Vol. XXX, 1980
Wängstedi, Sten V.: Demotische Quittungen über Ölsteuer ........................................ 5
Meinardus, Otto F. A.: Eine koptische Darstellung des Sündenfalls .................................. 27
Rundgren, Frithiof: Principia Linguistica Semitica .............................................................. 32
Cardaillac, Louis: Morisques et Chrétiens dans l'Espagne du XVIe siècle ......................... 103
Paula, Heikki: Characteristics of the Arabic Dialect of the Bani Sajar Tribe ....................... 112
Wallén, Ruth: Hidden Indo-European and/or Indo-Aryan 'Loanwords' in Old Tamil? ........ 140
Book Reviews ........................................................................................................................... 157
Works Received ....................................................................................................................... 179

Vol. XXX, 1981
Wängstedi, Sten V.: Demotische Ostraka. Varia II ................................................................. 5
Riad, Eva: Ṣafī'ā dans le Coran .................................................................................................. 37
Rundgren, Frithiof: The Poem "Dayr ‘Abdūn" by Ibn al-Mu'tazz ........................................ 63
Almbladh, Karin: hēlāk—"miserable", and hūn—"strength" and "supplication" ....................... 133
Eskult, Mats: Hebrew and Aramaic ṭeqām ............................................................................ 137
Gutwirth, E.: The ‘World Upside Down’ in Hebrew .............................................................. 141
Kronholm, Tryggve: The Vale of Tears .................................................................................. 149
Rundgren, Frithiof: Aramaica IV .......................................................................................... 173
Book Reviews ........................................................................................................................... 185
Works Received ....................................................................................................................... 216

Vol. XXXI-XXXII, 1982-1983
Wängstedi, Sten V.: Demotische Ostraka. Varia III ............................................................... 5
Brunschi, Wolfgang: Acht Holztafeln aus dem Britischen Museum .................................... 33
Hummel, Siegfried: Vignette zum ägyptischen Totenbuch, Kap. 110 ................................. 43
Kronholm, Trygve: Dependence and Prophetic Originality in the Koran ............................. 47
Retsō, Jan: Subjectless sentences in Arabic dialects .............................................................. 71
Rundgren, Frithiof: On the Representation of Morphemic Categories in Arabic ................. 93
Meinardus, Otto F. A.: Eine volkstümliche Yunus Emre Kultstätte ...................................... 117
Riad, Eva: Old Syriac xanninā "fosterling" ............................................................................ 123
Cannuyer, Christian: Les Nestoriens du Proche-Orient au XIIIe siècle .............................. 131
Rundgren, Frithiof: Aramaica V ............................................................................................ 143
Samovantsov, A. M.: The Legal Systems of the Arthasāstra and the Dharmaśāstra .............. 147
Wällén, Ruth: Reflections on the Tamil Alphabet .................................................................. 163
Book Reviews ........................................................................................................................... 179
Works Received ....................................................................................................................... 203

Vol. XXXIII-XXXV, 1984-1986
Amer, Attila: .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ORIENTALIA SUECANA

founded by Erik Gren


Edited by
FRITHIOF RUNDGREN

ALMQVIST & Wiksell International
Stockholm Sweden
# Contents

*Brunsch, Wolfgang*: Zwei demotische Texte aus Hamburg .................. 5  
*Meinardus, Otto F. A.*: Die koptische Kunst im Wandel der letzten drei Jahrhunderte .................................................. 11  
*Vitestam, Gösta*: Στραγγαξ und γυν. An Etymological Study .................. 29  
*Eilers, Wilhelm*: Zu Resch als Wurzdeterminativ (r-) .................. 39  
*Kronholm, Tryggve*: Damim al-hawā: Ibn al-Jauzī’s Treatise against Passion .................. 47  
*Rundgren, Frithiof*: Aspectology in the Light of Text Linguistics .................. 57  
*Rundgren, Frithiof*: Some Remarks on the Ktābā dā- ‘al ida’tā da-ṣrārā 77  
*Rundgren, Frithiof*: Odor suavitatis ........................................ 85  
*Edsman, Carl-Martin*: Réponse ........................................ 99  
*Baitchura, Uzbek*: An Overview of the Altaic Vocalism with Regard to Some General Laws of Language Development .......................................... 101  
*Raising, Gad*: Soma ........................................ 125  
*Walldén, Ruth*: Notes on Tamil Phonology ........................................ 127  
**Book Reviews:** ........................................ 135  
**Works Received** ........................................ 143
Zwei demotische Texte aus Hamburg

WOLFGANG BRUNSSCH


1) P. Hamburg D33 ro²: Schülerübung (Tafeln 1–2)
(10,2 × 10 cm; am oberen und linken Rand Spuren einer Kolumnenbegrenzung; der Papyrus ist von hellem Braun, die Tusche schwarz. Herkunft: Fajum (?), Datierung: 1.–2. Jahrhundert n. Chr.)

Text:
1) sıf j †w† - mnmn a {†w†}
2) sıf hqr b
3) sıf †jﬁ ttn c
4) sıf †jﬁ †w† - qqs q d
5) sıf †w† - ..?.. e
6) sıf tāj - lhjm f
7) sıf †w† - qnt g
8) sıf †w† -  Lâm qnt h

a) <cq : die Lesung †w†- (נ) erscheint mir, trotz des letzten Zeichens, das wie ein zu gross geratenges t aussieht, unumgänglich, vgl. Erichsen, Glossar 25, 1. römischer Schriftbeleg. <cq : mnmn - schütteln.

b) Oder ist q̱ṟ - Beutel γ - γ zu lesen? (s. Erichsen, Glossar 544 s.v., römischer Schriftbeleg). Dann wäre das Zeichen γ wohl dj.t. zu lesen; doch erscheint diese Möglichkeit fraglicher als die erste.

c) <c̱ : tontr - gleichen (oder q̱ṉn - kämpfen?)

d) <c̱ : lochc - tanzen (Erichsen, Glossar 550/593), mit dem Determinativ des schlagenden Armes.

e) Das Zeichen hinter †w† - γ ist dasselbe wie das, mit dem qqs aufhört (oder ist es ṉt bzw. ṉw zu lesen?).

f) lhjm – Lotosknospe, s. P. Kairo 30692, 22: „... s̱n ṟhmj sṟpt ...“ – „Lotos, Lotosknospe und Lotosblatt“; und P. Berlin P 13603, II 7 (Erichsen/Schott,

Für die Publikationserlaubnis und die Photos mit den entsprechenden Angaben danke ich Herrn Direktor Dr. Gronemeyer.
Fragmente memphitischer Theologie): „… ïrm w' t lhmj …“ – „und eine Lotosknospe“.

g) Hỹt – Feige.

h) Wiederholung von Zeile 7.

Tafel 2. P. Hamburg D 33 ro (Handpause).
Übersetzung:
1) Schwert, unerschütterliches
2) Schwert, hungern des
3) Schwert, ähnelndes (?)
4) Schwert, tanzendes
5) Schwert, machtloses (?) (oder: unsichtbares (7))
6) Schwert, Lotosknospen pflückendes
7) Schwert, feigenloses (sic)
8) — idem —

Bei dem Text handelt es sich offenbar um eine recht flüchtig hingeschriebene Schülerübung, in der gleiche (ähnliche) Syntagmata eingeübt wurden. Für seine Zwecke verwendete der Schüler, dem vielleicht eine Vorlage zur Verfügung stand, ein freigebiebenes quadratisches Stück der Vorderseite eines religiösen Textes, von dem der folgende ein Teil war.

2) P. Hamburg D 33 vso: Isisilitanei (Tafeln 3–4)

(Datierung: 1.–2. Jahrhundert n.Chr. Der Text auf dem Recto bietet einen Datierungspunkt ante quem; zu den übrigen Daten s. unter P. Hamburg D 33 ro)

Text:

x+1) ..?.. [t3] 'Tluj (?)[a] whm 'nḫ3 (?)[b] [... x+2) t3 bl.t³ ntj hn Pr-Sbk[d] [... x+3) ..?.. t3 hj.t (t3) bhj.(t)³ ntj'ḥn [... x+4) [t3] hwnt.w³ t³.t³ ntj hn ..?.. [... x+5) ..?.. t3 hwnt.w³ mnḥ[t... x+6) 'Iwnw t3 nb.t Šm³ [... x+7) ntj hn Pr-Wsfr {-r³} t3 hwnt ntj'ḥn [... ]

a) : Lesung nur als Vorschlag gedacht (אַלפָּס). Deutlich erkennbar sind lediglich lj am Anfang und das Isiszeichen am Schluss.

b) : Die Lesung 'nh ist nur als Vorschlag gedacht; die Wendung wäre damit demotisch das erste Mal belegt, vgl. „τὸ ἄνω“ — „of old“, P. Oxy 1380, II 38.

c) : bl.t. (ﺈپس) — jung (oder إل – blind (?)).


e) : Lesung mit Vorbehalt, vgl. „εὔφρωσύνην“', P. Oxy 1380, II 37.

f) : Vgl. die Parallele im P. Tebt.Tait 14, 7: „ntj hn 'Iwnw t3 hwnt.w³ t³ ntj hn Nw.t³“ — „who is in Hermonthis, the great Maiden who is in Thebes“.

g) Vielleicht ein mit mw- beginnender Ortsname.

h) : Hier eindeutig „Herrin“ — „ἀνασσαρ“, nicht „Maiden“ — „χώρη“, vgl. auch Zeile x+7: "אוכ". 
i) Ob verderbt aus: t³ nb.t ²Iwnw-šm²? Dann wäre Hermonthis gemeint₁².

j) ḫp³ ²jš: Vielleicht handelt es sich um Abusir el-meleq im 20. oberägyptischen Gau₁³. Auffallend und mir unerklärlich ist das abusive {-r⁻} dann in der Schreibung.
Übersetzung:

x+1) ... [die] Jugendliche (?), ewig lebend (?) [ ... 
x+2) die Junge, welche in Pr-Sbk ist [ ... 
x+3) ... die Hohe, die Glückliche, welche in [ ... 
x+4) [die] grosse Jungfrau, welche in ... [ ... 
x+5) ... die wohlütige Herrin [ ... 
x+6) die Herrin von Herbonthis (?) [ ... 
x+7) welche in Pr-Wsir ⟨r°⟩ ist, die Herrin, welche in [ ... 

Der vorliegende Text ist mit P. Tebt.Tait 14 ein weiterer Zeuge für eine demotische Parallelversion zum ersten Teil von P. Oxy 1380\(^{14}\), einer ätiologischen Aufzählung von Orten und den Erscheinungsformen der Isis, in welchen sie dort verehrt wird\(^{15}\). Da in keinem Falle eine direkte Entsprechung von demotischem und griechischem Text vorliegt\(^{16}\), muss die Frage nach der Originalfassung weiterhin offen bleiben\(^{17}\).

ANMERKUNGEN


2. Vom Inhalt der Texte her erscheint die Annahme vso/ro für die Reihenfolge der Beschreibung plausibler.


6. Gauthier, Dictionnaire géographique, s.v. (125).

7. W. J. Tait, Papyri from Tebtunis in Egyptian and in Greek (Texts from Excavations 3), London 1977, 49.

8. Gauthier, o.c., i.e. (28–33).

9. P. Oxy 1380, 1 15.16.

10. Tait, o.c., 49 und 51 o.

11. P. Oxy 1380, IV 71.


13. Gauthier, o.c., s.v. (69).


15. Eine geordnete geographische Abfolge ist dabei nicht auszumachen.


17. S. einerseits Weinreich, in: Aegyptus 11, 1930/31, 18 und andererseits Tait, o.c., 52.
Die koptische Kunst im Wandel der letzten drei Jahrhunderte

OTTO F. A. MEINARDUS

ZUM BEGRIFF DER KOPTISCHEN KUNST


Begriiff, so stellt sie eine ‘barbarische’ Volkskunst dar, die von Kopten getragen wurde.


Auch in der koptischen Museumswelt wird nur ein bescheidener Raum der Spätzeit zugemessen. Im Koptischen Museum zu Alt-Kairo ist der Ikonographie der letzten drei Jahrhunderte ein Saal zugewiesen. Die Ausstellungen der koptischen Kunst in Minya und Dair Abû Hinnis\(^1\) beschränken sich auf Gegenstände der ‘alten’ Kunst. Ein anderes Bild ergibt sich aus den Sammlungen koptischer Kunstgegenstände in den koptischen Klöstern. Besonders herauszustellen sind die Coptica des St. Antonius-Klosters (Dair Anbâ Antûniûs) in der östlichen Wüste am Roten Meer\(^1\), des Syrer-Klosters (Dair as-Surîân)\(^1\) und des St. Makarius-Klosters (Dair Abû Maqâr) in der Wüste des Wādi ḫ-n-Natrûn\(^1\).

DAS 18. JAHRHUNDERT


Ohne Steuern zu zahlen durften sie Land erwerben, Berufe ausüben und sie fielen auch nicht unter die ägyptische Gesetzeshoheit.


Im 18. Jahrhundert erwarben drei der vier koptischen Wüstenklöster im Wâdî ʿn-Natrûn (Dair Abû Maqâr, Dair as-Sûriân, Dair Anbâ Bishoi) eine Reihe
tuches Christi über dem horizontalen Querbalken des Kreuzes aus dem Weißen Kloster (Dair al-Ahmar) westlich von Sohag in der Kirche der hl. Märtyrer (Dair as-Shuhadá) am östlichen Wüstenrand von al-Hawáwish, östlich der oberägyptischen Stadt Akhmim²⁶.


Beachtenswert für diese Epoche ist die Fabrikation von Altarschränken, und Tischler und Elfenbeinschnitzer füllten eine aufgetretene Lücke. So berichtet Burmester allein von acht Altarschränken, die zwischen 1738 und 1778 in fünf Kirchen von Alt-Kairo errichtet wurden²⁹.

Sowohl der Mangel an geeignetem Holz als auch der Einfluß westlicher Maltechniken veranlaßten so manchen koptischen Maler im 18. Jahrhundert sich von der traditionellen Holztafelmalerei loszulösen und größere Flächenbilder auf
Malerleinwand herzustellen. Die Qualität dieser Ausführungen litt unter der stetigen Nachfrage, so daß Alfred Butler seine Beurteilung der koptischen Malerei dieser Epoche wie folgt zusammenfaßt:

Panel-pictures are older and generally more interesting than those on canvas—a material which has only been used during the last two hundred years: and the painters on canvas were so childishly wanting in all power of design and colouring, that their works may be dismissed in one sentence as worthless. The paintings on panel are rather difficult to classify, either by date or style, owing to the persistence of Byzantine methods and traditions.  

Viele dieser auf Leinwand gemalten Bilder in den Kirchen sind heutzutage in schlechtem Zustand, entweder teilweise eingerissen oder verdreht.

DAS 19. JAHRHUNDERT


Zusätzliche politische Bestätigung erhielten die Kopten durch eine Reihe von Dekreten, die ihnen weitere Rechte verschafften, besonders durch den Hatt-i-Sharif von Gülhane 1839 und den Hatt-i-Humâyun 1856. Die wichtigsten Aspekte dieser Regelungen betrafen die kirchlichen Angelegenheiten, die Verwaltung der Kirchengüter und frommen Stiftungen (waqf), die Errichtung konfessioneller


Evangelisten Lukas gemaltes Marienbild verehrt. Für die Kirchen in den koptischen Wüstentösten des Wādi ḫ-n-Natrūn bemalte er Kelchtabernakel.36 Auch in Jerusalem wirkte er für die koptische Kirche. Das Triptychon, das die 24 Ältesten der Apokalypse und den Pantokrator darstellt, schmückte bis 1967 die Südwand der Kirche der Vier Körperlosen Wesen (Asomati) in der Grabeskirche.37

Alle von Astāsī ar-Rumī gemalten Ikonen tragen am unteren Bildrand einen arabischen Text mit Widmung, Hersteller und Datum. Die Mehrzahl seiner Ikonen sind mit dem Datum des koptischen Kalenders (A.M.) datiert, aber auch Daten mit dem islamischen Kalender (A.H.) finden Verwendung. Typische Texte lauten:


oder


Diese Beobachtung ist umso beachtenswerter, da während der Amtszeit von Kyrillus IV. sich in Kairo und Asyūt eine bilderfeindliche Bewegung ausbreitete. Aufgrund der populären Verehrung von Ikonen, ließ der Patriarch die Tafelbilder zusammenbringen und öffentlich auf Scheiterhaufen verbrennen. Butler beschrieb den Vorfall: „Considering that too much reverence was shown to pictures, and being determined to put down the superstition, he ordered paintings to be brought
from all quarters, and made a grand bonfire of them. No doubt many of the oldest and best thus perished, though in many other cases the order was fortunately disregarded.  


Die Ikonographie des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts, obwohl in vielen Fällen eigenständig geprägt aufgrund der koptischen Hagiologie, lehnte sich dennoch stark an die byzantinischen Vorgaben an, wie Butler sie auch treffend beschrieb:

Coptic art generally has a certain large leaven of Byzantine elements ... the Coptic paintings that remain, instead of indicating a single type immutably permanent, show a steady continuous order of change, and although this change is a change of disintegration and decay, it proves nevertheless that the art contained organic vitality and vigour.

DAS 20. JAHRHUNDERT


den Geist ihrer Ahnen widerspiegeln. So schreibt Ramses Younan: „Professor Habib Gorgi, an archaeologist of a particular genre, has also been occupied for some ten years in excavating the Nile Valley in his own way. Only, instead of digging up the earth for antiquities, he explores the souls of young Egyptians, with the resolute faith that the genius which has produced the ancient art cannot possibly be entirely extinct, but must be hidden somewhere in the depths of the people’s heart. The fact is, that for Professor Gorgi, the soul can be thought of as made up of several layers, of which only the outermost is exposed to the influence of the enviroment, the innermost reaffirming an experience thousands of years old.“


In der koptischen Ikonographie machte sich dieser Bewußtseinswandel auf die ursprüngliche ägyptische Identität besonders bemerkbar, indem man sich vorzugsweise von fremden Einflüssen abwandte und sowohl das byzantinische als auch das westliche Erbe kategorisch ablehnte. Führung in dieser neo-koptischen ikonographischen Bewegung ist der im koptischen Institut (Institute of Coptic Studies) in Abbasiyah, Kairo, schaffende und lehrende Professor Isaak Fanûs, der seit über dreißig Jahren eine Vielzahl von koptischen Kirchen in Ägypten und im Ausland (z.B. in London) künstlerisch ausgestattet hat. Einige seiner bedeutendsten Schüler sind Mansûr Farag, Yusuf Girgis Ayad, Kamila Shawky und
Bidur Latif, deren ikonographische Werke ebenfalls in vielen koptischen Kirchen zu sehen sind. Auffällig bei den Künstlern dieser neo-koptischen Schule ist die Auswahl der Motive. Neben den traditionellen biblischen Themen, nämlich denen des liturgischen Festtagszyklus, widmen sie sich besonders Themen der

Aber nicht nur die Wahl der typisch koptischen Motive zeichnet diese Schule
ANMERKUNGEN

21. Ibid.
29. Burmester, ACC, 21, 38, 46, 60, 70.
38. Siehe Note 33.
41. Siehe Note 36.
42. Butler, ACCE, II, 90.
43. Egypt's Princes, Philadelphia, 1864.
44. Modern Sons of the Pharaohs, London, 1918.
I

When the Editorial Committee of the Dictionary of the Swedish Academy (Svenska Akademiens Ordboksredaktion) had gathered material for the word storax (styrax) it was kind enough to consult me. The available handbooks stated that “styrax was imported into Greece by the Phoenicians and probably has a Semitic origin; cf. Hebr. šôrî. About this some have doubts.” Accordingly it was not clear whether the suggested “Semitic origin” refers to the object or if it also includes the word.¹ I found the problem extremely interesting but as I realized that part of the etymological aspect, particularly that which concerned the relations between the classical and Semitic languages, was beyond the scope of a Swedish dictionary I decided to undertake a more thorough study. The original relationship between the classical and Semitic peoples, languages and cultures is a fascinating chapter. It is well-known that confrontations and meetings between them have taken place periodically in different stages. Herodotos is certainly right when he says of the plant στύραξ and its products that it was one of the commodities which the Phoenicians exported to the countries around the Mediterranean Sea.² Στύραξ is a tree or bush which secretes a resin from which products like resin, gum, balsam, ointment, salve, spices and frankincense can be made. Στύραξ (storax, like mastic) corresponds to several Semitic words which are not clearly kept apart in different versions of the Bible.³ The most important in the Old Testament are libnā (Gen. 30: 37 and Hos. 4: 13) and nātāf (Ex. 30: 34). I will omit these words which have been taken by different translators to have identical or similar meanings. The interesting word is the Hebrew šôrî as it is this word which has been connected with the Greek στύραξ and it is also the most important and normative Hebrew name for this product. The word šôrî with its variations šîrî and šôrî and a feminine form (šîrîyā) occur in several places in the O.T.: Gen. 37: 25, 43: 11, Jer. 8: 22, 46: 11, 51: 8 and Hes. 27: 17. In the oldest versions this word is always translated by resin (resina, ḥetīn, ḥetīnē). This plant required a very warm climate to grow in natural conditions. Therefore it had very limited possibilities for spreading which naturally increased its value. Šôrî is sometimes called “balsam from Gilead”. The produce of this plant is nearly regarded as a national product in the O.T. zimrat hā-āres.⁴ It is also clear from the ancient sources that the plant was of great importance in international trade. This was above all due to its pharmacological usage. The following two quotations from Genesis, 37: 25 and 43: 11, make it clear that the plant was especially desirable to the Egyptians which wasn’t surprising as it was clearly one of the ingredients used in embalming.⁵
II

Before we go any further let us devote some attention to the Greek word στύραξ. Principally one cannot exclude the possibility that the word can have originated on Greek soil as an indigenous way of denoting the object with which one was confronted. στύραξ and στυράξων can also mean “lance shaft” and this could favour an indigenous origin. Several etymologists are, however, of the opinion that the meaning “lance shaft” is not independent but is originally identical with the word for the tree in question. The verb στυράξω “to smell or taste like styrax”, which is also mentioned in this connection clearly must be considered to be a denominative formation. The ending-αξ is not unusual in Greek. In this connection we can mention as an aside the remarkable fact that the etymology for this ending has not yet been completely elucidated. It is at any rate a phenomenon native to Greek. It occurs several times with names of plants, e.g. ὀμῦξαξ, σμῦλαξ and δόναξ. It should however be noted that Nehring considers the last of these as well as several other plant names with-αξ to be non-Greek. The discussion about internal classical problems does not however concern our position which involves the root styr-. We should remember that the word στύραξ does not occupy a unique position in the discussion of classical loanwords from the Semitic world. It is precisely within the plant kingdom that we find several Greek and Latin names that have a Semitic origin. κρόκιον, “crocus”, “safran” from Hebr. karkom; κυμίνιον, “cummin” from Hebr. kammon; λήδανον, “gum-mastic” from Arab. ladān or Hebr. lādan; ῥητίνη, “flowing gum” from Aram. rtn; λεβανός, “frankincense” from Hebr. lbn etc., are some examples.

It is hardly surprising in itself that the name of a unique object which is transferred from one culture to another follows the object and often undergoes an adjustment of form. This general approach supports the theory that στύραξ became the Greek designation of that commodity which, according to Herodotos, the Phoenicians exported and which was called ἱπτὶ in Hebrew.

Discussion of the linguistic problems involved with the two words took place during the 19th century mainly in the German learned world and engaged the attention of several of the foremost orientalists and classicists of the time. I shall now try to give a critical sketch of their research and thereafter continue with material which is of later date.

III

In his younger days the German orientalist, Julius Olshausen (born 1800), was interested in the question of which of the Semitic peoples first developed signs for writing and adjusted them to the Semitic sounds. He presented different possibilities as to priority and discussed among other things whether it was the Phoenicians who passed on their writing to the Hebrews or vice versa. Even if he thought that he could never reach a conclusive answer it became obvious that the Phoenicians had played a key role in the history of the northwest Semitic languages. The Phoenician and Hebrew languages were very closely related and it was certainly through the medium of the Phoenician that the Semitic languages confronted the Greek language.
Forty years later the same Olshausen interpreted our word, στῦραξ, and established that the name of the tree was of Phoenician origin. His thesis was, however, that the original form in Greek had been στῦραξ and that this reconstructed form should be related to Ἀστυραξ and linked up with Astarte, the famous goddess of the Phoenicians. The designation referred especially to the tree dedicated to Astarte. In his opinion the short initial-α had disappeared.

The best we can say about Olshausen's theory is that it demonstrated the cultural and religious influence exercised by the Phoenicians. As for the rest one can only agree with Heinrich Lewy when he declared some years later that this explanation was untenable ("haltlos").

Unfortunately we are obliged to observe that we hardly have any Phoenician sources in the original and can only form an idea of the Phoenician literature through certain Greek and Latin descriptions. Thus we can obtain no etymological clues from this sphere. We can derive certain information from the Babylonian and Assyrian linguistic area, namely from the so-called Tell el-Amarna letters (18th dynasty in Egypt. Amenhotep IV, Achnaton, reigned from 1370 to 1352 B.C.). One of the letters is from a woman to her mistress. As is usual in this ancient correspondence the letter is about the handing over of gifts. A Canaanite word, zurwa, which corresponds etymologically to the Hebrew šorī occurs here. It is a known fact that both Phoenician and Hebrew belong to the Canaanite linguistic sphere. The letter, which unfortunately is quite damaged, ends with the words: karpatu rikkat zu-ur-wa. The assyriologist, J. A. Knudtzon translates: "... ein Gefäß Gewürz (zurwa)" and says that here "begegnet uns die erste kanaänische Glossse zu dem babylonischen Worte rikkat". The corresponding word in Arabic is darw, which Lisān al-ʿarab and Tādj al-ʿarūs explain as "a species of tree of sweet odour. The teeth are cleansed with its wood and its leaves are put into perfume." There is an equivalent word in the Aramaic linguistic area which has become šarwā in Syriac. This word is glossed as "the fruit of the pine" (cone?) by Bar Bahlul. In Mishnaic Hebrew šorī designates a fragrant resin.

Apart from the various nuances in meaning which the word has received in the other Semitic languages it must be considered clear that the plant which the Phoenicians exported to the Greeks was that which was called šorī in Hebrew (Phoenician). More than a hundred years have now passed since the unparalleled orientalist, Paul de Lagarde, presented for the first time the theory that the Greek name στῦραξ was identical with the Hebrew šorī which he transcribed as גור or גור. Ten years later Lewy ascertained that "Schon Lagarde hat das Richtige gefunden: στῦραξ geht zurück auf hebr. šorī, 'das balsamische Harz des Mastixbaumes und der Terebinte'." Walther Prellwitz, who in his first edition of his Etymologisches Wörterbuch (1892) tried to derive στῦραξ from the root of στῦρω changed his mind, presumably influenced by the debate on the subject, and in the second edition he states that it is a Semitic loanword. He takes an unnecessary detour when he gives the American scholar, Muss-Arnolt, as his authority because Muss-Arnolt himself bases his study on the work of Prellwitz' German colleague, Paul de Lagarde.

Some years later Alfons Nehring expressed his doubts about this interpreta-
tion. He claimed without further explanation that there was a phonetical ("lautlich") difficulty as regards $s = \sigma$. He was also of the opinion that the plant in question was a native of Asia Minor and not of the Semitic area. This is an opinion which seems quite improbable since mastic products from Chios became known at the earliest during the Hellenistic period.

Nehring points out another semantic difficulty as he thinks that the secondary meaning of $\sigma\tau\gamma\phi\varsigma$, "lance shaft" is indigenous. There is, however, no proof that the word meaning "lance shaft" is more indigenous than the one in the other meaning and Nehring does not present convincing evidence for his theory. In reality the two meanings can be related to each other in a way which was no longer obvious at a later time. The fact is that several etymologists consider them to have an identical origin.

The outcome of the discussion which I have just summarized and which took place mainly towards the end of the last century was that two opinions crystallized which were in direct contradiction to each other. According to the one interpretation which was supported by several of the foremost semitists and classicists of the period it was considered perfectly clear that the word $\sigma\tau\gamma\phi\varsigma$ could be traced back to the Hebrew $s\ddot{o}r\ddot{i}$. The other opinion was held by Nehring. He doubted that the word could be Semitic but never gave exact reasons for the position he took. It is a puzzle to me that this latter interpretation has met with such a positive response. Since then these two interpretations have simply stood side by side and have been passed on in a manner which is far too simple-minded. Thus Frisk says in 1970: "Lagarde und Lewy verglichen hebr. $\ddot{s}\ddot{o}r\ddot{i}$ ... Bedenken bei Schrader-Nehring". In the latest Greek etymological dictionary Chantraine (1980) writes after merely having referred to Lewy: "Je rapprochement ne semble guère possible."

IV

We have now reached the crucial point in this discussion: Can the Hebrew letter $s$ with its equivalences in the other Semitic languages become $\sigma$ in Greek? It was exactly this question which caused Nehring to doubt. Anyone familiar with modern $i\nu\nu$ knows that $s$ is pronounced as an affricate "ts". The question is how long $s$ has been pronounced in this way and whether it already could have played a role in the meeting between the classical and Semitic languages at the time of the Phoenicians' commercial dominance. If $s$ had sounded like "ts" at that time it is not improbable that this letter would have become $\sigma$ in Greek by means of metathesis. It appears that no word in Greek could begin with an initial "t" + "s". In 1879 Olshausen held a lecture before the "Gesamtsitzung der Akademie" which contained a wealth of material and views. However when he came to the question of whether $s$ had been pronounced as a fricative or as an affricate in older times he remained vague and expressed no exact opinion except in a few special cases.

The first person who explicitly proposed the hypothesis that $s$ in old Hebrew must have had an affricate realization was the assyriologist Paul Haupt. He says: "Die Zugehörigkeit des $s$ zu den 'emphatischen' Consonanten $t$, $q$ etc. wird
nur dann begreiflich wenn man annimmt, dass die Aussprache $s$ bei deutsch-
polnischen Juden (und des $s$ und $d$ bei den Abessiniern) etwas Ursprüngliches ist.
Auch Fränkel (ZA III,53,1) hält die Aussprache $s$ als $ts$ für die ältere." 29 According
to Nöldeke special importance ought to be attributed to the Ethiopian name of the,
letter. 29 He joins the earlier scholar, Hjob Ludolf, in maintaining that $sad\dot{a}$ ought
to be transcribed as $tsad\dot{a}$. 30 In this connection he also adduces $\tau\alpha\delta\eta$ in the
Septuagint codex B (Vatican) which he takes to indicate an affricate pronunciation.

Richard Steiner is responsible for the latest contribution to this discussion. He
has presented a very valuable special monograph on the affricated $sade$ in
Semitic. 31 Even if the purpose of his work differs partially from this study in that
it concentrates mainly on the realization of the Semitic $s$ among the widely
differing languages spoken by the Jews of the Middle Ages and the following
period, it contributes much new material to the discussion. In most of the
languages where Hebrew words occur as loanwords in the period after late
Antiquity $s$ was in fact realized as an affricate. It is especially interesting to note
the historical insights backward in time contained in this book.

In this connection one should note the somewhat odd view held by Paul Joüon
in his Old Testament grammar which is so widely used today, namely that an
affricate pronunciation would be non-Semitic. 32 He argues that in the first place a
Semitic syllable cannot begin with two consonants and in the second place it is
precisely $ts$ which is avoided by means of metathesis (*$hit\dot{s}ad\dot{e}d$*$>hi$\dot{s}$\dot{t}$ad\dot{e}d$).
Steiner remarks correctly that Joüon has not rightly understood "the very real
phonetic and phonemic difference between affricates and homorganic clusters". 33

The fact is that the affricate pronunciation has become so pervasive that certain
old documents have $taw + samekh$ instead of $sade$. Thus a very interesting
example of this way of writing has been noted in a demotic document (Aramaic
text) from the second century B.C. It is included in the so-called Papyrus Amherst
63, and in reality there are experts in this document who think that it is written in the
fourth century B.C. Here one finds the word $Ts\dot{a}p\dot{a}n\dot{a}$ which is the same as
the word $\dot{S}$apânu, known from Ugaritic mythology and other sources. The word
occurs in the neo-Assyrian texts as $Spn$. 34 The contrary situation exists today
when an unobservant writer can represent $t + s$ by $s$ on the basis of pronunciation.

At this point we must go back to the century-old discussion which I summa-
rized earlier and give a general view of such material as is relevant for this study.
Steiner’s research has partially another purpose.

Already Lagarde presented two examples from some manuscripts of the Septu-
agint which are of interest for our study: $\textit{Meso\dot{t}re\dot{a}m}$ (Meso\dot{t}ra\dot{e}w, Meso\dot{t}rei,
Meso\dot{t}rei) is a transcription of the Hebrew $\textit{Mi\dot{s}rat\dot{e}m}$ meaning the son of Ham in
Gen. 10:6 and 13. The second is the name of the city $\textit{Bo\dot{s}ra}$ which is transcribed
as Bó\dot{t}re\dot{t}o in later manuscripts. 35 Even if $s$ is most often rendered by $\sigma$ for
examples $\Sigma\dot{t}\dot{h}\dot{h}\dot{h}$ or occasionally by $\sigma\sigma$, for example $\textit{Bύ\dot{u}n\dot{o}c}$ and by $\tau$, for example
$\textit{Tύ\dot{c}o}$ there are good examples of $s$ being represented by $\sigma\sigma$ in Greek. 36

This interpretation is in fact also supported by Steiner. He states clearly that $\dot{s}$
must have been an affricate in the Aegean region already in the sixth—fifth
centuries B.C. and that Egyptian transcriptions of Canaanite š show that this letter was an affricate already in the second millennium B.C.\textsuperscript{37}

Steiner also evokes Gershenson’s interesting suggestion that the mythological name ἄστριγος (name of 1. the aboriginal Cretan king whose father married Europa, with whom Zeus had consorted in the form of a bull, and 2. the Minotaur, whose father also was a bull) does not derive from the Greek ἄστρι “star” but from Phoenician *hasîr, “herb, grass” (a word which also exists in Hebrew). Thus the name of the ancient Cretan bull would mean “grass-eating”.\textsuperscript{38} Gershenson is of the opinion that “astir” is a metathesized form of “atsir” and gives several examples of metathesis which has occurred in Hebrew words when they have been taken up into Greek.\textsuperscript{39} He quotes among other examples the reading of a Septuagint manuscript where Ἀστριγός is written for the Hebrew Ἑσρόν (Nu 26:17).\textsuperscript{40}

It is hardly surprising that the Greeks had certain difficulties in reproducing the distinctive Semitic sounds. This is clearly shown by the fact that they were not consistent. Naturally we cannot entirely discern the oral problems of pronunciation. However, we can draw, the conclusion from the written documentary evidence presented above that the emphatic consonant š was understood by the Greeks to be some form of affricate, most likely “ts”.\textsuperscript{41} Whether they registered this affricate technically as though it were two phonemes, t + s, and if a metathesis of ts to st occurred subsequently during some phase of the historical development of the transcription cannot be illustrated in detail. In my opinion this is not essential for this study. At this point it is enough to observe that in many cases the Greeks realized the Semitic š as στ.

One can of course wonder why the Greeks didn’t use their consonant ζ to reproduce an š pronounced as an affricate but one can only wonder. It seems as though they had reserved ζ for another difficult Semitic sound, the Zayin.\textsuperscript{42}

Heinrich Ewald (who otherwise advocates that š was a fricative) considered that “die zusammengesetzten Laute” z och š had originated as s together with d and t.\textsuperscript{43} One hundred and fifty-five years later Steiner says in his conclusion that he does not deny the possibility of a fricative realisation of š in certain areas but underlines very strongly that š had an affricated realization in various northwest Semitic languages.\textsuperscript{44} What is more, one can point out that when the Semites took over Greek or Roman words (thus in the opposite direction) they clearly considered that st corresponded to š. Greek ληστής, “thief” which is believed to be behind the Arabic liṣṣ and Latin castrum, “castle” behind Arabic qaṣr are two examples.\textsuperscript{45}

Thus when Phoenician merchants displayed the product which they called šôrî in Greek harbours, the Greeks understood the name to be στόραξ (with addition of the ending-αξ which is common in plant names, see p. 30).

CONCLUSION

1. The plant στόραξ which the Phoenicians brought to the Greeks came from the Semitic linguistic area and was widely spread in Phoenicia, Syria and Palestine. In the last-mentioned area this was an important export article which was
in great demand. It appears that the kings of Judah had a monopoly on all trade with this commodity at a later date. As was to be expected the Semitic name of this important article accompanied it when it was exported. The name occurs in most of the Semitic languages and is גֶּרֶשׁ in Hebrew.

2. The emphatic consonant š, found in the Semitic languages, was a strange sound for the ancient Greeks. We do not know exactly how it can have sounded to their ears. It is a possibility that they apprehended it as “ts” which they subsequently rendered by οτι with a transposition of the two consonantal sounds. In any case this was one of the ways in which they reproduced this consonant in Greek. This is obviously what occurred when they reproduced the word which is called גֶּרֶשׁ in Hebrew. In my opinion there can be no doubt that ἕρωξ comes from this word.

NOTES
5. See Movers op. cit., p. 222f.
6. See, e.g., Frisk, op. cit.
16. Lewy, op. cit., p. 41.
22. See, e.g., Frisk, op. cit., p. 814.
23. Frisk, op. cit., p. 815.
25. I would like to recall the curious remark in K. V. Zetterstéen’s “Arabiska studier i Sverige”, Uppsala 1946, p. 32 but only for the sake of its singularity. Translated into English it runs as follows: “I never acquired the barbaric pronunciation of this consonant as s which used to be usual but I said it as an ordinary s.” Zetterstéen’s remark becomes interesting when it is put in relation to N. V. Yushmanov’s earlier assertion in Théorie des consonnes emphatiques sémitiques, 1925, p. 55, that the affricative pronunciation of sade is an artificial creation of Ashkenazic Jewry. Compare Lagarde, Mitteilungen IV, p. 375.
27. See, however, p. 570, the lower half of the page.
30. Hjøb Ludolf, Grammatica Linguae Amharicae quae vernacula est Habessinorum cum Historia Aethiopica. Frankfurt am Main 1618 and 1681. Ethiopian has two consonants which correspond to Hebrew sade, which Ludolf transcribes as tsadai and tsappa respectively.
32. P. Jouon, Grammaire de l’hébreu biblique. Rome 1923 ff. §5m. His opinion on sade survived L. Šemkovský’s revised version of 1947 and is still found in later editions.
33. Steiner, op. cit., p. 3.
36. See further Muss-Arnolt, op. cit., p. 49. He also gives ḥāḏāšōrōs as an example but in my opinion this is not relevant. On p. 138 Muss-Arnolt derives this word from the Arab. al-bāṣra “stone of Basra” and quotes O. Blau’s “Altarabische Sprachstudien” (ZDMG, 25, 1871), p. 528. Prellwitz also adopts this interpretation (1905): “Stein von Basra entlehnt”. That this is a loanword in Greek is beyond all doubt. On the other hand it ought to be completely impossible —despite the notice in Yiqt (Mu’djam al-buldañ, written in the 12th century, the Beirouth edition 1955–57, I, p. 430, col. 1; Wustenfeld’s edition I, p. 636)—to associate this stone with al-Basra as the name of this city first appears during the Islamic period while alabaster occurs already with Herodotos (3:20) in the older form ḥāḏāšōrōs. At that period the word meant a vase, often made of alabaster, for holding perfumes. Therefore everything speaks in favour of the opinion held by Kurt Sethe. He held that the word was of Egyptian origin: “a-la-baste, “vessel of the goddess Ebaste (=Bubastis)” (Sethe, “Die Bau- und Denkmalsteine der alten Ägypter und ihre Namen”, Sitzungsberichte der preuss. Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-hist. Klasse, p. 864 ff. Berlin 1933. See p. 887 ff.) Later etymologists have adopted Sethe’s interpretation, e.g. Frisk and Chantraine.
37. Steiner, op. cit., pp. 60, 69 and 90.
40. See otherwise the Septuagint-edition of Brooke-McLean.
41. Cf. Steiner, op. cit., p. 65. Material from a certain period can have preserved older traditions. This is the case for example when Steiner maintains (p. 63): “We suggest, like Dioscorides στ = s,
it should be seen as evidence for affricated š in Punic." (Dioscorides’ De Materia Medica is from 77 A.D.)


43. H. Ewald, Kritische Grammatik der hebräischen Sprache, Leipzig 1827, p. 27f.

44. Steiner, op. cit., p. 89; cf. also p. 69.

Zu Resch als Wurzeldeterminativ (r-)

WILHELM EILERS †


- r-DŠ arab. rads „zertrampeln, (den Boden) glattwalzen“, dazu synonym arab. dāsus, daʾs DŠ, dāhs DḥŠ, wohl auch arab. dars DrŠ „dreschen“ → „lernen!“, dazu arab. ʾadas, hebr. ʾāḏāša h f. „Linse“ als Plattfrucht (i. Gegs. zur kugeligen Erbse).

- r-DL radʿ rdradl = dalil = nadil/nadal als n-DL, dazu weiter ar. ʾadil „Tadler“ als ʾ-DL „Verächtlichmacher, Herabwürdiger“.

- r-GS (Š?) arab. raGIS „unrein“ = nagiš dass. n-GS.

- r-HB arab. rah(a)b rahba f. „fürchten; Furcht“, woher rāhib „Mönch“ als gottesfürchtig (wie np. tarsā „sc. Gott fürchtend“ → „Christ“) zu HyB in arab. ḥayy(a) f. „Furcht, Ehrfurcht“.

- r-HM arab. rahim rahma „Mutterlieb“ und rahma f. „Mitleid, Erbarmen“, falls diese Wörter und ihre Wurzel zu HM „warm, heiß“ gehören mit ḥamma f. „Therme“, ḥamma f. „Fieber“, ḥammām „Bad“, auch wohl ḥamām(a f.) „Taube“ (wegen ihres beim Schlachten deutlich bemerkbaren wärmeren Blu-
tes), dazu hamw „Hitze“ und die vielen Ableitungen wie almar „rot“ (r), hamas „Begeisterung“ (s), hamd „Lob“ (d), wohl auch himmis/himnas eigentlich die zum Rösten bestimmte „Erbse“ (s), hamid „sauer“ (d) usf.
r-KM arab. rakam/rükam „Haufe“, kam „viel“, kann „Menge“, dazu akk. nakamum „(an)aufhauen“ mit nakatum „Schatz“ (n-KM), kaum(a f.) „Haufe; Hügel“ (KwM), akama f. „Haufe; Hügel“ (p-KM).


r-QS arab. arqaš „bunt, gescheckt“ = naqš/manqūš, naqš „Bild“ (n-QS).

r-TB akk. ratum „feucht, frisch; bewässert“, arab. marṣal „naß, feucht“, rūṭab eigentlich noch feuchte d. h. frische „Datteln“, falls zu semit. TũyB „gut (süß etc.) sein“: akk. tābum, hebr. tōb, arab. tayyib. Fraglich. Aber in einem ariden Land muß und wird gegebenenfalls Feuchtes als das schlechthin Gute erscheinen.

Beachte den r/n-Wechsel in den Wurzeln

r/n-DL
r/n-GS (Š?)
r/n-KM
r/n-QS


Von Resch in diesen Beispielen ist Resch als fester Basis-Bestandteil sauber zu scheiden. Wir bringen in einer Auswahl folgende Gegenbeispiele:

RD „hinterher sein“ in akk. RD-w/y als redūm „treiben, (ver)folgen“, in RD-p als arab. radif „hinterdrein sein, folgen“, radif „Hintermann (auf dem Pferd); Refrain“, hebr. rādāf „(ver)folgen“, syr. rādāf „(per)sequi“, geminiert in assyr. rādāum „(Feinde) verfolgen“.

RH „weich, zart“ in arab. raḥrāḥ „tenuis, mollis“, in arab. raḥāḥ „weich (Boden)“; als RH-w/y in arab. raḥiy „schwach, schlaff“, raḥw/raḥw „locker, sanft, weich“ nebst riḥwadd „von zartem Körperbau (Geliebter)“ (angelehnt an w-DD?) als RH-s in arab. raḥ(s) „zart, weich“; als RH-m in arab. raḥim „sanft, weich“ hebr. raḥūm „Liebling“, wohl auch in arab. raḥām „Marmor“ als verhältnismäßig leicht zu behauendem Kalkstein; ferner dazu arab. raḥīl/ raḥīl „weibliches Lamm“, aramT. raḥlā, hebr. rāḥel dass. (fPN Rahel), akk. laḥrum (dissimiliert; evtl. apokopierte Vollreplikation ḫhr(h).


Die Thousands of Years of Resch als Basis-Standardteil, wie das zu allgemeiner Verwirrung auch sonst der Fall ist, kreuzen sich mitunter. Außerdem ist mit Rückbildungen allenthalben zu rechnen. Solche Erscheinungen sind auch dem Indogermanischen und wohl noch anderen Sprachkreisen nicht fremd.

Kechridas Aufsatz führt nur mit Resch anlautende Wurzeln auf. Eingehendes Studium verdient jedoch auch insfigiertes und suffigiertes Resch.

-r- insfigiert:

`urqūb „Achillessehne, Knie flechte zu arab. `aq(i)b „Ferne, Hacke“
`erqūl ḍiuq „Gazelle“; Diminutiv wie akk. uzālum; arab. ḍiāzūl, syr. ḍiūzāl (zz?)
birgūs „reichlich (Wasser/Milch) gelend“ (Kamelstute) → Planet Jupiter, zu arab. baqāsa (u3) „reichlich fließen lassen (Wasser/Milch)“
baqūs „üppig fließend“
dars/dārās „Dreschen, (Aus-)Drusch (des Korns)“ → „Lektions-; Lektion“ zu arab. daus „Niedertreten; Dreschen“ (vgl. hebr./aram.)
D-r-Š
ɡārš „Zerquetschen, Zerreiben“; aramT. giršā/girsā „Gruppe“ zu arab. ḡāṣša (u) „zermahlen, zerquetschen“
G-r-Š
kardasə „häufen“, takardas „An/Aufhäufung“ = kads, kudāsa f., kuddas „Haufe, Stapel“
k-r-ds(?)
karsaḥa „verkrüppeln“ = arab. kasiḥa, hebr. u. syr. „ab/beschneiden“
k-r-sh
qartama „abschneiden“ = arab. qaṭama (i) dass.
Q-r-Ò
sabrada „(die Haare) abrasieren“ = arab. sabada dass. (Meta-
these)
s(?)b-r-d
šarbaka „verwickeln, verwirren“ zu arab. šabaka (i) „ver- fliechten, verwirren“ mit šabaka f. „Netz“
š-r-bk

Zu Resch als Wurzeldeterminativ (r-)

Exkurs. Die r-Emphase wirkt sprachgeschichtlich noch lange – bis in die Gegenwart. Zunächst einige Indogermanische Beispiele:

np. aždar(hā) → osm. ejder(ha) „Drache“ < av. aži.dahāka- „die D(∫)Aḥ-hāk-Schlanget“: aždaḥā
barahne „nackt“ < *bayna-: av. mayna-, ai. nagnā-, armen. merk (Pokorny Wb 769; Mayrhofer II 126)
pārs in pārs kardan „anschlagen, bellen (Hund)“ für pās „Wacht, Hut“ <

Aus den romanischen Sprachen:

ital. māndorla „(mandelförmiger) Heiligenschein“ differenziert von māndola „Mandel“
span. estrella „Stern“ lat. stella
sangre „Blut“ lat. sanguis
frz. ourdir „anscheneric, anzelteln“ (Weberei) lat. odiri
trésor „Schatz“ (engl. treasure, dt. der Tresor, aber ital./span. tesoro) lat.
thesaurus < griech. ὀ θησαυρός.

Deutsch:

Karnickel = Kaninchen < lat. cuniculus
Süddeutsche Deminutiva wie
Hannerl = Hannele, Freunferl = Freundchen usw.

Ungarisch:
bitterschön statt bitte schön, bittschein

Kindersprache
Garwitter für Gewitter.

Zur Belustigung gibt die deutsche Individualaussprache Anlaß bei
a’ber, A’schenbecher, Ta’schentuch, wa’nsinnig (s. oben).
Landschaftlich schraben für und neben schaben, prusten für pusten.

Nachzutragen aus aramäisch-semitischem Bereich:

syr. ethbaraš „sich bewegen“ (Schlange) zu ḫš im Dopplungsstamm mit buhštāš „Bewegung“
aramT. kūṣayā „Stuhl, Thron“ (> arab. kūṣiy dass.) < akk. kussūm (< sumer. gu-za), gewöhnlich als Dissimilation erklärt
syr. parqa’ „Krähen“ (Vogel) zu paqāʿ „brechen“ (< hierher auch der ON aramT. Darmēseq < Dammēseq Damaskus.

Ferner:

np. nuqraẓ „Leittier“, falls identisch mit np. nuhāz (> armen. noqaz) <
*naza’az „voranführend“ (Markwart)
gārs „Gaze, Schleier/Netzstoff“ < fr. la gaze.
Sogar

osttürk. bırlá für billä/bilä „mit; und“, osman. bile „selbst; auch“. (Jarring, Wörterverzeichnis p. 15.)

-r- suffigiert

ażar, „anderer“ zu semit. ḥ- „Bruder“

 בא́ (hebr.) „Rede, Wort“ mit dibbēr „reden“ zu akk. dibbūm/dabābūm „in Rechtssachen reden“, arab. nakb/mandab „Klage“

ахар „rot“ zu ẖamm „heiß sein“ und Derivaten

ァッサールァッスー, „versammeln“ nebst ẖaḍara f. „Insekten“ zu ẖaṣid „Sammlung“

ァッドゥルァッダーラ, „grün“ zu ḥudāb „Grünfärbung“, ḥadīl „feucht“

(ABN Chiser)

 камерум (akk.) „häuften“, камрум „Haufe“, kumurrum „Summe“; s. oben sub r-KM

 namoro/kir „Leopard, Tiger“ mit anmar gefleckt, gestreift“ zu namnam „mit Streifen versehen“

ساماراسمرة f., (labial) şumra f. „Fenchel“ als Duplikat zu şamm „rienen, Geruch“

šatr „häftigen“ zu šaṭṭ/saṭṭ „Ufer“

tabr „vernichten“ zu tabba (i) zugrunde gehen“

ザヒ＝ザヒル, „anschwellen, überfließen“ zu ẓahha f. „heftiger Regenguß“

Nicht selten ist die r-Erweiterung der Wurzel zur Quadrilittera wie bei

‘asgara = ‘asaga: „beim Gehen den Hals recken (Kamel)“

nebst ‘asgama f. „Schnelligkeit, Beweglichkeit“

ماشارا f. „Spaß, Scherz“, tamashur „Verspottung, Spöttelei“ zu mashiri „Mißgeburt; Cretin“

(ABN Chiser)

muşmahır „hochragend (Bauwerk)“ = şami „hoch“ zu šamhi/šumuh „hoch sein“

Hier hebt sich die Nominalbildung auf -ür heraus:

ğudmür „Stumpf“ von ġadm „abschneiden, abhauen“ mit ġidm und ġidr „Wurzel“, ġidl „Stumpf, (Baum-)Stamm“

Guđμùr „(Volks-)Menge“ zu ġamm „sich sammeln“, ġam „sammeln“

Kuśbura f. „Knoten (im Halm), Knorren“ = kast, dazu vielleicht kibba f. „Knäuel, Hügel“

Samğār, (vokalharmonisch) sumğār „kümmerlich, häßlich“ zu samīg „häßlich“ u. dgl.

Damm al-hawā: Ibn al-Jauzi’s Treatise against Passion*

TRYGGVE KRONHOLM

The theme of love has always been fundamental in the meditation of the Arabs, in accordance with its universal nature. A report by ʿAlī ibn al-Husain al-Maṣʿūdī in his Murūj ad-ḥathab wa-maḍādin al-ja’ūhar (ed. B. de Meynard–P. de Courteille, revue et corrigée par Ch. Pellat, 1–7, Beyrouth 1966–1979 [Publications de l’Université Libanaise. Section des études historiques XI], 4/236–246, 256–258 = ed. C. Barbier de Meynard, 1–9, Paris 1914–1930, 6/368–386) mirrors a discussion on this theme in the presence of Yahyā ibn Kālid al-Barmakī (d. 190/805), in which thirteen representatives of different religious tendencies offer their respective definitions; not even the Greek background and influence on the subject are neglected in this report. One of the earliest attempts to define the nature of love (ʿīṣq) which is still preserved is the one given by Abū ʿUṯmān al-Jāhiz (d. 255/868–869) in his Risāla fī l-ʿīṣq wan-nisā (Risāla fī al-Jāhīz, ed. H. Sandūbī, Cairo 1352/1933, 266–275 = ed. Majmūʿat arrasā, Cairo 1324, 157–188; on the genre, see F. Rundgren, Arabische Literatur und orientalische Antike, OrSuec 19–20, 1970–1971, 105ff.). The subsequent history of Arabic literature includes numerous specimens of the constant struggle with this problem, among them the work Damm al-hawā by the famous preacher, historian and traditionist Abū l-Faraj ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān ibn ʿAlī, i.e. Ibn al-Jauzī (born in Bagdad sometime between 507/1113 and 512/1118; he died there at the age of 86 or 87; for sources and literature, see my article Akbaranā jaddī, OrSuec 33–35/1984–1986, 241), viz. the work to which Dr Leder has devoted the monograph under review.

However, the literary theme of love as treated by the Arabic authors did not awaken the interest of Western scholars until relatively late, one of the main reasons being that the relevant works were hardly accessible in fairly reliable editions until this century. Among the more important editions of this nature we find Ibn Sinā’s Risāla fī l-ʿīṣq, ed. A. F. Mehren, in Traités mystiques, III. Fasc., Leyden 1894 (new ed. by Ahmed Ateş, Istanbul 1953; see F. Rundgren, OrSuec 27–28/1978–1979, 46); Ibn Ḥazm al-Andalusi’s Tawq al-ḥamāma fī l-ulfa wal-ulaff, ed. D. K. Pétrof, Leiden 1914 (new ed. by L. Bercher, Algiers 1949; and by Hasan Kāmil aṣ-Ṣairafi and Ibrāhīm al-Abyārī, Cairo 1950; re-issue Cairo 1383/1964); Muḥammad ibn Dāwūd’s az-Zahra, ed. A. R. Nykl in collaboration


The first serious contribution by Western research to this literary genre was that made by the great H. Ritter (Philologika VII. Arabische und persische Schriften über die profane und mystische Liebe, Der Islam 21/1933, 1–83), in which he, in accordance with the title of his study, divided the Arabic literature on love in two major categories (cf. also Ritter’s monograph Das Meer der Seele. Mensch, Welt und Gott in den Geschichten des Fārūddūn ʿAṭṭār, Leiden 1955; Nachdruck mit Zusätzen und Verbesserungen. Leiden 1978). The various Islamic conceptions on mystical love have been treated by many scholars, in particular, though, by L. Massignon (spec. his Interférences philosophiques et penccées métaphysiques dans la mystique Hallajienne: notion de l’Essentiel Désir, Mélanges Maréchal 2, Paris 1950) and A. Schimmel (recently in Mystische Dimensionen des Islam. Die Geschichte des Sufismus, Köln 1985, spec. 191–214; here further references, pp. 621–665). The Arabic amour courtois in its origins, early development and impact was investigated by J.-Cl. Vadet in his monograph L’esprit courtois en Orient dans les cinq premiers siècles de l’hégire, Paris 1968. On the basis of Ritter’s fundamental distinction between profane and mystical love, L. A. Giffen investigated the Theory of Profane Love among the Arabs, New York 1971 (cf. review by R. Sellheim, Der Islam 50/1973, 339 f.; see also Giffen’s study on Love Poetry and Love Theory in Medieval Arabic Literature, in Arabic Poetry. Theory and Development ..., ed. G. E. von Grunebaum,

Dr S. Leder’s monograph on Ibn al-Jauzi’s Damm al-hawā is a major contribution to our knowledge of the Islamic concept of love. Ibn al-Jauzi’s treatise against passion (al-hawā), which was composed sometime during the interval between 560/1165 and 566/1171, is a very comprehensive work (671 pp. in the only extant edition, Cairo 1381/1962, see above). The aim of this compilation is to warn against the disastrous effects and consequences of passion and to instruct people on how to avoid passion. The work is not that of a philosopher, but of an experienced, exhorting and practically inclined preacher and traditionist, well versed in hadīt, fiqīh and tafsīr, but also in akbār and adāb in general (excellent documentation in M. L. Swartz, Ibn al-Jawzi: A Study of His Life and Work as a Preacher. Including a critical edition of his Kitāb al-Quṣṣās wa’l-Mudhakkirin, with introduction and notes, 1–2 [doctoral dissertation submitted to Harvard University, April 1967]; as well as his printed edition of the same work, 1971; for details, see OrSuec 33–35/1984–1986, 255). Accordingly, approximately 90% of Damm al-hawā consists of traditions about early Islamic ascetics, ethical doctrines and reflexions, theories attempting to explain the phenomenon of love, and love stories of various nature; merely 10% of the book is devoted to argument by the author himself.

This two-fold material, which is interwoven throughout the work, is taken as the point of departure in Dr Leder’s treatment, which represents a revised version of a Frankfort dissertation presented at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universität in 1982 and originally prepared under the supervision of professor R. Sellheim (on the author, see ZDMG 136/1986, Wissenschaftliche Nachrichten, p. 25).

The investigation is examplarily disposed in four major parts, the first one introducing the author and his Damm al-hawā (pp. 13–71), the second one being devoted to an analysis of the two kinds of traditions included in the work, viz. those concerned with pious men and ascetics and those concerned with love stories, including a search for the sources of these two kinds of material (pp. 73–156), and the third one treating Ibn al-Jauzi’s own argument against passion (pp. 157–250); the concluding part deals with the ‘Udritic ideal of love, which is represented by many of the included stories (pp. 251–282). A most satisfactory bibliography is appended (pp. 283–309), as well as indices of names and works (pp. 311–319) and of places and terms (pp. 319–321; the Arabic termini technici and the Stichwörter might have deserved separate indexes).

In the "Einleitung" (pp. 1–11), which precedes the four main parts of the monograph, Dr Leder gives a short presentation of the character of Ibn al-Jauzi’s Damm al-hawā in a most intellectually enjoyable fashion, taking as his point of
departure a report given by Ibn Jubair (Rihlat al-kātib al-adīb al-hāri‘ al-labib, ed. W. Wright. 2nd. ed. by M. J. de Goeje, Leiden–London 1907, 222–224) on his experience of a sermon given in Bagdad 580/1184 by Ibn al-Jauzi: deeply impressed the crowd listened to the rigid scholar’s sermon, which appeared unequalled to Ibn Jubair, but the remarkable thing was that his preaching was interspersed with verses of love (nasib), which awakened the pain of love (waqīd) in the hearts of the crowd, and the verses of love expressed devotion to God (ya‘dū ma’dū‘u’llah n-nasibiyun zuhdan). The vivid report by an eye-witness introduces a problem experienced when studying Ibn al-Jauzi’s works. It is well known that Ibn al-Jauzi’s preserved collections of sermons, like Bustān al-wā‘iẓin wa-riyād as-sāmi‘in (2nd ed. Cairo 1383/1963), al-Muntakab fi n-nuwall (unedited; MS British Library Or. 11648; MS Escorial, Derenbourg Nr. 1433), and al-Yaqūta fi l-‘awā‘iz (in the margin of as-Samarqandi, Raunaq al-majālis, ed. ‘Uṯmān ibn Yaḥyā ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb al-Mīrī, Cairo 1322), reveal a fairly traditional Islamic preaching of exhortatory character focalized on the fugitiveness of human life and the inescapable Day of Judgement. It is also generally recognized that Ibn al-Jauzi strictly criticizes public preachers (qawṣās), ‘who spend the greater part of their meetings dilating on the subject of passion (išq) and love (mahabbah), reciting erotic poetry (gazal) which includes a description of the object of this passion and its beauty, and a complaint of the pain of separation’ (Kitāb al-Qawṣās wal-mudākkirin, ed. M. L. Swartz, Beyrouth 1971, § 253, p. 115; cf. transl. 199). A parallel criticism is also preserved in his Naqd al-‘ilm wal-ilamā‘ au Tālībī Ilbīs (ed. Muhammad Mu‘in ad-Dīma‘iqi, Cairo 1340, 121). However, other collections by Ibn al-Jauzi demonstrate his own inclination towards belles lettres and even love stories and poetry, naturally in the service of ethical instruction. Thus, in his encyclopaedic work al-Mudhīs fi ‘ulūm al-Qur‘ān wal-hadīth wal-luġa wa-‘uyūn at-ta‘rik wal-‘awā‘iz (ed. Muḥammad ibn Tāhir as-Samawī, Bagdad 1384; reprint Beirut 1973), the latter part of which contains minor texts from his sermons (pp. 71–569 = ch. 5), his preaching is interspersed with verses on love, although his tenor is a warning against the consequences of passion and desire. Likewise, in Damm al-hawā‘ we meet with the seeming contradiction that Ibn al-Jauzi’s major work against passion is a treasury of love stories and love poetry. Dr Leder rightly interprets this state of affairs by saying: ‘Wie seine Bemühungen, das Fundament des Islam, Gottes Wort und die von allen späteren Interpretationen gereinigte Lehre des Propheten für die Regierung der Angelegenheiten der Gemeinde zur Geltung zu bringen, der Überzeugung Ausdruck geben, Frömmigkeit nicht im Gegensatz zum weltlichen Leben zu verstehen, sondern darin zu verwirklichen, war auch sein persönlicher Lebensrahmen von einer regen weltlich wirksamen Frömmigkeit—als Lehrer, Prediger, Autor—bestimmt. Diese Haltung entspricht den Werten, die Ibn al-Gauzi im Damm al-hawā‘ vertritt; denn wie Gottesfurcht und fromme Zügelung der Begehrlichkeit werden die Vernunft und das Ideal des tätigen und um Wissenschaft bemühten Menschen einer schwächlichen Dreigabe an die Leidenschaft entgegengestellt’ (pp. 10f.). Nonetheless, it seems that this understanding only mirrors the outward part of a more complex conception, in which Ibn al-Jauzi’s inclination to combine a strict adherence to Hanbalite Sunna with a propensity for early,
orthodox taṣawwuf constitutes an inner counterpart, giving his quotations of love stories and poems a deeper meaning and not merely a practical awareness of normal life and a wish to keep this life under the control of ethics; or in his own words: It is necessary for the preacher ‘that he “seek the face of God” in his preaching’ (al-Quṣṣāṣ, ed. cit.; §43, p. 26; cf. transl. 112; cf. J. M. S. Baljon, “To Seek the Face of God” in Quran and Hadith, Acta Orientalia 21/1950–1953, 254–266).

Dr Leder devotes the first major part of his work to ‘Einführung zu Autor und Werk’. The first half of this part deals with ‘Ibn al-Gauzî und seine Zeit’ (pp. 15–42) and discusses competently the sources to Ibn al-Jauzî’s life, his education and early activity, his position among the preachers and religious schools of contemporary Bagdad, his political influence, the later years of his life etc. Although many of these topics have been treated in great detail by M. L. Swartz (see above), Dr Leder has succeeded in concentrating on aspects relevant to a study of Damm al-hawâ; this applies in particular to his emphasis on early education, masters of tradition and theological position; Dr Leder also provides much additional material in relation to the studies by Swartz, although always in strict awareness of topic. He devotes the second half of the first part of his monograph to ‘Die Kompilation wider die Leidschaft’ (pp. 43–77), dealing with questions of text and dating, literary structure, position in Ibn al-Jauzî’s total production as well as its position in the Arabic literature on love; literary prototypes; and the constant tension between ‘Gelehrte Überlieferung und originäre Lehre’; the latter section has a special impact on the major investigation, since it points out that also in his creative literary work and preaching Ibn al-Jauzî remains a traditionalist, who even when citing morally disputable stories, painstakingly demonstrates the soundness of the stories by adducing a chain of transmitters. The author’s carefulness is the basis of Dr Leder’s major contribution: his investigation of ‘Die Überlieferungen im Damm al-hawâ und ihre Quellen’, which constitutes the second and largest part of his monograph.

Dr Leder divides his traditionist studies into two sections, the first one treating of the religious traditions, which are mostly adduced by Ibn al-Jauzî in a kind of order of authority (Koranic quotations, aḥādît, instruction given by Companions of the Prophet, and ultimately, and most richly, guiding words and deeds of pious men, scholars and ascetics), the second one discussing the love stories (pp. 78–95 and 96–140 respectively, followed by some appended translations, pp. 141–156).

As regards ‘die frommen Überlieferungen’ (pp. 78–95), Dr Leder does not aim at an investigation of all the traditions included in Damm al-hawâ, but confines himself to eight more prominent sources, viz. Ibn al-Uṣāri (died in 451/1059), Ibn Bâkuwaih (died in 428/1037), Abû Nu‘aim al-İṣṭahârî (died in 430/1038), Ibn Jahdâm (died in 414/1023), as-Sulâmî (died in 412/1021), al-İjûrri (died in 360/970), ʿAbd Allâh ibn Ahmad ibn Ḥanbâl (died in 290/903), and Ibn Abî d-Dunyâ (died in 281/894). The investigation is focalized on the way tradition was handed down from these source authorities to Ibn al-Jauzi’s various teachers, who are essentially well known from his own writings (in particular his al-Muntaqam fi taʿrîk al-mulûk wal-umam; see also Maṣyakat Ibn al-Jauzi, ed. Muhammad Maḥfûz, Beirut 1400/1980) as well as from modern biographies (spec.
by M. L. Swartz; see above). In a most instructive manner Dr Leder diagrammatizes the respective path of tradition in a comprehensive stemma (inserted between p. 82 and 83).

Even more rewarding is Dr Leder’s treatment of the sources and the tracks of tradition as concerns the love stories (pp. 96–140). In this case Dr Leder distinguishes and concentrates on eleven sources, viz. as-Sarrāj (died in 500/1106), al-Ḵāṭīb al-Bağdādī (died in 463/1071), Abū l-Qāsim at-Tanūḵī (died in 447/1055), ad-Ḍārī (died in 365/976), Abū l-Faraj al-Īṣfahānī (died in 356/967), al-Ḵarāʿītī (died in 327/938), Ibn Duraid (died in 321/933), Ibn al-Marzūbān (died in 309/921), Ibn Abī d-Dunya (see above), az-Zuhair ibn Bakkār (died in 256/870), and al-ʿAṣmaʿī (died in about 213/828). Four of these authorities are treated in greater detail than the others: the section on al-Ḵāṭīb al-Bağdādī includes studies of his sources (in particular Ibn Abī d-Dunya, al-Marzūbān [died in 384/994], and al-Muʿāfā [died in 390/1000]); the section on Abū l-Qāsim at-Tanūḵī includes investigations of his sources (especially Abū ʿAli at-Tanūḵī [died in 384/994] and al-Kaukabī [died in 382/992]) as well as of his transmitters; the same applies to the paragraphs devoted to al-Khāʾītī and Ibn al-Marzūbān (as concerns the latter, special attention is given to az-Zabībī [died in 371/982], Ibn Ḥaṣayn wāḥih [died in 382/992], and Ibn al-Anbārī [died in 328/940] as his transmitters; and to al-ʿUtbi [died in 228/842], al-Madāʾinī [died in 225/840 or 228/843], and al-Haṭtam ibn ʿAdī [died in about 207/822] as his sources).

A major problem in correctly distinguishing of the sources is that of methodological consideration. In the introduction to his studies into the two dominating types of traditions included in Damm al-hawā, Dr Leder gives a definition of the criteria employed in his differentiation of the sources: ‘Die für Ibn al-Ǧauzī’s Werk bedeutenden Quellen sind in den Isnādān daran zu erkennen, dass mit ihnen eine mehrfach gleiche oder in einigen Varianten genannte Zeugenkette zuvor nie oder viel seltener genannten Informanten übergeht. Dadurch weisen sich die betreffenden Tradenten als Sammler von Überlieferungen oder Autoren aus. Ein weiteres Indiz für eine Quelle ist die mehrfache Zitierung in ununterbrochener Folge. Zitiert Ibn al-Ǧauzī mehrfach hintereinander eine Quelle, so führt er den Isnad zu dieser nur einmal an, um dann von der Quelle direkt deren jeweiligen Informanten und die Überlieferung zu zitieren’ (p. 75). Basically, this approach is sound, but the difficulties in applying it consistently may be underlined. Firstly, it should be noted that investigation hitherto undertaken into the lives of the professors of Ibn al-Ǧauzī—who are treated without apparent exception as informants in the present monograph—has been focalized mainly on their role as teachers, not on their literary activity; this implies that the role of these various informants in their capacity of sources or original compilers of source material is not yet sufficiently familiar to allow for a definite exclusion of them as sources themselves. Secondly, it ought to be emphasized that the criterion pertaining to ‘die mehrfache Zitierung in ununterbrochener Folge’, however justified, includes an element demanding caution, since the habit of amassing traditions of identical or related provenience is most frequent in Arabic literature and helpful merely to a restricted degree in ascertaining a source in the sense of primary source; accordingly, what is considered a literary source, on the basis of
the afore-mentioned criteria, may occasionally be a source, which on the one hand is itself naturally built on previous ‘sources’ and on the other hand is in its turn included in works which rightly deserve the designation of ‘sources’. Thus, in an investigation of, for instance, Sibt ibn al-Jauzi’s ‘sources’ in his al-Jalis as-sāliḥ wal-anīs an-nāṣīḥ (cf. OrSuce 33–35/1984–1986, 241–256) and e.g. in particular of the role played there by extracts from Sīfah as-ṣafwā (ed. under the supervision of Dr Muhammad ‘Abd al-Mu‘īd Kān. 1–4. Hyderabad 1388/1968–1392/1972; or by Maḥmūd Fakūrī–Muhammad Rawās Qal‘āhji. 1–4. Aleppo 1389/1969–1393/1973; a third edition of which has appeared after the publication of Dr Leder’s work: Beirut: Dār al-Ma‘rīfā 1405/1985), the question is raised as to what exactly should be defined as the source of such sections: is Ibn al-Jauzī, the maternal grandfather of Sibt, to be considered as the source; or is Abū Nu‘aim al-Isfahānī and his Hīyat al-auliya2 waṭ-ṭabaqāt al-aṣfīyā2, composed in 422/1031 (cf. El2 132 b–143 a [J. Pedersen]; ed. 1–10. Cairo 1351/1932–1357/1938; third edition: Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-‘Arabi 1400/1980) and underlying the composition of Sīfat as-safwā to a considerable extent, more correctly to be distinguished as the source; or should we even try to force our way further back to Abū Nu‘aim’s conceivable sources (to be sought e.g. among his earlier contemporaries, such as as-Sulamī, Ja‘far al-Kuldi, al-‘Aṣamī, Abū Nu‘aim’s scholarly father or his ascetic grandfather etc.)? Questions of this nature, far from diminishing the value of the method pursued by Dr Leder, are apt to underline the relative aspect when speaking of ‘sources’ in this context. Normally, though, I would be inclined to regard the latest accessible, literary source of an author—e.g. in the example chosen naturally Ibn al-Jauzī’s Sīfat as-safwā—as the source per definitionem, and, this being so, we must allow for the possibility that in fact several of Ibn al-Jauzī’s immediate teachers are likely to have composed literary works including some of the material that is considered by Dr Leder as deriving from earlier sources.

The third major part of Dr Leder’s work is devoted to Ibn al-Jauzī’s criticism of passion in Damm al-hawā. A presentation and analysis of this criticism is necessary, since the author’s method of argument in Damm al-hawā is entangled, and the wealth of traditional material adduced continually threatens the reader’s awareness of the line of thought underlying the various pieces compiled. Dr Leder rightly points out that Ibn al-Jauzī’s main concern is to warn against passion of a destructive nature—not at all identical with sexuality, which to Ibn al-Jauzī is nothing but a natural drive in itself—and to point out resources for protection and healing.

Provocatively Dr Leder chooses as his point of departure chapter 49 of Damm al-hawā (comprising 50 chapters in its entirety), which treats of the fundamental concern of Ibn al-Jauzī: the remedy for the disease of passion. In this chapter Ibn al-Jauzī reveals in an introductory manner the nature of passion, the awareness of which leads him to propose several kinds of medicine, like cooling down one’s body (Damm 634), undertaking voyages (Damm 634), concentrating on gaining one’s livelihood (Damm 634 f.), looking at beautiful women—other than the one desired—who are legally accessible (Damm 635 f.), sleeping with permissible women (Damm 639), and directing one’s attention to the fugitiveness of this life
by visiting sick persons, funerals and the like (Damm 639); contemplations of this nature lead Ibn al-Jauzi into a treatment of the inner roots of human passion; thus, he demonstrates that the power of passion (sultân al-hawâ) might be conquered by the observation (i’îdâl) of reality in its discrepancy with the illusory world of passion.

On the basis of this central chapter Dr Leder enters on a discussion of the fundamental ethical concepts displayed in Damm al-hawâ (pp. 174–192), with particular devotion to the tension between the elevated destiny of man and his lower nature (al-hawâ in its relation to an-nafs); further of man’s virtues and conscience (pp. 193–201), focalized on as-sabr and al-qalb; of the legal aspects underlying Ibn al-Jauzi’s theme (pp. 202–219), i.e. on illicit sexual connexions as over against the state of lawful matrimony; and, ultimately, of the theory of love (išq) determining the work Damm al-hawâ (pp. 220–250). On the whole, Dr Leder’s treatment is solid and convincing. However, one desideratum might be mentioned: Although it might be argued that Ibn al-Jauzi in his Damm al-hawâ stands in no immediate indebtedness to the ethics and philosophy of the ancient Greek authors, the treatment of his fundamental concepts of man, his destiny, his virtues and passions, would have been greatly improved by being placed within the larger frame of relationship between Greek and Arabic ethical theory on a philosophical basis (see e.g. P. Tillet, Sagesse grecque et philosophie musulmane, Les Mardis de Dâr el-Salam, Cairo 1958; F. Rundgren, Arabische Literatur und orientalische Antike, OrSec 19–20/1970–1971, 81–124; and E. Riad, in her edition of Ibn Hazm’s Kitâb al-Âklâq wasiyar, Uppsala 1980, spec. 34–38, with references). It should be admitted, though, that Dr Leder does not ignore this aspect entirely.

Dr Leder’s monograph is concluded by a series of five contributions to the elucidation of an idea that plays a fairly significant role in Damm al-hawâ, viz. the conception of ‘pure love’ as reflected in certain Bedouin (‘Udri) traditions. In an introductory section (pp. 253–257) Dr Leder discusses the view expressed by Ibn al-Jauzi that love and matrimony actually are irreconcilable, or, as formulated by a woman speaking out of one of the Bedouin stories (Damm 235): mâ nukîha ḥubbun qaṭṭu illâ fasada; succinctly Dr Leder unravels the point Ibn al-Jauzi wishes to make in this respect: that real, pure love is of a nature that is endangered and eventually extinguished by a treatment in disharmony with the ethical norms; he might have added that in Ibn al-Jauzi’s conception this conviction is of a theological character, pure love and true ethics both ultimately deriving their origin from Allâh. Dr Leder proceeds in analysing a few texts of Damm al-hawâ comprising reports of persons representing the pride of temperance/restraint: on the ‘Udri poet Jamîl (d. 82/701; GAS 2/406 ff.); Laila al-Akyâliya (d. 85/704; GAS 2/399 f.); Kutayyir (d. 105/723; GAS 2/408 f.) and his love towards ‘Azza; Dû r-Rumma (d. 117/735; GAS 2/394 ff.), and tends towards the opinion that these traditions are ‘nachträglich entstandene Lehren im Kleide des Berichtes’ (p. 262), a judgement which in my view deserves further evidence. The third section gives a most erudite contribution to the concept of love issuing from traditions included in Damm al-hawâ concerning classical amorous couples of the Umayyad period, such as Majnûn and Lailâ, ‘Urwa and ‘Afrâ, ‘Abbâs ibn
al-Ahnaf and Fauz, Ḍū r-Rumma and Maiya, Tauba and Lailā al-Akhyaliya, Jamil and Buṭaina, Kuṭayyir and ʿAzza—the traditions on Majnūn and the ʿUdrītes dominating these texts (pp. 263–270). The subsequent essay on martyrs of love (pp. 271–278) is also very rewarding—a treatment of a series of love stories in Ḍamm al-hawā containing the motif of death from pain of love, starting from a Prophetic dictum running: ‘He who is passionately in love (man ʿašīqa), but remains abstinent and chaste until he dies—he is a martyr’ (which Ibn al-Jauzī, the illustrious traditionist, transmits in ten versions, each of which has a different isnād!). A brief epilogue on love as fulfilled through longing (Sehnsucht) (pp. 279–282) concludes the monograph.

Every student of classical Arabic literature is indebted to Dr Leder for his painstaking and penetrating treatment of Ibn al-Jauzī’s Ḍamm al-hawā, not merely for the detailed and minute discussion of the various love stories and religious traditions included in this work and the diligent analysis of informants and sources, as well as of ethical conceptions and major motifs, but also for making Ibn al-Jauzī’s most fascinating and rewarding book against human passions known and accessible even to students only slightly conversant with Arabic. Having reached the end of Dr Leder’s monograph, it appears difficult to disagree with the words concluding Dr Tilman Seidensticker’s Kurzanzeige in ZDMG 136/1986, saying: ‘Ein umfangreiches Werk aus Ibn al-Gauzi’s grosser Produktion ist uns nunmehr gut erschlossen’ (p. 648).
Aspectology in the Light of Text Linguistics

FRITHIORF RUNDGREN

Oscar Löfgren viro nonagenario dicatum

I

Surveying the linguistic scene of today we find an increasing number of studies on what is called "aspect", published during the last two decades. This is even the case with my field, Semitic languages, where studies on aspect almost incessantly appear, after my contributions to the subject 30 years ago. The reason why I entered upon these no doubt difficult questions was in fact a morphological controversy concerning two Semitic verbforms, namely, on the one hand, the Old Ethiopic yawattal, still today called "imperfect" but rather curiously translated, in the first instance, by "he will kill" (cf. O. Lambdin, Introduction to Classical Ethiopic, 1978, p. 144), and, on the other, the Akkadian so-called "present" iparras "he decides, will decide, decided", a likewise curious rendering of a "present". In this connection it is necessary to warn the reader against the disinformation spread by Peter T. Daniels in his annotated translation of Bergsträsser's "Einführung" (1983), p. 22 and elsewhere.

Now, since the connection between these two forms is crucial for the whole question of how West- and East-Semitic are interrelated, it was of the greatest importance to interpret both forms according to the linguistic stage of development prevailing at the time when they emerged in history. From a chronological point of view, about 3000 years might lie between yawattal and iparras. Moreover, since it was obvious, at any rate to me, that we are not entitled to derive both forms from a Proto-Semitic "Urpräsens" *yajattal, as was suggested by leading Assyriologists, I introduced the concept of "aspect" into the discussions of what was then generally called "the tenses of Semitic", and in 1961 I published the first "aspectology" in the history of linguistics. In the light of the theory of aspect elaborated by me in "Intensiv und Aspektkorrelation" (1959) both yawattal and iparras appeared to me as new, secondary formations, although emerging at different stages of the development of Semitic. Moreover, I came to the conclusion that we are, in both cases, confronted mainly with the same phenomenon: the renewal of the cursive aspect. I would add that, with me, the terms cursive and constative are based on a more fundamental distinction, namely between static and fientic, a distinction rooted in the very morphology of the Semitic verb. I rejected the old opposition complete/incomplete, early in use in some quarters and rather mechanically taken over from the Slavonic languages, and increasingly gained the impression that the Semitic languages can teach us more about the phenomenon of aspect than can the Slavonic.

However that may be, I left the whole subject for a while, feeling that I could

* Opening paper read at the Second Scandinavian Symposium on Aspectology, Uppsala, 21st to 23rd November 1986.
penetrate no further. Among other things, in 1973 I started an investigation into general morphemics, since I felt that I was not in a position to explain to my students what ought to be understood by the concept of the so-called morpheme. Penetrating deeper and deeper into the problem I arrived at a point where I was obliged to reject most of the old as well as the new linguistics, adopting instead what I called “ontological structuralism”, completely ignoring the fact—and this in Hägerström’s Uppsala—that already the name of the theory created by me no doubt smacks of metaphysics.³

This method led me by and by to a widening of the scope of linguistics, to embrace also areas which had hitherto been regarded as extralinguistic. Moreover, at this time I began to study some works dealing with the theory of literature, and found that the theorists of literature had only a fairly vague idea of what language really is. On the other hand, it became clear to me that linguists had no clear perception of the position of literature within linguistics. Confronted with this so to speak epistemological dilemma, I published my “Introduction to the Fundamentals of Text Linguistics” (1983),⁴ based on a coherent theory of language, now taking the text as the first articulation of language. Moreover, ever since I read Claude Lévi-Strauss’ “L’analyse structurale en linguistique et en anthropologie” (Word 1/1945) I had a firm belief that linguistics, being “la science pilote” par excellence, might place at our disposal convenient methods for handling various subtle problems in the field of the humanities as a whole. In order to pave the way for applications of linguistic theory in new fields, I published in 1984 “A Contribution to the Fundamentals of Literary Hermeneutics”.⁵

Now, all this implies that the term “text linguistics” means, with me, just what it says: the linguistics of the text. Moreover, the approach, as sketched in the aforesaid publications, ought, I think, to have some importance for the elaboration of more coherent aspectual theories. For if everyday language often misleads us in our scientific efforts in general, school grammar terminology in particular is apt to lead the linguist astray in his search for what Roman Jakobson called the “essence” of language. In this opening lecture I shall contend that also aspectual studies will, in the long run, profit by being pursued in the light of what I call text linguistics.

Bernard Comrie begins his book “Aspect” (1976) as follows: “Since the term ‘aspect’ tends to be less familiar to students than are terms for other verbal categories such as tense or mood, it is as well, before giving a definition of aspect, to consider some examples of aspectual distinctions in languages likely to be familiar to readers ... etc.” (p. 1). Apart from the fact that most students of linguistics ought to be familiar with the term aspect, I would like, in contrast to Comrie’s self-assurance, to adduce another, somewhat less optimistic statement, namely a comment from a letter from Ferdinand de Saussure to Antoine Meillet, written in 1894: “Mais je suis bien dégoûté de tout cela, et de la difficulté qu’il y a en général à écrire seulement dix lignes ayant le sens commun en matière de faits de langue ... Sans cesse, cette inéptie de la terminologie courante, la nécessité de la réformer, et de montrer pour cela quelle espèce d’objet est la langue en général ... Cela finira malgré moi par un livre où, sans enthousiasme, j’explic-
querai pourquoi il n’y a pas un seul terme employé en linguistique auquel j’accorde un sens quelconque.” (E. Roulet, F. de Saussure, 1975, p. 4.) However, the result of this fit of despondency is to be found in his unforgettable “Cours”. Yet his pessimistic words remain true even today.

Now there were also other pessimists. Thus Leonard Bloomfield said: “The most difficult step in the study of language is the first step. Again and again, scholarship has approached the study of language without actually entering upon it.” (Language 1933/1954, p. 21.) This problem of the first step does not seem to exist for most linguists of today. However, there was one man to whom such basic questions really meant something, namely the great Danish linguist Louis Hjelmslev. In his famous book “Prolegomena to a Theory of Language” (1961), pp. 5f. he says: “Linguistics must attempt to grasp language, not as a conglomerate of non-linguistic (e.g. physical, physiological, psychological, logical, sociological) phenomena, but as a self-sufficient totality, a structure sui generis. Only in this way can language in itself be subjected to scientific treatment without again disappointing its investigators and escaping their view.” Here the word “conglomerate” should be emphasized, for language is all these phenomena at the same time, but in a very specific order (cf. OS 31-2/1984, p. 114), an order to be discovered, step by step, with the help of ontological structuralism. Moreover, language not only depicts the outer world in a peculiar way, it is, in a sense, the world it depicts, a linguistically inflected world.

Now Comrie has not, as far as I can see, access to a coherent theory of language within the framework of which he could consider the phenomenon of aspect more appropriately. He seems, at least to me, to be a conventional eclect, and I repeat: it is, in the last resort, necessary to start even such studies from a tolerably coherent theory of language. Thus I hold the view that already an improvement of the linguistic terminology can lead us aright here, for de Saussure spoke no doubt correctly of “cette inéptie de la terminologie courante”. It is obviously important to try to use terms which have something to do with the level of language they are supposed to define.

To begin with, language in its more conventional sense, should be envisaged as the material of literature, literature itself being integrated in culture. Thus language is in fact only to be found, is only directly observable, in its function, namely precisely as literature, taken in the widest sense of the word (August Boeckh). Outside their function there can be no question of either literature or language. This fact explains, for instance, why Comrie can maintain that the so-called perfective aspect in on pročital and the imperfective one in on čital might both be translated into English by “he read”. However, Comrie does not himself give such an explanation, although it is obvious that the Russian expressions can only be observed in texts, as texts, that is, for instance, as On čital and On pročital respectively. For in its capacity as the material of literature language is always organized according to the rules of the textual behaviour valid for each linguistic community, this behaviour being then integrated in a certain, wider system of cultural behaviour. Moreover, textual behaviour is only one, although probably the most important, of all the forms of cultural behaviour there are.

Now, since language in the sense of textual behaviour only exists as literature I
shall say that the social form of existence of language is as literature in the sense of an ars litterarum. Here the very concept of “form of existence” is of great importance because it constitutes the basis of what I call “ontological structuralism”. Every linguistic phenomenon must, first and foremost, be estimated from the point of view of how it occurs in the system of textual behaviour. Thus we obtain the following hierarchy: culture > literature > text > language, enabling us to extend “the linguistic”, so to speak, to embrace also domains hitherto regarded as belonging to “the extra-linguistic”. I should also add that language is thus in itself non-figurative art used as figurative art, that is, language functions as if it were the natural expression for the phenomena of the surrounding world, natural and social (Eranos 83/1985, pp. 170ff.; OS 30, pp. 204ff.).

Thus, what we observe in the aforesaid On ētīa and On prōcītal is, first and foremost, two specimens of Russian textual behaviour. Consequently, aspect is a textual phenomenon. Now, it is obvious that a cultural phenomenon such as the text should be divided into units which can be regarded as consubstantial with the cultural phenomenon in question. Thus, a text should not, cannot be divided into so-called “sentences”. For inasmuch as the sentence is a piece of ars litterarum its division must have some reference to this state of affairs. A piece of art should, of course, not, in the first instance, be divided into sentences even if it can be admitted that this kind of art also expresses what we call “sentences”. As we see, we are here confronted with the Hjelmslevian problem of “the linguistic viewpoint”, language being a structure sui generis. As such a structure the text is to be divided into textemes, i.e. units of textual behaviour.

In this connection the term kalām in old Arabic grammar is of some interest. This term reflects λόγος in the sense of “speech”, and what λέξεις are to λόγος, kalim are to kalām. Moreover, it is important to notice that, at the beginning of this kind of grammar, the concept of *alkalām almalfūz is the basis here, that is, the Stoic λόγος προφορικός, the term lafz designating the προφορά, the “pronunciation” of the grammatical form (= maqrā < ḥuḏūḥ) of the kalām and its parts. Now we are entitled to translate kalām with “sentence” in the conventional sense. For the Stoics never reached, of course, the concept of the “texteme”; they were far too interested in the correlation διάνοια ~ φωνή, and seem to have had two kinds of λόγος: ὁ κατὰ διάνοια λόγος ~ ὁ κατὰ προφορὰν λόγος, the true speaking being then meprqa ba-rūxā or mappraq rūxā = ἡ ἐν πνεύματι προφορā < Stoic πρό-λογος (Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1415 a, 5), cf. Eva Riad, Studies in the Syriac Preface (1988), pp. 179ff., and the letter of Mara Bar Serapion, p. 45 (nāmōšā here = n. ḳẉỵṇāyā = ḥumlōgumēνος τῇ φωνῇ ζῆν) and p. 46 (ed. Cureton); cf. Varro, De Lingua Latina, § 56! In addition to what I have said in “Über den griechischen Einfluss auf die arabischen Nationalgrammatik” (1976), p. 135 I would point out that lafaza is a translation of Syriac ṣappeq < a Stoic προφέρεσθαι in the sense of “eject, pro-nounce”. However, what is pronounced is not sound but certain parts of speaking, a structure, a maqrā of speaking, speech. Now the goal of scientific humanism is not to study kalām, ḫumla etc. in the sense of what we call “sentence” and “clause”, that is, terms of very limited value in true linguistics, but to utilize studies in Arabic grammar in order to throw light on the human language.
Thus it is important to understand how ὁμον 개념 to mean ʃiʃl. This is in consequence of the Stoic development of linguistic theory. To the Stoic, λόγος was, on the one hand, two kinds of speech, and, on the other, "reason", and the double meaning of ξύον λογικόν > ἡγαίων νατικ presupposes Stoic philosophy. Moreover, to the sphere of λόγος "speech" belonged also ὁμον: "statement", in the sense of "predicate". From a purely formal point of view this statement can be a so-called "nominal" or "verbal" clause. However, such terms belong to the lexemic level of linguistic analysis, created by the old school masters and still today causing confusion in linguistics. The important thing is that from the point of view of text linguistics there is no such distinction as that between "nominal" and "verbal" clause, and from the Stoics we can, likewise, learn that the "predicate" is always "verbal", so to speak. For with them ὁμον designated speech in the function as statement, and this statement is always static or fientic or neutral and thus always also "verbal". It is in this way that ὁμον came to mean "verb". Moreover, the Stoics divided the "name" into two classes, the nomen proprium < ἴδια ποιότης (> Syriac ἡγνάμ "persona, ipse", cf. OS 25-6/1978, p. 152), and the nomen appellation < νομιμ ποιότης. 

Now language has not only an expression but also, and above all, a communicative function. Thus a certain kind of textual behaviour evokes in the receiver various kinds of "meaning", for instance, "poem", "novel" etc., i.e. a purely cultural kind of "meaning", or, the intuition that something, in any case linguistically, meaningful is being or has been said, the smallest unit of which is the texteme. For, while On čital is a text constituting a more or less independent communication, ... on čital ... is only part of such a textual communication. However, due to the order of the words this part allows in itself for the intuition of something complete: "... he was reading, used to read ...", that is, it constitutes what I call a texteme in the casus rectus or in the casus obliquus.

From this it follows in fact that what is called "aspect" is, primarily, a textemic, not a "verbal" category. For just as it is crucial when describing a certain linguistic state to distinguish between diachrony and synchrony, in the same way, it is of the greatest importance in describing, synchronically, a linguistic phenomenon not to confuse the levels of language and try to explain a phenomenon belonging to one level, directly from a phenomenon belonging to another, for instance, the word directly from the texteme. This occurs when we speak of "verbal aspect", the verb being a lexeme (word class). For in relation to the texteme a lexeme is only an entity by abstraction, immediately derived from its function as one of the phrases constituting the texteme. Thus we must state a lack of homogeneity in method here, depending on the inveterate habit of classifying the units of language with the help of categories obtained by an analysis of units belonging to higher levels without considering what has been lost in the analytic procedure. Thus a texteme like ... on čital ... is composed of the subject phrase on and the predicate phrase čital, constituting together a phraseme, i.e. the expresional side of the texteme. Now, the texteme being in itself an entity by derivation in relation to the text, it goes almost without saying that the "verb" čital cannot, being an entity by abstraction in relation to the text, be said to have imperfective aspect in a so to speak levelless on čital. As regards
the term “sentence” it has thus no linguistic reality except insofar as we use it as a designation for the purely structural content of the texteme, indicating then in the present case “completeness” in the sense of “main clause”. Regarded as a lexeme čitāt’ is a so-called “imperfective” verb, i.e. a grammaticalized mode of action having, however, no aspectual connotations in itself. Phenomena of text linguistics should not be described in terms of lexemic grammar!

From all that has hitherto been said it follows that linguistics eo ipso is text linguistics, and that every study of aspect should start from the text and its immediate constituents, the textemes, the latter being integrated by the text, which in turn confers upon them also its cultural content (units of a poem, a novel etc.). Moreover, regarded as a purely formal network the text is pure syntax, textemes in different case-forms, i.e. in *casus rectus* or *casus obliquus* (=subordinate clause), following on behind other textemes in the same variation. In consequence of the semiotic properties of this kind of concatenations of textemes certain configurations are formed, which constitute a kind of purely expressive “supratextual discursivity” comparable to the strokes of certain kinds of art.

Let us now consider two statements made by the famous American professor N. Chomsky. First. “The central notion in linguistic theory is that of ‘linguistic level’. A linguistic level, such as phonemics, morphology, phrase structure, is essentially a set of descriptive devices that are made available for the construction of grammars; it constitutes a certain method for representing utterances” (Syntactic Structures, 1957/64, p. 11). It is, in fact, of no use to speak of “levels” without being able to define this concept within the framework of a coherent linguistic theory. And, by the way, even a phoneme has a kind of morphology. Secondly, the following statement: “We may think of a language as a set of sentences, each with an ideal phonetic form and an associated intrinsic semantic interpretation. The grammar of a language is the system of rules that specifies this sound-meaning correspondence.” (Chomsky-Halle, The Sound Pattern of English, 1968, p. 3). As we have seen, we should, by no means, think of language in this way, for it is not the sentence that constitutes the first articulation but the text, the latter being also a representation of a certain kind of cultural behaviour. In the same way, it is not consistent with a sound method to maintain that a sentence has a phonetic form and an associated semantic interpretation, for the so-called sentence is already in itself form in the sense of de Saussure. Moreover, phonetics has nothing directly to do with semantics, and it is thus impossible to speak of a “sound-meaning correspondence”. I repeat, language in its capacity as textual behaviour has *literature* as its socio-cultural form of existence. From an empty playing with conventional terms inherited from Antiquity nothing good seems to emerge.

In this connection a purely theoretical decision might be of some value. It is on the dialectic *doubleness*, on the tension between *sameness* and *otherness* that the artistic exploitation of linguistic sound effects is based. On the one hand the identification of the pure expresional structure with a certain phonemic sequence, on the other the difference of this expresional structure, bound in a sequence of technemic radicals, from the same phonemic sequence: Sāv, sāv
susa, våg våg slå (Rundgren, Uttrycksstruktur, metrik och textlingvistik, in preparation).

Now, if the socio-cultural form of existence of language is as literature, we can take this state of affairs as the point of departure for the further search for a point of intersection between language and literature. Proceeding along these lines of investigation, we find, on the one hand, the concept of “literarity”, constituting, in my opinion, the very nucleus of what is called “style”, and, on the other, the linguistic phenomenon of what is called “mood”. Since mood has, as we shall see, a certain affinity with aspect, I shall first consider its structure a little.

Let me, to begin with, quote the following words of Wackernagel: “Für alle Sprachen, die uns hier beschäftigen, können wir sagen, dass der Indikativ innerhalb der Modusformen eine ähnliche Stellung einnimmt, wie das Präsens innerhalb der Tempusformen. Einerseits hat er eine ausgesprochene Spezialbedeutung, indem er die Wirklichkeit im Gegensatz zu dem bloss Gewollten oder Möglichen ausdrückt. Aber zugleich auch kann er, ich möchte sagen eine modale Indifferenz ausdrücken, d. h. da gebraucht sein, wo man weder Wirklichkeit noch Unwirklichkeit aussagen, sondern eine der modalen Färbung überhaupt entbehrende Aussage geben will.” (Vorlesungen über Syntax, I, p. 224.) This is an important statement, but also an interesting case of use of school grammar language. The indicative is said to express something, although a verbal form in the indicative is only an entity by abstraction, expressing in itself nothing of the kind Wackernagel says it does. In reality it is the sender who expresses something in his textual behaviour by using what we call “indicative” for the representation of his own reality. Even if such hypostatizing of grammatical terms is practical for didactical purposes, it is nevertheless apt to lead our thoughts astray, away from the essence of language.

From what has now been said it is obvious that the category of mood reflects the attitude of a sender to reality, and this reality has nothing to do directly with the lexeme “verb”. It is a textual and thus also a textemic category. Now, also the aspect can be said to reflect the attitude of the sender to reality, although in another way. As I have pointed out more than once, forms designating “mood” have frequently emerged from neutralized aspeticual forms. Let me now add that cases of aspeticual neutralization might be easier to state more explicitly in the perspective of text linguistics.

As regards mood, it follows from the aforesaid double function of the texteme in the so-called indicative that it has one negative and one neutral value within the structure of an opposition of modality. Thus the modality in the sense of modus subjunctivus, optativus, conjunctivus etc. constitutes the marked term of the opposition modality/non-modality. However, the marked term constitutes in itself a privative gradual opposition. The negative value non-modality in the sense of “no subjectively tinged attitude to reality” is then the attitude we call “indicative”, the neutral value being represented by, for instance, hypothetical textemes. In the neutral value of the modal opposition we thus find a link between aspect and mood.

Now, the concept of “literarity”, designates the degree of stylistic intention or stylistic consciousness of the sender, being thus likewise based on attitudes on
the part of the sender. This concept forms a link between language and culture, and I have therefore defined this kind of literariness in terms of the modal opposition. I confine myself to this statement, adding only the importance of what I call "the condition of the beginning". For it makes a considerable difference if the analysis starts from the text, integrated as it is in culture, or from the phoneme in the conventional sense. While it is possible to derive the phoneme from the text, it is impossible to reconstruct the text from the phonemes. The phoneme is only an entity by abstraction in the lowest degree, and as the result of a specific kind of analysis the phoneme has no existence in language in function but only in the semantically poor world of the so-called phonemic inventories. For in contradiction to what Chomsky maintains, it is not the linguistic level in his sense that is the central notion in linguistic theory. We must distinguish between a linguistic theory in the conventional sense and a true theory of language in function, i.e. a theory of language as textual behaviour integrated in culture. In this perspective the fundamental notion in linguistic theory is the sign, almost in the Saussurean sense, although Saussure was never able to give his sign a place within the hierarchical organization of language. However that may be, the fundamental concept of linguistics turns out to be the sign function in itself, from the text as a cultural sign to the radical, the radical par excellence being the smallest morpheme of language. Let me illustrate what I mean with the concept of the radical by adding an Arabic unit, for instance, harir "silk". This unit allows us, of course, to establish, inter alia, the existence of the phoneme h in Arabic, by so-called substitution: harir "silk"/marir "strong, firm": h/m. But what about the -rīr common to both units? The conventional phonologist proceeds here in the same way to the establishment of the phoneme r etc., although it is quite clear that the group -rīr in harir cannot be the same as in marir. Disregarding this important fact, the phonemician states that harir contains four phonemes h, a, r, and i and speaks then also of the phonemic level, saying that the two r:s are the same phoneme r.

However, there can be no question of an independent phonemic level in harir, since we are dealing here with two different r:s, i.e. the r:s may be called, it is true, the same phoneme r, but this is of no greater interest in this connection, language being in itself non-figurative art used as figurative art. In living language we are only concerned with the figurative use of the in themselves non-figurative phonemes. A linguistic unit like harir must, first and foremost, be divided into smaller units consubstantial with the properties of harir as a "word" in the Arabic language, i.e. into the five radicals h-a-r-i-r, containing thus two different r:s. The "word" being, as an intuitive structure, in itself a sign-picture, the radical is to be understood as a picture-sign. Now, since a linguistic sign is always "une chose double" as de Saussure said, i.e. harir is in fact not only a unit but also a unity: (harir = expression ~ HARIIR = content) or (HARIIR ~ harir), each of the radicals must also be conceived of as "une chose double": (h- ~ H-) etc. Now, if the word is a sign-picture and the radical a picture-sign, the function of the radical is that of being a techneme, a unit of art of language in its capacity as an ars litterarum. From this it follows that the radical is a morpheme, and it remains to be proved more explicitly how it could be said to be a morpheme.
While one of the most important steps forward in linguistics is represented by the
discipline of the phoneme, the conventional so-called morphemes must be
considered a complete failure. I say that a morpheme is “a minimal linguistic unit
the expression of which is, on its specific level, its own content and the content
its own expression, and, which, at the same time, is its own referent”. Now it
should be noticed that we are here dealing with the empty relational structure of
the morpheme. When this structure is realized in concreto the “referent” as-
sumes the structural value of a metareferent, the meaning (the sense) of the sign
in question being then the pragmatic referent, i.e. the meaning in casu, cf. for
instance our (harīr ~ HARĪR) = the sign in itself, “harīr” = pragmatic referent
(the sense in casu and also “the word harīr”), for since the metareferent of the
sign also indicates the level of the unit within the textual framework, the whole
meaning of the morpheme harīr is in fact “the word harīr”, the “word” being
then the metareferent indicating the level “word” in the sense of a “class-word”,
i.e. as the general representation harīr, so that also the unity (hr = expression ~
H- = content) has as its metareferent precisely the level “radical” in the sense of
a techneme, its pragmatic referent being then the representation “hr”.

The concept of the word as being a general representation is, as far as I can
see, of great importance also for the theory of aspect. For if the word were not a
general representation of an object but an etiquette or a proper name, the
possibility of semantic change would on the whole be very restricted. Thus the
reason why a mode of action can allow for a change of aspect is in the last resort
likewise due to the fact that the word in itself functions as a general representa-
tion of an object: to write 1. “to write actually” = fientic. 2. “to be a writer” =
static. The opposition static/fientic seems to be the fons et origo of all or most
aspectual correlations. However, it is always, first and foremost, the texteme, as
being a piece of the text, that is fientic or static or neutral. From the point of view
of, for instance, Semitic the distinction between nominal and verbal clauses has
no place in a text linguistic analysis, and linguistic analysis should always start
from text linguistics, cf. above, p. 62.

Now for every theory the moment comes, when one or more weak points are
detected. At first these new insights lead to nothing, such weak points being
considered negligible. Thus a state of eclecticism arises. Now, the history of
science tells us that precisely phenomena regarded as negligible frequently bring
about, at last, a revision of a theory. In this connection we can think of the
confusion of mode of action and aspect which still prevails in some quarters.
Therefore one should not without further ado raise the objection against my
exposition that every one who deals with verbal aspect is conscious of the
conditions on which he uses his terminology. My answer to this objection will be
then: If this really is the case one had better use the scientifically more appropri-
ate terminology. In so doing one will, I think, detect new factors influencing the
choice of aspect and also be able to re-define the whole phenomenon of aspect in
a much more comprehensive and, so to speak, richer way. In conclusion I would
like to sum up some tenets from my “Fundamentals of Literary Hermeneutics”
(Orientalia Suecana 31-2, pp. 105 f.).
1. There cannot be a question of any kind of text linguistics without due attention
paid to a general theory of language, derived from language itself and not based on terms taken over from Antiquity or the Middle Ages.

2. Language manifests itself also and in the first instance as "literature".

3. Literature being thus the social and cultural mode of existence of language, it is in this mode of existence that language is integrated in "culture".

4. The concept of integration is of primarily "holistic" importance in linguistics, determining the ontological state of a unit.

5. The hierarchic organization of language compels the analyst to pay attention to "the condition of the beginning".

II

The Hermeneutic Viewpoint

From the exposition given in the "Cours", pp. 27f. we can see that the capacity for linguistic behaviour cannot be dealt with properly unless we also consider the problem of understanding. For linguistic behaviour presupposes a receiver who understands what the sender understands—his hermeneutic horizon—when he utters something, i.e. produces a text, a piece of textual behaviour. Thus there is no speech-act without a corresponding act of understanding (cf. below, p. 73), and this in two senses, namely 1. What the receiver understands. 2. What the sender understands. Both kinds of understanding are of importance in this connection. Furthermore, the usual subject–object orientation breaks down also in the field of linguistics (cf. OS 29, p. 51; OS 30, p. 120): the subject = the linguist, the object = language. A linguistic category cannot be defined exclusively in terms of the subject–object orientation in the conventional sense. It must also be defined in terms of understanding, for, as Heidegger says, "Understanding is the medium of ontological disclosure" (cf. OS 31–2, p. 200). Moreover, it has been maintained that all kinds of understanding are linguistic in some sense. If this is true, which it seems to be, a possibility opens of explaining "understanding" in linguistic terms (cf. below, p. 71).

First and foremost I would call attention to the possibility of conceiving our ability of "understanding", on the whole, in terms of form, on the analogy of "la langue" as being form, in the sense of "Principia", p. 51. Proceeding further along these lines we are entitled to speak of "acts of understanding", every act being composed of noetic behavioural events of some sort. Now, an act of understanding being form, symbolic form, it must also have a relational structure since form is always an organization of elements (1M, p. 1). However, inasmuch as "understanding" is always manifested individually, I claim that understanding is only indirectly observable, as individual acts of interpretation. Moreover, the act of interpretation is always only conceivable as a realization of "understanding" as form, composed of what I would call "noetic morphemes", organized hierarchically (OS 31–2, p. 107). Thus we ought to be able to distinguish between various levels of understanding. Perhaps we might say that "understanding" comes into existence in the borderland between "die Welt in ihrer Faktizität" (Heidegger) and the so-called consciousness of men (cf. Principia, p. 51, and "Cours", p. 156).
Now the world is understood by us as "text" (OS 31–2, p. 200) and thus we can posit text as the highest level also of understanding. Every individual's act of interpretation might then be envisaged as a realization of "understanding" as being the medium through which the world is perceived by him who understands, and understands it as text. Thus the text in the proper sense is only a specific case of a much wider concept, the texture of the world. In the text, in the conventional sense of the word, the world appears as "inflected" in a specific way, namely as literature, but to understand fully such a text means to understand it as being placed in the world and in time in a general sense, not only in its own world and time—without which it never can be a text—, for as Hegel said: "The truth is the whole" (OS 30, p. 122). Moreover, the performer of an interpretative act is always dependent on the historicity and linguisticity of his own "understanding" determining his interpretive noetic behaviour. For "understanding" is in itself a kind of behaviour, to be compared with linguistic behaviour in my sense and thus to be decomposed in noetic behavioural events. An interpreter can only translate what he understands of what the sender understands = intends. However, in translating "the understood" every interpreter is depending on the quality and quantity of his own understanding of the world.

Now the question arises how we can imagine the faculty of understanding in behavioural terms. Firstly we will have to state the existence of the faculty in question. For however and whatever we understand, it is a fact that we do understand, that we exercise the "mental" behaviour of understanding, to be observed in the individual acts of interpretation. As has been pointed out above, p. 62, we must in linguistics carefully distinguish between "form" and the conventional forms in which "form" is realized. In the same way we must distinguish between the faculty of understanding and the individual ability of using the faculty. I would venture to suggest that it is the faculty of understanding that is at the base of what I call the linguistic faculty as such. For we can only utter the understood, and thus "the linguistic faculty as such" ought to reflect, in some way, the structure of understanding as form.

Now the linguistic faculty as such is in turn reflected in the organization of the morphemes, the behavioural universals (from the text to the phonemes), which are in turn observable in their various conventional representations. The relational structure of these "intuitional" forms (the morphemes) being at each metareferential level in principle the same, i.e. an organization of the elements "expression", "content" and "referent" (above, p. 65), the question arises how we have to imagine a corresponding structure of "understanding". However, if "understanding" is the medium of ontological disclosure we must ask what it means that this medium is linguistic in nature. To me it must mean that "understanding" as a behavioural activity, as a function of the "consciousness", reflects, in its levels (below, p. 71), various states of the "consciousness", for which I refer the reader to OS 31–2, p. 112f. Now, if we may assume that it is possible to distinguish between various levels of understanding we can use the concept of the "noetic morpheme" on the analogy of the linguistic morpheme in order to discover the possible counterparts of the latter in the field of "understanding".

To begin with, we recall the already mentioned literary "inflection" of reality
with the aid of textual behaviour. Thus I shall contend that to understand the world means a similar inflectional activity, a noetic behaviour interpreting the texture of the world, or for short: the world as a kind of text. This tendency towards a contextual perception of the objects of the world (Principia, p. 69) has apparently been greatly strengthened by evolution because it proved to make memorizing (cf. “in absentia” OS 31–2, p. 112) easier, thus influencing the evolving faculty of "understanding" in the "syntagmatic" as well as in the "paradigmatic" direction and resulting in the genesis of the organization of a system of noetic morphemes which constitute the core of the kind of symbolic thinking preceding the genesis of the articulated language (Principia, pp. 67 ff.). Thus while on the one hand the faculty of understanding is to be regarded as a prerequisite of the origin of language we have, on the other, to reckon with a strong influence of the evolving language on the faculty in question, an influence making "understanding" more and more "linguistic", so to speak. Moreover, since we obtain knowledge mostly with the aid of language we must also reckon with an influence of language on the "historicity" inherent already in understanding as such. It is the faculty of understanding that, in the last resort, explains the ability of symbolic thinking typical of man and a prerequisite of the genesis of language.

Now the contextual perception of the world ought, first and foremost, to be based on the faculty of discerning differences of various kinds, e.g. a tree (=A) and a stone (=B). A tree is not a stone but just a tree, and a stone is not a tree but just a stone. The relationship obtaining between "tree" and "stone" being logically that of a diametrical opposition we can call these two objects diametrical opposites. Now, introducing my speechless savage (Principia, p. 69) I shall say that as long as his hermeneutical horizon is limited to the tree in the vicinity of a stone and vice versa as well as to the nearest surroundings of these objects he will understand A as non-B and B as non-A in an absolute sense, his world constituting a very poor "text". Contemplating this primitive text he will recognize the idea of "difference" as well as the idea of "vicinity", the latter paying the way for the concept of "similarity". However, this cognitive act of his is still an Erlebnis. He "lives" his observation as an experience, so to speak, being in the midst of it, belonging himself to the text as a contextual element. The tree and the stone are looking at him and he is looking at them. Thus his "understanding" becomes a medium of ontological disclosure. Being himself a contextual element in the hermeneutical situation he becomes aware of his ontological position which defines him as "understander" in relation to the "understood" (the tree and the stone); cf. OS 31–2, p. 200. Thus he understands also himself as well as the objects in question. Moreover, he understands himself in relation to these objects and these objects in relation to himself. This ideal situation of "understanding" implies a moment of simultaneousness, a highly important fact, for although the ideal hermeneutic situation can only be realized with the sender, it lingers, so to speak, and is also to be included, to a certain extent, in the situation of the receiver who, in his capacity as an interpreter understands, tries to understand what the sender understands = intends. Otherwise communication would not be possible. Thus the receiver understands what the sender understands as the
intention of the latter. This intention the receiver can understand even without
the sender uttering a word. Both can look at the tree and the stone, and when the
sender then turns to the receiver the latter can, from the expression of the
sender’s face divine the latter’s intention. In this case the prerequisite of the
wordless understanding is that both be regarding the same objects. From the
expression of the sender’s face the receiver then understands the sender’s
intention, or at least a part of it, concerning the objects. This means that the
receiver possesses the faculty of understanding par excellence, i.e. the faculty to
understand what the sender understands, and to understand it as being the
sender’s intention concerning the objects in question, although the perception of
the receiver is divided between the objects and the face of the sender, the content
of the intention being determined by the cultural and casual situation on the part
of both the sender and the receiver.

From this experiment it appears that “intention” is to be considered the
metareferent of understanding as a noetic level, the full meaning of the under-
stood being “the intention X” (cf. above, p. 68).

We now understand the connection between this kind of “intention” and the
metareferent of the purely linguistic text in the sense of “something has been or is
being said” (Principia, p. 41), i.e. a text, a complete communication (cf. above, p.
61). Thus it is “understanding” in this more general sense that is one of the
sources of what I call the behavioural universals of linguistics, i.e. the morphemes
constituting the true la langue, unknown to de Saussure. The hierarchical
organization of these morphemes, a kind of behavioural intuitions making lan-
guage possible, reflects stages in the evolution of the function of the human brain,
inter alia in the sense of anteriority and posteriority.

In this connection I would recall my formula of the genetic evolution of the
linguistic sign: I ~ III > (II ~ III) = “I” (OS 30, p. 122). This formula says, on
the one hand, that the “object” (I), in our case the tree and the stone, and the
“name” (III), in our case still something only “understood” by both the sender
and the receiver, enter into a relation as the elements I and III, and III and I
respectively. On the other, that these elements are now being more and more
qualitatively transformed into constituents of the relation in question, the relation
integrating thus the elements as parts of a holistic structure which creates an
identity between I (object) and III (the understood) making then by repetition III
(the understood) become the understood of an idea (II) of the object (I). For what
is understood by a community of individuals becomes an idea of this community,
and more specifically a general idea (cf. OS 30, p. 123), this general idea being
thus born out of “understanding”, namely the act of understanding common to a
group of individuals, small or large, however subjectively tinged the individual
act of understanding may be.

Now it goes without saying that a common perception and recognition of an
object as well as its interpretation through the expression of the face of various
senders is, even if accompanied by certain gestures, not a practical way of
communication. What is needed is a re-organization of the elements I (object), II
(idea of the object), and III (the object as understood) yielding a new relational
structure, more adapted to the requirements of social communication. If we now
compare the formula of the genetic evolution of the linguistic sign I ~ III > (II ~ III) = “I” we find that the object (I) is named, e.g. “faras” = the pragmatic referent of faras, which is only the one-dimensional representation of the sign (FARAS = II ~ faras = III), where a name (III) of an object (I) has also become the idea (II) of the object (I) in question (the object as a name). It is (II) that we call the “content” and (III) the “expression” of the sign. However, it is important to note that it is “the understood” (III) that has become the “name” of an object, not directly the object itself.

From this experiment appears the central importance of the category of “understanding”, the function of which is to establish a connection between a sender, a receiver, and an object. In order to fulfil this function, the category of understanding must be common to a collective, to a community of individuals sharing the same understanding of the world surrounding them (cf. Cours, p. 38).

Thus the “category” of understanding is not only the prerequisite of the genesis of the human language, it appears also as “distributed”, so to speak, in the very organization of the linguistic sign as such. To begin with, we have to take into consideration what I call “the naming situation” (Principia, p. 33 and p. 70f.). Let us imagine a situation where the animal “horse” is by a general agreement, so to speak, baptized faras (III), the “understood” (III) obtaining thus a name which is a substitute for the object (I) as something understood. Now, the name having become a substitute for the object, the object (I), the substituted object, becomes at the same time the content of a de-objectivating denomination (cf. OS 30, p. 123), i.e. the named idea (II) of the object (I), the object becoming thus—as being its own idea—also “the understood” = FARAS, the “name” of which is faras.

Now the name faras is understood by the community as FARAS being itself “the understood”, i.e. something “understood” is understood by the community, and thus the isomorphic sign (FARAS ~ faras) has come into existence, the expression (faras) being its own content (FARAS) and vice versa. That which is now understood is the whole linguistic sign (FARAS ~ faras), and this is first and foremost, always understood as “faras”, the pragmatic referent indicating “the understood” in casu.

Thus we have arrived at a more sophisticated appreciation of what we call the “meaning” and the “sense” of a word. The contextual sense of a word might be envisaged as a function of its meaning, and the meaning of a word is equivalent to the meaning of the word in question as a value, viz. in the sense of a general idea. The function of a word as a general idea emanates from the fact that the word as a linguistic category (morpheme) constitutes in itself a value, namely within the hierarchichal organization of the true morphemes, constituting the true langue, which is a system of general values, i.e. universal behavioural values. Moreover, the value “word” having developed from something “understood” by a whole community, we understand also the reason why the word is to be estimated a “class-word” representing a general idea of an object and explaining also the contextual fluctuations (senses) in the meaning of a lexeme (word-class).

Thus the task of an interpreter of, for instance, the Qur’ān is to try to understand what Muhammad understood, i.e. his intention (in the afore-men-
tioned more technical sense). In achieving this task the interpreter must consider the Prophet’s level of understanding as well as his own. However that may be, “understanding” is an extremely important psycholinguistic category, neglected by students of linguistics, literature and philosophy. Now, if literature as textual behaviour constitutes the true “first articulation” (p. 60) of language we will have to realize that a literary work like the Qurʾān is, considered a product of Muhammad, to be regarded as an individual instance of this kind of “first articulation” implying a specific “inflection” of the world, according to an individual application of the rules of the Arabic language. However, the rules of the Arabic language are extracted from the Arabic language as literature in the sense of August Boeckh (cf. Principia, p. 102), and thus include prose as well as poetry, as the two main kinds of linguistic cultural behaviour (OS 30, pp. 114f.). What we are talking about then is in fact the cultural behaviour of the prophet, for language is in itself an *ars litterarum*, art as communication and communication as art. Moreover, it is sometimes rather pointless to distinguish between “language as system, langue, and language in use, parole”, for language in use implies, of course, also the system in use (cf. OS 31–2, p. 106ff.). We should never forget that de Saussure says: “la langue ainsi délimitée est de nature homogène: c’est un système de signes où il n’y a d’essentiel que l’union du sens et de l’image acoustique, et où les deux parties du signe sont également psychiques” (Cours, p. 32). For an expression like “distinction between la langue and la parole” can also be misleading. We are here dealing with a dichotomy, i.e. a bipartition of a *unity*, precisely on the analogy of the linguistic sign as analysed by de Saussure and as understood by me: *faras* is the representative of the whole sign (*faras ~ FARAS*), and so is “faras”, the pragmatic referent, “language in use”, so to speak, for in “faras” we observe also the system in use. However, as I have pointed out, the statement that certain elements constitute a “system” is not in itself particularly interesting. The interesting thing is to discern how they might be said to constitute a system (Principia, 40). The answer is: by virtue of the existence of the true *la langue*. For it is not the very *representation* of the word that allows of various so-called realizations but the morphemic category “word” hiding behind its representation; there is in living language nothing like *faras*, the full meaning of which is always “the word faras” (IM, passim).

Now, as already intimated, the representation *faras* reflects, first and foremost, an aesthetic convention, this unit constituting a sound-picture, or, more correctly, a sign-picture composed of behavioural *events*, picture-signs, and thus implying a certain *order of relation* between these events, represented by the alphabetical radicals + the vowels of Arabic (above, p. 64). As regards the Qurʾān we have to depart from the textual behaviour of the prophet, reflecting his understanding of the world. However, he does not utter all that he understands, and what he utters he understands in his own way, and what he thus understands constitutes his *intention*, the observable side of his understanding.

Now, utilizing our analysis of the linguistic sign we might, at least preliminarily, venture the equation that—*mutatis mutandis*—“intention” is to “understanding” what *faras* is to FARAS, i.e. the “intention” is the expression and “understanding” the content of a noetic morpheme within the sphere of what we
call “consciousness” as composed of a hierarchical organization of noetic morphemes reflected in the organization of textual behaviour and corresponding to various states of “consciousness” (cf. OS 31–2, pp. 112 f.). Thus I shall say that “understanding” is form, i.e. an organization of elements (Principia, p. 51). However that may be, it appears, at least to me, that the elegant paper “Interpretationens problem: tolkning – förståelse” by I. Jonsson is far too superficial to be accepted in scientific circles (Annales Academiae Regiae Scientiarum Upsaliensis, 26/1986, pp. 20 ff.).

III

Prolegomena to The Linguistic Categories of Arabic

Following a suggestion from Professor H. B. Rosén I have long been trying to write a book on the linguistic categories of Arabic. As I wanted to dedicate this book to Professor Rosén as a token of a long friendship I felt a need to give him of my best. However, the task was not an easy one, the less so as I very soon had to admit that I did not know what ought to be understood by a “linguistic category”. Thus I was, for instance, immediately confronted with the problem of the “extra-linguistic”, for only after having solved this problem could I hope to discern what is to be called “the linguistic” par excellence, i.e. the human language in the more conventional sense, cf. OS 30, pp. 205 ff.

Now, recalling the already quoted pessimistic words of Ferdinand de Saussure (above, p. 58) I tried to sketch the connection between the “linguistic” and “the extra-linguistic”, using what I called the method of “ontological structuralism” (OS 30, p. 93). Whether this kind of structuralism is only a “method” (cf. J. Piaget, Le structuralisme, 1968, pp. 117 f.), or a true philosophy of language I dare not yet say; in any case it does not seem to have much in common with, for instance, “Representations. Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science” (1981) by Jerry A. Fodor, according to the publisher’s blurb “one of the world’s foremost linguistic philosophers”.

Now, as for the relationship obtaining between “the linguistic” and “the extra-linguistic” I introduced the hierarchy “culture” > “literature” > “text” > “language” (OS 31–2, pp. 96 f.; Eranos 83, p. 173, n. 5; OS 33–5, p. VII), thus challenging the view whereby “culture” is treated as if it belonged to the extralinguistic sphere. It is, however, obvious that any language is, in some way, also integrated in culture, integration being in itself a holistic term (OS 31–2, p. 106 and p. 113). Trying to answer this important question I have drawn attention to the fact that language exists only as literature, in the sense of August Boeckh. This phenomenon I call the socio-cultural mode of existence of language (OS 31–2, pp. 105–6), for there is no such thing as language in itself, composed of “sentences” as is usually maintained. In order to be accessible for study, language must be observed by us in its true ontological state of existence within the framework of the culture to which it belongs, i.e. also as a cultural activity. Moreover, as cultural activity, i.e. in function (cf. Principia, p. 39), language appears, as was already said, as literature, and as literature it appears only in texts, and as text, the latter showing us what kind of cultural activity language
really is. It is *textual behaviour*, a specific kind of cultural activity, and it is also this fact that constitutes the true so-called "first articulation" of language (cf. OS 30, p. 130, n. 24). Thus it goes without saying that a cultural behaviour like the textual one should not, in the first instance, be segmented into "sentences" or "clauses", terms which are by no means consubstantial with the concept of the text as being a kind of *cultural* behaviour. The text is, first and foremost, to be divided into its parts, that is, into *textemes* which are then *entities by derivation* directly from the text as a cultural category. This means that it is the textemes that have to be considered the true immediate constituents of the text, the text itself integrating at the same time the elements in question precisely as "constituents"; it is important to distinguish between "element" and "constituent" (cf. Principia, p. 40).

From what has hitherto been said we can see that it is a long way from the text to the "word", let alone from the text to the phoneme or to the sound, the material of the phoneme. Moreover, even the ontological state of the phoneme has, in the last resort, to be inferred from the level of the text regarded as a cultural category. Furthermore, the metareferent of the text as a *sign* being *mundus grammatico inflectus et intellectus* or simply *mundus*, we understand that only a *total semiotic perspective* will suffice here. Thus, when Brice R. Wachterhauser maintains that "hermeneutical theories of understanding argue that all human understanding is never without words and never outside of time" we must take "words" in a metaphorical sense (Hermeneutics and Modern Philosophy, 1986, p. 5). The world is understood as text (OS 31–2, p. 200). Moreover, when Wachterhauser continues: "On the contrary, what is distinctive about human understanding is that it is always in terms of some evolving linguistic framework that has been worked out over time in terms of some historically conditioned set of concerns and practices" (op. cit., pp. 5–6), one would like to know what he, Heidegger, Gadamer etc. understands by language. This he, unfortunately, does not say. However, if "understanding" is basically linguistic, it must be important to know what language really is. For to the so-called "speech-act" an "act of understanding" ought to correspond (Principia, p. 51; OS 31–2, p. 200). Moreover, if "understanding" is the medium of "ontological disclosure" (Heidegger) and this medium is linguistic in nature (Gadamer), we ought also to know something of the *ontological* state of language itself.

Now, the "text" being a kind of cultural behaviour (cf. OS 31–2, pp. 97f.), this fact—and it is a fact—leads us to introduce a distinction between *semiotic* and *semantic* categories, the latter being, in some way, always integrated in the former. For it goes without saying that a semiotic category is, in some way, always also semantic. However, a semantic category, in the usual linguistic sense, is only also semiotic insofar as it can be considered to be an *entity by derivation*, i.e. an entity directly derived from a cultural category, in our case the *text* in the aforementioned sense. For it is in the text that the point of *intersection* between culture and language, as being the material of literature, is to be found, the content of the text being constituted by the very mode of existence of language, namely as *literature* in the aforementioned sense. The technemic
function of this specific mode of existence is to be designated as "literarity" (cf. OS 31-2, p. 95). For practical reasons "semiotic" will here be used of cultural phenomena, although it is obvious that in living language the semiotic moment is preserved in various degrees throughout the architecture of the whole language. This is a question of analysis.

Thus the very fact that "horse" is in Arabic expressed by faras and not by hippos, equus, at etc. is in itself a cultural fact, but the "word" faras is a purely linguistic fact. For the category of the word is not an immediate constituent of the text since the word and the text belong to quite different ontological levels. As we have seen, the text is mainly a cultural category, namely insofar as it is the result of a certain kind of cultural behaviour, the expression of which is linguistic in nature, i.e. what we are wont to call "linguistic", from lingua "tongue". As we see, already the term "linguistic" is misleading, having reference only to the speech-apparatus, or, more correctly, to a part thereof (metaphorically), and not to what is done with it. However, speech is a kind of cultural behaviour, textural behaviour, a term that could be used with profit in discussing the literary phenomenon of intertextuality (cf. OS 36-7, 85ff.).

Thus I shall contend that in its first articulation language is, first and foremost, cultural behaviour making use of linguistic behaviour (in the sense of textual behaviour) as its expression. Now this means that, from a purely linguistic point of view, the relational metareferent of the text is precisely this cultural behaviour, constituted by its mode of existence as literature and to be grasped by us in the shape of "literarity" manifested as "supratexual discursivity" (OS 29, p. 102; OS 30, pp. 112ff.). Moreover, this kind of discursivity appears to us as configurations formed by concatenations of the text (OS 31-2, pp. 199ff.), constituting from the point of view of aspect also the expressional value of "background" and "foreground" and "neutral".

Now, as I said, it is at the level of the text that the point of intersection between culture and language (as being the material of literature) is to be found. Thus the metareferent of the text, ought, in some way, also to be a transformation of the specific metareferent of the text, considered then from the properly cultural point of view. At this stage of my exposition I shall simply make the following statement: From a cultural-functional viewpoint the text is a way to inflect the world (cf. Eranos 83, pp. 170ff.). Moreover the text is, as a cultural category, mundus grammaticae intellectus. It is a picture of the world, always represented in a specific way by a sender. On the part of the receiver the text is mundus grammaticae intellectus, the term grammaticae taken also in the sense of Dionysius Thrax (ed. G. Uhlig, p. 5). Regarded as a cultural sign on the analogy of the iconic sign par excellence, the word, the text might be expected to exhibit the same relational structure as the word, although on a still higher level than the so-called "sentence", namely the same relational structure as is to be found between the elements expression, content and referent.

Referring the reader to "Principia" p. 80 as well as to Eranos 83, pp. 170ff. I shall posit the following type of sign for the cultural sign of the text:

\[
\text{mundus grammaticae intellectus} = \text{content} \\
\text{mundus grammaticae inflectus} = \text{expression}
\]
From this we can extract *mundus* “world”, as being a common denominator, to designate the referent, i.e. the level of the sign (cf. Principia, p. 79f.). But what about the pragmatic referent? Let us take as a minimal example the text Faras! “Look, a horse!” Substituting Arabic for *grammaticae* the expression of the text is to be designated as *mundus Arabice inflectus* = “Faras!” being then the pragmatic referent, the meaning (the sense) *in casu*, and *mundus Arabice intellectus* the content. Now, the metareferent being the likewise common denominator *mundus*, it is—on the analogy of, for instance, Akkadian *ilmarduk, urki*—appropriate to designate the full meaning of the text *Faras*! as *mundus*(*Faras* = expression ~ *ARAS* = content) = “Faras!” = pragmatic referent, or, for short “the text ‘faras’”. It goes without saying that it is not possible to divide the text, as being a representation of “world”, into “sentences”. As has been already said, in this sense the text can only be divided into parts of the text, i.e. into texthemes, entities with perspectivistic function, indicating “foreground” and “background” and “neutral”.

What is the meaning of *grammaticae* in this connection? I would answer: The world painted with the help of *grammata, litterae* (cf. Eranos 83/1985, pp. 170ff.). I have already mentioned Dionysius Thrax (p. 74). Now a Swedish professor of so-called “general linguistics” says: “Ett första försökt till svar på frågan (i.e. What is grammar?) skulle kunna vara följande: En grammatik är en beskrivning av hur ett språk fungerar.” (Ö. Dahl, Grammatik, 1982, p. 9.) One can agree that the term “grammar” might have this meaning, but only on the condition that one is able to define what one understands by a “language”. For we ought no doubt to know at least something about the very nature of the object, the functioning of which we think “grammar” describes (cf. OS 31–2, 1984, p. 112; Bloomfield, Language, p. 21; Hjelmslev, Prolegomena, p. 21; Rundgren, Fenn.-Ugrica Suecana 5/1982, p. 236 and p. 243).

I now return to the beginning, to Ethiopic, rejecting thus Lambdin’s exposition mentioned above, p. 57. Oscar Löfgren once suggested that I should write an etymological dictionary of the Semitic languages. I never came to do so. However, dealing with the notion of *ifāqār* “need, want, lack” in Ibn al-ʿArabi I tried also to find the etymon of the Ethiopic ideomorpheme *faq* “love” (Dillmann, Lexicon, 1357–1359) attested, to begin with, in *faq* “love”, cf. *faqra* naqdan or *faqra* *bābāda* < χιλιοζενία, presupposing a *faqara* or “*faqra* “love”, replaced by the denominative *afaqara* “love”. Now Arabic has *iftaqara*, meaning on the one hand “cleave, slit, rent, open”, and, on the other “become poor, needy”, i.e. *faqir*, cf. *iftaqara* *ilayhi* “he wanted, needed, required it” (Lane 2425f.). The verb *faqara*, *yafqaru*, inf. *faqran* means “dig, perforate, cleave”, and *faqir* “something dug” and—“poor, needy, in want of”. Already here it appears that *faqara*, inf. *faqar- “become poor, needy” is to be compared with the Ethiopic *faqra* posited by me above: “to be in need of” and thus “desire, require” > “love”, attested in the denominative *afaqara*. According to Lane *faqir* ~ *maqūr* means also a man “afflicted (lit. having the vertebrae of his back broken) by a calamity” and thus “poor”, to which one might—*mutatis mutandis*—compare Engl. “broke” = “ruined, poor”. To the same ideomorpheme *faq* belongs Middle/Late Babylonian *paqaru* “claim” (older *baqaru*). W. Leslaus’ treatment
of the ideomorpheme in question in his "Comparative Dictionary of Ge‘ez" (1987), p. 164 can, in my opinion, hardly be accepted.

NOTES

2. Das althebräische Verbum. Abriss der Aspektlehre.
7. According to I. Jonsson Saussure has “discovered” la langue (Idéer och teorier om ordens konst, 1971, p. 206); the exposition in I. Jonsson, I symbolens hus, 1983, pp. 216f. is little better.
Some Remarks on the Katābā da-ʾal idaʾtā da-šrārā*

FRITHIOF RUNDGREN

The comprehensive work on which I shall comment, ‘‘The Book of the Knowledge of Truth’’, invites, of course, diverse reflexions. Here it is my intention to make a small contribution to our understanding of what I call the hermeneutic horizon of its author, always a difficult problem, and in this case complicated still further by the fact that the author is unknown to us and the dating thus uncertain. I would express my basic view of hermeneutics as follows: It is always a question of understanding what the author himself understood. According to the editor, Karl Kayser, the original part of the text belongs to a period no earlier than the tenth century, probably later, and Book III, Chapter 2 to a time not before the Crusades.¹

Book I begins as follows: ‘‘Thus man is living, endowed with reason (māḥīlā), mortal, composed of a living and rational soul which by its nature is pure (ṣafyā)² and enlightened (nahhirā) and therefore receptive of reason (hawnā) and knowledge, continually and endlessly, and of one material and heavy body consisting of four elements of which this whole visible world consists and is ordered (māṭak-kas)’’ (p. 13,13–6).

That the author opens with a definition of man depends inter alia on the fact that among all created beings man holds a strong, very specific position in this work. The definition itself seems to be an extension of Porphyry’s statement: ‘‘For we say that man is a living, rational, mortal being, capable of mind and knowledge’’ (λέγομεν γάρ ἂνθρωπον εἶναι ζῶον λογικόν θνητόν νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεχόμεν;); Commentary on the Categories ed. A. Busse, 1887, p. 60, 17–8.

Now it is also said in the passage just quoted that not only man but also the whole of the visible world is composed of four elements in a certain order, taksā, and the concept of order dominates also to a great extent the exposition of the author. Thus it is appropriate to take our passage as the starting point for a consideration of his doctrine of the elements. In Book II, Chapter 5, pp. 179, 6–184.20 it is said: ‘‘Matter is simply the four elements which, in turn, consist of four natures (kayānā), the parents and upholders of this world and all that is in it, that is, cold, warm, moist, and dry. Except these there is nothing. And every element is composed of two natures.’’ (p. 179,6–9.) As for the elements he deals with them in the following order: air, earth, fire, and water, apparently under the influence of the story of the creation which occupies a strong position in this work. Moreover, it seems here to be a question of what Nemesios of Emesa (about 400 A.D.) calls τὸ στοιχεῖον τὸ κοσμικόν; with him the elements appear,

however, in the order earth, water, air and fire (De Natura Hominis, Chapter V, p. 150, ed. Chr. Fr. Matthaei, Halle, 1802).

Now our author considers the air to be composed of warm-moist, which, according to what has been said above, ought to mean two natures, while Nemesios says that "the air is moist and warm in accordance to its own nature" (p. 151). Moreover, the nature of earth is cold-dry contrary (saqqūblā) to the warm-moist of the air. However, Nemesios states: ἑναντία δὲ ἄλλης ἐστὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα, τὰ κατὰ τὰς δύο ποιότητας ἑναντία (p. 152) from which we gather, I think, that kayana is "quality" as well as "nature". The author shows us now how "the Creatorship joined fitly together these contrary qualities, united their contrariety by the aid of great love and desire, made and put in order this All". He tells us "how the all-wise Demiurgeship united these contrary, each other effacing and destroying (qualities), putting out of them in order this beautiful structure" (p. 180,1–4). From this parallelism, so typical of the style of the work, I already now point out "Creator~Demiurge" as well as "this All" ~ "beautiful structure" (cosmos).

The reasoning of the author is as follows. The qualitative syzygy of the air, that is, warm-moist gives rise to a union with the syzygy of the fire (warm-dry), both elements containing the quality "warm", as well as with that of water (moist-warm), both of them containing the quality "moist". Thus the contrary opposition water/fire is abolished through the insertion of the element "air" between them, that is, water-air-fire, the air filling the function of a δἐξιομόιος, this, in the last resort, on the analogy of the Platonic τὸ μεσον. In the same way the contrary opposition earth (cold-dry)/ air (moist-warm) is abolished in the new structure earth–water–fire, where in the syzygy (cold-moist) of the water the quality "cold" could be combined with the qualitative equivalent of the element "earth", and the quality "moist" of this same element "water" with the corresponding quality of the element "fire".

Thus in this cosmic chemistry or perhaps rather physics the four elementary entities have two functions, namely of an element and of a constituent of a cosmic system of elements, the very concept of "system" being a Hellenistic achievement, cf. Poseidonios's definition of the cosmos as being "A system made up of heaven and earth and the natures in them, or, again, a system constituted by gods and men and all things created for their sake" (Diogenes Laertios, VII, 138). Thus the Syriac word rendered above by "structure", namely qūyāmā, might also reflect this Hellenistic "system" of which it seems, in the last resort, to be a translation. As we see, the νεῖκος "Strife" reigning between the Empedoclean elements is here transformed into the φιλία "Love", but then in the sense of the (σον)δειομός as it appears in Nemesios. However, in our author this concept, rooted in the Timaeos, has been influenced by the Neo-Platonic theory of love: ba-rexmatā wa-ya”ibūtā.

Now, having given us this explanation, based on the homogeneity of the combining qualities, the author advances—as he says—an explanation of his own, based on the probably mutual relationship obtaining between contrary qualities. He says: "Thus earth is cold-dry. When its dryness is moistened with water that it is longing for, and when, likewise, its cold is heated by the warmth
from the sunbeams and this union and much longed-for connexion set in, every beautiful species and thing is brought about and accomplished.” (p. 181,15–18.) Moreover, the author compares this heteroqualitative desire of the elements with the natural love between man and woman. He says: “And in this way the elements were fitly joined together and united with each other through a passionate desire like natural love between man and woman. And thus they were united in a natural, decent and much longed-for union, and they brought about matter, this matter from which everything has obtained its structure and perfection.”

The emphasis on natural, heterosexual love I would, in this connection, like to see not only as a popularization of an obscure complex but also as a Christian feature in accordance with what I call the stylistic, horizontal, coordinating harmony dominating throughout the work and based on an *ecumenizing* identification of elements belonging to different semiotic systems.

In accordance with the story of creation in Genesis the author now visualizes the order of the elements as follows (p. 179,9):

```
fire

air

water

earth
```

What has now been said about *rexnatā* and *ya‘ibūtā* necessitates some words on the background of the function of love in the field of ancient natural philosophy. Ever since Plato’s *Symposium* love, Eros, is the basic force, driving man to seek knowledge in general, and true knowledge in particular, that is, knowledge of what really is, or, for short “the real”. However, in the main, such endeavours were, from the beginning also connected with the search for a highest entity, God, who may then be called Being, Cause, the Good, Number or Motion. During periods of syncretism or eclecticism such elements of thought were integrated into more comprehensive systems, the most important document of creed being later the Timaeus as interpreted by its first dominant interpreter, the great Stoic Poseidonios from Apameia (135–51 B.C.). *He* seems to be a true forerunner of Neo-Platonism and the originator of the synthesis between Plato and Aristotle. In this connection I recall the name of Karl Reinhardt and his famous book “Poseidonios” from 1921 where the author found in this philosopher one of the most eager systematicians and a bold champion of explanations founded on the concept of “cause”. We are reminded of the fact that our Syriac work has the alternative title *Katābā da‘ellat kul ‘ellān*, and I have already mentioned the great role the concept of *takṣā* “order” plays here.

Now the Platonic theme of love is handled in a specific way by our author, namely in the sense of love of mankind. I quote a passage from the prologue, the *qaddimūt mellatā* (p. 13,8).³

1. He who in peaceful seclusion reads this book will become “initiated into the whole of the knowledge of truth” and thereby also promoted in dignity (*meštawšat*), exalted, perfected, and “what we are justified in saying, but what also is (too) great to say: made God (*met‘allah*)⁴ and united with his Maker”. This Neo-Platonic kind of deification, by Kayser compared *inter alia* with that in Dionysius
Areopagita (transl., p. 7), is at the basis of the author’s raised assessment of the value of man and thus also the foundation of his love of mankind. Thus he says of him who reads the book carefully that “next to his Maker there is nothing in the world more loved and dear to him than Man, his bar kayānā. In him he sees his Lord and in him he owns his Creator, but only on the condition that he is not near to him (man) but far away from all kinds of dealing and intimacy with people.” (p. 5,21–6,6.)

However, as far as the дейων is concerned, it is here appropriate to mention a pamphlet which was apparently widespread in Antiquity although we find it mentioned only by two ancient Greek authors. I mean Aristotle’s great “preface” to the writings he had so far composed as well as to Plato’s, namely the “Exhortation to philosophy”, written about 350 B.C. in a specific cultural situation, which comes particularly to the fore in the programmatic key-word τὸ χρήσμον “the truly useful” as against a superficial and more immediate benefit. Here we have one of the main sources for the Syriac concept of yuirānā and thus also for the Muslim ṣanas’a. Moreover, the content of this pamphlet seems also, in its entirety, to have influenced Syriac theology, probably through the mediation of a specific Syriac form of Neo-Platonism. For it is a remarkable coincidence that the Neo-Pythagorean and Neo-Platonist Iamblichus (died c. 325 A.D.) incorporated considerable sections of this Aristotelian Protrepticus “Exhortation” into his own Protrepticus.

2. The author says that “he is burning with love for all men and is struck with passion for them because he has come to know their precious nature (kayānhōn w-iqārhōn)” (p. 6,12–3).

3. On the whole human beings exist only as different peoples organized in nations but, from the beginning and finally, they are only just human beings, belonging to one race. They are, as the author puts it, “brothers, relatives, members of each other, sons of one family and one stock” (p. 7,16). This now gives the author opportunity to change the formula of humility into what might give us the impression of some ambivalence. For he says he is “a little member having together with all of you a share in the human kind” (p. 8,1). On one hand his social position is insignificant, on the other he must be a true nobleman since he belongs to the human race.

4. Later on he says: “I became conscious of (arġaṣet) and understood the great love and the abundant care the good Lord, the wise Creator and the wise provider has for his beloved creation” (p. 10,3–4). This gradual perception of the manifestations of the divine belongs to the behaviour of the true mystic, and thus the author becomes by and by aware of the high value (iqār) of human kind (p. 10,4–5). For Man is created not in God’s image but bā-ṣalmō, that is, according to a representation of the image or idea of God, as in Genesis 1.27—according to Paul Ricoeur belonging to a “thème mythique emprunté aux peuples ambiant et introduit tardivement” (Le conflit des interprétations, 1969, p. 475). Now, since God loves His creation we also ought to love our kinsmen. “Thus”, he says, “it is right for everyone who comes across this universal book (kāṭāba gawwānāyā)”
to endue the divine love, which is to be understood through the love for men, and
to arm himself with love for the image of the Creator.” (p. 12,1–5.)

The specific hermeneutic horizon of the author permits him sometimes to make
extensions of biblical passages, for instance Luke 6,31: “And as ye would that
men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise”, where we find the addition:
“And as you desire and wish that the Creator should do to you, do you also, in
what you can, to the whole creation.” (p. 11,23–12,1.) Thus he establishes here
and on p. 11,15–8 a _direct_ connection between God and Man, a directness
depending on the strong position which the story of the creation in Genesis
occupies in his thinking.

Having picked up some points from this comprehensive work I now ask: How
is this remarkable book to be characterized more generally? The author himself
designates it as a _kataba gawwānāyā la-kul ‘ammin da-xitā šamayyā “a book
common to all peoples under the sky”_, and Kayser rightly rejects Bickell’s
translation “Universalbuch für alle Völker” (transl., p. XIV). For it is by no
means in itself an “encyclopaedia”. The encyclopaedic features are all subordi-
nated to what I would like to call the author’s _ecumenical_ purpose, his spiritual
_ōlqumēn_ consisting of Jews, Christians and Muslims, and more specifically of
their confessions (taudadātā). Moreover, nature is common to all peoples, and it is
in the “Book of Nature”, written by the Creator that the author reads. This is
the sense of _gawwānāyā “universal”_ in this connection. But how did this word
come to mean “universal”? This is an old story.

In Old Syriac the preposition _ba “in”_ is sometimes strengthened to _ba-gaw “in
the interior of”_, “in the midst of” (cf. Accadian _ina qerbi_), to _gawwā “pars
interna corporis”_. From this _ba-gaw_ one obtained early a _gawwā “medium”_.
Now, since the Greek ἐν μέσῳ could, in certain expressions, be used in the sense
of “in common” and _da-gawwā_ thus could render _koinόs_ (e.g. Acta 4,32)
gawwānāyā came to mean also “universal”.

The author has a certain cosmological “Weltanschauung” from which he
derives his view that “there is an order for everything” (p. 13,21); on Poseidonios
cf. above, p. 79. Moreover, the exposition itself follows, likewise, a certain order.
According to this trend the author also tries to discover what might have
constituted the first thought of man, finding it in the concept of the _baytā “the
house”_. Now, in order to arrive at this concept the very first thought of man
must, he thinks, have been that of the _tātilā “roof”_, as being a cover for the
body against the heat of the sun, the vehemence of the wind, and the rain. Then
he comes to think of the fact that the roof must have walls (_essā_) to carry it, and
later still another thought came into his mind: The walls must have what he calls
_‘umqā da-šet’essā mašarrārātā_ (16,10) “the depth of firm foundations” on which
the walls could be raised. Then he arrives at the following conclusion: “Where
the thought stopped, from there the action should begin, and where the thought
already begins and the thought comes into mind, there is the end of the action,
and this is called ‘the preconceived end’, as also everybody knows.”

Here the author has borrowed a topos of Stoic origin. This topos has served
various purposes. Let us quote the following words of Reinhardt’s: “die Um-
menschenheit in ihrer Vertiertheit, ihrer Zerstreutheit, ihrer inneren und äusseren
Gefährdung muss geschildert werden, damit die veredelnde und rettende Wirkung der jeweils zu preisenden Kunst sich desto leuchtender dagegen abhebe" (Poseidonios, p. 402). It is always Greek philosophy that forms the background from which "die jeweils zu preisende Kunst" stands out. In our case this art is not as with Cicero "eloquence" (De Inventione, Book I), or, as with Vitruvius "architecture" (De Architectura, Book II) but the taṭlīlā, philosophy being here the idātā da-šrārā although in a religious sense. However, the truly philosophic topos of "the preconceived end" had reached the Syrians via certain commentaries on Aristotle, propagated to them mainly through Probus;8 for Poseidonios and Ibn Xaldūn cf. the present writer in Religion och Bibel, 32/1973, p. 5. Thus, stressing the Poseidonian touch of the theme of the "house" we have only to add that the introduction of the taṭlīlā here has been adapted to the position held by Genesis 1,1ff. in the thinking of our anonymous author.

I shall now sum up my points. 1. Among the many cases of parallelism I mentioned "Creator"—"Demiurge" as well as "this All"—"beautiful structure" (cosmos). The first serves according to Kayser as a warning directed against the gnostics (transl., p. 8). Of this I am, however, not so sure. The second one has the "Poseidonian touch", so to speak. 2. As for the doctrine of the elements I assumed some connection with Nemesios.9 3. I spoke of the Platonic and Neo-Platonic concept of becoming metʿallah, corresponding to the θεωρίας of Dionysius Areopagita but already present in nuce in the Protrepticus of Aristotle. 4. I mentioned a more likely significance of the expression katābā gawwānāyā. 5. More than once I invoked the great name of Poseidonios as I, long ago, also did for Bardesanes (Orientalia Suecana 22/1974, pp. 80f.). 6. I also pointed out the true philosophic origin of the concept of yutrānā. Le me add the author’s specific kind of φιλοαρχοπλικά as well as the fact that the Protrepticus seems, in its entirety, to have influenced Syriac theology. For here we find, for instance, the prototype of the very title of our work. In his pamphlet Aristotle says of ἔπιστημη that it has "theory" as its most powerful end, which seems to mean that this kind of knowledge is ἔπιστημη τῆς ὀληθείας or idātā da-šrārā. In the pamphlet in question we also find the preliminary stage of the concept of the "preconceived end" as well as that of the topos of the "house" (cf. possibly al-hāʾit bei Sibawayh, this according to Eva Riad).10 However, the ways on which all the concepts mentioned in my "remarks" have reached the author, that is, the question of his sources must first be thoroughly investigated before we can define, more precisely, what I call his hermeneutic horizon.

EXCURSUS

The specific Stoic equivalent of the Greek πρὸςλογος seems after all to be the term ἡμπάκ βα-ρῶξα or ἡμπάκ ῥῶξα thoroughly discussed by Eva Riad, Studies in the Syriac Preface, 1988, pp. 184ff. Mainly two circumstances speak in favour of an interpretatio Stoica here. 1. The expression ἡμπάκ βα-ρῶξα appears twice already in the letter of Mara Bar Serapion, which is imbued with Stoic thinking, namely a) δεξιότα γάρ ῥω-μπάκ βα-ρῶξα da-mkān lā metṭol xakkimā "For fear and
excuse of what is natural does not behove the wise” (Spicilegium Syriacum, ed. W. Cureton, 1855, p. 45); b) mānā gār xārēn it lan lā-mēmar, kad ba-qṭirā metdabrīn xakkīmā men iday ṯārōnā wā-mēstābyā xakkīmāthōn men mēkal qarsā wā-metgalzīn ba-nakkhrīthōn da-lā mpq ba-rūxā “For what else have we to say when the wise by force are dragged away by tyrants, and their wisdom is taken prisoner by calumny, and they are deprived of their intelligence without an apology” (p. 46). In accordance with Varro’s is tum prolocutus, quom in animo quod habuit extulit loquendo (De Lingua Latina, VI, 55) I am inclined to interpret nafaq ba-rūxā, inf. meppaq ba-rūxā as well as apeq rūxā, mappaq rūxā as “plead”, translating the specific Stoic meaning of προλέγειν “to speak out that which is in one’s mind”, including the ἐνδιάθετος λόγος. 2. Arabic laţ in Sibawayhi < Syriac mappaq < Stoic προφορά, to προφέροντες “eject, pronounce”. In addition to the exposition given by Max Pohlenz in “Die Stoa. Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung” (1948, pp. 38–9) I would venture the following reflexion: If Zeno from Citéium (335–263 B.C.) were of Phoenician origin, as has been assumed, he might have easier than a pure Greek come upon the idea of two types of logos, using, for instance, the mlk “king” of the script as what I call an ideomorpheme (m-l-k, the “root”) designating thus “the inner, silent speech”, while the pronunciation milk could be regarded as “the outer speech”, the λόγος προφορικός.

NOTES
3. Cf. Excursus, p. X.
In a paper entitled "The Origin of the ‘Teaching of the Apostles’", below (TA), W. Witakowski presented a series of arguments in order to prove that the TA was 1) originally composed in Syriac, 2) composed in Edessa, and 3) composed in the second quarter of the fourth century (p. 165). However, on p. 171 W. places the composition of the canons between 325 and 410, and the frame story "probably somewhat later"; on p. 167 he adduces "indications which make TA fit the 4th century or even its first half". Since W. attaches special importance to philological arguments I shall mainly consider such. As for the text of the TA, W. Cureton edited this from the MS. Add. 14,644 but carefully compared it with Add. 14,531 as well as with the edition of Lagarde (1856), cf. Cureton, Ancient Syriac Documents (1864), pp. 166-7.

On p. 171 W. concludes: "The textual testimony of the frame story, which depends on a Vetus Syra reading, not known elsewhere, is the proof, that Syriac was the original language of TA." However, on p. 170 the same textual testimony is "most probably based on the reading of the Vetus Syra text of Acts 2,2". Thus, what at first is "most probable" later becomes a fact, "the proof". Although such transformations of an hypothesis into a fact are, of course, not unusual, sometimes even justified, such logical shifts are a priori always apt to arouse our suspicions, the more so in the present case since "the proof" is combined with an argumentum e silentio: the alleged Vetus Syra reading is not known elsewhere, according to W.1a

Here two questions arise. 1. Whence did W. derive the idea that we are dealing with a Vetus Syra reading in the present case? 2. What is to be understood by the term "Vetus Syra" today? The first question receives an at any rate possible answer in a paper by J. Kerschensteiner, Biblica, 45/1964, pp. 63-74. However, on p. 73 Kerschensteiner also says: "Aber bei der Freiheit der Übersetzungsweise, die für die Vetus Syra charakteristisch ist, scheint es nicht ausgeschlossen, dass 'Paraclitus' im alt syrischen Text stand."² (cf. below). To this, however, the following words of Nöldeke’s should be added: "Diesmal ist die syrische Bibel stärker herangezogen worden, namentlich die Evangelien, und besonders die synoptischen. Diese zeigen fast durchweg ein recht flüssendes, idiomatisches Syrisch, das sich im Grunde besser liest als das semitische Griechisch der Originale. Noch stärker als in unserem gewöhnlichen Text (P. = Peschitā) tritt das in der älteren Gestalt bei C. (Curetonianus), S. (Sinaicitus) und in den Citaten des Aphraates hervor." (Kurzgefasste Syrische Grammatik,² 1898, p. XIII), quoted already by A. Hjelt, Die alt syrische Evangelienübersetzung und Tatians Diatessaron (1901), pp. 8-9. Thus we are here dealing with two kinds of ‘Freiheit der
Übersetzungsweise’. 1. ‘Freiheit’ in the sense of Nölkeke. 2. ‘Freiheit’ in the sense of a harmonistic redaction. Bearing this in mind we shall now consider the ‘textual testimony’ adduced by W.

He finds this ‘in the beginning of the frame story’ of the TA (p. 170), i.e. in the last third of the front part of this story. For what is the relationship obtaining between the front and the back part of the text that frames the canons? Now in the front part we read inter alia, and W. reads exclusively, or more correctly tries to read: wo-rēxā bassimā da-nukrāy-wā laʾālmā panni-wā lahōn (Cureton, op. cit., p. 25, 15–6). With W. this becomes: wo-riḥā bassimā da-nukrāy (h)wā laʾālmā panni (h)wā lahōn where riḥā is half West Syriac and half East Syriac, the other words East Syriac, with the exception of nukrāy which is neither Western nor Eastern; nukr-āy, cf. Hebrew nākrī, thus quīl. Moreover W. reads Cureton’s pny hwā as panni-wā but translates—with Cureton (p. 25)—‘was diffused on them’ which is, of course, impossible, this verb being transitive while Cureton’s panni-wā is intransitive.

With the somewhat cursory approach which characterizes this paper—and unfortunately not only this—W. did not observe that already Cureton found the reading pny hwā problematic, pointing out that both B and C have p’x, i.e. pā’axwā “fragabat odor” which, according to him, ‘seems to be more correct’ (op. cit., p. 168). Now W. quotes Lagarde, Reliquiae . . . Syriac (1856), informing us even about the MS. (p. 162 and n. 4). Since no “non vidi” appears here one might have expected W. to inspect this edition, as Cureton did, for editions are to be consulted and not used as learned decorations. Already from Payne-Smith, Thesaurus, 3053 it appears that the word in question is to be found in Reliquiae, p. 34,6: rxy perpetual p’x hwā lhwun as against Cureton’s panni-wā = ēpēqosēweto, while Lagarde renders his pā’ax-wā laḥōn by προσόπως αὐτοῖς (Reliquiae . . . Graecae, p. 90,5); disperebebat would perhaps be better; cf. wo-rēxā da-swātā pā’ax-wā (Cureton, op. cit., p. 42,5–6) “and the odour of the sacrifices was diffusing itself” (transl. p. 41). Thus panni-wā seems to be the lectio difficilior and should therefore perhaps be retained.

Now the passage just quoted from the TA, p. 25,5–6 (Cureton) is according to W. “most probably based on the reading of the Vetus Syra text of Acts 2,2 known from the Liber Graduum and Ephrem’s commentary on the Acts in an Armenian catena, but no longer extant! in Peshitta” (p. 170). W. quotes, however, only the following words, w-ātā-wā rēx bassimūteh da-rūxā paraqētā (ed. M. Kmosko, 1926 = PS. I: 3, col. 553) where the relevant text runs: a(y)k da-ktib:da-kad salliw šolīkā w-etkaṣṣafu aykan da-xawti ennōn māran, nāhar atrā da-beh itay-hōn-waw w-ātā-wā rēx bassimūtēh da-rūxā paraqētā “layhun a(y)k da-men qāṭīr “sicut scriptum est: Orantibus Apostolis et supplicantibus, sic etis ostendit Dīnā, resplendent locus, ubi erant, et advenit odor suiavitatis Spiritus Paracliti eos quasi ex vehementia” (col. 554). Kmosko refers here to Acta 2,2 saying however also: “additamenta spuria textui illata, qui fortissimam movent suspicionem ea ex opere aliquo apocrypho hausta esse” (op. cit., p. CLXV). Moreover he informs us that the Gospel used in the Liber Graduum is the Diatessaron (p. CLXII).

Now W. has only quoted the following words: w-ātā-wā rēx bassimūteh da-rūxā paraqētā having read Kerschensteiner, Biblica 45, p. 66. It is, however,
important to quote at least the following words: "and a smell of the sweetness of
the Spirit paraclete was coming to them as if by force". Otherwise we cannot
establish a connection between the Liber Gradum and W.s third testimony,
taken from Afräm’s Commentary on the Acts to be found in an Armenian catena:
"A voice of violent wind was in the house where the disciples of Jesus were
assembled, and a sweet smell exhaled (probably <pā'ax-wā) from the violence of
the wind and filled the house." (W., p. 170). To this material I would add
Matthew 3,16.

In his Commentary on the New Testament Īsō’dād, for Matthew 3,16, starts
according to the Peshitta and finishes his quotation accordingly, but between
these two canonic parts he has inserted the following section: "And immedi-
ately—as the Diatessaron testifies—a mighty light flashed, and over the Jordan
white clouds had thickened, and many spiritual hosts were seen, that were
praising in the air, and Jordan stood still from its flowing, in that its water did not
move, and a sweet odour was wafted therefrom (wa-rēxā da-besmā men tammān
pā'ax-wā)"; i.e. almost the same intertextual topos as we find in the front story
of the TA; cf. A. Hjelt, op. cit., p. 32 and p. 136; F. C. Burkitt, Evangelion da-
Mepharreshe, II/1904, pp. 114-5 and p. 191 (Bar Šalibi’s Commentary on the
Gospels); the reading "mighty light" (nuhrā ʿazzizā) is corroborated by the Itala:
lumen magnum fulgebāt ~ lumen ingens circumfulsit (Itala. Das Neue Testament
p. 135; Burkitt, op. cit., p. 115; cf. on Īsō’dād Kmosko, op. cit. p. CLXV!

Now, in dealing with these difficult matters it must be considered important to
be able to define what one understands by the term "Vetus Syra" in general and
by the Vetus Syra of the Acts in particular. In his somewhat cubistic prose A.
Baumstark says: “Von Paulusbüchern und Apg die neben einem, wie auch immer
gestalteteten, ‘Evangelium’ die ältesten Bestandteile eines syrischen NTs bildeten,
eine von der abschliessenden der NTlichen P, noch verschiedene Textgestalt
dsich nicht zutage getreten, wirkt aber im armenischen Texte derselben nach.
Um so wünschenswerter wäre ein Versuch, auch ihre altsyrische Textgeschichte
an der Hand des ältesten Zitatennmaterials einigermassen aufzuhellen.” (Ge-
schichte der syrischen Literatur, 1922, pp. 22-3). With these words of Baum-
stark’s we might now compare the following statement: "Was somit in Efr-Pk,
Efr-AK, Efrs-AC, LG und Afr an Acta- und Paulustext erhalten ist, repräsentiert
nicht verschiedene Frühformen der Peshitta, sondern einen einheitlichen altsy-
rischen Apostolostext, dessen Gegenstück allem Anschein nach Diatessaron
war." (Kerschensteiner, Biblica, 45, pp. 73-4). Here we should ask the following
questions: 1. What is the sense of the term "Gegenstück" here? 2. What is the
relationship obtaining between the Diatessaron and this allegedly uniform text of
the Acts? In order to be able to answer these questions we must make a
methodical digression.

II

It is obvious that the front story of the TA is based on a summary of some kind of
Acts 1-2. However, we are here dealing with a summary of a specific kind,
admitting free variations, all according to an author’s wish to point out certain
traits, which may be objective, i.e. concerning historical facts, or dogmatic, i.e. emphasizing certain religious tenets. In addition we also have another kind of summary represented by Tatian's Diatessaron, the result of harmonizing (cf. below). Such a creative activity is based on a principle which, with a modern term, might be called *intertextuality*. Applying the linguistic theory advanced by me, whereby a language in principle is *textual behaviour* I shall try to illustrate the phenomenon of intertextuality by adducing some specimens of textual behaviour of a specific kind.

The theory in question is based on what I call "ontological structuralism", constituting a non-horizontal, vertical perspective, so to speak, from the text to the phoneme. Transferring this perspective to the allegedly extra-linguistic level we obtain the hierarchy *culture*—*literature*—*text*—*language*. For language, being textual behaviour, can only exist as literature (in the widest sense of the word), this social mode of existence of language being in turn integrated in the *semiotic* systems of culture, governing, in various ways, the hermeneutic horizon⁴a of the participants of the culture in question.

Let us now as an example take John 12.3: "Then took Mary a pound of ointment of spikenard, very costly, and anointed the feet of Jesus, and wiped his feet with her hair: *w-etmali baytā men rēxeḥ da-besmā* "and the house was filled with the odour of the ointment". (King James Version.) Already here it can be said that a *r'xh db-sm* could also be read *rēxeḥ da-bsmā* "odor suavitatis". Thus it is Jesus who is anointed with precious, sweet-scented oil, and the Sinaitic and the Curetonian versions have here *wa-mlā baytā kulleh men rēxeḥ da-meš=xā* "and the whole house was full of the smell of the oil". The next step in the intertextual development is then the emphasis on the fact that the sweet scent emanates also from Jesus (cf. below). Moreover we read in Matthew 26.6–7: "Now when Jesus was in Bethany in the house of Simon the leper, (7) there came unto him a woman having an alabaster box of very precious ointment (*meš=xā da-besmā*), and poured it on his head, as he sat at meat." (King James Version.) And then 26.12–13: "For in that she hath poured this ointment on my body, she did it for my burial. Verily I say unto you, Wheresoever this gospel shall be preached in the whole world (*db-kullah 'almā*), there shall also this, that this woman hath done, be told for a memorial of her." Jesus is being anointed by the woman with sweet-scented oil. This act of hers will be known in the whole world (cf. below).

Thus we have here two elements of text, *rēxeḥ da-besmā* and *db-kulleh 'almā*, which will later become, as we shall see, intertextual *constituents* of a new text. For W.s arguing at the level of isolated elements has not the value of a scientific proof. On the one hand it is necessary to trace the relevant origin of the elements, on the other we must carefully study the textual and cultural environment into which these elements enter in their capacity as intertextual constituents. In the present case it is thus important to observe *where* and *how* the intertextual topos "odor suavitatis" appears in the new text. In the front story Ṣem'ōn Kēfā lets Jesus say: Ṣm da-selqet lwät āby māsad-dar-nā lōhōn rūxā paraqlētā, *db-hā nallef-kōn kulmeddem da-zādeq lakōn, db-teddā'n wō-tawdā'ūn* "When I am ascended to my Father I will send to you the Spirit, the Paraclete, that he may
teach you every thing which it is meet for you to know, and to make known.’” (Cureton, op. cit., p. 25, 11–3; transl., p. 25). Cureton rightly compares John 14, 26 (p. 168), and we can add 14, 16; 15, 26, and 16, 7.

Now it is immediately after the passage just quoted that the intertextual topos “odor suavitatis” appears: wa-kâd hi Șem’ôn Këfà hallân la-sîlî xaברawy emar-wâ wa-salîhed-wâ lîhôn, qâlā da-kasîyâ es’îmawâ-wâ lîhôn wa-rêxâ bassimâ da-nukrây-wâ la-’almâ pani-wâ lîhôn, wa-leššânâ da-nûrâ bût qâlā la-rêxâ naxêt-waw men šêmâyî lôwâthôn “And when Simon Cephas had spoken these things to his fellow Apostles, and reminded them, a voice of mystery was heard by them, and sweet odour, which is strange to the world, was diffused on them, and tongues of fire, between the voice and the odour, came down to them from heaven.” (Cureton, p. 25, 13–7; transl., p. 25). Far from being convinced by W.’s paper that the words wa-rêxâ bassimâ etc. reflect a “Vetus Syra reading” in the usual sense of the term, I would, to begin with, recall the following statement: “Es wurde schon darauf hingewiesen, dass hier wie auch LG (132, 23 und 553, 21) und bei Marutha der Heilige Geist in Zusammenhang mit Apg 2,1,2 als Paracletus bezeichnet wird. Obwohl dafür also vier Belegstellen vorhanden sind, könnte man trotzdem noch an einen Einfluss des Johannevangeliums denken.” (Kerschensteiner, Biblica, 45, p. 73.) As we have seen, already Cureton had referred to John 14, 26, but we now also see that Kerschensteiner has no understanding either of the phenomenon of intertextuality.

Within the framework of intertextual thinking reminiscences of various Bible-passages can be combined according to what the objective, factual or dogmatic situation seems to require. Thus the poor women who anointed Jesus with sweet-scented oil should be known to the whole world in connection with the preaching of the Gospel, and until then she was unknown (nukrây-), and so was the “odor suavitatis”. Moreover, the sweet smell emanated also from Jesus, and in John it is Jesus who asks the Father to send the παράκλητος, τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας (14, 16) as a kind of substitute for Jesus himself, producing now also the mysterious voice; the tongues of fire are taken from Act 2, 3 and are here placed between the sweet odour and the voice.

Thus one might venture the guess that the phenomenon of intertextuality has played a considerable role for the origin of apocrypha of various kinds, and, after all, it is perhaps in its light we should examine the passage in the Liber Graduum quoted above (p. 86), the more so as Kerschensteiner has characterized Afrâm’s text of the Acts in the following way: “Es ... ist bekannt, dass ‘Ephráms Actatext den sogenannten Westerntext bietet und diesen in einer sehr freien Form; dass mitunter Elemente auftauchen, die an die Apokryphen erinnern; dass manches geradezu nach Art der Targumin übersetzt ist usw.’” (Biblica, 45, p. 64.) Moreover, we have seen that Kerschensteiner has spoken of the Diatessaron as the “Gegenstück” of a uniform Old Syriac text of the Acts (above, p. 87). Thus it is not out of place to quote two statements made by Paul Kahle in this connection. 1. “The bishoprics, numbering twenty and more, which existed about 224 in the countries along the Tigris, needed a certain period to develop. Tatian may have tried to contact them. It seems that it was for these Christian communities in Assyria that he composed a Syriac text arranged in the order of
the Diatessaron.” (The Cairo Geniza, 1959, p. 284.)—G. D. Kilpatrick: “If the Diatessaron was primarily an arrangement of the Gospel material, then the whole question whether the Diatessaron was first produced in Greek or Syriac becomes of less importance.” (l.c., n. 4.) 2. “As the Gospel text in the Sinai palimpsest was probably copied in the fourth century, at a time when the Diatessaron was highly valued in the Eastern Churches, it may well be that it also was influenced by the Diatessaron.” (op. cit., p. 293.) Kahle sees in Gospel texts like the Sinaiticus and the Curetonian versions “descendants of the Syriac text which was before Tatian when he composed the Diatessaron”. (ibidem.)

Thus, if we now ask ourselves: Why did this Assyrian, conversant with Greek philosophy, after the return to his native country in 172 set about arranging the Syriac Gospel material to be found in the four Evangelists to yield a kind of Textus receptus? As an answer to this question I would venture the following hypothesis. In his capacity as a man conversant with the Greek philosophy of his time, i.e. with early Neo-Platonism, he was acquainted with one of its main tenets, namely the dogmatic “harmony” existing, according to this movement, between Plato and Aristotle. In the third century a Christian in Alexandria, Ammonios, compiles his Monotessarion or Diatessaron in four columns where the Gospel of Matthew came in the first column and the parallel sections from the other Evangelists in three separate columns, an arrangement paving the way for the specific kind of intertextuality to be found in the evangélion dasxallatā; cf. Origen’s Hexapla. Moreover, Tatian wanted to create an equivalent to what was later called the Targum Onqelos, authoritative in the East. For on the pattern of the “harmony” accepted by the pagan Neo-Platonists, the young Christian Church has created its own harmonic movement, the dogmatic harmony existing between The Old Testament and its fulfilment in The New Testament, especially strong in Judaeo-Christian circles.

Thus, when H. Kaufhold says: “Der Text, den Paul de Lagarde herausgegeben hat, durfte im 4. Jhdt. griechisch entstanden und schon bald ins Syrische über- setzt worden sein.” (Paul de Lagarde und die syrische Kirchengeschichte, 1968, p. 127), he has not, so it seems to me, paid due attention to the Diatessaron as the “Gegenstück” of a uniform text of the Acts. To the other arguments adduced by Witakowski I shall return in another context.

III

Returning to the phenomenon of intertextuality I shall now seek to exemplify the importance of this phenomenon also for Old Testament exegesis. In Hosea 12,3–5 we read: wa-rib la-Yhwh ‘im-Yāhūdā wa-li-fqd ‘al-Yaʿqūb ki-drākāw, ka-ma la-lālāw yāsib lō (4) ba-bbāṭăn ‘aqab ʿat-ʿāxiw, u-ba-ʿônō ūsrāh ʿat-ʿālōhīm. (5) wa-yāyāṣar ʿāl-maʿpāk wa-yāyūkāl bākā wa-yīytxānnīn-lō, bēt-ʿēl yīmṣā-ʿānnū, wa-ṣām yadabber ʿimmānū “The LORD hath also a controversy with Judah, and will punish Jacob according to his ways; according to his doing will he recompense him. 4. He took his brother by the heel in the womb, and by his strength he had power with God: 5. Yea, he had power over the angel, and prevailed: he wept, and made supplication unto him: he found him in Beth-el, and there he spake with us;” (King James Version.)
The unforgettable Henrik S. Nyberg (1889–1974)\(^5\) has applied his unrivalled acumen to this passage too, namely in his famous book “Studien zum Hoseabuche” (1935), pp. 94–7. However, in the present case, we will see how deeply rooted his thinking was in conventional school grammar: we are here dealing with the acumen of a school master, faithful to what he had learnt and teaching this with enthusiasm to his students. Churchill once said: “Personally I am always ready to learn, although I do not always like being taught”, and, in my experience, Nyberg definitely did not like being taught. But, alas, we must all—nolens volens—like being taught, and so I shall start by saying: Unaware of the implications of the phenomenon and principle of intertextuality, he substituted here this unawareness not with further studies in linguistics and literature but with a somewhat unrestrained subjectivity, going thus, as far as I can see, completely astray. For linguistic analysis must, first and foremost be *textlinguistic* analysis, in the true sense of the term,\(^6\) for the simple reason that the human language manifests itself to our *understanding* as textual behaviour according to the hierarchy established by me: culture>literature>text language. The rather complicated intertextual behaviour of which the Prophet Hosea here gives proof reflects also his *hermeneutic horizon*, although not in a modern, subjective way, for his textual behaviour was regulated by rhetoric tradition.

In Genesis 32,29 we read: *wa-yəyōmār* (scil. *ʔiš, v. 25): *lō*\(^2\) *Ya χʰq)b yəʔāmer )))), *šimkā, kī * im-Yūsrāʾēl, kī-šárītā *im-20* 3hō*im wa- *im* 30*5nāšim wa-tūkāl “And he said, Thy name shall be called no more Jacob, but Israel: for as a prince hast thou power with God and with men, and hast prevailed.” (King James Version.) According to Nöldeke the verb *sārāh* “kämpfen” only occurs once, namely Gen. 32,29 “dehn Hos. 12,4 mit *wa-yāsār* (das nicht von *šur* abzuleiten) hängt von jener Stelle ab” (Neue Beiträge zur semitischen Sprachwissenschaft, 1910, p. 75, n. 3),\(^7\) which seems to indicate that Nöldeke regarded also *yāsār* as at least etymologically akin to *sārāh*: formally it is possible to posit a *yāsor>* *wa-yāsār*, from *šēr*, cf. below.

Now, what kind of verb is this *sārāh*? This question Nöldeke has answered with his usual gift of divination, associating it with Arabic *šārā, yāšā “sell” (cf. below). Within the scope of a treatment of Arabic *šir*, I have dealt with the Arabic ideogramme *šēr* saying that it “die verschiedensten Probleme aufgibt, die vermutlich noch lange Zeit ihrer Lösung harren müssen” (OS 10/1962, p. 112); later I discussed *šir* in the sense of “bartering” (OS 21/1973, p. 58); cf. Ural-Altaische Jahrbücher 47/1975, p. 168, and Eranos 83/1985, pp. 169ff. Then according to Nöldeke Arabic *šariya* means “aufgeregt, muter, schlimm sein usw.”, *šārā “erregen”, *ašrā “aufhetzen”, *ištarā “sich aufhetzen lassen, heftig werden”, *šār “streiten, widersprechen”. Of the last-mentioned Nöldeke says: “Das ist vielleicht dasselbe Wort: der aufgeregte Wettbewerb könnte den Handel bezeichnen.” (op. cit., p. 75.) At a bartering a quarrel about the “price” could easily arise, and it is this more general “aufgeregt sein” that explains why *šār “sell”* sometimes may mean “buy” = *ištarā*.

However, it is perhaps possible to proceed further here, which we can do by combining Accadian *nadānum “give”* with Arabic *natina, natana, yantinu*, and *natana “stink”, causative natana*. Nyberg rightly points out that we are here
dealing with a fairly specialized meaning of “give” and assumes that natana originally meant “give off a nasty smell” (Betarydelseutvecklingens problem, in Orientering i språketenskap, ed. H. S. Nyberg, 1943, p. 179). But it is far more important to observe that from this specialized meaning we can derive further information, namely that *natan- in itself was once used in the sense of “give off”, i.e. “hand over” (commodities, merchandise). For in this way we can shed some light on nadānum in the sense of “offer, hand over, transfer”, cf. especially nādinānum “seller, person who has sold property”: šāyimānum ina bīt nādinānum kasap ʾishqul-u ileqqe “the man who bought takes the money he had paid from the estate of the one who sold” (CAD II: 1/1980, p. 61), cf. Gothic suljan “sacrifice”<“let take”.

Now the ideomorpheme šry also occurs in Hebrew mišrāḥ “rule, dominion” (Jes. 9,5f.) as well as in the name Šarāyāh(u), and the question arises: Is there a relation between Acc. šaruru “king” and our šry? Von Soden gives us the following information: “šarru(m) I, a AK šarrum (hebr. šar Vorsteher usw.) ‘König, Fürst’” (AH 13/1976, p. 1188b). Referring to my treatment of Arabic šarr- in OS 10/1962, pp. 109–113, I would now postulate that, for instance, Old Syriac sari “stink”—like Arabic natina—originally meant “give off a nasty smell”<Aramaic *šari “give off, hand over”, with which we can then compare Arabic šarā “sell”<“hand over”, but šarīn<*šariyūn “stinking”, and šarr- “bad”. Moreover, referring likewise, to what I have said about Latin rex in Acta Orientalia 49/1988, p. 141, I am inclined to assume that Acc. šarru as well as Hebr. šār (if it is not an Acc. loan word) reflect an ideomorpheme šry “after having quarrelled about the merchandise, hand it over”: *šariyūm>*šaryum->šarrum (ry>rr); this is my main reason for combining Hebr. šār with šrr. From this fundamental acceptance we can then also derive the meaning “stretch out, extend” in the sense of Latin rex: qui regit fines (Benveniste, Le vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes, II, p. 14): >šarrum “king”. Thus we find also here that ancient terms of trade have yielded expressions for the notion of the “king”, cf. Arabic malaka, yamliku “acquire”, milkun “property”, but malikun “king”, mulkun “kingdom”, and malikun “lord”, cf. Yiśrāʾēl “El is ruler”. 8 All that has now been said is also of some importance to our understanding of Avestan xša Mazda-, a word tackled by Nyberg in his mighty work “Die Religionen des alten Iran” (1938), pp. 133 ff.; I shall come back to this problem in another context.

Let us now consider Hosea 12,5, translated thus by J. Johansson in his learned dissertation “Profeten Hosea” (1899)9, p. 35: “Ja, han kämpade med ängeln och vann; han grät och bad till honom. I Betel fann han honom, och där talade han med honom.”, while Nyberg believes that the passage should be translated as follows: “Und das Numen, der Engel, kämpfte und siegte. Er weinte und flehte um Erbarmen; der Baältys war es, der fand ihn—and dort redet er (jetzt) mit uns.” (op. cit., p. 95), a somewhat astonishing result of ingenious lucubrations. Against the whole tradition he thinks that it is Jacob who is here the loser and the Angel the winner. However, remaining in the main a conventional grammarian, and as such as splendid one, Nyberg remained unaware of the phenomenon of Biblical intertextuality in general and of prophetical intertextuality in particular.
For it is not only Genesis 32,23–33 that Hosea had in mind (Nyberg, p. 94) but also Gen. 27,34,38 and Gen. 28,10–19. In Gen. 27,34 Esau loudly complains of the blessing that has failed to appear, and in Gen. 27,38 he repeats his complaint: *wa-*yissâ ‘Esâw qôlô *wa-yuvek*. Moreover, it is Esau, who beseeches his father for the blessing. Thus Hosea 12,5 *bâkâ wa-yitsannân-lô* would be fitting only for Esau. However, the situation is here very different. God wants to punish Jacob for his evil deeds, God being now the father and not Isaac (cf. Ricoeur, Le conflit des interpretations, 1969, pp. 458 ff.). Hosea now lets Jacob assume the role of Esau, so that he substitutes Jacob’s words in Gen. 32,27 lô’ *šallêx’kâ kî ‘imbêrakâtâni* by a transformation of Gen. 27,38 into *bâkâ wa-yitsannân-lô*: Jacob wept and beseeched him, namely the Angel, for a blessing, just as Esau had been forced to do in consequence of Jacob’s fraud; to the “plan” of the Prophet belongs, of course, also the firm belief that Jacob-Israel is, in the last resort, forgiven in advance, so to speak, but this is another story, not to say history.

As we see, an ingenious case of prophetic intertextuality recalling, in a way, the harmonizing practice of Tatian mentioned above. Similarly the words *bêt *êl yimâš’aînâ wa-*sâm yedabber ‘immânâ receive their natural explanation, being two “emphatic” textemes: “It was in Betel that he found him, and it was there that he spoke with us.”, where reminiscences from Gen. 28,10–19 have influenced the words just quoted and delivered the word *mal’âk “angel” in wa-yyâsâr ‘âl-mâl’âk wa-yyûkâl*, cf. Gen. 28,12 *mal’âkê *lôhîm*! Nyberg’s in my opinion unacceptable exegesis is, I think, due to his general outlook. Following the principles he had made his own (op. cit., pp. 11 ff.) he allowed himself to amend *wa-yyâsâr* to *wa-yyîsâr* (the expected form) but not *‘âl*– to *‘ât*– although this change is minor (cf. F. Delitzsch, Die Lese- und Schreibfehler im Alten Testament, 1920, §97, p. 94), the more so as “die Masoreten haben mit ihrem *wa-yyâsâr* sicher an *sûr* gedacht” (Nyberg, op. cit., p. 94), for *sûr* can take *‘âl*-, and an *‘at*– might thus by oral tradition have been changed into *‘âl*–. Nyberg prefers to alter the preposition into a god although an *‘âl*– is not unthinkable with a *sârâ*– *sâr* as a variation of *sârah* according to what has been said above. Remaining throughout at the lexicem level of language and thus also speaking of nominal- and verbal sentences (pp. 96–7), although we are, at the level of textlinguistics, only justified in speaking of static and fientic textemes, he disposed of himself of a more realistic and thus scientific approach. The so-called nominal sentence is quite as verbal as the verbal one.

Let me take as an example the Russian minimal text *Dom nov* “The house is new”, incorrectly analysed by Meillet as “une phrase nominale” (Linguistique historique et linguistique générale, II/1938, p. 5). From the point of view of text linguistics (in my sense) this utterance should be written:

\[
\text{text} \left( \text{DOM NOV = texteme} \right) = \text{“Dom nov”}
\]

Being only a part of the text, the texteme cannot function as a text. In the present case the texteme coincides, it is true, formally with the text. However, the texteme being here formally identical with the text but only integrated indirectly, through the text, in *culture*, it follows that the isolated texteme is without a
situation in the world. It is only by adding the metareferent “text” as a “determinative” to the purely linguistic sign “texteme” that this is transformed into the cultural sign “text”, the meaning in casu “Dom nov” constituting the pragmatic referent.

Now, the text Dom nov being a “scene”, so to speak, it cannot be analysed in subject phrase and predicate phrase, i.e. in logical categories. This analysis belongs to the expression, the phraseme dom nov, and should be carried out in the following way: the house / is new (cf. the Accadian stative), where the predicate phrase—as being a part of the phraseme—is “verbal” not nominal. For we must learn how to distinguish between the lexem “verb” and the phrase as a part of the phraseme. All predicate phrases are “verbal” although not necessarily in the sense of “le procès” (Meillet, op. cit., p. 4). It goes without saying that the general linguistic theory developed by me during the period 1973–1988 is of great interest also to the so-called “Computational linguistics”, cf. S. Allén, Språklig databehandling och särspråklig forskning (Nysvenska Studier, 55–6/1976, pp. 5–15), and the present writer in Orientalia Suecana, 29/1981, p. 51. According to Allén the natural languages are “ett slags teckensystem” (p. 5). However, a natural language is an organization of representations of level-bound signs of a specific kind (the true morphemes), from culture to phoneme. For Allén’s use of the term “morphen” cf. his article Morfo-log-i och poly-sem-i (Nysvenska Studier, 57/1977, pp. 12ff.), and the present writer in “Princopia”, passim.

The thinking of the conventional linguist is governed by the subject–object orientation (cf. OS 30/1983, p. 120) in a way that has been destructive for the evolution of linguistic theory. Thus such a linguist thinks, for instance, that there is a direct relation between sound and meaning (Chomsky). He believes that a text is composed of sentences and clauses. He contemplates such sentences, and completely governed by his own primitive hermeneutic horizon as he is, he discerns what he thinks he sees and what he thinks he understands, namely verbal and nominal sentences. However, what he observes is an utterance made by another subject, having his own hermeneutic horizon concerning what he utters with the aid of his textual behaviour. It goes without saying that the observing subject only believes that he is observing nominal and verbal sentences, for in reality he tries to understand what the sender, the other subject, understands by his utterance, an expression or a communication. Now the observing subject sometimes tries to defend himself by saying that the subject–object orientation at any rate is justified in its capacity as a practical application of a scientific theory although he obviously has no idea of how such a theory should be formulated. Sometimes he also contends that it belongs to the children’s diseases of scientism not to pay attention to the inherent limitations of the applicability of a scientific theory, thus placing himself on the pleasant super-level of irresponsibility in the hope of being considered a wise man, the true sage. However this is only a further illusion insofar as it is by the “practice” that a theory can be tested, and if the practical application of the subject–object orientation leads to the result that nominal- and verbal sentences really exist, the orientation in question must, in some way, be wrong. One of the serious disadvantages of this orientation is that it prevents an ontological outlook and thus also the introduction of the concepts of
relativity and qualitative change into linguistics, concepts fundamental to our understanding of what the human language really is, or, at least might be said to be.

Now in her painstaking, penetrating dissertation "A Study of Nominal Sentences in the Oldest Upaniṣads" (1978) Gunilla Gren-Eklund says: "The use of the term 'assertion' is rather appropriate with regard to the second major aspect of the sentence—its relation to the text. The continuum of the text as a manifold message can hardly be analysed in any smaller units than assertions" (p. 136). Most conventional linguists will, I think, agree with her; on B. Wiklander's "propositions" cf. OS 31-2/1984, p. 199; what is said in OS 31-2, pp. 198 ff. holds in principle also for Bruce C. Johanson, To All Brethren. A Text-Linguistic and Rhetorical Approach to 1 Thessalonians (1987). However, considering the cultural and thus semiotic phenomenon of the text to constitute a piece of textual behaviour and thus a semiotic unity, we realize that the text is also a cultural sign. Moreover, it is precisely in its capacity as such a sign that the very concept "text" prevents us from treating the text simply as a manifold message to be analysed as a continuum of assertions. For a natural language is a specific kind of textual behaviour, to be immediately observed in its morphological representation (including "syntax"). This morphological representation constitutes a system, not, however, to be described, in the first instance, in conventional, one-dimensional grammar but in textual grammar, the text governing, by means of integration, all underlying levels and thus creating also a vertical system, i.e. the system of intuitional morphemes (holisms) representing various degrees of articulation, from the text (= the first articulation) to the phoneme (= the last articulation).

Now these intuitional morphemes are, in their purely cognitive function, to be called noetic morphemes, the structure of which is composed of noetic elements reflected in the intuitional morphemes underlying the morphological representations in question (i.e. expression, content, referent). These equivalents of the reflecting intuitional elements constitute what I call "noetic form", the "material" of "understanding", the nucleus of the faculty of symbolic thinking typical of Man. Thus we obtain a system of hierarchically organized intuitional articulations reflecting stages of the human intelligence at work, i.e. "the understood world" as reflected in "the inflected world", governed by the articulating and articulated intuitions: text, texteme, lex and radical (OS 31-2/1984, p. 113).

The intuitional morphemes constitute the true la langue, explaining, in some measure at least, the formal structure of the morphological systems of the human languages. However, the vertical, "paradigmatic" morphemes or intuitional holisms, based on the hierarchy culture>literature>text>language is one thing, the horizontal, "syntagmatic" so-called morphemes another. Thus a scientific analysis should start from the text, e.g. Unacceptable!, based on the static texteme unacceptable!, the so-called "verbal aspect" being in reality a textual and textemic category. Thus the genetic evolution of the so-called "sentence" would be: Static aspect (cf. qatal-ta, qatul-ta, qatil-ta)>static aspect / fientic aspect (cf. qatal-ta / *ta-qatul etc.), semantic nuances such as "statement", "assertion" etc. being the result of a realization of the aspectual, textual category
in specific speech acts. Language being inflected world, nominal-and verbal sentences belong to the rather poor, one-dimensional world of the conventional linguist; cf. Principia, p. 39 and, for instance, Benveniste, La phrase nominale, in Problèmes de linguistique générale (1966), pp. 151 ff.

Now, considering a morphological opposition such as qabarayaqburu (ideomorpheme qbr “to bury”) we realize that this opposition refers to the level of the text. For language forms are, normally, to be found in texts and as texts. Thus we are in the present case dealing either with an opposition between two texts, namely Qabarat “He buries etc.” and Yaqburat “He is burying”—the difference having reference also to the texts as being different cultural signs,—or to one text, e.g. Qabarar... yaqburat ..., these forms constituting then parts of the text, i.e. textemes, the first one static and the second one fientic. This difference is aspectual in nature, and aspect is thus a textual and not a lexemic category. We must learn to distinguish between the aspectual category of the text and the texteme respectively and the “actional” category of the lexeme, or between the textual, aspectual category and the mode of action of the lexeme. The lexeme qabarar exhibits fientic mode of action but the text Qabarar static aspect; the lexeme yaqburu has fientic mode of action but the text Yaqburu fientic aspect, the values of the textual opposition being then realized as the “meanings” constative, cursive, and neutral. However, it is only the Scientia nuova constituting the doctrine of ontological structuralism (cf. OS 33-5/1986, pp. V ff.) that has made it possible for us to distinguish, in this way, between aspect and mode of action. Aspect is a textual and thus also a syntactical category, the function of which is perspectivic, so to speak: foreground, background, and neutral, yielding the possibility of breaking the linearity of textual behaviour. Moreover, the lexeme qabarar is still an element, but at the level of the text it is a constituent: Qabarar, cf. OS 30/1983, p. 129 and n. 1; Principia, p. 40.

Above all, what I have said in this paper concerning the phenomenon of intertextuality will, I think, prove useful also when we are dealing with the problems of oral tradition in the ordinary sense of the term, one of Nyberg’s main interests in the field of Old Testament study.

NOTES

3. Witakowski characterizes the TA as “an apocryphal document of a composite character” (p. 161).
4. Cf. the words atyik ds-men qaṭir just quoted.

8. According to W. Leslau also Syriac *molak* means "rule" (Comparative Dictionary of Ge'ez, 1987, p. 344). As one knows it means "persuasit, promisit, minatus est".

9. Ignored by N.
Réponse

La contribution de M. Widengren aux *Orientalia Suecana* XXXIII–XXXV (1984–1986) a fait naître de l’étonnement. Des lecteurs se sont demandé s’il n’a pas célébré son propre 80ème anniversaire plutôt que de faire hommage à M. Rundgren, en lançant une furieuse attaque contre un ancien élève et collègue, dont le nom figure dans la même *tabula gratulatoria* d’un ouvrage intitulé *On the Dignity of Man*. Ce qui plus est, la critique de M. Widengren, en 1986, vise une thèse pour le doctorat qui date de 1940.

En réalité, les pages 481–486 « Quelques passages dans la littérature syriaque d’inspiration liturgique », constituent pour la plupart une traduction en français d’une ancienne expertise. Etant donné que la critique linguistique exprimée par M. Widengren à cette occasion (1949), a été réfutée par moi dans un ouvrage intitulé *Res aut verba* (Lund 1949), dont le manuscrit avait été scruté par le professeur Axel Möberg, le plus éminent syriologue de la Suède, il est superflu de répéter ici la défense.


*Carl-Martin Edsman*
An Overview of the Altaic Vocalism with Regard to Some General Laws of Language Development

UZBEK BAITCHURA, Leningrad

A comparative-historical investigation includes, as is known, first of all such aspects as (1) description of languages on different historical levels considering the modern state as the most important level in the history of a language; (2) establishing of sound correspondences: (a) between individual languages, (b) between linguistic groups; (3) establishing linguistic laws of development; (4) tracing the history of concrete sounds on different levels, etc. In the present article I preserve this order of discussion, however without pretension to solve all problems of the history of the Altaic vocalism, and only hope to contribute to studies of these problems, taking into consideration also the results of instrumental-phonetic investigations generally paid little attention to by comparativists.

I. VOWEL SYSTEM

Basing Their opinions on the acoustical perception, Altaists have described the system of the modern Altaic vocalism as consisting of 16 vowels opposed according to three qualitative marks: guttural–palatal; wide–narrow; labial–non-labial and, besides, according to one quantitative opposition: long vowels versus short vowels (see table 1). ¹

It is presumed that the vowel harmony has favoured the preservation of this system. Exceptions are mostly registered in Korean and in Čuvaš.

The investigation of the Altaic vocalism with regard to the instrumental-phonetic data obtained by now (as well as considering the field investigations) enables us to establish the following vowel types in modern Altaic languages (the phoneme being understood as a sound type independent of the phonetic position). ²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Back</th>
<th>Non-labial</th>
<th>Front</th>
<th>Non-labial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Labial</td>
<td></td>
<td>Labial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>u</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>ü</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wide</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>ö</td>
<td>ä/e</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Tur. kılz ‘girl’; Kalm. allx ‘to write’; Lam. ṣin ‘dog’; Kor. pxida ‘to blossom’.

Sol. deši ‘head’.

Table 1
On the whole we have a vocalic system not of eight, however of twelve vowels in the Altaic languages, not counting the distinction to the long and the short vowels, because the distinction to the vowels of full formation and the mixed ones is added. Mixed vowels, in turn, consist of four types, being opposed according to the features: wide—narrow, front—back, labial—non-labial, and besides, they can be long or short: although mixed vowels are mostly reduced, being shorter than the vowels of full formation approximately by two times in the Turkic languages, however in some other Altaic languages also long mixed vowels are possible (see table 2).

The opposition of the mixed vowels according to their width is of a very relative character: the sounds ɔ, ɔ can be counted to the wide ones only within the limits of the mixed vowels and only in comparison to the corresponding non-labial mixed vowels. In comparison with the back vowels of full formation ɯ, ɨ all mixed vowels possess a smaller front resonator and have a higher position of the mass of the tongue, i.e. they are more narrow. The opposition according to the width is absolute only between the back labial mixed vowel ɔ, on the one hand,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wide</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and the front non-labial mixed vowel \( \check{\v} \), on the other hand, whereas the front labial mixed vowel \( \check{a} \) and the back non-labial mixed \( \check{\v} \) are very near to each other according to the degree of the rise of the tongue, i.e. according to the width. The opposition of the mixed vowels according to labialization is very relative and the same is true for the opposition of the front mixed vowels to the back ones.\(^3\)

On the basis of instrumental-phonetic studies I established in 1953 for the Volga Turkic languages (and in 1959–62 for the Turkic languages in general) that the opposition of vowels is (and evidently has always been) based on several distinctive features both qualitative as well as quantitative, and as the distinctive features of the mixed vowels are feebly marked (because of the qualitative reduction of the latter), these vowels are opposed to each other as well as on the whole to other vowels (i.e. to the vowels of full formation) according to several marks at one and the same time. Or if to express it otherwise, according to one complicated mark: in the Turkic languages the reduced vowels differ from other vowels simultaneously with their length (they are short) and with their mixed character, and this is why they were named later “reduced (short)” (1970); (2) and the reduced vowels differ from one another according to the zone (front or back), and according to the work of the lips (labial—non-labial) as well as according to the width (wide—narrow); thus, e.g., the labialized mixed vowel \( \check{\v} \) is at the same time more back and more wide in comparison with the unrounded mixed vowel \( \check{a} \) and so on.

My conclusion about the possibility of the opposition of sounds according to a combination of marks (features) or, to say it otherwise, according to one complex feature, which could only be deduced on the basis of instrumental studies, was taken up by many Soviet Turcologists and became current,\(^4\) while my further investigations enabled to extend this inference to the Altaic languages in general.

Phonologic oppositions can be levelled under the influence of various factors. Thus, as I explained in 1953, mixed vowels appear because of quantitative reduction producing retardation of the articulation when some speech organs have no time to take the position necessary for the pronunciation of the corresponding vowel of full formation, e.g. for the articulation of the vowel \( u \), and thus the position of the tongue approaches to that for the indifferent position—the position of rest—to which the position of the tongue during articulation of the mixed vowels is near, all explained by physiological reasons; the lips have no time to be rounded (as it is necessary for the pronunciation of the vowel \( u \)), and thus the degree of labialization weakens and reduces, whereas in Čuvaš and in some subdialects of Tatar (e.g. the Behind of Qazan subdialect) the mixed (reduced) vowels have completely lost their opposition of rounded—unrounded.\(^5\) Thus the quantitative reduction leads to the qualitative one.

In his “Phonetik der Nördlichen Türkischen”, Leipzig, 1882,\(^6\) Wilhelm Radloff, the founder of Russian Turkology, wrote about the connection between the quantitative and qualitative reduction of vowels, however only my experimental-phonetic studies have led to the explanation of the mechanism of this process and thus have made it possible to find out the phonetic basis of the vowel shift in the Volga Turkic languages established by Radloff.

The opposition of the pharyngeal vowels to non-pharyngeal ones, as well as of
the nasalized to the non-nasalized are evidently of no phonologic character, at any rate pharyngalization is not the sole mark for distinguishing these vowels. Thus, the pharyngeal vowels in the languages in which they have been registered (e.g., Tuvinian and Udehe) are opposed to other vowels not solely according to the feature of pharyngalization, however also according to some other marks, namely their length.7

Nasalized vowels are limited in their position, e.g., in the Manchu-Tungus languages—according to my instrumental-phonetic data—a partial nasalisation is possible depending on the phonetic position (at the beginning, at the end and beside nasal consonants), however it is not phonologic.8 As to the broken (interrupted) vowels, e.g. in Udehe, they are not something unusual, they are not slurred, however just broken, interrupted, judging by R. Schneider’s cymograms of 1933.9 Possibly with this fact is connected that, in the Altaic languages, the strong beginning (starker Einsatz) can be used as one of the phonologic means, e.g., in the Turkic dialects—cf. Kassim-Tatar ‘r’a ‘crow’ instead of Qazan Tatar qary ‘id.’, etc. In other cases the strong beginning can characterize vowels at the absolute beginning of words, as it was established by me with instrumental-phonetic means, e.g., in Khakas, the strong beginning is characteristic of short vowels.10

Many vowels are diphthongoid in the Altaic languages, however there are practically no diphthongs, because the combinations of two vowels can be decomposed morphologically as well as historically, cf. Turk. taï<taï ‘mountain’–taüy ‘his mountain’; aj ‘moon’–ajy ‘his moon’, etc.

My instrumental data have led to establishing that palatalization of vowels in the Altaic languages consists primarily in a more front position of the tongue in comparison with its position during the articulation of guttural vowels, but not in a higher rise of the back of the tongue, as it was presumed before: the latter as well as the most narrow point of the resonator is only of a secondary importance for palatalization of vowels.

Thus, instrumental data corroborate, on the whole, the conclusions based on acoustic perception by ear about the existence, in the Altaic languages, of binar oppositions of vowels according to the zone of articulation (front–back), width (open–closed), labialization (rounded–unrounded) and according to the length (long–short), while phonetic gradations of these marks can have four and more degrees in every one of these oppositions.

Thus, e.g., my instrumental studies of ca. 20 Altaic languages (Turkic, Mongolian, Manchu-Tungus) have led to establishing of four degrees of non-phonologic vowel length and to corroborating of the existence of two degrees of phonologic vowel length which is preserved in some languages up to the present time, while in the others there is only the qualitative length connected with the quality of the vowel, or there are variations depending on the phonetic position.

It is hardly possible to find a language in which long and short vowels should differ phonetically only according to their length: even in English, German and other European languages long vowels, as a rule, differ from the short ones also in their quality (cf., e.g., English /i/ and /I/, etc.).11 Still more this refers to the Altaic languages, for which a more lax articulation is characteristic.
Thus, the connection of phonetic marks of speech sounds is a more widely spread phenomenon than it has seemed at the first sight. It includes (a) the connection between qualitative marks and the quantitative ones; (b) the connection between various qualitative marks; (c) the connection between the quantitative features of the neighbouring sounds.

The connection between the qualitative and quantitative features is not confined to and exhausted with the connection between the brevity and the mixed character of the articulation of the reduced vowels. My instrumental-phonetic data have led to the conclusion that wide vowels, as a rule, exceed in length the narrow ones, which can be explained by the necessity of more time and efforts for the articulation of high vowels of the same length as the corresponding wide ones, while the length of the guttural and labial vowels tends to surpass that of the corresponding non-labial and palatal vowels, which in turn is connected with the tendency of the latter to be more narrow in comparison with the respective labial and guttural vowels.

The latter phenomenon, namely the tendency of the guttural and labial vowels to be wider in comparison with the corresponding palatal and non-labial vowels represents an example of the connection between the qualitative features also explained with physiological causes.

The connection between the qualitative features manifests itself in two ways. First, as I established in 1955, there is a tendency of an inverse ratio between the length of vowels in neighbouring syllables: an increase of the length of the vowel of one syllable is a factor favouring a decrease of the length of the vowel of the other syllable. Secondly, an increase of the number of sounds in a word (when the number of syllables is equal) favours the reduction of the length of individual sounds. Both these phenomena are in their essence reduced to the regularity that the length of a word tends (under other equal conditions) to be constant. Here we have a kind of positional changes of vowel length.

Besides that, to the factors of positional changes of the length of vowels belong: (1) the structure of the syllable, the stressed or unstressed position and the quality of the surrounding consonants, namely: voiceless—voicelessness, fricativeness—occlusiveness, aspirated or non-aspirated character, strong or weak pronunciation of the consonants. Here strong articulation, voicelessness, occlusiveness, aspiration of the neighbouring consonants (both preceding and following), an increase of the length of vowels in the neighbouring syllables, an increase of the number of sounds in the syllable or in the word, unstressed position, closed character of the syllable in question are the factors decreasing the length of vowels, whereas the contrary conditions favour an increase of the vowel length.

The positional changes of the quality of vowels are the following: (1) palatalization—velarisation, (2) labialization—delabialization, (3) widening—narrowing, (4) nasalization—denasalization, (5) pharyngalization—depharyngalization, (6) voicing—devoicing, (7) qualitative reduction and passing over to the mixed vowels or narrowing. The quantitative reduction is discussed above. The deletion of vowels is a logical result of the reduction, both quantitative and qualitative.

The factors of positional changes of vowel qualities are: the length, the stress,
guttural and labial vowels (e.g. in words) to which in the modern or Western Mongolian languages front (palatal) and non-labial vowels correspond.

**Most important correspondences of vowels in the Manchu-Tungus languages**

To the correspondences of general character the following ones belong.

1. At the beginning of words, to the long vowel of the Northern Manchu-Tungus languages mostly a short vowel of the Southern Manchu-Tungus languages corresponds. E.g. Evenk. āg-, Neg., Ude. ǎg-, Ma. akuna ‘to moor (to)’; Evenk., Solon, e.a. sā-, Orok, Ma. sa- ‘to know’, etc. Here belong also the correspondence of long ō in the Northern languages to the short vowels a, o, u, ō in the Southern group. E.g. Evenk. īkā, Ude. jōho ‘cauldron’, Evenk. galškta, Ude. galakta ‘to look for’, etc.

2. In the Northern Manchu-Tungus languages the vowel of the last syllable can often fall out, especially at the absolute end, in contradistinction from the Southern group, although this regularity also is not absolute and manifests itself only statistically. E.g., Nan., Ude., e.a. ǎnla, Lam. ǎlal ‘hand’, Ma. e.a. ǎnva, Lamut buy ‘izjubr’ (kind of deer), etc.

3. The correspondence of palatal non-rounded i, e in the Northern group to guttural rounded vowels u, ū in the Southern group: Lamut gildá, Nan. guída ‘to stretch’, ‘to drag’; Lam. digen, Ude. dī, Ma., e.a. dūn ‘for’; Evenk. žiluga, Ma. čzulho/čžulhu ‘bridle’, ‘rein’; Evenk. žikta, Lam. ńi, Ma. duksi ‘bilberry’.


5. The correspondences according to the five phonologic marks: (a) guttural-palatal: Evenk., Lam. ɡl- Olča, Orok. Nan. yIrī, Ma. ɡī- ‘to cut out’; Orok. ulisə/ulisə, Olča. ɨlsə/ɨlsə ‘meat’; Evenk. adIr, Ude. adī ‘net’, etc.


(c) Wide—narrow: Nan. adoli, Ude. adil, Evenk. adIr ‘net’, etc.

(d) Vowels of full formation—reduced (mixed): Neg. bəjə ‘man’, while in other Manchu-Tungus languages beji/beje along with bajə/bajə ‘being’, ‘man’, ‘body’, etc.;

(e) Long vowels—short vowels; Evenk. e.a. sā-, Ma. sa- ‘to know’, and so on.

Characteristic for the Manchu-Tungus languages is the existence of the correspondences of long vowels to the short ones and of palatal to the guttural ones not only between different languages, however even within one language (in its subdialects). The correspondence of a long vowel of the first syllable in the Northern group to a short vowel in the Southern group as well as deletion of non-initial syllables and vowels in the Northern group can be connected with the place of the stress.

The material adduced shows that in the Manchu-Tungus languages, the following correspondences of vowels are most widespread: long—short; palatal—non-palatal; labial—non-labial; wide—narrow, and this manifests itself not only in
comparisons of different languages, however even within one language, in its
subdialec.ts.

Most important vowel correspondences between different groups
of the Altaic languages

A. General correspondences

1. The correspondence of the same vowels, that is preservation of the same
vowel in the languages belonging to different Altaic groups: Examples: Turk.
mor, Mong. morin, Uigh., Tuv. mor ‘horse’; Evenk. kutu, Mong. kutuq ‘happiness’;
tengiz/teniz ‘sea’; Evenk. biltuy ‘prophecy’, Mong. bilig ‘knowledge’, Turk. bil-
to know’, bilig/bilik ‘knowledge’, etc. Considerable deviations are only found
in Korean and Ćuvaš, which have peculiarities in many respects.

2. The correspondence of a long vowel (mostly in the Eastern or North-
Eastern Altaic languages) to a short vowel (mainly in the more Western
languages). Examples: Evenk., Ma. mö, Dag. möd, Mngr. möd, Halha moden,
Kalm. modn ‘tree’; ‘forest’; Lam. üru ‘to flow out’, ‘to have the source’, Evenk.
(Koibal) ur- ‘id.’, etc. However analogous correspondences exist also be-
tween languages within the same or different groups of the Altaic languages.
Cf. Turkm. däs, Tatar taš ‘stone’; Yak. küs, Trkm. gül ‘force’, other Turkic
languages küč//küc ‘id.’; Dag. ön, Kalm. on ‘year’; Evenk. nölä, Ma. gele ‘got
frightened’, etc. Although long vowels are more often found in the Eastern
languages, however sometimes a contrary picture is possible, namely the cor-
respondence of a long vowel in a more Western language to a short vowel in a more
Eastern one, e.g., Trkm. ür, Wr. Mong. ere ‘man’, Evenk. n‘ari, ‘id’; Trkm.
ür, Ćuv. ir, Tat. irtä, Wr. Mong. erte, Evenk. irda/irda ‘early’, and so on.

3. A further development of this correspondence is falling out of vowels.
Eastern languages, on the whole, have better preserved the phonetic structure of
non-initial syllables of words, and this explains the correspondence of some
longer forms of words in the Eastern languages of the Altaic group to more short
ones in the Western. Examples: Lam. n‘ari, Wr. Mong. ere, Turk. är/ir/ar
‘man’, Ma.-Tung. kökü, Wr. Mong. köke, Turk. kök ‘blue’; Ma.-Tung. hütü,
Turk. qut/qut ‘soul’; Ma.-Tung. ali-, Turk. al- ‘to take’, etc.

B. The correspondences based on phonologic marks of vowels

1. The correspondence of the palatal vowels ā, ö, ü, i in the Western languages
(Turkic, partly Mongolian: Kalmuk, Halha) to the guttural or the guttural
removed to the front, namely ü and palatal but removed backwards—I/i: o(ə), ü(y,
u), u (I) in the Eastern Altaic languages (Manchu-Tungus, Korean, partly Eastern
Mongolian languages). Examples: Nan. türkša // Ma.-T. ture; Wr.-Mo. tür ‘top
of a boat’. Mngr. fugor, Ma. üker, Tat. iyöz/iğöz, Turkm. ököz ‘bull’; Kor. turi,
Nan. duin, Mo. dörben, Tat. dört, other Turkic languages tör//dört ‘four’, etc.

2. The correspondence of labial vowels in the Eastern languages to non-labial
ones in the Western. E.g. Lam turgo 'support', Mong. tüşi 'to lean', 'to look for support', Turk. tiräk/tiräk 'support', tirä/tirä 'to support', etc.

3. The correspondence of wide vowels to narrow ones. E.g. Turk. mal 'cattle', 'riches', Mong. morin 'horse', Kor. mor, Evenk. murin 'horse'; Tat. taš, Kor. tol, Kalm. čolun, Bur. šulun, Čuv. čul 'stone', Turkm. ār, Tat. ir, Old Turk. er, Čuv. ar, Mong. ere 'man', etc.

4. The correspondence of vowels of full formation to the mixed ones. Examples: Uzb. kätä, 'big', Turk kät, Mong. kêtü 'very', Evenk. kotts 'very much'; Volga-Turkic kóc/kös, other Turkic languages küč, Mong. kükün, Kalm. kükün 'force'; Tat. jdrä/ţdräk 'fist', Evenk., Ma.-Tung., Mong. ndurqal/nurqa 'fist', etc. According to Ramstedt, to Turkic i, ā corresponds e (i.e. ş or ø) in the Manchu-Tungus languages.²⁰

The correspondences enumerated above do not have an absolute character and manifest themselves only statistically, just as many other linguistic phenomena, because often exceptions are possible, which is evidently a general linguistic law.

On the basis of the material discussed it seems possible to establish the following most important correspondences of vowels in the Altaic languages:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{a} & : \text{a, o, i (I), i} \\
\text{ä} & : \text{ä, a, i (I), i} \\
\text{o} & : \text{o, u, uo} \\
\text{ö} & : \text{ö, o, uo} \\
\text{u} & : \text{u, o} \\
\text{ü} & : \text{ü, u} \\
\text{e} & : \text{e, ä} \\
\text{ē} & : \text{ē, ā, ä, e, iā, a, ī, ī} \\
\text{ō} & : \text{ō, o, u, ü, e, i (I), ū} \\
\text{ōō} & : \text{ō, ō, u, üō, ū} \\
\text{ü} & : \text{ü u, ū, u, i, ī (I)} \\
\text{üü} & : \text{ü, ū, u, ī, ū} \\
\text{i} & : \text{i, ī} \\
\text{i ī} & : \text{i ī, i ī} \\
\text{i ī} & : \text{i ī, i ī} \\
\end{align*}
\]

This list is not complete, for it contains only most important correspondences; some of those not mentioned here are discussed above.

The material taken into consideration leads to the conclusion that the vocalism of the modern Altaic languages has a considerable unity, which manifests itself in the following: (1) the unity of the phonologic marks of the vowels in the Altaic languages and linguistic groups; (2) the unity of the system of the vowel phonemes which has only slight variations in different languages and linguistic groups of the Altaic unity; (3) the unity in the positional changes of vowels; (4) the unity of the qualitative and the quantitative relations and connections in the vocalism of different groups of the Altaic languages, in different languages and even dialects, including the analogous character of the regular correspondences between vowels of separate languages within this or that group, in comparison with the corresponding relations within another linguistic group, etc. E.g., it has been estab-
lished that the correspondences of the type olu, ile, ulâ, alâ and many others exist parallel within the Turkic, the Mongolian and the Manchu-Tungus groups of the Altaic languages. And not solely in general correspondences, however also in details.

E.g., specific correspondences of the type wa(lo); wa/u are registered in all groups of the Altaic languages, cf. Turk. ojuna/jan, Čuv. vajän 'play'; Wr.-Mong. ol-, Dag. wool 'to find'; Wr.-Mong. dunda, Dag. dwanda 'middle'; in the Ma.-Tung.: Evenk. osikta, Sol. usikta, Ude. wa(h)ikta 'claw'. The comparison with Nan. hosikta, Or. hosikta 'id.' shows that the development was in the direction wa>a in the Altaic languages.

From the historical point of view, the Altaic vocalism also has a unity which, according to Ramstedt e.a., manifests itself in the preservation of the original vocalism to a considerable degree in many languages and is explained by the existence of the law of vowel harmony, which results in that, in the Altaic vocalisms, there was not and could not be such vowel shift which is registered in the Indo-European languages. This is why, as I have demonstrated above, we often find the correspondence of one and the same vowel (ala, u/u, etc.) in the same words in different groups of the Altaic languages, which is in concordance also with the tables of sound correspondences adduced by Ramstedt and perceptible exclusions represent only the Korean and the Čuvaš languages, which has been taken notice of by N. Poppe.

Thus, we can draw the conclusion about the uniformity of the development, about the uniformity of the phonetic correspondences between different groups of the Altaic languages as well as between different languages entering into one, this or that, Altaic group, and even within one language—between its dialects, although these correspondences are never absolute and everywhere exceptions and exclusions are possible. However, in principle, uniform are the oppositions according to this or that phonologic mark, e.g., palatal-guttural both for more eastern languages on the whole as compared to the western ones (e.g. the Manchu-Tungus languages in comparison with the Turkic) and for more eastern Mongolian languages (e.g. Buryat) in comparison with the Western Mongolian (e.g. Kalmyk), as well as for more eastern Turkic languages (Yakut, Tuvinian) to the more western Turkic languages (e.g., Tatar, Turkish), and even for more eastern dialects of a given language, e.g., Tatar (in Siberia) to the western dialects of the same language (in the Tatar ASSR, Gor'kij area, etc.); more eastern languages and dialects have a more back articulatory basis, which is true both on the Altaic level as well as on the level of individual languages and of the dialects of one and the same language. However just this fact eliminates the oppositions based on these marks and they cease to characterize the relations between different Altaic languages or, to say it otherwise, these oppositions cease to characterise the relations between different groups of the Altaic languages in contradistinction from the relations between individual languages, and between the dialects of one and the same language.

The data obtained by now lead to the conclusion that during the observable period the sound composition of the Altaic languages has not undergone any essential changes: the latter could have taken place only at the Pre-Altaic period.

After the works by G. Ramstedt and N. N. Poppe, who established many
phonetic correspondences between the Altaic languages and thus have founded the basis of the theory of the genetic affinity of the named languages, it seems difficult to go further than the suggested above 12 vowels system in the Altaic languages, plus the opposition of long and short vowels. The reason of this lies, on the one hand, in the peculiarities of the development of the Altaic languages themselves as well as in the state of things in the investigation of them, and on the other hand, in the crisis of, at least some, principles of comparativistics.

As is known, the genetic affinity of the Altaic languages is up to now disputed and called in question, and the opinion about the convergent origin of the unity of these languages exists. And as one of the important arguments, the cases of complete coincidence of forms in different groups of the Altaic languages are used, which forms are taken for borrowings just because of their complete coincidence, and without another proof. And the negation of the genetic affinity excludes the possibility of a reconstruction of the Common Altaic prasystem of speech sounds altogether.

Such evolution of the views of certain well known comparativists is not strange if we take into consideration that long since objections were raised against reconstruction of parent language forms on the grounds that, e.g., the forms obtained in this way usually belong to different temporal levels, which is one of the well known drawbacks of the comparative-historical method in its classical form.

Considering all said above, the linguistic data obtained by now and the state of the theory, we have to assume, for the Altaic languages, the twelve-vowels system described above (every vowel can be long or short, not mentioning phonetic variations reaching to four degrees of length) and the correspondences of vowels between various languages within the Altaic group listed, v.s., whereas further reconstructions will be evidently limited to predominantly special questions. And as I had written earlier (in 1968) the existing methods enable us to establish trustworthy archetypes of words (their forms and semantics) mainly (if not solely) for loanwords in a concrete given language or group of languages, whereas the initial forms of vernacular words and forms (irrespective of what concrete language or linguistic family it originates from) cannot be established at all.23

Such were my views in 1969–1970 when I investigated the problem according to the plan of the Institute of Linguistics of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, as they were described in my study “Vokalism (glasnye fonemy) v altaiskix jazykax” (a summary of 53 pages MS submitted to the Institute in 1970 was partly published in 1977).24 To this I add the considerations on the phonetic laws of development in the Altaic languages dispersed in various works of mine, which are summarized and amplified below.

III. ON SOME PHONETIC LAWS IN THE ALTAIC LANGUAGES

In 1953 I sketched in the following way the tendencies of the development of speech sounds in the Tatar language, which were later extended to other Turkic languages and formulated as linguistic laws.
"As well as according to the vowel harmony (qualitative opposition) there existed in Tatar a quantitative opposition of long and short vowels just as in English and German. However if in English and German the difference between the long and the short vowels is primarily based on quantitative differences, in Tatar, due to its inner laws of development, the priority in the function of sense differentiation has, in the course of historical development, passed over to the quality of sounds, which furthered deepening of the gap between articulation of the long and the short vowels. The transition of the function of sense differentiation evidently appeared possible because, of old as well as nowadays, vowels differed according to several features both qualitative and quantitative. The sounds which are at present rendered with б, е (e), are heterogeneous as to their origin and appeared in different ways. Thus, б descends from short ы, from о < ы; from ии а/e derives from ы, from а < ы, from у. Experimental-phonetically this is corroborated by greater dispersion of measurements of the length of these vowels; а, е descend from ы, ы, respectively. Long vowels (primarily long vowels) reduce in length (unstressed ы, ы are perceptibly shorter than а, у, also the stressed ы, is shorter than а at the absolute end); short vowels change their quality (the material and the social aspects of the language being closely interwoven); the number of long vowels being restored again at the expense of the deletion of consonants (secondary long vowels being produced). It is the high vowels that are shortened but not the low vowels, because no examples of short low vowels are registered, which is physiologically explained by the necessity of more work of the articulatory apparatus for production of high vowels, and by a loose (lax) articulation. It was evidently in this way that the process of historical development went on in this case."

In 1955 I came to the conclusion that, along with the tendency to the qualitative unity of the word represented by the law of synharmonism, there existed also a tendency to the quantitative unity of the word according to which the length of a word tends to be within certain limits, which produces this effect: an increase of the length of one syllable (or vowel) of the word results in a decrease of the length of the other syllable (resp. vowel) of this word. I described this conclusion thus:

In 1953 the Tatar linguist Lotfi Yafarov formulated for the Tatar-Turkic languages the law of the development from a more back articulation to a more front one (in his book Tatar tele üşestä, Qazan, 1953, repeated later in 1958 in the Uçenye zapiski Kazanskogo gosudarstvennogo pedagogičeskogo instituta, vypusk 15, Qazan, 1958, pp. 275–285), which was repeated generalized in the West in 1977. This regularity is corroborated not only with historical data and areal distribution of the corresponding linguistic facts, but also with the material pertaining to the anatomy and physiology of speech.

Continuing my investigations, I came, in 1965, to the conclusion that the other most general and most important law of the development of linguistic forms consists in phonetically shortening of words, on the one hand, and of adding morphological elements, etc., on the other hand. We have to assume longer (i.e. containing more sounds) forms of a word to be older than the phonetically shorter variants of the same word if the contrary is not proved in every individual case (the proof that the “additional” element/sound is a morpheme must consist of a demonstration of its meaning). In the course of time words are effaced, lose sounds and whole syllables, diminish in size to the degree that this does not injure the semantics, while word composition, affixation, etc. represent a contrary process, which, however, as well as adding of sounds when adaptation of loanwords by no means contradict this general law of historical and combinatoric reduction of linguistic forms, the process being corroborated with instrumental-phonetic investigations of many languages, too. And from this most general law a number of other more concrete regularities follow.

Thus, I have established experimental-phonetically the following phonetic regularities produced by physiological laws, and representing, at the same time, the laws of historical development.

1) Long vowels diminish in length and become short: \( \ddot{V} > V > \ddot{V} \).
2) Short vowels reduce quantitatively and qualitatively: \( V > \ddot{V} > \ddot{a} \) (\( \ddot{a} \) is neutral sound);
3) Articulation of back vowels is removed to the front and they tend to become thus front vowels: \( a > \ddot{a} > e \), vide supra.
4) Labialized vowels become unrounded: \( o > \ddot{o} > y \) (\( \ddot{a} \)).
5) The articulation both of high and wide short vowels tends to approach, in width, to that of neutral vowels and become mixed vowels when reduced, because the latter articulation is the nearest to the neutral position when the articulatory organs are in the position of rest: \( u > o \) (\( \ddot{o} > o \); \( e > i > \ddot{e} \); \( a > e > \ddot{a} \).
6) Reduction in the unstressed position can favour narrowing: \( o > u; e > i; a > y \).
7) Thus, we see narrowing of wide vowels and widening of the narrow accompanied and favoured by the reduction.

These regularities were established, on the basis of instrumental investigations, for Tatar and Chuvash in 1953–1955, etc., for other Turkic languages from 1957 and later: 1959, 1961, 1962, etc., while further instrumental studies allowed to extend these regularities to other Altaic languages.

Of most importance for combinatoric and historical changes of vowels is the influence of stress. Unstressed position can lead to quantitative and qualitative reduction, which in turn, leads to the gradual loss of separate phonetic features of
the vowels as, e.g., to delabialization, devoicing, nasalization, etc. and finally to the deletion of the vowels, which process begins with the articulatory organs approaching in their position to that of the neutral (i.e. mixed) vowel (1953, etc.). With this the variability of the pronunciation is connected (registered in 1952, 1959, etc., v.i.), e.g. äleili or Oluii, etc. Short (reduced) vowels are first to subject to the reduction in the unstressed position, whereas under the stress their length can increase and narrow vowels can widen. However even stressed vowels can sometimes lose some of their features, e.g. be devoiced, for instance, in the neighbourhood with strong voiceless consonants.

Combinatorial (positional) changes of vowels. The qualitative and quantitative characteristics of vowels depend on the following factors: (1) the quality of the vowel (qualitative length), (2) stressed–unstressed position; (3) the structure of the syllable; (4) the number of syllables in the word; (5) the consonantal environment (neighbouring consonants); (6) the vowels of the preceding and of the following syllables; (7) the number of sounds in the word and their length (1953–1959, 1962, etc.).

Palatalization of vowels can result from the influence of palatal and palatalized consonants as ȝ, č, c (č‘), j, ž, ʒ, etc.

Labialization of vowels can take place under the influence of neighbouring labial consonants or labial vowels of the neighbouring syllables.

Diphthongoidal character of vowels is connected with their length: this was first registered in 1953. In general, every vowel more or less changes during the pronunciation, however this is more clearly manifested in long vowels. On the other hand, a diphthongoidal pronunciation can indicate at an increase of the length. However it would hardly be correct to extend this rule mechanically to every case without control.

The syllabic structure. As it was mentioned above, I established in 1955, on the basis of instrumental-phonetic studies, the existence of the tendency to the inverse dependence of the length of one vowel of a disyllabic or polysyllabic word from the length of other vowels of the word (ALH, V, Budapest, 1955, p. 267).

This regularity should not be confused with that established by E. Lagerkrantz for some Finno-Ugrian languages and consisting of the formula that the length of a syllable with a long vowel and a short consonant in it, namely V:C is equal to that of a syllable with a short vowel and a long consonant, namely VC. To this more or less corresponds my next conclusion according to which, in di- and polysyllabic words, the length of individual sounds reduces in comparison with their length in monosyllabic words, and the length of individual sounds in words with a greater number of sounds diminishes in comparison with that in words in which there is the same number of syllables, however the number of sounds is less.

The latter conclusion concerns the relations within one syllable, while the first deduction reflects the relations between different syllables within one di- or polysyllabic word.

These regularities explain many phonetic changes. E.g., in disyllabic words, the vowel of the initial syllable tends to increase in length if the second vowel is narrow or a reduced one (1955, 1958, 1959, etc.), because the latter are shorter.
than the wide ones. For the same reason the length of the root vowel is diminished when some affixes are added to a monosyllabic word. My instrumental-phonetic investigations in various languages support this conclusion. E.g., as it is described in my Zvukovoj stroj ..., Qazan, 1959, pp. 73–74, etc., the length of vowels in Khakas words with a long vowel in the initial syllable and a short one in the second (hoostat 'to make draw', čeeke 'to embroider', etc.) comprised, on the average, for 13 words (30 measurements) 21.1 centiseconds for the first vowel and 6.5 cs for the second, while in words with short vowels in both syllables (hostat 'to force to join', hohta 'to stripe', etc.) comprised on the average 7.9 cs for the first vowel and 8.4 cs for the second (for 6 words 23 measurements). The increase of the length of the second vowel in the latter group of words is explained by diminishing of the length of the vowel of the initial syllable.

Combinatory changes of the syllabic structure established experimental-phonetically, as well as historical development can be rendered with the following formula: CVC→CVC+CVC→CVCCVC→CVVCVC→VCVC//CVCV→VCV/CVC→VC//CV→V→(for affixes)→C. However this is not counting the derivation and word composition: they change the picture of the development of any stage, and then the process of shortening begins again, while longer forms are always primary (older) if the contrary is not proved in every individual case, e.g., if it is not proved that a concrete longer form has appeared in the course of word composition or derivation. This pertains to all linguistic phenomena and is a general law of glottogenesis (1965, 1969, 1974, etc., 1985).32

Under equal conditions, wide vowels are mostly longer than the narrow ones. This is why, if in a disyllabic word, there is a wide vowel in one syllable and a narrow one in the other, the length of the wide vowel tends to be longer than in the case when there are two wide vowels in an analogous (in other respects) word and v.v. (See my Zvukovoj stroj ... I, 1959, pp. 73, etc. about Khakas; analogous examples for other Turkic languages see in the same book: for Turkmenian on pp. 90–93 and table 31; for Kasakh—pp. 99, 101 and table 34; for Azarbajdzani—pp. 82–83; for Çuvaş p. 68; also my article in Učenye zapiski Çuvašskogo naučno-issledovatel’skogo instituta jazyka ..., Čeboksary, 1958, v. XVIII, p. 68, also my article in CAJ XIX and other works.)

However the motive forces of language development (inclusive phonetics) are not reduced to physiological laws. Of greatest importance is the influence of other languages resulting from political domination, a higher economical development and/or cultural level of another nation (or nations), and other external factors, which can turn the development of the language to a reverse one in comparison with what could be expected when proceeding from physiological laws described above, the interference of non-linguistic and/or external linguistic factors being possible at any stage of the development.

The influence of non-linguistic or of external linguistic factors can be contrary to the general laws of glottogenesis as well as to combinatorial (positional) changes.

Thus, e.g., under the influence of other languages, the development from palatal to guttural vowels (or words) is possible, as well as the development from
a shorter form of a word to a longer one, e.g., when borrowing, cf. Pers. râzâ ‘fast’, Turk. urala, ‘id.’ etc. However later such forms, in turn, are subjected to the general laws of combinatorial changes and of historical development established above (1961, 1965, etc.).

Linguistic interaction can lead to levelling of quantitative (as well as qualitative) opposition (1962), whereas in isolation a language can preserve its older features. In 1962 I formulated this in the following way (the quotation is given in English translation taken from my article in CAJ XIX, 1975, p. 96): “The shift of vowels in the Turkic languages of this region” (i.e. of the Volga-Kama region—U.B.) “is evidently a result of the quantitative reduction of the short vowels, which in its turn, was connected with the levelling of the quantitative oppositions in vocalism—as a possible result of the linguistic interaction between the Turkic and the ancient Fenno-Ugric population of that region, for, as a rule, only in some southern or eastern Turkic languages are preserved pure (or almost pure) quantitative oppositions of vowels (in Turkmen, Khakas, Yakut), and these languages, except Yakut, were for a long time exclusively or mainly in the Turkic encirclement. When mixing of different ethnic units reaches a considerable extent, the quantitative characteristics of sounds have a tendency to disappear (cf. Azerbaijani, Uzbek, etc.), because the system of subtle phonetic and phonology oppositions is destroyed and only the most rough oppositions are left, which are common to all of the interacting dialects. The quantitative oppositions are levelled also in the case when both interacting languages possess such oppositions, but they do not coincide in them. The condition for a linguistic interaction is evidently not a simple neighbourhood of the peoples speaking those languages, but a long-term interchange and bilingualism of the majority of the population of the region, because it is the language that influences but not the geographic environment or heredity. It is not excluded that the levelling of the quantitative oppositions in the Russian vocalism is also connected with the mixing of the Russians with other peoples of Eastern Europe which were conquered by the former after their coming here.” “This certainly refers also to morphology and syntax, for there are many cases in which the analytical type of a language came to existence as a result of the linguistic interaction (mixing) of different related and unrelated languages, as it was in the history of English, French, Danube-Bolgar, etc. It is evident that the loss of many Indo-European forms (e.g. those of the verb) and substitution of them by a number of Fenno-Ugric forms in Russian is also the result of the linguistic interaction between these languages. It is also not excluded that the analytical structure of the Chinese language is a result of manifold mixtures of different languages of many peoples once inhabiting that territory, which fact is corroborated, as it is known, by many historical data.”

In isolation only physiological laws can be at work. And from this point of view, it is important to make notice of the role of reduction, as a rule, in an unstressed position, which could produce certain tendencies in the development of the Turkic languages (the same can be extended to the Altaic languages in general). I mean the vowel shift and the variability of vowels most clearly manifested in the Volga Turkic languages, but not in them alone.
The vowel shift described by W. Radloff and repeated by others without reference to him was attributed by Radloff to the Volga-Turkic languages. His followers in the investigation of this phenomenon specified his conclusions. H. Paasonen established that this vowel shift was not completed in Mishar-Tatar, whereas I found that this shift partly had taken place in a number of other Turkic languages not belonging to the Volga Turkic ones. On the other hand, my instrumental investigations led to the conclusion that this vowel shift resulted from shortening of wide vowels (o>u; ø>ü; a/e>i) and from quantitative reduction (followed by the qualitative one) of historically short high vowels (u>o; i>ü; i>i). Quantitative reduction led to the qualitative reduction when the position of the articulatory organs approached to that of the neutral vowel and thus the mixed vowels appeared, registered by our X-ray photographs.

However the unevenness of this vowel shift even in the Volga Turkic languages came hand in hand with the variability of the vocalism of concrete words, in which the historical varieties of the same vowel could be revived, and pronounced one instead of the other without the sense of the word being changed. This process was described in my book Zvukovoj stroj ... I, 1959, pp. 22-23, as follows.

"As it has been established on the basis of the materials obtained after W. Radloff,1 the vowel shift in the Volga Turkic languages is relative both in the dialectal and lexical sense. Because of unevenness of the vowel shift, it is possible to encounter, in the subdialecits of the Qazan Tatar language, the correspondences u/o (butqa/botqa ‘gruel’, cf. Uzb. bútqa, Qaz. botqa); ü/ö (çügrär/çügrär ‘he runs’, cf. Uzb. jugurmoq ‘to run’, Qaz. çügrärä, Tuv. çügrär); ü/ö (inänänä ‘needle’, aibär/aibär ‘thing’, cf. Qaz., Q.-Q., Tuv. ine ‘needle’, Uzb. ignä, Tur. ignä ‘needle’, etc.)." 2" ‘In Mishar Tatar the development of the Turkic o>u; ø>ü has not always taken place (cf. Mish.-Tat. zor ‘big’, jok ‘no’ and Qaz.-Tat. zur, juq with the same meaning; Mish.-Tat. köp, Qaz.-Tat. küp ‘much’, etc.). 2 Thus, the vowel shift in the Volga-Turkic languages has taken place only in the main, only mostly, but is not an absolute rule. This circumstance helps to explain why in Modern Tatar of Qazan one can hear the nuances of u or ü/ö approaching to o, ø or to ö, ü respectively, 3 the variants of ö pronounced close to i and vice versa. In emphatic speech it is possible the alternation /e/; e, e.g., Qaz.-Tat. ket!! instead of kit ‘go away’, etc. On the other hand, the vowel shift has taken place, to a certain degree, also in other Turkic languages not entering into the group of the Volga-Turkic. Cf., e.g., Qaz.-Tat. ikö ‘two’, Khak. iköö ‘two’, Azerb. ekiz ‘twins’, Q.-Qalp. eki ‘two’, Tuv. iji ‘two’, etc. From the examples it is seen that in the Tuvinian word iji evidently the vowel shift has taken place in the first vowel, while in Khakas ökö the shift has developed even further than in Qaz.-Tatar” (Pp. 22-23).

In the notes it is said: "(1) W. W. Radloff. Phonetik der Nördlichen Türkischen, Leipzig, 1882; Zur Geschichte des türkischen Vokalsystems (Izvestija Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk, 1901, t. XIV, N°4). (2) See in detail H. Paasonen. Die türkische Lehnrwörter im Mordvinischen (JSFOM, XV_2). (3) In Očerki po metodike prepodavanija russkogo i rodnogo jazykov v tatarskoi škole” (M., 1952, p. 11), N. K. Dmitriev remarks: 'Elderly Tatars have nowadays full
habits for articulation of o, however they, not feeling it as a phoneme, confuse it with Tatar o and u. For instance, they can say qom, qom and qum in the sense of Russian 'kom'."

A further development of the described tendencies to reduction can terminate with a complete loss of the vowels, the narrow and reduced vowels being deleted first. If the quantitative (as well as the qualitative—in most cases) reduction can be established with the help of instrumental methods, the deletion of vowels representing the final result of reduction, can be registered even by acoustic perception by ear and was, in many cases, established by Radloff in his "Phonetik", 1882, first of all concerning the loss of the narrow and reduced (short) vowels.36

Judging by the linguistic material obtained, analogous regularities are characteristic also of other Altaic languages. However the mixed vowels in the Altaic languages can also be of another origin, because here also long mixed vowels are possible, which can be primary from the point of view of glottogenesis, but hardly are in this case.

The most important and typical developments produced by physiological laws are the following:

1. The development of the syllabic structure: CVC>CVC+CVC>CVC>CVCCVC>
   VCVC/CVVC>VCV/CVC>VC/CV>V/ (for affixes) C>Ø
2. The quantitative development of vowels:
   ˚V>V>˚a (neutral sound)>Ø
3. The qualitative development of vowels:
   a>˚u>ı>ɔ>ı>Ø
   o>u>o>y(ø)>Ø
   ˚u>o>y>ı>Ø
   o>ı; u>ı; ı>i; ɔ>ı; y(ø)>ı
   and others.

These changes and developments of physiological nature are produced by the influence of the place of stress, of the structure of the syllable, by the length and the quality of speech sounds, etc., and can be characteristic of any language under analogous conditions.

However, other developments are also possible, including the reverse ones, which take place under the influence of (1) the concrete phonetic position (in the neighbourhood of these or those speech sounds, etc.), of (2) other languages, of (3) some non-linguistic factors, because the influence of all these factors can be at variance with that of the physiological laws described. However, after the latter influence has produced its effect and ceased to act, the physiological laws resume their force, and the development according to them begins again, starting from the position which was reached by the language under these alien influences. The process is thus very complicated, consisting of the development under the influence of different factors interacting with one another, and tracing the history of individual speech sounds requires further investigations taking into consideration all factors of language development described above.
ABBREVIATIONS

Azerb. = Azerbaijani
Baš. = Baškir
Bur. = Buryat
Čag. = Çagataj
Čuv. = Čuvaš
Dag. = Dagur
Evenk. = Evenki
Halh./Khalkh. = Khalkha
Kalm. = Kalmyk
Kar. = Karaim
Kirg. = Kirgiz
Kom. = Koman
Kor. = Korean
Lam. = Lamut
Ma. = Manchu
Mish.-Tat. = Mishar-Tatar
Mog. = Mogol
Mong. = Mongol
Mngr. = Monguor
Nan. = Nanaj
Neg. = Negidal
Olča = Olča
Old-Turk. = Old Turkic
Ord. = Ordoes
Oroč = Oroč
Oroko = Orok
Pers. = Persian
Qaz. = Qazaq
Q.-Qalpq./Qara-Qalpq. = Qara Qalpaq
Qaz.-Tat. = Qazan Tatar
Sol. = Solon
Tat. = Tatar
Trkm. = Turkmen
Tur. = Turkish
Turk. = Turkic
Tuv. = Tuvanian
Uigh. = New Uighur
Wr.-Mong. = Written Mongolian
Yak./Ják. = Yaqut
Khak. = Khakas

NOTES

1. See nos. 1, 19, 21, 26, 30–39, etc.
2. See no. 10, p. 25 et passim, also see my contribution “On the Principle of Correspondence of Linguistic Concepts and Units to the Language Levels Represented by Them” in Proceedings of the Eleventh International Congress of Linguists, Bologna–Florence, 1972. Edited by L. Heilman, Bologna, 1974, p. 342 where it is said, e.g., that the phoneme is to be defined, on the basis of the phonetic-phonologic aspect, as a sound (or group of sounds) independent of its (their) phonetic position.
3. See no. 2, p. 9, and other works of the same author.
4. No. 2, pp. 9, 12, and other works of the same author.
5. No. 2, ibidem, no. 7, pp. 40–42; no. 10, p. 12, and other works of the same author.
REFERENCES


2. U. Š. Baičura, Glasnye tatarskogo literaturnogo jazyka v svete eksperimental’nyh
  dannyh, Avtoresferat dissertacii na soiskanie učenoj stepeni kandidata filologicheskix
  nauk, Moskva–Leningrad, 1953.

3. U. Š. Baičura, “Eksperimental’phonetische Beiträge zur Untersuchung des Wortak-
  zentes des Kasan-Tatarischen”, Acta Linguistica Academiae Scientiarum Hungari-

  dannym”, Učenye zapiski Kazanskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, vol. 117, kn.
  9, Kazan’, 1957.

5. U. Š. Baičura, “Nekotorye kimografichskie dannye o dlitel’nosti glasnix i o zvonko-
 osti i dlitel’nosti soglasnyh čuvašskogo jazyka”, Učenye zapiski Naučno-issledovatel’-
  skogo instituta jazyka, literatury, istorii i ekonomiki pri sovete ministrov Čuvašskoj
  ASSR, Čeboksary, 1958, vypusk XVIII.

6. U. Š. Baičura, “Eksperimental’phonetische Beiträge zur Kenntnis des Lautbehandes


36. G. J. Ramstedt, Das Schriftmongolische und die Urgamundart phonetisch verglichen, JSFOu XXI, Helsinki, 1903.
Soma

GAD RAUSING

The rituals described or alluded to in the Rigveda again and again include the drinking or the sacrifice of “soma”, the deified juice of a plant of the same name which later scholars, remarkably enough, have not been able to identify precisely although the Swedish Encyclopedia (Svensk Uppslagsbok) claims that the vedic soma was the juice of Sarcostemma viminalte and of Calotropis gigantea, and that its persian equivalent, haoma, was made with the juice of a plant of the Ephedra family. This is, however, conjecture.

Soma is extensively described in the 9. book of Rigveda, haoma in the Avesta. Emmenau suggests a date of about 1200–1000 B.C. for the composition of the Rigveda, but an earlier date is perfectly possible. What conclusions, if any, can be drawn from the texts?

Book I. Hymn CXXX:2
O Indra, drink the Soma juice pressed
out with stones, poured from the reservoir,
as an ox drinks the spring, a very
thirsty bull the spring.
For the sweet draught that gladdens thee,
for the mightiest freshening of thy strength.

(Griffith, 1973.)

This tells us that the drink is sweet, nourishing and gives immediate strength. It also “gladdens the drinker”. It is also available in fairly large quantities, and the juice is extracted by crushing plants, or parts of plants, between stones.

I am not familiar with the properties of juice extracted from any of the plants mentioned above, but there is one plant, cultivated in India since times immemorial, the juice of which is collected when the stalks have been crushed, a juice which is nourishing and sweet: sugar cane. Present-day Indians drink large quantities of sugar-cane juice, usually pressed by street vendors in the presence of the customers. From personal experience I know that the sugar in the juice will give the tired drinker an immediate injection of energy and strength, that it makes you “feel good”. Was soma sugar-cane juice?

But soma also “gladdened” the drinker. It is very easy to ferment sugar-cane juice, using one of many culture yeasts now available or even wild yeast. The drink produced even with wild yeast is quite palatable and nothing is more apt to “gladden the drinker” since the alcohol content may be up to 15%.

Sugar-cane is native to India, probably being a cultigen of Saccharum spontaneum, a grass of tropical Asia, the marrow of which contains a certain amount of sugar. Even the juice of the latter may be fermented although the alcohol content of the drink thus produced will probably be somewhat lower than that of fermented sugar-cane juice.
Sugar-cane is known to have been cultivated in India since at least 1000 B.C. We do not know how much earlier S. spontaneum was first collected, but it seems probable that it was used at a very early time indeed.

This hypothesis does not explain the use of haoma in Persia—there is nothing in early Persian literature to suggest that sugar-cane was cultivated there. And, in either case, sugar-cane was an Indian plant—the Indo-Europeans would probably not have known it before their migration to India.

But I still suggest that late Vedic soma may have been (fermented) sugar-cane juice.

Notes on Tamil Phonology

RUTH WALLDÉN

I

In his work "The Sanskritic Element in the Vocabularies of the Dravidian Languages". Dravidic Studies No. III. University of Madras 1974, pp. 97 ff., and p. 136, S. Anavaratavinayakam Pillai mentions a change from \( a \) to \( e \) "found in the case of words borrowed from Sanskrit". This is a change noted by several scholars.\(^1\) There is an agreement among them that it occurs in words "borrowed from Sanskrit", but the explanations given, if any, are not the same. While e.g. Caldwell holds that the change occurs because "In Tamil, \( a \) is the heaviest of all the simple vowels, and therefore the most liable to change. It evinces a tendency to be weakened into \( e \) ...", this view is strongly disputed by Subrahmanya Sastri, who after a discussion on pp. 21–22 concludes: "Hence we may safely infer that 'a' generally changes to 'e' when it is preceded by the third consonant of each varga i.e. \( g, j, d, d, \) and \( b \) and not by the second or the fourth. Besides, such a change is not seen in pure Tamil words."

I have tried to find out whether an overall explanation to the phenomenon could be found at all. For this purpose I have collected a material mainly consisting of those alleged loanwords in Tamil Lexicon which contain an \( a \) in the first syllable and which have a corresponding form with the same meaning containing an \( e \) in the same environment. The material thus obtained has been complemented by examples showing the same characteristics which have been taken from the works of the authors quoted, and by some examples not noted so far.

The Tamil words have all been dated according to the literary references given in TL or by the authors. The dating follows Zvelebil's.\(^2\) Although often approximate the dating was made in order to illustrate the phenomenon also from the point of view of occurrence in Ta. literature.

These conditions, viz. the occurrence of both \( a \)- and \( e \)-forms carrying the same meaning and having literary references that make a dating of both forms possible, have necessarily put narrow limits to my material. A great number of lexical items, often with the note 'colloquial' or ‘local’, had to be left out. Still it is to be hoped that the material will prove sufficient to highlight the phenomenon observed.

Skt. \( a r k a \)\(^3\) 'Calotropis gigantea'; Ta. \( a r u k k a m \) (850–900), \( e r u k k u \) (1700). The first and the last items are mentioned by Anavaratavinayakam Pillai, p. 98, and he adds: "This is perhaps the only instance of an initial \( a \) changing into \( e \)." Here I would point at Skt. \( a s- \) 'to reach' (deriv. \( a s t i- \)); Ta. \( a t tai \) (900–1000), \( e t t u \) (900–1000), and Skt. \( a s t a \) 'eight'; Ta. \( a t t a \) (850–900), \( e t t u \) (450).

\( k+a \)

Skt. \( k a s t a- \) 'evil'; Ta. \( k a t t a \) 'hardship' (800–900), \( k e t t a \) 'bad' (900).
ksa
Skt. ksa- ‘to pardon’; Ta. cam (900–1000), cem (1700).

kh+a
Skt. khañ- ‘to cut’; Ta. kan (800), ken (1800), further Skt. khañ- ‘a fish’; Ta. kalu (850–900), kelu (800).

g+a

c+a

f+a
Skt. jagat ‘world’; Ta. cakam (850–900), cekam (1700). Skt. janaka- ‘father’; Ta. canaka (900–1000), canka (1300–1400). Skt. janana- ‘birth’; Ta. canaa (800), cana (900). There are also other derivatives of the Skt. root jan- which have reflexes of the same kind in Ta.

Skt. japa- ‘to utter prayer’; Ta. cavi (900), cavi (1500), and Skt. japa- ‘prayer’.

Skt. jala- ‘water’; Ta. ca (400), cel (1000). Skt. jaya- ‘victory’; Ta. ca (800), cem (1700).

d+a

n+a
Skt. nara- ‘iron arrow’; Ta. nara ‘iron rod’ (550), nericam ‘arrow’ (1800). Skt. nlika- ‘lotus flower’; Ta. nlikam (1700), neli (1500).

b+a

bh+a
Skt. bhadra- ‘bull, elephant’; Ta. pattiram ‘elephant’ (1300–1400), petram (400).

m+a

y+a

ś, s+ā

I have already quoted Caldwell’s attempt to explain the change a>e in the Tamil equivalents of Sanskrit words and Subrahmanya Sastri’s refutation of his view. This latter author adds op. cit., p. 22: “The same change does not generally take place when ‘a’ is preceded in Sanskrit by kh or gh, ch or jh, dh, ph, or bh.”

Anavaratavinayakam Pillai is partly of the same opinion. On pp. 97–98 he says: “This change from a to e is found in the case of words borrowed from Sanskrit, which begin with a non-aspirated voiced stop.” Later on, p. 98, he continues: “It is worth noting that when b changes into v as in valam, the a remains unchanged.” On p. 136 he says: “This vowel-change a>e is peculiar to Tamil and is common in words beginning with unaspirated voiced stops and liquids . . . Except ceyam and pelam, these examples are only heard in popular speech.”

Zvelebil, in his CDP, pp. 42–43, touches upon the phenomenon under discussion. Apart from some late Pallava and Chola inscriptions he mostly locates this change to borrowed words in the colloquial language.5 “Rarely this alternation occurs in Ta. items, too,” he says, and takes as an example of this, just like Anavaratavinayakam Pillai, p. 98, kattu ‘tie, knot’ and kettu id. I do not consider this example a very good one, since I think it is ~ Skt. granth-, grath- ‘to tie’. Zvelebil observes, p. 42., that after an initial palatal c a alternates with e in South Dravidian.

The material cited above seems to warrant the following conclusions.

No reasons given so far suffice to explain the a>e change. The only point still to be commonly maintained is the statement that the phenomenon occurs in words common to Skt. and Ta.

No phonetic environment could be pointed at as particularly favourable to the change; it occurs in all kinds of phonetic surroundings.

The change may be frequent in colloquial Ta., but it certainly occurs in literary Ta. as well.
The dating, always approximate, does not always allow of a statement as to which alternative is the earlier one.

It is well known that an a, ai or au initial or in the first syllable of a Tamil word is pronounced with the a-element well preserved.

It is, I think, equally undisputable that the pronunciation of Sanskrit in present-day South India strongly tends to show an $a>e$ change.

A possible conclusion could be that the $a>e$ change accounted for above might originate in a corresponding pronunciation, dialectal or otherwise, present already at an early stage in Sanskrit.

II

Let me add just a few further remarks concerning Tamil phonology.

The phenomenon called samprasārana⁷ in Sanskrit can be traced in Tamil as well. This holds for some Skt.-Ta. “gemeingut” words.

\[v a > u\]

Skt. vac- ‘to speak’; vacana-, ukti- ‘speech’, ukta- ‘spoken’
MIA vacana-, vayana- ‘speech’; utta-, vutta- ‘spoken’
Ta. vacanam, utti ‘speech’
Skt. vad- ‘to speak’, udita- ‘spoken’; (kim)vadanti ‘common saying’
MIA vad- ‘to speak’, udita- ‘spoken’
Ta. vatanti ‘common saying’, cf. utavu ‘to tell’
Skt. vap- ‘to shear’, upa- ‘shorn; vapan- ‘shearing’, ‘shaving’
MIA —
Ta. vapoṇam ‘shaving’; cf. uppaṭṭi ‘sheaf’
Skt. vaś- ‘to command’, uśana- ‘obedient’; vaśa- ‘control’ vaśya- ‘to be subjugated’
MIA vasa- ‘power’, vassa- ‘subjected to’
Ta. vacam ‘control’, vaci ‘subjugation’; cf. ula⁸ ‘to discharge the duties of an office’
Skt. vas- ‘to dress’, usāṇa- ‘dressed’, vasana- ‘cloth’
MIA vasana-, vasana- ‘dress’
Ta. vacanam ‘cloth’; cf. uṭu ‘to dress’⁹
Skt. vas- ‘to dwell’, uṣṭa-, uṣṭa- ‘dwelt’; vasa-, vasati ‘dwelling’
MIA vasati, vasai ‘to live, stay’; vuttha- ‘resided’
Ta. vaci, vacati ‘dwelling’; cf. ucam ‘town’
Skt. vas-, uṣ- ‘to shine’; vasu ‘ray of light’ vasar(-han), uṣā- ‘dawn’
MIA uṣā- ‘dawn’
Skt. vah-, ūh- ‘to drive’, ‘to push’, uhyā- ‘driving’; vahatu-, vahati- ‘ox’ L.
MIA vahati, vahāī ‘to carry’
Ta. vakatu, vakati ‘bull’; cf. ukai ‘to drive, move’
Notes on tamil phonology

Skt. kvath- ‘to boil’, kvatha- ‘decoction’
MIA kathati, kahai, kadhai, kuthati ‘to boil’ kuthita ‘boiled’
Ta. cf. kuṭi-nir ‘decoction’

Skt. tvar-, tur- ‘to urge’, tvarita- ‘quick’, tvarā- ‘quickness’ tura- ‘quick’
MIA turati ‘to press forward’, tura- ‘quick’, tara- ‘speed’
Ta. turita ‘quick’, turai ‘quickness’

Skt. svar- ‘to sound’, svara- ‘musical note’ (with traces of v a>u change)
MIA sara- ‘musical note’ (with traces of va>u change)
Ta. caram, curam ‘musical note’

ya>i

Skt. yaj- ‘to sacrifice’, yaṣṭi-’ sacrificing’, sacrifice’
MIA jattha- ‘sacrificed’, iṭṭha- ‘sacrificed’
Ta. attil ‘place for performing sacrificial ceremony’, itti ‘sacrifice’

Whether the following items should be regarded as samprasāraṇa phenomena within Tamil itself or as mere accidental cases may be difficult to decide.

v a>u

Skt. vā- ‘to blow’, vāta- ‘wind, rheumatism’
MIA vāta-, vāya- ‘wind’
Ta. vātam ‘wind, rheumatism’; cf. ūtal, ūtai ‘wind, rheumatism’

Skt. vāś- ‘to howl’
MIA vāsati, vāsaī ‘to utter a cry (of animals and birds)’
Ta. vācitam ‘cry of birds, beasts etc.’; cf. ūlai14 ‘to howl’

Skt. vāsī- ‘chisel, adze’
MIA vāsī- ‘adze’
Ta. vācci, vāycci ‘adze’; cf. uli15 ‘chisel, axe’

Skt. jvar- ‘to burn’, jvara- ‘fever’; jārti- id.
MIA jara- ‘fever’
Ta. jvaram; curam id.

Skt. svā- svayam16 ‘own, one’s own’
MIA sayam, saim ‘self, own’
Ta. cuva- ‘one’s own’; cuvam id.

Skt. hve-, hvayati ‘to call, summon’, hūtvā ‘having called’
MIA ahayati ‘to summon’
Ta. kavar ‘to call, summon’; cf. kāvu, küpp(itu) id.

Cf. also:

Skt. udak-, udan- ‘the north’
MIA — — — — — —
Ta. utakku ‘the north’, vāṭakku id.
Ta. vāḷi ‘place’, loc. ending; uli, uḷi id.
ya>i

Skt.  yasti(kā) ‘pearl necklace, anything slender’
MIA ———
Ta.  yasti, atti(kai) ‘necklace’; cf. itti ‘slender’
Skt.  yasti- ‘staff, stick’
MIA  yatti, jatti ‘staff, stick’
Ta.  yatti ‘staff’; cf. itti ‘pike’

In some cases the changes shown above can be traced back to Skt.; in a few they can be seen in MIA. Although there are cases which might be taken as instances of so-called samprasāraṇa within Ta. too, they are not regular enough to be regarded as results of a real sound-law.

III

Contrary to MIA where Skt. vya- usually has correspondences of a varied shape,17 e.g. vya-, va-, vi-, viya-, the regular and easily recognizable correspondence in Tamil to Skt. vya- is viya-. A glance in TL will suffice to show this.

Less conspicuous is another, quite common correspondence, in some cases (but not all) noted by TL, viz. Skt. vyā—Ta. vē-

Skt. vyakta- ‘manifest’
Ta. viyaktam, viyattam ‘clearness’; cf. vēṭṭa ‘clear’, vettam ‘clearness’
Skt. vyāhya- ‘suggested sense’
Ta. viyānkiyam id.; vēṅkiyam, vēṅkiyam id.
Skt. vyāñjana- ‘condiment’
Ta. viyāṅcaṇam id.; vēṅcaṇam id.
Skt. vyātipāta- ‘a division of time’
Ta. viyātipātam id.; vētipātam id.
Skt. vyātireka- ‘contrariety’
Ta. viyātirekam id.; vēṭirēkam id.
Skt. vyadh-, caus. also vedh- ‘to pierce’ etc.; vyādha- ‘hunter’
Ta. viyātaṇ ‘hunter’; vēṭaṇ, vēṭuvaṇ id.
Skt. vyath- ‘to oppress’; vyathā- ‘suffering’
Ta. viyātā(-karam) ‘(removing) oppression’; vēṭī ‘to oppress’, vēṭai, vēṭu ‘suffering’
Skt. vyarthā- ‘uselessness’
Ta. viyartam id.; vēṭṭi, vēṭṭi id.18
Skt. vyasana- ‘calamity, distress’
Ta. viyācaṇam, viyātaṇam ‘grief’; cf. vēcaṭai ‘sorrow’

There are also less clear instances, cf. Skt. vyā-, vi-, intens. also vevi-, ‘to cover, envelop’ Ta. vēy ‘to cover, surround’, or Skt. vyāṅga- ‘spotted, speckled’ Ta. viyāṅkam ‘natural spot’ vēṅkai ‘tiger’.19 Cf. also Skt. vyath- ‘to tremble’ Ta. vetir id.
While the Ta. viya- words are regular tatsamas and in some cases have their correspondences also in MIA, the ve- words could not be thus classified.

Neither could an acceptable phonetic explanation be given by pointing to special phonetic surroundings.20

Literary references are rare but both viya- and vē-words are present in Old Tamil; thus we can not state with any certainty that one group is older than the other.

NOTES


5. There is the much-discussed Ta. cā ‘to die’ (450–500) and ceku ‘to kill’ 100 B.C. – 300 A.D.) which might perhaps be connected with Skt. jas-, the causative of which, jāsayati, means ‘to cause to expire’.

6. CDP, pp. 42–43 Zvelebil has a very interesting discussion concerning the fact that in Tolkāpiyam the vowel a is not allowed after an initial c.


11. Cf. EWA.


13. Cf. EWA.


15. Cf. EWA with literature and references, and DEDK 699. See also note 8 above.

16. Cf. EWA with literature and references.

17. See e.g. Pischel, op. cit. § 286; Mayrhofer, op. cit., p. 46, and DIAL.


19. Cf. EWA under tyāγhra-.

20. However, this iyā->e-phenomenon seems to be restricted to words which in Skt. begin with a u. It is difficult not to say impossible to find e-forms in Ta. corresponding to yo-forms from e.g. Skt. tyaj- ‘to abandon’, tyāga- ‘abandonment’ Ta. tiyākam id. Skt. dhyā- ‘to meditate’ dhyāna- ‘meditation’ is~Ta. tiyānam. Ta. tiyān ‘one to be meditated upon’ corresponds to Skt. dhyeya- id.
Reviews


The genre of the “universal chronicle” or “world chronicle” emerged as a result of the view of history as God’s plan of salvation and the gradual development of mankind. Eusebius of Caesarea, with his chronicle, became the point of departure for a long tradition of Christian chronographic literature in the East as well as in the West. While Hellenistic and Roman chronographers had compiled a running annalistic registration of certain determined parts of the past, and while there had been attempts by Christian chronographers to synchronise certain sectors of Greek and Jewish history, Eusebius outdid all such enterprises by delivering a complete synchronisation of the history of all known nations from a fixed beginning, i.e. the birth of Abraham, until his own time. Originating in the apologetic need for proving that the Jewish-Christian tradition was anterior to that of the Greek, the chronicle of Eusebius became the starting point for Christian historiography. Eusebius also became the instigator and model, for the Syriac world chronicle.

For the Christian Syrians who did not possess a national history or historiography of their own, but who instead found their identity to a great extent in their affiliation to the Christian “nation”, historiography became important. It took the form of hagiography, martyrlogy, biographies, local histories, monastery histories, histories of important events or periods, histories of the Church, and world histories. The latter, for which the form of the universal chronicle was adopted, developed under the influence of the Syriac translation of Eusebius’ chronicle (Witakowski, 77). It was mostly Monophysites who cultivated the universal chronicle, while the Nestorians applied themselves to the other historiographic genres. We have a great number of Syriac world chronicles. The earlier ones were short chronicles of an annalistic character, while the later ones took up the narrative elements of other historiographic genres. The result was what Witakowski calls the *developed chronicle* (p. 83). The first of this genre was that of Pseudo-Dionysius, dealt with in the study under review.

Historiography of late antiquity is an object of interest for scholars today, and here Syriac historiography has its given place. Research into the domain of Syriac historiography has up till now been confined mostly to the edition of texts and the investigation of sources or of isolated events or periods. It is therefore gratifying that somebody has now undertaken the task of analysing a world chronicle, making its contents available to historians and giving it a place in the history of general historiography.

The work under review is a doctoral dissertation which was defended at the Department of Semitic languages at Uppsala University on May 5, 1987. The dissertation deals, as we said, with a Syriac chronicle written in 775 A.D. by a man of whom we know only that he was a Monophysite monk at the monastery of Zuqin in Northern Mesopotamia. He is conventionally called Pseudo-Dionysius since the work was once attributed to the Jacobite patriarch Dionysius of Tel Maxre. It is a world chronicle beginning with the creation and ending up with the author’s own time. The last entry is 775 A.D. The chronicle is a compilation and mainly based on the Old Testament, the chronicle of Eusebius, the church histories of Socrates and John of Ephesus, the history of the Byzantine-Persian war of Anastasius I and Qawad and the events in Syria from 495 to 507 attributed to Joshua the Stylist. For the period from the year 728 onwards the author bases his statements upon his own research and observations.

Pseudo-Dionysius’ chronicle has been judged severely by scholars. It is unreliable, the author is mediocre, limited, a bad stylist etc. (W., 27). These criticisms apply if one is concerned with the question “What does the source say about the past?”, if one is looking for hard facts (W., 27). It is quite possible, however, W. contends, that Pseudo-Dionysius’ purpose was different (W., 28). What this purpose is and how it has been reached is what the dissertation is all about. W. states his own purpose as follows: “The aim of the present work will be just to show through the example of Pseudo-Dionysius’ work how Syrian Monophysite Christians in the early Middle Ages could conceive the past, and how and for what purpose they could write about it.” The interest of W.’s dissertation lies
in this approach. The interest is directed at the work as a source of information on itself. But the above statement leaves the following question unanswered. Why this particular chronicle? One can gather from reading his dissertation that what the author wants is to dig out the mentality that governed the minds of medieval Syrian historiographers. He does not, however, state the reason for choosing this particular work for analysis. Now, one can sustain with good reason that Pseudo-Dionysius reflects as well as any other the mentality of Syrian historiographers. A writer of this time does in fact not display individual traits as much as he represents the tradition in which he stands, the tradition of the literary genre that he cultivates, whether he be an outstanding figure or a mediocre writer. W. declares (p. 28) that his study is an investigation into the history of historiography. Therefore he will not deal with the question of the reliability of the information offered or with the establishing of source-dependence, nor will he analyse the work’s literary structure, techniques or style. Now, as for this last point, one cannot overlook the fact that historiography at the time was a literary genre and subject to literary conventions. To leave out the literary point of view altogether prevents W. from coming to grips with certain questions and from distinguishing between literary convention and the author’s own contribution. If we consider, for instance, the Syrians’ view of the concept of literature in relation to the Greek concept of literature we find that for the Greeks conformity to certain rules as to style and form was essential. There existed sanctioned traditions for the various genres. On the other hand, great individual freedom of individual creativeness as to the contents was allowed within the limits set by these rules. For the Syrians the concept of literature was determined by the fact that practically all literature was Christian. Therefore, the contents were limited. On the one hand the Syrians took over to a great extent the confines of tradition as far as the form was concerned. On the other hand, because of their Christian outlook, they were also obliged to reject to a large extent individual freedom with regard to the contents of what was written. It was no longer man that was the measure of everything but instead the Christian doctrine. W. remarks (p. 172) that Pseudo-Dionysius did not write history for history’s sake but with a didactic purpose. This is true of all Syriac literature. There is no question of l’art pour l’art here. Everything is placed in the service of Christian preaching. And all literature is in reality Bible exegesis, comments on the Bible and the early fathers of the Church. If one considers, for instance, prefaces to Syriac works one finds that while Greek writers, historiographers or others, may emphasise as a great merit that they bring something new “etwas noch nie gesagtes” to quote Curtis, the Syrian author frequently says in the preface to his work: “I do not bring anything new, I only repeat what has already been said by the fathers, I explain, I collect the material, but I am altogether in the tradition. I fill in the gaps and I pass on, but I do not put forward a personal opinion.” At the same time, the all-pervading question for the Syrians is the contents of the work. Form and style are of minor importance. One can see this in the attitude towards rhetoric of various Christian authors, how it changes according to whether one believes that rhetoric promotes the Christian message or hinders it.

Eusebius, in the preface to his Church history, has still the classical “I enter upon new paths that nobody has trodden before”. No such tone can be heard in Pseudo-Dionysius. He speaks in the preface to the last part of the chronicle, which is his personal contribution, about the duty of transmitting from fathers to sons and he supports himself with quotations from the Bible. Even the choice of Bible verses is traditional. Those that he uses are often used in other prefaces. Therefore, by drawing attention to the Syrians’ concept of literature W. could have found support for choosing any one of the Syrian historiographers as a representative of the historiographic tradition and the mentality that it reflects, thus no excluding Pseudo-Dionysius. Still, one would have expected to have been given also a positive reason for the author’s choice of this particular work.

In the introduction the author gives (p. 29) his own definitions of the terms history, historiography and meta-historiography as he intends to use them in this work. These definitions are resumed in slightly different forms in Ch. 5 (p. 147). Commendable as such an attempt at defining the terminology used may be, it does not in this case contribute to clarity. Also the author is not consistent in his use of the terms. This is particularly true of the term history. On p. 29 the author states that history “will be used only in the meaning of the ‘past (of mankind), i.e. objective reality which is ‘there’, or, rather was ‘there’, independent of any historian ever coming, finding it out or telling about it.” Apart from the fact that a past that is not seen through somebody’s eyes is hardly conceivable, the use of the word history meaning res gestae as well as the science or discipline of history, and also historiography, is so rooted in our minds that the restriction of the term to mean only res gestae seems unnatural.
As it turns out the author cannot maintain consistency throughout the work. He is obliged to resort to designations like "history" (pp. 89, 133) or 'history' (pp. 59, 61) or history proper (p. 140) to make himself clear. In the latter case it is all the more confusing as the term history proper here means history writing and not history (proper) as it is defined on p. 147. The rest of the introductory chapter deals with the history of the editions and the discussions about the authorship. The chapter ends with an interesting survey of the studies that have been made of the chronicle.

Before entering upon the meta-historiographic analysis the author, drawing extensively upon the Zuqnin chronicle, gives a survey in the first chapter of the political, social, economic and cultural conditions in which the Monophysite Christians in Syria lived under the two first centuries of Muslim dominion up to the time of Pseudo-Dionysius. In Ch. 2 follows an investigation into the origin and development of the Christian world chronicle and in Ch. 3 its development in Syria. Both these chapters are instructive, particularly Ch. 3 which is a valuable complement to the surveys of Syriac historical writing by J.-B. Chabot and S. Brock. In Ch. 4, entitled "The Chronicle and Its Author. A Metahistoriographic Analysis", which is central in the dissertation, the chronicle of Pseudo-Dionysius is analysed as to its structure and contents, the author's aims, his method and his view of history. W. has succeeded in giving a surprisingly rich picture of Pseudo-Dionysius' personality based on a careful analysis of the chronicle, which gives very little direct information about the life of the author. In analysing the contents of the chronicle W. first arranges the material according to modern subdisciplines of history: political history, church history, history of (other) religions, social and economic history, cultural and intellectual history. As these major themes do not exhaust all the material W. attempts a regrouping according to a system more adequate to the material, viz. 1. The history of God's deeds 2. The history of people's pious actions 3. The history of the depravation of mankind, of sins and punishments 4. The history of the gradual development of mankind. This arrangement brings out Pseudo-Dionysius' vision of history in a clearer way. The natural association of the expression used for the fourth category, namely "the gradual development of mankind" is, however, not with "morally neutral events"—if such were even conceivable at this time—but with God's plan or the gradual education of mankind. In the work of Pseudo-Joshua, in the epilogue, one perceives an optimistic tone as to the possibility of such a development. What about Pseudo-Dionysius himself?

Pseudo-Dionysius' chronicle is in W.'s view to be regarded as a didactic, pragmatic work more than a purely historical one. "He would not have bothered (to write this book) otherwise" (p. 138). This rather refreshing remark is wholly conjectural. As we have already pointed out, a greater awareness of rules and conventions in relation to the producing of literary works as well as of purely rhetorical conventions would have enabled the author to give a wider perspective. Thus he neglects to mention that the author of the chronicle wrote at the request of some persons mentioned by name in the preface to the whole work and to whom he dedicated his work. The preface in question is preserved in mutilated form. It is edited by Chabot II, pp. 418-420. The author calls his preface "a reply to a letter punnāv mellāt d-eğgarā from Gwargis, chorecscopus in Amid, Awtel, rēsādýrā, archimandrit, Lazarus, periodoeutus, and the venerable Anastasius and the rest of the brethren." So whatever Ps. Dionysius' personal interest in history-writing was one must remember that his work was part of a greater scheme and his intention certainly conformed to the general atmosphere. There are some other instances where the perspective might have been widened by considering the literary tradition in which the chronicle stands. W. mentions the sole reference in the chronicle made to a theological problem, namely the trinitarian doctrine (p. 94). W. points out, rightly, that the author defends the trinitarian doctrine against accusations of polytheism on the part of the Muslims. One may add that the Syrian writer, whether Monophysites, Nestorians or Melkites, were in the habit of making a declaration of orthodoxy at the beginning of their work, an assurance directed to the reader that they stand in a firm orthodox tradition. Likewise, when Pseudo-Dionysius, in the preface to the original part of his work (W., pp., 136-137), refutes criticism that he anticipates for not giving exact dates for all events, he stands in a tradition. Eusebius, in the preface to his Chronicle, expresses himself in the same was quoting Acta 1, 7 in his support: "It is not for you to know the times of the seasons, which the Father has put in his own power". The same point is taken up by Ignatius of Melitene and Michael the Syrian in the prefaces to their histories. On the other hand, when W. suggests that the expressions used by Pseudo-Dionysius pointing to God's role in history (pp. 139ff.) "should be taken as rhetorical, that is an utterance of the author's modesty rather than indicating his true opinion", I think he is
wrong. Even though Pseudo-Joshua touches on the problem of free will and God’s acting through history in the preface to his history, it was not until the 12th century with John of Mardin that the first attempt to detach historical events from religious determinism was made. And John of Mardin was violently attacked and accused of blasphemy (see J. M. Fiey, ‘Les chroniqueurs syriaques’, in Paroles de L’Orient XII, 253-264). We cannot expect Pseudo-Dionysius to have taken such a stand in the 8th century. Besides, the example chosen here is actually taken from John of Ephesus, not from Pseudo-Dionysius’ own text. The same goes for the quotations on p. 143 notes. 24 and 25, which are both from John of Ephesus and for pp. 154 and 157 where the quotations nos. 40, 57 and 58 refer to Pseudo-Joshua’s text and therefore do not illustrate Pseudo-Dionysius’ choice of terms.

In Ch. 5 W. attempts a semantic analysis of all the terms for history, chronology and chronography that Pseudo-Dionysius uses and he compares them with those of other Syrian historiographers. The result of this inventory is accounted for in two tables on pp. 161-162. It appears that five words cover the concept of “history” in its two main connotations, or subfields, i.e. history-as-actuality and history-as-record. The author shows how these terms have developed from one of these subfields to the other. He gives special attention to the word ūṣītā. He considers it a problem how to decide when this word is to be seen as belonging to the one or the other subfield and tries to find a syntactic solution to the problem. This attempt does not give much, however. It seems to the reviewer that it is not such a great problem, as it is only natural that the “primary” meaning remains when a word glides form one subfield to the other. All in all this investigation, albeit carefully done, does not contribute much to clarity.

In his handling of the Syriac language, in the transcription and translation, W. unfortunately displays a lack of accuracy. He uses the East-Syriac, Nestorian reading and transcribes accordingly. Sometimes, however, he falls into the West-Syrian and, for example, writes balṣūd instead of balṣūd (p. 139 n. 5; p. 143 n. 23) or ӯm instead of ӯm (p. 143 n. 21), or wa-nīlaf instead of wa-nīlaf. Some other errors occur repeatedly: the primae y: yilef instead of ilef (p. 45 n. 32; p. 57 n. 126), yisef(l) instead of ḥeṣf(2) (p. 57 n. 126, cf. yisef instead of ḥeṣf p. 158 (63); ṣīḍāyā instead of ṣīḍāyā (p. 97 n. 59); ydaṭṭāḥōn instead of ḫeṭṭāḥōn (p. 139 n. 6). It is often difficult in Syriac to determine whether a verb is of the eipa- or the eipâ’- pattern. Only a careful study of the lexicon can guide us and sometimes it is impossible to know which form is intended. In the following examples, however, there should be no hesitation: meddammār-nā, pronounced meddammār-nā (p. 93 n. 27) and etkannāsāt and tetkannās (p. 107 n. 21) instead of the eipa- forms. Likewise for the pā’al versus pa’al, for instance moraxumānūṭeh (p. 139 n. 2, p. 143 n. 20). On p. 110 n. 38 wa-μaqīm is wrong. It should be wa-medīng, as the translation indicates. On p. 139 n. 5 we must read da-taṛrīqīn instead of da-taṛrīqīn. We also find the same lack of accuracy in the reading and translation of the quoted texts. On p. 136, with the text on p. 137 n. 7, the author has been led astray in the translation by choosing a wrong, later reading: wa-hwā lan šēyānā instead of hwā-坛 šēyānā. It should be “We wished to leave a record … in order that maybe …”. On p. 139 1.22 ff., with the text in n. 6, the author has overlooked the wa- in wa-nef’āt. In addition he seems not to have understood that the abstract noun with the pronoun suffix of the first person, da-bṣirūṭan, stands for the person, a very common way of expressing modesty, cf. mea parvitas. I propose the following translation: “The grace of God visited the countries of Asia, Caria, Lydia and Phrygia through the care (zeal) of Justinian the Victorious. And it went out from him abundantly through the mediation of our humble selves …”. On p. 150 (13) ‘uttād is one of the common expressions for ‘preface’. The translation should be: “First the preface. After I have transmitted the secular matters which have been squeezed out from various books and traditions I …”. On p. 154 (40) the author keeps the reading da-hwā, in which case the translation should be ‘that has come’. Otherwise he should have done as W. Wright proposes in The Chronicle of Joshua the Stylite, Syr. text p. 92 n. 2, namely emended to da-hwā. On p. 158 (63) the author has inserted a wa- that is not in the text and translated accordingly. It should be “… nobody at all took care to add to that canon of his (i.e. Eusebius), the times thereafter and the memorable things which took place in them.”

The strength of this dissertation is also its weakness. By keeping strictly to the investigation of Pseudo-Dionysius’ chronicle as it presents itself and with the single aim of describing it as a historiographic work within the history of historiography and relying mostly on his own observations W. has achieved a unity for his own work and an original personal approach to his object of research. The analysis of Pseudo-Dionysius’ personality and mentality is clever and informative. At the same
time, however, by disregarding the literary side of the chronicle, W. has not always been able to distinguish between Pseudo-Dionysius' personal contributions and literary clichés and conventions. However, this study is a fresh and interesting approach to a historiographic work and it will certainly serve as a model as well as the starting point for future studies.

Uppsala

Eva Riad


This volume, altogether containing nearly 700 pages, is an important contribution to the knowledge about the Vedic and Brahmanic ritual. The author died prematurely at the age of 33, and the necessary tasks of publishing her material was undertaken by prof. G. Oberhammer, Krick's instructor in the field of Indian philology. The central theme of this study is the ritual connected with the establishment of the sacrificial fire. Consequently this survey and the resulting discussion are of general importance for all classic and preclassic Indian rituals.

The author aims of defining the preclassic system of rituals and the background of the general Vedic cult of fire. All possible material has been adduced: the Vedic hymns, the Brāhmaṇa texts, some epic material and sūtra texts of which the oldest śrauta sūtra, the Baudhāyaṇa, is adduced with a rather complete translation. This comprehensive collection of material is made accessible through a successful disposition of chapters, with each chapter focusing on various problems in detail. It is thus possible to study how the texts treat many special parts of the ritual, such as the timing of the sacrifice (especially in view of the constellations), the choice of place and priest, the preparatory fasting, the utensils, the lighting and relighting of the fire, the sacrificial gifts and many other concepts recurring in the ritual. A short summary poses both many questions and some provocative suggestions about how to interpret the ritual in the oldest layers. The author's deep knowledge and sound judgment provides a book that offers an excellent point of departure for further discussions on the topic. In spite of a good systematic arrangement, such an extensive amount of material runs the risk of being hard to survey, and we accordingly owe a great gratitude to the editor's ambition to add some comprehensive indices to the work.

Uppsala

Gunilla Gren-Eklund


This book offers us a valuable survey based on modern scholarship and in general provides a comprehensive illustration of Buddhism both in words and pictures. The list of well-known contributors on the front page promises good information and this promise is fulfilled. The intention of the book, to a certain extent, is to present the historical development, but the main emphasis turns out to be the description of the spread of Buddhism in the Asian countries.

Most of the authors stress the functions of the sangha, and there is an evident ambition to describe the integration of the religious aspects in different societies, historically as well as in modern times. The final chapter presents modern Buddhism, its revival in India and Indonesia and how it has reached the modern Western world. By presenting various perspectives in a very coherent and comprehensively informative way this book certainly satisfies a need. It is already being used as a book of reference for students of Buddhism. In this context the appendixed glossary, essential bibliography and index of names and concepts are most valuable.

Uppsala

Gunilla Gren-Eklund

It is with great pleasure one welcomes a volume containing new material from Erich Frauwallner, one of the most skilled and sensible scholars in the field of Indian philosophy. Ten years after his death we can now add some articles to his bibliography, which show his mastery over very difficult material. The present volume contains some of the most complete surveys among Frauwallner’s writing from different periods of his scholarly life. The preface of this volume announces two forthcoming volumes: one containing translations of philosophical texts and another containing selected material from his preliminary work on the third volume of “Geschichte der indischen Philosophie”, viz. about the growth of Hinayāna. These forthcoming volumes anticipate great expectations.

The topics of this volume are mainly concerned with philosophy, especially logic. One exception is the article treating the Buddhist chronicles. It discusses the relations of Dipavamsa, Mahāvamsa and the introduction to Buddhaghosas commentary on Vinayapiṭaka, Samantapāsādikā, and the dependence on different atīkākathā. It is an analysis of the texts rather than a conclusive discussion about their historical value as the title of the article might suggest. This article and the following one, about Vaiśeṣika, exhibit how this darśana initially had no soteriologic scope, are from the 1950s. Two articles about Navanyāya from the 1960s give an easily accessible as well as a very reliable survey of both its history and of the most essential concepts in the new logic.

The greater part of the sketches belongs to the planned forthcoming volumes of Frauwallner’s “Indische Philosophie”. A third volume will comprise the developments and schools of Buddhism and a fourth one mainly the methodological basis for the Indian philosophy, such as the dialectics, the scientific systematics and philosophy of language. This fourth volume will also contain two sections called “Vollendung” and “Nachblüte”, treating individual philosophers within various philosophical systems.

Three longer sketches to this work are presented in the volume of under review, of which two give a very clear picture of the background to the logic in the developed technique of dispute, which was fundamental to the intellectual life of classical India. The survey of the main points of Nyāya, given in the first of the sketches is one of the best to be found. Also of great importance is the third sketch concerning linguistic theory in Nyāya and Mīmāṁśā. Even if this topic, as always, should be further discussed in connection with the grammatical and more specific linguistic-philosophical tradition of India, we nevertheless have a basic introduction to the topic, which can also be recommended to non-specialists. Since all good analytical and informative work on Mīmāṁśā is desirable, it is really regrettable that all of Frauwallner’s profound knowledge about Mīmāṁśā, which comes to the fore in this and two other short sketches, will not be available to the public. The final sketch is an important one, which can be added to Frauwallner’s previous work on Buddhist logicians. It defines what was newly introduced into the Dignāga school by Dharmakīrti.

With this wealth of material this volume is a rich and quite necessary book, and we are pleased that we have the opportunity to study these sketches.

Uppsala

Gunilla Gren-Eklund


The kernel of all Navyanyāya texts is Gaṅgeśa’s Tattvacintāmani. In 1970, E. Frauwallner (in the second part of the article in WZKSO 14 on Raghunātha Siromani) drew attention to the situation of scholarly study of the Navyanyāya. The basic problem is the lack of modern and complete solid editions; firstly of the main Gaṅgeśa-text, and secondly its commentaries, which exist in great numbers. In this volume we recognize that this problem is being amended with the addition of a well qualified edition of Yajñapati’s commentary, Prabhā, to the anumāna-section of Tattvacintāmani.
Yajñapati's commentary also includes the *pratyakṣa*- and the *śabda*-sections, and according to the editor, also a lost commentary on the *upamaṇa*-section, which is not mentioned by B. K. Matilal in his survey of Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika (HIL 6:2, 1977). Yajñapati is one of the foremost scholars on the tradition of Navyanyāya and since he became quite a disputed interpreter of Gaṅgeśa, his views, with or without approval, occur frequently in the following debate. This situation has in fact also given the editor of the text some valuable help. With access to the sole extant manuscript the editor has also had the possibility, of which he has also made use, to exploit the later commentaries on the main text. In this case the editor has also had to resort to reading of manuscripts not yet edited. Some information on these manuscripts could have been included in the account on p. 18 of which the text is based on. It is, moreover, not clear if the editor has examined the main manuscript throughout or if he has followed the existing transcript copy.

As long as a complete translation of the text is lacking, the analysis of the contents of the text on pp. 19–50 is of greatest value for the usefulness of the text. It might even be claimed that for the investigation of the philosophy we are offered an unbiased auxiliary which is not so certain in the case of a translation.

The text with the apparatus on readings of the text by authors quoting Yajñapati and MS. readings corrected by the editor is very clear and legible. The *pratikas* are marked by spaced-out letters. In general we are indebted to the editor and to the Vienna Institute of Indology for their incessant efforts to give us additional background to the study of the Navyanyāya.

Uppsala

*Gunilla Gren-Eklund*


Annali della facolta’ di lingue e letterature straniere di Ca’ Foscari. Bulzoni. Roma 1981. 20:3. (Serie orientale, 12.)


Gren-Eklund, Gunilla: The survival of a hypothesis: Sanskrit evi and Latin gen. sg. -i
Harvinainen, Tapani: On Vowel Reduction in Hebrew
Håkansson, Lennart: Textkritisches zu Seneca Maior
Isaksson, Bo: Concerning Two Arguments of H. Bauer for a Priority of the So-called Imperfect (the "Aorist")
Jarring, Gunnar: Ramazan Poetry from Charkan
Johanson, Lars: Zur Konsonantenstärkung im Türkischen
Karlsö, Gustaf: Eine Insel im Marmarameer. Ein Brief des Ignatius Diaconus
Keerthi De, Hadi M.: De la radicale "R" dans les racines trilitères arabes
Knudsen, Ebbe Egede: Innovation in the Akkadian Present
Kronholm, Tryggve: Akbaranâ jaddi. Preliminary observations on the dependence of Sibt ibn al-Jauzi in his Kitâb al-Jalis as-šâlih wal-anâsh an-nâsh on the works of his grandfather
Lodhi, Abdulaziz Y.: The Status of Arabic in East Africa
Løkkegaard, Fride: 'ašrê hâ-'îš. A Morphological and Etymological Essay
Macuch, Rudolf: Hermeneutische Akrobatik aufgrund phonetischen Lautwandels in aramäischen Dialekten
Mantel-Nicke, Joanna: Some Thoughts on the Role of the Contemporary Philologist. Based on the Experience of an Ethiopian Philologist
Palea, Heikki: Characteristics of the Arabic Dialect of the Hwêtât Tribe
Pedersén, Olof: The Reading of the Neo-Assyrian Logogram U.U.
Philomenko, Marc: Sur une interpolation essénisante dans le Siracide (16, 15-16)
Polotsky, H. J.: Neusyrische Konjugation
Prasse, Karl-G.: The Values of the Tenses in Tuarag (Berber)
Retså, Jan: State, Determination and Definiteness in Arabic. A Reconsideration
Riad, Ewa: verb 'to sit' and 'to jump', qâf 'to pull together' and 'to jump'
Rosén, Haim B.: On Some Nominal Morphological Categories in Biblical Hebrew
Rosén, Staffan: A Note on Korean kus 'exorcism'
Schall, Anton: Coranica
Sellheim, Rudolf: "Familiennamen" im islamischen Mittelalter. Eine Skizze
Simonsen, Nils: A Note on the Knowledge of Indian Grammar Among the Tibetan Translators of the Ninth Century
Sköld, Tryggve: Finnish viha 'Hatred' and Its Indo-Iranian Background
Spuler, Bertold: Les Iraniens et le gouvernement des Arabes au début de la domination de l'Islam
Stedlund, Gerhard: Notes on bar nash and the Detrimental Effects of Its Transformation into the Title "The Son of Man"
Söderlind, Johannes: James Joyce and the Linguistic Theories of His Time
Toll, Christopher: Zur Bedeutung des aramäischen Ausdruckes bar nâš
Utas, Bo: Did 'Ahdra remain a virgin?
Versteegh, Kees: Word Order in Uzbekistan Arabic and Universal Grammar
Vitessam, Gösta: Sîr.—A Lexicographical Essay on a Word with Various Nuances in Arabic and Islam
Waldén, Ruth: Reflections on the Tamil Alphabet. III–IV
Wickman, Bo: Old Hungarian from Arabic Sources
Widdgren, Geo: Aramäische et Syriaca II
Witakowski, Witold: Chronicles of Edessa
Wångstedt, Sten V.: Verrichtung von Tempeldienst und Zuteilung von Gerste (?) wegen Misswuchses
Zaborski, Andrzej: A Note on Cushitic Demonstrative Pronouns
Contents

Brunsch, Wolfgang: Zwei demotische Texte aus Hamburg .................. 5
Vitestam, Gösta: Στύραξ and nę. An Etymological Study .................. 29
Eilers, Wilhelm: Zu Resch als Wurzeldeterminativ (r-) .................... 39
Kronholm, Tryggve: Damm al-hawā: Ibn al-Jauzi's Treatise against Passion 47
Rundgren, Frithiof: Aspectology in the Light of Text Linguistics .......... 57
Rundgren, Frithiof: Some Remarks on the Katābā da- ʾal idaʾītā da-šrārā 77
Rundgren, Frithiof: Odor suavitatis ............................................. 85
Edsman, Carl-Martin: Réponse ...................................................... 99
Baitchura, Uzbek: An Overview of the Altaic Vocalism with Regard to Some General Laws of Language Development .................. 101
Rausing, Gad: Soma ................................................................. 125
Waldén, Ruth: Notes on Tamil Phonology ..................................... 127
Book Reviews: ............................................................................ 135
Works Received ................................................................. 143

Almqvist & Wiksell International
Stockholm Sweden

ISBN 91-22-01308-3