall (2010, p. 230) found the foreign journalism rather devoid of agency and that “foreign news as a genre practices methodological nationalism”. The problem of the power dynamic in the media at a moment of crisis was tackled by Alexa Robertson (2013, p. 5), who focused on how “citizen witnesses and professional journalists literally spoke to the world from the streets of Tunis and Cairo” and “the importance of the image, affect, experiential accounts, and emotive testimonies”. According to her study, the crowdsourced material was used and the role of social media was addressed less often than expected.

At the foreign policy level, experts and diplomats admit that Maidan has changed little, especially in terms of the foreign policy staff, including those dealing with Ukraine’s European policy. The same people remained in the same positions, which is, in fact, not very surprising as they were the ones who prepared the Association Agreement. However, questions arise as to the MFA’s place in the power structure. One of the informants, Fedir, is a highly experienced 50-year-old diplomat and has previously held top positions in one of the MFA’s Directorates General in charge of European affairs, been an ambassador-at-large and an ambassador to a number of European and Middle Eastern countries. According to this former high-ranking diplomat

the MFA is an inferior department; it is the department to serve the president in terms of foreign policy. They do not make policy. They just do what they are told to do. No initiative on their part. And this becomes more and more so all the time; Euromaidan has even speeded this up because of the need to optimise the limited funds available to the state at the expense of, among others, the MFA.

Eva, a 26-year-old expert and analyst with a foreign policy NGO who has worked very closely with the MFA for several years, can simply confirm this: “What has not changed is in principle neither good nor bad; generally, it is just the way it used to be – the foreign policy is made in the presidential administration. The MFA has more informative functions”. But the change is still visible elsewhere.
If it was über-cool to engage some top official for an event before, it’s all totally accessible. They are easily approachable on Facebook because they use it, while not all the old guard were doing this. And then, some cooperation is underway with [Ukrainian] civil society. There is a group called “Ukraine – the World”, something that brings together the presidential administration, diplomats and civil society in a very broad way. So the cooperation now goes more “hand in hand”. And this is positive.

It is important to note that journalists reporting on foreign policy may see their own position as very weak because of Ukraine’s generally peripheral state, as Davyd certainly does:

There is no foreign news journalism as such. There is no demand for it. I can imagine how many themes are not covered because I have no outlet to which to offer an article on them. And if I did, nobody would read it. This is what matters. Because for the Ukrainian reader, it is crucial that there is a direct connection to Ukraine.

Eduard describes the media’s role in defining Ukraine’s foreign policy:

Journalists of course have an impact but once again on the issues that have much populist potential. Where the issue is based on specific vested and moneyed interests, it is more difficult for journalists to project their influence because when politicians are making a decision, they often choose specific vested interests, whereas if it is about some populist stuff, it is quite easy.

Euromaidan has also changed the dynamic of the interaction between the policymakers, civil society and the media. New NGO groups such as Maidan of Foreign Affairs, established by a group of former diplomats who found themselves among the opposition to both Yanukovych’s administration and the current president Petro Poroshenko, have lambasted Poroshenko’s team for its foreign policy since his early days in office. They are often called “the shadow MFA” and enjoy considerable authority among the public as an independent and alternative centre of foreign policy and an actor with the potential to influence the policies pursued by the state.

The diplomatic functionaries and the activist circles in many ways continued to bridge the gap and to even merge in some way. Moreover, the informational policy and, generally speaking, attitude to the media changed (and it makes sense to speak of a mediatisation of diplomacy in this context), as attested to by Hryhoriy, a 36-year-old the MFA’s official:
Our diplomatic discourse has gone public. And I think it was the Ukraine Crisis Media Center that did it. They offered a platform that was so powerful, [the idea] was kinda hiding in the open, but it wasn’t there before them. Now it turns out that they do not go to the diplomats, but the diplomats go to them. And, essentially, this is one of the most prestigious tribunes [maidanchyk] from which you can speak. Once again, many of its creators are now part of the government. For example, Vasyl Myroshnychenko, he's very influential; he is actively linked with Dmytro Kuleba. So, in some ways, it gets tricky to distinguish between the public and the diplomats in many cases. Who influences whom? As for the Ukraine Crisis Media Center, when battalion commanders, the president’s plenipotentiaries, diplomats, foreign guests all have the opportunity to speak, and they are all on this platform, it creates almost an obligation to come and talk.

The patterns of media use by the Ukrainian policymakers reveal their reliance on trusted personal ties. There clearly exists a heavy user of internal dispatches, who is reliant on internal dispatches, supplemented by private communication and the news media. Another politician profile is the heavy media user who gives prominence to the news media and private communication.

Fedir, a very experienced diplomat, explained the internal work of the MFA information departments:

I can speak from my own experience that the media are rather closely monitored [pryskiplyvo], archived and very clearly put into different compartments [chitko], and it was like this for many years under Yanukovych and probably under Yushchenko. The next question is how often do the highest dignitaries use it to draw conclusions. There is a lot of filtering into “our” and “not our” journalists, experts; there is an understanding of who does what. Even if you have got some traction with a tiny article, you have surely been noted and shelved somewhere. As for influencing the work, it must be a massive lobbying campaign. I mean, one article won’t change the direction.

This shows a complicated picture where the mutual influences are entangled and a lot of interpersonal dynamic is taking place. Clearly, much of the interaction between diplomats, on the one hand, and Ukrainian civil society as well as journalists, on the other hand, is happening outside the media. As a recent example from Ukraine, Eva cites the Nestor Group, comprising several prominent intellectuals. It was founded in 2012 by about two dozen experts from various branches of the social sciences and
humanities and was named after the newborn son of one of the participants, a living embodiment of the nation’s future, which the participants wanted to put on what they saw as the most optimal path.

We have this Nestor Group now: Yevhen Hlibovytsky, Oleksandr Sushko [and others]. This can be an example. But it is a bohemian one, you know. I mean, they gathered in the Arsenal [art gallery]; they presented this paper, a really good one, a vision that has no specific recommendations. And I am not judging them; I’ve got no recommendations either. But things are moving. By the way, it was telling that [Yaroslav] Hrytsak [a leading historian] was a member of the board to elect the head of the Antimonopoly Committee. This is very significant to me.

Davyd notes that in Ukraine “everyone has their own image of Europe. And the main image is of such a Europe as Germany, Switzerland, Sweden – this is the image of Northern Europe, not even Western. While simply looking at who our neighbours in Europe are”.

We will see they are Orban’s authoritarian regime, Kaczyński’s regime is gravitating towards authoritarianism, and Fico’s authoritarian regime. And, surprisingly, the Romanian democracy, corrupted and also gravitating towards authoritarianism from time to time. Who said that Ukraine in the midst of such a region has to be Germany or Switzerland? Just how is that going to happen? How come? I would like to build a Ukraine that would be like Poland or Romania. I am trying to create a real image of an East European perspective that has never been liked here. Like, Romania is a poor country that is modernising. Ukraine is a poor country that may modernise. It may take thirty years to build the classical democracy here, or eternity. The Romanian way is not our worst choice.

This should be seen in the context of the comparison between media and official narratives that evidences an active recontextualisation of discourses on Europe from the mediasphere to policymaking, which has been especially active since Euromaidan. The social movement’s discourse and the media texts that created it (such as Yevhen Sverstyuk’s article from October 2013, analysed above), specifically the discourse of a “Europe of values”, were recontextualised as the official foreign policy discourse, embedded in the new environment of discourses of reform, geopolitics and identity. Especially striking was the reversal implied here, given that it was the conformist media which prior to Euromaidan recontextualised a pragmatist governmental discourse on Europe. Together with the restructuring
of formal, informal and even personal relations between experts, bloggers, public figures, journalists and policymakers, this produces a picture of a profound discursive shift in Ukrainian society.

Journalists and diplomats: The Polish compromise

Poland’s relation to Europe as well as its interaction dynamic between the media and the diplomats have many similarities with Ukraine, but these are nevertheless similarities with a twist. As was clear from the previous analysis of the publications as well as from the interviews, Ukraine mainly regarded Europe as a normative example and a source of values. The ambiguous identification is widespread; on the one hand, “sure, we are Europe”, but at the same time, a clear demarcation exists between the political Europe and “ourselves”. Foreign policy is appropriated by the domestic agenda but also very often takes it over. In Poland, Europe already was a normative “political task” in the 1990s.

Today, however, breaking with traditional clientelism and seeking agency are more of an issue. Experts talk of a “schizophrenic attitude”: “we are by default part of Europe, and yet when it is discussed, we call it ‘they’”, in the words of Maciej, a mid-level MFA official.

This is also true for the analysis of the official Polish foreign policy (“Priorities”), where Europe is never mentioned in the context of a “we”. According to Maciej, public opinion and foreign policy have to balance between security and identity: whereas identity demands the type of actions that may be dangerous, security dictates an adaptation to the environment.

If we compare how the policymakers in these two countries use the media, many similarities and a few key differences emerge. Just like Ukraine, Poland has a heavy media user who mostly consumes news media and keeps internal dispatches to only the self-estimated 25%–30% of their informational diet; but this type is rivaled by a heavy user of expert information who consumes, in addition to the news media, lots of think tank reports and expert analysis. Private communication is notable in all cases. All of them use newspaper websites rather than paper versions as their information sources. Notably, little attention is paid to television, whose influence may still be mediated by public opinion.
Figure 46. Discourses in the interviews with Polish journalists and diplomats

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<th>POLICYMAKERS</th>
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<td>Europe as an abstract value system</td>
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<td>Europe stretches geographically from the Atlantic to the Urals</td>
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<td>Huge interest in and sympathy towards Euromaidan</td>
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<td>Significant influence of the media</td>
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Jacek, a rather high-ranking Polish diplomat who shifted the focus of his work from the West European states to Ukraine during the crisis, reveals a common perception among the diplomats that the media’s influence is quite general and mediated by society:
It seems to me that eventually, as in any state, the news media are an important factor. Through them the people learn about what is happening and what is not happening in the world, in their country. This is the interface that binds every citizen with their community. And that works in the short term, but in the longer – the school, the family matter; still, it depends on the background.

The media situation in Poland is characterised by a broad, historically rooted consensus among the power elites, the media and public opinion on Ukraine. As Łukasz, a political expert advising at one time the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, explained:

This whole thing reversed the process of Poland becoming a “post-security country” like Germany. We perceive this current situation as a huge security threat, and the consensus is so overwhelming that the minority who think Poland shouldn’t be too hard on Russia so as not to spoil relations with Germany choose to refrain from voicing it.

Positive changes in the Polish perception of Ukrainians took place during Euromaidan and the subsequent conflict with Russia. Ukraine, according to one of the respondents, became for Poles “no longer part of ‘the East’; us rather than them”. Support for EU membership soared to 90 per cent and is very evident in the media, which perform a strong “internalisation of Europe”. A recurrent estimate is that, for better or worse, television is what most decisively forms public opinion in Poland and that foreign policy is quite influenced by public opinion, “perhaps more so than in the West”.

Europe also intervenes in Polish domestic affairs through its foreign policy. Łukasz gave an interesting example:

Kaczyński lost the election in 2007 in particular because he was considered inappropriate by Western Europe, and thanks to him Poland was turning, as people thought, into the laughing stock of Europe. The same as today [2014], people prefer PO, Tusk and Sikorski as the ones who would fit Europe’s general approach.

Given that the preference has apparently changed in favour of more conservative politicians and the PO is no longer popular among the voters, Europe may have lost some of its commanding appeal in favour of a narrower, nationally oriented set of values.
How the Polish foreign policymakers use the media is quite different from the Ukrainian experience thanks to the wider adoption of technologies. Jacek was one example:

I choose different sources on each level. If I am to speak about my professional work, most of my day is spent on the Internet. Most of all, it is Twitter, and also Facebook. I also use Google News, and what it shows, together with Twitter, produces some picture. On both Twitter and Google News, I follow the major Polish media, the major Ukrainian media, some Russian, American, French media, some political commentators. Apart from that, I try to watch some Polish TV newscast at night. Not because I am very interested, but because it shows what average people think and know.

As for Polish journalism’s more immediate impact on its country’s foreign policy, Łukasz shared his perspective:

There is a very clear connection between Poland’s foreign policy and the discourse in the media. The major media support Poland’s official line. […] It is extremely hard to tell who influences whom, whether the media are influencing our diplomats or the diplomats are influencing the media. I think both ideas are wrong. Orwell spoke of doublethink. What is singlethink then? Taking into account some shared historical experience, a common mentality, culture, our elites or part of them develop this singlethink that leads to certain outcomes: that Poland decided to support the Iraq intervention politically and militarily as actively as possible; it was sharply opposed to the Russian aggression towards Ukraine. And, of course, the main media do not receive the themes list from the MFA, nor does Adam Michnik come to the MFA and say, like, “Today you will be saying that and that”, for example that Ukraine needs to be saved. No, this is rather a co-dependence. And obviously, this co-dependence does not involve everybody. There are oppositional forces that sporadically go against this policy. Also, some non-streaming media do not support it.

Łukasz went as far as to even suggest that the Polish media practices self-censorship, thus supporting the unwritten agreement between the political and the media elites:

For example, during the Iraq War, some of my older colleagues, say, one well-known international political scientist who is now an advisor to the president of Poland on international issues, another is an international lawyer well-known as well, so both of them were highly critical of the Iraq intervention in 2003. When they started to speak about it in the media – this
is almost a joke! – they were literally thrown out. Because they were invited to tell [Polish] society why something is needed and how it should be done, but then they started voicing their own doubts. And this also shows how difficult it is to go at this media level against this politics/media movement, the mainstream.

Łukasz recognises, at the same time, that the government still feels some pressure from the public or society as such (public opinion) and especially the active minority, and it is held accountable to some extent at least, even though foreign policy is far from the people’s top priority. In a nutshell, taken together with his previous statement, the situation looks like one where the media serve as a contested field or interface between the power that governs and the power that seeks to influence the government:

Generally, people have no interest in foreign policy, and if you had asked them some two years ago what should be the priority of the government policies, these people – Poles, Ukrainians, Swedes, Russians – they would have answered “the economy, employment, internal security, schools”, etc. Foreign policy is somewhere at the bottom of the list. So, I think, in general, the Polish government has scope (and not just in Poland, everywhere). So, there are things that turn out to be important for a section of Polish society, and the Polish government must treat it respectfully and take it into account.

Polish journalists have a disconcerted perspective. Miron, a 35-year-old foreign desk reporter from Gazeta Wyborcza, thinks there is a strong polarisation in how the public perceives journalists; therefore, their influence has been weakened and practically halved by this polarisation.

It is precisely like in the political field: you have traitors and you have heroes. There is no middle ground, and in the press, it is the same: people favour journalists with similar views to their own while rejecting those who voiced different opinions. And this changes for the worse. Since PiS has come to power, they have vulgarised the language completely, the language of the relations between politicians and journalists. They do not answer phone calls; they do not want to talk; they are arrogant. They say that journalists will still write what they believe, so what is the point of talking to them if you cannot change their views? Pointless. So they do not talk.

When confronted with a question about how much of an influence he perceives his own work as having, Miron answered:
I feel it does and it is significant, but it is diminishing. You can write a thousand articles about how the refugees are normal, middle-class people fleeing chaos at home and desiring the same things that we desire, and then you read the comments under your article, where they start over and over with the same primitive arguments. I often lose heart as a result of it.

It is important to bear in mind that the situation in Poland has not remained the same in recent years. A striking difference is found between the way informants spoke before and after the conservative PiS came to power in 2015. Social polarisation is increasing, and the media (primarily, the public and state-controlled) have found themselves under increasing pressure from the government, which is trying to manage the mediasphere in what may resemble the Russian experience. A recurrent pattern in the interviews with the Polish journalists is the marginalisation of Polish journalism, a perceived lack of influence on both (currently conservative) elites and the broad population (non-reading and ignorant at best, conservative and hostile at worst). In the words of Tomek from Polityka, “journalists have turned into public enemies in Poland after the 2015 election; it was better before that, I think. But now, the powerful figures in the government allow themselves to differentiate between ‘the Polish’ [i.e. ‘truly Polish’] and ‘the Polish-language’ media [i.e. only published in Polish], calling the pro-government media the former and the liberal and left-wing publications the latter”. As Tomek perceives it, the number of letters to the newsroom has decreased, which he believes indicates a lack of interest and a disengagement from the audiences.

While Miron defines Europe primarily as geographically stretching all the way to the Urals, Tomek immediately says that it cannot be seen spatially but instead should be talked about as a system of values: countries can become European and then un-European again – this happened to Turkey, he said. He was also the one to clearly express that Europe must not be identified with the EU.

Looking at the recontextualisation of Polish discourses, the dynamic of 2013–2014 led to complex recontextualisations of certain, mostly identity-related, discourses on Europe from the mediasphere, which were then used for official political purposes. When the government later changed, the recontextualisation continued, only switching to the discourses borrowed from Eurosceptical sources and embedded in a more negative environment.
Journalists and diplomats: Russian harmonies

One of the notable findings of the Russian substudy is the significant polarisation of Russian journalists. On the one hand, there is a strong sense of disappointment about the media situation, and on the other hand, journalists from Novaya complained about the narrowing scope for what is possible in media work as well as about the spread of conformism and uniform discourses, while more pro-Kremlin journalists lamented precisely the spread of conflicting discourses and a lack of willingness to support the state in a difficult international situation.

One of the Russian journalists, Natalya, complained of the same “singlethink”, implying that many journalists and publicists voluntarily cooperate with the government, serving as a willing channel of influence.

It is interesting to note how Ukraine, with its clashes between the elite and the public, differs from both Poland and Russia, where social and political compromise and uniformity define the political landscape. Others tend to see the biggest problem being the commercialisation of the media system rather than state intervention. One of my informants, Anastasiya, a younger-generation foreign desk reporter who has worked for Izvestiya, drew the interviewer’s attention to this situation:

What most influences the work of journalists in Russia is having to think about the rating, the citation index, and how to attract the reader. Because there are some topics, extremely interesting and needed, but they are more niche-oriented, while you have to understand that you are working for a broad audience and somehow choose stories that are simple yet potentially more interesting to a much larger audience.

At the same time, informants strive to construct their position as capable of influence and positive change; however, the examples they produce only concern stories of ordinary people at the bottom of the ladder. “For example, retired women were tricked out of their ownership of their apartments. We revealed a con scheme, and this really had an impact on the court’s decision to return the apartments and money to their owners”. Of course, this is a parallel to Ukraine’s journalist authority and power function; at the same time, rather than taking over the functions of the authorities, journalists in cases like these simply exert pressure on the judiciary.
Despite these known situations of taking an advocacy stance, all Russian journalists are strikingly different from their Ukrainian colleagues in that they do not construct elaborate justifications that would enable a journalist to take part in activism. For the interviewed Russian journalists, the line between activism and profession is rigid and not to be crossed.

This line lies where activism begins to encroach upon the journalist’s objective position. There it is. [In our newsroom] the journalists are very professional and have worked in journalism all their lives. So I cannot say
anyone has attended rallies, barricades or something like this – only for the purpose of covering it. This is acceptable for them as for a citizen, and generally everyone has their own stance. But if it is about their work, then in any case the rules of respectable journalism suggest giving a fact and two opinions about it – pro and contra.

In this elaboration, Izvestiya’s Anastasiya constructed activism as linked to actual street protests (barricades and rallies), on the one hand, and to suppressing the alternative opinion, on the other hand, which precludes bypassing this self-imposed limit. The only exclusion this logic allows is “creative work, in the sense of analysis, writing academic works, becoming a media character, whatever comes from their public status and the status of a writing person. It seems that professional identity and the status of journalists in Russia are discursively legitimised by reference to strictly delineated professional standards, for all of the respondents invoked the definition of the profession, audiences’ expectations and the potential loss of professional capacity. “If you begin taking sides, you no longer can be called a journalist; you are a propagandist or a salesman then”, as one participant colourfully characterised it.

At the same time, there may be a more complex negotiation at work. When asked about what could absolve journalists from professional duties, the informants chose a rather long list of factors.

Rostislav, a journalist for an independent Russian publication, confided that he thought that a journalist may be “a referee, an arbiter, an inspector” but not a politician or activist; he said that journalists may take off their professional hat only to help a dying person. However, when questioned further, he admitted that a journalist can be a human rights activist and that the Russian population typically sees a journalist as “someone who can help them out in a difficult situation”.

Anton, a middle-aged and well-experienced journalist who has worked for a number of media outlets, was particularly adamant about it.

I am not sure I would actually do this, and I have not been in any situation like this. But there are issues where it is very difficult to maintain your impartiality, and maybe not even necessary. For example, take a terror attack. Do I need that sound bite from the other [opposing] side? Professionally – yes, and it would sell too. But I can imagine other consequences stemming from it. There are matters where everything changes: security, the preservation of the state or human lives, something along these lines.
Interestingly, some informants complained about the lack of strong professional identification among Russian journalists as well as weak mutual support and cooperation; some emphasised this as the key problem rather than censorship or other forms of the direct and indirect influence of journalists’ work in Russia. For instance, Denis, Kommersant’s middle-aged international desk observer, noted: “Solidarity, well, I think it does exist just as in other professional environments. How is it manifested? In mutual support, in that we may share topics, help each other, communicate with each other respectfully and do not steal some interesting topics, our ‘daily bread’”. Practically the only specific manifestation of solidarity here is sharing topics and “not stealing”, respecting each other’s professional territory. Rostislav opined that professional solidarity in Russia manifests itself as a human or informal friendly solidarity (cf. the spectrum of possible interactions in the Ukrainian journalist community under the current challenges).

Another interesting parallel is the refusal of respondents to discuss potential security risks for journalists; as one informant literally said, “The most horrible cases of journalist persecution in Russia are happening in Ukraine”.

I mean, these deaths there are in their dozens now, no investigation, no trials. This is the saddest thing. [...] On the whole, it seems to me there is no distinct horror, no violence against journalists in Russia. Like, I have worked in Germany, and I could not see any major difference. Some individual cases always happen. But this is the journalists’ fault because they often use dishonest methods to gather information.

When asked to summarise their attitude towards Europe, the Russian journalists showed considerable ambivalence. Some see Russia as part of Europe, while others do not or are unsure; likewise, their estimates of Europe’s place in the world varied widely, although none expressed negativity. But the perspectives could be specific such as Yevgeny, a young journalist from an oppositional newspaper who linked a positive view of Europe with Christian values:

There is an understanding by a well-known author that [Europe] is an area from Lisbon to Vladivostok. Well, I think that geographically it is about that. And on top of that, this is a continent; these are European values, so to speak. So, I think it concerns the fact that Europe is actually about Christian values above all.
The definition of Europe as spanning all the way to the Far East (basically, Identical with Eurasia), appears in the responses recurrently and rhymes with the official Russian policy narrative as well as with the Eurasianist discourses (cf. Chapter 5). It is curious and significant that all the interviewees, both the journalists and the diplomats, denied that there were any contacts between them other than very public and formal ones (such as at a presser or in an interview situation). I interpret it twofold: first, the contacts may indeed be very weak, but secondly, the interaction between Russian journalists and policymakers is primarily seen as something that can only be negative, and thus people tend to deny its existence.

Rostislav, however, noted a telling situation regarding the Euromaidan coverage:

Overall, the first months of Euromaidan illustrate very well the relationship between our media and our authorities, because before the directive [raznarydaka] came, everyone was writing whatever they wanted. When it all started, I was at a NATO foreign ministers’ meeting, and I remember that everyone was writing whatever they wanted; we had good chats with Ukrainian journalists, with Georgian journalists; we sat at the same table, etc. And then the bans were introduced, towards the spring. As you know, they closed Lenta.ru in March, I think…they tried to pressure the managers…and so since then I started feeling that something is not right [perekos]. That the topics that are favoured by our authorities…the point of view that is favoured by our authorities…the point of view that is favoured by our authorities; they dominate in the newspaper.

In any case, foreign policy is constructed as an exclusive prerogative of the president whereby diplomats are merely experts, communicators and executive officers; in this sense, they are not policy “makers”. In this, there is a strong parallel to the Ukrainian system, where the president is practically seen as running the MFA single-handedly. The only difference is that in Russia it is formalised, whereas in Ukraine such dominance is quite informal. One retired diplomat, Vladimir, who until a few years ago was an ambassador to a Central European country, explained:

So, if you know the Constitution of the Russian Federation, making foreign policy decisions is the prerogative of the head of state. The relationship is co-dependent here. Very often the MFA prepares material for the president on all sorts of foreign policy events, like a visit or any kind of negotiations.

Simultaneously, Vladimir made a comparison with European diplomats, who, according to him, have even less autonomy: “As far as I know, Euro-
pean diplomats, they are even tougher [zhestche] and, I would say, more constrained within the limits of what is dictated to them by their superiors”. He also then went on to criticise their use of the media in diplomatic work, which offers a key insight into both the communication between Western and Russian diplomats and its perception by a major participant:

The countries’ leadership very often refers to an opinion voiced by a newspaper rather than by informed circles. This, I believe, is in principle an unprofessional approach for professional diplomats. I mean, if my partner refers me to The New York Times, which published an article saying that Russia bombed to smithereens twenty-eight hospitals in Aleppo, I am honestly allergic to this. Because either you cite some serious sources, so it must be information from the Ministry of Defence, or you give this link…

Vladimir sees working with information as the main task and skill diplomats should have. A well-informed foreign policy worker, in his opinion, is a man who has considerable experience of work both domestically and overseas and who definitely has a wide circle of political, economic and media contacts in his country of interest. Therefore, speaking of what information is needed, it is all needed, the whole lot. Of course, it is retrieved from all sources available. And I do not find it necessary to tell you about specific sources. Frankly, I am slightly bewildered that the authors of this questionnaire need it. A diplomat works with his sources, sometimes he writes in his dispatches: “citing his own opinion, the interlocutor said the following”. It means that I should consider that he does not want to become known and he emphasises that this is his own opinion. Therefore, closed sources, open sources…all sources matter.

Vladimir, a former ambassador, underscores that Russian civil society may have some limited influence on the country’s foreign policy, but it does not necessarily have to oppose the government:

There is a plethora of such organisations that clearly hold the same view articulated by the state leadership. It does not mean that they are a mouth-piece or parroting the leadership. It means that they share certain positions that are expressed when making Russia’s foreign policy.

Vladimir had no doubts either about his work being in perfect accord with his own political views:
So, I would like to tell you right away that I do not remember a moment in my life when my personal beliefs were inconsistent and... if I, suppose... suppose I had such cases when I doubt something, it means I have an opportunity to express them when preparing the information. If they are deemed well argued, they will be taken into account. If they are deemed poorly argued, they will not be taken into account. It is wrong to believe that a diplomat must defend their political views at work. Once again, this is a government department.

One of the interviewees underlined that informal networks play a critical role in Russian diplomacy as well as domestic policy, but at the same time legal and other formal procedures are seen at the heart of the Russian political system. It may be telling to note that one interviewee in the policymaking sphere was initially uncooperative, even when being interviewed by a Russian; he responded with references to the Russian Constitution: “This is what we base our work on. All our work is dictated by law; every procedure is described; I have nothing really to add to it”. To be fair, I have to say that overall interviewing diplomats proved trickier than I thought, and a significant number of Ukrainian MFA staff refused to be interviewed. The Polish policymakers, most of whom I had interviewed before the conservative PiS came to power, proved slightly more open, even though here too some requests were ignored.

Before concluding this chapter, I must look again comparatively at the recontextualisation of the Russian discourses on Europe. Here it is also clearly in play; however, what differentiates Russia from Ukraine and Poland is that its discourses are typically recontextualised by the media from the official rhetoric, and so the process is the other way round. Oppositional and pro-Kremlin media embed them within different contexts; however, in the hierarchy of discourses, they retain their dominant status.

Summary

The analysis of the in-depth interviews with Ukrainian and Polish policymakers and journalists suggests that Polish diplomats have a stronger autonomy and the Ukrainian diplomatic service is in a rather dysfunctional state. However, it is also possible to conjecture that Ukrainian journalists had a stronger degree of autonomy during Euromaidan, as they temporarily took over some traditional power roles from the collapsing state authorities. Russian journalists and foreign policy professionals are contrastingly split along the lines of critical and accommodating views on the situation in the
country. In contrast with Ukraine and Poland, there seems to be a certain lack of consensus on the value of journalist autonomy (although for media workers in all three countries, its meaning is conditional and negotiated).

As I have demonstrated in this chapter, the official narratives in each country provide a more or less concerted narrative with the major public discourses generated and spread through the media. It is hard to establish whether this is a result of the media’s direct influence or if the main determining influences are found elsewhere, but there is at least sufficient evidence that the political system and the mediasphere strive for an equilibrium under the existing conditions of governmentality. The interviews with Ukrainian journalists as well as other circumstantial evidence suggest that the Ukrainian media have been a major political actor and at a certain point started taking over the power functions when the more traditional power system started crumbling. The impact on foreign policy was notable but mostly mediated through the leading role that journalists played in defining Europe for Ukrainians and spearheading the Euromaidan protest. This was, however, an exceptional situation that did not last long. In Poland, the journalists fulfilled a similar role of taking responsibility for the Europeanisation of Polish society, and they successfully project their influence on foreign policy, even though this policy is much more structured and firmly institutionalised than in Ukraine. Russian journalists and policymakers either advocate that the media have a subordinated position in Russian society or are extremely critical of this situation, but they see no significant opportunities for the mediasphere to take the lead in the political field.
CHAPTER 8

Conclusion

The concept of hauntology (intended as a pun on ontology), which Jacques Derrida conceived in the early 1990s, suggests that history may function linearly but also as haunting: the ghostly presence of the past that is neither present nor past (or both at the same time). This is not only to repeat William Faulkner’s famous quote: “The past is never dead. It’s not even past”. The problem of the spectre questions the status of the past, which returns permanently to haunt the present: what is it if it does not fully belong to the past but is also obviously separated from the present? Europe as “the Old World” is inhabited by particularly many spectres, and yet, speaking about those that haunt Europe, both Marx and Derrida may have overlooked its principal spectre: Europe itself.

In this conclusion, I will revisit the key findings from the different parts of my study and read them against each other in an effort to achieve the aim I set out in the Introduction. Beginning with the historical origins, the narrative spectres that continue to reappear, I will then turn to the current discourses on Europe in Ukraine, Russia and Poland during Euromaidan and the Ukrainian crisis, and finally discuss how these narratives relate to issues of media power.

Spectres of Europe: Narrative vampirism and postcolonial trauma

The concept of Europe has come to be one of the principal experiences of modernity – not only but especially in the Eastern part of the Continent. The present-day politics of progress and tradition focus on Europe, and the notion itself enters the stage almost simultaneously with early modernity.

Historically, Europe as a geographical idea emerged in East European imaginary in the sixteenth century. Polish and Ukrainian discourses are difficult to disentangle because, at that time, the two countries were part of
one single state, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, that was relatively open to Western influences, while Russia kept itself more isolated from the rest of the Continent. It can be assumed that the Poles fashioned their own narratives of Europe – as a religious community of Western Christianity – around the resilient Ottoman threat and especially the Battle of Vienna, when the Polish army under King Jan Sobieski played an important part in laying this threat to rest. The earliest Ukrainian texts consciously mentioning Europe as a closely knit community date back to the 1720s but reflect the images that took shape in the 1690s and 1700s, when the Hetmanate, a breakaway from Polish-Lithuania, stabilised internally. Russia became exposed to the concept of Europe during the roughly simultaneous Petrine era.

It is important to note that the three countries’ foundational myths attribute the origins of their statehood to Germanic Europe: the more advanced Holy Roman Empire (Poland) and the more provincial Scandinavian Viking clans (Russia and Ukraine). A more fundamental difference was that Christianity was adopted from Rome via Germany in Gniezno and Krakow, and from Byzantium in medieval Kyiv; Moscow was later to inherit the Byzantine version of Christianity. This infused the literary traditions of how the West was portrayed in early modern Ukraine and Russia with a strong anti-Catholicism. At the same time, the flashy European imagery from Greek and Roman mythology that came via Poland, placed the self-perception of educated Ukrainians within the confines of baroque Europe. Constituting the backbone of the Russian imperial elite at the early stage of the Petrine reforms, these baroque Ukrainians did their best to wed this imagery and self-perception with that of the previously more isolated Muscovy.

These origins developed in an intricate and multifaceted way. There were no consistently loyal sympathisers of Europe in Eastern Europe, and no constant anti-Europeans. None of these countries has either constantly rejected Europe or had a constant immunity to anti-Europeanism. Their ambivalent vacillation and interaction between different positions have been driven by indigenous factors whereby the same nation may have embraced the idea of Europe at one time and rejected it at others. This situation is in flux, and cultures that once eschewed Europe may have later or even at the same time turned to it for technology, knowledge and ideology, although changes were often gradual and slow, prolonged for decades or even centuries.

In Ukraine, texts from the 1720s to the 1740s testify to a gradual increase in understanding Europe as a family of monarchies and on the occasion of
individual contacts with Western lands to the perception of their higher level of technological and material development, as well as the difficulties in crossing borders. Even though these narratives strikingly resemble contemporary Ukrainian narratives, it is problematic to interpret this as a continuity of narrative; rather, I am inclined to see it as a continuity of experience. The old texts have been hardly known and read, yet the authors separated by centuries often found themselves exposed to similar encounters with Western Europe and thus produced narratives that appear similar.

At the same time, Poland constructed divided narratives of Europe. On the one hand, some of its elites remained sceptical of the absolutist Western monarchies and tended to see their own system as more liberal and superior. On the other hand, the crisis of this system made others demand an adoption of European absolutism to overcome this crisis. The Russian encounter with Europe at a time when Russia became admitted to the community of monarchies after the Great Northern War was characterised by an uncritical adoption of all things European, including military, industrial and social technologies. However, this situation also co-opted narratives of difference, such as Pushkin’s popularised idea of a “window into Europe”, or the harsh criticism of Europe by Denis Fonvisin (1745–1792). Direct encounters between Europeans and Russians, such as during the Russian occupation of France in 1812–1814, generated a flurry of positive as well as negative narratives and likely contributed to the rise in more internally consistent pro- and anti-European sentiments.

In the first half of the nineteenth century, when Russia was dominating the region and had incorporated much of present-day Ukraine and Poland, the intellectual life in all three cultures swung dramatically from grappling with the problem of Europe to focusing on national identities and pan-Slavonic cultural and political projects. At this time, Europe disappeared from the Ukrainian intellectual horizon, which by that time had become firmly dependent on the imperial centres, while Poland was engulfed by an anti-Western (anti-German, in essence) sentiment. Also, Russia began to construct an image of the decadent and spiritually corrupt Europe, which Slavs were supposed to renew with an injection of spirituality.

The Poles were soon to experience a series of failed uprisings against Russian rule, leading to a revival of religious imaginary of Poland as “the Christ of Europe”, which linked back to the baroque narratives of Poland as the bulwark of Christian Europe. At the same time, Poland heeded the need for economic, social and political modernisation based on European examples, whereby Europe was once again seen as the source of positive
values and valuables. This more or less marked the beginning of the current narrative continuity of Europe as formulated by Polish authors, which has been demonstrated in Chapter 4, the historical section of this study. At this very time, the image of Europe, still found in Ukraine today (as a source of values and a beacon for Ukraine’s own self-identification and self-understanding), was first formulated by Mykhaylo Drahomanov and became the cornerstone of the Ukrainian autonomist and later independentist political programmes.

In the three countries, different classes dominated the development of the idea of Europe. While Polish narratives were typically created first by the petty gentry, which professed values of personal freedom and (thoroughly intermixed with other social groups) comprised up to 10 per cent of the population, Russia’s most Europeanised class was the senior nobility, numerically an insignificant minority detached from the rest of the population. Another significant educated class of bureaucrats was dependent on the state. Besides being an empire, the Romanovs’ Russia also lacked internal homogeneity for uniform narratives to penetrate all its classes and ethnic groups. In Ukraine, the Cossack nobility, petty gentry and clergy were economically and culturally closer to the lower classes, like in Poland, but also statistically a small group, rather like in Russia. All in all, this reduced distance in Poland between the educated and lower classes helped integrate the idea of Europe into the national self-identification, while Russian Europeanism remained distant from the broader population and confined to debates in isolated groups. In Ukraine, the national idea was Europeanised like in Poland but had like in Russia difficulties reaching all the strata.

Perhaps counterintuitively, the underlying perception of Europe in all the three countries has been rather pro-European. However, partly thanks to this divergent class dynamics, different aspects of Europeanness came to the fore: the rationalism-Europeanness and the humanism-Europeanness. Whereas the Europe that the Russian ruling classes learnt from was the Europe of the French and British empires and German bureaucracy, the Ukrainian elites learnt from the Europe of revolutions and national and social liberation. Russian Europeanism was therefore dictated by the drive to be accepted into the Europe of powerful states, but Ukraine’s Europeanism was driven by the urge to become part of the Europe of rights and values.

The twentieth century brought a crystallisation of these narratives. Ukrainian nationalism was married to Europeanism, as was evident in the events of 1917–1921 and the subsequent decade. A plethora of Ukrainian discourses, from the extreme right to the extreme left, defined themselves as
aspiring to a European ideal, which made it a golden age of Europe in Ukrainian thought. The left-winger Mykola Khvylovy called for Ukraine’s reorientation towards the “psychological Europe” at the same time as the émigré ultranationalist and fascist sympathiser Dmytro Dontsov chose European imperialism as a clear example for Ukraine to follow if it wanted to succeed. Centrist and liberal figures such as George Shevelov and Yuriy Kosach also declared the Europeanisation of Ukraine as their priority. These discourses, however, had to migrate spatially (outside Ukraine) or hierarchically (to samizdat and kitchen-talk) as the dominant regime of power-knowledge was delimited by the Soviet anti-Western policy. In Russia itself, these official discourses suppressed more moderate Westernism, but also many key émigré figures such as the Eurasianists formulated anti-European ideas. During the Cold War, dissidents and diasporas preserved and developed alternative narratives of Europe in all three nations, with the West seen as the key ally in the struggle against the Soviet regime. At the same time, the materialist perspective gained an impetus thanks to the inflow of pop music and consumerist goods that formed a sort of cargo cult. In the 1989–1991 period, Europe became more accessible and developed into a focal point for a number of domestic political issues.

Having examined this change of the narrative dynamic in the three countries and their cultural and linguistic traditions, this pattern of interaction suggests to me an interpretive scheme whereby East European narratives of Europe tend to oscillate between (1) idealising admiration, (2) materialist pragmatics, and (3) geopolitical demonising – depending on the internal situations in the three societies. Once Europe appears as a concept, it becomes a factor of internal politics: when an East European society is undergoing a crisis of sorts, such as Russia in the 1680s, 1810s, 1850s and 1980s (as the Soviet Union), or Poland in the 1780s, 1830s, 1860s or 1970s–1980s, it is likely to generate more interest in Europe and more positive narratives thereof. This may either coincide with or be causally linked to a greater openness and intensive interaction with West European nations.

From this perspective, the long tradition of positive portrayals of Europe in Ukraine can be explained not only through the use of Europe as a legitimating and identity-building device by Ukrainian nationalism but also by the fact that in the divided and stateless nation, the crises never truly ceased.

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24 In anthropology, “cargo cults” are used to refer to the material objects of industrial societies that acquire highly symbolic and often religious status in a more “primitive” society. The parallel to how Western goods in Eastern Europe and tribal societies are becoming objects of worship has been noted by Oleksandr Hrytsenko (see Chapter 4).
and even the plentiful times had an unresolved ghost – yet another spectre – of its own self-identification and legal status hovering over all such discourses: was it to be a colony, an autonomous province or a state?

At the same time, whenever a society has undergone a period of economic, political and/or military assertiveness, or for that matter ideological innovation, its narratives of Europe may be increasingly contested by Euroscepticism or anti-Europeism. This was the case with Russia in the 1760s–1790s, 1825–1855, 1923–1956 and 2000s, and with Poland in the age of Sarmatism, and now in 2010s.

Metaphorically speaking, Eastern Europe’s narrative relationship to Europe at large (often understood as Western Europe) is reminiscent of vampirism. In times of weakness, East Europeans turn to Europe for ideas, technologies, techniques and cash that, once injected into their societies, will allow them to function more successfully for a while; yet when such an East European society is saturated with all of the above, it feels that it does not need Europe as much and is likely to become sceptical or defiant until the next internal crisis forces it to seek new resources in Europe again. This may seem counterintuitive for a postcolonial reading that suggests a subordinate position of dependence for Eastern Europe. Yet the relationship between a vampire and its victim is unequal in precisely this way: despite its threatening and aggressive bent, the vampire needs a victim and is dependent on it. The insufficiency of one’s own blood to sustain an autonomous life and the necessity of feeding on someone else’s vital forces are the definition of dependence and lack of autonomy. And just as vampires depend on their victims, Eastern Europe’s dependence on the West can be seen as either voluntary and ego-centric or forced and circumstantial. In either case, it is a compulsive dependence.

Such a relationship may also be best theorised not as economy-driven but as psychology-driven. What matters is not only the actual strength of the society (although it can certainly matter a lot too) but above all its self-confidence and perceived autonomy. Here postcolonial theory becomes even more relevant. Despite many difficult encounters and physical traumas inflicted on Eastern Europe by Western Europe, there is nothing comparable with the colonial domination of Europeans in Africa and Asia. This does not mean, however, that the East European trauma is a fiction (although it is indeed largely imaginary). Within the European context, the presence of a more successful, more accomplished subject aspiring to represent the universal subject is already traumatic; it is impossible, deep down, for the human psyche to admit the other’s ontological superiority without
profound and mostly negative consequences for the psyche itself. This calls for two reactions: either aggression or fantasy. The oscillation of the Ukrainian, Polish and Russian narratives of Europe between “pro” and “anti” stems, I believe, either 1) from the urge to obliterate or devalue the traumatic Other, the better Other (the urge inherent in all nativisms) by its physical or symbolic destruction or denigration, or 2) from identifying with it in order to acquire the same qualities and the same level of standing, i.e. by erasing one’s own current identification. Tactically, one can also embark on the identification project in order to develop the power necessary to destroy the successful rival later. It is likely a mere function of political unification and strength that determines the current status of the denial mechanism as the language of power in Russia and of the identification mechanism as the language of power in Ukraine: strong, unified, consolidated political agents tend to be more confrontational. As is obvious from all the historical examples I have presented, there is no such thing as an inherent cultural tendency to be more pro-European; it is simply a function of the domestic and international power dynamic. At the end of the day, what has been historically going on between Western and Eastern Europe can be interpreted as a case of the Hegelian “master/slave” dialectic between independent and dependent self-consciousnesses.

Public discourses: Three contemporary narratives of Europe

Given this historical perspective, which public discourses in the three countries are currently dominant? And how do today’s narratives relate to that history? When it comes to both formal public-sphere institutions (newspapers) and more informal communicative networks (blogs and online forums), Ukraine, Russia and Poland all similarly display a cohabitation of different types of discourses. However, the terms of cohabitation and their relative power statuses differ.

First of all, the sheer scope of the coverage is very different, reflecting the economic strength of the media system: Polish newspapers generally write the most about Europe, while Ukraine lags behind both Poland and Russia in this respect. Quality newspapers, especially weeklies, also tend to write more about Europe than tabloids. The tabloid coverage of Europe has few texts in the genre of analysis, whereas analysis dominates the Polish newspapers and the highbrow Ukrainian publications. Izvestiya has an opinionated mixture of interviews and the writings of columnists, and Novaya
specialises in first-witness accounts that refer to Europe – something very unusual for all the Polish newspapers.

Europe is also framed with a range of topics that vary in different publications. In politics, foreign and domestic contexts are typically mixed, while economic issues dominate the expert and financial press. In their coverage of social problems, the Ukrainian and Polish newspapers usually invoke Europe but not the Russian ones, where arts and cultural news refer to Europe more than elsewhere. In the Polish newspapers, especially Polityka, historical themes strongly correlate with Europe. Lifestyle and travel are not very popular subject areas for discussing Europe, but they are slightly more important to the Ukrainian newspapers.

Likewise, specific kinds of visuals are used in stories of Europe. In general, people are preferred to buildings, although some atmospheric urban landscapes are quite usual in the Ukrainian and Russian newspapers. News photography is less popular everywhere, yet consistently present. Among the people portrayed, Ukraine’s Korrespondent and Segodnya and Russia’s Kommersant publish numerous pictures of politicians, and for Ukraine’s elite publications, ordinary people feature the most. Cartoons, collages and landscapes are slightly more common in the Ukrainian outlets as well. The popularity of urban and natural landscapes in the Ukrainian press possibly hints to a more spatial imagining of Europe. Public figures are mostly seen in the Polish press (and in Russia’s Izvestiya).

There are two understandings of what “Europe” actually is, namely the EU and the purely geographical interpretation. However, the Polish liberal newspapers are more likely to see it as a continent. The Russian media tend to associate Europe more with the EU than their Polish counterparts do, and the Ukrainian media even more so. The Ukrainian journalists are also slightly more preoccupied with symbolic aspects than the others. Unlike the other newspapers, Gazeta Wyborcza, Novaya, Izvestiya, Korrespondent and Dzerkalo Tyzhnya generally associate Europe with values. Typically, Europe is associated with benign values (in Ukraine more so than elsewhere). With the exception of the daily Gazeta Wyborcza with its firm stance, the Polish newspapers do not focus on positive values at all.

When Europe is understood as a value complex, there seem to be two possible value cores: that of rationalist technocratic modernity (associated with efficiency, modernity, quality, standards) and that of humanistic values (rights, justice, fairness, etc.). The results indicate a cluster of publications quite sympathetic to European values (Dzerkalo Tyzhnya, Korrespondent,
Novaya, Gazeta Wyborcza, all liberal). Political allegiances appear to over-
ride national or format specifics.

Eastern and Western Europe are only very rarely contrasted with each
other everywhere, while Central–Eastern Europe quite usually only appears
in the Polish newspapers, apparently spilling over to some extent into
Ukraine but not so much into Russia. The values of Europe are described
more often as alien in Russia, much more rarely in Ukraine and very sel-
dom in Poland.

Europe is quite uniformly found in a subject position in a sentence in
about one-fifth of the texts. The Polish newspapers rarely see Europe as a
threat or an enemy, while the Russian newspapers do in 10%–20% of their
articles on Europe. The Ukrainian ones are closer to their Polish counter-
parts in this respect. The numbers in this category clearly varied at different
points in time: Europe came to be seen in Russia as an enemy more often
after the annexation of Crimea. The Ukrainian press became embittered
against Europe in August 2014 for failing to help against Russian aggres-
sion. As one follows the material in time, Brussels’ reaction to these events
gives the Ukrainian journalists grounds to construct Europe as unwel-
coming and rejecting.

The Ukrainian press overall strongly believed that Ukraine should adopt
more European practices and had a concrete programme for it: Europe
should become the goal of these reform processes. Somewhat less often the
Russian journalists would like to see more European practices in Russia,
and when they do, it is rarely suggested that Russia has to change politically.
In Ukraine, the journalists tended more often to regard Europe as successful
and less often as failing, while Poland was the most balanced of the three
countries, with the most negative stories but also many positive ones. In
Russia, the positive coverage was the weakest, but it had a rather strong
negative coverage. The frame of European welfare is present everywhere but
is strongest in Ukraine. A common European identity frame is rare and
slightly more popular in Poland and in the Russian newspaper Novaya. An
institutional perspective is present, though not so strong and mostly found
in the Ukrainian and Polish newspapers. The past is more important in the
European discourses of the Russian newspapers, but it also dominates the
Polish weekly Polityka. Poland, moreover, tends to talk less about the
future. The tabloid Segodnya almost always writes about the present, and it
seems that the more quality newspapers tend to give more of a historical
context. The Polish newspapers write most often about Europe’s terrible
past as well as (more rarely) its golden age, and they do discuss a possible
golden future for Europe somewhat more often; Novaya and Dzerkalo Tyzhnya follow the same pattern. The Ukrainian media frame Europe in the context of Ukraine more than others, which is predictable. However, the Russian newspapers seem to mention Ukraine alongside Europe more often than the Polish ones. In both Poland and Russia, there was a clear break in the winter of 2013–2014 (Euromaidan and the Ukraine–Russia crisis) that marked a sharp rise in the number of texts about Europe that also mention Ukraine.

These are the results of the quantitative content analysis; they suggest, overall, that Ukrainian public discourse on Europe has been recontextualised by the official discourse in post-Euromaidan Ukraine. At the same time, it is, rather, the Russian media that recontextualise from the official discourse the discourse of a failing Europe as an enemy and a threat, while the Polish case represents a more diversified, insider perspective on Europe (more negative but also more positive stories on Europe) and a more complex system of mutual recontextualisations.

The qualitative analysis presents a slightly different perspective.

I have analysed the Ukrainian newspapers whose voices are listened to by pro-Western intelligentsia and parts of the political class (Dzerkalo Tyzhnya), middle class (Korrespondent) and more diverse popular audiences (Segodnia). Here the public discourses largely exclude anti-European discourses, which, once displaced from the mediasphere, instead colonise parts of the web. Each newspaper, however, still has a different story about Europe.

Dzerkalo Tyzhnya is the closest equivalent to the “Europe of values” discourse initiated by Drahomanov. Ukraine is constructed as lacking the progressive social practices and governing values, which has to be overcome by an orientation towards “European standards”. Occasionally, Europe is criticised for being too pragmatically flexible vis-à-vis Russia or being unable to resolve its own crises, but these criticisms then focus on Europe’s shortcomings with a view to improving rather than disavowing.

In contrast to this, the tabloid Segodnya has some rather more visible stories about Europe’s materialist success. Europe is sometimes very obviously constructed as a place where life is good, in a striking parallel to Hryhorovych-Barsky’s 1747 account. For example, one recurrent theme that did not show up significantly in the quantitative data is the advice on how to go on holiday, enrol for studies or even move to “Europe” (the EU), and what kinds of professions are most in demand there. Geographically, Ukraine is seen as being in Europe but extremely lagging behind in terms of mainly material standards. Europe may also be portrayed negatively when it
shows its unwelcoming side by rejecting Ukrainians or Ukraine’s integration prospects.

*Korrespondent* combines this materialist perspective on Europe with the more value-based one. Having changed owners at the beginning of Euromaidan (and hence in the middle of my sampling time frame), it has largely ignored the connection between the protest and Europe, covering them as completely separate themes – unlike all the other newspapers in the sample, including the Russian and Polish ones. Euromaidan was covered heavily, as was Europe, but the latter was rarely mentioned in the articles dealing with Euromaidan. Even though the pro-Russian Yanukovych clan has owned *Korrespondent* since the end of 2013, the coverage of Europe has remained largely neutral to positive.

The Russian media’s focus on European values is also found in forms similar to those in the Ukrainian media. This is true of *Novaya Gazeta*, which is generally receptive to Europe and admits the Continent’s values are worth aspiring to; this newspaper has also opened its pages to a few Ukrainian authors. Its discourse is similar to that of the Ukrainian weekly *Dzerkalo Tyzhnya*, with the major exception that Russia’s orientation towards those values is not discussed as a task in the way it is in the Ukrainian newspapers. A significant difference emerges with the other two sampled Russian newspapers. In *Kommersant*, Europe is only rarely seen as a universal value construct, and some articles are drawn to the conclusion that it is nevertheless in decline. In its extensive coverage, from floods to economic crisis and democracy deficit, Europe is constructed as failing. Gas transit is another massive theme, perhaps unsurprisingly for the business daily it is, but the theme’s dominance shows that the idealist perspective of Ukraine’s *Dzerkalo Tyzhnya* and Russia’s *Novaya* finds little space in *Kommersant*. There may be some standards orientation to Europe, but what dominates the coverage is the frame of a tired and dysfunctional Europe. The third newspaper, *Izvestiya*, sees Europe as a threat to Russia, particularly in the articles by the prominent ideologist Boris Mezhuyev. European values, however, are constructed positively, only from a rationalist, technological perspective (efficiency, etc.) rather than a humanistic, like in Ukraine’s *Dzerkalo Tyzhnya* or Poland’s *Gazeta Wyborcza*. Those humanistic values are here described as morally degenerate, anti-traditional, anti-family, anti-religion, all of which are construed as negative. In many texts, Europe is constructed as aggressive and authoritarian but also living through its last days before its ultimate demise.
Summing up, based on this analysis of very diverse papers under different ownership and of different political orientation, the most striking difference between Ukrainian and Russian narratives is that Ukrainian elites, despite their internal diversity, seem to have formed a consensus about Europe as a source of positive values constituting a self-imposed task for self-reform, which was recontextualised to the official discourse from public discussion. Russian narratives, however, are divided: some resemble the Ukrainian talk of values, others reject Europe for being an aggressive rival (the perspective that the Kremlin certainly favours and tries to recontextualise to public debate from its official rhetoric), yet others are ambiguously split between these two poles. Although Ukraine is geographically and socially divided, Russia has – despite internationally performing as a unified actor – elites that are much more divided on the issue of Europe. I would also argue that Moscow’s self-positioning vis-à-vis Europe may prove even more divisive for Russia in future (as it was in the past).

In Poland, perspectives again differ. There is the idea of Europe as a set of institutions and values that are clearly recurrent as categories of qualitative analysis. *Gazeta Wyborcza* most strongly champions a value-based, universalist and idealist narrative of Europe that serves as a tool for attacking both Warsaw and Brussels. The conservative *Rzeczpospolita* adds a more traditionalist and slightly critical view of Europe while also focusing more on the economy. In this newspaper, Eurosceptic voices are heard more often than in the others, making it marginally similar to *Kommersant*. This may perhaps indicate that finance-oriented dailies tend to be relatively Eurosceptical, maybe as a result of favouring pragmatism over idealism. In the centrist *Polityka*, the theme of the values and standards is more prominent again, and European history is heavily covered. In this weekly (as well as in *Gazeta Wyborcza* in a less pronounced way), Poland is positioned in what is called “Central-Eastern Europe” – a more prestigious place than the pretty gloomy “Eastern Europe”, which *Polityka* situates in the post-Soviet space. Poland is also predicated as trying to live up to the West European standard, a comparison usually employed when dealing with domestic issues. Thus, many Polish journalists construct a privileged position in the geographic imaginary pushing the eastness further to the East. Like in Ukraine, anti-European narratives are suppressed, but in contrast to Ukraine, the materialist perspective is rather poorly represented from a qualitative analysis perspective.

Yet all newspapers share certain similarities. All of them use Europe as a geographical and institutional shortcut, primarily based on spatial and legal
coordinates that serve as the framework for other conceptualisations. While secondary constructions often differ, the spatial ones are generally agreed upon by all. They are vague, however. Journalists tend to see them most typically as a locational frame of reference or mainly associate them with the EU, while sometimes also identifying Europe with the Council of Europe or just the eurozone countries. Also, all seem to concur that Europe acts as a political subject and that it hardly has its best times to come. The differences could be summarised as follows: Russians focus on the dramatic EU crisis, along with the perceived otherness and often aggressiveness of Brussels, while Ukrainians strongly prefer a symbolic understanding of a Europe of values as a self-assigned task, linked to a consumerist attitude to Europe as a superior material culture. Moreover, Poles are unique in their self-identification with Europe and attention to the institutional framework of the EU. These differences are related to each country’s political status in Europe but also to their different vocabularies, with devices such as synecdoche, metonymy and catachresis represented to varying extents in the three countries (the most in Ukraine).

**Europe as a power switch: Media power behind European narratives**

How do these narratives function in the interface between the authorities, the public and the journalists in these three countries? The interviews I carried out with journalists and policymakers, as well as the study of institutional contexts, policy documents and some relevant individual cases, together indicate that this relationship is far from simple or unidirectional.

Previous research on journalist professionalisation shows that East European journalists tend to be active agents in the political system. This study confirms that it was also the case for all three countries during Euromaidan. As is clear too from other studies (Nygren et al., 2016), journalists during Euromaidan and the Ukrainian crisis sacrificed impartiality for the sake of active involvement in the political process. However, the landscape in all three countries proved much more diverse. The journalists’ relations to the events they describe were positioned differently along a range of types, spanning from the conformist journalist who fully withdraws from participation in order to uphold editorial policy to the activist journalist who uses his or her profession to project political influence and is often engaged in political activism outside work. Between these schematic poles, there are a number of diverse types, such as those journalists who comply
with the internal censorship at work but engage in political activism in their spare time. These journalists often negotiate and justify such deviation from official standards of impartiality in complex and contradictory ways that indicate a separation of activist and professional work or depict deficiencies in the political system as a licence to intervene. The diplomats interviewed can also loosely be organised into a few categories according to their patterns of information consumption: while all tend to be rather heavy media users, some claimed to rely on internal channels of information more than others (this reliance may be stronger in Ukraine and Russia).

The differences are significant and context-specific. In Ukraine, Euromaidan created an exceptional situation where journalists found themselves able to project a much stronger influence on audiences and politics. The revolution itself was largely created by oppositional activist journalists who promoted it as both participants/organisers and heralds who made the protest known. When the state authorities and their monopoly on violence crumbled, journalists and oppositional media often had to fulfil unusual power functions such as surveillance, the registration of crime and, together with activist self-defence units, patrolling the streets. The conventional media simultaneously ensured a smooth transition and prevented further rips in the social fabric. Prominent journalist figures managed to project influence on foreign policymakers by furnishing them with information and lobbying for them to become greater involved in the Ukrainian situation. The social perception of their power position as well as their self-perception thereof were very positive. However, following the consolidation of the state and the war situation, the autonomy of the journalists is perceived as clearly diminished. With no autonomous legitimacy in the political field, the journalists’ power function collapsed, but the fusion of the journalism and the political fields was maintained.

The Russian journalists are also divided between the more oppositional activists on the one hand, and on the other hand, those loyal to the interests of the state. However, in these interviews, the reference to professional standards is more dominant and the scope for involvement is perceived as narrower and more rigid. The possibilities for activism are perceived as extremely limited. Instead, serving the national interests and maintaining the “harmony” (as one interviewee noted) between the owners, editors and reporters are a supreme priority, like an overall matrix embracing all social fields, including journalism and news media.

In Ukraine, the flexible discourse of journalists allows them to leave and return to the profession in a matter of minutes. There the professional
standard of autonomy is rather weak, but this on the other hand empowers journalists to carry out social action in the political field. In Russia, the discourse of professional standards and autonomy instead functions as a social constraint that prevents journalists from conducting social action and detaches them from social practice. This practice of self-disempowerment is something that Krzyżanowski (2014) also found among Polish journalists. My own findings indicate that in Poland the focus is on the inter-party struggle and political parallelism, while the perception of the social power of journalists is a rather controversial issue: some find this power quite strong, others do not. In any case, there is a considerable foreign policy consensus among journalists and politicians, resulting from a permanent negotiation and recontextualisation between and within these groups. In Russia, a similar consensus exists but is weakened by strongly oppositional and critical journalists. Overall, the support for the state among pro-government journalists is more unconditional and the criticism by their oppositional counterparts is harsher than in either Poland or Ukraine. The latter seems to have undergone a change during Euromaidan whereby the oppositional criticism of the country’s foreign policy became a source of the formulation of a new foreign policy practically forced on the post-Maidan state authorities by Ukrainian civil society – the public discourse of Europe was recontextualised to the foreign policy discourse, while in Russia the official discourse was recontextualised by the public discourse and, even framed by oppositional criticism, continues to function even in the most critical statements. In all three countries, political decision making is a prerogative of the authorities and the political elites, yet the concept of recontextualisation redefines the power status as who makes powerful utterances. In terms of discursive power patterns, Ukraine, Russia and Poland have produced very different social structures.

In Ukraine, the idea of Europe as socially and materially superior was used by oppositional activist journalists to alter the societal power balance in their own favour, as the narrative of Europe they popularised became dominant and adopted as official. In Poland, the consensus among journalists and politicians was formed long ago. Thus, the system remained in equilibrium throughout the country’s European integration and later during the Ukrainian crisis, even though certain cracks appeared when the conservative-populist government came to power in 2015. In Russia, activist journalists remain in a similar situation as their Ukrainian colleagues before Euromaidan: they produce narratives of Europe that are suppressed by the state-sponsored media and the government, which continue to promote the
antagonistic narrative of Europe as a threat and a problem. Thus, my interpretation of the narratives of Europe is that the social power of journalists perhaps resides in Poland in a relative equilibrium based upon a narrative consensus; in Russia, this social power is weaker against a much stronger state; and in Ukraine, it is stronger against a considerably weaker state.

It is important to note that when political power fails or collapses, journalists and traditional media can temporarily take over. Hannah Arendt (1972) famously defined power as an effect of a collective action rather than brutal coercion (cf. also Arendt, 1961/1968). As long as the authorities cannot be trusted, the media in their contemporary, late/liquid modern, media-tised form are likely to be turned to as a force to be used for cementing social cohesion and steering society. The public senses the media’s proximity to the state power: they perceive the media as a site of power and intuitively interpret their surveillance capacity and discursive capacity of producing validating statements as a potential that can fill the void left by the abdicating illegitimate government. It is hardly surprising that Ukraine’s online news resources reached “unprecedented’ levels”, and not only because “at times of political turmoil and instability, consumption of news generally increases as citizens seek information and an understanding of events” (Szostek, 2014, p. 6). This is evident from the sequence of political events in 2013–2014, from the interviews with journalists and partly policymakers, and from the relationship between the pro-European discourses dominant in Ukraine and the eventual victory of the pro-European social movement.

From this Arendtian perspective, the Yanukovych regime in 2010–2014 was dismantling rather than consolidating power. Journalists at that time were actively taking sides, gaining authority and articulating objectives and demands. This was facilitated by a strong culture of revolutionising activism. Were these journalists performing an unusual power role, exerting an advanced civic practice, or was the whole situation rather a sign of systemic dysfunctionality in a critical state of emergency? This needs to be further discussed and investigated. In any case, during Euromaidan the distances within the political field between Ukrainian politicians, journalists and ordinary citizens were notably reduced. In Poland, the distance was greater – and this distance has defined the “public sphere”. However, it also shrank so much that it resulted in an overwhelming compromise between the elites, the media and public opinion during the Ukrainian crisis. The Russian case likewise demonstrates a notorious fusion of political rhetoric and public opinion with a weak opposition. However, the attempts at a comparison floundered when trying to answer whether Russia is a genuinely autocratic
society, in which case neither “public opinion” nor the “public sphere” makes sense as an explanatory concept. In the Polish-Ukrainian cross-comparison, the question arises whether revolutions have this potential to reduce the distances in power relations also beyond the most affected polity. Being a typical example of a functioning pluralist system, the Polish media remain relatively weak and heteronomous in relation to the political field, channelling but also often projecting influence through public opinion even though the public do not trust them very much. It seems that although the Polish media are institutionally not very strong or independent, they form a contested site of power where the political elites and other actors struggle to project influence.

Revisiting the interaction between politics and the public sphere, one may conclude that even though the public spheres in all three countries are struggling to influence politics, the results are uneven with hits and misses. It is perhaps best understood as a dynamic of discourse recontextualisation between the sites of its production and reception, and the direction of the dynamic depends on the media’s capability to produce rather than reproduce discourses. While Ukraine currently represents a situation where the public sphere rebelled and notably remoulded the political field (though with certain limitations, to be sure), the Russian public sphere and media-sphere are rather weak and subordinate to the administrative system. Further, the Polish public sphere has at present been forced into retreat after a prolonged period of equilibrium. However, these situations are relatively unstable and fluid and in each case may not last very long, at least in Ukraine and Poland. What may help secure some achievements and reverse some losses is perhaps the pull of Europe, and here I would like to say one final word on this.

The narrative constellations described here represent an interesting case of a narrative parallax (a concept used by, among others, Slavoj Žižek, 2006), suggesting that a change in the observed and represented object is caused primarily by a change in the observing and representing subject (akin to celestial bodies that seem to move less due to their own movement and more due to the movement of the Earth-based observers). The narrative discourses on Europe are changing first and foremost because the narrators are changing.

Now I would like to expand this physical metaphor. The way European-ness functions in the discourses is not only a binary quality that can be used to define whether someone or something is European or not, but, metaphorically speaking, it also behaves like a wave or a field. This is why loca-
ting a border or a limit to it is such a futile enterprise. Rather than a walled fortress, Europe is a constellation of epicentres surrounded by a bundle of shock waves or ripples. One could imagine that, at some point in time and space, there was a series of fluctuations and perturbations associated with establishing a paradigm of modernity and Europeanness. The shock waves penetrated much further than the events themselves. It is virtually impossible to specify where these waves cease to exist, but they get fainter with distance in time and space. Hence, Europeanness is perceived as a degree, a shade of colour, so that people or geopolitical actors can be “more” or “less” European. Also, similar to massive celestial bodies, which distort and curve space-time by forcing the surrounding matter to move in response to them, these epicentres of Europeanness create a “gravitational field” that is not uniform and homogenous but exerts a stronger pull on that which is closer. Therefore, asking whether some place is European is futile; and even asking what is more and what is less European is similarly unproductive. Europe is an effect rather than a quality. This is why virtually no place would be totally devoid of Europe, but its effect is also clearly stronger in the places closer to it, geographically and mentally. This explains several of the differences and similarities between Ukraine, Russia and Poland.

Trailblazing: Issues for future research

I see two directions for future studies of the problem I have examined quantitatively and qualitatively in this work: an extensive one and an in-depth one. First of all, even though I have contextualised my study historically by combining original and existing research, there remains a need for a more systematic study of the historical narratives of Europe in all three countries; so far, no systematising work has been done on them in recent years. Secondly, an interesting comparative aspect may be found in juxtaposing these countries with others in Central Europe, the Baltic region, the Balkans or even Central Asia. Thirdly, it may be relevant to apply the same research questions and methodological combination to a different set of newspapers or a different set of media (for instance television) in the same three countries. Even without such a comparative aspect, an in-depth study of a single media system based on a more diverse sample could add important nuances, although in all these cases I would not expect the results to differ much from this study. This is because I have already diversified my samples sufficiently. A more promising prospect is likely that of comparing
Western with Eastern narratives of Europe as well as West European narratives of Eastern Europe with East European narratives of Western Europe.

At a different level, the problem may be explored by addressing non-elitist, popular narratives of Europe among the classes with limited access to the conventional media platform. The experiences and discursive constructions of those who have never left their home town as well as of seasonal and long-term migrants can be compared with the elitist narratives examined here and will more than likely produce interesting results, with attention paid to how media narrations interact with social hierarchies and power relations. Narratives of Europe are also worth studying in their more implicit manifestations in fiction, poetry, everyday talk and genres other than those of the news media, which I have investigated here. Finally, they could and should be studied outside their national contexts, as manifestations of transnational or global phenomena.

Also, one could analyse the findings based on such material from another theoretical framework. I would like particularly to take one final detour and rethink the results of my study from the perspective of Ernesto Laclau’s “empty signifier” theory. It is arguably applicable here because Europe in East European imaginations is reminiscent of an empty signifier: a grand metanarrative that signifies political goals beyond the reach of the subject. Juxtaposed with the situation presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 above, the Laclau-inspired line of thinking suggests that while “European standards” exist in their actual nation-specific forms, the perceived lack of modernity and “Europeanness” urges the participants of the political struggle in Ukraine to bring about “Europe”. And whatever group succeeds in persuading that their goals are “those that carry out the filling of that lack” (Laclau, 1996, p. 44) becomes the winner of the political struggle. The critical perspective would then imply not so much criticising the very perception of the lack of modernity and progress as associated with Europe but rather criticising group-specific claims to an ability to overcome it that lay the foundation for those groups’ hegemony. In Russia, Evropa/Gayropa is, on the contrary, a floating rather than an empty signifier that can be attached deliberately to whatever is perceived as a negative value (including concepts as diverse as LGBT rights and Pax Americana), while the true Russian empty signifier is the nostalgia-driven lack of greatness, superpower status and respect. In Poland, the process of filling Europe (once an empty signifier like in Ukraine) with more specific content might be underway right now, though its completion is a sheer utopia. I leave these observations as hypotheses to be tested in other, future studies.
In his relevant critique of power imbalances between Western and Eastern Europe, Jan Grzymski (2009, pp. 89–90) argues that the idea of Eastern Europe is a result of the West’s hermeneutical work. Referring to Gadamer’s concept of prejudice, Grzymski suggests that as human perception is built upon anticipatory structures requiring objects to be classified as coherent and homogenous entities, the stereotypes are parts of the hermeneutical process, which facilitates, if not enables, understanding. Continuing this line of thought, one can assume that if these stereotypes are dismantled, nothing is left to make the understanding possible (which is clear in the current helplessness of the West’s political elites against the challenges to the values they claim to stand for). Therefore, what is needed is not a nihilist critique of “Europe”, “East” and “West” as unnecessary ideas consigned to the waste bin of history, but a more alert hermeneutical sensitivity aimed at understanding the whole in relation to its parts and of the parts in the context of the whole. This is impossible without a degree of abstraction and generality.

Focusing on differences between the three countries – or on similarities that construct a stereotypical East Europeanness – will inevitably result in allegations of selective attention to certain aspects or even essentialism. These suggestions would profoundly misperceive both my objective and my handling of the material. By paying attention to different narratives told and retold in the media I have studied, I do not seek to undermine the possibilities for dialogue or add more boundaries to this deeply divided world, which it may seem to a reader with a particular perspective. But what I do want is to draw attention to the inherent and long-standing heterogeneity of the region, which far too often is represented in the West as homogenous, impenetrable, impossible to understand and inherently problematic. If I have any agenda in this text, it is to help dismantle this generalising scheme and demonstrate not only that Eastern Europe has its story about Europe but that it also has many contrasting stories, told in different languages, from various cultures and historical backgrounds, by different voices with very dissimilar levels of volume and audibility, clashing, overlapping, seeking to cancel out and mute each other, each with universalist aspirations and programmes, mutually incompatible more likely than not, and all naturally and indigenously formed rather than parachuted in by some external force. This is equally far from the “clash of civilisations” talk on “the West vs. the Rest”, from a rosy pink idealistic picture, from the theorists’ sterile lab; observing discourses in their natural habitat indeed has something of a wildlife study about it. Such a study brings a lot of smells
from the field, and mud on the shoes. And in this specific case, in these times of violence and war, it is easy to find your fingers sticky with blood.

Postlude: A few personal remarks

I also feel compelled to conclude with a few personal, but to me important, notes and observations that provide conclusive anecdotal evidence from the closest distance possible: from within. As a kid, I used to spend a lot of time at my grandparents’ house in a small town some 180 km north-east of Kyiv, far away from Polish, Habsburg or any other “Western” influences and closer to Moscow than to Warsaw – or for that matter Stockholm, where I now live. I remember well, sometime around 1989–1990, the excitement with which adults discussed the two most recent developments in a larger and more central small city to which our town has historically gravitated. One was the opening of an upmarket (by local standards) restaurant named \textit{Ukrayinski Stravy} [Ukrainian Meals]. Another recently opened establishment that engendered optimism in my relatives was a disco hall (see Picture 16): a truly lavish one, prestigious enough to attract some big-city acts to an otherwise provincial setting – the club’s name was \textit{Yevropa} [Europe]! These minor events were highly valued by my relatives, who attached tremendous significance to them. This shows anecdotally how important the national revival and the turn towards Europe were at the time when Ukraine was becoming independent and taking shape as a nation state. Except for perhaps a one-of-a-kind Potemkin façade in Lviv, the capital of a “nationalist” region, and in Kyiv, the republican centre, a restaurant referring to any “Ukrainian” cuisine, as distinct from Russian, could not have opened before 1989.\footnote{ Democratisation began in Ukraine significantly later than in Russia, the reason being the anti-perestroika republican leader Borys Shcherbytsky (1918–1990) remained in power until mid-1989, thus keeping the old strict ways in place. On top of that, Ukraine had been a target of purges, most recently in the 1960s, the 1970s and the early 1980s. A popular proverb was thus coined: “When Moscow’s cutting nails, Kyiv’s cutting fingers”, hinting to a much stricter suppression of dissent in Ukraine by the central Soviet authorities for fear of separatism and nationalism in the republic. It also dates the de facto beginning of perestroika in Ukraine to 1989 rather than 1985.} However, neither would it have been possible to name anything after Europe, which was then officially lambasted as bourgeois, capitalist, corrupt and enslaved by America. But now the nineteenth-century hotel Europe on Kyiv’s European Square echoed in the late twentieth-century disco club Europe in a smallish provincial town, as did all the images of Europe that resonated in these names. These fresh pos-
sibilities and the power these new phenomena radiated to the locals made social and political change tangible, but it is even more important that they went hand in hand. Being more Ukrainian and simultaneously more European formed a single, barely breakable semantic complex. Independent Ukraine was seen as already, by design, closer to Europe and indeed more European. Based on a revival of the historical tradition of signifying Europe, post-Soviet Ukrainian nationalism kick-started as a Europeanising endeavour. This also gave an open-ended initial impetus to this nationalism: as long as Europe was defined as a republican, rationalist, human-rights-oriented project, the nationalism striving for the European ideal had a difficult time building an anti-democratic, discriminatory and xenophobic Ukraine. This has likely contributed to the fact that mainstream Ukrainian nationalism, represented by the so-called national-democratic parties and one of the key actors during Euromaidan, proved so inclusive ethnically.\(^{26}\) But as traditionalist, patriarchal and xenophobic tendencies once more gain strength in signifying Europe, such a version of republican nationalism is prone to being redefined on more exclusive and rigid terms. With the prestige of rational, modernist Europe on the wane, nationalists search for other, less benevolent authorities.

The house, the source of this memory I carry with me, was also where my grandfather taught me to read before school. He used a lot of Ukrainian literature but also some “central” (i.e., Moscow-based) newspapers he enjoyed reading, certainly Izvestiya rather than Pravda, as the former was seen as more liberal and containing at least some truths vis-à-vis the entirely propagandistic latter one. It was also the house that our relatives from Russia would annually stay at for long periods. They were Ukrainians who had fled the terrors of the starving pre-war village but had later become thoroughly Russified and had intermixed with Russians. In the same house, my father’s Polish roots were mentioned nearly every time he was around. In a way, the situation of those days frames the design of my study, not for

\(^{26}\) This does not concern so much the more radical, extremist right such as the Right Sector. However, it is worth noting that even its leader, Dmytro Yarosh, publicly stated that their understanding of Ukrainians includes people of different ethnicities who support an independent and strong Ukraine. The honesty of these statements should be questioned. However, I find it difficult to refute the fact that the Right Sector – whose values I certainly do not share – did embrace people of all nationalities, among them many right-wing Russians and Jews. What matters for my argument here is that even if this statement by Yarosh was imitative, paid mere lip-service to popular ideas and aimed to whitewash his group, the very fact that such a statement was made testifies to the power of the inclusive discourse it at least imitates or pays lip-service to.
selfish or nostalgic reasons, but because those days left me with experiences of signification and identification that I wanted to explore academically, looking for answers to some of the challenges I later in life saw Eastern Europe facing. That was personally the point when it all started for me. I do not mean of course some particular point that marked the definite start, some point zero, or a Hegelian past that contained the seeds of the future, or even a Derridean spectre that keeps returning, but rather a temporary disposition – a Foucauldian dispositif – in a very old discursive relationship, at an intersection of language and narrative, social and political ties, differences and power relations, that often unfolded chaotically, unsystematically and hardly consistently over time, with plenty of discontinuities, but yet allowing for reconstructing some zigzagged and punctured lines of change. The 1980s and 1990s preceded the situation as it was in the 2000s and 2010s that I have studied here. While having refrained from establishing any causal relations, I still see them – rooted in even earlier periods – as a point of reference against which to triangulate the current situation, a narrative parallax of Europe in the three great nations situated in the East of this complex continent.

How Europe has been imagined has changed throughout history and will continue to do so. At this moment in the mid-2010s, Europe has become a topic of hotly contested (and contesting) narratives; in a sense, it has been used as a discursive weapon by all conflicting sides. These narratives are employed to empower oneself or to overpower others in manifestations of indigenous agency. Europe cannot really do much about the way it is seen, and it cannot be held responsible for the way others construct it, but it can for what it does with these constructions. I hope that this study has persuasively demonstrated that representations of Europe are powerful strategic tools, and whether they are used to enslave or liberate remains up to Europe and to us Europeans.
Appendix

This Appendix presents extra research materials such as reliability texts results, QCA coding instruction and questionnaires, thus furnishing an insight into how raw data was generated. Unfortunately, most of the materials could not be included in the Appendix for reasons of their prohibiting size (e.g., sampling frames) or too complicated layout requirements (e.g., Excel data sheets). In order to provide access to these materials (including sampling frames, coding results, polynomial data reliability tests, interview transcripts), I have set up a website https://mediatedeuropes.wordpress.com/ where most of these materials will be publicly available. I am encouraging all interested parties to familiarise with them and use in further research so that they continue contributing to knowledge and strengthen the reliability of this study. NB: some of the more sensitive materials may require a password, please contact me in such case: roman.horbyk [at] sh.se. Some of the transcripts may be withheld at the request of the interviewees in an especially sensitive position. No copyrighted material (such as any newspaper content) will be provided.

Appendix 1
Quantitative content analysis: Sampling and reliability

Sampling is typically one of the most pressing issues during a quantitative study. How many coding unites are enough? Just how many would be too few or too many? The only way to address these questions effectively is by using relevant statistical instruments. The principal task is to make the sample both workable and acceptably representative, with appropriate levels of confidence interval and standard error.

One of the popular and uncomplicated methods to calculate the desired sample size entails the use of reverse formulas for standard error and confidence intervals. The desired sample size n is derived from two things: “(a) the desired confidence interval around a given sample mean and (b) the estimated variance for the variable in the population” (Neuendorf, 2002, p. 89).
According to the respective formula in Neuendorf, for binomial measures (as the vast majority of questions in the codebook are yes/no questions that generate binomial data):

\[ n = \left( \frac{1}{4} \right) \left( \frac{1}{\epsilon^2} \right)^2, \]

where \( n \) = sample size, \( P \times Q = (0.5)(0.5) \), the most conservative case estimating the proportions for the populations \( P \) and \( Q \) for binomial data, \( \epsilon \) = the appropriate normal distribution weighting.

From this ensues a sample size at the standard error =.01 and confidence interval =85% (which the 1.439 index stands for):

\[ 52 \approx (0.5 \times 0.5) \left( \frac{1.439}{0.1} \right)^2 \]

These indicators are sufficiently strong to make reliable generalisable inferences about the entire population of coding units. Therefore, it was decided to sample randomly 52 articles from each publication (amounting in the end to 468 articles from nine newspapers and three different countries to be analysed). This is a representative sample, random and standing at the confidence interval 85% (meaning that 85% of all population are expected to fall within the measurement performed) and standard error 0.1 (meaning that the sample is 90% identical with the population in terms of representing the parameters measured).

A representative generalizable sample is one of the requirements for any valid quantitative study. Another requirement, which has to do specifically with content analysis, is the coder reliability.

Following the chosen interpretivist approach, reliability was also understood very closely to the definition in Krippendorff (2004, p. 212), as “the degree to which members of a designated community agree on the readings, interpretations, responses to, or uses of given texts or data”.

From a much more objectivist stance, Priest (1996) suggested an analogy to a ruler which cannot be used for measurement if it shrinks and changes its form all the time or when it is calibrated in centimeters while there is a need to know the length in inches. The interpretive approach – which I am applying here – is reluctant to think of measurement as something so universal and precise as a ruler could be perceived. However, from this perspective (much more suitable for operations with qualitative concepts developed from the data, such as in the particular case of this study),
content analysis must be reproducible. “To check on this possibility, analysts must generate reliability data at least under test-test conditions and account not only for individual instabilities but also for disagreements among observers, coders, or analysts” (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 216–217). All these recognised methods were applied in this project to prove the replicability of the categorical operationalization and the results’ reliability.

This was ensured in several ways. First of all, there were four smaller pilot tests each using five to ten articles that helped develop and fine-tune the coding instruction. Even at this early stage, potential points of disagreement between the coders were identified and tackled by reformulating the questions in ever more lucid and unambiguous way.

When the coding instruction (at its fifth version) started producing satisfactory data with these small pilot tests, it was validated by the large scale reliability test involving 40 articles from the newspapers in each of the three countries (8.5% of the total sample). The reliability test involved both coders, who firstly coded this subsample of articles independently of each other and then repeated this procedure in 14-21 days, without any consultations with each other. Reliability test was performed twice (test-test and test-retest model, according to Krippendorff (2004) on a sample of 45 articles. On the first stage, both coders read the same articles and performed coding to check on how much they agreed over the coding categories and to what extent they were capable of producing reliable and generalisable results. Afterwards the agreement indices were calculated according to the formulas cited in the chapter on methods.

Krippendorff (2004, p. 249) suggested the use of alpha index to check on the reliability of the results. “On this scale, alpha is the degree to which independent observers, using the categories of a population of phenomena, respond identically to each individual phenomenon”:

$$\alpha = 1 - \frac{D_o}{D}$$

where Krippendorff’s α is a reliability index, $D_o$ is the measure of the observed disagreement, and $D$ is the measure of disagreement that can be explained by chance.

The results showed acceptable (in some cases prominent) reliability of the operationalisation, although two variables were weak with $\alpha = 0.55$ and even $\alpha = 0.20$ (!), therefore they were eventually discarded during the analysis (and their results are not reported).

The following table presents the results of the intercoder (Krippendorff’s α) reliability tests for each binomial category.
Table A1. Intercoder reliability test results, binomial

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Picture: yes/no</th>
<th>Europe identified with EU</th>
<th>Europe identified with CoE</th>
<th>Europe as symbol</th>
<th>Good vs bad values</th>
<th>Europe as the Other</th>
<th>Europe as actor</th>
<th>Europe as threat</th>
<th>Struggle with Europe</th>
<th>Europe as goal</th>
<th>Conforming to Europe</th>
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<th>Europe in troubles</th>
<th>Europe as the land of plenty</th>
<th>Common identity</th>
<th>Institutional perspective</th>
<th>Ukraine mentioned?</th>
<th>Terrible past</th>
<th>Golden past</th>
<th>Golden future</th>
<th>Metonymy</th>
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These are exceptionally good indicators, since Krippendorff (2004) recommends care in using variables with $\alpha \leq .80$; in this case, nearly all variables show extremely high intercoder reliability $\alpha \geq .90$. These variables guarantee reliable results and can be confidently used in interpretation. The only category indicating a weaker agreement is coding synecdoche. Even though this dictates some reservations, this indicator still shows significant agreement and is contextually strengthened by the other two neighbouring categories, metonymy and catachresis.

The intracoder reliability test results for each coder were also completely acceptable.
Table A2. Intracoder reliability test results, binomial (Coder 1)

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<th>Picture: yes/no</th>
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Table A3. Intracoder reliability test results, binomial (Coder 2)

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<th>Picture: yes/no</th>
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<th>Common identity</th>
<th>Institutional Perspective</th>
<th>Ukraine mentioned?</th>
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Both coders showed high internal reliability and consistency of responses, overwhelmingly choosing the same answers after 14 to 21 days after the initial coding.

Another indicator, Pearson’s r, was also calculated for the non-binomial data categories, i.e. where there were more than one response option, according to the formula (Neuendorf, 2002, 158):

$$r = \frac{n\sum xy - (\sum x)(\sum y)}{\sqrt{n(\sum x^2) - (\sum x)^2} \sqrt{n(\sum y^2) - (\sum y)^2}}$$
where \( n \) = the number of the articles coded, \( A \) = the score of coder A, \( B \) = the score of coder B.

The reliability of the polynomial categories results calculated based on this statistic was also within acceptable limits and, to save the place, the results for these less important for my analysis categories are reported on the website https://mediatedeuropes.wordpress.com/

Appendix 2
The coding instruction

Europe in Ukrainian, Russian, Polish press

Fifth and final version

Sampling
Please select all articles that refer to Europe from the newspapers *Novaya gazeta*, *Izvestiya*, *Kommersant* (Russia), *Korrespondent*, *Dzerkalo tyzhnya*, *Segodnya* (Ukraine), *Polityka*, *Gazeta wyborcza*, *Rzeczpospolita* (Poland) between 1 February 2013 and 30 September 2014. For this purpose, use search options on the newspapers’ websites or, in case they are available, specialised archives of past articles (for example, *Gazeta wyborcza – Archiwum*) or specially obtained archives of past issues in PDF (*Korrespondent*). Whenever the search is carried out on the website items from the website live news ticker as well as from other thematic supplement may be included in the sample if they qualify for mentioning Europe. Perform the search by consequently inserting the search requests, «Европа», «Европы», «Европой», «Европу», «Европе» (for the Russian-language press); «Європа», «Європи», «Європою», «Європу», «Європі», «Європо» (for the Ukrainian-language press); „Europa“, „Europy“, „Europą“, „Europę“, „Europie“, „Europo“ (for the Polish-language press).

After this first stage, please look through the articles selected and carefully remove duplicates and homonymic references. Deselect all the articles that only contain references to Europe as part of a proper name (for example, the political party “Europa Plus” in Poland or the League of Europe football tournament). The rule of thumb should be that all the articles that contain one or more references to Europe should stay in the sample.
Arrange the articles chronologically and enumerate them in a sampling frame formatted as a table that contains information on all the articles such as a reference number in the list, a date of publication, a headline, a link to access the article. Generate sets of 52 random numbers (the articles’ reference numbers) with the help of the random numbers generator for each newspaper. The sampled articles should thus be included in the final sample for analysis and saved for the use of coders.

Unitising
Please consider an isolated article as both a sampling and a coding unit. An isolated article should be understood as a text of any length (starting form one sentence) with clearly indicated beginning and end. Please approach several-thousand-words and a-single-sentence articles on the same terms. Make sure you separate each article from others during the coding.

Coding
Read this section of the code book first. Please then read the sampled texts with due attention. Each time after you have read one article, please consult the questionnaire that follows right after the section “Operational definitions”. Please give the answer to every question therein. For this, you should use an answer sheet enclosed (in Excel; not reproduced in this Appendix). There, you should fill in the horizontal lines of boxes with the proper codes for every article, according to the questions’ numbers which must coincide in the questionnaire and in the answer sheet.

You can go back to the text of the article you are coding as many times as you need to make an informed judgment on every question. If you are hesitant, please consult the operational definitions, and then go back to the text. You can go back to the code book as often as you may need to decide on the code. **If you are still unsure as to which code to choose, please select the negative answer (“no” or feature absent) in all such cases.**

Always consider what the text you are reading suggests what Europe is. As with many constructed concepts, this might contradict contemporary ideas about geography, your own understanding or what you see as the commonly accepted knowledge of where the limits of Europe could be. Accept unconditionally the ad-hoc understanding of Europe the analysed text suggests. The use of the word “Europe” in the instance of discourse you are analysing is essential for both sampling and analysis.

Please stay sensitive to irony, as you are expected to code the overall contextualised meaning of the texts (their discursive properties) rather than
particular phrases. Ironic statements should be coded according to their ironic meaning, not their literal meaning, no matter how much they contradict each other.

With respect to coding the article topics, please always try to define one main theme per article, and use multiple topics as the last resort. In other categories, please always choose “no” (feature absent) when the question seems inapplicable. It is more important not to code the article wrong than to code it right. In case of doubt whether a particular feature is present in the text, always choose “no”. After you have coded every article you need, make sure there are no empty boxes left, and return the answer sheet to the researcher.

In special cases when the text suggests that there are two or more different “Europes” and tries to construct them as opposing each other, choose the codes for the Europe that is represented in the text as currently dominant. If this is impossible to determine, choose the codes for the Europe the text identifies with or sympathises to. If even such a decision is impossible to make, choose N/A in all contradictory cases.

Operational definitions

0 The article’s reference number
This is the number of the article under which it stands in the sampling frame list.

1 The country where the article was published
In alphabetical order: Poland (if the article comes from Gazeta wyborcza, Polityka, Rzeczpospolita), or Russia (if the article comes from Izvestiya, Kommersant, Novaya gazeta), or Ukraine (if the article comes from Dzerkalo tyzhnya, Korrespondent, Segodnya). Every country is represented by three newspapers, and in this box you mention in which country the newspaper is published where the article you have just read was placed.

2 The newspaper where the article was published
Likewise, here you mention in which of the nine newspapers the article you have just read was published.

3 Genre of the article
News is here defined as a text of any length, written in a narrative form that describes any events represented as facts that have recently (from the
perspective of the publication date) happened or became known, without establishing more than superficial connections between them and other such events, without making extensive references to the past or future predictions, and without openly expressing a judgement about them.

**Reportage** is defined as a text of any length, written in a narrative form that describes from a more or less individual perspective of the author as a witness to any events represented as facts that have recently (from the perspective of the publication date) happened and became known.

**Interview** is defined as a text of any length written in a dialogical (or polilological) form that represents a real conversation between two or several interlocutors.

**Analysis** is defined as a text of any length, written in a narrative form that provides an explanation of its subject by way of establishing connections between it and other events, putting it in a context of past developments, and/or making predictions about how it can develop in the future. Book, film and music reviews should be treated as analysis as well.

**Opinion** is defined as a text of any length written in a narrative form that represents a personal, subjective perspective of the author expressing a more or less explicit judgement about its subject.

### 4 Topic of the article

**Domestic politics** applies to the articles focused only on political actors and their activities within what is described as the territory of the country where the newspaper is published.

**International news** applies to the articles focused on actors, their activities, and developments **ONLY** outside what is described as the territory of the country where the newspaper is published.

**Politics: mixed** applies to the articles where either the domestic political actors and their activities are described in the context of foreign relations, or foreign political actors and activities are described in the context of domestic political process.

**Economy** applies to the articles focused on economic activities (economy dominates occupying over 50% of the text), no matter the focus, foreign or domestic.

**Society** applies to the articles focused on current social groups, processes and trends as well as their motivations and rationalisations (over 50% of the text) or speaks about society (many societies) in general.

**Culture** applies to the articles that focus (over 50% of the text) on **culture as a general way of life**, practices and identities that are seen as inherent to a
large group of people (e.g., ethnos or nation) without speaking about society.

Arts applies to the articles focused on **cultural product**, such as arts, literature, theatre, film etc. This category is distinguished from **celebrity** in that the articles here should be understood to focus on the cultural product. If the focus is on the persons of actors in this field, select **celebrity**, or if both foci are present, select **multiple topics**.

Sport applies to the articles that cover sport events, tournaments, trends and individual athletes in their professional capacity. If the focus is on the persons of actors in this field, select **celebrity**, or if both foci are more or less equally present, select **multiple topics**.

Lifestyle/travel applies to the articles that focus on practical advice for everyday life as well as travel or particular everyday or travel experiences.

Celebrity applies to the articles that focus on the personal life and characters of the actors in the field of cultural production, including both elite and mass consumption culture.

History applies to the articles that focus on past developments not seen as recent or immediately linked to the current events.

Science applies to the articles that focus on activities and actors in research and technology.

Other applies to the articles with a single dominant topic that is not identical with any of the above. Please specify what that is.

In the case the **topics are mixed**, coder can use several of the above categories. However, this option must be used very sparingly and as the last resort only (for example, if two clearly different topics occupy equal amounts of text). If the article is largely focused on one aspect, choose the main topic only.

5 **Illustration**

If the article is laid out together with pictorial material of any kind, select 1. If the article contains text only or, in some cases, if it is impossible even to determine whether it has been illustrated, select 0.

6 **Content of the illustration**

Please use one of the following categories based on your judgement of what this picture is representing. For example, pictures with landmarks or institutions may contain some or even many people but they are not the main content of the picture and function only as a background crowd. Likewise, notable politicians may be photographed in front of or inside an
in institutional building but the judgement must be made whether the photograph in such cases is representing the actors or the institutions in the first place. **If an interview is illustrated with a picture of the interviewee, the options “1A People: politicians” or “1B People: public figures” must be chosen.**

N/A (no picture; pictorial status unknown). The article contains text only and no pictorial material of any kind. Or else it is impossible to determine, from the kind of the material available for analysis, whether or not it has even been illustrated.

People: politician(s). The article is illustrated with a picture that shows one or several individuals in their capacity as political actors. State officials, diplomats, and functionaries from international organisations (UN, IMF etc.) also belong here. The picture is portrait-like and does not focus on an event as it happens but on the people portrayed.

People: public figure(s). The article is illustrated with a picture that shows one or several individuals in their capacity as people well-known to the public thanks to their activity other than in politics.

People: anonymous. The article is illustrated with a picture that shows one or several individuals (or a crowd) that are not specifically named or identifiable and that represent a group of people generally.

Building(s): landmarks. The article is illustrated with a picture that shows one or several buildings in their capacity as well-known or symbolical constructions for their location.

Building(s): institutions. The article is illustrated with a picture that shows one or several buildings in their capacity as locations of governing bodies or other institutional actors.

Building(s): anonymous/atmospheric. The article is illustrated with a picture that shows one or several buildings that are not identifiable as particular landmarks or institutions but instead serve to convey the sense of place or urban landscape (NB it is different from the landscape category which implies a natural landscape).
Event. The article is illustrated with a picture that shows a significant recent development in the process of happening. Rather than people and buildings/settings, action is in the focus of the picture.

Landscapes. The article is illustrated with a picture that shows nature without or with some artificial constructions or people that do not constitute the main content of the picture.

Paintings. The article is illustrated with a reproduced painting by a classical, modern, or unknown artist.

Collage/cartoon. The article is illustrated with a hand drawing or a clearly manipulated combination of images that illustrate or relate in some other way to the content of the article.

Picture of the text’s author. The text features the picture of the person who has the by-line or is otherwise known as having authored the text.

Other. None of the above applies to the content of the picture (specify the content).

7 Europe as location
If action in the text at least partly takes place in Europe (indicated specifically by phrases such as “In Europe, X does Y”), select 1. If the action takes place outside Europe and Europe is therefore mentioned circumstantially, for example as a background for comparison, rather than as the setting of any action, select 0.

8 Europe as continent
If the text uses the word “Europe” to refer to the geographically defined European continent (with limits at the strait of Bosporus and the Ural mountains, and of course the Atlantic, the Mediterranean and the Arctic), select 1. If no such reference is made and the understanding of Europe implies narrower or broader limits (such as those of the EU or Council of Europe, or some other borders are implied), select 0. If Europe is understood as an abstract or symbolic entity rather than spatial/geo–graphical/physical, select 0. If it is impossible to infer the meaning plausibly, select 0.
9 Europe as the EU
If the text uses the word “Europe” at least one time as synonymous with the EU as an institutional entity or a clearly defined group of 28 countries, please select 1. If no such identification is made or if this identification is challenged, select 0.

10 Europe as the Council of Europe
If the text uses the word “Europe” to refer to the Council of Europe as an institutional entity or a group of countries synonymic with Europe, select 1. If no such identification is made or if this identification is challenged, select 0.

11 Europe as symbol
If the text uses the word “Europe” to refer neither to geographical reality nor to supranational institutions or group of countries, but instead uses “Europe” as a shortcut to abstract ideas (such as positive or negative values, standards, rights, obligations, trends), select 1. If no such use is made, select 0.

12 Good or bad values
If the text does not mention Europe as a symbolic entity, select 2. If there is such a mention but no judgement is evident on whether or not these symbolic aspects of Europe are helpful or harmful, select 2. If it is evident from the text that the norms, practices, standard, quality control, trends etc are bad, malign, harmful and undesirable, select 1. If it is evident from the text that the norms, practices, standards, quality control, trends etc are good, benign, helpful and desirable, select 0.

13 Specific values
Please fill in this field what specific values (or, alternatively, traditions, standards, cultures) are mentioned in the text as originating in Europe, or originated by it, or actively spread by it. If no specific values are mentioned as well as if the value aspect is absent altogether, write “N/A”.

14 Incompatibility with Europe
If it is evident from the text that the values, norms, practices, standards, traditions, cultures, trends etc that it says are European, are unnatural for the country where it is published or the readers it is addressing, or
incompatible, impossible to combine or accept (but are not necessarily bad), select 1. If there is nothing like this in the text, select 0.

15 East vs West
If the text uses the phrase “Eastern Europe” and/or “Central Europe” and/or “Central/Eastern Europe” in an explicit comparison, opposition, juxtaposition or otherwise explicitly differentiating way to the phrase “Western Europe”, select 1. If there is no such juxtaposition, opposition, comparison or differentiation, or if either term is simply used without mentioning the other, select 0.

16 “Central-Eastern Europe”
If the phrase “Central-Eastern Europe” or “East-Central” appears in the text, select 1. If there is no such appearance, select 0.

17 Europe as actor
If the text at least once portrays Europe as capable of carrying out independent actions as a single actor by saying “Europe wants…”, “Europe’s goal is…”, “Europe won…”, “Europe lost…”, “Europe needs…”, “Europe has to…”, “Europe will do (this and that)…”, “Europe acts/will act…” etc.), or if the opposite statements are made in the negative form, select 1. If no such statement is made at all, select 0. If “Europe” is at least once found in the subject position in a sentence with an active form verb predicate (except for “to be”), choose 1. Also choose 1, if Europe is constructed as a single actor by other means (for example, by direct statement “Europe is a unified actor”), if this is, according to your judgement, an important point of the article.

18 Threats from Europe
If the text describes potential or actual harm to the country of its publication or community of its readers coming intentionally or unintentionally from what it sees as Europe (if it is seen as a unified actor – see above) and having a potential or actual negative impact on the country where the newspaper is published or on the community of its readers, select 1. If no such description is invoked or the threats emanate from actors merely located in Europe but not identified with Europe as a whole, select 0. “Harm” and “negative impact” are understood here as a decrease in welfare, security, influence, position, a weakening of identity etc. of the community/country/state. If the negative consequences of Europe’s actions had been
potential at a point in the past but were averted or never materialised, still choose 1.

19 Europe in distress
If the text says that negative events, processes or trends happen in Europe that bring about what is seen as harmful consequences for Europe itself (such as economic decline, democracy deficit, infringement of national sovereignty or individual rights, weakening security, group infighting, moral and social decay etc., etc.), select 1. If no such description is invoked, select 0. If troubles concern individual European countries without Europe mentioned in the immediate context, choose 0. If troubles in individual counties are described with Europe mentioned in the immediate context, choose 1. If troubles are described as happening in the EU or Eurozone, choose 1. If troubles are described as having happened in the past and not happening anymore, still choose 1.

20 Conflict with Europe
If the text implies that the country of the newspaper’s publication or the community of its readers are in an open struggle, either resisting defensively or attacking offensively, against what it sees as Europe, select 1. If no such implication is made or the text is simply disappointed or unhappy with Europe, select 0. “Open struggle” should be understood as exchange of harmful actions with the aim to improve own situation and worsen the situation of the rival subject, with both sides admitting these aims.

21 Europe as goal
If the text says that “Europe” poses for the country of its publication or the community of its reader a goal that already is or has to be a priority of the current domestic political, economical, social, cultural process, for example as the destination of reform especially expressed in terms of spatial metaphors of “movement”, select 1. If no such idea is expressed, select 0.

22 Adjusting to Europe
If the text says that its country of publication or the community of its readers are obliged to or should oblige to change themselves, or would be better off if changed, to become more like what it implies by “Europe”, select 1. If no such idea is expressed, select 0. If the text says that they should act or behave the way Europeans act, choose 1. If the text expresses regret
that they do not act or behave like Europeans or refuse to change themselves or accept an obligation to change, select 1.

23 Adjusting Europe
If the text says that what it implies by “Europe” has to change itself to become more like the country of newspaper’s publication or its community of readers, or Europeans should behave more like the people in the country of the newspaper’s publication, select 1. If no such idea is expressed, select 0.

24 Unwelcoming Europe
If the text describes what it understands by “Europe” as seeking to distance itself from the country of the newspaper’s publication or the community of its readers or individual representatives thereof, or otherwise creating obstacles and boundaries to interaction with them, select 1. If no such description is made, select 0.

25 Europe as difficult for travels
If the text mentions difficulties for the representatives from the country of the newspaper’s publication or the community of its readers or other third parties characters (including migrant workers and refugees) in travelling to and/or within what is understood by “Europe”, select 1. If no such references are made, select 0.

26 Successful Europe
If in the text’s narrative Europe succeeds in achieving its goal(s) or successfully accomplishing something that has been planned and/or organized by it, select 1. If no such references are made, select 0. Select 0 as well when such actions happen in or are performed by individual countries seen as European without mentioning Europe at all.

27 Abundant Europe
If the text describes what it calls “Europe” as a place characterised by abundance, wealth, good living, including when it is compared favourably to the situation in the country of the newspaper’s publication, select 1. If no such description is made, select 0. Select 0 as well when such descriptions relate to individual countries seen as European without mentioning Europe at all.
28 Emigration to Europe
If the text says that personally moving from the country of its publication to what is seen as Europe will increase one’s wellbeing, success and/or other aspects of life, select 1. ‘Moving’ is understood here as relocating permanently for work or studies. If no such estimate is made, select 0. Select 0 as well when such descriptions relate to individual countries seen as European without mentioning Europe at all.

29 Emigrating advice
If the text provides practical advice in the form of recommendations, tips, “lifehacks”, experience sharing, on how one could move from its current country of residence (presumably, the country of the newspaper’s publication) to what is implied by “Europe”, select 1. ‘Move’ is understood here as relocating permanently for work or studies but not travelling for tourism or vacation. If no such advice is given in the text, select 0.

30 Common European identity
If the text mentions a common European identity and says that it exists, select 1. If no such reference is made or hesitant, select 0. If the text contains formulations such as “Europe is…/Europeans are…” describing their inherent qualities, choose 1.

31 Institutional Europe
If the text has a focus on or provides explanations on how any European institution(s) work(s), explains or describes pan-European political processes, legislation, legal norms and procedures, select 1. If no such perspective is detectable, select 0.

32 Euromaidan and Ukrainian crisis
If the text mentions Ukraine, Ukrainian politicians, Ukrainian politics (before or after November 2013), Ukrainian crisis, Euromaidan, Donbas, any other region in Ukraine, war in Donbas etc., select 1. If no such reference is made, select 0.

33 Chronology
Check the chronology of the events only in the sentences and paragraphs where Europe is mentioned. Select the respective code for references to the events of the present (within one year before or ahead the date of publi-
cation), earlier (than one year) and prospective future (later than one year) events, also if they concern actors other than “Europe”. Ignore the conditional mode and subjunctives.

34 Europe’s terrible past
If the text mentions past events that happened or were otherwise related to Europe (carried out in it, by it or related to it) and are seen as destructive, uncivilised, intolerable, harmful and so on, select 1. If no such references are made, select 0.

35 Europe’s past golden age
If the text says that Europe had periods that are compared favourably to its present situation, select 1. If no such statement is made, select 0.

36 Europe’s future golden age
If the text says that Europe is headed towards or is otherwise going to have a period in its future that is compared favourably to its present (and possibly past) situation, select 1. If no such reference is made, select 0.

37 Europe as metonymy
If the text uses the word “Europe” to refer to non-geographical substances that it associates with Europe based on their closeness (they are widely practiced or originated there: “Euro-renovation”, “European style”, “European values”, “Europe coat”, “socks like in Europe”, “a la Europe”, “in a European way”), select 1. If no such use is made, select 0.

38 Europe as synecdoche
If the text uses the word “Europe” to refer to what it implies to be one of its parts (such as one country or one institution, for example if “Europe” used to refer to them: France, Brussels, the European Commission, some Europe-located group or community, industry, enterprise or association, or even an individual), select 1. If no such use is made, select 0.

39 Europe as catachresis
Select 1, if the text uses the word “Europe” in an unconventional usage, such as: 1) crossing categorical boundaries with other words, 2) reversal of the expected meaning, 3) replacing the word or its part with another word or its
part to create a completely different meaning (cf. “Gayropa”), 4) strained\textsuperscript{27} use of the word, 5) replacement of the word with an ambiguous synonym. If none of such uses is made, select 0.

THE QUESTIONNAIRE STARTS HERE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>0 Put the article’s reference number</th>
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<th>1 Put the code for the country where the article was published</th>
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<th>2 Put the code for the newspaper where the article was published</th>
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<th>3 Put the code for the genre</th>
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<th>4 Put the code for the topic of the article</th>
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<td>0 Domestic politics</td>
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<td>3 Economy</td>
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<td>6 Arts</td>
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<td>8 Lifestyle/travel</td>
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<td>12 Other (specify)</td>
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<th>5 The text is illustrated with a picture</th>
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<td>0 No; N/A</td>
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<th>6 Specify the content of the picture</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 N/A (no picture)</td>
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<td>1A People: politician(s)</td>
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\textsuperscript{27} Strained: 1) done or produced with excessive effort; 2) pushed by antagonism near to open conflict (Merriam-Webster).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
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<tr>
<td>2A Building(s): landmarks</td>
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<td>2B Building(s): institutions</td>
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<td>2C Building(s): anonymous/atmospheric</td>
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<td>3 Event</td>
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<td>4 Landscapes</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 Paintings</td>
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<td>6 Collage/cartoon</td>
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<td>7 Picture of the text’s author</td>
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<td>8 Other</td>
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<td>7 The entire/part of action in the text takes place in Europe</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>8 The text uses word “Europe” in a purely geographical sense as the continent bordered by the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Arctic, the strait of Bosporus and the Ural mountains; without references to symbolic/abstract Europe or European institutions</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9 The text uses word “Europe” at least once as synonymous to the European Union</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10 The text uses word “Europe” at least once to refer to the Council of Europe</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 The text uses word “Europe” at least once to refer to a symbolic reality not identical with institutions or geographical references (including: mentions of European norms, practices, standards)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Are the symbolic qualities (including: norms, practices, standards, also quality control) described as positive (benign) or negative (malign)?</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Neutral; N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
13 What specific values are ascribed as inherent to what is understood as Europe, if any? (Specify; write N/A if non-applicable)

14 The article describes European symbolic qualities as fundamentally incompatible with the country where it is published/the community of its readers

0 No 1 Yes

15 The text makes a clear distinction between Eastern and Western Europe (excluding: simply using either term)

0 No 1 Yes

16 The text mentions Central-Eastern or East-Central Europe

0 No 1 Yes

17 The article says that Europe is a unified actor or puts it at least once in the active subject position in a sentence

0 No 1 Yes

18 The article makes references to what it represents as threats from Europe as an actor to the country of publication (excluding: threats from the actors located in Europe)

0 No 1 Yes

19 The text says that there are or were troubles in Europe

0 No 1 Yes
20 The article makes references to an explicit struggle between what it calls “Europe” and the country where it is published/the community of its readers (excluding: dissatisfaction with Europe or aspects thereof)
0 No 1 Yes

21 The text says or implies unambiguously that “Europe” represents for the country where it is published/the community of its readers a goal that has to be achieved
0 No 1 Yes

22 The text says or implies unambiguously that “Europe” is something to which the country where it is published/the community of its readers has to adjust
0 No 1 Yes

23 The text says or implies unambiguously that “Europe” is something that has to adjust itself to the country where it is published/the community of its readers
0 Yes 1 Yes

24 The text describes what it calls “Europe” as unwelcoming and rejecting (towards people or other actors in the country of its publication, or towards this country itself)
0 No 1 Yes

25 The text refers to difficulties in traveling to and within what it describes as Europe (including: migrant workers)
0 No 1 Yes

26 The text describes what it calls “Europe” as successful in achieving its goals (excluding: individual European countries without mentioning “Europe”)
0 No 1 Yes
27 The text describes what it calls “Europe” as the location of material abundance and supreme living standards (excluding: individual countries without mentioning Europe)

0 No 1 Yes

28 The text suggests it is good to emigrate from the country of its publication to what it understands as Europe

0 No 1 Yes

29 The text gives its readers practical advice on how to emigrate from the country of its publication to what it understands as Europe

0 No 1 Yes

30 The text says explicitly that there is a common European identity

0 No 1 Yes

31 The text describes what it calls “Europe” from an institutional perspective, focusing on internal working and politics or one or several European institutions

0 No 1 Yes

32 The text makes references to what it calls “Europe” in the context of Ukraine, Ukrainian politics, Ukrainian crisis or Euromaidan (also in the context of Ukraine/Ukrainian politics before November 2013)

0 No 1 Yes

33 In the text’s chronology, which of the following is mentioned in relation to what it understands as Europe (multiple responses possible)?

0 Past (earlier than 1 year before date of writing)
APPENDIX

1 Present (incl. 1 year before and after date of writing)
2 Future (later than 1 year after date of writing)

34 Does the text make reference to the idea that what it understands as Europe had a terrible past?
0 No 1 Yes

35 Does the text make reference to the idea that what it understands as Europe had a golden age in the past?
0 No 1 Yes

36 Does the text make reference to the idea that what it understands as Europe will have a golden age in the future?
0 No 1 Yes

37 Does the text make use of the word “Europe” as a metonymy?
0 No 1 Yes

38 Does the text make use of the word “Europe” as a synecdoche?
0 No 1 Yes

39 Does the text make use of the word “Europe” as a catachresis?
0 No 1 Yes

END OF QUESTIONNAIRE
Appendix 3
Questionnaires for in-depth interviews (examples)28

Instructions: the interview is to be administered by asking the respondents the following set of questions in the indicated order. In case of need, immediate follow-up questions can be posed (asking for clarifications, reasons, examples and so on). The follow-up questions or subquestions (marked as SQ) should be asked when the answers given by the respondent appear poor/insufficient. The follow-ups are not supposed to be asked mandatorily. The interview should last between 30 and 60 minutes.

Questionnaire for semi-structured general guide approach in-depth interviews with Ukrainian journalists (used especially for those who covered Euromaidan)

Q1: How did Maidan change your work?
   SQ1: What were your or your editorial team’s main information sources? How much time did you or your colleagues spend in Maidan, if present?
Q2: What were you specifically doing when in Maidan, if you or your colleagues covered it personally?
   SQ2: What was your typical day/night in Maidan like?
Q3: How did your newsroom cover the protests?
   SQ3: How did the journalists and editors perceived the events? Was any censorship attempted?
Q4: What was the people’s attitude towards journalists, if you were present during the protest?
   SQ4: Did journalists keep themselves separately, why yes or no?
Q5: How did the relationship with the politicians changed in Maidan or as a result of Maidan?
   SQ5: What has the influence of politicians on journalists and vice versa been since the beginning of Maidan?
Q6: Where do you see the line separating journalist and activist?
   SQ6: Why were you in Maidan? What were you professional/personal reasons? In what capacity were you present at the site of the protest? Is the professional community uniform or there are different groups?

—

28 According to the chosen methodological approach, the interviews were conducted as semi-structured and in a number of cases deviated from these templates (used rather as departure points). The questionnaires also developed during the study, with some questions omitted and new ones added, although in essence these questions remained as the basis.
APPENDIX

Q7: How did Maidan change the perception of the media in society?
   SQ7: How do you think people viewed you and your work before and after the protest?
Q8: Which groups had more influence on decision-making in Maidan?
   SQ8: Who had the most authority? Who eventually had more power?
Q9: What was the place of journalists in Maidan? What kind of influence did they have?
   SQ9: To which extent do you think journalists could project influence on protesters, protest leaders and oppositional politicians?

Questionnaire for semi-structured general guide approach in-depth interviews with diplomats and foreign policy experts

Q1: How do you define Europe and what do you think its political role is?
   SQ1: Where are the limits of Europe?
Q2: What is the relation of your country and Europe: part of the whole, one of the leaders, a dissident, something else?
   SQ2: What is your attitude towards Maidan?
Q3: What impact did Maidan have on you?
   SQ3: What was the reaction of external policy makers to Maidan? What was their possible involvement?
Q4: How were policy makers affected by Maidan?
   SQ4: How often do (did) you have to execute the decisions that run contrary to what you find desirable?
Q5: When it comes to translating symbolic power and influence into political one, who do you think has the most authority in the society?
   SQ5: Which sources are relevant for your work? Are they different to what you use otherwise?
Q6: What is the general role and place of media in society?
   SQ6: How does your department/mission collect information? Where does it receive the information from? How do you perform its analysis? How regularly do you monitor news media and which ones?
Q7: What does being informed mean for you?
   SQ7: How do you use the information you collect?
Q8: What are the sources of information you use? Why do you use these sources and not others?
   SQ8: What are the most valuable things in the media for you? Do you need rather facts than opinion, or conversely? Do you need to separate them always?
Q9: Where do you see the strongest influence of the media in society?
   SQ9: What is the role of media in society? To what extent public opinion in your country is shaped by the media, in particular the ones you use?
Q10: How would you describe the relation between the external policy and what the public says?
   SQ10: What determines the external policy the most? What is the influence of media and the public opinion on what you do?
**Questionnaire for semi-structured general guide approach in-depth interviews with journalists**

Q1: How did Maidan affect your work?  
   SQ1: What were your main information sources?  

Q2: How was the coverage of Maidan specifically organised?  
   SQ2: Were you or any other journalist from your publication physically present during the Maidan?  

Q3: How did your newsroom cover the protests?  
   SQ3: How did the journalists and editors perceived the events?  

Q4: How did Maidan change the social perceptions?  
   SQ4: The role of media? Perception of Ukraine?  

Q5: What is the dynamic of the relations between media and politicians in your country?  
   SQ5: What has the influence of politicians on journalists and vice versa been in your country?  

Q6: Where do you see the line separating journalist and activist?  
   SQ6: Is the professional community uniform or there are different groups?  

Q7: What is, in your opinion, the dominant attitude to journalists in your country?  
   SQ7: How do you think people viewed you and your work before and how do they now?  

Q8: Which groups have more influence on decision-making in your country?  
   SQ8: Who has the most authority in your country? Who eventually has more power?  

Q9: What was the place of journalists in your country? What kind of influence do they have?  
   SQ9: To which extent do you think journalists could project influence on politicians and decision-makers?


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The national narratives of Europe in Ukraine, Russia and Poland are characterised by a dependence on the West. Historically, these narratives vacillated between idealising admiration, materialist pragmatics and geopolitical demonising. They have been present in each country to some extent, intertwined with their own identification.

These discourses of Europe were rekindled and developed during Euromaidan (2013–2014). Nine major Ukrainian, Russian and Polish newspapers with diverse orientations struggled to define Europe as a continent, as the EU or as a set of values. Political orientation defined attitude; liberal publications in all three countries focused on the positives whereas conservative and business newspapers were more critical of Europe. There were, however, divergent national patterns. Coverage in Ukraine was positive mostly, in Russia more negative and the Polish perception significantly polarised.

During and after Euromaidan, Ukrainian journalists used their powerful Europe-as-values concept to actively intervene in the political field and promote it in official foreign policy. This was enabled by the abandoning journalistic neutrality. In contrast, Russian and Polish journalists were more dependent on the foreign policy narratives dispensed by political elites and more constrained in their social practice.

Roman Horbyk accomplished his BA and MA degrees at Kyiv National Taras Shevchenko University. He then received an international Master’s degree in 2012 with a joint certificate from the Universities of Aarhus and Hamburg. Mediated Europes – Discourse and Power in Ukraine, Russia and Poland during Euromaidan is his doctoral dissertation.

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