Bridging the Humanitarian-Development Divide

Indonesian-Swedish Stakeholder Case Studies on LRRD

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Abstract

This thesis studies the concept of Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD), a topic discussed since the late 1980’s that has failed to be practically implemented, partly because of widely divergent perspectives on the concept. The discourse on LRRD has so far largely been conducted in a top-down fashion with donors constituting the dominant interlocutor, while the perspectives of aid organisations and local communities involved in humanitarian and developmental programmes have been widely overlooked. This thesis thus means to bring clarity to how LRRD is conceptualised by different stakeholders through proposing a comprehensive conceptual framework based from literature, which is used to analyse empirical case studies at the local, national, and international levels. The case studies were conducted in Indonesia and Sweden through interviews with 16 participants and a survey with 20 beneficiaries as respondents. The participants included: beneficiaries at a tsunami post-disaster site, local community leaders, a local level NGO, two national level Indonesia NGOs (MDMC and YEU), and an INGO (Plan International).

The research reveal that none of the cases experienced as rigid divide between humanitarian and development action as is often suggested in the literature discourse and through donor policies. All interviewed NGOs expressed that they operated in a way that does create strong humanitarian-developmental linkages and that the major obstacle to achieve this is external pressures, particularly from donor agencies, to operate under exclusively humanitarian or developmental imperatives.
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Acronyms

BNPB - Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana
CDRM&CDS - Center for Disaster Risk Management and Community Development Studies
CFK - Cipta Fondasi Komunitas
DRR - Disaster Risk Reduction
GKBM - Gereja Kristen Protestan Di Mentawai
HFI - Humanitarian Forum Indonesia
ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross
IOM - International Organisation for Migration
IFRC - International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
INGO - International Non-Governmental Organisation
LRRD - Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
MDMC - Muhammadiyah Disaster Management Center
MSF - Médecins Sans Frontières
NGO - Non-Governmental Organisation
TEC - Tsunami Evaluation Committee
UNICEF - (Originally) United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund, (since 1953 United Nations Children's Fund, while keeping original acronym)
UNWCDRR - United Nations World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction
UNDP - United Nations Development Programme
YAKKUM - Yayasan Kristen untuk Kesehatan Umum
YEU - YAKKUM Emergency Unit
WHO - World Health Organisation
WHS - World Humanitarian Summit
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1. Introduction

1.1 Background

During the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) in 2016, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon advocated for linking the humanitarian sector’s work to the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals, as well as urging development actors to address root-causes to humanitarian need:

“Humanitarian actors need to move beyond repeatedly carrying out short-term interventions year after year towards contributing to the achievement of longer-term development results. Development actors will need to plan and act with greater urgency to tackle people’s vulnerability, inequality and risk as they pursue the Sustainable Development Goals.” (Ban, 2016: 32)

Attention was thus rekindled to “Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development” (LRRD), a heavily debated topic over the last three decades. Interlinked with these debates, we also find re-evaluations of humanitarian and development actors’ role and the functioning of their mandates. Humanitarian organisations have been deemed as being in a critical state of crises due to lacking adaptability to modern world contexts (ODI, 2016).

Bennett (2016) argued that these problems partly stem from the humanitarian system’s overly “exceptionalist” endeavour of safeguarding the humanitarian
principles\(^1\) of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence\(^2\), while failing to integrate relevant actors and actions to address humanitarian need in both a short- and long-term perspective.

The basic assumption underlying the LRRD debate is that short- and long-term needs are innately interconnected through complex structures of vulnerabilities and should be addressed as such to achieve effective outcomes (Otto and Weingärtner 2013).

Short-term relief has long been discussed as possessing irrevocable long-term consequences, humanitarian actors therefore cannot dislodge themselves from the long-term effects of their actions (Anderson 1994), resulting in the now largely mainstreamed “do no harm principle” (Anderson 1999). While the issue of accountability to long-term negative impacts have been accepted, the question if humanitarian actors should address root-causes for humanitarian need remains unanswered (Audet, 2015).

Most available literature on LRRD is based on a theoretical-strategic perspective, the view from other stakeholders remains understudied. Aid organisations

\(^1\)It has been suggested that the term “humanitarian principles” should be used to denote the principles nation states are bound to by International Humanitarian Law during armed conflict, and that instead the term used for humanitarian actors’ principles should be “the principles of humanitarian action” (Collinson and Elhawary, 2012). However, most commonly the term “humanitarian principles” is used in denotation of the four listed principles for humanitarian actors, and will be used thusly in this thesis (UNOCHA, 2012).

\(^2\)The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has described the fundamental humanitarian principles as follows; “Humanity- Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found. The purpose of humanitarian action is to protect life and health and ensure respect for human beings. Neutrality- Humanitarian actors must not take sides in hostilities or engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature. Impartiality- Humanitarian action must be carried out on the basis of need alone, giving priority to the most urgent cases of distress and making no distinctions on the basis of nationality, race, gender, religious belief, class or political opinions. Independence: Humanitarian action must be autonomous from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented.” (ICRC, 2015).
implementing humanitarian- and development actions have largely been excluded from the conceptualisation of LRRD; what the concept is to entail and how it is to be practiced. Particularly the perspectives of stakeholders at the local field level, have so far had little influence on the LRRD debate.

This thesis thus means to contribute to the LRRD debate by providing an analysis of how perspectives differ between stakeholders at different levels. A comprehensive literature analysis of academic and donor-agency conceptual discourse is used to synthesise a framework to apply to the empirically studied cases. These cases will analyse different stakeholders’ perspectives on the humanitarian-development divide and LRRD; from beneficiaries on an isolated island outside of Sumatra, to an INGO-office in Sweden working under an international mandate.

1.2. Purpose

The purpose of this thesis is to provide an analysis of different stakeholders’ perspectives on the divisions and linkages of humanitarian and development action. Moreover, the thesis means to compare these perspectives against the conceptual discourse from academic literature and donor-formulated policies on LRRD.

It is worth emphasising that the purpose of this thesis is not to make an evaluation of how well the studied cases have performed regarding the LRRD concept. This would require a different methodological approach than what is utilised in this thesis.
1.3. Research question

The overarching research question for this thesis is as follows:

*How does the researched stakeholders view the divisions and linkages of humanitarian- and development action?*

1.4. Thesis outline

The thesis is divided into six chapters:

*The first chapter* outlines an introductory background to the topic of the thesis, the purpose of the conducted research, the research question, this outline description, the fundamental theoretical perspectives on the humanitarian sector, the research methods, the factors affecting validity and reliability of the data, ethical considerations, limitations, a description of the selection of cases, a comprehensive review of previous research which will highlight the shifting *focuses* and *gaps* in the research, and the justifications for research.

*The second chapter* analyses in detail *how* academic literature and donor policy documents have conceptualised LRRD. From this analysis, a comprehensive conceptual framework of LRRD is proposed which will be utilised in the analyses of the subsequent chapters.

*The third chapter* presents, analyses and discusses the collected data from the local stakeholder level.

*The fourth chapter* presents, analyses and discusses the cases at the national stakeholder level.

*The fifth chapter* presents, analyses and discusses the cases at the international stakeholder level.

*The sixth chapter* creates a summary of the conclusions from the three stakeholder level. Based on the findings recommendations are made for policy makers and future researchers.
1.5. Theoretical perspective on the “humanitarian sector”

In this chapter two theoretical perspectives on the “humanitarian sector” will be presented. These perspective will be used as a fundamental analytical framework throughout the thesis for the understanding of divergent perspectives on humanitarian action. The two perspectives will be understood through the lens of sociological theoretical paradigms.

1.5.1 The Humanitarian Silo perspective

The classical, “exceptionalistic” view on the humanitarian sector mentioned in the introduction is described by Bennett (2016:49) as characterised by a belief that humanitarian actions are: “[...]distinct from other forms of aid, and something that only humanitarians can do and understand.”

Humanitarian actors are often accused of adopting this type of “silo-mentality”; a term borrowed from organisational theory denoting a conscious or unconscious habit of disregarding other actors or regarding them as obstacles to be avoided (Cilliers and Greyvenstein, 2011). For usage in this thesis I will refer to this as the “Humanitarian Silo perspective”.

1.5.2 The Humanitarian Ecosystem perspective

A terminology that has gained increasing popularity, particularly in connection with the WHS, is that of the “Humanitarian Ecosystem”, used in lieu of the old term “Humanitarian System”. By metaphorically regarding the humanitarian sector as an “ecosystem”, the term acknowledges the pluralistic organisational structures with a broad spectrum of mandates, some strictly humanitarian such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, but also dual- and multi-mandated organisations which act both under humanitarian and development mandates.
This perspective constitutes a dynamic change; arguing that humanitarian actions are not to be considered as belonging to a precisely framed “humanitarian sector”; independently working around governments, nation states, military, as well as other actors in the aid sector (Macrae 2012)(Bennett, 2016). Instead, the thesis adopts what I will refer to as "the Humanitarian Ecosystem perspective" - Within this perspective, humanitarian actions are to be regarded as belonging to a multitude of complex systems involving all forms of humanitarian need and all contexts in which they are responded to.

1.5.3 Comparison to sociological paradigms

Meta-theories of the study of organisational structures have often been described through applied parallels to major sociological paradigms' views on social organisations (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). The Humanitarian Silo perspective incorporates aspects which can be compared to a classical sociological structural functionalist perspective, viewing social organisations from a macro-perspective with clearly defined functions, purposes, and interacting with its social environment in a precisely engineered fashion (Jones, 2007). This perspective also sees the categories “humanitarian” and “developmental” as objective “social facts”.

In contrast, the Humanitarian Ecosystem perspective implies instead a view on social organisations more in common with interactionism; regarding organisations involved in humanitarian action as exhibiting heteronomous functions, which not necessarily fits into a minutely designed machinery (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Another similarity to interactionism is the view on the categories “humanitarian” and “development”, which are seen as subjective social constructs. The Humanitarian Ecosystem perspective thus adopts a more micro-level approach for the understanding of humanitarian action and the pluralistic nature involved in its implementation.
1.6. Method

The research is conducted mainly through qualitative analyses of stakeholders’ conceptualisations of LRRD, which includes both a comprehensive analysis of how the concept has been framed in literature on the subject and empirical case studies.

The analysis of literature primarily includes academic publications, but also white-papers and grey-literature from donor agencies and aid organisations. Based on the analysis of literature, a theoretical framework for perspectives on LRRD is synthesised and later applied for the analysis of the empirically collected data.

Empirical research was conducted in Indonesia and Sweden with the purpose of providing analysis of cases of stakeholders’ perspectives at the local, national, and international levels.

The local level received particular attention since it has been largely overlooked in previous research. The case studies at the local level incorporate two categories of stakeholders: a local NGO, and community members.

The empirical case studies on organisational perspectives were conducted through in-depth interviews with NGO-officials, the majority of which were officials at senior level positions, and can thus be considered valid representatives of their respective organisations.

For the more in-depth study of the local-level, the organisation Cipta Fondasi Komunitas (CFK) was studied through two separate interviews with senior officials as well as through an additionally pair-interview with two junior-level officials, both of whom worked full time at field-level. This was to detect if there were changes in perceptions between the organisation’s higher and lower levels of staff. The junior-level staff were also native residents to Sikakap and therefore deemed to have a

3By “local NGO” I denote that the NGO does not operate with a national mandate. The chosen organisation at the time only operated at the local context, but had previously conducted programmes on the island of Sumatra.
stronger local perspective, whereas the two senior staff officials neither were natives to Sikakap nor worked locally, as they based their work from the city of Medan on Sumatra.

With consideration to the differing contexts of the researched stakeholder levels, the tools of data collection were adapted to increase the quality of the collected data. Overall, the used methodology had an emphasis on qualitative data collection, however a complementary survey was conducted in order to provide quantitative support for the perceptions of beneficiaries.

1.6.1 In-depth interviews

The main tool used for empirical data collection was in-depth semi-structured interviews, the benefit of which including that it enables the researcher to both draw deductive conclusions based on the research questions as well as to make inductive discoveries by allowing the participants to add own information through the answering of open ended questions. Moreover, participants were given the opportunity to elaborate with information they deemed relevant but that the research had failed to expect. This methodology thus has the potential of illuminating the unknown unknowns (Bernard 2006). Taking the complex and multi-variable operational contexts of humanitarian and developmental actors into consideration, there is an increased relevance to conduct research with an inductive, open-ended manner.

The conducted interviews lasted between thirty minutes and two hours. Some of the interviews were performed with participants on a one-on-one basis, while some were performed in pairs based on participants’ availability and comfort.

Some participants preferred having the interview conducted together with a colleague, this setup was an effective way of building rapport between the interviewer and participants, since it contributed to a more comfortable interview
setting for the participants as they could get support from each other’s experiences in answering complex questions, which is essential for quality data gathering in interviews (Bailey, 2006a). in this way, the pair-interviews had some of the qualities of a focus group discussion.

The participants’ way of responding questions indicated that the participants in pair-interviews acted as representatives of their organisations; indicated by how they rarely showed any disagreement with each other but instead expressed how they viewed the standpoint of the organisation which they both represented. This was a positive side-effect, since the purpose of the interviews with NGO-officials was for them to express the views of their organisations rather than personal opinions.

When the colleagues were of different management levels it was mostly the official in the more senior-position who was the most active responding to questions, but let the second participating official respond when he or she had more experience in that particular question.

The majority of the interviewed participants were proficient in English. In the case study at Sikakap, I received interpretational help from able CFK-staff members for the interviews with the sub-village leader, the kindergarten principal, the two local staff members of CFK, and the two local community members.

1.6.2 Survey

Due to limitations in time and resources, a complementary conduction of a survey was chosen as a time-effective research tool to increase the qualitative data collected from the two interviews with beneficiaries, as well as the reliability concerning their perspectives.

The need for the survey was based on that the two beneficiaries participating in the interviews were randomly selected and therefore were not necessarily representative of the overall perspective of local beneficiaries; whereas the interviewed NGO-officials and community leaders held professional representative
positions at their respective organisations. Therefore, the data from these interviews may be regarded as possessing both validity and reliability without the need of surveys.

The survey was designed to primarily gather quantitative data through close ended questions, which were supplemented with open ended questions providing the possibility to elaborate and supply qualitative data. The survey was written by myself in English and translated into Bahasa Indonesian by a CFK staff-member. Three CFK staff members assisted in filling out the form and explaining the questions to participants, one of whom spoke the local dialect of the local language; Bahasa Mentawai, which proved crucial since several community members had limited knowledge of Bahasa Indonesia and several were not literate.

The entire survey form in both its English and Bahasa Indonesian versions can be found in Appendix I and II.

The survey was performed during mid-day in the sub-village of Bulakmonga, which was chosen on the premise of the relocation of the majority of its community members after the tsunami struck in 2010. Women were overrepresented as respondents due to the fact that most men worked in agricultural fields during this time of day and were therefore not present in the sub-village when the survey was conducted. A total of 20 participants responded to the survey, which can be considered a representative amount considering that Bulakmonga has less than 100 inhabitants and the high degree of similarity of data provided by the 20 respondents.

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4 Sub-villages are official administrative division in Indonesia. Villages, Desa, can consist of far outspread housing with large distances between settlements, in the case of Sikakap, the extent of the village is located even on two different islands, Palau Pagai-utara and Palau Pagai-selatan. Sikakap’s many sub-villages have several hours travel distance between them and could therefore be compared to a more traditional European view of individual villages.
1.6.3 Qualitative Analysis method

The data gathered through interviews is analysed through a qualitative thematic analysis. The participants’ answers are coded according to a prepared set of themes and subthemes, based on the prepared questions. Since the interviews were conducted in a semi-structured fashion, the participants were allowed to elaborate in a relatively free manner and would hence often jump between the probed themes.

For most interviews, it was possible to make a digital voice recording which constitutes the basis for the subsequent analysis. Due to the volume of the collected data and the limited timeframe for this thesis, as well as in consultation with my thesis supervisor, full transcriptions of the interviews are not made. Instead, the interviews were analysed to identify relevant data for the research questions, quotes were transcribed and notes of minute and second position in the recording were noted. The resulting data was assorted to the prepared themes and subthemes.

1.7 Validity and reliability

The validity and reliability of the results of the empirical case studies of this thesis should be evaluated with consideration to the relationship between myself as the academic researcher, and the interviewed participants.

It has long been established that the researcher inevitably has an influence on the collected data in all social studies (Bernard, 2006); moreover, just the fact that the participants consciously are part of a study affect the results, something that is often referred to as the Hawthorne effect. The term was coined in 1958 when analysing previously collected data regarding factory workers’ performance under varying physical conditions (Fernald et al., 2012).

Moreover, other factors affecting the validity and reliability of the empirical studies worth considering are as follow:

Firstly, my role as a student writing a thesis on LRRD is likely to lead to participants
wishing to present their organisation in a positive light regarding implementation of LRRD strategies. However, after conducting the interviews, I did not receive any indication of this. When presenting the topic of my thesis I did my best to express a neutral stance towards LRRD as a concept. I avoided questions that would imply that LRRD is either positive or negative, such as "Have you managed to apply LRRD strategies?", which would imply that this is something the organisation should have done.

Secondly, all the participants except for three were Indonesians. As a foreigner, I was generally treated in a highly favourable manner; most participants were very friendly and curious about me as a person. This was an overwhelmingly positive aspect since I was well received and all participants were very accommodating in their participation and practical arrangements. However, the participants also likely acted and responded differently to the questions posed in comparison to if I had belonged to their social group and talked their native languages. For interviews conducted using interpreters, the validity might be seen as affected by the fact that the CFK staff members who supported me for this were not professional interpreters, which could affect the validity as some of the content might be lost in translation.

Lastly, in the case of Plan International Sweden, I possessed personal experience from my undertaking of a four-month internship at the organisation when I conducted the interviews. The contacts made during the internship as well as the understanding of the organisation proved highly valuable for conducting the case study, however as having a professional experience working for the organisation, I could be regarded as having a non-neutral stance to the organisation and the interviewed participants. Thus, when conducting the interviews as well as during the analysis of the study I have done my utmost to be as unbiased and objective as possible.
1.8. Ethical considerations

Qualitative research, with its open ended and often personal nature, has an increased need to adhere to standards of ethical principles and general considerations of possible ethical repercussions caused by the conducted research (Bailey, 2016b). Different ethical standards have been formulated in modern academia, the most adherent being the Belmont Report publication on “Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research” (Weindling, 2001).

1.8.1. Ethical considerations in interviews with NGO-officials and community leaders

Since the questions in the interviews pertained to subjects related to the participants, their profession and associated organisations, with no questions regarding the participants’ personal life, there were no particular ethical considerations regarding these interviews.

In the case of one interview, the participant brought up incidents of severe violence that she and her colleagues had been exposed to. Since this personal traumatic experience was not directly relevant for the thesis’ research questions, in my role as researcher I avoided follow-up questions on the topic out of ethical consideration.

Moreover, the participants were informed that they would be treated with anonymity in the thesis, but that their professional positions would be stated since this information is deemed relevant for the assessment of the collected data’s reliability. They were also beforehand informed about the possibility of their stated professional position and other information presented in the thesis could be used to identify their respective identities.
1.8.2. Ethical considerations in interviews and survey with community members and beneficiaries

Since the participants were survivors of a natural disaster which had caused severe destruction to their community, the topic of the disaster was considered sensitive. In the interviews the participants were asked if they had been directly affected by the tsunami and which aid organisations they had received relief from, in order to determine if they could be considered beneficiaries. The questions asked in the interviews and survey were however of a general nature and did not ask detailed questions of a personal nature, such as how exactly the participants personally had been affected or if they had causalities within the family, as this information was not deemed relevant in regard to the research question and was omitted for ethical considerations.

When asked to partake in either interview or survey, prospective participants were informed that these were to be fully voluntary and anonymous, in accordance to ethical standards.

1.9. Limitation

This thesis aims to provide insights to interconnected stakeholders in the humanitarian- and development sectors based in Indonesia and Sweden. When comparing the results through the perspective of other empirical and theoretical studies, the thesis is limited to the cases ascribed. The cases should moreover not be interpreted as representative for the entire sector nor for their stakeholder-level. Especially the local-level case studies in Sikakap should only be regarded as belonging to this one specific context and not as representative for Indonesia as a whole, or other Indonesian local-level contexts.

Language was a barrier, had I known the national language; Bahasa Indonesian, there would likely have been many more opportunities to conduct field research by being able to perform interviews with non-English speakers without the need for an interpreter.
1.10 Selection of cases

The empirical research in Indonesia aimed at gathering data of multi-level perspectives from humanitarian and development sectoral stakeholders. The key contact enabling most of the continued research was Plan International Indonesia, which I in turn came in contact with through Plan International Sweden, where I was to perform an internship after the period of research in Indonesia had been concluded.

Plan International Indonesia acted as “gatekeeper” for gaining access to prospective participants from Indonesian NGOs, in accordance to the “snowball method” of sampling participants (Ritchie et al., 2003), whereas CFK acted as gatekeeper at the local level for access to community members as participants and respondents to the survey.

The targeting of prospective participants was carried out in accordance with a pre-established set of requisite characteristics for each needed level, further described below.

1.10.1. International Level NGO:

**Requisite**: An INGO -national office within an international strategic and financial decision making mandate.

**Chosen office**: *Plan International Sweden*. The study of the organisation included two separate interviews: one with the head of the Disaster Management Unit, and one with the National Programme Director.

**Requisite**: Country office for an INGO involved in disaster response with either humanitarian focus, development focus, or both.

**Chosen INGO**: *Plan International Indonesia*. The study of the organisation included an interview with senior staff members; the Deputy Country Director and a Senior Programme Manager.
1.10.2. National Level NGO:

**Requisite**: two National NGOs involved in disaster response with either humanitarian focus, development focus, or both.

Taking into consideration Indonesia’s cultural context of a strong emphasis on religious activities and belonging, a Muslim, respectively a Christian faith-based NGO were deliberately chosen; representing the two largest religions among the six religions recognized by the national government of Indonesia (Yang, 2005). The chosen Muslim faith-based NGO was *Muhammadiyah Disaster Management Center (MDMC)*. The chosen Christian faith-based NGO was *YAKKUM Emergency Unit (YEU)*. The study of YEU included an interview with two of the organisation’s senior staff. The study of MDMC included an interview with one of the organisation’s senior staff.

1.10.3. Local level: Sikakap tsunami post-disaster stakeholder perspectives

A post-disaster site was chosen for more in-depth research of local stakeholders relevant for the purpose of the study. The case of Sikakap village was chosen for more in-depth research since it exemplifies a disaster context where an emergent disaster relief was followed by rehabilitation and development. CFK became the focal point in this study due to their presence throughout all of these stages and still ongoing operations in the context.

The chosen local stakeholders were as follows:

**Requisite**: A local NGO involved in disaster response and staying in lieu for longer term rehabilitation and development work.

**Chosen organisation**: *Cipta Fondasi Komunitas (CFK)*. The study of the organisation included two separate interviews with two of the organisation’s senior staff and one pair-interview with two program managers who were local residents to Sikakap.
**Requisite:** A *political leader* holding this position at the time and place of the tsunami.

**Chosen participant:** The sub-village leader of Bulakmonga, where most of the populations had been relocated, and with a heavy involvement from aid organisations.

**Requisite:** A *religious leader* holding this position at the time and place of the tsunami.

**Chosen participant:** A Christian priest working and still active in one of the sub-villages directly affected by the tsunami.  

**Requisite:** A *social leader* with personal experience from the disaster and involved with organisations providing disaster relief.

**Chosen participant:** The Principal of a kindergarten in a disaster affected area and coordinator of a network of kindergartens.

**Requisite:** *Beneficiaries* of disaster relief and development aid.

**Chosen participants:** Two community members for participation in two separate in-depth interviews. Twenty community members were part of the survey.

### 1.11. Previous research on LRRD

This chapter outlines the shifting focuses of the major publications on LRRD. This literature review will be relatively extensive in its effort to provide a foundational overview of the themes in the academic discourse as well as to identify gaps in previous research. This serves as a precursor for the later detailed analysis of how LRRD has been conceptualised.

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5 According to CFK, the majority of the population of Sikakap are Christians. Originally I also aimed at interviewing a Muslim religious leader, however my visit to Sikakap coincided with the week leading up to the Muslim festival Eid al-Adha and the leaders responded to my invitation of participation with that they were busy with preparations.
Despite the longevity of the debate concerning LRRD, available literature remains relatively limited in consideration to the complexity of the concept and the profound consequences LRRD entails for both the humanitarian and development sectors. The literature has mostly taken the form of conceptual theory, case studies focusing on the national level, case studies on responses to specific disasters, and research on financial issues of LRRD; as well as both general and specific case studies of donor agencies’ management of LRRD.

1.11.1. Literature on conceptual theory of LRRD

Research on LRRD largely consists of constructive analysis, discussing how LRRD could be designed, often with distinct normative undertones. Notable, frequently referenced, conceptual academic literature includes: Longhurst (1994), Sollis (1994), Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell (1994), Anderson (1994), White and Cliffe (2000), Slim (2000), Harmer and Macrae (2004), Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri (2005), Suhrke and Ofstad (2005), and Mosel and Levine (2014). The main contributions of these authors will be included in chapter 2.

Otto and Weingärtner (2013) provided one of the most up-to-date and comprehensive studies of LRRD which is of particular usage for this thesis since it is both overall conceptual and also incorporates perspectives and aspects relevant to a multitude of different stakeholders, from donors and policy-makers to field staff. The purpose of this thesis is however more focused in its aim at highlighted conceptual differences.

1.11.2. Literature on National contexts

Literature on LRRD tends to be predominantly theoretical and to focus on the strategic/policy-level. However, there are exceptions; during the 1990’s, the theoretical LRRD debate was complemented with empirical case studies largely focused on the national level as the subject of analysis. These included Maxwell and Lirenso (1994) on LRRD in the Ethiopian context, Eele and Luhila (1994) on
the Zambian context, Buchanan-Smith and Tiogelang (1994) on the context of Botswana, Green and Mavie (1994) on the context of Mozambique, and Mugwara (1994) on context of the 10 member states of the regional organisation Southern African Development Community. The studies had a narrow perspective on LRRD and mostly focused on linking food-relief with improving livelihood opportunities through work-for-food programmes. Hyder (1996) made a similar case study on LRRD thinking in work-for-food programmes conducted in the aftermath of the major cyclone in south eastern Bangladesh in April 1991.

All of these studies were based on a conceptualisation of LRRD by Longhurst (1994) and Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell (1994); in which there was a strong emphasis on the government's role in implementing LRRD strategies. These case studies were thus largely concerned with determining the potential for state governments to successfully apply LRRD strategies, with success or failure depending on domestic efforts and unrelated to the actions of foreign aid providers. This line of analysis can be regarded as means of diverting accountability away from Western actors and express little faith on domestic as well as international civil society actors. The case studies nevertheless provided a contextual dimension analysis of national political and economical in the era in which they were published; a dimension that has been less prioritised in the last 20 years of the debate.

The articles are mostly angled at the appropriateness of their conceptualisation of LRRD in the local and national contexts. Maxwell and Lirenso (1994), following the perspective of LRRD-manifestation through governmental programming, largely dismissed the possibilities of implementing effective LRRD in Ethiopia due to governmental corruption and weak state capacities. Opposingly, Buchanan-Smith and Tiogelang (1994), in their analysis of the national context of Botswana, praised

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6 At the time of publication of the study these states were: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

7 Ee and Luhila (1994) being one exception, their analysis made quite positive conclusions regarding civil society actors potential in the Zambian context.
the LRRD potential of this country based on effective government and lack of domestic armed conflict. These authors analyse LRRD potential through a narrow perspective, largely limited to being government-centered and heavily focused on LRRD in terms of only two sectors: food security and livelihood, disregarding many vital sectors such as health, security, and education. The articles take a clear developmentalist perspective, focusing on development in economic terms and failing to address the complexity of humanitarian needs and the profound implications of the humanitarian principles. Even the word "humanitarian" is omitted completely in most of these articles and instead the word “relief” is used. This is not unlikely an attempt of circumventing the immensely complex topic of adapting developmental programming for adherence to the humanitarian principles. Maxwell and Lirenso (1994) does mention "institutional differences" between the “relief” and “development” sectors as an obstacle in implementing LRRD, but fails to address these differences in any detail.

1.1.1.3. Literature on LRRD in disaster-specific cases

Since the 1990’s, empirically based case studies in research of LRRD has mostly taken the form of cases studies of responses to specific disasters. These studies are relatively small in number but highly comprehensive and detailed.

Shortly after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, a group of aid agencies set up the Tsunami Evaluation Committee (TEC), which was to serve under a multi-sectoral evaluation mandate, and with one of its main tasks being the undertaking of joint academic-practitioner evaluations of the tsunami-response in regard to LRRD (ALNAP, n.d.). Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri (2005) formulated a broad conceptualisation of LRRD for the subsequent analysis of the tsunami-response, in which LRRD was seen as a concept to be applied to all contexts in which

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8 Elee and Luhila (1994) do use the word “humanitarian” but do not mention the humanitarian principles.
consolidation of long-term- and short-term aid is relevant.

In the main study published by TEC, Christoplos (2006), provides a highly detailed analysis of an extensive number of aspects of LRRD, both conceptual and context specific to the Indian Ocean Tsunami response. The study remains one of the most cited in the LRRD debate and many of its conclusions provide valuable references for this thesis.

Although Christoplos (2006) included conceptual conclusions based on interviews with practitioners, organisations and local community members in three empirical studies, these however differed distinctly in purpose from this thesis in that they did not focus on differences in conceptualisations of humanitarian actions, development actions, and LRRD between the interviewed organisations and other stakeholders. Indeed, Christoplos (2006) highlighted that it was problematic to compare the data collected from cases since the different participants had differing conceptual perspectives (Christoplos, 2006:18). Therefore, this thesis contributes by filling a void in the field of research concerning LRRD.

Shütte and Kreutzmann (2011) made an analysis on the disaster response in Pakistan-administered Kashmir after the earthquake 2005. This analysis focused on contexts and results of the response, with very limited conceptual elements. This analysis however proved relevant in relation to one of the Interviews with staff from Plan International Sweden, since the participant discussed this disaster in the context of LRRD.

1.11.4. Literature on LRRD in relation to funding and donor issues

The perspective on LRRD that has become the most clearly formulated and researched is the perspective of donor agencies and conceptual funding/donor-strategies; both through academic studies and through grey literature and white papers published by donor agencies, donor states and intergovernmental organisations. Detailed academic studies on these issues include: Harmer and Macrae (2004)
which analysed financial institutions’ approach to LRRD in cases of protracted crisis; Koddenbrock (2009) which focused on the approaches of the European Commission and the USA; Steets (2009), which analysed donor LRRD strategies in general, and Mosel and Levine (2014) which both analysed LRRD at a broad conceptual level and researched donor strategies focusing on a tool called Transitional Development Assistance, developed by The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ).

1.11.5 Literature on aid organisations in relations to LRRD

There have been few empirical studies conducted with a focus on aid organisations. Walker (1994) provided a short analysis of the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) in terms of how well they performed on the early iteration of LRRD, as conceptualised by Longhurst (1994), and Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell (1994). Despite the insinuation of the article title’s claim to focus on the IFRC’s perspective, the article does not include any trace of the IFRC’s stance towards LRRD and, similarly to other authors of this phase of the LRRD debate, manages to entirely avoid issues regarding the harmonising of links to development with the humanitarian principles, an issue which is seemingly axiomatic to include in connection with an organisation so strongly associated to the Dunantist principles\(^9\) as the IFRC.

Macrae and Bradbury (1998) provided an in-depth study of UNICEF’s LRRD programming strategies in what they call “twilight zones”; i.e. contexts in a transitional phase from what is traditionally regarded as humanitarian relief to a phase of “normality”. The study contains interviews with staff from both headquarters level and at field level\(^10\) and provides an in-depth analysis of how UNICEF approach LRRD at both a conceptual and operational level.

\(^9\) The “classical” humanitarianism, as conceptualised by Red Cross founder Henri Dunant, places a particular emphasis on strict neutrality towards belligerent parties for operation in conflict settings (Gordon and Donini, 2015).

\(^10\) Focusing on Rwanda and Uganda, but also includes the contexts of Somalia and Sudan.
Janse and Flier (2014), made a thorough analysis on Cordaid in the disaster response and reconstruction efforts of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti focusing on their shelter strategy. The authors provided in-depth analysis of the efficiency and effectivity of specific tools in terms of LRRD, which is a level of analysis otherwise largely overlooked in the debate (Otto and Weingärtner, 2013).

1.12 Justification for Research and Relevance to the humanitarian field

From the literature review above it has become clear that the predominant focus in the LRRD debate has been on the academic conceptualisation of LRRD as a concept and on the perspectives of donor agencies. Empirical research on the operational/implementing level remains lacking and, to the knowledge of the author of this thesis, there has previously been very little focus on developing understanding for how beneficiaries and local community members perceive the issues related to LRRD (Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri, 2005:4).

One of the main critiques explaining the failure of taking LRRD beyond the various theoretical blueprints is that the debate still lacks a consensus of the scope of the concept, as well as conflicting views on the definition and limits of “humanitarian” and “development” actions (Otto and Weingärtner, 2013:19). Understanding different stakeholders’ perspectives is of vital importance for the designing and implementation of LRRD strategies. The push in the development of the LRRD concept has been driven by a spearheaded top-down mentality over the last three decades, both in the focus of academic research and in LRRD strategies developed by the European Commission and other stakeholders at the donor level. It is thus not surprising that numerous studies indicate a large gap between theory
and practice, with LRRD strategies being regarded as ‘too vague and disconnected from practice to make any tangible difference’ by actors at operational and field levels (Christoplos, 2006: 36). It has been frequently pointed out that despite the decade long top-level discussions on LRRD, very few tools or guidelines remain at disposal to use for practical implementation of LRRD.

Studies have shown that some vital components of LRRD such as coordination have been more successful when performed at the field level rather than at headquarters-level (Mosel and Levine, 2014: 10). It is therefore not unlikely that LRRD could be developed in a more realistic and practical fashion if including more stakeholders in its conceptualisation the designing of strategies. For this to be achieved it is vital to achieve a better understanding of the operational and field levels perspectives. By bringing knowledge from more stakeholders involved in humanitarian and development actions, lessons may be learnt for a debate of a concept that for decades has been stated to appear “intuitively simple” (Mosel and Levine, 2014:1), yet have consistently failed to become operationalised.
2. Theoretical conceptualisations of LRRD

As a topic with at least three decades of academic and organisational discourse (Mosel and Levine 2014), the theoretical framing of linkages between the development and humanitarian sectors has been conceptualised with both distinct and subtle differences.

One of the major distinct differences concerns the perspectives on programmatic linkages in temporal dimensions, i.e. whether linkages are to be viewed as a parallel synergy of aid with short-term and long-term aims, or a fixed set of chronological hand-over processes of programs existing within strictly framed periods of contexts' status as being either in a state of “disaster” or “normalcy”.

These conceptualisations have been denoted with a few different terms and acronyms, the most common being Linking Relief, Rehabilitation, and Development (LRRD). Some authors have chosen to omit Rehabilitation in the concept name but still came to refer to Rehabilitation as a distinct feature in text (Longhurst, 1994).

With the potential of encapsulating all aspects of both humanitarian and development action, the framing and conceptualisation of LRRD is understandably an immensely complex issue and remains to a large degree unclear still after decades of discussion (Maxwell et al. 2010). In the subsequent subchapters, the major theoretical conceptualisation of LRRD, commonly referred to as the “Continuum”- and “Contiguum”-models are analysed, and a discussion chapter will use the conclusions from this literature-based research to synthesise a conceptual framework to be applied for analysis of the case studies.
2.1. The early LRRD debate - The Continuum Model

The discussion of how to link the identified gaps between humanitarian short-term disaster relief and long-term development aid first emerged during the African food-security disasters of the 1980's and early 1990's (Mosel and Levine 2015; Christoplos 2006). During these severe disasters, several Sub-Saharan African countries’ increased need and dependency on aid initiated discussions concerning how emergency relief during these famines could be linked to long-term development aid through primarily hand-over processes and exit strategies when a context moves between phases.

This perspective has been dubbed the “Continuum”-model of LRRD (Otto and Weingärtner, 2013). Macrae (1995), argued that the linear “Continuum” model perspective of LRRD was inspired by the 1950’s modernisation theory in which development was seen as a straight, progressive process with a heavy focus on economic growth. Through this way of understanding development, disasters of both natural and man-made causes, including armed conflict, were to be seen as temporary disruptions of an otherwise linear development process.

The function of LRRD in this perspective was to create temporal “links” between “relief” and “development” so that a disaster context would move as swiftly as possible from the disaster-phase to a state of “normalcy” where the local context can continue the pre-disaster development process.

Already in 1985 Hans Singer made calls for linking of humanitarian and development actions in response to what he concluded was an uncoordinated, sometimes competitive, relationship between humanitarian emergency food aid and development aid in the context of food insecurities in Sub-Saharan Africa: “The old division, whether conceptual, administrative or resource allocative, between emergency food aid and non-emergency or developmental food aid simply
collapses in the light of the present African experience, and a new approach is needed." (Singer, 1985:13).

One argued reason for the rise of the debate has been related to the increase in aid budgets during this same time period, with ensuing demands from donors for more efficient strategies (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell, 1994). The early LRRD debate often focused more on economic efficiency from a donor's perspective rather than long-term effectiveness in solving root-causes for humanitarian need. A clear example of this is the speculative quantitative argumentation of cost-efficiency suggested by Maxwell and Lirenso (1994). “Relief” in the early debate was often discussed as how relief could be adapted so as not to disrupt subsequent development aid, e.g. through disrupting local markets and creating aid-dependency (Singer, 1985). Another aspect of the early LRRD debate was its tended focus on how disaster relief could be used for developmental purposes, primarily through work-for-aid programmes which simultaneously would create opportunities to create large scale “free”-labour, for example in infrastructure projects and other developmentally-vital structural advances, and at the same time create opportunities for livelihoods (Maxwell and Lirenso 1994). Sollis (1994), in contrast, emphasised that economic development at the macro level may have complex social repercussions at the local level - not necessarily leading to reduced vulnerabilities- instead LRRD need to be approached with a complex understanding of local social structures.

2.2. The Contiguum Model

During the 1990's, the debate concerning LRRD started to evolve away from the Continuum model perspective. Longhurst (1994) argued that many contexts consist of endemic or cyclical states of emergency, whereupon a definite designation of a state of disaster or normalcy becomes obscured.

Longhurst (1994) also advanced the notion of what a disaster is by recognising that disasters are not just a temporary lack of physical necessities, but also the result of
complex physical and social vulnerabilities. This advanced perspective of humanitarian need was related to the influential work of Nobel Memorial Economy Prize laureate Amartya Sen, and his argumentation that famines are not caused by the actual lack of food, but rather are a product of social inequity (Sen, 1981). The changing perspective of development in association to LRRD during the early 1990’s was associated with a general “crisis in developmentalism”, in which developmental theorists were facing difficulties explaining complex emergencies in Africa and the Middle East. These emergencies were seen as contradicting the classical linear modernist theory which was argued to still be entrenched in the development field (Duffield, 1994)

This deconstruction of the definitive disaster-normality dichotomy led to a new paradigm dominating the academic discourse on LRRD, dubbed the “Contiguum” perspective. By the end of the 1990’s, the Contiguum perspective also came to be endorsed by national and international donor agencies as well as many NGOs in the aid sector (Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri 2005)(Humanitarian Coalition, 2015)(Sida 1999).

In the wake of the early Contiguum perspective-debate, new, more complex typologies of humanitarian need-contexts were starting to be introduced into the LRRD debate. Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell (1994) argued for four types of “emergencies”: rapid onset emergencies, slow onset emergencies, permanent emergencies and complex political emergencies. Each of these types were argued to offer different situation-specific opportunities and challenges for LRRD, with slow onset emergencies being the then contemporarily most investigated category with the African famines of the 1980’s and 1990s falling into this category of emergency. The advancement of the LRRD debate was cantered around discussions of LRRD in more complicated contexts, starting with settings of armed conflict and other “complex political emergencies".
Following the breakdown of strictly framed phases with the introduction of the Contiguum perspective, in contrast to the previous Continuum debate, the linkages in LRRD was no longer seen as exit strategies and handover processes between actors exclusively operating in specific temporal phases; instead actors with relief- and developmental-mandates were in the new paradigm encouraged to act simultaneously with the ambition to achieve LRRD. Several authors have identified “rehabilitation” to be the weakest link, as it has been regarded as too developmental for some humanitarian actors, and in too chaotic for some development actors to engage. Simultaneously rehabilitation projects have been regarded as costly and difficult to acquire sufficient funds for (Macrae 1995). Paradoxically, at approximately the same time the European Commission was advocating improvement in rehabilitation efforts and arguing for the role of rehabilitation programs as a tool for bridging humanitarian and development goals (EC, 1996).

Since the end of the 1990’s, there has been a growing focus on rehabilitation issues. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), together with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) developed the concept of “Early recovery” in 2005 to address the need to not only supply basic material needs (such as food) in the early phase of a humanitarian disaster, but to also as quickly as possible restore basic functions of a society. ”Early recovery” is one of several concepts often associated to LRRD, but often promoted among humanitarian actors without necessarily relating the concept to the broader concept of LRRD (Otto and Weingärtner 2013). "Resilience" is another concept that has been frequently discussed as in essence serving as a tool to transcend the humanitarian-development divide without necessarily always being directly referenced to LRRD. The vagueness of the term “resilience” has been argued to give actors working under a humanitarian mandate an opportunity to approach root causes for humanitarian need without accusations of stepping outside the designated mandate (Levine and Mosel, 2014).
Yet another concept falling into a “grey-zone” between humanitarian and development is “Building Back Better”, in which disasters are seen as results of structural weaknesses and vulnerabilities and thereby also creating a “window of opportunity” to make lasting improvements during reconstruction (Christoplos, 2006). The basic idea was expressed already by Buchanan Smith and Maxwell (1994): “[...]rehabilitation can offer more than a return to the status quo, particularly where the emergency itself induced positive change[...]” (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell, 1994: 8).

Building Back Better became conceptualised as a guiding ethos during the massive reconstruction efforts after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami in which multi-sectoral reconstruction was essential and improving resilience of affected communities (UNWCDRR, 2015)(UNICEF 2005)(Fan, 2013). The essence of Building Back Better was expressed already in the Hyogo Framework for Action: 2005-2015 (2005), and was further referred to explicitly in the follow up Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 (2015).

Despite the conceptual name giving an impression of concerning physical structural reconstruction, Building Back Better has also been adopted for non-physical recovery programming such as mental health services (WHO, 2013) and gender mainstreaming in advocacy (Jauhola, 2010).

Some authors have argued that LRRD is not always a needed concept since some already “developed” contexts have no need of further development, such as the State of Louisiana after Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (Audet, 2015), contradicting the notion that all disasters display local weaknesses in resilience and vulnerabilities. Wisner and Walker (2006) however sharply criticised the disaster response to Hurricane Katrina and argued that the USA had major shortcomings in the relief and rehabilitation efforts and were lacking the political will to make needed improvements. Contrastingly, Mochizuki and Chang (2016) argued for the relevance of applying
Building Back Better in a high-income country typically regarded as already “developed”: Japan after the tsunami and subsequent nuclear disaster at Fukushima in 2011. The authors found some evidence that reconstructions at the local context level had been made in coherency with the Build Back Better concept.

Parallel to this shift in temporal framing of “emergencies” or “disasters”, the dichotomy between the role of humanitarian and development actors also became blurred. This discussion broke new ground in debating how linkages in LRRD were not just to be seen as linkages between actors with strictly exclusive mandates, but as a link between actions performed by one and the same actor. Instead of LRRD being limited to the question “who does what and when?”, the concept started to be centred on reforming the way all actors in the humanitarian-development spectrum operated to better achieve sustainable results in accordance with the imperative of LRRD. Actors were discussed as taking on parallel responsibilities in of both short-term and long-term needs. It was even discussed how individual actions could be designed to simultaneously addressed both long- and short term needs. (Mosel and Levine, 2014)

2.3. Linkage to Security

During the latter half of the 1990’s, the LRRD debate continued to adopt a broader conceptual view of the scope of contexts for LRRD-application; not only in regard to whether or not developmental actions should be performed in parallel to humanitarian actions, but also how the LRRD concept could be implemented in new types of contexts. This change came as a development of a general increased focus on post-conflict rehabilitation and the social-, political, and economical- root causes for humanitarian and developmental issues in conflict afflicted societies and fragile states in complex political emergencies (Macrae 1995). The debate at this point started emphasising the need to apply development goals in humanitarian disaster contexts with active-, dormant- and post-armed conflict contexts (Audet, 2015, Macrae et al., 1997). The Development Assistance Committee of the OECD
questioned one of the cornerstone assumptions of humanitarian exceptionalism; that an exclusively humanitarian imperative is essential in conflict contexts:

“Contrary to many past assumptions, we have found that a sharp distinction between short-term emergency relief and longer-term development aid is rarely useful in planning support for countries in open conflict.” (DAC 1997)

Harmer and Macrae (2004) argued that these developments were driven by a new aim at also linking humanitarian relief and development action with aspects of security in fragile environments; driven by a desire from actors within the development sector to enter new countries and contexts, in reacting to the expectations formulated in the Millennium Development Goals, and also as a result of an increased sense of international responsibility for global security and welfare concerns and a general conceptual acceptance of LRRD-frameworks.

The debate centred around how humanitarian actions are to be coordinated between humanitarian and non-humanitarian actors, including military. This led in 2007 to an updated version of the Oslo Guidelines on The Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief, originally from 1992 (UNOCHA, 2007). In a connected European Commission communication document, the usage of military support in humanitarian disaster operations was advocated, while also cautiously highlighting:

“As it is vital to ensure the neutrality of humanitarian action, any blurring of lines between humanitarian and military tasks should be avoided. Therefore, military forces and assets should only be used as a "last resort" in humanitarian operations in accordance with international guidelines” (EC, 2007)

The need for LRRD was argued to be particularly dire in contexts of protracted conflict and other contexts with endemic humanitarian needs and minimal levels of reconstruction efforts. An example of this being the occupied Palestinian territories where humanitarian actions have been performed for decades, yet until today the
vast majority of aid funds are being allocated to emergency relief, whereas very little goes to reconstruction and disaster prevention (Otto and Weingärtner, 2013). The relevance of adopting the Contiguum perspective of LRRD became central at this point of the debate, since the Continuum perspective entailed that development actions would sometimes need to wait for generations before a link was to be formed when the context evolved to the imagined development phase. The case of Palestine also serves as an example of LRRD failing to be implemented partly due to political entrenchment from donor states, as well as many reconstruction and development actions being associated to state-building actions and thus hindered by donor states which are Israeli allies, such as the USA (Harmer and Macrae, 2004).

The debate about LRRD being linked to responses to security issues became intensified after the 9/11 attacks in 2001, whereupon the general global focus on terror mitigation also became included in the LRRD debate (Audet, 2015). The conflicts following the attacks, conducted under the epithet “global war on terror”, also caused great challenges for aid providers in affected contexts, which still today experience severe needs of relief, rehabilitation, and development. These challenges were made the more difficult to address without breaching the humanitarian principle of neutrality, particularly due to the fact that the USA was one of the major aid donors in the region (Otto and Weingärtner, 2013)(Harmer and Macrae 2004).

The Iraqi war has been regarded as an “extreme” example of political entrenchment of humanitarian action, and led to a questioning the feasibility of “coherence” between actions addressing humanitarian need and political issues - a heavily discussed topic starting in the beginning of the 1990’s in parallel to the development of the LRRD debate (Torrente, 2004)(Macrae and Leader, 2000).
2.4. Rights-based approach to LRRD

By the end of the 1990’s, rights-based LRRD was proposed as an alternative way to approach the bridging of humanitarian and development imperatives by focusing on the rights that under international law transcends designations of “humanitarian” or “developmental” contextual labels. This approach also differs from other perspectives in its outlook on stakeholders; instead of viewing stakeholders as either “beneficiaries” or “non-beneficiaries”, which tends to be the case in the Humanitarian Silo perspective, the rights-based approach instead centres on identifying structures of duty bearer and rights holders. Duty bearers being those individuals or organisations whose responsibility is to uphold the rights of rights holders, such as parents to their children and states to their populations (Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri 2005) (Slim, 2000). This approach implies a radically different mindset from classical humanitarianism towards actors in aid contexts by sharply contrasting the Humanitarian Silo perspective’s approach of autonomously fulfilling humanitarian needs while distancing oneself from other actors. The rights-based approach instead demands a highly contextualised understanding of local social structures and the supporting of identified duty bearers’ capabilities to fulfil the rights of rights holders. This approach thus besides centring around international law, it also lays focus upon the understanding of contexts, as well as capacity building.

2.5. Donor perspective

As mentioned in the chapter on the early LRRD debate, the rise of the LRRD debate has been partly been sourced to demands from donor agencies to reform the aid system. The early debates thus made the financial perspective one of the central imperatives for LRRD, in which calculations of cost-benefits analysis was seen as a central issue (Maxwell and Lirenso, 1994). Until today the perspectives of donor agencies remain some of the most influential voices in the debate, with donor agencies’ white-papers and grey literature being cited significantly more
often than aid providers’, with the European Union being one of the most vocal and most frequently cited interlocutors (Mosel and Levine 2014). Many of the available academic studies on LRRD has been commissioned by donor agencies, giving ample evidence for many donor’s substantial interest in the concept (e.g. Lewis (2001), Christoplos (2006), and Otto and Weingärtner (2013)).

2.5.1. Development of the EU’s perspective on LRRD

During the mid-1990’s donor agencies began issuing documents on LRRD to directly communicate their stance in the debate. A European Commission Communication Paper in 1996 (EC, 1996) was the first publicly stated document positioning the Commission’s perspective. The document showed dedicated support for LRRD as a concept and advocated its mainstreaming. Even though a “holistic” approach was advocated to create linkages, the document was written with the language of the Continuum perspective, emphasising handover processes between linear phases. The document clearly echoed the contents and language of Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell (1994), to the extent of some passages being close to identical.¹¹ There are however major differences in how the EC (1996) document approaches LRRD, most notably by viewing the concept as applicable to broader contexts, including armed conflict, but also focusing more on social and structural development aspects rather than primarily economical goals.

¹¹ Compare for example the first paragraph Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell (1994: 2) with the first paragraph EC (1996: iii):

“The basic idea is simple and sensible. Emergencies are costly in terms of human life and resources. They are disruptive of development. They demand a long period of rehabilitation. And they have spawned bureaucratic structures. (Buchanan-Smith,1994:2).

“The basic justification for linking relief, rehabilitation and development is simple and sensible: disasters are costly in both human life and resources; they disrupt economic and social development; they require long periods of rehabilitation; they lead to separate bureaucratic structures and procedures which duplicate development institutions."

Neither Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell (1994), nor either of its co-authors were referenced in EC (1996).
The Commission however became a vocal supporter of the Contiguum perspective, starting with an updated communication document; EC (2001), which expressed a critical view on the linearity of the Continuum perspective with support for simultaneous delivery of both categories of aid. The document still however continued to focus on handover-processes between humanitarian and development actors, as well as the filling of temporal gaps through top-down coordination. The document clearly supports a compartmentalised view of humanitarian and development in terms of actions, actors and timeframe: “The corresponding instruments and working methods differ in their time perspective, the implementing partners, the role of national authorities and the content of interventions.” (EC, 2001:1).

In stark contrast to this exhibited stance in favour of the Humanitarian Silo perspective, in 2006 the European Commission, Council, and Commission together published “The European Consensus on Development”, in which “humanitarian aid” twice was defined as a “modality” under “development assistance” (EU, 2006: §26, §59). The document made a vague statement of that the EU would promote LRRD in “transition situations”, but did not specify how or in which form this would be conducted (EU, 2006: §21).

In the Commission’s communication documents EC(2007), in preparation of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid (EU, 2008) the narrow humanitarian exceptionalist view was again supported, with expressed concern relating to recent global developments. Although the referred developments were not specified, it is not unlikely that this is insinuating the aforementioned critique of political entrenchment in humanitarian aid during the then still ongoing war in Iraq. LRRD was supported, but expressed in vague terms of cooperation between actors. Moreover, calls were made for the developing of new frameworks and preparations for pilot-programmes. The document fell back into the perspective of phase-specific based responses despite EC (2001) explicitly supporting the Contiguum model. The subsequent humanitarian consensus document, EU (2008), states that
"The principles that apply to humanitarian aid are specific and distinct from other forms of aid" (EU, 2008: §22), but repeatedly expresses support for the LRRD concept based on close, simultaneous coordination between actors in accordance with the Contiguum model:

"[...] (LRRD) requires humanitarian and development actors to coordinate from the earliest phases of a crisis response and to act in parallel with a view to ensuring a smooth transition. It necessitates mutual awareness of the different modalities, instruments and approaches on the part of all aid actors, and flexible and innovative transition strategies. At an international level the ‘early recovery cluster’ is looking specifically at addressing the link between relief and development aid at the earliest stages of disaster response.” (EU, 2008: §77)

Again, the emphasis lies on “transitions”, with LRRD seen as a tool for early recovery, as well as with a footnote referencing to the Building Back Better concept (ibid.). The document made calls for the EU to create practical implementation models for LRRD based on:

"[...] experiences and lessons learnt and address improved cooperation between humanitarian and development agencies and other aid actors, including in the international community, particularly at field level and in situations of fragility or complex emergencies”. (EU, 2008: §78)

Despite these fervent calls for action, in 2010 a development review by the Commission concluded that little progress had been made to implement LRRD in the EU donor mechanism (EC, 2010).

The European Parliament issued a policy paper on LRRD in 2012 where a renewed interest in the LRRD concept was motivated by “[...] climate change, the increase of major natural disasters, and the emergence of increasingly complex conflicts [...], and also the problem of major funding gaps in connection with the 2010 Haiti earthquake. (EP, 2012:1). In this document, the Contiguum perspective was again fully supported, while continuing to firmly separate humanitarian and development actors. The document introduces improvement of resilience as part of LRRD efforts but does not specify the conformity of this concept to the
humanitarian-development dichotomy. The document also presents a number of funding mechanism changes to be implemented between 2014-2020 which can be associated to LRRD; centring around increased flexibility in allocation of funds in multi-year grants. The document also again made calls for an “increased understanding and interaction between the humanitarian and development actors through capacity building, training and awareness raising.” (EP, 2012:10).

In 2016, the Commission published a proposal document in preparation for a new European Consensus on Development in which the previous terminology of “humanitarian aid” as a “development modality” was omitted. Again, calls were made for LRRD to be implemented through institutional reform at EU and its member states’ level:

“This requires improved working practices between the development and humanitarian communities to strengthen the linking of relief, rehabilitation and development, including a deeper exchange of information, donor coordination, joint analysis of risks and vulnerabilities, a shared definition of strategic priorities, joint programming, transition strategies and through the EU's Conflict Early Warning System.” (EC, 2016: §54)

2.6 Discussion based on literature-discourse: proposal of a conceptual framework

As the literature research above has shown, the conceptual development of LRRD has been complex with many varying parameters. The concept’s lack of clear frameworks makes assessment of LRRD perspective difficult to determine in the many cases when interlocutors refer to the topic without clearly defining the concept. The identified inconsistencies between EU documents’ use of the term LRRD in terms of divergent views on phases, actors and actions exemplifies the need for more precise terminology.

The old division of the Continuum and Contiguum model is too imprecise to suffice as relevant terminology in the debate since widely divergent perspectives can fall
into the Contiguum category. Both the Humanitarian Silo perspective of EC (2007) and the conceptualisation of Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell (1994) would belong to the Contiguum model, despite the fact that these two publications embodies unequivocally different perspectives, with the latter approaching the term “relief” in LRRD in a decisively more liberal definition in terms of actors and actions.

Through the lens of the Humanitarian Ecosystem perspective of this thesis I will summarize the different perspectives in the literature research above divided into the parameters of how LRRD is conceptualised based on how the humanitarian-development linkages and division: in terms of temporal phases, actors, and actions. This will serve as a conceptual framework for analysis of the empirical cases.

From the researched literature conceptualisations, the different perspectives will here be categorised as belong to four degrees of humanitarian-development integration.\(^{12}\)

The Continuum model offer a way to unite the short-term goals of humanitarian actions with the long-term goals of development actions by coordinating the work between separate actors, each working within separate temporal phases. According to this model, the issue of LRRD is thus a relatively simple question of coordinating “who does what and when?”, in order to avoid a “gap” in the imagined chronological procession of actions (Suhrke and Ofstad, 2005). For usage in this thesis, I will refer to this as the first degree of humanitarian-development integration. This perspective of LRRD fits into the Humanitarian Silo perspective and offers an example of LRRD that can appeal to humanitarian exceptionalists as described by Bennett (2016), wishing to keep humanitarian actors separated from other actors. The linkages here can instead be created from external funding.

\(^{12}\) This typology has not been conceptualised previously, to the knowledge of the author of this thesis.
mechanisms designed by donor agencies and other top-level actors by coordinating handover processes between actors.

With the introduction of the Contiguum model however, the idea of LRRD became much more complex, leading to the next three degrees of humanitarian-development integration. Firstly, by suggesting that humanitarian actors and development actors are to work side by side during the same phases of an emergency, this I will refer to as the second degree of humanitarian-development integration. This level of integration still supports the dichotomous division of humanitarian and development actors and actions of the Humanitarian Silo perspective, but requires a collaboration between the two through close coordination, thus challenging the humanitarian exceptionalists strive for independence from, and neutrality towards, actors considered as non-humanitarian.

The third degree of integration steps away from the humanitarian-development dichotomy and instead embraces the Humanitarian Ecosystem perspective by arguing that humanitarian and development actions are to be performed during the same time, and possibly, while not necessarily, by the same actors. The concepts of early recovery and Building Back Better follow this level of integration, while usually not using the terminology of integrating development into humanitarian action,

The fourth degree of integration is close to the third, but advances to also integrating humanitarian and development at the activity level of taken actions. Several early authors exemplify this such as Maxwell and Lirenso (1994) who conceptualised how actions could be taken that both served humanitarian and development goals at the same time, such as work-for-aid programmes. The fourth level of integration is the most complex since it fully embraces the Humanitarian Ecosystem perspective by dissolving the dichotomous humanitarian-development division at the temporal-, actor-, and activity parameters.
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3. Local stakeholder level - Sikakap, Mentawai Islands

The village of Sikakap is situated on the relatively isolated Mentawai Islands west of Sumatra. On October 25th, 2010, a tsunami struck the southern island chain, killing more than 500 people and displacing over 11,000; many of whom needed to be permanently relocated. The worst affected area was the village of Sikakap, which became centre for the emergency response and later development efforts, including the governmental disaster agency BNPB, as well as international, national, and local organisations (IRIN, 2011).

In this chapter data collected between on local stakeholders’ perspectives will be presented and analysed in two subchapters followed by a third for discussion of the collected data through the lens of the theoretical framework. The data collection took place between September 3rd and September 12th, 2016.

The first subchapter concerns the perspectives of community members, including interviews with two aid beneficiaries (henceforth referred to as Participant A and B), a Christian priest (Participant C), the official leader for the tsunami affected sub-village Bulakmonga (Participant D)\textsuperscript{13}, and a kindergarten principal (Participant E).\textsuperscript{14} Results from a survey with 20 aid beneficiaries are also presented here.

The second subchapter concerns the perspectives of the local level NGO CFK, and the presented data is gathered from a total of four participants: two field working programme officers (Participant F and G) whom were interviewed together in a pair-interview; the organisation’s finance officer (Participant H), and the co-founder/technical advisor (Participant I).

\textsuperscript{13} The title in in Bahasa Indonesian reads \textit{Kepala Dusun}, which could also be translated to “Hamlet Chief”.

\textsuperscript{14} A full list of participants is included in Appendix IV.
3.1. Community members

3.1.1. Perspectives on the humanitarian-development divide

The interviewed community members all had extensive personal experiences of a number of different NGOs operations, Participant A and B were at the time of the interview still undergoing training in child protection. Participant B had been temporarily displaced during the disaster due to a partial destruction of his home, whereas Participant A was only indirectly affected by the tsunami, but stated that he was affected psychologically and through the damage to the overall community. All community members, including Participant A and B, displayed relatively detailed knowledge of the NGOs presence during and after the disaster, naming involved local and international organisations, including: YEU, IOM, CDRM, UNDP, Mercy Corps, Surfaid, Ready Indonesia, and CFK.

Both of the beneficiaries volunteered during the disaster through the local church organisation Gereja Kristen Protestan Di Mentawai (GKBM). Their tasks included transportation of emergency supplies and the collection and burying of dead bodies. Participant C, the priest, elaborated on the development of the response; during the first days, there were no communication channels available to call for aid and the local community had to make a response on their own. The church attempted to assemble emergency supplies on from non-affected sub-villages for displaced tsunami victims, such as food and clothes.

After the disaster alarm had reached the national community, the church’s disaster response efforts were led by the Center for Disaster Risk Management and Community Development Studies (CDRM&CDS), a network of Christian organisations involved in both disaster response and community development, based at Nommensen University, Sumatra.

Participants D and E had also close collaboration with CDRM&CDS during the emergency response and rehabilitation process. Participant D elaborated on collaborations he as a sub-village leader had with UNDP for the conduction of a rehabilitation programme through donation of agricultural supplies. Community members had been consulted on which types of crops they would prefer as a
source of livelihood whereupon production of cocoa beans had been chosen. During my visit, I observed that this practiced had continued at a commercial, but small, household scale.

All the interviewed community members had observed that the NGOs performed diverse types of programming; including emergency relief actions directly after the tsunami as well as rehabilitation and development actions. Most also expressed an understanding of the coordinative mechanism, led by the national government’s board for disaster management, Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana (BNPB). However, despite the relatively extensive experience of humanitarian and development actions, most of the interviewed community members lacked a clear concept of there being a division between humanitarian and development actors. They had heard the term “humanitarian”, but had only a vague perspective of the meaning of the term such as: “it means helping humans” (Participant C). This statement is likely related to the composition of the word for “humanitarian” in Bahasa Indonesian, “Kemanusiaan”, literally meaning “for humanity”.

Among the interviewed community members, the one expressing a more distinct perspective on the meaning of the term “humanitarian” was Participant E. In her capacity as principal of a relatively large kindergarten and head in an educational network consisting of 17 schools spread over the island, she had worked with CDRM shortly after the tsunami in a project on a Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR). In her perspective, DRR was to be regarded as a community development action, and she saw the division between humanitarian and development actions in a cyclical pattern of development (in the form of DRR), as being followed by humanitarian emergency aid right after a disaster, to again being followed by development actions focusing on social and economic issues as well as DRR. However, she did not find the division between humanitarian and development actions to be fundamentally different:
“There is a strong relation between humanitarian and community development especially after the disaster, because the people do development, community development to also to help people. The basis is humanitarian, to help people.”

The temporal aspect as defining factor in the division of the terms “humanitarian” and “development” was also brought up by Participant D after careful consideration of what the difference would be: “The difference is only the duration. One day, two weeks. CFK here for a very long time, doing training, electricity etc.”

None of the interviewed community members viewed aid organisations to be divided in a strict dichotomy, even though Participant E had a clearer concept of an existing distinction, as she still stated that the same organisation could be both humanitarian and developmental, bringing up CFK as an example: “Humanitarian and development organisations are not different. It works for human and social life and also for all lives of humans.”

The main conclusions that can be drawn from the interviews with Participants A-E includes that local community members did not have a perspective of humanitarian and development organisations as two separate types of actors, while some members had the perspective of a temporal distinction in performed actions. To increase the reliability of the qualitative data collected through interviews, a survey was performed to provide supporting evidence for this conclusion. The entirety of the survey data can be found in Appendix III.

20 community members responded to the survey, all of whom had been relocated after the tsunami, of which 19 stated having experiences of one or several different aid organisations.

For the question: “Are you familiar with the term “humanitarian organisation?” 12 responded “No”, 3 responded “Uncertain”, and 3 responded “Yes”, 2 left the field blank.

15 The quotations from the conducted interviews have undergone minor editing of grammatical and syntax errors in cases where this was deemed necessary for the understanding of the text.
Among the 3 familiarized with the term, one responded that the difference between “humanitarian organisations” and “development organisations” was “Small”, while another responded there was “Some difference”, and the third responded “No difference”.

The open-ended question - “What in your opinion are the differences (if any) between ‘humanitarian organisations’ and ‘development organisations’?”- was filled in by 2 respondents: The responses were as follows:

1.: “Humanitarian organisations only ensure the protection of populations. However, Development organisation not only ensure the protection of populations but also develop the human resources.”

2.: “Humanitarian organisations provides aid when there is disaster. Development organisations provides aid by assisting the people to get back on their feet.”

In statement 1., the “protection” of civilians can be interpreted as protecting the basic human needs for survival, which thus would concur with the common conception that humanitarian aid is limited to life-sustaining actions. Development organisations are however regarded as embodying double capacities; a perspective that can likely have been influenced by CFK and other organisations present through their immediate disaster relief and capacity building programs.

In statement 2., the term “humanitarian” is associated to disasters, thus again connecting the term to a specific temporal phase. Relating “development” to “get back on their feet” would imply that “development” is equated to rehabilitation actions.

Considering the low numbers of respondents stating they had familiarity with the term “humanitarian” vis-a-vis no statement of any distinct difference, the collected survey data strongly supported the conclusions drawn from the interviews.
3.1.2. Perspectives on bridging the humanitarian-development divide

Since most of the interviewed community members did not have a perspective of a concrete humanitarian-development divide, it was difficult to frame questions regarding the LRRD concept. The participants were asked questions aimed at probing this issue by asking how they had experienced the presence of NGOs during and after the disaster. Several expressed that the majority of organisations had only a very short local presence after the disaster, including those aiming at long-term impacts, such as the livelihoods programmes conducted by UNDP. Participant E stated that although there had been a coordinated transition from relief to rehabilitation, the long-term development had not been completely successful:

“In the disaster area, we will need more NGOs to stay long here, so they can prepare and also fix education, economy and farming. The activity of the NGOs that came after the disaster was effective just for the nearest time, but the for the long-term it did not work properly.”

She exemplified this with cases of schools constructed with the help of Plan International, but that had not been furnished or equipped with necessary materials. During my research, I had the opportunity of observing these schools first hand, the structures were indeed insufficient as permanent schools, consisting of raised wooden platform with roof, but without walls, windows, furniture or educational material. When asked why the community had not independently improved the school structures, the CFK-staff CFK explained that this was due to a lack of funds, as parents could often not afford the school fees, which led to the teachers often did not even receive their wages, a circle that thus impeded an investment for an improvement of the school structure.

Participant E further emphasised the need for capacity building and expressed appreciation towards CFK for their conducting of long-term community development programmes. Participant D also emphasised the need for long-term
presence to achieve successful capacity building, highlighting that some of the quick capacity building projects lacked long-term effect; “After organisations left, some stopped doing what they had been trained to do”.

Based on the interviews, local community members saw a need for rehabilitation and long-term development action as well as commended CFK for having a long-term presence, which created links between relief, rehabilitation and development.

3.2. Local level NGO - CFK

The founding of CFK originated in the disaster response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami which caused massive damage to Aceh province in northern Sumatra, a region that from 1976 until 2005 was in armed conflict between the Indonesian National Government and the militant group Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) which was fighting for Acehnese independence and strict enforcement of Sharia law (Le Billon and Waizenegger, 2007).

CFK was first founded as part of the Christian faith based umbrella organisation Helping Hands International. After a year CFK became fully independent due to an ambition to acquire a stronger local base.

Initially, the organisation provided emergency relief to tsunami victims in Aceh but continued programmes focusing on rehabilitation and community development until 2011. In 2009 CFK responded to a major earthquake striking the city of Padang on western Sumatra, conducting emergency relief and physical rehabilitation programmes for two years, but without remaining for continued development actions since these were not deemed of high necessity in this area. Instead, CFK focused on operations on the Mentawai Islands off the coast from Padang; the response started directly after the 2010 tsunami with emergency supplies but continued with physical reconstruction and a broad range of community development projects including livelihoods, education and child protection
Between 2011-2016, all CFK operations were based in Sikakap, however after an earthquake struck Aceh province in December 2016, CFK became the implementing partner for Plan International Indonesia in their disaster response, focusing on emergency shelter and child protection (Participant I, personal communication, December 9, 2016).

3.1.1. Perspectives on the humanitarian-development divide

All four interview staff members were uncertain or unfamiliar with the meaning of the term “humanitarian”, particularly Participant H whom stated to have no conception of the term, while Participant F and G recognised the term with an initial hesitation to its meaning.

Participant F responded to the question: “How familiar do you feel with the term humanitarian and humanitarian organisation?” by asking “Is that us? Are we a humanitarian organisation?”.

Participant I was familiar with the term but found it difficult to frame the meaning of the term. When asked if she considered CFK to be a humanitarian organisation, she took a long pause in consideration and said that the organisation did not define itself using this term specifically, that they instead had a “holistic” approach to different types of need including both material support and capacity building of communities.

Similarly, Participants F and G both stated that they thought CFK ought to be considered both a humanitarian and development organisation, arguing that what separated humanitarian and development actions is that humanitarian actions consists mainly of the provision of physical goods, while “development actions” would mean capacity building of communities.
When asked if humanitarian and development actions should be considered completely separate entities, Participant F stated:

“They are related, almost the same. Even when we’re involved in the disaster response, there is also the development side of it. Some people might say humanitarian organisations are just giving aid, physical help, but I feel that there is also an element of capacity building the community, so I feel that humanitarians are also developing the community and not just giving food and physical aid, but also developing the community. Two aspects of helping people and helping their community”.

Participant G agreed that humanitarian and developmental are to be seen as related but put stronger emphasis on separation by temporal phases:

“There is a bit of a difference, community development happens when the community is in a more stable position, when their lives are not in chaos or in crisis, but they need to develop and grow and develop in their capacity, but it’s still part of humanitarian work. There is a difference between the humanitarian side when it’s in a crisis and is there to give aid and help the people in that immediate needs, that they can get the needs that they have to return to their daily life. And so, when that community is stable, going back to more normalcy, that’s when the community development side comes into it.”

Participant G thus expressed that humanitarian aid has the function of early recovery, in contrast to several of the interviewed community members who expressed that recovery actions should be considered developmental.

3.1.2. Perspectives on bridging the humanitarian-development divide

Participant G elaborated on the perspective of the different phases as depending on the capacity of the population to take ownership of development actions themselves.

“In order to prioritise the need, based on the conditions at that time, it is still important to make the distinction between humanitarian help and community development. [...] It’s about looking at whom is able to participate in activities towards their own development and rehabilitation, that’s where the community are involved in that. The humanitarian side is when they are not able to handle things themselves, that’s when we come in and help them in their direct and immediate need where they can’t
necessarily help themselves, but when they are able to start to help themselves, that's when the community development side kicks in, when they are more involved in the development and the activities.”

The bridging of this divide was emphasised by both participant F and G as relying on close monitoring of the population’s level of capacity to take ownership of the development process.

While Participant I also repeatedly expressed a phase-based reasoning, she still argued against the perspective of disaster affected populations being regarded as passive during the response phase, but that a bridging of the divide should be created already in the initial phase instead:

“even if in our relief actions, we still try to actually do capacity building and use local resources rather than just giving aid. We will give aid where it’s needed but like when we were in Padang, when building the houses, we were wanting them to use local resources, they were contributing and stuff like that. So even in the relief side of things we still try to implement as much community development principles as possible. So that they at the beginning don’t become dependent on organisations, but they themselves are able to build back their communities.”

Participant I argued that demands from donor agencies creates the primary obstacle impeding the incorporation of long-term capacity building efforts into disaster relief. She expressed that particularly donors focusing on humanitarian relief operations tends to have highly limited timeframes in their budgets, meaning that implementing organisations are forced to rush implementation which frequently leads to wasteful and ineffective programs.

“In the Aceh response UNHCR had a set deadline of when we had to use up their funding by, and even though the community wanted our programme to extend for longer, we had to use up all our money, even though we could have extended for several more months to continue our programs, but we had to finish up our money right then and there. We were just throwing away money.”

The participant continued to argue that humanitarian donor agencies lack an understanding of how community development works when trying to implement concepts such as early recovery and Building Back Better, due to the inherent hastiness and lack of comprehension of local contexts. She exemplified with her
experience from Aceh where organisations had provided disaster affected fishermen with new, large boats to stimulate the market:

“What they didn’t realise was that this is post conflict, for people in Aceh to work together you need to have a team to take it out and it uses more fuel so it’s more expensive to run and so within a few months the beaches were littered with all these boat that were not being used.”

Participant I emphasised the need for donor agencies to understand how different levels of urgency affects the effectiveness and efficiency of programming, especially when trying to bridge the divide between physical relief provision and community capacity building.

3.3. Discussion: LRRD at a local level perspective

The collected data indicates that at the researched local level case, the term “humanitarian” lacked relevance in terms of a mode of identity for actors. The term was often not recognised, and when it was, it was mostly in association to a context-a phase of sudden disaster requiring urgent material intervention. Moreover, it was also associated to the term “aid”, implying the provision of physical goods, while “community development” was strongly linked to capacity building through trainings and community participatory development. The division between humanitarian and development was thus regarded as present at both temporal and activity level, but not strictly at the actor level. Therefore, all the interviewed local level stakeholders employed a perspective in conformity to the Humanitarian Ecosystem perspective.

Among the participants who did express ideas concerning the bridging of a humanitarian-development divide, the perspective on the degree of integration varied. While Participant I argued relatively clearly for a third degree of integration, the other participants’ perspectives were more similar to a first degree of integration, due to their support of a Continuum perspective through an emphasis on bridging phase-specific actions and having linkages created on a chronological basis.
Considering the contexts of the researched local level case, the results are not surprising. The Mentawai Islands as well as Sumatra and the rest of Indonesia being highly prone to rapid onset natural disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanic eruptions, it is thus not surprising that the local level stakeholders had a distinct division of phases. During the early LRRD debate, Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell (1994), as well as Longhurst (1994), argued for the need of analysing LRRD in context to diverse types of disasters. Phases would likely be perceived as less evident for organisations and community members in contexts of slow onset disasters such as famine or disasters connected to complex political emergencies. Similarly, in an area affected by intense armed conflict, the humanitarian term may also be more widespread among community members as related to the principle of neutrality.

However, CFK worked in Aceh for several years during the conflict and post-conflict phase, and still did not see a relevance in identifying the organisation as humanitarian. Instead, the interviewed staff members valued the identity of the organisation upon its faith-based nature.
4. National stakeholder level - Indonesian national NGOs

This chapter presents and analyses the data gathered on the perspectives of two national level Indonesian NGOs.

The analysed data was collected through a pair interview with two staff members from YAKKUM Emergency Unit (YEU), conducted on August 18th, 2016, and one individual interview with a staff member from Muhammadiyah Disaster Management Center (MDMC), conducted on September 23rd, 2016. The two interviewed staff members from YEU were: the head of the Communications and Information Department (henceforth referred to as Participant J) and the head of Human Resources (Participant K), whereas the MDMC staff member was the Vice Secretary-General (Participant L).

4.1. Perspectives on the humanitarian-development divide

Both MDMC and YEU are units under their respective faith-based umbrella organisations; Muhammadiyah respectively Yayasan Kristen untuk Kesehatan Umum\textsuperscript{16} (YAKKUM).

Muhammadiyah was founded in 1912 and is today one of Indonesia's largest Islamic organisations, focusing on education, health and social development, whereas MDMC was first founded in 2007 and received a full mandate in 2010 to manage all of Muhammadiyah’s DRR- and disaster relief programs.

On the other hand, YAKKUM’s primary focus is on programming related to public

\textsuperscript{16} In English: Christian Foundation for Public Health.
health, running 14 complete hospitals as well as nursing academies, rehabilitation centres, and a disaster training centre. Moreover, each hospital has community development outreach units for programming in rural areas. YEU was founded in 2001 to manage DRR training, advocacy and disaster response.

Both the YEU and MDMC staff members expressed a perspective on humanitarian and development action as quite clearly divided through their internal organisational structures with different units acting in phase specific contexts. Muhammadiyah has one department for development programming, and one for disaster phases- MDMC, whereas YAKKUM has specific units for three phases, YEU for disaster phases, a Rehabilitation Unit for the rehabilitation phase as the name dictates, and Community Development Units for development phases.

Both YEU and MDMC are thus highly departmentalised in their programming and place emphasis on phase-based planning. All three participants argued that their organisational units would usually profile themselves as humanitarian, despite the fact that they are both working under developmental umbrella organisations. However, the profile as humanitarian appeared to be made relevant for the distribution of responsibilities within their respective umbrellas, and not as much externally. All three participants argued that their religious profiles as Muslim vis-à-vis Christian faith-based organisations were what mattered. When asked about profiling the organisation as humanitarian or developmental, Participant L responded:

“Actually, MDMC is-based as a faith-based organisation. So, we work across the religion to manage issues as humanitarianism without borders. Our mandate is a faith-based organisation, but the mandate we have within Muhammadiyah, is humanitarian.”

All three participants expressed that it was predominantly their status as religious organisations that affected access to target populations, not their profile as humanitarian organisations.

Participant J stated:
“Sometimes we face that because we are from a Christian-based organisation, when we serve in areas where a majority are non-Christian, it's always challenging, in some cases we have been rejected. Even when we first time came to Aceh. But through our network with Humanitarian Forum Indonesia [HFI], there is also a backup mechanism. Working together, and sometimes people just want to see the flags.”

Participant K explained that to achieve effective programmes, 14 Indonesian Christian and Muslim faith-based NGOs, including MDMC, cooperate closely within the network HFI. Periodically in Aceh, hostilities had been focused on Christian organisations, whereupon they had continued operating under the flag of partner Muslim organisations. YEU managed to receive access to the province of West Papua, which is rare due to the ongoing conflict between the Indonesian government and Papuan nationalists. Having a Christian majority population, the West Papuan government allowed YEU to enter while not giving access to MDMC. Participant L stated that MDMC had managed to operate in West Papua under the flag of a Christian partners from HFI; Karina Caritas Indonesia.

4.2. Perspectives on bridging the humanitarian-development divide

Although stating a view of their mandates within their respective units as purely humanitarian, the participants also argued for bridging activities in the DRR and disaster responses of YEU and MDMC. These activities include; capacity building, livelihood, micro financing, agricultural programmes and advocacy. MDMC performs human rights training to teach marginalised groups to claim their rights socially and legally, YEU performs gender transformative actions through the supporting of women’s social and economic networks. YEU has also had several programmes to give voice to rural community members, particularly women, in the development of the official long term development plan for the district and national government.

Both the participants from YEU and MDMC frequently referred to “empowerment” as part of their humanitarian mandate.
Apart from these actions bridging the humanitarian-development divide, all three participants repeatedly emphasised that despite having compartmentalised organisational structures devoted to distinct phases, MDMC and YEU have close collaborations between their respective humanitarian, rehabilitation, and development units. As Participant L expressed it:

“We work only in the disaster and early recovery phases, after the situation returns to normal, we hand over the mandate to another Muhammadiyah council to do development, because our mandate is only in disaster. We can be there after the disaster, but we cannot be the leader. We work together.”

Participant J also stated that collaborations between humanitarian and development unit were not only important for the implementation of programming, but also for enhancing organisational knowledge and understanding of different priorities.

“Through the coordination mechanism within YAKKUM’s units we discuss every issue. For example, the community development units they will talk about development issues, about poverty, health related to poverty, or vice versa, poverty related to health. We are influenced and encourage of this shared knowledge from different units. What I am talking about are the internal factors that motivates us to have further linking into development. We have seen that there are connectors of issues; in terms of poverty, emergencies, health issues. We discovered these connectors and we made an agenda to do joint advocacy on these specific issues. And that is why that, although we are from the emergency unit we also see these issues as interconnected with what we are doing right now. How to address poverty and how to know about Sustainable Development Goals. We try to link what we have done so far with those kinds of ideas and we are not limiting ourselves only to emergency, during this phase, but we are also focusing on that.”
4.3. Discussion: LRRD at an Indonesian national level perspective

The humanitarian-development divide is through the perspective of the interviewed participants from YEU and MDMC constituting an internal organisational division based on distinct temporal phases.

In the case of MDMC and YEU, the determination of their perspectives on the humanitarian sector and the degree of humanitarian-development integration is dependent on the abstraction level. If analysing the structure of MDMC and YEU internally within their respective umbrella organisations, it can be argued that they exemplify a first degree of integration, considering that the units had specific humanitarian phase-based mandates, with close cooperation and hand-over processes to other units and other organisations, and in this way linking relief, rehabilitation and development. Also, if regarding these emergency units as separate organisations from their respective umbrella organisations, then this may be argued to coincide with the Humanitarian Silo perspective.

However, all participants frequently emphasised their attachment to other units with development mandates, therefore the organisational structure of YAKKUM and Muhammadiyah may interpreted as supportive of the premises of the Humanitarian Ecosystem perspective. Also, despite the arguments of the participants for the nature of MDRC and YEU mandates as being purely humanitarian, they still implemented many activities bridging short-term relief and long-term development goals. They can therefore be regarded as implementing the fourth level of humanitarian-development integration.

The perspectives of MDMC and YEU are relatable to the temporal contexts in which they operate in. Unlike CFK which operates in disaster and non-disaster settings, Muhammadiyah and YAKKUM have divided their units according to phases. It is thus not surprising that MDMC and YEU have a framework of what constitutes “humanitarian” based on definite division of phases, while activities are
regarded more broadly. Contrastingly, CFK having a mandate independent of phases regarded humanitarian and development actions in a narrower perspective, based on if actions are providing physical goods or building capacities.
5. International stakeholder level - Plan International

In this chapter, the data gathered on the perspectives of Plan International will be presented and analysed. The data was collected through a pair interview with two staff members from Plan International Indonesia, conducted on August 8th, 2016, as well as two individual interviews with staff members from Plan International Sweden, conducted on March 24th and April 3rd, 2017. The two staff members from Indonesia were the Deputy Country Director (Participant M) and a Programme Support Manager (Participant N). The two staff members from Sweden were the National Programme Director (henceforth referred to as Participant O), and the Head of the Disaster Risk Management Unit (Participant P).

The data collected from the four participants was largely coherent, despite being collected in three separate settings and two different countries, indicating that the results were largely representative of the perspectives of the Plan International federation. The four participants had different contextual focuses; Participant M and N naturally discussed the topics from an Indonesian context, whereas Participant O contextualised several topics to her previous role as Country Director of Plan International Pakistan, especially relating to her personal experiences from leading the disaster response to the major earthquake in Pakistani Kashmir in 2005. Participant P on the other hand held a global perspective and expressed the most detailed information of Plan Internationals stance to the discussed themes.
5.1. Perspectives on the humanitarian-development divide

The four participants questioned the functionality of strict divisions of humanitarian and developmental phases, actors, and actions. Participant O exemplified by problematising the difficulty of attaching the HIV/AIDS pandemic response to a humanitarian or development label. Participant P similarly discussed other contexts need is both urgent and long-term and therefore does not fit under humanitarian/development labels; such as during protracted crises scenarios:

“We see that we are working in contexts for a very long time and we think about time perspective rather than anything else. Today the average time span for a refugee camp is around 16 years. 16 years of a child’s life is just way too long to only think about humanitarian relief, in the standard term of what that is. It also means that you will have to have some sort of development chance and for example have more serious education than just education in emergencies”

Participant P also argued that all contexts should be approached using the same standards, and added that many contexts which usually are regarded as being in a developmental phase exhibit the same types of dire humanitarian needs as contexts regarded as in a humanitarian phase:

“Sphere, for example, is a standard that applies everywhere, it doesn’t just have to be in humanitarian contexts. Why would you not talk about Sphere in a very impoverished part of Burkina Faso? Where you don’t have conflict or disaster, but people are really poor. They still have the right to 50 litres of water every day, that’s the minimum of what you need.”

All four participants argued that the pressure to implement a humanitarian-development divide is imposed in a top-down fashion. Participant M stated that Plan International Indonesia usually follow directions of the national government for what they considered as a humanitarian phase. Participant N further discussed how donors also impose a divide:

“There is an interesting case in our practice of emergency response: the donor wanted this to be pure emergency response project. And it needed to be done in
thirty days. So, you can see from the period it is really a humanitarian response project. And the way we design the project is that a big portion has development aspects, we wanted to do a training on resilience, we want to do a training on how to use water safely and to wash hands before the eating or cooking. These kinds of aspect on the project was rejected by the donors, because they wanted us only focused on the delivery of water."

Participant P stated that the relevance of the formal divide also follows a top-down pattern, with little or no relevance at field level:

“So, the further up you go in the food-chain the more of a divide it is. The further down you go, like if you talk to local organisations, or if you talk to children; it’s not like they one day say that now I live in a humanitarian setting and tomorrow I will live in a development setting, they just live there. They don’t know anything else, and they don’t really care if you talk about humanitarian relief or if you talk about development, is my experience. They care about what you are doing and the way that you are acting doing that, but not really what it’s called, in that sense.”

Participant O elaborated on this theme by contextualising to experiences from the Pakistani earthquake:

“Communities would not differentiate between development and humanitarian actors. They would differentiate those who are the army and those who are not, and those who are there to help them. If you went on top of the Himalayas in a small village, they wouldn’t have a clue. They would know what an army person is, but they wouldn’t know who a development actor is or what civil society is. Many would not even differentiate between NGOs and Taliban, they are seen as the same category, they are loosely structured organisations. A lot of them might like the Taliban much better than they like Plan. Because they understand, the Taliban, they come from those mountainous areas.”

The participants expressed that they did view the humanitarian-development divide as a relevant concept in terms of understanding specialised organisational knowledge; the differing skills employed to address stable contexts vis-à-vis emergencies in which actions must be performed under high levels of urgency. Participant M brought up practical procedures which can be challenging for actors usually operating under non-emergencies, such as the short time-frame for procurement and logistics. Participant O narrated how challenges like these emerged during the Pakistani earthquake; at a time when Plan International still
had relatively limited experience in emergency response, thus they immediately flew in experienced consultants to provide guidance, which resulted, in the opinion of the participant, in a highly successful disaster response.

Participant M and O expressed that the connections between humanitarian and development work has been reflected in the history of Plan. Despite Plan International’s original foundation lying in the emergency response during the Spanish Civil War, the organisation became mostly involved in development work and started to re-acquire skills in disaster management in connection with the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and the 2005 Pakistani earthquake. Participant M expressed this as: “It’s like a cycle, you have to go back and forth. Now of course Plan has already gained skills, gained a reputation we also want to improve our profile globally and be one of the recognised organisations for disaster response.”

5.2. Perspectives on bridging the humanitarian-development divide

The four participants all expressed the need for bridging the humanitarian-development divide at all levels. They all referred to Plan International’s embrace of the rights-based approach in their framing of linkages between humanitarian and development mandates by letting the convention on the Rights of the Child act as the central framework for all of Plan International’s operations regardless of context. Participant P stated:

“The main thing is that we don’t really have to define ourselves either as a humanitarian or development since we are a child right’s organisation that are working on contexts, and the contexts are just a way in which we work. We work for children’s rights. When we then work with implementing the child rights convention we need to do that in different types of contexts. Sometimes it is conflict, sometimes it is disasters, sometimes it’s even a middle or high income country, like Sweden. All of the states which have ratified the child’s rights convention, they need to uphold it.
So, it’s more the activities that change, but the rights, they don’t change, they are the same for all children.”

The participant further elaborated on the need for close monitoring of contexts to facilitate continuous adaptation of programming in accordance to the level of urgency and the capacity of the community:

“The aim is always the same, it’s just the way that you do it, so for us it’s more the idea that you need to be as fast as needed, but as developmental as possible in your response. As soon as possible you should try to transition over to doing more developmental-like activities in, what may be protracted crises for example. Maybe you need to do food distributions the first couple of months, markets are not functioning, you have to give food. Then, what can you do to target the food crises? You can change and you can see when markets are functioning and then you can do cash transfers instead. You can actually produce food. You can get food in the market, people can get what they need. They are not as dependent on aid delivery in that sense. You can give them seeds instead so that they can plant. And get back to as normal way and as developmental situation as possible. So, it’s about changing the way that you work, the longer that you are present, basically. So that you don’t stay and do food delivery for 50 years, like it has been in some places of the world.”

All participants repeatedly emphasise the need for adaptation to contextual developments, aiming at identifying ways of conducting activities addressing both immediate need as well as root-causes and long-term developmental goals as fast as possible. Participant P discussed how this model, referred to as the “Full Spectrum approach” differ from how she conceptualised classical operations of dual mandated operations; which see sees as:

“Dual mandate is a mindset approach, if you say you are dual that means that you have two legs, there are two teams, two ways of working and so on. Where you have your development team and your humanitarian team, and they don’t talk to each other, they don’t work with each other and they have difficulties of making things happen in the context. So, you don’t really take the best of two sides, you try to identify: is this humanitarian or is it development? And based on that you deploy your team.”

The “Full Spectrum approach”, is a concept related to LRRD discussed by Plan International in recent years and is expected to be formally conceptualised in a
publication in mid-2017. Participant P conceptualised the Full Spectrum approach as a full integration of humanitarian and development mandates into all contexts. Contexts in turn are regarded as a spectrum of required actions, not a humanitarian/developmental dichotomy.

To achieve this approach, all participants discussed the need for acquiring a two-way knowledge exchange between specialists in humanitarian and development actions. Participant O stated:

“We have some distinct competences in both humanitarian and development that you need to merge, and in different stages you need one or the other more. You shouldn't be condescending to knowledge and skills. There are different knowledge and skills but you have to work more closely with each other and respect each other’s knowledge and skills, and I think that is how we are working here as well. I would like to see that more, closer collaborations, different experiences. And I think that when they work together, which they have in Rwanda and Uganda, it works really, really well. You come in from two different perspectives, and you are in this together and you work on these linkages. It’s really really interesting to see how we can further develop that.”

Participant P likewise elaborated on the need for bridging the fundamental differences in knowledge and skills of actors whom identify themselves as exclusively humanitarian or developmental. She argued that developmental actors tend to be based in high levels of cooperation with state governments, and therefore lack knowledge and skills of how to operate in conflict-affected and fragile settings. Humanitarian actors oppositely were argued as to lack skills addressing complex needs and rights, as well as how to conduct capacity building and empowerment. All four participants reasoned that one fundamental aspect from development needed to be incorporated into humanitarian aid is the consistent view of targeted populations as active agents, and not simply as passive recipients of aid.

All participant argued that having both a humanitarian and development mandate had not affected access to target populations. Participant M pointed out that some actors in Aceh had been targeted in violent attacks, but not Plan International, and
the attacks were seen as a result of a general hostility towards outsiders regardless of operating under humanitarian or development mandates. Participant O asserted that the reasons for the violent attack against Plan International Pakistan in 2008 remains unknown but that they followed a pattern of violence against NGOs in general.

Participant O and P repeatedly emphasised that having long term presence is essential for achieving both humanitarian and developmental goals. They argued that for effective programming, trust needs to be built up over extended periods of time in a way that the humanitarian principles alone cannot provide. Participant P provided two telling contextual examples of this which are worth to be presented in full:

“What you want in implementing the humanitarian principles is trust. You want people to trust you basically. That is what the humanitarian principles are there for. It’s so that people should know that you are there not to do anything else than what you say you are going to do. And for us as an organisation it has proven quite interesting to see how in certain cases our long-term presence has helped us uphold the humanitarian principles in a better way than for other organisations. Let me give you an example; In far north Cameroon, where you have Boko Haram. We have had a field office there that did development work for many many years, then the conflict broke out. We had better access than many other organisations because we were known and trusted by the communities there. So, it wasn’t that we were going around and preaching about the humanitarian principles as such, it was just that we had been doing good, independent, neutral work before the conflict broke out. So, we were trusted by the community and then we were trusted to continue. So, it helped us in a way to be trusted and uphold the principles, just because we had the presence there before and we were there for a long time period.”

The second example concerns not only how trust affects access, but also the effectiveness of programming and prevention of violent confrontation:

During the Ebola response, there were quite a few cases where there were new humanitarian organisations coming into Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea. Plan International is the biggest INGO in Guinea. And there the big realisation was that Ebola needed to be stopped through community mobilisation. After a few months, everyone realised that you cannot stop Ebola at the clinics. It doesn’t really matter if you give people health care or not in that sense, as horrible as that was. To be able
to stop the disease from spreading, people needed to change their practices, their attitudes. They needed to change their burial practices, the way they cared for their sick and the dead. When this became clear there were organisations that went out and tried to talk to communities, to try to get them to change their behaviour. For example, MSF did this and they had staff that were killed by community members, because they didn’t trust them. They saw them as outsiders who were coming to preach these horrible things. They felt threatened basically. While Plan’s staff were able to convey these messages and work together with communities, and were trusted to deliver them. So, there we were successful in doing these community mobilisation-based changes. Just because we had also been working there before. That’s why I find sometimes that the basics of the humanitarian principles are of course extremely important, they are a part of how we should work. But in the end it’s about does people trust you or not. And for people to trust you sometimes need to stick around. You have to be there. So that can sometimes be the big added value of Plan International, we have this link between our humanitarian and development work and we can do this really really well.”

Participant M discussed how disasters can sometimes provide a window opportunity for both humanitarian and development actors to receive access to previously restricted areas. He contextualised this to the tsunami response in Aceh, where he stated no INGOs had access before the tsunami. After the tsunami, the area opened up for relief, rehabilitation and development, albeit still encountering restrictions.

Participant O also argued that disaster in themselves create opportunities of implementing developmental changes:

“If you set up schools and camps for example you also change parents’ perceptions because aid could be for children who have never been to school before in their lives. You talk about this six month window of opportunity. You know people are very very open because everything has changed. So, you are very open to new ideas, you are very open to change your whole life. But that closes very quickly again. I saw that parents who never had their kids in school all of a sudden had dreams of their children's future and education.”
5.3. Discussion: LRRD at the international level perspective

Even though phase-based reasoning was included in the argumentations of the four participants, the phases were considered fluid and not fixed, with humanitarian and developmental actions being performed simultaneously. The perspectives thus correspond to the Contiguum perspective of LRRD. This perspective is relatable to the international level mandate of the organisation and the multitude of complex contexts in which they operate; as made evident by the participants’ problematization of dividing phases in cases of protracted crises in long term refugee settlements, and contexts with extreme levels of endemic poverty which were classified as “permanent emergencies” by Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell (1994).

All participants were clear in their view that actors do not need to be divided into a humanitarian and development dichotomy and that working in both leads to more effective programming. Their perspective thus coincides with the Humanitarian Ecosystem perspective.

The participants further argued that even though short-term actions in the immediate urgency of disaster responses are necessary, actions fulfilling both short-term, long-term and developmental purposes should be implemented as soon as possible, in accordance with the fourth degree of humanitarian-development integration.
6. Conclusions

In this chapter, the conclusions of the studied cases will be related to the theoretical framework to provide answers to the research question: *How do the researched stakeholders view the divisions and linkages of humanitarian- and development action?*

The conclusions are presented in three subchapters corresponding to the three parameters of the thesis’ framework of humanitarian-development integration: phases, actors, and actions. The fourth subchapter presents recommendations for future research and policy makers.

6.1. Humanitarian and developmental phases

The stakeholders at the three studied levels all discussed the relevance of phases. At the local level, community members made a distinction between the phase of the disaster and the phase when the community had returned to a relative degree of normalcy. This distinction was also highlighted by staff from CFK, MDMC, and YEU, who discussed how LRRD is to be implemented through transition of actions between phases. These stakeholders also emphasised the need of monitoring contexts to determine phases. This shows that the Continuum model’s framework on disaster chronology does possess a certain degree of relevance in Indonesia.

While the interviewed staff members from Plan International also referred to phases in their argumentations, a more complex perspective was expressed in which phases were not seen as dichotomous, but instead as a spectrum of changes to numerous contextual factors. Emphasis was again put on monitoring contexts, with the aim of determining incremental changes. The complex perspective on phases expressed by staff from Plan International is undoubtedly
affected by the multitude of different contexts in which their organisation is present in; such as protracted crises and complex political emergencies.

The Continuum model as discussed during the early LRRD debate however implies a strict division of assigned actors and actions to each respective phase. The operations of Plan International and CFK clearly did not follow this perspective, since they were explicit about their developmental profiles, whereas MDMC and YEU did see themselves as “purely humanitarian” organisational units working in designated disaster phases. The different stakeholders distinguished phases slightly differently; MDMC’s mandate included rehabilitation while YAKKUM had a separate unit other than YEU responsible for rehabilitation programmes. Furthermore, during disaster phases, MDMC and YEU also performed actions which would often be consider developmental, such as livelihood programmes and human rights training. Their programming can thus not be considered coherent with that of the Continuum model.

6.2. Humanitarian and developmental organisational profiles

A concrete divide between humanitarian and development organisations was not perceived by the local community members, most of whom did not express any detailed concept of a difference between humanitarian or development organisations. Some had noticed a difference in mandate in terms of length of organisations’ local presence after the disaster, but had not reflected upon whether these organisations would classify themselves in different categories or not. The results from the survey provided supportive evidence that the local community members had very low familiarity with the term “humanitarian”.

Similarly, the staff of the local level NGO; CFK, did not put any emphasis on having a humanitarian profile, despite their several humanitarian disaster responses. Instead, they put heavy emphasis upon their religious profile as a faith-based organisation, an emphasise also shared with MDMC and YEU concerning their organisational identities. They all discussed how their Christian vis-à-vis Muslim
profiles had a greater impact for access to populations than their humanitarian/developmental profiles.

The participants from Plan International instead put an emphasis on their identity as a child right’s organisation, which they argued had precedence over their profile as a humanitarian and development actor. They further argued that their long-term presence is what provided them with access and the acceptance of communities, rather than their recognition as a humanitarian actor. This perspective of Plan International’s organisational profile is clearly incongruous with the Humanitarian Silo perspective, supporting the Ecosystem perspective instead.

The organisational profiles of MDMC and YEU are, as mentioned in the previous section, depending on if they are viewed as individual organisations or as direct parts of their respective umbrella organisations. However, the connection to the developmental mandates of their respective umbrella organisations, Muhammadiyah and YAKKUM, means that their profiles do not adhere to the dichotomic organisational profiles of the Humanitarian Silo perspective. Instead, MDMC and YEU exhibit a complex organisational structure in consistency with the Humanitarian Ecosystem perspective. Both MDMC and YEU argued for implementation of LRRD through close collaboration with their developmental counterparts Muhammadiyah and YAKKUM, as well as with external humanitarian and development actors. This type of cooperation between explicit humanitarian and developmental actors can be regarded as the first degree of integration. However, if regarding Muhammadiyah and YAKKUM from an external perspective, then their level of integration would be the fourth degree since they embody a dual capacity of developmental and humanitarian mandates, and several of their actions during disaster responses have capacity building-qualities.
6.3. Humanitarian and developmental actions

As mentioned in the two sections above, the actions conducted by YEU and MDMC were by themselves seen as a purely humanitarian, while externally they could be regarded as belonging to the fourth degree of integration.

At the local level, actions regarded as humanitarian were largely limited to the provision of physical goods, while development actions were conceptualised as having the purpose of capacity building. The participants from CFK expressed the need for division between these types of actions, with physical goods predominantly being delivered during the disaster phase and capacity building being performed during times of normalcy. However, it was also emphasised that the delivery of goods was only an action to be performed when no other alternative is available, and that the aim should be to implement capacity building elements even during the disaster phase, in accordance with the third degree of integration.

The participants from Plan International heavily emphasised the aim to be as “developmental as possible” in disaster contexts by attempting to include actions that simultaneously serves both short-, and long-term goals. Combining humanitarian and development actions in disaster contexts were not only viewed as possible to conduct, but disasters were even regarded as “windows of opportunity” to conduct transformative actions for the benefits of children’s rights. This perspective on actions is a clear example of the fourth degree of integration.

6.4. Recommendations

6.4.1. Research

The studied cases in this thesis provided many interesting aspects of LRRD for further research. These include how actors during emergencies can utilise the “window of opportunity”, the contextualisation of LRRD-design, monitoring of
contexts for LRRD-adaptability of actions, as well as the functioning of religious profiles vis-à-vis humanitarian/development profiles.

Further studies should be conducted to study perspectives of LRRD from other types of stakeholders, including actors who do define their organisational profiles as exclusively humanitarian or developmental. Perspectives of stakeholders in other types of contexts should also be researched. It would be especially relevant to research perspectives from stakeholders in disaster contexts which in this thesis have been identified as of particular relevance for LRRD-strategies; such as protracted crises and complex political emergencies.

6.4.2. Policy

The conclusion of this research does not provide conclusive evidence for the perspectives of stakeholders at different levels, they do however provide examples of the perspectives of the types of organisations that do not fit into the view of a concrete humanitarian sector. The cases in this thesis show how organisations from the local, national, and international level can work to implement the principles of LRRD in terms of bridging divisions in phases, actors, and actions. These are the types of actors that themselves can fulfil humanitarian as well as developmental goals in accordance with the foundational imperative of LRRD. A way to achieve LRRD from a policy level is to adapt funding mechanisms to accommodate organisations with the intent and capacity to implement LRRD.

Based on the research of this thesis, to advance the functioning of humanitarian action, especially in regards to LRRD, the dichotomous framing of the humanitarian and development sectors needs to be discarded. It is a well-known fact that many of the major actors involved in humanitarian action are not exclusively operating under humanitarian mandates, yet this fact is disregarded in humanitarian exceptionalistic frameworks embedded in much of the humanitarian discourse and in policy documents, such as the 2007 European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. Donors and policymakers need to acknowledge the complexity involved in
humanitarian action in terms of phases, actors and actions. A generic model of humanitarian action to fit all contexts is neither effective nor realistic.

This however does not mean that the humanitarian principles in any way should be viewed as less viable. As expressed by the interviewed staff members from Plan International; adopting both humanitarian and development mandates require a high degree of standards and principles imposed on both long-term and short-term actions. For donor agencies, approaching LRRD strategies in funding mechanisms will require stringent efforts to safeguard humanitarian funds from being used in ways which may violate the humanitarian principles.
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Brussels:
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Appendix I. Survey form in Bahasa Indonesian

Survei Penelitian Lembaga Pemberi Bantuan
Tujuan survei ini adalah untuk mengetahui pemahaman masyarakat terhadap lembaga pemberi bantuan yang sudah pernah ada di Mentawai. Survei ini akan digunakan dalam skripsi akademik dan responden tidak perlu menuliskan nama. Partisipasi dalam survei ini adalah mereka yang rela menjawab pertanyaan di bawah ini.

Umur: _____ tahun  Jenis Kelamin: □ Laki-laki  □ Perempuan

Pertanyaan-Pertanyaan

1. Dimana Anda tinggal sekarang?
   Nama Dusun: ____________________________  Nama Desa: ____________________________

2. Apakah rumah Anda direlokasi karena tsunami 2010?  □ Ya  □ Tidak

3. Seberapa banyak Anda (atau keluarga Anda) menerima bantuan yang diberikan di Mentawai saat bencana?
   □ Banyak  □ Tidak ada
   □ Cukup banyak  □ Tidak tahu
   □ Sedikit  □ Tidak mau jawab

   Jika ada, sebutkan nama lembaga yang pernah memberikan bantuan: ____________________________

4. Apakah Anda mengetahui istilah "lembaga kemanusiaan"?
   □ Ya  □ Tidak  □ Kurang tahu  □ Tidak mau menjawab

   Jika tidak, Anda tidak perlu menjawab pertanyaan-pertanyaan berikut. Terima kasih atas partisipasi Anda.

5. Apakah Anda mengetahui istilah "lembaga pengembangan masyarakat"?
   □ Ya  □ Tidak  □ Kurang tahu  □ Tidak mau menjawab

   Jika tidak, Anda tidak perlu menjawab pertanyaan-pertanyaan berikut. Terima kasih atas partisipasi Anda.

6. Jika Anda menjawab "ya" untuk pertanyaan 4 dan 5 diatas, menurut Anda apakah ada perbedaan antara “Lembaga Kemanusiaan” dan “Lembaga Pengembangan Masyarakat”?
   □ Sangat berbeda
   □ Cukup berbeda
   □ Sedikit berbeda
   □ Tidak berbeda
   □ Kurang tahu
   □ Tidak mau menjawab

Jawaban:

☐ Kurang tahu
☐ Tidak mau menjawab

Terima kasih atas partisipasi Anda.
Appendix II. Survey questions in English

Questionnaire beneficiaries:

The purpose of this questionnaire is to study the perception of aid delivered in Mentawai. The questionnaire will be used in an academic thesis, answers will be anonymous and participation is completely voluntary.

Questions

Where do you live now?
Village:
Sub-village:

Where did you live at the time of the tsunami (2010)?
Village:
Sub-village:

In your opinion, how much personal experience have you had of aid delivered to Mentawai?
Much experience# Some experience# Little experience# No experience# Uncertain# Do not want to answer#

If any, what aid organisations have you had experience of?

Are you familiar with the term "humanitarian organisation"?
Yes# No# Uncertain# Do not want to answer#

If no, the following questions do not apply. Thank you so much for participating.
Are you familiar with the term "development organisation"?
#Yes #No #Uncertain #Do not want to answer
If no, the following questions do not apply. Thank you so much for participating.

If yes to the previous two questions, what do you think of the differences between "humanitarian organisations" and "development organisation"?
There are large differences# There are some differences# There are small difference# There are no differences# Uncertain# Do not want to answer#

What in your opinion are the differences (if any) between "humanitarian organisations" and "development organisations"?
Answer:

Uncertain#
Do not want to answer#
Appendix III. Survey results

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Survey #</th>
<th>Needed assistance completing the form</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Sub-village</th>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Where you relocated after the 2010 tsunami?</th>
<th>In your opinion, how much personal experience have you had of aid delivered to Mentawai?</th>
<th>If any, which aid organisations have you had experience of?</th>
<th>Are you familiar with the term “humanitarian organisations”?</th>
<th>Are you familiar with the term “development organisations”?</th>
<th>If yes to the previous two questions, what do you think of the differences between “humanitarian organisations” and “development organisations”?</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Bulka monga</td>
<td>Taikako</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Somewhat experience</td>
<td>Dinos, IOM, CDM, Uncertain</td>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>Small differences Humanitarian organisation provides aid when there is disaster. Development organisations focus on long-term development of communities.</td>
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Humanitarian organisation only ensure the protection of populations. However, Development org not only ensure the protection of populations but also develop the human resources.
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<tr>
<th>No</th>
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<td>No</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>47</td>
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<td>UND P Yes Yes</td>
<td>No difference</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>Taikako</td>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>IOM, CFK</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Female</td>
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<td>Taikako</td>
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<td>57</td>
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<td>Taikako</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>Taikako</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Corp</td>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>Organization</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Ruamaga Taikako</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Pamarinta Proposi, NGO, SPT Surfaid, YEU, CFK, CDR M; IOM, UNDP</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix IV. Participant list

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assigned code</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Male, community member of sub village Pasibuat, Taikako village, Sikakap Sub-district. Farmer by occupation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Male, community member of sub village Pasibuat, Taikako village, Sikakap Sub-district. Gardener and fisherman by occupation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Male, priest and head of the local church organisation GKB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Male, political leader of the sub-village Bulakmonga.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Female, principal of a kindergarten and head of a local education network consisting of 17 schools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Female, CFK Programme Officer, native Sikakap community member.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Male, CFK Programme Officer, native Sikakap community member.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Female, CFK Finance Officer, based in Medan, Sumatra.</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Female, CFK co-founder and Technical Advisor, based in Medan, Sumatra.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>Female, head of the Communications and Information Department of YEU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>Female, head of Human Resources of YEU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>Male, Vice Secretary-General of MDMC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>Male, Deputy Country Director of Plan International Indonesia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>Male, Programme Support Manager of Plan International Indonesia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>Female, National Programme Director of Plan International Sweden, former Country director of Plan International Pakistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>Female, Head of the Disaster Risk Management Unit of Plan International Sweden.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>