Incentives for Implementation? The relationship between biased versus neutral mediators and the degree of peace agreement implementation
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Abstract

In peace and conflict research the study of peace agreement implementation has often focussed on the duration of peace. This however risks overlooking the implementation of the peace agreement as a whole. Simultaneously, the relationship between biased versus neutral mediators and the degree of agreement implementation has not been systematically investigated. This study addresses this gap by asking: how does biased mediation affect the implementation of peace agreements? I apply the logic of theories on artificial incentives for peace (Beardsley 2008) and argue that biased mediators will create and use more temporary incentives to induce the warring parties towards a negotiated settlement. Once a peace agreement is signed and the mediator’s influence wanes, it is argued that these artificial incentives ultimately result in reduced momentum for implementation and a lower degree of implementation overall. This leads to the expected hypothesis that if a mediator is biased peace agreements will be implemented to a lower degree. Using the methods of structured, focussed comparison and process tracing, this paper will compare the mediation and implementation processes in the Tajikistan and Burundian civil wars. The findings display partial support for the hypothesised causal mechanism, although the hypothesis overall is not supported.
Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations .................................................................................................................. 5
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................ 6
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................. 6
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 7
Previous literature and specifying the research gap ................................................................. 10
Theoretical framework ................................................................................................................... 13
  Conceptualising biased mediation, impartiality and leverage .................................................... 13
  When can biased mediators be effective? .................................................................................. 14
  Conceptualising artificial incentives for peace ....................................................................... 15
  Constructing the argument ....................................................................................................... 16
Research design ............................................................................................................................ 19
  Method ...................................................................................................................................... 19
  Case selection ............................................................................................................................ 20
  Case typology ............................................................................................................................ 24
  Operationalisation of the theoretical framework .................................................................... 24
  Time frame and data sources .................................................................................................... 29
  Structure of analysis ................................................................................................................ 30
Case 1 – Empirical analysis of Tajikistan ................................................................................... 32
  Background to the civil war and mediation in Tajikistan ...................................................... 32
  Verifying the independent variable ....................................................................................... 33
  Testing the intervening variable ............................................................................................. 35
  Measuring the dependent variable ......................................................................................... 39
  Within-case analysis .............................................................................................................. 43
Case 2 – Empirical analysis of Burundi ......................................................................................... 45
  Background to the civil war and mediation in Burundi ........................................................... 45
  Verifying the independent variable ........................................................................................ 46
  Testing the intervening variable ............................................................................................. 47
  Measuring the dependent variable ......................................................................................... 51
  Within-case analysis .............................................................................................................. 55
Comparative analysis .................................................................................................................... 57
  The use of artificial incentives for peace .............................................................................. 57
  The implementation of the peace agreements ...................................................................... 59
  Overall implications for the causal mechanism and hypothesis ........................................... 61
  Alternative explanations .......................................................................................................... 62
  Additional observations ......................................................................................................... 63
Limitations and biases ........................................................................................................... 64
Conclusions ............................................................................................................................ 67
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................... 69

List of Abbreviations

CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States
CNDD – National Council for the Defense of Democracy
FROLINA – National Liberation Front
IMC – Implementation Monitoring Committee
OAU – Organisation for African Unity
OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE - Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OIC - Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
UN – United Nations
UTO – United Tajik Opposition
List of Tables

Table 1. Control Variables ................................................................. 22
Table 2. Questions and indicators of mediator bias .................................. 25
Table 3. Questions and indicators of artificial incentives for peace ................ 26
Table 4. Questions and indicators for measuring the pace of implementation .... 27
Table 5. Measuring momentum for implementation .................................. 28
Table 6. Measuring the degree of implementation .................................... 29
Table 7. Questions and indicators of mediator bias .................................... 34
Table 8. Summary of artificial incentives in Tajikistan ................................ 39
Table 9. The pace of implementation in Tajikistan ................................... 40
Table 10. Overall degree of implementation in Tajikistan ............................ 43
Table 11. Questions and indicators of mediator bias ................................. 46
Table 12. Summary of artificial incentives in Burundi ............................... 51
Table 13. Pace of implementation in Burundi ........................................ 52
Table 14. Overall degree of implementation in Burundi ............................. 55
Table 15. Summary of artificial incentives for peace ............................... 59
Table 16. Summary of the implementation processes ................................ 61

List of Figures

Figure 1. Theoretical Framework .......................................................... 18
Figure 2. Points of Empirical Investigation ............................................ 20
Introduction

When a peace agreement is signed to end the tumult of civil war this is often lauded as a triumph of conflict resolution and it is hoped this achievement will be the first step in a journey towards a peaceful future. However, the signatures fixed to these documents have little meaning if the parties to the conflict are unable to commit to its implementation once the spotlight of the international community has faded. Civil war peace agreements in particular are notoriously fragile and prone to violent relapse (DeRouen and Bercovitch 2008). One only needs to glance at the experiences of Chad, Sudan, Guatemala, Colombia and Liberia to see this tragic pattern unfold1. An increasingly popular method for securing peace settlements is through the use of third party mediation (Bercovitch et al. 2008). Mediators assume the role of a go-between to assist the parties in reaching a negotiated compromise, and while some mediators have no interests in the type of settlement, others will openly favour one of the parties or one outcome over another.

The utility of biased mediation has been explored in relation to how these mediators encourage warring parties to sign a peace agreement (Kydd 2003; Smith and Stam 2003; Svensson 2007; Savun 2008) and scholars have attempted to draw conclusions about the quality and content of the agreements biased mediators tend to reach (Svensson 2009). However, thus far, very little research has focussed on whether these agreements are eventually implemented. Likewise, a significant amount of research exists on why certain peace agreements are implemented while others are not (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Mattes and Savun 2009; DeRouen et al. 2009; DeRouen et al. 2010). Yet to date, scant attention has been paid to the nexus between biased mediation and agreement implementation. This paper proposes to address this research gap by asking: how does biased mediation affect the implementation of peace agreements?

In doing so, rather than measuring the durability of peace, this study will assess the implementation of a peace agreement as a whole. This is an important distinction, as the attainment of peace is only one element within the broader framework of a comprehensive peace agreement. This study therefore aims to understand whether and how the presence of biased mediators, compared with unbiased mediators, will affect the degree that peace agreements are enacted in the long run and whether their use of so-called ‘artificial

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1 Since 1989, Chad, Sudan, Guatemala, Colombia and Liberia witnessed the signing of 11, 10, 16, 4 and 11 peace agreements respectively (Wallensteen 2015, 130).
incentives’ is an influential part of this causal story. It is hoped that by enhancing our knowledge of these processes, more nuanced information about the effects of biased versus neutral mediation on agreement implementation can be gleaned. Ultimately, this will be beneficial for researchers, practitioners and policy makers alike when deciding or recommending who should be assigned to mediate in civil wars to maximise the likelihood of an agreement being implemented to the fullest extent.

To ascertain whether there is a relationship between biased mediation and agreement implementation, the logic of a previously established theory on how mediation can affect the longevity of peace will be applied. This theory posits that all third-party mediators create and often deliberately use artificial incentives for peace during the negotiations to make a settlement more appealing than the continuation of conflict (Beardsley 2008, 2011). These incentives could come in the form of tangible rewards or punishments such as foreign aid or economic sanctions, or intangible rewards and punishments, including prestige or political alienation. It is therefore predicted that the more artificial incentives a mediator creates, the less likely peace is to last once these incentives wear off. The logic of this theory will be applied to test whether biased mediators create more artificial incentives for peace and whether this in turn affects the degree of agreement implementation. In combination with theories about how biased mediators are expected to use leverage to influence their preferred parties, I argue that biased mediators will create and use more artificial incentives for peace than unbiased mediators, therefore reducing the likelihood that peace agreements will be fully implemented. This leads us to hypothesise that if a mediator is biased peace agreements will be implemented to a lower degree.

A binary, qualitative comparison will be employed, using the cases of the Tajikistan civil war (1992-1997) and the Burundian civil war (1993-2003), focussing on the mediation efforts of Russia and Nelson Mandela respectively. The data will be collected according to the method of a structured, focussed comparison, and process tracing will also be used when investigating the degree of implementation. Primary sources, such as news articles will be drawn upon throughout this study in addition to a range of secondary sources, including online databases, historical accounts and academic articles.

The findings uncovered in this study are mixed, and therefore cannot claim to provide support for the hypothesis, although partial support for the causal mechanism is found. There is evidence to suggest that the biased mediator (Russia) did create and use more artificial incentives for peace, and to greater effect, than the neutral efforts of Nelson Mandela, however this did not result in a lower degree of overall implementation in
Tajikistan compared with Burundi. The empirical analysis further demonstrates that although the momentum for implementation was more sustained in Burundi, this may have been due to the continued presence of an external facilitator, rather than the resolve of the warring parties alone.

From here, an outline of previous literature related to the research gap will be provided before the theoretical framework for the study is explained. Next, an overview of the research design and methodology will follow before the empirical analysis itself is conducted. The results of the analysis will then be compared and discussed, along with potential alternative explanations, limitations of the study and the final conclusions.
Previous literature and specifying the research gap

A substantial body of research exists on the function and utility of biased mediation in conflict resolution and yet it remains a strongly contested issue (Wallensteen and Svensson 2014, 321). Previous work has examined how biased mediation can be effective with respect to how information is credibly conveyed between warring parties (Kydd 2003; Smith and Stam 2003; Savun 2008). These analyses suggest that biased mediators can be advantageous because the mediator’s preferred party will be more inclined to trust their advice and agree to concessions when they know the mediator favours them. Research has also been conducted on the direction of biased mediation (either government or rebel biased) and the likelihood of reaching a peace agreement (Svensson 2007). These findings indicate that government biased mediators are positively associated with a negotiated settlement being reached, while rebel biased mediators are not, adding important insights into the role of third party bias (Svensson 2007). Bias has also been investigated with regard to the use of third party military coercion, with recent research concluding that a militarily powerful mediator should be openly and demonstrably biased if threats of military intervention are to be believed and thus effective at inducing a peace deal (Favretto 2009). However, despite this plethora of research, thus far, scant attention has been paid to how bias affects the implementation of peace agreements. While studies have assessed the relationship between mediation bias and the likelihood of reaching a peace agreement, little has been done to understand whether they are eventually implemented. Until now, our knowledge on bias has been restricted to the point at which a peace agreement is signed.

Scholars have also dedicated increasing attention to the factors affecting the duration of peace once an agreement is signed, particularly with respect to post-war allocations of power. In 2003, Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie argued, using evidence obtained through quantitative analysis, that the inclusion of power sharing provisions within a peace agreement had a positive and significant effect on the duration of peace (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003). These findings were partially reinforced and nuanced by subsequent pieces of research, which indicate that peace is especially likely to endure when military and territorial power sharing is enacted, while political power sharing alone was not found to positively affect the duration of peace (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; DeRouen et al. 2009). Further support for the effectiveness of power sharing was also found in a 2009 study by Mattes and Savun, who demonstrate that fear-reducing mechanisms such as power sharing and third party guarantees, as well as cost-increasing measures, including the physical separation of fighting
forces and the presence of peacekeepers, can increase the likelihood of lasting peace. Indeed, the impact of peacekeeping and third party security guarantees have also been extensively examined and found to be highly influential determinants of lasting peace (Walter 2002; Fortna 2008).

Additional strands of research have revealed that the overall capacity of the state significantly impacts the level of peace agreement implementation (DeRouen et al. 2010), while others draw attention to the detrimental role of ‘spoilers’ and ‘veto players’ who may seek to destabilise and undermine a peace agreement if they are excluded from negotiations and cannot be convinced to adhere to its terms (Stedman 1997; Nilsson 2008; Greenhill and Major 2007). Thus, the content of peace agreements and the conditions surrounding their implementation have been thoroughly examined with respect to the duration of peace. However, as mentioned, lasting peace is only one aspect of peace agreement implementation and far less consideration has been given to the implementation of peace accords in their entirety. Furthermore, no attempts have been made to test whether the presence of a biased or neutral mediator matters for agreement implementation in the long-run.

One piece of research which has taken tentative steps towards addressing the long-term implications of biased mediation has been conducted by Isak Svensson (2009) who examines the type of stipulations that biased and neutral mediators tend to secure within negotiated agreements. Through a quantitative analysis of peace agreements, Svensson finds that biased mediators, more often than neutral mediators, tend to be associated with institutionally elaborate peace agreements that contain provisions argued to be conducive to durable peace, such as political, military and territorial power sharing, third party security guarantees and amnesties (Svensson 2009). Svensson contends this is because biased mediators have incentives to protect the interests of the party they are partial towards and can use leverage to pressure them into making more costly concessions. This contrasts with neutral mediators who are thought to be less interested in the sustainability of the agreement and hence will be more likely to push the parties towards a settlement containing fewer of the aforementioned stipulations (Svensson 2009). Thus, it is claimed that biased mediators on the whole will be more likely to reach better quality and therefore more durable peace agreements.

Nevertheless, Svensson acknowledges that he does not look at the eventual implementation of these agreements and notes that other researchers have found mediation to have contrasting positive and negative effects on peace in the short and long run (Beardsley 2008). This begs the question, that if biased mediators are expected to reach better quality
peace agreements, does this also lead to higher levels of implementation? Indeed, this presents a critical research gap as it raises the possibility that even peace agreements deemed to be superior in quality may not ultimately be implemented. On this particular aspect, the current literature falls largely silent. We can also see that the literature on agreement implementation rarely mentions the role of biased mediation and focusses mainly on the duration of peace alone. This imposes significant limitations on our understanding of the requirements for holistic peace agreement implementation and the role of third party mediators in achieving this.
Theoretical framework

This section will detail the theoretical foundations upon which this research project is based. Key theories and concepts will be outlined with regard to answering the research question: *how does biased mediation affect the implementation of peace agreements?* A causal diagram is given to demonstrate the linkages connecting the author’s argumentation and the resulting hypothesis will be presented.

Conceptualising biased mediation, impartiality and leverage

The concept of biased mediation, as opposed to impartial or neutral mediation, is highly contested in the research community. It is particularly controversial as many would consider bias to be a violation of the basic premise of mediation, where impartiality allows a mediator to gain the trust of both parties to the conflict (Nathan 1999; Fisher 1995, Young 1967). Nevertheless, a growing body of research has emerged which demonstrates that biased mediators can, under certain circumstances, be effective at bringing conflicting parties to an agreement. The contested nature of this debate is a central motivation for this research which aims to shed further light on the functions of bias and impartiality in mediation.

For the purposes of this study, mediation will be defined broadly as “a voluntary political process in which a third-party actor assists the disputing parties in negotiating an agreement” as outlined by Svensson and Lindgren (2013, 707). Therefore, as well as non-coercive strategies, mediation in this paper will also encompass instances of intervention where the mediator has the ability to ‘promise rewards or threaten punishments’ (Fisher 1995), including the use of military force.

Furthermore, I adopt the definition of biased mediation used by previous scholars where bias is dependent on “the extent to which the third party derives utility from the allocation of the stakes to each side in the dispute” (Beber 2012, 403). This definition focusses mainly on ‘bias of source’ or a preferred party (Carnevale and Arad 1996, 45), rather than ‘bias of content’ - a preferred outcome (Carnevale and Arad 1994). This contrasts with an impartial or neutral mediator who has no preferences for a particular party, as defined by Kydd (2003). The terms ‘impartial’ and ‘neutral’ throughout this paper will be used interchangeably following the example of Beber (2012, 403).
When can biased mediators be effective?

A central claim in support of biased mediation is that it allows the mediator to exercise greater leverage over at least one of the parties (Kydd 2003; Svensson 2009). Leverage has been primarily used by these proponents to refer to material costs and benefits. The source of this leverage is deemed to be the mediator’s closer ties to their preferred party, as they will likely have pre-existing relationships which the mediator can capitalise on in the negotiations (Svensson 2009). This will allow the biased mediator to exert greater pressure on their preferred party to commit to costly concessions that otherwise would be difficult to extract (Touval and Zartman 1989, 129). While a neutral mediator also may have the ability to utilise tangible (material) costs and benefits in the negotiations, it is implied that they would be less capable of successfully applying this leverage because they don’t possess close ties to one of the parties.

Mediators may also be able to use less tangible forms of influence in peace negotiations, which are based on “psychological processes or social norms” (Kirgis 2014, 104). For instance, appealing to a party’s conscience could encourage them to question the morality of their actions, and whether continued warfare could damage their reputation and support base within the international community and at home (Beardsley 2008). However, following the logic of how material leverage is utilised, these forms of intangible leverage are also likely to be even more effective when you already have closer ties with one or more of the warring parties. Both biased and neutral mediators could possess shared norms and ideologies with one or both of the parties, however a biased mediator is better able to take advantage of these, as they can use pre-existing relations to increase the pressure on the side they are closer to. Hence biased mediators will again be better positioned to encourage their side to make more costly concessions than neutral mediators.

In addition to leverage, it is further argued that biased mediators are better able to act as credible conveyors of information in at least two ways. Firstly, Andrew Kydd argues that a mediator that favours one of the parties will be trusted by that side to convey credible information, placing them in a better position to counsel towards restraint (Kydd 2003). This stands in contrast to neutral mediators, argues Kydd, because neutral mediators will not be trusted by either party to convey sincere information as they are only interested in ending the conflict. Secondly, it is argued that credibility also comes from the knowledge that a biased mediator wants to protect their side and has a desire to reach a particular outcome (Svensson 2009). The transparency of their preferences will act as a credible signal that they are
prepared to use leverage to secure their preferred solution, whereas it will be assumed that a neutral mediator will not be prepared to use leverage in case this precipitates the breakdown of the negotiations (Svensson 2009).

The combination of leverage and credibility that stem from possessing preferences in the conflict are crucial to understanding how biased mediation can be beneficial in situations of incomplete information and uncertain intentions. However, it is these qualities that I claim will ultimately hinder the implementation of these agreements.

Conceptualising artificial incentives for peace

When a mediator intervenes in a conflict they will adopt certain strategies to try to bring the parties towards a settlement (Bercovitch et al. 2008). According to the literature on bargaining theory, this suggests that the mediator must find a way of altering the ‘bargaining space’ between the conflicting parties until there is an overlap in their preferences – the alternatives that they would prefer to conflict (Beardsley 2008). In order to do this, a mediator will have to either facilitate the realisation of overlapping bargaining space which already exists, or they can create an overlap in the bargaining space by altering the costs of war themselves. The latter is a more manipulative strategy which requires greater intervention and it is this which forms the basis for what Beardsley terms ‘artificial incentives’ for peace.

In his 2008 paper titled ‘Agreement without Peace?’ Beardsley examines the effect that mediation has on the durability of peace and finds that in the short term, mediation makes peace agreements more likely. However, over time this effect diminishes to the point where conflict is more likely to recur than if no mediation had taken place (Beardsley 2008). It is argued that this occurs because the mediator temporarily alters the bargaining space through ‘artificial incentives’ which ultimately cannot be sustained after the agreement has been signed. The three mediation strategies which Beardsley claims can produce artificial incentives include the communication of private information between the parties, leveraging tangible and intangible costs, and lastly, promises of post-agreement monitoring and enforcement (Beardsley 2008). While these incentives help the parties to reach an agreement in the short term, once the influence of the mediator wanes and these incentives expire, the parties’ preferences are likely to diverge to the point where they believe they can gain more from conflict than peace. Werner and Yuen (2005) also uphold this view, claiming that mediation may result in a settlement with ‘unnatural agreement terms’ which don’t reflect
the parties’ true expectations about what would have happened if they had continued to fight. Crucially, a mediator that focusses on manipulating the parties’ preferences in a forceful bid for peace, may prevent them from resolving the incompatibility at the heart of the conflict. Therefore, Beardsley (2008, 2011) argues that mediation might only allow for a short break in hostilities and make conflict more likely to recur in the long run. This study will focus on how biased mediation affects the overall implementation of an agreement, rather than the durability of peace. However, the same theoretical logic regarding the impact of artificial incentives for peace is expected to apply.

Elaborating further on this argument, it is asserted that manipulative mediation strategies that rely on forceful leverage are more likely to create artificial incentives for peace than those which simply facilitate the realisation of a compromise (Beardsley 2011, Werner and Yuen 2005). However, Beardsley does not explore the possibility that different actors could create more or different types of incentives for peace than others. For Beardsley, all mediators are biased in some way, whether towards securing peace, or securing a particular outcome for their preferred side (Beardsley 2011, 22). Therefore, all mediators could have interests in using manipulative strategies to achieve a settlement. Furthermore, he also advocates that all mediators, whether powerful or not, are capable of using leverage and adopting manipulative mediation strategies. He argues that while mediators with power and resources are able to use tangible (material or physical) leverage, mediators without such resources can use intangible (immaterial) leverage to manipulate parties’ preferences for war or peace (Beardsley 2008). The mechanism that creates artificial incentives according to Beardsley is the use of a manipulative strategy, not the strength of the actor or their relationship with the parties.

It is precisely this aspect of third party mediation which this study aims to test. If both neutral and biased mediators are able to use leverage and have incentives to use this to achieve an agreement, will they also create artificial incentives which jeopardise peace in equal measure? By examining how biased and neutral mediators wield their leverage this will allow us to see what effect bias can be expected to have on the eventual implementation of peace agreements.

**Constructing the argument**

As previously outlined, one of the key ways in which it is claimed that biased mediators are able to reach peace agreements is through the application of leverage over the side they are
closest to in order to pressure them into making costly concessions. However, heavy-handed strategies that involve significant manipulation of the parties’ preferences are also thought to be primarily responsible for the breakdown of peace agreements in the long run. I therefore argue that biased mediators will be more likely to use their additional leverage and produce more artificial incentives for peace which will have a negative impact on long-term agreement implementation.

On the contrary, it could be argued that neutral mediators will be more likely to use artificial incentives for peace. A neutral mediator is assumed to have no immediate interests in the conflict or preferences about what concessions are made and by whom. This leads some to claim they therefore have greater incentives to misrepresent the positions of the conflicting parties in a hasty attempt to reach a peace deal and will not be concerned with whether an agreement actually lasts (Svensson 2007, 2009). However, this doesn’t seem convincing when we consider why neutral mediators most likely offer to intervene in the first place. It has been suggested that a neutral mediator is often motivated by altruistic humanitarian concerns, or because they want to improve their own status and reputation (Svensson 2009). In both instances, the mediator would stand to lose credibility if the peace they mediated later broke down. Indeed, they may even be drawn back into negotiations to try to remedy the situation. Therefore, both biased and neutral mediators have incentives to ensure the agreement they negotiate is sustainable in the long run, particularly given the substantial costs of engaging in third party negotiations (Favretto 2009, 251).

What is at issue here is whether the strategies these mediators use are more or less likely to result in the final agreement being implemented. Again, it could be argued that neutral, rather than biased mediators are more likely to push the parties into an unsustainable agreement because they are mainly focussed on achieving peace at any cost. However, without the ability to take advantage of closer ties with one side in the conflict a neutral mediator may not be able to force the parties into such costly concessions. Furthermore, if neutral mediators are perceived to lack sincere interest in the final outcome, as some scholars suggest (Kydd 2003; Svensson 2009), they would be unable to credibly wield as much leverage as a biased mediator (Favretto 2009). For instance, Favretto argues in the case of great-power mediation that when a state threatens to use force but is not perceived as ‘highly biased’ towards one side it will not be taken seriously (Favretto 2009). Instead, Favretto asserts that neutral mediators can be successful negotiators because their impartiality leads them to avoid the use of force in favour of more facilitative strategies (Favretto 2009, 251).
Therefore, I argue that if a neutral mediator lacks the credibility and leverage to bestow heavy costs and benefits, these limitations will force them to use less heavy-handed strategies than biased mediators and instead apply more facilitative and subtle mediation strategies to move the parties towards an agreement. Ultimately, this means that when they are able to bring the parties to an agreement it is more likely to contain concessions that they genuinely consider acceptable. Consequently, such agreements are more likely to be self-sustaining and implemented in the long run. By this logic, we would also expect biased mediators to use heavier leverage during negotiations, which will produce more artificial incentives for peace and decrease the likelihood of long-term agreement implementation.

The causal diagram below demonstrates how these arguments lead us to expect that biased mediation will result in a lower degree of peace agreement implementation:

**Figure 1. Theoretical Framework**

Biased mediators have interests in achieving a particular outcome which favours the side they are closest to.

They will be more likely to possess additional leverage over their preferred party to secure costly concessions.

Heavy-handed use of leverage will create more artificial incentives for peace.

Post-agreement the influence of the mediator decreases and the parties become discontented with the deal.

Momentum for implementing the agreement will decrease leading to a lower degree of implementation overall.

These expectations can be summarised in the hypothesis below:

**Hypothesis:** If a mediator is biased peace agreements will be implemented to a lower degree.
Research design

The following section will outline how the theoretical arguments presented in the previous chapter will be empirically investigated. For clarity, the unit of analysis is third party mediation in civil wars. The method chosen to conduct this analysis will take the form of a binary, structured, focused comparison combined with process tracing of most similar systems (MSS). Firstly, the justifications for this choice of research method will be explained, followed by the criteria underpinning my case selection. It will then be detailed how I intend to operationalise the theoretical concepts integral to the independent, dependent and intervening variables which comprise the hypothesised causal mechanism shown in Figure 1. Following this, I will outline the time frames under which the cases will be studied and the sources that will be used to collect data on my variables. Lastly, an overview of the structure of the empirical analysis will be provided.

Method

To answer the question ‘how does biased mediation affect the implementation of peace agreements?’ I have chosen to employ a qualitative, structured focused research design which also utilises process tracing for the measurement of implementation. The method of a structured focused comparison provides a rigorous framework for collecting data by asking the same questions of each case (George and Bennett 2004, 67). This ensures that standardised data can be collected and then systematically compared. Furthermore, the data collection focuses only on particular aspects of the cases deemed to be of greatest relevance for answering the research question and achieving the research objectives (George and Bennett 2004, 67, 70). It was also considered necessary to employ process tracing for part of the measurement of implementation in order to observe potential changes over time in more detail, as there are many complex facets within this variable. Employing a mixed methods approach in this way will allow for methodological triangulation, which can increase our confidence in the data we gather and the inferences we derive from them (Flick 2007, 54-74). Process tracing has been described as “attempts to identify the intervening causal process - the causal chain and causal mechanism - between an independent variable and the outcome of the dependent variable,” (George and Bennett 2004, 206-7). Process tracing in this study will however only be used to investigate the latter part of the causal chain to trace changes in the parties’ commitment to the implementation process over time.
This research design was considered particularly suitable because the nature of the research question highlights that we are not only interested in understanding how biased mediation (the independent variable) affects the implementation of peace agreements (the dependent variable), but also why a relationship between these variables might exist. Therefore, we need to employ a research design that allows us to go beyond simply ascertaining covariation and enables us to make reasoned judgements about the likelihood of causation. In contrast to a statistical large ‘n’ study, a qualitative, comparative case study design enables the researcher to look at a smaller number of cases in depth, allowing them to access more fine-grained information that can lead to a better understanding of ‘complex causality’ (Lim 2010, 20, 23). Accessing this level of detail can be especially beneficial when conducting hypothesis testing, which is the primary aim of this study.

The research design will be applied to compare the values of the independent, dependent and intervening variable (artificial incentives for peace) as shown in Figure 2. below.

**Figure 2. Points of empirical investigation**

![Diagram](image.png)

**Case selection**

Careful attention must be given to the process of case selection when doing small ‘n’ qualitative analysis as this is the primary basis on which we gather data to test our theories (Powner 2015, 110). I chose to focus this study on the mediation efforts of Russia during the Tajikistan civil war (1992-1997) and of Nelson Mandela in the Burundian civil war (1993-2003). The following section will elaborate on how and why these decisions were made.

The overall population of cases for this study was defined by the research question and the theoretical framework. Namely, they must be cases of third party mediation (one biased and one impartial) in which a formal peace agreement was signed. The level of analysis was also defined by the relevant theoretical frameworks, which were developed in
relation to inter and intra-state crises (Beardsley 2008) and civil wars (Svensson 2009). Taking these considerations into account, the population of cases to choose from was fairly small. While third party mediation has, relatively speaking, become an increasingly popular form of conflict resolution (Bercovitch et al. 2008, 345), in absolute terms the number of cases is still not very large. Therefore, there are even fewer cases of mediation that are overtly biased or impartial that have both successfully brought about peace agreements. To assist in the case selection process, I used a previous dataset created by Isak Svensson examining the incidence of biased and non-biased mediation of intra-state conflicts between 1989 – 2003 (Svensson 2007). To illustrate the size of the population of cases in this dataset, out of the 206 conflict dyads in 67 countries during this period, 47 peace agreements were signed, 33 of which were aided by mediators. Of these 33 mediated peace agreements, 17 peace agreements were concluded with a biased mediator. Examples of alternative cases of biased mediation that were also considered include French intervention during the Niger Delta crisis, Australia’s mediation in Papua New Guinea and US, EU and NATO mediation in Macedonia.

I chose to restrict the level of analysis to cases of civil war for three main reasons. Firstly, it was determined that cases of intra-state conflict and civil war could lead to a wider range of variation on the dependent variable than inter-state conflict, as peace agreements between countries may be limited to a narrower set of stipulations, such as the withdrawal of troops, repatriation and cessation of violence. Focussing on intra-state conflicts instead could allow for the study of more complex peace agreements that include military, political and territorial power-sharing. Secondly, it has been suggested that the commitment problems that often hamper the implementation of peace agreements between states could be even more severe in intra-state conflicts and civil wars because the conflicting parties have to live with one another again once the fighting ceases (Walter 2002). This is because the need for reconciliation and reintegration in intra-state conflicts heightens the prospects for future reprisals and confrontations that lead to re-escalation and a relapse into conflict (Walter 2002). Therefore, if civil war peace agreements are more fragile, we are thus subjecting the hypothesis to a harder test than if we only looked at more durable inter-state agreements. Thirdly, Beardsley’s theory of artificial incentives for peace was initially applied to cases of international crises, and yet he acknowledges that the same logic should apply to cases of intra-state conflict. Therefore, it would also make for a more novel and interesting study to test his theory on a different type of conflict.
Relatedly, the decision to focus on civil wars over intra-state conflicts also has certain advantages. For instance, we know that the level of battle related deaths will have exceeded the threshold of 1000 as defined by the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP 2014), therefore the severity of these cases makes it likely that a comprehensive peace agreement is needed to satisfy the demands of the parties and provide for in-depth peacebuilding and reconciliation. Thus, wide ranging peace agreements also allow for greater variation in implementation.

The individual cases were selected on the basis of distinct variation on the independent variable (biased and impartial mediation). This will allow for the production of counterfactual evidence needed to provide support for the claims in the hypothesis. Given the focus on variation in the independent variable, the MSS method was the most appropriate case selection strategy (Lim 2010, 42). By choosing two cases that are very similar in many important aspects other than the independent variable, the MSS method allows us to isolate the effect of the explanatory variable by controlling for other factors that could have led to the predicted outcomes (Lim 2010, 34; Powner 2015, 124). These factors could otherwise be potential alternative explanations which may have an impact on the dependent variable or they could be confounding factors which affect both the independent and dependent variable. To ensure my cases would be comparable, a set of criteria was established to ensure that important factors could be held constant, as shown below in Table 1.

Table 1. Control Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control Variables</th>
<th>Tajikistan civil war</th>
<th>Burundi civil war</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mediators of considerable strength</td>
<td>Russia – as part of a coalition of observers to UN facilitated peace talks.</td>
<td>Nelson Mandela. At the request of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict duration(^2)</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>7 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle related deaths(^3)</td>
<td>50,000 – 60,000</td>
<td>120,000 – 200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive peace agreement</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typology of conflict</td>
<td>Governmental</td>
<td>Governmental</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^2\) Measured from the outbreak of civil war up to the signing of the peace agreement.
\(^3\) Measured from the outbreak of civil war up to the signing of the peace agreement.
It was essential to ensure that the strength of the mediator was similar in both cases because if one mediator were more influential than the other we would not be able to tell if the level of agreement implementation resulted from the difference in bias, or the different capabilities of the mediators to exert pressure on the parties. In the case of Tajikistan, Russia can be categorised as a strong mediator as defined by the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) which in 2007 placed Russia as the fifth most powerful nation globally (CINC 2007). Similarly the United Nations (UN) could also be considered a strong mediator given its broad membership of states and the ability of the Security Council to authorise sanctions and send peacekeepers to intervene militarily in conflict zones (Thakur 2006, 30).

In the case of Burundi, the OAU can be considered a strong mediator for similar reasons to the UN as it was composed of a broad membership of African states.

The duration of the conflict was also relevant to control for in this study as the length of the conflict can be an indicator of numerous factors that could affect the implementation of an agreement. Firstly, it can be an indication of the intractability of the conflict and how entrenched the parties are in their positions. Secondly, the duration of the conflict can also tell us about the balance of power between the parties and how difficult it is for one to defeat the other. If one of the conflicts were more protracted than the other then this could affect how well the agreement is implemented. Thirdly, the length of the conflict can also be an indication of the destructiveness of the war and hence how difficult it will be for a nation to recover from and implement a peace agreement.

A further factor to control for in the case selection process was the number of battle related deaths, which can be an indication of how committed the parties are to their cause. Also, if the human costs of conflict are higher, this suggests that reconciliation will be more difficult to achieve once the conflict has ended. Although the number of battle related deaths was higher in Burundi, both cases represent conflicts with very high levels of bloodshed (Jr. DeRouen and Heo 2007, 753; Human Rights Watch 2001; Smith and Walsh 2000; BBC 2000a).

It was also crucial to ensure that both cases resulted in the signing of comprehensive peace agreements, as a peace agreement containing a narrow set of stipulations could arguably be easier to implement than a very detailed and lengthy peace agreement. In the case of Tajikistan and Burundi the peace agreements were very comprehensive, each containing a broad range of provisions such as power sharing, military and police reform and refugee resettlement, to name a few key aspects (Arusha Accord 2000; National Accord in Tajikistan 1997).
Finally, while the initial incompatibilities sparking the conflicts were fairly different, both rebel forces in the conflicts were driven by a sense of unequal and unjust treatment by the government and political exclusion and thus manifested themselves in a struggle for control of the state (Nourzhanov and Bleuer 2013; Bentley and Southall 2005, 49).

Case typology

In this study, the choice of Tajikistan represents a ‘least likely,’ ‘crucial case’ on which to test the hypothesis (Gerring 2007, 89). A hard case is one that “on all dimensions except the dimension of theoretical interest, is predicted not to achieve a certain outcome, and yet does so,” (Gerring 2007, 115). Previous research has shown that government biased mediators are more often associated with peace agreements that contain stipulations thought to be beneficial for durable peace (Svensson 2009). This is because biased mediators will want to protect the interests of their preferred party, and thus try to enshrine favourable measures within the agreement on their behalf. This has been shown to lead to more institutionally complex agreements (Svensson 2009). An agreement that increases the likelihood of durable peace might also be expected to provide a more enabling environment for the implementation of other stipulations within a peace agreement. Therefore, if the expected hypothesis is upheld in this instance, and implementation is in fact found to be more difficult following a biased mediator, this would suggest that in other ‘less difficult’ cases of biased mediation the theoretical framework should also apply.

Operationalisation of the theoretical framework

In order to test the hypothesis, the theoretical concepts that comprise the independent, dependent and intervening variables must be operationalised so that we can measure them empirically. This involves converting the theoretical definitions of the concepts into operational definitions through the use of indicators - the observable characteristics of a concept (Powner 2015, 273). This is an incredibly important step in the research design, as careless operationalisation could severely compromise the internal validity of the investigation. The questions that will be asked of each case will also be presented below, in accordance with the method of a structured focused comparison.
Operationalising biased mediation – the independent variable

The operational definition of biased mediation in this paper will refer to a mediator that has previously provided one of the parties with substantial political, economic, military or moral support in the five years preceding the mediation efforts (Svensson 2007, 184). This will be measured dichotomously as either biased or non-biased if the mediator has provided any one of these forms of support. As the definition suggests, the indicators for this concept rest on four categories of support (political, economic, military and moral) which will be reflected in the questions asked of each case. To clarify what could be considered a ‘substantial’ form of support, this study will focus on the highest and most prominent forms of support for each category. A summary of the operationalisation is shown below.

Table 2. Questions and indicators of mediator bias

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Has the mediator provided one of the conflicting parties with substantial political, economic, military or moral support during the five years preceding the initiation of mediation?</td>
<td>Political: General agreements of cooperation, state visits&lt;br&gt;Economic: Financial aid, trade deals&lt;br&gt;Military: Direct military support, arms trade deals, joint military exercises, military training&lt;br&gt;Moral: Public statements for or against the objectives of one of the conflicting parties</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Operationalising artificial incentives for peace – the intervening variable

Beardsley (2008) outlines three broad categories of artificial incentives – information provision, leveraging costs and benefits, and providing monitoring and enforcement. This analysis will investigate and operationalise the latter two categories, as the provision of information during negotiations is a trait generally associated with all forms of mediation and thus is not theoretically expected to differ greatly in magnitude between different types of mediators. Beardsley (2008) also highlights that these artificial incentives can be either tangible (ie. material or physical) or intangible (ie. immaterial and difficult to quantify precisely) and that they are usually temporary, hence artificial, in nature. As no single
definition of artificial incentives is provided by Beardsley however, I define them within this paper as tangible and intangible incentives for peace created by a third party mediator during negotiations which are temporary or reliant on the commitment and intervention of a mediator to sustain them. It is important to not be misled by the use of the word ‘incentives’ here, as both I and Beardsley use the word to refer not only to inducements for peace but also the use of leverage to impose costs on the parties. Thus ‘artificial incentives’ refer to any deliberate use of leverage to alter the preferences of the parties and make peace a more appealing alternative to conflict. To operationalise this, artificial incentives will be broken down into four categories: tangible costs, tangible benefits, intangible costs and intangible benefits. These will be measured cumulatively, with the types of artificial incentives being recorded and then compared. The questions to be applied to the cases are outlined below with examples of potential indicators.

Table 3. Questions and indicators of artificial incentives for peace

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does the mediator threaten or impose tangible costs?</td>
<td>Economic sanctions, military coercion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the mediator promise or utilise tangible benefits?</td>
<td>Trade deals, foreign aid, ceasefire monitoring assistance, peacekeeping forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the mediator threaten or impose intangible costs?</td>
<td>Diplomatic pressure, humanitarian appeals, highlighting audience costs, public criticism over conduct during war or in the negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the mediator promise or utilise intangible benefits?</td>
<td>Promises of closer ties or prestige, further conciliation support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Operationalising implementation – the dependent variable

Agreement implementation is a particularly complex variable to operationalise given its many facets and dimensions. Not only are comprehensive peace agreements usually very detailed, but they are also very different, as they have been tailored to address the specific problems unique to each conflict. Furthermore, implementation is often a lengthy process and doesn’t proceed in a strictly linear fashion. Set-backs are usually encountered along the way, and as peace agreements are often implemented to different degrees it would not be
realistic to measure implementation dichotomously. While all these factors make the task of measurement fairly complicated, it also provides the opportunity to analyse subtle differences in implementation over time, revealing important information about the conflict actor’s attitudes towards the peace process. Therefore, I will attempt to measure not only how well the main clauses of the peace agreement were put into place, but also assess how the implementation process unfolded.

To do this, I have chosen to measure implementation in three ways. Firstly, I will measure the pace of the implementation process by measuring how long it took to fully implement fifteen key aspects of the peace agreements over a ten-year time frame. If certain aspects were not fully implemented in this time, the degree of implementation reached at the end of the ten-year period will be recorded. To conduct this part of the analysis, I will utilise data collected by the KROC Institute for International Peace Studies, which measures the degree that each of the agreement stipulations were implemented over time according to categories of ‘low’ ‘medium’ and ‘high’ levels of implementation (Peace Accord Matrix Codebook 2015, 2-3). This part of the analysis will be guided by the two questions outlined below.

Table 4. Questions and indicators for measuring the pace of implementation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Indicators / Aspects for investigation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 1: Pace of implementation</strong></td>
<td>Electoral reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. How long did it take to fully implement each key aspect of the peace agreement?</td>
<td>Ceasefire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Demobilisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Executive reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Power sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constitutional reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Police reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Judicial reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political prisoner release</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reintegration of soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Refugee resettlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. If certain aspects were not fully implemented, what was the degree of implementation 10 years after the agreement was signed?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Secondly, I will attempt to measure the momentum of the implementation process and the parties’ attitudes towards the peace agreement by utilising process tracing over the first five years after the peace agreement was signed. According to Beardsley (2008), it is only after a peace deal has been brokered and the mediator’s influence begins to wane that the parties’ cost – benefit calculations are likely to change and they begin to prefer the option of fighting to peace. When applying this logic to the implementation of peace agreements, we would expect the momentum for enacting the agreement to decrease over time, eventually leading to a diminished level of implementation. Therefore, process tracing will allow us to analyse the parties’ attitudes towards and satisfaction with the peace agreement in much greater depth to see if this appears to change over time and whether the use of artificial incentives appears to have affected this. The type of process tracing that I will use to test this part of the causal story involves the collection of ‘sequential evidence’ which “deals with the temporal and spatial chronology of events predicted by a hypothesised causal mechanism,” (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 99). This will be presented in a narrative format utilising information from news articles sourced using the Factiva database.

**Table 5. Measuring momentum for implementation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 2: Momentum for Implementation</th>
<th>Indicators / Aspects for investigation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Method</strong></td>
<td><strong>Process tracing – sequential evidence</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Negative shifts in the parties’ attitudes towards implementation may be displayed in the form of: public statements, attempts to delay or hinder implementation or the total neglect of certain aspects of the peace agreement.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, to assess the overall level of implementation more concretely I will again draw on the KROC Institute’s existing measurements of peace agreement implementation ten years after the peace deal was brokered.
Table 6. Measuring the degree of implementation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 3: Degree of Implementation</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>After ten years, what was the overall degree of implementation reported to be?</td>
<td>KROC Peace Accords Matrix</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Time frame and data sources

To ensure we collect consistent and therefore comparable data on the respective cases, we must assign clear time boundaries to each stage of the empirical analysis. The starting point for our analysis of the independent variable will be five years prior to the initiation of mediation. This is in line with how biased mediation has been operationalised to distinguish whether a third party has previously provided substantial support to one of the conflict parties. Five years prior to the mediation is judged to be a reasonable period of time to establish whether a mediator is biased towards one of the parties because the further we move from this point the less certain we can be that they still favour them, and the more we could question the internal validity of this measure of bias. This measure has been used by previous scholars to determine the presence of bias (Svensson 2007, 185).

The analysis of the use of artificial incentives for peace will begin from the time the third party engages in peace negotiations and will cease when the peace agreement has been signed. From this point, formal mediation negotiations are deemed to have ended and third party involvement after this stage will be regarded as part of the implementation process. This distinction is justified by the theoretical determinants of artificial incentives for peace, which Beardsley identifies as incentives that are used prior to the settlement of an agreement in order to make peace a more appealing alternative (Beardsley 2008, 726).

As outlined in the operationalisation section, if artificial incentives are created which are reliant on the intervention of the mediator to sustain them, we would also expect to see a decrease in momentum for agreement implementation as the mediator’s influence diminishes. Therefore, it is necessary to measure this momentum over a sufficient period of time after the agreement has been signed to capture how the parties’ preferences for implementation change. I have chosen to measure implementation in several ways over the span of both five and ten years after the agreement was signed. It was important to choose this length of time because implementation can take a long time to enact and there must be
time for us to see how the parties’ attitudes towards implementation change when the mediator’s influence wanes. Although there is no concrete guidance on what constitutes a minimum time frame for measuring agreement implementation, previous researchers have looked at implementation from at least five years after the agreement was signed (Walter 2002; Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008). This serves as a good indication to justify the ten-year time frame used here.

This study will utilise numerous primary and secondary sources to gather data. For example, when undertaking process tracing to measure the dependent variable, news articles will be the main source of data, while secondary sources will include journal articles, books and online reports. Close attention will be paid throughout to evaluate the quality of these sources and to screen for possible biases. This involves looking at the origin of the source and whether they support a certain political, religious, ideological or ethnic group. This can be ascertained by checking their stated goals (if it is an organisation) or other articles that the author or organisation has produced. Where a source is found to have potential bias, a decision will be made about whether it should be used and how much could be cross-referenced with other sources to assess its accuracy. The use of triangulation is important for all sources however and wherever possible, multiple sources will be sought and compared to ensure the accuracy and reliability of information. Triangulation is a commonly used method of information verification in the social sciences which helps to increase our confidence in the evidence we use to build our arguments (Flick 2007). Over-reliance on a few sources could lead us to make incorrect or distorted judgements about the validity of our claims (Flick 2007, 29), or could may limit their generalisability (Flick 2007, 118), therefore every effort will be made to avoid this here.

**Structure of analysis**

The next section of this paper will be the empirical analysis, where the data for the independent, intervening and dependent variables will be presented. The cases will be examined individually one after the other in order to highlight the linkages between the variables. Before the variables are examined, a short background to the conflict and mediation efforts will be provided. For the independent and intervening variables, the data will be presented according to the questions comprising the structured focussed comparison, with summary tables of the results provided at the end of each section of analysis. When measuring the dependent variable, the data collection and findings will be guided by the
three aspects of analysis highlighted previously: pace, momentum and overall degree of implementation. The questions comprising the structured focussed comparison will guide the presentation of the pace and overall degree of implementation and process tracing will be used to assess the momentum of implementation. Following each case a with-case analysis will be conducted, to examine the linkages between the variables. This will allow us to look in-depth at the chain of events connecting the independent and dependent variable.

The cases will then be compared to see whether the hypothesis is supported given the evidence from both cases. I will then move on to discuss some of the alternative explanations that could have influenced the outcomes observed in the empirical analysis and any additional implications of the findings, before lastly turning to critically reflect on some of the limitations of the study.
Case 1 – Empirical Analysis of Tajikistan

Background to the civil war and mediation in Tajikistan

The civil war in Tajikistan began in May 1992 and was primarily fought between a constellation of ‘opposition’ parties under the banner of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) against the government of Tajikistan led firstly by Rakhmon Nabiev and then Emomali Rahmonov from November 1992.

Many underlying causes have been attributed to the conflict, for example, Tajikistan witnessed an Islamic revival throughout the 1980s, in defiance of the secularism upheld by communism (Akiner 2001, 28-33) and the diverse ethnic composition of Tajikistan also fermented divisions in a country with a long history of forced resettlement and high levels of in and out migration (Heathershaw 2009, 22; Akiner 2001, 21-23). The pre-war years also saw the emergence of a political ‘awakening’ where ideas of multi-party democracy grew in popularity (Akiner 2001, 27-34; Heathershaw 2009, 24-25) and the role of regionally based personal rivalries has been highlighted as a driving force behind many divisions (Akiner 2001, 19). Ultimately though, the trigger for conflict was the break-down of the Soviet Union and the unleashing of a “complex crisis of decolonisation” (Heathershaw 2009, 25). When Tajikistan became independent in September 1991 (Heathershaw 2009, 26; Brown 1998, 88) it emerged as one of the poorest of the post-Soviet Republics (Akiner 2001, 1; Lezhnev 2005, 54). Tajikistan was left without a national army and struggling with corruption, a stagnant economy and high unemployment (Akiner 2001, 25-27).

When ex-Soviet premier Rakhmon Nabiev won the 1991 election and re-established Tajikistan’s Communist Party, opposition movements staged mass protests in the capital city Dushanbe in March 1992 (Lezhnev 2005, 55; Brown 1998, 89-90). Counter protests were organised which soon turned violent and triggered waves of fighting beyond the city (Lezhnev 2005, 55). The conflict escalated rapidly between May and November 1992 (Heathershaw 2009, 28) and became a struggle for power between the paramilitary group the Popular Front (PF) in support of the government of Tajikistan and the UTO (Akiner 2001, 37, 39).

The first round of UN chaired peace talks began in April 1994 in Moscow (Akiner 2001, 47). Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) all served as observers to the peace process.

Verifying the independent variable - the presence or absence of bias

As a former part of the Soviet Union, Russia had strong reasons to be concerned about the conflict in Tajikistan (Jonson 1997, 2). After the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia was looking to re-assert its influence on the world stage and to cement its role as a dominant regional power (Jonson 1997, 2). Thus, the conflict in Tajikistan was both a threat to Russian domestic security and its reputation internationally (Jonson 1997, 2). For example, the Russian Defence Minister said in February 1993 that Tajikistan was “strategically important for both the security of your state and ours” (Jawad and Tadjbakhsh 1995, 22) and President Yeltsin admitted in 1993 that Tajikistan’s southern border was “in effect Russia’s” (Heathershaw 2009, 31; Jawad and Tadjbakhsh 1995, 25). Indeed, some members of the Russian government still saw Tajikistan as a ‘protectorate’ that Russia was responsible for defending (Heathershaw 2009, 31). The framing of the conflict as a matter of national security demonstrates Russia’s high level of commitment to achieving stability in Tajikistan.

However, not only did Russia want to achieve stability, but they also saw the apparent surge of radical Islam as a cultural threat with potential to spread if left uncontained (Heathershaw 2009, 31). This helps to explain why most accounts of the conflict indicate that Russia was biased in favour of the government in Tajikistan and against the UTO. For example, when the President of the Russian Federation’s Committee for Internal Affairs was asked in July 1993 why Russia doesn’t remove its troops from Tajikistan, he replied “If we withdraw…Tajikistan will be sacrificed to the Islamists” (Poujol 1998, 106). Similarly, in February 1993 the Russian Defence Minister said during a visit to Tajikistan that more Russian troops would be provided to “protect Tajikistan against Islamic fundamentalism” (Jawad and Tadjbakhsh 1995, 16). This indicates that moral support for a preferred party, one of the key components of biased mediation, was present in the case of Tajikistan.

Another factor which demonstrates that Russia was biased in favour of the Tajikistan government is the political and military support accorded to them. For instance, on the 25th May 1993 Russia signed a Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Republic of Tajikistan (Akiner 2001, 44; Jawad and Tadjbakhsh 1995, 23; Abdullaev and
Akbarzaheh 2010, 53; Fenenko 2013, 202). Reportedly, this agreement outlined commitments on the level of Russian troops stationed in Tajikistan, as well as the financing and provision of weaponry and commitments to assist one another in the face of military aggression (Abdullaev and Akbarzaheh 2010, 53, 54; Lynch 2001, 58). Further to this, in May 1992 Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and Uzbekistan signed a Collective Security Treaty, affirming mutual military assistance in case of an attack on one of the signatories (Johnson 1997, 13; Akiner 2001, 44). These are clear signals of Russia’s political support for the government and intent to protect Tajikistan against perceived threats through military means.

Lastly, in the years prior to the peace talks Russia provided substantial economic assistance to the Tajikistan government. For example, accounts refer to Russia lending credit to the Tajikistan government and deferring their debts (Akiner 2001, 47; Ghasimi 1994, 9). In addition, several sources have estimated that Russia was still paying for large portions of Tajikistan’s national budget after independence, with some saying that Russia funded between 50 percent to 70 percent of Tajikistan’s budget in 1993 (US State Department 1994; Jawad and Tadjbakhsh 1995, 22; Human Rights Watch 1994). Such high levels of financial assistance suggest that Russia had significant economic interests in seeing Tajikistan restored to a state of stability.

The preceding analysis highlights that Russia fulfilled all the pre-established criteria for a biased mediator and a summary of this can be seen below.

**Table 7. Questions and indicators of mediator bias**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Present in Case 1?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Has the mediator provided one of the conflicting parties with substantial political, economic, military or moral support during the five years preceding the initiation of mediation?</td>
<td>Political: General agreements of cooperation, state visits</td>
<td>Yes – agreements of cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic: Financial aid, trade deals</td>
<td>Yes – all indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military: Direct military support, arms trade deals, joint military exercises, military training</td>
<td>Yes – direct military support and arms deals, military training</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Testing the intervening variable – the use of artificial incentives for peace in Tajikistan

Threatening or imposing tangible costs

By the end of 1995 and into 1996, Russia’s stance towards the conflict in Tajikistan had shifted as they realised that a military victory was not possible without substantial costs, and that a negotiated settlement was the only other way to end the war (Jonson 1997, 11; Tetsuro 2005, 193). This is demonstrated poignantly by President Yeltsin’s comments at the CIS Summit in January 1996 that “We cannot carry Tajikistan in our arms forever” (Panfilov 1996, 15; Jonson 1997, 11). As consistent supporters of the Rahmonov government and with Tajikistan still heavily reliant on Russia militarily and economically (Jawad and Tadjbakhsh 1995, 22), Russia was in an extremely favourable position to exert significant leverage on the government. For example, when Tajikistan became independent in 1991 it had no national army and therefore it was both strategically prudent and logistically convenient for Russia to leave certain former Soviet Union forces behind under Russian control, such as the 201st Motor Rifle Division (Orr 1998, 151). Additionally, when conflict broke out, Russia led the way in establishing (what it considered) a peacekeeping force in 1993 under the mandate of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) which at one stage amounted to 20,000 troops (Heathershaw 2009, 31). It should be noted that while their formal mandate was peacekeeping, it has been recorded that they often acted as more of a counter-insurgency operation in support of government forces (Jonson 1997, 13; Raevsky and Vorobev 1994; Roy Allison 1994). This highlights the substantial military presence Russia had in Tajikistan and the leverage it therefore possessed to persuade the government to make concessions at the negotiating table. Although there is little overt evidence to suggest that Russia did impose economic, political or military sanctions on Tajikistan, the threatening comments made by President Yeltsin at the 1996 CIS meeting indicate Russia’s willingness to apply pressure to the Tajikistan government by reminding them that Russia could withdraw their material support and ‘drop’ Tajikistan at any time. In fact, in 1996 the Duma Committee on
Geopolitics discussed the issue of Russian troop withdrawal from Tajikistan and “concluded that the Russian leadership should seriously correct its policy” (Jonson 1997, 32). This was followed in spring 1997 with a proposal to discuss the issue on troop levels in Tajikistan in the Duma (Jonson 1997, 32). This highlights that the cost of ‘carrying’ Tajikistan and supporting the Rahmonov government was becoming increasingly controversial in Russia – signalling to the Tajikistan government that material support would not be provided indefinitely if progress could not be made in resolving the conflict.

**Promising tangible benefits**

When measuring this aspect of artificial incentives for peace, without explicit statements to show that Russia offered material benefits to the Tajikistan government in return for compliance at the negotiating table, it can be difficult to tell whether material support given to the Tajikistan government was a reward for agreeing to concessions, or if Russia was just demonstrating continued support for their preferred party. There can be little doubt that Russia was capable of promising and providing tangible benefits to the government of Tajikistan as a means of inducing them into a peace agreement. Furthermore, it seems logical to conclude that if Russia were prepared to threaten to withdraw material support in a bid to secure a peace deal, they would also be prepared to offer material rewards to achieve this goal as well. For instance, at a meeting of CIS leaders in Moscow in August 1993 it was reported that this was the first time that the participants truly exerted pressure on Rahmonov to enter into peace talks with the opposition (Jawad and Tadjbakhsh 1995, 17). At the same meeting, Radio Liberty reported that the delegates “committed themselves to increasing the numbers of troops guarding the border [with Tajikistan],” and “promised additional military, economic and humanitarian aid to Tajikistan” (Jawad and Tadjbakhsh 1995, 17). This seems to suggest that these commitments were used as incentives to try to persuade the Tajikistan government that if they entered into peace negotiations they could rely on continued material support from Russia and the CIS.

**Threatening or imposing intangible costs**

It has been widely claimed that Russia utilised heavy diplomatic pressure to persuade President Rahmonov and the government of Tajikistan to enter into negotiations with the UTO and then eventually to make concessions that resulted in a final peace agreement in
June 1997 (Lynch 2001, 59; Jonson 2001, 23; Tetsuro 2010). A former assistant to the UN mediation team in Tajikistan reported afterwards that their leverage was “used to help soften the positions of the Tajik parties, first to bring them to engage in direct negotiations and then to make compromises” (Hay 2001, 40). Furthermore, she highlights that “When the gap between the positions of the two parties was too wide…the UN mediators sometimes shared their drafts with the most influential observers, requesting them to use their leverage with the parties to encourage them to compromise” (Hay 2001, 43). Ultimately, Hay concludes that Russian influence was a key factor for the signing of the eventual peace agreement (Hay 2001, 39).

There are clear indications that during the inter-Tajik negotiations Russia exerted intense diplomatic pressure on the Rahmonov regime to influence their decisions in favour of a peace settlement. For example, in September 1994, after the first two rounds of formal peace talks had stalled, Russia managed to persuade the Rahmonov government to make significant concessions to the opposition, resulting in the agreement of a temporary ceasefire (Akiner 2001, 54). After refusing to give in to demands from the opposition for an amnesty and the release of political prisoners, at the last minute the Tajikistan government agreed to terms on both these aspects (Akiner 2001, 54; Tetsuro 2010, 7). An in-depth report by the Accord research institute, states that the Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia was ‘instrumental’ in convincing the Tajikistan government to make these concessions and pressure the government into signing the temporary ceasefire agreement (Hay 2001, 40). Also, an OECD report from October 1995 suggests that the Russians were “the principle force” behind the signing of the temporary ceasefire in 1994 and for encouraging the Tajikistan government to send a high-level delegate to sign the document (Brenninkmeijer 1998, 196-7). These claims of Russian influence appear to be convincing, especially given the unexpected nature of this U-turn in government policy. Therefore, it seems likely that Russia pressured the government to agree to the ceasefire and used considerable leverage to push the Tajikistan government into making costly concessions in the search for peace.

Numerous sources also attest to Russia’s use of diplomatic pressure on the Tajikistan government when it came to signing the accords in the final peace agreement. In December 1996, the Nezavisimaya Gazeta reported that the UTO leaders were jubilant after the latest round of peace talks in Moscow, quoting them as saying “We are pleased to note that Russia’s approach to the Tajik conflict has changed…the compromise version that was drawn up by the Russian Foreign Ministry took a great many of our proposals into account”
adding that “The fact that Rahmonov agreed to sign the agreement is in large part thanks to Russian diplomacy” (Rotar 1997, 15-16). The Current Digest notes that this is a very revealing remark, as the opposition had previously been very critical of Russia’s interventions in the peace talks. Indeed, at this meeting in December 1996, the Tajikistan government in the final instance conceded to the UTO’s core demand for creating a transitional coalition government with a certain number of seats set aside for the UTO (Rotar 1997, 15).

Additionally, several sources cite the personal influence of the Russian Foreign Minister Primakov in pushing the Tajikistan government forward in the negotiations and for opening up dialogue with the UTO at the beginning of 1996 (Jonson 1997, 11; Hay 2001). For instance, the Nezavisimaya Gazeta quoted Primakov as telling the press after his meetings in Dushanbe that “There are several aspects to stabilisation: It involves relationships between the republic’s current constitutional leadership and the opposition” (Konstantinova 1996, 16). This statement is significant because it emphasises the need for the leadership of Tajikistan to establish better relations with the opposition. The effectiveness of this pressure from Primakov can be seen from the ‘breakthrough’ later in the year when Primakov persuaded the Tajikistan government to arrange a meeting between President Rahmonov and the opposition leader Said Abdullo Nuri “in order to hold talks and sign a ceasefire agreement” (Velekhov 1996, 20). Furthermore, a former assistant to the UN mediation team for the inter-Tajik talks noted that “The personal contribution of Russian Foreign Minister Primakov and his Deputy, Mister Pastukhov, were invaluable for reaching an agreement on the Protocol on Military issues in March 1997, one of the most important documents of the process” (Hay 2001, 40). These examples further reinforce claims that Russia was heavily involved in pressuring the Tajikistan government into seeking a compromise with the UTO (Lynch 2001, 59; Jonson 2001, 23; Tetsuro 2010).

Promising intangible benefits

In a similar vein to the promising of tangible benefits, as Russia was a supporter of the Rahmonov regime it can be difficult to differentiate between routine displays of support and those made with the intention of incentivising a negotiated settlement. However, using the same argumentation, it seems logical that if Russia were prepared to use intense diplomatic pressure to push the Tajik government into negotiating and making concessions towards the opposition, they would at the same time also be implying that cooperating on this issue
would earn Rahmonov and his government Russia’s favour. For example, when President Yeltsin expressed dissatisfaction at having to ‘carry’ Tajikistan in 1996, he was sending a signal to the Tajik government that their relations could be damaged if the conflict didn’t end soon. Hence it seems reasonable to assume that after placing the Rahmonov under pressure to reach a settlement, Tajikistan would rise in Russia’s esteem if a suitable agreement were found.

Table 8. Summary of artificial incentives in Tajikistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Potential Indicators</th>
<th>Present in Case 1?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does the mediator threaten or impose tangible costs?</td>
<td>Economic sanctions or military coercion</td>
<td>Yes – public threats to withdraw support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the mediator promise to provide tangible benefits?</td>
<td>Trade deals, foreign aid, ceasefire monitoring assistance, peacekeeping forces</td>
<td>Yes – military, economic and humanitarian aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the mediator threaten or impose intangible costs?</td>
<td>Diplomatic pressure, humanitarian appeals, highlighting audience costs, public criticism over conduct during war or in the negotiations</td>
<td>Yes – intense diplomatic pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the mediator promise to provide intangible benefits?</td>
<td>Promises of closer long term ties or prestige, further conciliation support</td>
<td>Yes – indications of closer ties</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Measuring the Dependent Variable – the implementation of the peace agreement in Tajikistan

Pace of implementation

Table 9 below demonstrates the amount of time each clause of the National Accord in Tajikistan took to reach full implementation, or how far implementation had progressed ten years after the agreement was signed. The results show that 60 percent (9 of 15) of the main stipulations of the agreement had been fully implemented within three years and 20 percent (3 of 15) reached a minimal level of implementation after ten years, while the remaining 20 percent were not implemented at all within the ten-year time frame. The lack of medium-range values in the results shows a division between the 60 percent of stipulations that were
implemented fully within a relatively short period of time, and the 40 percent that were only implemented to a low level or not at all after ten years. The mean length of time taken to implement the 9 stipulations which achieved full implementation within 10 years was 2.4 years.4

**Table 9. The pace of implementation in Tajikistan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Key agreement clauses</th>
<th>Time taken to implement5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. How long did it take to fully implement each key aspect of the peace agreement?</td>
<td>Electoral reform</td>
<td>3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ceasefire</td>
<td>2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Demobilisation</td>
<td>2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disarmament</td>
<td>Minimal implementation after 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Executive reform</td>
<td>Minimal implementation after 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Power sharing</td>
<td>3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constitutional reform</td>
<td>2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military reform</td>
<td>3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Police reform</td>
<td>No implementation after 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Judicial reform</td>
<td>Minimal implementation after 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political prisoner release</td>
<td>2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reintegration of soldiers</td>
<td>No implementation after 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Refugee resettlement</td>
<td>3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Media reform</td>
<td>No implementation after 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amnesty</td>
<td>2 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The momentum for implementation**

This section of the empirical analysis will examine the momentum for implementation, in order to discern the attitudes of the parties towards the peace agreement. This investigation will cover the 5-year period after the agreement was signed, from June 27th 1997 to June

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4 Mean time taken to implement the stipulations fully implemented within 10 years = (3+2+2+3+2+3+2+3+2) / 9 = 2.4 years.
5 Data sourced using the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, Peace Accord Matrix: [https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/general-agreement-establishment-peace-and-national-accord-tajikistan](https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/general-agreement-establishment-peace-and-national-accord-tajikistan)
The initial results from the process tracing analysis demonstrate that the implementation of the peace agreement in Tajikistan began very slowly. In particular, complaints were raised by the UTO on the minimal progress to release political prisoners and the legalisation of political parties (Shargorodsky 1998). Similarly, Kofi Anan, then Secretary General of the United Nations, raised concerns in early 1998 about the slow pace of implementation (Agence France-Presse 1998a). At this time, the UTO were continuing to launch violent attacks on government troops (Pope 1998).

A crucial shift also occurred regarding Russia’s relationship with the Tajik government. The Russian government appeared to cease playing a mediating role, and instead resumed their support for the Rahmonov regime by forming a security troika on the 6th May 1998 with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Agence France-Presse 1998b). This seems to have boosted Rahmonov’s confidence and altered his behaviour towards implementation, as in May 1998 the Tajik government passed a law banning religious political parties and opposition parties with foreign financing, in contravention of the peace accord (Associated Press 1998a). The UN was quick to denounce this and pressured the Tajikistan government into creating a special commission to amend it (Reuters 1998). These examples demonstrate reluctance in implementing the peace agreement, as well as deliberate attempts to undermine it.

Criticism from the international community initially only elicited consent for a partial amnesty from the Tajik government (Associated Press 1998b), although a couple of months later in August 1998 the government finally incorporated four opposition figures into government positions (AP Online 1998). However, this progress didn’t last long, and in September a high-profile opposition figure was assassinated (BBC 1998a) with the UN calling for an investigation into this (BBC 1998b). This sluggish pace of implementation was

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6 Search terms included ‘Tajikistan peace implementation,’ ‘Tajikistan opposition,’ and ‘Tajikistan peace.’
followed in February 1999 by a report from Kofi Anan on the peace process, lamenting the slow pace of implementation towards most aspects of the agreement (Dow Jones Newswire 1999). Although the government responded quickly to this by establishing a commission to discuss further integration of the opposition into the government (BBC 1999a), the UN’s special envoy Jan Kubis, continued to pour criticism on the government and the UTO for several months afterwards (Associated Press 1999a; Associated Press 1999b; Agence France-Presse 1999).

Eventually a breakthrough occurred in mid-May 1999 and we can see evidence of a positive shift in the parties’ attitudes towards implementing the peace agreement. On the 14th May the Tajik Parliament passed a full amnesty for UTO fighters (BBC 1999b) and in late June, four more members of the UTO were appointed to government positions (Reuters 1999a), with another two given cabinet posts in early July (BBC 1999c, 1999d). These leaps in progress were also followed in August with meetings between Rahmonov and Nuri, resulting in dates being set for the referendum on constitutional reform and national elections, as well as the ban on opposition political parties being lifted (Associated Press 1999c). It therefore seems that the persistent criticism of the UN was necessary to bring about this alteration in the parties’ attitudes towards implementation.

Nevertheless, the run up to the elections in February 2000 was marred by numerous accounts of obstacles preventing opposition candidates from registering, with both the US and EU announcing their concerns (Reuters 1999b; Pressi 1999). This appears to have foreshadowed what was to come, as once the referendum and elections had taken place very little progress was made to implement the remaining aspects of the peace agreement, with hardly any reports commenting on the outstanding stipulations of the agreement. Indeed, the only media reports to be found in the following two years were those from the UTO and the OSCE respectively stating that there were many aspects of the agreement left incomplete such as the amnesty for former fighters and reintegration of soldiers (BBC 2001a), and judicial reform (BBC 2001b).

A likely cause of this apparent loss of momentum can be found in statements by Rahmonov in the aftermath of the elections, which seem to demonstrate that he now considered implementation to be complete. Addressing Parliament on the 27th April 2000, Rahmonov spoke about implementation in the past tense, saying that “The members of the National Reconciliation Commission had a great share in implementing the general agreement on peace and national reconciliation,” (BBC 2000b), as if the implementation process was already finished. When combined with the lack of further reports on any
additional progress in fulfilling the stipulations of the peace accord, this seems to reinforce the suggestion that agreement implementation was no longer a priority for the Tajik government.

This analysis has shown the slow and stuttering nature of the implementation process in Tajikistan. In the first few years, progress on implementation only followed after criticism from the UN and the international community, suggesting that the UTO and the Tajik government in particular, needed constant pressure to make any headway in implementation. Notable by their absence in the implementation process is Russia, who seem to have fallen silent on the subject of the accord after the agreement was reached. They instead reverted to simply supporting of the Rahmonov regime. Therefore, once the national elections had taken place and the international spotlight turned away from Tajikistan, all momentum for implementation appeared to be lost. This indicates that the parties could not be relied upon to enforce the remaining stipulations without international pressure and the intervention of external actors such as Russia.

**Overall degree of implementation**

Using the KROC Institute’s Peace Accords Matrix we can see that after ten years the implementation of the peace agreement in Tajikistan was deemed to be 76 percent complete. This suggests that while most aspects of the agreement were enacted, significant gaps in implementation remained.

**Table 10. Overall degree of implementation in Tajikistan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Overall degree of implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>After ten years, what was the overall degree of implementation reported to be?</td>
<td>KROC Peace Accords Matrix Database</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Within-case analysis**

From the preceding analysis, we can see that Russia was a consistently biased mediator determined to ensure the Tajikistan government prevailed over the UTO rebels. As a part of their mediation strategy, Russia created and used artificial incentives for peace by imposing significant intangible costs on the Tajikistan government in the form of intense diplomatic
pressure and threatened to impose tangible costs by implying they could withdraw their material support to the government. It is also likely that they used their influence to offer or promise to provide significant tangible and intangible benefits to the Tajikistan government in return for their cooperation in reaching a peace settlement.

The analysis of the pace, process and overall degree of implementation allows us to see further whether there appear to be any changes in the momentum of implementation after the peace agreement was signed. Table 9 appears to show that momentum for implementing the peace agreement was consistent up to the first three years after the peace agreement was signed, with most of the stipulations being fully implemented within this time. However, after this three-year mark, implementation appears to have slowed significantly, as there was no further progress in fully implementing any other aspects of the agreement over the ten-year time frame. Indeed, established measurements from the KROC Peace Accords Matrix Database show that after 10 years the agreement had only been implemented to a level of 76 percent.

The narrative analysis appears to reinforce these findings, as the news articles examined seem to show that for the first three years after the agreement was signed there was slow but steady progress in implementing certain aspects of the agreement. However, after the elections in February 2000 there appeared to be a reduction in momentum for implementing the peace agreement, particularly from Rahmonov’s side. Statements from Rahmonov seem to show that he felt the accord had already been implemented to a satisfactory degree and the sudden reduction in news reports on implementation suggest that the government’s attention had turned to focus on other matters. The few reports that were available regarding the implementation of the agreement after April 2000 also indicate there were several aspects of the accord that were left unfulfilled.

The results of this analysis therefore appear to show a correlation between the presence of a biased mediator, artificial incentives for peace and waning momentum for implementing peace agreements. Regarding the hypothesised causal mechanism, the analysis of artificial incentives for peace demonstrates that the leverage Russia exerted on the Tajikistan government was often effective in influencing their decisions. For instance, when making concessions on political prisoners and amnesties, pushing for a temporary ceasefire in 1994 and arranging meetings between Rahmonov and the UTO, to name just a few examples. Thus, when Russia ceased its mediation role and reverted back to simply being a close ally of Rahmonov, as demonstrated by the formation of the security troika in May 1998, the pressure to commit to implementing the peace accord was perhaps somewhat
relieved and thus the Tajikistan government did not seem to feel the need to implement more of the accord than was necessary after the elections had been held. Thus, there appears to be empirical support for the predicted causal mechanism in this case, however, to determine support for the hypothesis as a whole, a comparison must be conducted to see if counterfactual evidence can be found in the second case study.

Case 2 – Empirical Analysis of Burundi

Background to the civil war and mediation in Burundi

Burundi has a long history of violent conflict since gaining independence from Belgium in 1962 (Falch 2008). In the simplest terms, these waves of violence were precipitated by “the unequal distribution of wealth and monopolization of power” of the Tutsi minority over the Hutu majority (Falch 2008). The civil war which began in October 1993 was triggered by the killing of the country’s first democratically elected President, Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu, in an unsuccessful military coup by Tutsi soldiers (Bentley and Southall 2005, 49-50). Although successive Presidents were drawn from the same Hutu political party as Ndadaye, their grasp on power was tenuous and tens of thousands of Tutsis and Hutus died in the ensuing violence (Bentley and Southall 2005, 50, 52). The conflict was fought mainly between the Tutsi dominated army, the government (which alternated between Tutsi and Hutu leadership) and several Hutu rebel groups, of which the National Council for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD), the National Liberation Front (FROLINA) and Palipehutu-Forces for National Liberation (FNL) were the largest (Cunningham 2011, 142). By mid-1996 the military launched another coup and managed to re-install former Tutsi President Pierre Buyoya to power (Bentley and Southall 2005, 58).

Third party mediation efforts were initiated in early 1996 by former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere at the request of the OAU (Bentley and Southall 2005, 56). Then, when Nyerere died in October 1999 he was succeeded by Nelson Mandela as lead mediator in December 1999 (Bentley and Southall 2005, 63, 71). The Arusha Accord was finalised and signed on the 28th August 2000 by 13 parties to the conflict, including the National Liberation Front, (Bentley and Southall 2005, 78; Cunningham 2011, 142) and by the 20th September 2000 another three Tutsi parties had signed the agreement (Africa News Service 2000). However, the CNDD and Palipehutu-FNL only signed ceasefire deals in 2003 and 2006 respectively (Cunningham 2011, 142).
Verifying the independent variable - the presence or absence of bias

When verifying Nelson Mandela’s neutrality, we need to ensure that he as an individual or as President of South Africa, did not provide any support to the parties from 1994 to 1999. In this regard, it has been noted that Mandela was thought of by the parties as a mediator from “outside the immediate region” and thus “did not carry the baggage of perceived bias” (Wolpe 2011, 52). This ‘outsider’ status and perception of neutrality is reinforced by the fact that Nelson Mandela previously kept his distance from the Burundian civil war as a whole and refrained from commenting on the violence during his Presidency. After searching media archives using Factiva and conducting independent internet searches, no evidence could be found that Nelson Mandela had publicly commented on the conflict in Burundi before he assumed the role of mediator in 1999. Furthermore, no evidence from primary sources or secondary literature could be found that South Africa under Nelson Mandela’s leadership had provided any political, economic or military support to any of the parties in the Burundian conflict. A potential proxy indicator which could also demonstrate Mandela’s distance from the Burundian conflict is that South Africa was not part of the regional group of nations that deliberated and then imposed economic embargoes on Burundi in 1996, which were explicitly levied in response to the military coup which installed Buyoya as President and aimed to force the government back to the negotiation table for peace talks (Grauvogel 2014, 7).

Therefore, Nelson Mandela did not show any of the signs of partiality outlined below which means we can categorise him as an unbiased mediator.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Present in Case 2?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Has the mediator provided one of the conflicting parties with substantial political, economic, military or moral support during the five years preceding the initiation of mediation?</td>
<td>Political: General agreements of cooperation, state visits</td>
<td>No – no indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic: Financial aid, trade deals</td>
<td>No – no indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military: Direct military support, arms trade deals, joint military exercises, military training</td>
<td>No – no indicators</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Testing the intervening variable – the use of artificial incentives for peace in Burundi

Threatening or imposing tangible costs

As an individual mediator representing the OAU, while Nelson Mandela lacked the ability to apply direct military pressure himself (Bentley and Southall 2005: 74) he was able to call upon the members of the OAU and the wider international community to consider applying this kind of force. Mandela’s predecessor, Julius Nyerere had been in favour of establishing a regional peacekeeping force in Burundi while the conflict was ongoing to provide protection for civilians in the country and to further push the parties into resuming negotiations (Bentley and Southall 2005, 57; Mthembu-Salter 2002). Although this was never actually taken forward the use of military intervention was also a bargaining option open to Mandela. Similarly, he could have chosen to lobby for the resumption of economic sanctions on the government as Nyerere had from July 1996 to January 1999 (Mthembu-Salter 2002). However, the use of sanctions and military force were not strategies that Mandela chose to pursue and it has been noted that he preferred to apply moral pressure on the parties instead (Mthembu-Salter 2002; Bentley and Southall 2005, 74).

Promising tangible benefits

From the start of his role as a mediator in the Burundian conflict Mandela was ever conscious about the important role that the international community could play in encouraging the parties to reach an agreement. He therefore wasted no time in seeking the financial support of heads of state during an address to the UN Security council in January 2000 (Reliefweb 2000). Indeed, after this initial appeal at the UN in January, many states pledged to provide Burundi with aid and it has been said that “The essence of their position, collectively, was that so long as progress could be made towards peace in negotiations, a shortage of money would not become a problem” (Bentley and Southall 2005, 77). Securing humanitarian aid for the citizens of Burundi may not at first appear to be a tangible incentive.
for peace, but by securing aid this sent a message to the parties that should the war end, international assistance could also be given to help Burundi recover in the aftermath of conflict too. In fact, we can see from Article 9 of the final peace agreement that Nelson Mandela had committed, once the peace agreement was signed, to organising an international donor conference to raise funds to assist in the reconstruction of Burundi (Arusha Accord 2000, 93). The knowledge that Burundi could receive financial support from the international community if peace were achieved would most likely have been a significant incentive for the parties to reach a peace agreement.

As a further way to incentivise the parties to reach an agreement, Mandela ensured that provisions were made in the agreement for an Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC) to supervise the implementation of the agreement (Arusha Accord 2000, 87). The IMC would have wide-ranging powers to issue directives to the parties which they would have to adhere to or the IMC could “Request the appropriate assistance of any international body or State or Party in enforcing compliance” (Arusha Agreement 2000, 51). Furthermore, the IMC would be chaired by a representative from the United Nations and would have inclusive membership comprising two representatives of the rebel Parties, one government representative, six Burundians of moral integrity, as well as representatives of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the regional Peace Initiative on Burundi (Arusha Accord 2000, 88). Such a broad-based coalition with participation from the UN, OAU and the Regional Peace Initiative would have given the signatories confidence that the IMC would be a balanced and representative decision making body, with substantial enforcement powers. Moreover, a Ceasefire Commission was also provided for in the final peace agreement which would comprise members of the “Government, the combatants of the political parties and movements, the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the Regional Peace Initiative for Burundi” to verify and supervise the demobilisation and disarmament process (Arusha Accord 2000, 72). The IMC and Ceasefire Commission would most likely have helped to alleviate the parties’ concerns beforehand about whether the opposing side would deliver on their commitments, and these measures have been found to be beneficial incentives for peace in previous civil wars such as in Zimbabwe in 1979 (Walter 2002, 113).

Along similar lines, another way in which Mandela tried to encourage the parties to reach a settlement was by obtaining third party security guarantees in the form of peacekeeping assistance. After the signing of the agreement, the parties would be required to submit a request to the United Nations who would provide an international peacekeeping
force “as soon as possible after the establishment of the Ceasefire Commission” (Arusha Accord 2000, 91). We can therefore see that Mandela went to great lengths to secure third party security guarantees, monitoring assistance and international financial support, which are all examples of Beardsley’s conceptualisation of ‘artificial incentives’ for peace.

Threatening or imposing intangible costs

Leveraging audience costs against both of the parties was a central part of Nelson Mandela’s negotiation strategy. In many accounts of the proceedings, it has been remarked that his high profile and good reputation, as well as his experience as a seasoned statesman gave him the unique advantage of being able to criticise both sides for their conduct during the conflict and throughout the negotiations (Sisk 2009, 140; Bentley and Southall 2005, 72). For any other political figure such a bold strategy may have offended the parties and caused the breakdown of negotiations, however in Mandela’s case, none of his admonitions resulted in parties walking away from the talks (Mthembu-Salter 2002). For instance, Mandela was notoriously forthright in his criticism of the government for establishing ‘regroupment’ camps, supposedly to protect civilians, however it seemed more likely that they were a way for the government to cut off the rebel groups from their support bases among the civilian population (Bentley and Southall 2005, 72; Human Rights Watch 2001; BBC 2000c.). We can see that the government felt pressurised by this criticism, as they quickly responded by agreeing to close some of the regroupment camps (Human Rights Watch 2000; BBC 2000c.; Bentley and Southall 2005, 72). Mandela also made it clear that the government should release the political prisoners they were holding and drew international attention to this by visiting the main prison in the capital Bujumbura in June 2000 (Mthembu-Salter 2002; BBC 2000c.). On this point however, the government did not take any notable action and were very resistant to the idea of releasing political prisoners, indicating that Nelson Mandela’s ability to use leverage on the government had limitations (Human Rights Watch 2001; International Crisis Group 2000). Equally, he was outspoken in his criticism of the Hutu rebel groups for the killing of civilians, demonstrating that he also sought to apply pressure on the rebel groups as well as the government (Human Rights Watch 2001; Sisk 2009, 140; Wolpe 2011, 55).

In addition to this, Mandela sought to put further diplomatic pressure on the parties by reaching out to the international community and encouraging heads of states to throw their diplomatic weight behind the peace process. As previously mentioned, Mandela
addressed the UN Security Council directly in January 2000 for this very purpose, emphasising that “The effectiveness of the messages we have delivered to the various protagonists in Burundi can only be reinforced by the participation of other heads of states and countries” (Reliefweb 2000). He also invited numerous heads of states to attend the next round of peace talks in Arusha in February, including President of the United States Bill Clinton, Jacques Chirac of France, Olesegun Obesanjo of Nigeria and King Fahd of Saudi Arabia (Mthembu-Salter 2002; Bentley and Southall 2005, 74). Although President Clinton was only able to address the February meeting via teleconference, in an interview afterwards, Howard Wolpe (the US Special Envoy to the Great Lakes) who was present at the meeting in Burundi, said President Clinton’s address “had an enormously positive psychological impact” on the delegates present, adding that “All around me, people were coming up and just expressing their appreciation” (Scoop News 2000). Although this source may be biased by the fact that Wolpe was the US Special Envoy and would probably have a more positive perspective on the impact of the US President’s address than others, it is still revealing that he described the Burundian response in such an optimistic way. Hence, by internationalising the conflict, Mandela sought to add a chorus of high profile voices to his own in putting pressure on the parties to continue with the talks and reach a negotiated settlement.

Promising intangible benefits

In addition to leveraging intangible costs on the parties, Mandela also stressed the potential benefits of laying down weapons and reaching a negotiated settlement. In one of his first speeches at Arusha in January 2000 he asked the audience, which included representatives of the Burundian government and the CNDD, “Please join the modern world. Why do you allow yourselves to be regarded as leaders without talent, leaders without vision?... When people in the West hear these things they say ‘Africans are still barbarians - no human being could do what they are doing”’ (BBC 2000a.). By making such statements, he was highlighting that while the conflict was ongoing, Burundi’s reputation would continue to suffer and that peace would raise Burundi up in the esteem of the international community. This is a clear example of what Beardsley calls ‘intangible leverage’ which aims to move the parties closer to an agreement by making peace a more appealing alternative to war.

Furthermore, Nelson Mandela also committed within the agreement to continue to act as a “moral guarantor” and “conciliation agent” after the accord was signed and no time
limits were placed on when this role would cease (Arusha Accord 2000, 89). This indicates that Mandela intended to stay involved in the implementation phase of the agreement and to continue to support the parties in the aftermath of the conflict.

**Table 12. Summary of artificial incentives in Burundi**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Potential Indicators</th>
<th>Present in Case 2?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does the mediator threaten or impose tangible costs?</td>
<td>Economic sanctions or military coercion</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the mediator promise to provide tangible benefits?</td>
<td>'Trade deals, foreign aid, ceasefire monitoring assistance, peacekeeping forces</td>
<td>Yes – foreign aid, monitoring and peacekeeping forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the mediator threaten or impose intangible costs?</td>
<td>Diplomatic pressure, humanitarian appeals, highlighting audience costs, public criticism over conduct during war or in the negotiations</td>
<td>Yes – All indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the mediator promise to provide intangible benefits?</td>
<td>Promises of closer long term ties or prestige, further conciliation support</td>
<td>Yes – closer ties to the ‘modern world’ and further moral guidance and conciliation support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Measuring the Dependent Variable – the implementation of the peace agreement in Burundi**

**Pace of implementation**

It is important to note that not all rebel groups signed the Arusha Accord in August 2000 and it was another six years before all warring factions had signed ceasefire deals with the government. However, it was necessary to begin measuring the pace of implementation from the year 2000 as several aspects of the agreement, such as power sharing, began straight away, albeit without full participation. The results in both columns demonstrate that 60 percent (9 of 15) of the main stipulations of the Arusha Accord were fully implemented within the ten-year time frame of analysis, while 27 percent (4 of 15) had reached a medium level of implementation by this time and 13 percent (2 of 15) of the clauses had only been implemented to a minimal degree. All of the stipulations had been taken forward to at least a minimal degree within ten years. The results further show that the stipulations that were fully implemented were enacted gradually over the ten-year time frame of analysis. The mean
length of time taken to implement the 9 stipulations which achieved full implementation within 10 years when including all conflict actors was 6.1 years.\(^7\)

**Table 13. Pace of implementation in Burundi**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Key agreement clauses</th>
<th>Time taken to implement(^8)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. How long did it take to fully implement each key aspect of the peace agreement?</td>
<td>Electoral reform</td>
<td>5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ceasefire</td>
<td>6 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Demobilisation</td>
<td>10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disarmament</td>
<td>Medium implementation after 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. If certain aspects were not fully implemented, what was the degree of implementation 10 years after the agreement was signed?</td>
<td>Executive reform</td>
<td>10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Power sharing</td>
<td>3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constitutional reform</td>
<td>5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military reform</td>
<td>5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Police reform</td>
<td>5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Judicial reform</td>
<td>Medium implementation after 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political prisoner release</td>
<td>6 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reintegration of soldiers</td>
<td>Medium implementation after 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Refugee resettlement</td>
<td>Medium implementation after 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Media reform</td>
<td>Minimal implementation after 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amnesty</td>
<td>Minimal implementation after 10 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^7\) Mean time taken to implement the stipulations fully implemented within 10 years = \((5+6+10+10+3+5+5+5+6) / 9 = 6.1\) years.

\(^8\) Data sourced using the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, Peace Accord Matrix: [https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/arusha-peace-and-reconciliation-agreement-burundi](https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/arusha-peace-and-reconciliation-agreement-burundi)
Momentum for implementation

This section of the empirical analysis will examine the momentum for implementation in order to assess the attitudes of the parties towards the peace agreement. This investigation will cover the 5-year period after the agreement was signed, from August 28th 2000 to August 2005 and will draw primarily upon media statements and reports sourced using Factiva.9 The purpose of this section is to enable us to see in more depth whether the parties remained committed to implementing the peace agreement or if their preferences regarding the settlement appear to change. The trends and patterns highlighted will then be discussed in the within-case analysis following this section.

Key trends in implementation

As previously mentioned, not all the warring parties signed the peace agreement in August 2000. The two largest Hutu rebel groups - the FNL (Forces for National Liberation) and CNDD-FDD refused to sign the agreement and continued fighting (Leopold 2000). This suggests that the pressure and incentives that Mandela used to urge the parties to reach a settlement were only partially effective. However, the 16 other parties that had signed the agreement would try to implement as much as possible in the meantime (Leopold 2000). For example, in early 2001, six pro-Tutsi signatories to the accord stated that "the Government should not use the excuse of the war to refuse to implement the Agreement," (All Africa 2001a).

As Nelson Mandela agreed to remain a ‘moral guarantor’ and ‘conciliation agent’ to the peace process after the agreement was signed (Arusha Accord 2000, 89) he delivered on this promise by arranging a large international donor conference for Burundi in December 2000 (Love 2000). He also continued to negotiate between the signatories to the agreement throughout the first half of 2001 to decide who should take the first turn as President of the transitional government (Hennop 2001; Agence France-Presse 2001). This demonstrates that the parties to the agreement were still at least partially reliant on the intervention of a mediator to keep the momentum of implementation moving forward. It is also interesting to note that in 2001 Mandela handed the role of mediator over to the Deputy-President of South Africa Jacob Zuma to help bring the remaining parties into a ceasefire (All Africa 2001b).

9 Search terms included ‘Burundi, rebel, peace, ceasefire, implementation,’ Burundi donor conference,’ ‘Burundi peacekeepers,’ ‘Burundi sanctions,’ ‘Burundi elections’
On the one hand, this decision appears to indicate there were doubts about the ability of the parties to implement the Arusha Accord by themselves, but it also seems to show a high level of dedication by the South African mediators to secure the implementation of the peace agreement.

Indeed, over this five-year period, there were many set-backs in the implementation process that indicated that the peace accord had not yet become self-enforcing. For instance, in October 2001 the Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC) noted that the government were behind schedule with submitting draft laws on immunity for politicians returning from exile (Xinhua News 2001) and again three years later the IMC issued a list of stipulations that had yet to be fulfilled including disarmament procedures and a new defence and security forces bill (BBC 2004). There was also a significant breach in the ceasefire agreement that Zuma helped to negotiate with two smaller factions of the CNDD-FDD and FNL at the end of December 2002 (Thomson 2003) and the larger factions of these groups pulled out of peace talks with the government in early 2003 (All Africa 2003). As further evidence of the slow pace of this process, the constitutional referendum and the Parliamentary and Presidential elections in early 2005 also took place well behind schedule (Nduwimana 2004).

In spite of these set-backs, there were also encouraging developments in implementing the stipulations of the Arusha Accord and we can see that from the beginning of 2005 to August, momentum for implementing the agreement increased markedly. For example, at the start of 2005 the government signed two new laws establishing a reformed army and police force, which would integrate former rebels and be comprised of equal numbers of Tutsi and Hutu (Agence France-Presse 2005a). Additional progress was also made on demobilisation as it was reported that “six of seven rebel groups have been gathered at 12 sites across the country,” in early 2005 (Agence France-Presse 2005a). Lastly, the referendum on the new Burundian constitution was finally held in February 2005 (Nduwimana 2005) which then paved the way for municipal elections in June and Parliamentary elections in July (Agence France-Presse 2005b; Xinhua News 2005).

The preceding analysis has shown that in the first five years after the Arusha Accords were signed, the implementation process encountered numerous obstacles, but progress to implement the agreements noticeably sped up towards the end of this period. However, as Mandela and Jacob Zuma were both involved in the peace making and implementation process over this period of time, it can be difficult to discern whether these efforts were as a result of the facilitation efforts of these actors, or of the parties’ own accord.
Overall degree of implementation

According to the KROC Institute’s Peace Accords Matrix we can see that after ten years the implementation of the peace agreement in Burundi was deemed to be 78 percent complete. This suggests that while most aspects of the agreement were enacted, significant gaps in implementation remained.

Table 14. Overall degree of implementation in Burundi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Overall degree of implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>After ten years, what was the overall degree of implementation reported to be?</td>
<td>KROC Peace Accords Matrix Database</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Within-case analysis

In the preceding analysis, there appears to be some evidence of empirical support for the hypothesised causal mechanism. Although due to limitations in the study that will be discussed later, this should be treated with caution.

We can see that Nelson Mandela was a neutral mediator with no preferences for any of the warring parties. This meant that he was often able to exert pressure on all conflict actors, and indeed he did frequently create and use artificial incentives to bring the parties closer towards a negotiated settlement. Although he did not choose to impose or threaten tangible costs such as military intervention or economic sanctions, he did apply intangible leverage in the form of diplomatic pressure, highlighting audience costs and criticising the parties’ conduct during the war and negotiations. Furthermore, he also promised to remain personally involved as a ‘conciliation agent’ after the agreement was signed and insisted the parties would benefit from an enhanced international reputation if they agreed to cease fighting. He also sought to secure promises of tangible benefits such as foreign aid, peace keeping assistance and monitoring from a wide range of states and international actors. However, it was also noted that there were limitations to the effectiveness of his pressure on the parties, and he was not always successful in persuading the Burundian government to listen to him, as on the issue of releasing political prisoners. Therefore, the diplomatic
pressure he applied did not always influence the behaviour of the parties, and by refusing to impose tangible costs he did not take as heavy-handed an approach as he could have done.

When assessing the pace, process and overall degree of implementation, table 13 appears to show that on the whole it took a fairly long time to achieve full implementation on most aspects of the Arusha Accord, with a mean duration of 6.1 years within the ten-year time frame. This suggests that many difficulties were encountered in bringing all conflict actors to commit to and implement the agreement. However, table 13 also appears to show that there was sustained and continuous momentum for implementing the peace agreement. In the case of demobilisation and executive reform, efforts to see them through to completion continued for ten years. Similarly, progress on disarmament (UNSC 2008), refugee resettlement (UNSC 2007) and rebel reintegration (MDRP 2007), continued to increase over the ten-year period to reach a ‘medium’ level of implementation by 2010. By the end of the ten-year time frame, all of the fifteen agreement stipulations examined had been taken forward to at least a minimal degree with none being completely neglected. This suggests that the parties managed to sustain a certain level of commitment to implementing the Arusha Accords over this time. Finally, the overall assessment of implementation after ten years by the KROC Institute’s Peace Accord Matrix was that the Arusha Accords had been enacted to a degree of 78 percent, which suggests that while good progress had been made, there were still some significant areas left for completion.

The in-depth examination of the first five years of the implementation process adds essential nuance to these finding however, and demonstrates that although certain aspects of the agreement were taken on fairly quickly, such as power sharing, and momentum for implementation was sustained, the majority of the agreement stipulations encountered numerous delays and set-backs while there was still intense fighting between the army, the FNL and the CNDD-FDD rebel groups.

Hence, we can see that Nelson Mandela was neutral mediator who did not apply such heavy-handed tactics to impose or threaten tangible costs on the parties and momentum for implementing the agreement does appear to have been sustained over the ten-year time frame. However, because Mandela and Jacob Zuma continued to be involved in the implementation phase after the Arusha agreement was signed, we cannot say with great certainty whether the sustained momentum towards implementation was a result of the parties’ own determination, or through the influence of the South African facilitators. The next section of the analysis will compare the findings of the empirical analysis to see to what extent the hypothesis can be supported or refuted.
Comparative analysis

Having analysed each case individually, this section will now compare the cases on the results of the empirical analysis. Specifically, this will focus on the intervening and dependent variables. The implications for the hypothesised causal mechanism and the hypothesis will be discussed throughout this section, with an overall summary provided at the end.

The use of artificial incentives for peace

As the analysis of the two cases has shown, artificial incentives for peace can take a variety of forms, and this study sought to operationalise them by breaking them down into four categories: tangible costs, tangible benefits, intangible costs and intangible benefits. This aimed to capture the range of ways in which leverage could be applied by a mediator to make a peace settlement more appealing than conflict.

When comparing the cases on how tangible costs were applied, Russia threatened to withdraw material support from the Tajikistan government when it realised how costly the war could be. This came in the form of a statement by President Yeltsin and from proposals in the Duma which suggested that support for the government in Tajikistan was decreasing. In contrast, in the case of Burundi, Nelson Mandela chose not to press for others to impose economic or political sanctions as he could have done. Therefore, it seems that Russia was more willing than Nelson Mandela to apply materially costly leverage on the warring parties.

Regarding the application of intangible costs, we can see that both Russia in Tajikistan and Mandela in Burundi applied concerted diplomatic pressure on the parties to highlight the costs of continued conflict and push them towards a negotiated settlement. However, we can see distinct differences in the type of leverage the two mediators used, how this was applied and its effectiveness. In Russia’s case, the leverage used was primarily in the form of intense diplomatic pressure and was directed mainly at the Tajikistan government. Decisions to agree to the terms of a ceasefire in 1994 and to the final signing of the peace accord were attributed by several sources to Russian intervention, as well as the facilitation of meetings between Rahmonov and the UTO leadership. The fact that these efforts often resulted in significant concessions from the Tajikistan government and that Rahmonov largely seemed to follow the advice of the Russian leadership, also suggests that this leverage was highly effective. In comparison, Nelson Mandela used his leverage to impose a different range of intangible costs on all the warring parties. Mandela was
consistently critical of both the government and the rebel groups, highlighting audience costs and criticising their conduct during the war and the negotiations. He also sought to garner international support for peace and invited other states to put pressure on the warring parties. However, there is evidence to suggest that this pressure was not always effective, as in the case of encouraging the government to release political prisoners. This indicates that while both Russia and Nelson Mandela sought to apply substantial leverage in their mediation efforts, Russia appears to have been more successful at obtaining concessions from their preferred party than Mandela who tried to put equal pressure on all parties.

When comparing the promising or granting of tangible benefits, it was difficult to empirically observe whether Russia made any deliberate promises to the Tajikistan government. Given the dearth of explicit reports and as a biased ally of the Tajik government, it is hard to discern whether benefits given to Tajikistan by Russia during or after the peace negotiations were rewards for progress towards a settlement, or whether they were simply a continuation of their support. However, there are some reports which imply that Russia did use material incentives as bargaining chips to try and get Rahmonov to the negotiation table, such as promises of further military, economic and humanitarian aid at the 1993 CIS summit. It also seems that this would be a logical bargaining manoeuvre given Russia’s extensive material resources and investments in Tajikistan. On the other hand, in Burundi, Nelson Mandela was able to be much more vocal about promising tangible benefits for the parties, including international finance, peacekeeping and monitoring support.

A similar problem of distinguishing between incentives and routine support also applied when measuring the use of intangible benefits that Russia may have used to influence the parties. However, it seems logical to assume that when Yeltsin complained about having to ‘carry’ Tajikistan he was also implying that their relations would benefit from the signing of a peace deal. It must be acknowledged that there is a shortage of direct evidence to show if this type of leverage was explicitly used, although it seems a reasonable conclusion to draw given Russia’s determination to seek a settlement. In contrast, in Burundi, Mandela openly highlighted the potential benefits to Burundi’s international reputation if a peace deal were signed. Therefore, it seems that in both cases tangible and intangible benefits were part of the mediator’s negotiation strategies, if only implicitly with regards to Russia.

In summary, it seems that Russia made greater and more effective use of artificial incentives for peace than Nelson Mandela did in Burundi. Therefore, this suggests partial support for the hypothesised causal mechanism as the biased mediator did successfully exert
greater leverage on their preferred party. The results of this comparison are displayed in the table below.

**Table 15. Summary of artificial incentives for peace**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Artificial incentives used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td><strong>Four types</strong> – tangible and intangible costs, and tangible and intangible benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td><strong>Three types</strong> – intangible costs and tangible and intangible benefits</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The implementation of the peace agreements

When we compare the *pace* at which the respective peace agreements were implemented, the parties in Tajikistan seem to have been able to do this much faster, with a mean average of 2.4 years (for those aspects fully implemented), compared with an average of 6.1 years in Burundi. For example, in Burundi it took six years before a full ceasefire was implemented compared with two years in Tajikistan. This indicates that in Tajikistan there was greater determination to implement certain aspects of the accord faster than in Burundi, which runs contrary to the expectations of the hypothesis.

Regarding the *momentum* for implementation, in Tajikistan, table 9 indicates that progress seems to have come to an abrupt halt after three years. As also shown through the in-depth analysis, this timing coincided with the national elections which were held in February 2000 and the dissolution of the National Reconciliation Commission. The process tracing analysis revealed that momentum increased up to this point over the first three years. However, after this, it seems that the attitudes of the Rahmonov government in Tajikistan towards implementation changed significantly and once certain core aspects of the accord had been implemented, Rahmonov seemed to lose interest in fulfilling any remaining aspects of the agreement. Given that the previous analysis revealed that Russia used considerable artificial incentives to pressure Rahmonov and his supporters into reaching a compromise with the opposition, this seems to indicate that this may have resulted from Russia’s waning pressure to continue implementing the agreement. Thus, appearing to provide empirical support for the hypothesised causal mechanism.

In Burundi, the initial analysis in table 13 also indicates a similar pattern of increasing momentum towards implementation over the first five years, as shown by the
flurry of activity around the five-year mark. Table 13 however also seems to demonstrate that in Burundi, more so than in Tajikistan, there was greater sustained momentum over the ten-year time frame for implementing the Arusha Accord. By the end of the ten-year time frame more aspects had achieved a medium level of progress in Burundi than in Tajikistan. This appears to provide support to the hypothesised causal mechanism that a neutral mediator using fewer artificial incentives will allow for a more self-enforcing peace agreement. However, when we delve into the in-depth analysis, we can see that after Nelson Mandela ceased to be involved in Burundi in early 2001, he passed over some of his responsibilities to Jacob Zuma who continued to mediate between the parties who had not signed the accord. Therefore, it is possible that the sustained momentum for implementation was partly influenced by the continued third-party efforts of Jacob Zuma. This makes it difficult to distinguish how far the momentum for implementation was the result of the parties’ own determination and thus whether the hypothesised causal mechanism truly receives support in this case.

Lastly, we can see from overall measures of the degree of implementation that both Tajikistan and Burundi had achieved very similar levels of implementation after ten years, with Tajikistan having implemented 76 percent of their peace agreement and Burundi at 78 percent. This finding suggests that the hypothesis: *if a mediator is biased peace agreements will be implemented to a lower degree*, is not supported as a two percent difference is not large enough to be particularly significant. Nevertheless, this is a very interesting discovery, as we have seen how the mediation attempts and implementation processes in the two countries were very different and yet the degrees of implementation are incredibly similar. It may be therefore, that the continued influence of a mediator in Burundi helped to maintain the momentum for implementation, thus leading to a higher level of completion. This possibility and other alternative explanations will be discussed in the following section of the paper.

In summary, as we can see from Table 16 below, the findings regarding implementation display some interesting variations and similarities. On the one hand, we can see that on average it took a lot longer for most of the provisions of the accord in Burundi to reach full implementation. Although in Burundi the momentum for implementation appears to have been sustained for much longer and resulted in more progress being reached on a greater number of components in the agreement. Finally, we see the striking similarity in the overall degrees of implementation after 10 years.
Table 16. Summary of the implementation processes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tajikistan</th>
<th>Burundi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pace</strong>&lt;sup&gt;10&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2.4 years</td>
<td>6.1 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Momentum</strong>&lt;sup&gt;11&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Began very slowly, then increased to peak around the three-year mark. Very little progress made over the rest of the ten-year time frame.</td>
<td>Began very slowly, then increased to peak around the five-year mark. Progress continued steadily over the rest of the ten-year time frame.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Degree of implementation after 10 years</strong>&lt;sup&gt;12&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall implications for the causal mechanism and hypothesis

The preceding analysis has shown mixed results with regards to the causal mechanism hypothesised to link artificial incentives with the degree of implementation. On the one hand, we can see that Russia, the biased mediator, did make greater use of artificial incentives for peace and in a more effective way than Mandela was able to in Burundi. Thus, providing partial support for the causal mechanism. Another aspect of the analysis which seems to show support for the causal mechanism is the sustained momentum that we see in Burundi compared with the sudden halt in implementation in Tajikistan after three years. However, as mentioned, we cannot say with great certainty whether this is the result of the parties’ own determination to continue the implementation process or the intervention of successive mediators following Nelson Mandela. Finally, the faster pace of implementation in Tajikistan and the equal degrees of overall implementation found in both cases after ten years seem to refute the hypothesis and cast doubt on the connection between artificial incentives for peace and lower overall levels of implementation.

<sup>10</sup> Average time taken for stipulations that reached full implementation.
<sup>11</sup> Measured over the ten-year time frame after agreements were signed. June 1997 - June 2007 in Tajikistan and August 2000 – August 2010 in Burundi.
<sup>12</sup> As measured using the KROC Institute Peace Accord Matrix.
Alternative explanations

When assessing the robustness of the findings, we must consider that other factors aside from the mediator’s use of artificial incentives could have influenced the results. Firstly, while the author was aware beforehand that not all warring parties in Burundi signed the Arusha Accord immediately, an unknown confounder which was discovered later was the continued presence of another mediator after Nelson Mandela. This makes it difficult for us to discern whether the parties in Burundi sustained momentum for implementation because they had not been induced to such a great extent with artificial incentives, or whether this was due to Jacob Zuma’s influence. Further analysis also revealed that another facilitator, Charles Nqakula, was appointed to succeed Jacob Zuma in May 2006 (Republic of South Africa 2006), who stayed in post until the end of 2008 (IRIN 2008). We also know from the in-depth empirical analysis that in Tajikistan, the United Nations continued to exert diplomatic pressure on the parties to urge them to implement the agreement. This may also have led to a higher degree of implementation in the case of Tajikistan than we would have seen without their influence. This perhaps highlights a limitation in the applicability of the theory of artificial incentives, as a core assumption is that once a peace agreement has been signed the mediators’ influence will inevitably diminish. However, both these cases demonstrate that in practice it can be difficult to determine when and to what degree a mediator’s influence has waned, thus making it hard to know when a peace agreement has truly become self-enforcing.

A potential explanation for the similarity in the overall levels of implementation could be related to the environment in which the agreements were enacted. DeRouen et al. (2010) argue that adequate state capacity is a necessary (although not sufficient) condition for successful peace agreement implementation. This is because even with the parties’ best intentions and committed support from the international community, weak state capacity can significantly hinder implementation efforts. In fact, Burundi is one of the case studies they examine and use to demonstrate their argument, citing “corruption, abuse of authority, human rights violations, poverty, underdevelopment and the absence of democratic institutions,” as significant obstacles for the implementation of the Arusha Accord (DeRouen et al. 2010, 343). According to the Composite Index of National Capability rankings from 2007, both Burundi and Tajikistan ranked especially low on this table, with Burundi as 108th most powerful and Tajikistan 130th out of 193 countries. This similarity in reduced state capacity may help to explain why the implementation processes in both countries began very
slowly and perhaps also why they had both only reached 78 percent and 76 percent completion rates after ten years.

Furthermore, one potential reason for the differences found in the pace of the implementation processes could be that in Burundi the main fighting factions had not yet reached a mutually hurting stalemate. The concept of a mutually hurting stalemate, originally coined by William Zartman has become a well-established marker against which to measure the ‘ripeness’ of a conflict for resolution (Touval and Zartman 1985, 258-60). The theory posits that until the warring parties in a conflict both perceive themselves to be in a painful stalemate where neither can win the war outright, then conflict is likely to continue (Zartman 2001). In Burundi, as two large parties initially abstained from the agreement, this suggests that they did not feel it was in their best interests to sign a peace agreement at this stage. On the other hand, in Tajikistan there are numerous references in the secondary literature which attest to the parties having arrived at a mutually hurting stalemate prior to the agreement (Tetsuro 2010, 17; Jonson 1997, 10; Asadullaev 2001, 24; Akiner 2001, 40). Therefore, the speed of the implementation process in Tajikistan could have been accelerated by this.

Additional observations

During the analysis of the agreements, it became clear that although both were comprehensive in the breadth of the stipulations included, the level of detail in the Arusha Accord was noticeably higher than in the Tajikistan accords. This calls into question previous research which indicates that biased mediators tend to produce better quality agreements than neutral mediators (Svensson 2009). It has been claimed that biased mediators are more likely to produce institutionally complex agreements to enshrine and protect the interests of their preferred party (Svensson 2009). This study found on the contrary, that the biased mediator (Russia) took the opposite approach to protecting their preferred party - by concluding a peace agreement which was by comparison, far less detailed and institutionally complex (although no less comprehensive) than the Arusha Accord. For instance, in contrast to the Arusha Accord, no specific reintegration plan was outlined in the Tajikistan peace accords for combatants that did not want to go into the national army, (National Accord in Tajikistan, Protocol on Military Issues 1997, 5) and there was also no time frame given for integrating the UTO into the government. Furthermore, the contact group responsible for monitoring the implementation of the agreement would not be able to levy consequences on the parties for non-implementation and there was no time frame given for its establishment or details of how it would function (National Accord in
Tajikistan, Protocol on the guarantees of implementation 1997, 4). As Russia played a significant role in shaping the agreement (Hay 2001; Jonson 1997; Akiner 2001) this lack of specificity suggests that Russia did not wish to include too much detail and preferred to keep the stipulations of the accord as general as possible rather than bind Rahmonov to specific commitments. If this is the case, it encourages us to reconsider the idea that biased mediators tend to produce agreements that are more detailed and thus of a superior quality.

Limitations and biases

Research design and methodology

By choosing to conduct a small ‘n’ comparison of two cases this can cause problems of external validity, as the results may be limited by how far they can be applied to the broader population of cases (Lim 2010, 41). Gathering data on such a small number of cases reduces confidence in our ability to make broader generalisations about the findings, especially as this study includes the study of Burundi which could constitute a non-typical case due to its complexity resulting from the number of conflict actors and the number of ceasefires brokered at different times. It therefore may be that these cases only represent a small sub-sample of the broader population, which may not allow us to draw conclusions that will apply more widely to others. This is to some extent mitigated by the fact that Tajikistan represents a hardest case, as previous studies have indicated that peace agreements negotiated by a government biased mediator are often of higher quality and thus more likely to endure (Svensson 2009). Therefore, if the hypothesis were to hold, this increases our confidence that the hypothesis will apply in other cases too. Nevertheless, we must bear the small number of cases in mind when considering how far these findings can contribute to the broader field of research.

It is also possible that the findings of this study could be compromised by the way in which the cases were selected. Firstly, when using the MSS method, it can be very difficult to identify cases with sufficient similarities which also vary on the independent variable (Lim 2010, 41; Powner 2015, 125). While we must try to match cases as best we can by controlling for the most important confounding factors, ultimately it must be acknowledged that there will be outstanding differences which could reduce or negate the explanatory power of the independent variable. Nevertheless, by looking at two carefully chosen cases in more depth, we are able to assess the relative weight of the explanatory variable. This
highlights the importance of being transparent about possible alternative explanations. Secondly, it may be that the author was also influenced by the amount of data available on particular cases, thereby compromising the comparability of the cases. For instance, it was difficult to source adequate levels of data on other cases that were initially considered, such as the mediation of France in the Niger Delta in 1995. It is hard to say how far restrictions on data availability could have negatively influenced the case selection process, but every effort was made by the author, given the limitations on available resources, to strike a good balance between ensuring comparability and sufficient data to conduct a thorough study.

Turning to examine the way in which the data collection process was designed, we can see that questions could be raised about the internal validity of the study if the variables were not operationalised in a way which adequately captures the central concepts being investigated. For instance, when operationalising artificial incentives for peace, guidance was sought not only from the theoretical literature which introduced the concepts (Beardsley 2008), but also from alternate literature on different types of leverage and the ways in which it can be applied in negotiations (Kirgis 2014). The author therefore aimed to find a balance between defining artificial incentives broadly enough to be sufficiently inclusive, but not so general as to introduce irrelevant and potentially confounding elements into the analysis. A similar logic was also applied when defining and operationalising the implementation of peace agreements. As implementation can encompass many different components and be difficult to quantify objectively, the author decided to measure it in three different ways (pace, momentum and overall degree), utilising both numerical measures and process tracing to ensure the concept was adequately captured in the empirical analysis. In doing so, an attempt was made to boost the internal validity of the study.

The reliability of the information gathered on these variables to some extent was also enhanced by the decision to use the method of a structured focused comparison, where the same questions were asked of each case. However, as process tracing was also used, this allowed much greater freedom for the author to choose which information to collect and present, thereby potentially introducing selection bias into the empirics. For this reason, the primary tool used to collect data was Factiva. While it is still possible that the author could selectively choose which information to include and dismiss, this allowed for the gathering of information from a wide range of different media sources, hence decreasing problems that could stem from the overreliance on a few biased sources. Using an extensive database of news articles also gave the author the option to verify information by triangulating and cross-
referencing between different media outlets. Thus, increasing the reliability and accuracy of the information that was eventually used.

Despite these attempts to use as broad a range of sources possible, some forms of information proved very challenging to obtain due to their covert nature. For instance, it was very difficult to source information on whether Russia offered or promised the Rahmonov regime tangible or intangible benefits. This is not only because Russia would be unlikely to make this information publicly known, but it would also be hard to know what their true intentions were and to distinguish between an incentive for peace and a routine continuation of support from a biased ally. In this case, the author was forced to use a combination of reasoned logic and any available empirical evidence to reach plausible conclusions about this aspect of the data collection.

Finally, in relation to the time frames chosen for data collection, while the ten-year time frame for assessing the pace and overall degree of implementation was sufficient for assessing general trends in the process and final level of implementation, the five-year time frame for the in-depth process tracing did place limitations on the amount of relevant information the author was able to capture on the parties’ commitment to the peace deals. The main reasons for choosing five years was that this constituted the minimum amount of time recommended by previous research for analysing implementation, and an in-depth analysis of ten years would have taken longer than the time available for conducting this study. However, it should be acknowledged that it would have been beneficial to extend the process tracing over the full ten-year time frame, especially when looking at Burundi, as we would have been able to see changes in the parties’ attitudes over a longer period of time after additional ceasefires were signed after the Arusha Accord.

**Empirical analysis**

A pertinent limitation of this study which could reduce our confidence in the explanatory power of the intervening variable, is that it was impossible to separate the effects of Nelson Mandela’s mediation efforts from those of his predecessor Julius Nyerere who had been involved in the mediation of the Burundian civil war since early 1996 (Bentley and Southall 2005, 57). Likewise, in choosing to study only Russia’s role in the Tajik civil war, it must be acknowledged that their efforts cannot be completely isolated from those of the United Nations and the other observers’ efforts in the peace process. Therefore, we cannot discount the likelihood that the decisions of the warring parties were
constantly being influenced by other external actors. This demonstrates why it was important to conduct an in-depth process tracing analysis when measuring implementation to gauge the relative weight of the mediator’s influence.

Conclusions

The role of bias in third party mediation has been analysed from several different perspectives in recent years, as have the factors which can affect the implementation of peace agreements. However, until now there has been no systematic investigation into whether the strategies employed by a biased mediator can influence the implementation of peace agreements in the long run. This study sought to shed light on this by assessing whether biased and neutral mediators use artificial incentives in different ways and to different extents during peace negotiations and how this could affect the overall implementation process. The theoretically derived hypothesis guiding this research therefore was: if a mediator is biased peace agreements will be implemented to a lower degree.

By comparing Russia’s biased mediation efforts during the Tajikistan civil war with Nelson Mandela’s neutral stance in Burundi, we can see that while the hypothesis was not supported, as the levels of overall implementation were very similar, interesting differences in the use of artificial incentives and the process of implementation were found. It was found that Russia did make greater use of heavy-handed leverage than Nelson Mandela, which resulted in the creation of more artificial incentives for peace. Russia’s application of leverage also appeared to be more effective than that used in Burundi. This suggests that part of the hypothesised causal mechanism, in which artificial incentives are used differently by biased and neutral mediators receives some support. When analysing the effect of these artificial incentives on the implementation process we found mixed results however. In Tajikistan, the pace of implementation was faster than in Burundi, although in Burundi, the implementation process appeared to maintain momentum for much longer and progress was made on a broader range of stipulations. It should be acknowledged that an unknown confounding factor was uncovered in the analysis stage of the research however, which meant that this sustained momentum may have been influenced by the continued presence of mediators in Burundi, rather than the efforts of the parties alone. In light of this, one recommendation for future research would be to select cases of civil wars where all parties to the conflict sign the initial peace agreement straight away. This makes it less likely that
further mediation attempts will be needed after the first agreement and thus it will be easier to see when the mediator’s influence has diminished.

This study does however suggest some interesting avenues for future research with potential policy implications. A particularly interesting finding was the abruptness with which the momentum for implementation in Tajikistan halted after the national elections had been held in February 2000. This suggests that peace agreements could be particularly vulnerable to stalling at this stage of implementation. Domestic and international actors may therefore need to be especially aware of this and ensure that efforts are made to sustain the momentum for implementation past these milestones in the process. Although the small scale of this study places limitations on how far we are able to generalise our findings to the broader population of cases, future research conducted on a larger scale may find this a worthwhile aspect of investigation.
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