NOXIOUS FUMES OF NATIONALISM

Master of Science in Peace and Conflict Studies Thesis

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ABSTRACT

This study is an investigation into the psychosociological causes of ethnic war through the lens of contact theory. Using group identity salience, perceptions of inequality, perception of threat and negative outgroup attitudes (NOAs) including prejudice and nationalism, this study introduces a supra-theory called the negative contact spiral to explain a gap in contact theory, namely the rare but powerful negative effects of intergroup contact. The study predicts that salience of ethnic identity leads to NOAs, both directly and via either perception of outgroups as threat or via perception of intergroup inequalities, but finds weak and mixed support for all predictions. A comparative case study of Yugoslavia from 1978-1982 and from 1987-1991 was used. Strongest support shows that a perception of inequalities leads to NOAs, and unexpectedly, strong support was also found for perception of inequality leading to perception of threat and for perception of threat for one group to lead to perception of threat for another. Support for the predictions of the negative contact spiral in general are weak and mixed. Further study is recommended to parse out the actual relationships between the variables studied in the spiral.

The title is inspired by a quote from Warren Zimmerman, the last US ambassador to Yugoslavia: “The aggressive nationalism emanating like noxious fumes from the leaders of Serbia and Croatia and their even more extreme advisers, officials, media manipulators, and allies had cast the die for disintegration and violence.” (Zimmermann 1995)
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Bosniak – the modern, politically correct term for people of ‘Muslim’ ethnicity, primarily from BiH. This term become common after the wars. Prior to the wars, the word ‘Muslim’ was used to refer to this group, that term was used entirely as an ethnic label and said nothing of beliefs or religious practice.

DV – Dependent variable – “The phenomenon thought to be influenced, affected, or caused by some other phenomenon.” (Johnson and Reynolds 2012, 626)

FRY – ‘Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ – the union of Serbia and Montenegro from the end of the SFRY until 2006 when Montenegro became its own country.

Grievance – a term I have left out of this paper. I felt it was used differently in different sources and the meaning was unclear. At times it was the same as the existence of inequalities, sometimes it was referring to resentment about inequalities and sometimes as motivation to fight about them… Sometimes it seemed the same as relative deprivation, sometimes not.

IV – Independent Variable - “The phenomenon thought to influence, affect, or cause some other phenomenon.” (Johnson and Reynolds 2012, 628)

JNA – Yugoslavian National Army

LCY – League of Communists of Yugoslavia – the ruling party of Yugoslavia

NOAs – Negative outgroup attitudes – a category that includes prejudice and nationalism¹ – one of the variables in the negative contact spiral and the DV in this paper.

Serbo-Croat – a language, also known as SBC (Serbian/Bosnian/Croatian) spoken by people in Serbia, Bosniak and Croatia. For political reasons, after the war people began referring to it as three languages.

SFRY – Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – the name of the country from WWII until the wars began in 1991.

¹ The terms nationalism and ethnonationalism are used interchangeably in this paper.
This paper centres around a supra-theory I created called the negative contact spiral. The story of how that spiral came to be really doesn’t show in this paper, here we use only the final version. It all started with a puzzle. I knew that according to contact theory, people of different groups should like each other as long as they have contact. But I also knew that that wasn’t how reality worked – I knew that there were ethnic wars in places that had previously been peaceful. In trying to reconcile these two facts I found myself mired in dozens of theories, factors and ideas. It really seemed to me like there were in fact two spirals – one positive in which contact leads to knowledge, empathy and reduce anxiety just as shown by contact theory – and a second that leads to negative results, but which hadn’t been defined or explored much.

Early versions of my negative contact spiral had as many as eight factors listed, many connections between them and many two-way connections. It also did not have any clear start or end point – no clear IV or DV. This made it very difficult to wrangle down into a theory parsimonious enough and simple enough to be explained and explored in this paper.

As explained in this thesis, the choice to look at just 4 factors, and just to look at the strongest, one-way connections between them, was made for sake of parsimony and falsifiability. However, future research may well find that other factors, other connections, other IV or DV are more accurately representative of reality. My contribution has been to start investigating the idea of a negative spiral. I don’t for a minute think that this is its final form.
INTRODUCTION

Interethnic conflict is some of the most violent and long-term conflict in the world. It has killed 10 million people since WWII. (Al Ramiah and Hewstone 2013) But, most multiethnic societies do not erupt in ethnic violence (Fearon and Laitin 1996). The fact that most multiethnic societies are peaceful, but some erupt in ethnic warfare, is puzzling.

This paper looks at that puzzle through the lens of contact theory – an established theory of prejudice reduction founded by Gordon Allport in 1954 (1979), tested and expanded upon by innumerable researchers, and tested quantitatively and definitively by Pettigrew and Tropp (2006). Specifically, this study aims to help fill an established gap in contact theory – namely, the rare, negative effects of intergroup contact. To do so, I have knit together a large number of other studies and theories from psychosocial disciplines. In this way, this paper rests on a supra-theory of my own creation – the negative contact spiral (see page 17). In the spiral, I predict that salient group identities lead both to the perception of inequalities and to a perception of other groups as a threat. Then all three of these factors lead to the DV, negative outgroup attitudes (NOAs) including prejudice and ethnonationalism. This leads to the research question for this study:

*How do negative outgroup attitudes, such as prejudice and nationalism, arise in multiethnic societies?*

Three hypotheses to test have been derived from the negative contact spiral:

**Hypothesis 1:** Salient group identities leads directly to negative outgroup attitudes

**Hypothesis 2a:** Salient group identities leads to a perception of other groups as threats

**Hypothesis 2b:** A perception of other groups as threats leads to negative outgroup attitudes.

**Hypothesis 3a:** Salient group identities leads to a perception of inequalities.

**Hypothesis 3b:** A perception of inequalities leads to negative outgroup attitudes.

To explore this, two time-points in the history of Yugoslavia are examined as two separate cases. The first is around 1980, with the death of the dictator Tito. The second is around 1990 with the fall of communism. The two cases are compared using structured, focussed comparison and each case is explored using process tracing. These methods were chosen because they were the best way to tease out the interactions between the variables and see the process that occurred in each case.
This is a preliminary explanatory study to explore, describe and explain relationships between the ethic identity salience and negative outgroup attitudes. The contribution to the literature and main argument is that once intergroup contact has begun to take on a negative character in a multiethnic society, these variables in the negative contact spiral interact and the result can be disastrous. Data for this paper has been collected primarily from academic articles, news articles, scholarly books and a few reputable websites.

The study reveals little support for the specific hypotheses or relationships predicted by the negative contact spiral, and support is also found for several unpredicted relationships (see pg. 68) and thus the research question cannot be answered conclusively. I suspect these findings are due to a combinations of the topic being overly ambitious given the time and space constraints of this paper as well as potentially due to a problem with results from lab studies not holding true in ‘real world’ applications. (See pg. 70). However, it is hoped that future research based on the preliminary findings here can refine the negative contact spiral so it can become a useful tool for peace researchers and policy makers.

This paper begins with a review of the literature on contact theory and presents the research gap and research question. Following that the negative contact spiral itself is presented and a cursory review of the literature for each of the four variables in it is undertaken. This is followed by a review of what is known about each of the links between variables in the spiral.

The next section of the paper outlines the methods and design of the research undertaken. It includes a discussion of the case selection, the operationalization of the variables and the expected results.

The third major section of the paper is where the findings are presented and analysed. First the SFC is completed for both cases and both IV and DV. This is followed by the process tracing of both cases. At the end of this section are a series of tables summarising the main findings.

The final section of the paper undertakes a discussion of the results and considers potential alternative reasons for the findings as well as limitations to the theory, methods and empirics used. Implications for contact theory are also discussed. It is hoped that although this particular formation of the negative contact spiral didn’t bear fruit, this work can still contribute to the field by exploring other permutations of the negative contact spiral.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH

CONTACT THEORY

Contact theory, previously known as the contact hypothesis, began in research into prejudice in the 1940s and 1950s in the US. The first contributor to this idea was Robin Williams who wrote a report on group relations in 1947 (Williams Jr. 1947; Pettigrew et al. 2011), but it was Gordon Allport, with his landmark 1954 book *The Nature of Prejudice* that is the foundation stone of this whole field of research. The key passage reads:

Prejudice (unless deeply rooted in the character structure of the individual) may be reduced by equal status contact between majority and minority groups in the pursuit of common goals. The effect is greatly enhanced if this contact is sanctioned by institutional supports (i.e., by law, custom or local atmosphere), and provided it is of a sort that leads to the perception of common interests and common humanity between members of the two groups. (Allport 1979, 281)

This is commonly paraphrased by researchers as Allport’s four conditions or Allport’s optimal contact conditions. (Equal status between the groups, working towards common goals, intergroup cooperation and support from authorities.) (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006)

Since then, hundreds of studies have tested elements of this idea in various forms and on different populations. Researchers debated the necessity of each of the four conditions, if some should be removed or others added, and what the mechanisms might be behind it all.²

CURRENT STATE OF THE DEBATE

In 2006, two modern giants in this field, Thomas Pettigrew and Linda Tropp, undertook a meta-study of over 500 studies of contact theory. Under stringent methodological conditions, they tried to analyse all relevant research in the intergroup contact field. This report become a landmark in contact theory and has been referenced in over 4000 other papers since. They came to several fascinating and useful conclusions. First, they found that Allport’s four conditions were merely facilitating conditions. Intergroup contact often has positive effects even when the conditions aren’t met. In other words, just exposure to others can increase

² It is relevant to note that Allport’s book was on prejudice, how it forms and how to reduce it. Intergroup contact was just one part of his section on prejudice reduction. He doesn’t expand on the idea to specify what the mechanism(s) could be, nor does he consider if and how the effects of intergroup contact could generalise to become more widely spread in the population as a whole. (Hewstone and Swart 2011) (Pettigrew 1998)
liking for them. In fact, an inverse relationship between contact between groups and a reduction in prejudice was seen in 94% of samples. This means that 94% of the time, contact with another group has positive results. (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006, 2008).

In terms of the mechanism, Pettigrew and Tropp (2008, 922) also investigated three that had all received a great deal of research attention. The first was the idea that intergroup contact reduces prejudice by increasing knowledge of the outgroup. The second was that it reduces the anxiety that may come from intergroup contact. The third mechanism they investigated was the idea that intergroup contact encourages perspective-taking and increases the empathy that people feel for others in outgroups. Remarkably, they found empirical support for all three mechanisms, though the increased knowledge is weaker than the other two.

Finally, they looked at causality and found that while the result does go both ways, it is stronger for contact reducing prejudice than vice versa. (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006)

These three findings: that most contact leads to positive results even if the four conditions aren’t met, that all three commonly proposed mechanisms are empirically supported, and that causality leads from contact to prejudice reduction, have provided solid ground for the theory and the field to grow even more. Pettigrew and Tropp’s 2006 article very much defines the current state of the debate on contact theory.

OTHER KNOWN FACTORS IN CONTACT THEORY

Even in the works of both Williams and Allport, it is clear that this is an enormously complex problem with many variables involved. (Pettigrew et al. 2011) However, after over six decades of research, research has parsed out quite a few of those complexities. For example: contact works to reduce prejudice for majority and minority members, just to different extents. (Pettigrew and Tropp 2008) Also, group size moderates the extent of the effect, not its existence. (Hewstone et al. 2014) It is also known that the effects on contact generalise through so-called ‘indirect contact’— if a person has an in-group friend who has an out-group friend, that person is also likely to be less prejudiced than someone with no such connections. (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006) In other words, the friend of my friend is my friend.
It has been established that the effects of contact are universal across ages, genders and nationalities. (Pettigrew et al. 2011; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006) Finally, Al Ramiah and Hewstone found an impressive number of factors that moderate/affect the effectiveness of contact including group status, individual levels of prejudice, prior levels of contact and intergroup ideologies. (Al Ramiah and Hewstone 2013, 537)

**RESEARCH GAP**

(addressed with ‘psychosocial geology’)

There is one key difference between how the founders of Contact Theory, and especially Gordon Allport, envisaged it and what is known today. In the 1940s and 50s, it was assumed that most intergroup contact had negative consequences, and the researchers were interested in parsing out what the necessary conditions were for it to have positive effects. (Pettigrew et al. 2011; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006) Today, after more than a half century of research, science is confident that in fact the reverse is true: the vast majority of the time, when two groups have contact with each other, the outcome is positive. (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006) However, the field is now realising that the next step it must take is to flip that initial assumption on its head and determine what the circumstances are that lead intergroup contact to have negative consequences in the minority of cases. This, often referred to as negative contact, is an established gap in the field (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006; Pettigrew 2008) and what this thesis intends to help address. The purpose of this study is to help explain what causes contact to fail sometimes, considering it works so well and so often in so many different cases. This puzzle leads to the research question below.

The negative effects of intergroup contact may be a gap recognised in current contact theory literature, however other areas of social science do know a fair bit about negative consequences resulting from intergroup interaction. In fact, a wide array of theories – especially those in social psychology – address this question from a variety of angles and in different ways.

Before discussing those theories, however, a short explanation of my choice to include so many theories into one thesis. *Social psychology has been criticized for operating like mining engineers – digging deep and narrow and digging out the valuable bits – instead of operating like geologists who identify all the features, their origins and interrelations in the broader picture.* (Kelley 1983) As Pettigrew noted, social psychology “too often gives cute new
labels to specific phenomena without relating them to broader middle-range theory.” (2001)\(^3\)

This is the problem here. Contact theory hasn’t been connected to other theories that do address the negative effects of intergroup contact including theories of prejudice formation, threat perception, and inequalities, to name a few. This is how this study intends to bridge the gap in contact theory – by taking a broad view to illuminate the connections between a large number of other studies and theories that all help to explore the negative consequences from intergroup contact. This whole paper is an exercise in ‘psychosocial geology’.

Regarding the gap in contact theory – it is understandable in a way that this gap exists. Not just because of the assumptions of early researchers about positive contact being the puzzle that needed explaining, but also because research on when contact has negative results could be taken by nationalist/racist/xenophobic groups and twisted to say that science is saying societies need to segregate and be ‘ethnically pure’. It must be emphasized that this is not the case. Keep in mind that 94 percent of the time contact has positive results. The vast majority of multiethnic societies are and remain peaceful. Negative contact is the exception, not the rule. However, social science still needs to study and understand this exceptional process so that when the spiral of negative contact begins in a society, policymakers may have better ideas of how to stop or reverse it and thus avoid ethnic conflict in future.

**RESEARCH QUESTION**

The negative effects of contact with other groups largely comes down to groups developing or strengthening negative outgroup attitudes as a result of the interaction. As such, the research question to be explored in this study is:

*How do negative outgroup attitudes, such as prejudice and nationalism, arise in multiethnic societies?*

**THEORY**

In this paper the aim is to show how four elements of intergroup contact interact with each other to produce situations that can ultimately lead to interethnic war. Though war is outside

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\(^3\) I imagine the miner approach may be more common because it requires less definitions and less reading of other material. Indeed, to do what I’m trying to do in a comprehensive way would require years and years of background reading. It has been incredibly challenging to try to cover them all fairly and accurately.
the theory of the negative contact spiral⁴, it is ultimately what this study aims to illuminate and avoid in future. The independent variable is salience of group identities. The idea behind that is that salience is the ultimate precondition: the other elements cannot occur without salience of group identity. Group identity salience, according to the spiral, leads into all three other elements: perception of outgroups as threats, perception of inequalities between groups (whether these inequalities are objective or just subjectively perceived as such), and the DV, Negative Outgroup Attitudes (NOAs). The umbrella category of NOAs includes several concepts, primarily prejudice and ethnonationalism. My theory is exceptionally complex, but it is a novel theory.

These elements were chosen based on a review of the relevant literature. The interaction between these elements is visualised in the negative contact spiral. The term ‘spiral’ was chosen since in lab results, many of these connections are mutually reinforcing to some extent (inequality and salience, threat and salience, negative outgroup attitudes and inequality). However for focus in this study I have chosen only to look at the stronger direction for each of these links. The spiral concept comes from interactions between these elements.

It is also important to note that this analysis is focussed on the group level. This is the relevant unit when discussing the effects of intergroup contact.

The remainder of this theory section unpacks the spiral. First, each of the elements is addressed on its own to define it and describe the current state of the literature on that subject as it relates to (positive) contact theory⁵. Following that, the connections between each of the factors in the negative contact spiral is explained with what is known about that interaction from existing studies and theories.

Throughout this paper, it is important to keep a few things in mind. First, this is a broad supra-theory of my own creation that attempts to knit together a wide variety of studies and theories. As such, it cannot go very far in depth with any one of them, except contact theory, which is the basis of the research gap. Further, the relationships in the negative contact spiral are all probabilistic and not deterministic. It would be foolish to think that the simple

⁴ Taking the process from the end of the spiral – negative outgroup attitudes – to war would require investigations of other complex processes such as recruitment and mobilization, which are well beyond the scope of this paper.

⁵ I use positive contact theory since that is the body of knowledge which exists and that is what the theory is today. However, if anything on negative effects comes up, it is explicitly noted as such.
THE NEGATIVE CONTACT SPIRAL
(WITH RELATED KEYWORDS AND THEORIES)

- Perception of Threat
  - Group Threat Theory
  - Realistic Conflict Theory
  - The Threat Hypothesis
  - Realistic Group Threat Theory
  - Integrated Threat Theory

- Perception of Inter-Group Inequalities
  - Horizontal Inequalities
  - Relative Deprivation Theory
  - Perceived vs Objective Inequalities
  - Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Inequalities
  - Grievances

- Group Identity Salience
  - Social Identity Theory
  - Self-Categorisation Theory

- Negative Outgroup Attitudes
  - Prejudice
  - (Ethno) Nationalism
presence of one of these factors doomed a society to slide down a slippery slope into ethnic war. However, with these factors present, they can interact and do increase the likelihood of NOAs such as prejudice and nationalism, which in turn can lead to interethnic war. An investigation of how to stop that process and other policy implications must be left to other research. This paper first attempts to show that this causal pathway is plausible by showing it is supported by existing research and then tries to anticipate counter arguments and show that other causal pathways are less plausible.

THE FOUR FACTORS:
Definition and State of the Literature on each Factor

SALIENCE

The key factor that sets off the negative contact spiral is group identities being salient. Salience refers to how prominent or conspicuous group identity is in a given context. In a context with high ethnic group salience, people identify primarily as members of their ethnic group – their ethnic identity is central to their personal identity. Further, people in such contexts tend to view others primarily in regards to ethnic group identity as well. Salience, though, isn’t bad in and of itself – is has been linked to both negative and positive contact.

However, salience is part of the negative contact spiral. The problem with salient group identities in intergroup interactions stems from seeing others only as their group identity and ignoring any diversity or plurality within the group and the multiple identities of the individuals. Monolithic group identities are dangerous, and to counteract that people need to be aware of the diversity within the group. Having one dominant, salient group identity prevents awareness of the diversity within the group. (Tredoux and Finchilescu 2007)

Within this discussion of salience, Social Identity Theory (SIT) and Self-Categorisation Theory (SCT) must be mentioned.

SIT is a theory of intergroup relations based on people’s group identities. (Baumeister and Vohs 2007b; ‘Social-Identity Theory - Oxford Reference’ 2017). It relates to the negative contact spiral in that when one of these identities becomes salient, it governs human perceptions, feelings, attitudes and behaviours. When the salient identity is ethnicity, it can
lead to seeing one’s ingroup and everything about it as better than an outgroup. (Baumeister and Vohs 2007b)

From SIT came SCT (Wright and Tropp 2001). SCT focuses on the fact that people can act both as individuals and as members of groups and that social identities can overpower individual identity in importance or influence. (Baumeister and Vohs 2007a) This is important for situations of outgroup contact since when people are around outgroup members group identities become more salient. (Ibid.)

To this discussion on salience, Walker, Wong, and Kretzschmar (2001) add that the perception of inequalities only applies with salient, historically opposed groups; that historical opposition provides salience.

NEGATIVE OUTGROUP ATTITUDES
(Prejudice and Ethnonationalism)

This theory lumps intergroup negative attitudes, prejudice and outgroup stereotyping all together – just as Pettigrew and Tropp did (2006). Prejudice is central to contact theory and Allport defined it as “a feeling, favourable or unfavourable, toward a person or thing, prior to, or not based on, actual experience” (Allport 1979, 7) It is also known that attitudes to one outgroup (including prejudice) transfer to others. (Hewstone et al. 2014) Thus, once a group is expressing NOAs against one group, they are likely to harbour NOAs against multiple other groups.

Prejudice is then also combined with ethnonationalism. It is under debate whether ingroup pride, such as nationalism, and outgroup prejudice are linked, as Pettigrew found (1998), or, as others have argued, that ingroup love doesn’t mean outgroup hate (Brewer 1999; Allport 1979). However, since this study only looks at ingroup pride (nationalism) that does have negative effects on outgroups and thus feel I am justified in considering all of these under the (very) broad category of ‘negative outgroup attitudes’ (NOAs). Put very simply, nationalism is ‘my group is superior to your group’ and prejudice as ‘your group is inferior to my group’, and thus they are two sides to the same coin. This is supported by the UCDP: “Since nationalism is in essence based on perceiving one’s ethnic kindred as being allies, it follows naturally that any other persons are different, giving rise to dangerous currents of exclusion and differentiation between peoples.” (UCDP 2017e)
PERCEPTION OF OUTGROUPS AS THREAT

The third factor is the perception of other groups as threats to the ingroup. This also includes work on intergroup anxiety. There are a number of theories that propose that the perception, subconscious or not, that outgroups pose a threat to one’s ingroup is central to negative results from intergroup contact. Theories include Group Threat Theory, Realistic Group Conflict Theory, The Threat Hypothesis, Realistic Group Threat Theory and Integrated Threat Theory. A comprehensive review of all of these approaches is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that all are centred on the idea that outgroups can seem threatening to ingroups in one way or another.\(^6\)

INEQUALITIES

Intergroup inequalities refer to some group(s) having more power/money/advantage of some sort than another. Inequality has been defined as “a structural, asymmetric condition governing social relations among actors.” (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013)

This factor is central to the negative contact spiral both because it is well established as a cause of interethnic war\(^7\) and because even within discussions of contact theory, it has been acknowledged that if the groups are of unequal status this can be especially detrimental to the chances of the contact having a positive outcome. (Al Ramiah and Hewstone 2013, 527).

Inequalities between groups are often referred to as **Horizontal Inequalities (HI)**; as opposed to vertical inequalities – which only affect individuals or households). (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013). For the purposes of this paper, ‘inequalities’ is used to mean horizontal inequalities since the unit of study for this research is groups.

Another key term when talking about intergroup contact and inequalities between groups is Relative Deprivation theory (RD). It characterises collective violence as a frustrated reaction resulting from aspirations (usually material) that have gone unfulfilled. (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013) Relative deprivation theory doesn’t explicitly look at interpersonal and

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\(^6\) For more on these theories see (Schlueter and Scheepers 2010; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; McLaren 2003, 915; Laurence 2011; Riek, Mania, and Gaertner 2006; Çakal et al. 2016; Pettigrew et al. 2011, 277)

\(^7\) see discussions of Horizontal Inequalities and of Relative Deprivation below, as well as the work of Lars-Erik Cederman
intergroup comparisons (Ibid, 11) However, it is often used, and in this paper is used, to examine interactions between groups.8

Inequalities can be political, economic, cultural or social. Political inequalities are when one group or groups have a disproportionate amount of power than others. This could be one ethnic group that controls the whole parliament or military, or it could just be a controlling proportion.9 Economic inequalities are one group controlling a disproportional share of wealth, access to capital etc… Social inequalities include education, societal status and uneven social access; and cultural inequalities cultural symbols and policies, religious rites and national holidays. (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013)

Political inequalities10 are seen as especially important in this process, because it is theorised that if a group feels aggrieved and wants to change the situation, they would first look to do this within established channels – through the political system in the country. However, if they are unable to address their grievance that way, then they would consider more costly and drastic measures such as mobilisation to a conflict. It is the empowered's opposition or repression of claims of politically excluded minorities that leads them to feel there is no alternative to protest11. (Kuhn and Weidmann 2015; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013, 59)

INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE FOUR FACTORS

At the core of the idea behind the negative contact spiral is the interactions between the elements. Each link in the negative contact spiral is based on studies that have demonstrated that effect. This section briefly examines what is known about each of those links from studies and established theories.

8 The big theorists behind RD are Davis 1962, 1997 and Gurr 1970, 19718 also Sambanis 2005, though it was first described by Stouffer et el 1949. Gurr 1970, says that the greater the discrepancy between one’s expectations and realities in status between different groups, the higher the frustration and the higher propensity to turn to violence. (Koktsidis 2014)
10 For more on inequalities, see (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Kuhn and Weidmann 2015) , and works by Frances Stewart
11 Of course, this willingness to fight is not enough to cause a war. That is where rebel recruitment and mobilization comes in. That is outside the scope of this paper. Contact theory just takes us to hating other groups – that’s all I am trying to explain, how do groups that coexist end up hating enough so much they could want to fight.
The direct link between salience and negative outgroup attitudes is complex. As mentioned in the section on salience, salient group identities contribute to both positive and negative contact experiences.

Cederman argues that salient group identities make people in intergroup contact situations more likely to base their assessments and decisions on the group identities of those they are interacting with, which is the definition of prejudice. (Cederman et al., 2011 p 481)

Also related to this link is SIT and the idea that the mere existence of groups is all that is required to get people to prefer their own group over others. (Al Ramiah and Hewstone 2013, 528) As soon as people know they are in a group, the identity is salient and can they become prejudiced against other groups. (see page 18 for more on SIT)
Just as with negative outgroup attitudes, salience is a prerequisite for inequalities to be problematic: Inequalities can’t arise if the group isn’t perceived as a group by themselves and others. (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013)

According to (Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011) is as follows: Salient group identities allow group members to compare their group’s situation with out groups’ and identify inequalities as grievances. Then, using Realistic Conflict Theory (see pg. 20) these conflicting resource claims by different groups then antagonise intergroup relations and produce a belief in the primacy of one’s own group over others. (Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011) In other words, to experience intergroup inequalities, one needs to identify with the group, perceive an inequality and feel it is unjust. (Pettigrew 2001)

\[\text{Salience} \rightarrow \text{Inequality} \rightarrow \text{Negative Outgroup Attitudes} \rightarrow \text{Threat} \]

\[\text{Salience} \rightarrow \text{Negative Outgroup Attitudes} \]

**FIGURE 15 - SALIENCE TO PERCEPTION OF INEQUALITY**

\[12\text{ See also (H. J. Smith and Spears 1996)}\]
A perception of intergroup inequality can result in negative attitudes to the minority group. (Pettigrew 2001) One study showed that inequalities between groups cause resentment of those inequalities. (Petersen 2002). In another study they discussed how upward social comparison can result in frustration, envy and resentment of the other group (E. R. Smith and Ho 2001). In order to have upward social comparison, you need to have inequalities. If those inequalities are between groups, then this feeds into the negative contact spiral. Wright and Tropp (2001) show that having an advantaged outgroup which is perceived by the ingroup as responsible for their disadvantage is when the feeling of inequality is strongest.

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13 See also (Oliver and Mendelberg 2000)
Similar to the other relationships studied here, one needs to identify with a group in order to perceive intergroup threats. (Çakal et al. 2016; Leyens et al. 2000; Shih et al. 2002) There is also evidence that a more salient identity increases perception of threat in outgroup interaction (Vorauer and Sasaki 2011) A related factor that contributes is a history of conflict between the groups. If there is a history of conflict, there is an increased potential for current threat. (Çakal et al. 2016)
There are significant quantities of research showing that perception of outgroup threat increases anti-outgroup attitudes. In fact, of all the links in the negative contact spiral, this is one of the most robust. This connection is so widely accepted that it is incorporated into many of the established theories of threat mentioned earlier (see page 20). Schlueter and Scheepers (2010) provide a comprehensive summary and clear evidence that perceived intergroup threat leads to prejudice against the outgroup.\(^{14}\)

**THE POWER OF NEGATIVE CONTACT**

Before moving on to discuss the methodology for this study, the concept of negative contact should be discussed. Negative contact is any intergroup interaction where at least one side concludes that the interaction was negative.

\(^{14}\) On page 286 of that article is a comprehensive review listing dozens of seminal articles and related theories.
This can help explain why contact doesn’t always result in positive consequences. Even if most instances of intergroup contact (94%) are positive or neutral, the negative effects from contact instances perceived as negative are stronger than the positive effects from positive contact instances. Negative contact experiences can thus undermine positive ones and may be more influential in intergroup relations. (Paolini, Harwood, and Rubin 2010; Hewstone et al. 2014; Barlow et al. 2012). This helps explain the spiral – once a society has begun to descend into the negative contact spiral, the negative effects can overpower the positive ones – especially as people begin to perceive more contact as negative and to anticipate that future contact will likely be negative.

SALIENCE AND NEGATIVE CONTACT

There is considerable evidence of a relationship between salience and negative contact. First, salience has been shown in lab experiments to cause participants to respond negatively, reducing trust and acceptance. (Tropp et al. 2006) This shows that salience causes contact to be negative.

On the other hand, the ‘valence-salience effect’ says that group memberships become more salient after negative contact experiences than after positive contact experiences. This is based on SCT and is key to understanding the negative contact spiral. They found that negative behaviour from a minority outgroup member made their ethnicity more salient to majority members. In other words, negative experience causes salient ethnicity. (Paolini, Harwood, and Rubin 2010)

These two effects (salience causes negative contact, and negative contact causes salience) may work synergistically to reinforce each other. (Ibid.) Though this isn’t strictly part of the mechanism in the negative contact spiral as it is framed in this study, it certainly is worth bearing in mind.
METHODS/RESEARCH DESIGN

“The content of ‘science’ is primarily the methods and rules, not the subject matter” (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 9)

The purpose of this section is to explain the reasoning behind the methodological choices used in this study. The methods used are listed along with how they are carried out and reasons they are relevant to this study.

First, this is a qualitative case study. Since the aim is to analyse the mechanism at work, a qualitative case study is a better tool than a quantitative statistical analysis. (Johnson and Reynolds 2012)

The major method used is the Comparative Method. Specifically, it is a comparative study of two cases. To do this, the case control method of Structured Focussed Comparison (SFC) is used.

Also, within each case Process Tracing (PT) is carried out in order to accurately describe the chain of events that occurred and to look for evidence of the hypothesized causal mechanism in action. Process tracing is considered to be a stronger test of a theory than just controlled comparison. (Van Evera 1997)

CASE STUDIES IN GENERAL

The first step in case study research is to identify the population (or ‘universe’) of cases, which the selected case is a case of. (George and Bennett 2005) In this paper, the potential cases to select from are cases of multiethnic societies that have suffered inter ethnic conflict15. That means that the results of this study should be comparable to the results of a similar study done on other societies in similar conditions. The population that this research speaks to is all multiethnic societies, since the hope is that this research can help to prevent ethnic war in such cases.

15 I speak of conflict here, and not just NOAs, because ethnic conflict is the larger puzzle we are contributing to solving. Also, cases of ethnic conflict by definition have people of ethnic groups who dislike each other so much they are at war over it. By taking this extreme form of NOAs, we narrow the population. George and Bennett advise scholars to keep a narrow definition of their population (2005)
The second step is to identify the research objective and the research strategy to achieve that objective. In this case, the research question is *How do negative outgroup attitudes arise in multiethnic societies?*

In attempting to answer that question this study is contributing to the body of knowledge around Contact Theory, and specifically helping to fill the gap of knowledge around negative contact effects – this is the research objective.

Next, the variables of interest must be identified. Based on the theory salient ethnic group identities has been selected as the IV. Further, the cases have been chosen to explain a variation on the DV – negative outgroup attitudes. See below for further elaboration of this. Within the cases, process tracing is used to look for evidence of the other variables: perception of threat and inequalities. It is important to note that these theories can only make probabilistic predictions; nothing in this theory suggests there may be deterministic predictions.

**STRUCTURED FOCUSED COMPARISON (SFC)**

When using SFC, a study uses a pre-established list of questions and applies them to all cases in the study to establish values of the IVs and DV and then compares the results. (George and Bennett 2005; Powner 2015) SFC is used to test the theory of the negative contact spiral as proposed earlier in the paper. In this controlled comparison it is expected that high values on IV will correlate with high values on DV. Thus if evidence of this is not found, the theory is falsified. (Van Evera 1997)

SFC is *structured* in that it asks same questions of each case. This guides and standardizes the data collection, which makes the cases systematically comparable. It is *focused* in that only looking at certain aspects of the cases are examined – not whole complex story. The researcher is focused on the research objective and theoretical focus to reach that objective. The result of SFC is more generalizable findings than a simple historical narrative case study would provide. (George and Bennett 2005)
PROCESS TRACING (PT)

The second method to use is process tracing (PT). PT is following the connections between the IV and the DV within a case, examining to see if the hypothesized causal process occurs (Van Evera 1997)

One advantage of PT is that it can explore cases where multiple paths lead to the same DV, or from the same IV. (George and Bennett 2005) This is useful in this study since the hypothesized mechanism isn’t a direct path so by using PT, the study likely be able to give stronger support to some parts of the negative contact spiral.

Process tracing can also help explain deviant cases – to see if there are new or different factors present that explain the deviation. (Ibid.) That is what this paper is attempting to do. War breaking out between ethnic groups is deviant – it is a rare occurrence and isn’t predicted by contact theory. PT can illuminate what occurred to cause this case to deviate from what would otherwise be expected.

CASE SELECTION

As discussed earlier, contact theory says that 94% of the time, when groups have contact with each other, the effects are positive. (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006) This suggests that in a mixed multiethnic state, ethnic conflict shouldn’t happen, yet sometimes it does. Since this is the puzzle this paper is trying to contribute to solving, case selection begins with choosing one of all multiethnic states – the population for this research. A case that did end in war was selected because ultimately, the hope of this study is to help explain ethnic war, and because the outbreak of war ensures the existence of NOAs at that time. Then, the war case must be compared with a counterfactual – a case of a multiethnic state that didn’t erupt in ethnic war. Plus, the study must control for as many other factors as possible to ensure the two cases are comparable so the results can be valid/reliable. The best way to do this, I decided, was to choose a state that had had ethnic war, and compare the war time with a peaceful time that otherwise was as similar as possible to the war time. Choosing two time points in the history of the same country controls for any number of potentially unaccounted for variables. Thus, it had to be a country that had peace (unlike, for example, the Israeli Palestinian conflict that has simmered for decades). Plus, for pragmatic reasons, since there is so much theory in the mechanism and so much that this study hopes to show with process tracing – it had to be a
country with much written about it in both time periods so that enough data was available. For these reasons, the choice was limited to the major inter ethnic conflicts which had enormous media and academic attention. The choice then, I felt, was between Rwanda and Yugoslavia.

Yugoslavia was also selected because it meets a number of Van Evera’s (1997) criteria for case selection. First, it is rich in data – this enables the research to better answer the questions about the case. Further, it has extreme values on the DV – though one cannot assume a lack of negative attitudes from a lack of war, one can assume a significant quantity of negative attitudes from the occurrence of war. (A war can’t start without feeling negatively towards the other group, so the war indicates there must have been an extreme value on the DV). Thirdly, it diverges from established theories – as mentioned above, this case, and indeed every case of interethnic war, is a major deviation from the predictions of contact theory. It also resembles current policy problems – there is no doubt that issues of ethnic tension, inequality and perception of threat are salient in today’s changing world. In addition, it has outlier characteristics – choosing a case that is poorly explained by existing theory. A case is then selected where the DV is high and known causes are absent (or, as with the negative contact spiral, there are multiple competing explanations for it). Finally it is of intrinsic importance (Van Evera 1997): Understanding the potential, if rare, problems that can arise from coexistence with other groups of humans is essential for our continued ability to thrive on this planet.

The next stage in case selection was to choose the time-points. The war time-point was relatively easy, since war, although not the DV, is the ultimate puzzle this study is contributing to understanding. It was to start in 1987 with Milošević’s rise to power; and end with the outbreak of war in 1991. This is referred to as the ‘1990’ time or case two. The second time point was more difficult to decide upon. Next, a point in time in Yugoslavia’s history that was most comparable to the 1990 time needed to be selected. The time chosen was 1980 because the dictator, Tito, died in 1980 after being in power since 1945. As such,

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16 Case study research should be theory-driven; one should not begin with a specific case in mind. (Kellstedt and Whitten 2013) However I must admit that due to a complex set of extenuating circumstances I had already collected a considerable amount of information on the former Yugoslavia in general, and in BiH in particular, when choosing this topic. With that in mind, it is of even greater importance that I justify my case selection so as to, as best as possible, eliminate any potential effects from selection bias on the results of this study.

17 Milošević ousts his mentor and predecessor and takes over presidency of Serbia in 1987. (Silber and Little 1996)
1980 is the only other time in Yugoslavia’s modern history when there was a transition in power. By focusing on two times of a power transition (from Tito to the 9-member rotating presidency, and from communism to democracy) maximum possible comparability for the two cases is thus ensured\(^{18}\). Also, since 1987-1991 was chosen as the range of time for the fall of communism case, a four-year period around 1980 was also chosen including some time before his death and the transition of power in order to see if the IV was present in this time and continuing for a few years after his death to show the stability in this period, in contrast with the final two years of the 1990 time period. Thus, the final cases for comparison are Yugoslavia 1978-1982, and 1987-1991.

Case selection must allow for variation on the DV; to explain the outbreak of war you must study both cases where wars occur and when they don’t. (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994) In choosing these two times as the cases they are chosen on the basis of change in the DV – NOAs, with the understanding that NOAs can lead to interethnic war. It is known that NOAs, and specifically nationalism, were rampant in Yugoslavia around 1990. (UCDP 2017c) It is also known that they weren’t at the death of Tito\(^{19}\). Thus, if the negative contact spiral theory is correct, one would expect to see salient ethnic identities in the second case, and not in the first. The goal is to find variation on the IV between the two cases, but at the time of selection it is not known if there is.

**OPERATIONALISATIONS**

A theory is an idea about the causal relationship between different concepts. The difficulty is that theory uses concepts, but in the real world concepts cannot be directly observed. That is where operationalization comes in (Kellstedt and Whitten 2013). This section explains how each of the concepts used in the negative contact spiral is measured.

Most of the variables are factors that are always present in every society to some degree. As such, they cannot usefully be operationalized as binary ‘yes, this is present’ or ‘no, this isn’t present’. Instead, the degree to which they are present in the two times must be described. However, one effect of doing a broad, surface-level, ‘geology-style’ study is not being able to

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\(^{18}\) There are, of course, numerous differences between these two transitions which one could argue compromise their comparability. However, I feel that to choose a different period in Yugoslavia’s history would be worse for comparability, and choosing a transition in a different country would reintroduce many other factors such as a different culture, different history, etc... There is no such thing as a perfect case.

\(^{19}\) At least, if they were present then they were heavily suppressed by Tito’s strictly anti-nationalist ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ policy (MacQueen and Mitchell 1995; Cvić 1980)
go in depth into each of these fields of study to determine if there is an established way to measure gradients of these various concepts such as inequality or negative outgroup attitudes in situations like this. As such, there is some imprecision in my operationalisations. Future research can try to fine-tune these operationalisations, but that is beyond the abilities of this paper.

SALIENCE

The beginning of the mechanism, the IV, is salience of group identities. ‘Salience’ means a primacy of importance of the role of ethnic identity. This may be evident in statements and actions that treat others solely on the basis of their ethnicity as well as frequent references to ethnic identity. To operationalize this, this study looks at reports of 1981 and 1991 census data on how people chose to identify themselves and analyses other sources to see if there is evidence that people tended to identify primarily with their ethnic group or not. For the 1990 time frame there is also a study of ethnic distance that can help show people’s attitudes to people from other ethnic groups.

The questions for the SFC on salience are:

I) Do most people choose to identify with their ethnic identity on the census at this time, or do they identify themselves as ‘Yugoslav’?

II) Is there evidence that people commonly tended to describe others in terms of ethnic identity?

NEGATIVE OUTGROUP ATTITUDES (NOAS)

The DV for this thesis is NOAs. As mentioned earlier, this includes intergroup prejudice and nationalism. These are deep fields of study and there are any number of ways to operationalize these variables. They may be evident in prejudiced statements by citizens or politicians. It may also be apparent in the use of negative propaganda against other groups. Ethnonationalism includes popularity of ethnic entrepreneurs/nationalist leaders and positive propaganda promoting one’s own group as blameless, or as victims – either now or historically. Also, it is important to delineate between what the leaders are expressing and what the majority of people are expressing as no group is homogenous. One way research can get a glimpse into how average people feel about other groups is from mixed marriages. Being willing to marry someone from another group shows a low level of negative attitudes
towards that group. “If there are many marital ties between the members of different groups, there must also be other social contacts – like friendships – between them.” (Smits 2010, 421) Further a lack of ethnically mixed marriages has been shown to be a good predictor of ethnic conflict. Smits suggests 8% as too low to prevent conflict and 16% as high enough. (2010)

Thus, the following as operationalisations have been devised for negative outgroup attitudes:

I) Do the people of any ethnic group express negative attitudes to other groups? How widespread are such views?

II) Do the leaders of any ethnic group express negative attitudes to other groups in speeches made in public, on media or in parliament? The leaders of how many groups are expressing such views?

III) How common are mixed marriages at this time? What trends or patterns, if any, are evident?

Before continuing into a discussion of the intervening variables, a potential concern must be addressed. Some may worry that this study is as risk of being a tautology – that salience and NOAs are not clearly separate and distinct concepts. Salience, in the view taken by this study, is simply people identifying themselves primarily as members of a given group. In essence, if someone’s response to “who/what are you?” would be “I am (demonym)”, then that group identity is salient. NOAs, on the other hand see one’s own group as superior to another group. Having a group identity salient doesn’t in and of itself mean that you think that group is better than others. It is the view taken by this study that the key distinction is whether there is a sense of superiority in the group identity or not that delineates between a salient group identity and NOAs such as prejudice or nationalism.

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INTERVENING VARIABLES

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The nature of the negative contact spiral is that it connects together a number of complex psychosocial theories into one mechanism. As such, the variables that are not the IV or the DV become intervening variables. Intervening variables are examined in the intra-case process tracing, but are not operationalized in advance nor used in the cross-case SFC analysis. Here how they may be manifest in the research sources. The difference is that these are more of a general concept, not operationalisations.
For perception of inequality, the primary focus is political inequalities such as the groups’ share of power within formal political structures as well as control of military force. Evidence of economic, social and cultural inequalities are mentioned when found. Keep in mind that these must be seen as unjust and problematic by the groups affected.

The second intervening variable in this study is perception of threat. This is both a group feeling threatened, but also a group overtly trying to threaten others. This is likely to manifest itself in terms of one group arming itself against others and in terms of groups actually saying they feel threatened. It is logical that a group would only arm itself if it feels threatened.

For both perception of threat and inequalities in this paper, no sharp distinction is made between objective and subjective inequalities because what is relevant to the psychosocial processes at play is perception. However, it is also established practice to assume that the presence of objective inequalities greatly increases the chances that the affected groups perceive them as such. (see Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013) Similarly, no distinction is made between objective and subjective threat.

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**CONTROLS**

As discussed above, by choosing two cases within the same country, this study controls for a large number of possible confounding variables. Indeed, by choosing two cases only a decade apart, one could argue that they are within the same generation and thus many of the individuals involved would be the same in the two cases.

One of the major similarities of the two time periods is that they are times of a transition in power. The second time period was a transition by definition, so by choosing a transition period for the first time period as well this study is attempting to hold that constant. Also, the ethnicity structure and demographics of Yugoslavia is the same during the two time periods. Third, the government structure being composed of six republics and two provinces and the various rights accorded them in the constitution is the same, up until the breakdown in the second time period.

However, there are of course major differences between these two time periods. One significant one is the global political climate – the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and other global trends are significantly different in the second time as compared to the first.
A short discussion of reliability and validity is needed here. Reliability means that the results of the study are repeatable and consistent. (Kellstedt and Whitten 2013; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Reliability is ensure by using SFC, thus if another researcher was to use the same questions to study this case they would likely come to the same conclusions as this study. However, the operationalisations of the variables do leave room for interpretation. It simply wouldn’t have been possible to create any more specificity in the operationalization – to insist on finding ways to quantify the level of NOAs expressed by politicians in a given case for example given the breadth of the topics covered by this study. This relates to the problems of data collection – given more time, more data could have been collected, more studies found, perhaps documents could have been translated which would have allowed for more specific results. As it is, that must be left to future researchers. Reliability and validity are strengthened by clarity and transparency in case selection and choosing a well-documented conflict. Keep in mind that my claims regarding the results of this study are not excessive. This is a preliminary theory-building study. To test the theory would require much more rigour than is possible here.

Validity is measuring what the study intends to measure (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Kellstedt and Whitten 2013). This is strengthened by the wide variety of sources used in both the theory and case study parts of this study – combining government statistics, academic journals, scholarly books, newspaper reports, academic surveys and a BBC documentary helps to ensure accuracy.

HYPOTHESES

Three hypotheses, derived from the possible paths from salience to NOAs hypothesized in the negative contact spiral, are tested.

**Hypothesis 1:** Salient group identities leads directly to negative outgroup attitudes

**Hypothesis 2a:** Salient group identities leads to a perception of other groups as threats

**Hypothesis 2b:** A perception of other groups as threats leads to negative outgroup attitudes.

**Hypothesis 3a:** Salient group identities leads to a perception of inequalities.

**Hypothesis 3b:** A perception of inequalities leads to negative outgroup attitudes.
EXPECTED RESULTS

Given this theory, it is expected that the evidence will follow all three pathways from salience to NOAs: directly from salient group identities to negative outgroup attitudes, from salience to negative attitudes via perception of threat, and from salience to attitudes via perception of inequalities.

FALSIFIABILITY

A quick discussion of the falsifiability of this theory is in order here. If, when examining the cases selected, evidence does not show that salience led to perception of threat, to perception of inequalities and directly to NOAs, then the theory is falsified. That is, the evidence found must follow the connections between the variables as predicted by the theory if the theory is to be supported. It is the connections between the variables that is the novelty with the negative contact spiral and applying it to this case. The existence of these four variables in this conflict is established.

FIGURE 19 - NEGATIVE CONTACT SPIRAL WITH HYPOTHESES
DATA COLLECTION

Data was collected from academic articles, newspaper articles and scholarly books. In addition, one documentary from a reputable news source (the BBC) was consulted as well as the occasional scholarly reference work and a small number of reputable websites such as the website for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Considering the number of theories and areas of study that have gone into this ‘psychosocial geology’ and creating the conflict spiral, and the fact that this is one of the most written-about conflicts in recent history, means that it would have been impossible to read and use even a significant fraction of all the material available. Further, my inexperience lead me to make some mistakes and read some sources that should probably have been forgone for other, better sources. Nonetheless, these various literatures have been reviewed to the extent permitted by the scope permitted by the circumstances.²⁰

Biased sources is a potential concern. Conducting this shallow ‘geological’ study of the theory necessitated reading only a few sources on each theory or only a few studies of each link between the variables. Since it was impossible to be comprehensive in doing so there is a not insignificant risk that the few sources that did get read for any one idea are perhaps not representative of the rest of the field. Efforts were made to find the key sources for each field, but again, the risk cannot be eliminated.

For the case study bias may be introduced because the history of the Yugoslavian conflicts is still contested and as such there are some heavily biased sources in circulation that appear at first glance to be scholarly and balanced. I have tried to avoid using such sources, although have found one or two of the sources I did end up using to be a little problematic in this way. To help counteract this potential bias, a wide variety of sources were used – from census figures and sociological surveys to newspaper and academic journal articles in addition to the scholarly books. Using variety of sources should reduce the impact of any one biased source, but the risk is always present.

In addition, there could be a social desirability bias that influenced how people answered the surveys or census, or the result may have been influenced by the political regimes in charge at the time. Further, this research often relied on indirect measures – what newspapers and

²⁰ For example, the book by Woodward (Woodward 1995) seems to be a fantastic source renowned by others, but I discovered it late in the writing process and simply did not have time to read it. However, to make best use of it I looked up a number of key facts in that book specifically to ensure they were factual.
academics have written about events – rather than on opinions and thoughts of the relevant people. Using census data and surveys when possible helps to counteract this indirectness, but brings greater risk of the social desirability bias affecting results. Also there simple is a lot more information available on the second time frame than the first. This presents a risk of data being incomparable between the two time frames. However, choosing to conduct the study using SFC helps alleviate this risk.

**FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS**

**ANALYSIS STRUCTURE**

The analysis begins with an examination of how salient ethnic identities were in each of the time frames. To do this, the SFC questions are answered first for each case. Following that the process tracing explores what happened during that time to see if it follows the mechanism predicted by the negative contact spiral.

There is much discussion and analysis woven in to the findings sections, but after them a summary discussion reflecting on theory reviews the main findings and presents them in a table.

Finally, potential alternative explanations for the findings and additional observations are explored. Also, theoretical, methodological and empirical limitations and weaknesses are discussed.

**GENERAL ANALYSIS DISCUSSION**

Before presenting the results of the SFC and PT, a few notes of clarification are warranted. First, there is a tendency for authors, when writing about Yugoslavia, to use the republics (Serbia, Croatia) as synonymous with the ethnic groups (Serbs, Croats). This study has certainly engaged in that. However, I feel that this is somewhat justifiable when one considers that the republics were largely congruous with the ethnicities. This is even true for the Serbs, the group who was spread most among different republics – about 80% of Serbs lived in Serbia (including its provinces). The only exception here is Bosnia which was 39.5% Bosniak, 32% Serb and 18.4% Croat based on the 1981 census (Cohen and Warwick 1983). To try to parse out more finely the differences between republics and the thoughts of their
ethnic populations simply wasn’t possible with the resources available. This choice is corroborated, for at least the second case, by Jović who argues that political debate in early 1980s was mostly along republican (but not ethnic) lines – it was between the republics and the central government. But in the late 1980s, he says, the conflict lines did match the republican lines, and thus largely the borders between ethnic groups. (2009)

Similarly, it is important to consider intra-group variation. “The original sin of ethnic studies is treating an ethnic group as a monolith.” (Perunovic 2016, 831) The Serbs in Croatia saw things very differently from the Serbs in Serbia, for example. Also, different groups in society see things different. For example, the Serbian Orthodox Church was giving very different messages from what the nationalist politicians were. (Ibid.) On the other hand, that is how government is supposed to work – leaders are supposed to represent and speak on behalf of their populations, so it’s perhaps not that crazy an assumption to make, at least after the conversion to democracy. The feelings of people and their political leaders have been separated as much as possible in this study, but the vast majority of material available focuses on the leaders so to a certain extent, this study must also do so.

SFC OF SALIENCE

Here the cases are examined in terms of the SFC questions on salience.

The questions are:

I) Do most people choose to identify with their ethnic identity on the census at this time, or do they identify themselves as ‘Yugoslav’?

II) Is there evidence that people commonly tended to classify others in terms of ethnic identity?

SFC QUESTION I: CENSUS DATA – CASE 1

In the 1981 census, 5.4% of the population classified themselves as ‘Yugoslav’ instead of giving an ethnicity on the census. (Woodward 1995, 32). This is far from a majority of people and much lower than expected. This figure suggests that 94.6% of the population identified with their ethnicity more than being Yugoslavian.

The breakdown by republic is shown in the table below. In no republic or province does more than about 1 in 12 people (8.3%) define themselves as Yugoslav.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic</th>
<th>Percentage identifying as Yugoslav 1981</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Entire Serbia</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Serbia proper</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vojvodina</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 7 ‘YUGOSLAV’ IDENTIFICATION BY REPUBLIC 1981 (WOODWARD 1995, 32)

It is interesting to note, though, that Croatia has one of the highest rates in the country, yet Croatia would also be one of the first republics to elect a nationalist government once communism fell and democratic elections were held in case two.

SFC QUESTION I: CENSUS DATA – CASE 2

A census was also held in 1991, when just 3.0% of the population identified as Yugoslav. (Woodward 1995, 32). That is, a startling 97% of the population in 1991 identified more strongly with their ethnicity than as Yugoslav.

When broken down by region, there was still significant variation, though still no region with more than about 8% of people identifying as Yugoslav in either time. There is also drop in the number of people identifying as Yugoslav in 1991 as compared to 1981. (Woodward 1995, 33–35)
The fact the vast majority of people identified more with their ethnic group than as Yugoslav indicates ethnicity was a salient identity for them in both times. This would suggest a lack of support for this theory and choice of IV.

**SFC QUESTION II: EVIDENCE PEOPLE OFTEN CLASSIFIED BY ETHNICITY**

**CASE 1**

In terms of salience in the late 70s and early 80s, the discussion starts with the constitution. There is evidence political leaders in the 70s were concerned with how to approach Yugoslavia’s cultural diversity in the design of the rotating collective presidency\(^{21}\), which gave each republic and province one seat. (Klemenčič and Žagar 2004; *New York Times* 1980)\(^{22}\) Similarly, Tito used a ‘National Key’ system to allocate government positions in

<table>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Entire 4.8%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Serbia proper 4.3%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Kosovo 0.2%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia Total</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{21}\) The nine members were one from each republic, one from each province and one from the LCY. This would get reduced to eight members upon the dissolution of the LCY in 1988.

\(^{22}\) In discussion of ethnicity and Yugoslavia’s constitution a mention must be made of the *narodi* and *narodnosti* – official categories established in the constitution. *Narodi* are the six constitutive ethnicities or ‘nations’ of Yugoslavia: Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Bosniaks (‘Muslims’), Serbs and Slovenes. Each has their own republic as a homeland. The *narodnosti* are the official minorities or ‘nationalities’: Albanians, Hungarians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Roma, Italians, Romanians, Rutheniens, Slovaks and Turks. Most of them have homelands outside Yugoslavia. These nationalities had minority rights to language and culture enshrined in the constitution. The nations did not. (Hudson 2003; Hammel, Mason, and Stevanovic 2010) This became an issue, especially for Serbs in Kosovo, as is evident below.
proportion to ethnicity in the population. (Dragrich 1992) The fact that cultural diversity was a concern when drafting the constitution and assigning government posts shows that ethnicity was somewhat salient, and was seen as a potential for problems.

However, a different picture emerges when hearing what individual citizens say about this time. In the words of one Croatian academic: "The truth is that most of the time, until the 1990s, the nationality (ethnic identification) of people with whom we, in Yugoslavia, lived and interacted was of no great concern and was inconsequential for our mutual relations." She continues: "Discourse relying on ethnic labels was what differentiated the extremists from the majority of Yugoslav citizens." (Perunovic 2016, 838)

In another anecdote that illustrates interethnic relations prior to the wars, one author mentions a friend of his who went to high school in Vukovar. When asked how many Croats and Serbs were in her class then, she replied she had no idea. (Zimmermann 1995) These anecdotal accounts suggest a significant non-salience of ethnicities during case 1.

In this section, we see evidence of salience as relevant for politics, but perhaps not for everyday people.

**SFC QUESTION II: EVIDENCE PEOPLE OFTEN CLASSIFIED BY ETHNICITY**

**CASE 2**

Now attention turns to case two. There was a study in 1989 that showed that the majority of young Yugoslavs identified primarily with Yugoslavia, over their nation, their republic/province or Europe. In fact, 62% of Yugoslavian youth said that Yugoslavian identity was very important to them. (whereas only 53% said the same of European identity, 52% of their republican or provincial identity, 44% of their identity as a citizen of the world and 39% of their local identity.) (Perunovic 2016)

Even the Albanians, who had been agitating for so long, were a little more likely to list their Yugoslavian identity as very important than their provincial (Kosovar) identity (49% versus 47%).(Perunovic 2016) Serbs, often seen as the group who most wanted to keep Yugoslavia whole, were not the group most likely to favour their Yugoslavian identity (71%). In fact, Montenegrins (80%), Hungarians (79%), Bosniaks (84%) and, perhaps unsurprisingly,
‘Yugoslavs’ (71%) were just as likely or more likely to list their Yugoslavian identity as very important. (Perunovic 2016) In fact, Slovenians are the only group who is most likely to list their own republic/provincial identity as most important. All other ethnic groups are more likely to see their Yugoslavian or world identity as more important.

Perhaps the clearest incident of a surge in salience in 1990 came from the media coverage of Milošević’s speech in Kosovo to Serbs in 1987. It is explored more in depth in the process tracing, but that speech brought to light for Serbs all across Yugoslavia their identity as Serbs, as one group spread across the country. Then, based on the actions Serbs took in reaction to that increased salience, other ethnicities also began to see their ethnicity as more salient. As illustrated by this quote from the UCDP: “The uprising in Kosovo rendered a domino effect … as the general sense of ethnic belonging among the different Yugoslavian ethnicities was expressed. The thriving sense of identity was ubiquitous throughout the whole of Yugoslavia”. (UCDP 2017c)

At the end of this first part of the SFC there emerges a significant disconnect in the findings. From the census, it appears that ethnicity is salient, since most people choose to categorise themselves by ethnicity rather than as ‘Yugoslav’. However, other evidence suggests that ethnicity wasn’t salient for most people in either time, though it may have been important for politics. This disconnect could be due to a shortage or bias of sources of information on what everyday people were thinking, or it could be do to some factor in the data in the census. Nonetheless, the conclusion must be that there can be no strong conclusion to draw as to how salient ethnicity was in either time based on this evidence.

SFC OF NOAS

Next, the two cases are examined in terms of the SFC questions on NOAs. The questions are:

III) Do the people of any ethnic group express negative attitudes to other groups? How widespread are such views?

IV) Do the leaders of any ethnic group express negative attitudes to other groups in speeches made in public, on media or in parliament? The leaders of how many groups are expressing such views?

V) How common are mixed marriages at this time? What trends or patterns, if any, are evident?
QUESTION III: EVERYDAY PEOPLE EXPRESSING NOAS IN CASE 1

In terms of everyday people expressing negative outgroup attitudes already in the 1980 time, only two examples emerged. The first is that Albanian Kosovars were unwelcomed anywhere in Yugoslavia outside Kosovo. (Jović 2009) If they tried to move outside Kosovo for work or school, local people wherever they moved would actively try to make their lives difficult. The second example comes from Slovenia. Slovenians during this time were using derogatory word to refer to non-Slovenians. They called all Bosnian/Serb/Croatian speaking workers Bosanci – regardless of if they were from BiH or not nor what their ethnicity was. While the term is colloquial slang for ‘southerners’ and thus not derogatory in and of itself, it came to mean ‘foreigner’. A clear sign of ethno-centrist thinking. As Jović notes Slovenians ”began to recognise them [Southerners] as culturally, religiously, politically and ethnically different.” (Jović 2009, 146) Seeing a group as different from yours is salience, when that word came to have derogatory meaning, it crossed directly into an expression of NOAs. The fact that only two examples of NOAs have emerged in this time\(^\text{23}\) shows that NOAs were not a significant problem in the first time frame.

Turning attention to the second time frame, more evidence of NOAs being expressed by everyday people is evident.

QUESTION III: EVERYDAY PEOPLE EXPRESSING NOAS IN CASE TWO

The most obvious evidence of NOAs by the public in case two is the elections. The population electing nationalists, as occurred in the majority of republics, is the population expressing nationalism and thus NOAs. It is important, however, to keep in mind that in no republic did a majority of voters actually vote for nationalist parties. But it was nationalist parties who formed winning coalitions. The elections “brought to power in each of the republics – except arguably Montenegro – politicians who appealed to voters on nationalist grounds,” (Woodward 1995, 122). So there is a not insignificant nationalist tendency in the population, but perhaps not a majority either. This is corroborated by a survey conducted in Yugoslavia in 1990 shows that the attitudes of the nationalist leaders did different from those of the general population. It revealed that the general population didn’t hate other ethnicities in 1990, however, nationalism was gaining momentum (Perunovic 2016)

\(^{23}\) And neither from groups that would ultimately be involved in the worst of the fighting in the conflict in the early 90s (though Kosovo did have violent conflict later)
Some authors also noted that evidence of interethnic antipathy was low at this time; before the outbreak of fighting. (Hammel, Mason, and Stevanovic 2010) In another example of the broader citizenry not being particularly nationalist at the time, but being aware of the winds of change blowing around them, the citizens of Sarajevo protested for peace en masse in 1990. They were proud of the intercultural nature of their city – it had the most mixed marriages of anywhere in Yugoslavia. (MacQueen and Mitchell 1995)

Nonetheless, nationalism was gaining ground. The 1987 Kosovo events had awakened a dormant Serbian nationalism. (UCDP 2017c) The events in Knin strengthened nationalism in Croats.

Comparing the viewpoints of two Serb villagers in Croatia in May 1991 illustrates the spectrum of viewpoints at the time. One said: “In the past I didn’t think much about being a Serb here, but I’m happy to be part of a minority.” (Sudetic 1991) His succinct statement illustrates that salient identity is new, but that it hadn’t lead him down any of the paths in the negative contact spiral. The second villager said: “We’re preparing to fight…If Croatia becomes independent, we have already voted to join Mother Serbia.” (Sudetic 1991) He has clearly progressed through the spiral, past NOAs and is readying for war. The contrast couldn’t be sharper.

A third quote can help illustrate this further, albeit an event from during the war. She was in one of the shelled cities, and sought shelter in a cellar. “There were a hundred people in that cellar, half of us Croats and half Serbs. We were friends when we went into the cellar, and three months later when we came out, we were still friends.” (Zimmermann 1995) This illustrates how there were still large segments of the population who didn’t espouse NOAs, even while under fire. If they didn’t harbour NOAs then, surely they didn’t feel them before the war either.

It is also worth noting how other actors - neither politicians nor the general public, were influencing this shift in opinion. Some authorities, such as the Serbian secret police, actively provoked conflict. “For example, in March 1992, local authorities in Sarajevo arrested an armed group of Serbs supplied with symbols of all three ethnicities. They were distributing flyers warning each of the three ethnic groups of the ‘danger from the other two’ groups, and calling on them to take up arms to defend themselves.” (Biro et al. 2004, 186)
In sum, there is (mixed) evidence of people from most ethnic groups expressing NOAs in case two, but not to any overwhelming degree.

**QUESTION IV: LEADERS EXPRESSING NOAS IN CASE 1**

Under Tito, there was a strict ban on expressions of ethnic rivalry and an anti-nationalist policy called ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ (MacQueen and Mitchell 1995; Cviic 1980). The very fact such a policy was needed says that there was some pressure from nationalist forces during his time in power.

One example of NOAs from leaders during the first time period is in 1978 when a Bosniak member of the LCY presidium accused Bosnian nationalists of wanting to turn BiH into a fatherland for Bosniaks. (Cviic 1980) Then, in 1979, Belgrade started cracking down on Muslim religious leaders who had been speaking out in favour of an Islamic revival. (Dobbs 1979)

Also, Franjo Tudjman, the leader of the nationalist party that would hold power in Croatia in the second time period, had been expelled from the LCY by Tito and imprisoned twice for nationalism during this time. (Zimmermann 1995)

So, there is evidence that leaders from two groups were accused of nationalism at this time. However, since every society expresses some level of each of the four variables. The important question is if there is a significant change in the levels between case one and case two.

**QUESTION IV: LEADERS EXPRESSING NOAS IN CASE 2**

“To win against public opinion, nationalist leaders had to engage in psychological warfare. They sought to persuade audiences both at home and abroad that the alternative to national states was no longer viable: in other words, to destroy forever the Yugoslav idea that they could live together.” (Woodward 1995, 228)

Even Milošević wasn’t 100% nationalist until the end of this time period. “Serbia has never had only Serbs living in it…This is not a disadvantage for Serbia. I am truly convinced that it

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24 However, the article notes, the Yugoslav press was often opaque and one sided so it is difficult to know what the truth is.
is its advantage.” said Milošević in June 1989 (Hudson 2003, 71) Hardly sounds like nationalism.

The big change was the introduction of multi-party democracy in 1990, when nationalist, anti-communist parties gained power. (Hudson 2003; UCDP 2017d) Nationalism then took two forms. The first was republics wanting to break away. The second was republics wanting to protect their ethnic members living in other republics (Woodward 1995)

There are some specific quotes that exemplify the nationalism at this time. First, Milošević said “only we Serbs really believe in Yugoslavia. We’re not trying to secede like the Croats and Slovenes and we’re not trying to create an Islamic state like the Muslims in Bosnia.” (Zimmermann 1995) Tudjman is famous for saying that Croatia was for Croats. (Dragnich 1992) Karadžić told the US ambassador, “Serbs have a right to territory not only where they’re now living but also where they’re buried since the earth they lie in was taken unjustly from them.” The ambassador then asked if the same was true for other groups, such as Bosniaks and Croats and Karadžić replied “No, because Croats are fascists and Muslims are Islamic fanatics.” (Zimmermann 1995)

Since four republics had nationalist government after their elections, and Milošević in Serbia was also nationalist by the end of this period, five ethnicities had leaders expressing NOAs in case two.

**QUESTION V: INTERMARRIAGE IN CASE 1**

Around 1980 13.1% of marriages concluded in Yugoslavia were ethnically mixed. In Kosovo it was only 6.1%, in Vojvodina is was 27.6%. For all marriages intact in 1981 only 8.6% were mixed. (Botev 1994) In fact, the data show that people were 220 times more likely to marry within their group. From this, Smits concludes that ethnic groups were fairly socially closed at this time. (2010) To compare this with other multiethnic societies, in the USSR in 1979 14.9% of marriages were mixed and in Canada it was more than 30%. (Botev 1994) Smits doesn’t give a clear threshold of how many marriages must be mixed to have a positive effect, but suggests 8% as too low to prevent conflict and 16% as high enough. (Smits 2010)
Percent of mixed marriages formed in 1980 with a Serb (Smits 2010) 25

- Croatians: 7.9%
- Bosniaks: 3.3%
- Albanians: 0.8%
- Macedonians: 6.1%
- Slovenes: 1.9%
- Montenegrins: 18.4%
- Hungarians: 15.9%

Total percent of mixed marriages existing in 1981 (Smits 2010) 26

- Croatians: 8.6%
- Bosniaks: 3.5%
- Albanians: 1.8%
- Macedonians: 6.3%
- Slovenes: 6.5%
- Montenegrins: 22.3%
- Hungarians: 17.5%
- Serbs: 6.1%

These figures are lower than expected. If the negative contact spiral theory was to hold true, there should be a large drop in these figures in the second time point. Since these figures from case one are low, it suggests that there already was a significant level of NOAs at this time. Only two groups are actually in the 9%-16% range suggested by Smits as needed to prevent ethnic conflict – Montenegrins and Hungarians. Notably, neither of those groups played a significant role in the conflict to come.

**QUESTION V: INTERMARRIAGE IN CASE 2**

Percent of marriages formed in 1989 with a Serb (and change since 1980) (Smits 2010)

- Croatians: 6.3% (-1.6%)
- Bosniaks: 2.7% (-0.6%)
- Albanians: 0.4% (-0.4%)
- Macedonians: 5.5% (-0.6%)
- Slovenes: 1.4% (-0.5%)
- Montenegrins: 17.5% (-0.9%)
- Hungarians: 13.9% (-2%)
This does show that generally, Montenegrins and Hungarians were by far most likely to intermarry with Serbs. This could be because Montenegrins are closely related to Serbs and Hungarians lived primarily in Vojvodina, where there where also a large concentration of Serbs.

Even if it is evident that there is a decrease among all groups, but considering the groups were already fairly closed in 1980, they are only a little more closed now.27

A 1990 survey asked people how they would feel about marrying someone from nine other ethnic groups. 33% of people would accept someone from eight or nine of the groups. 12% said six or seven of the groups, 14% said four or five of the groups, 19% said two or three of the groups, 18% would only accept their own group and 4% wouldn’t marry anyone. It’s notable that the largest group is the most accepting. (Perunovic 2016) There is no comparable data from the 1980 time point, however, this survey does give us a good insight into people’s NOAs or lack thereof against other groups in the second case28.

By mid-1990, there had been considerable efforts by nationalist parties in both Croatia and Serbia to foment hatred between these two groups, yet still 56% of Croats and 52% of Serbs would accept a marriage partner of the other nationality. (Perunovic 2016)

On the whole, the SFC question on marriage shows us that people didn’t intermarry as much as had hoped to find and thus doesn’t provide evidence of a change in NOAs between case one and case two.

PROCESS TRACING

This section traces the process of events in each case to see if the salient ethnic identities and NOAs, in so much as they existed, are linked in the way hypothesised by the negative contact spiral. In each timeframe, evidence is collected for the variables on the routes from salience to NOAs as predicted by the negative contact spiral. Any other links between these variables found, even if they do not fit with the predictions of the negative contact spiral, are also noted.

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27 Interestingly, Serbs and Montenegrins were the groups most likely to marry out-group partners, and both groups supported Yugoslavia at a multinational state to the end. (Botev and Wagner 1993)

28 Hypothetical marriage is widely accepted as the strongest test of NOAs – it is the situation in which the highest number of people will reject based on ethnicity. (Perunovic 2016)
There is no evidence of salience leading directly to NOAs in case 1. Nor was evidence of any group perceiving other groups as a threat at all in this time (with the possible exception of the Kosovo crisis – see below) evident and thus no evidence of salience leading to perception of threat leading to NOAs in Case 1. As such, only evidence of the third potential route through the negative contact spiral, via perception of inequalities, is discussed below.

However, given the mixed and weak evidence found of salience, it is perhaps not surprising that little proof was evident that the perception of these inequalities stems from salient group identities. Nonetheless, the relevant information is presented below.

1978 – 1980

There was no evidence found of salience leading to perception of inequalities, nor of inequalities leading to NOAs in 1978, 1979 nor 1980. However, this is likely because data wasn’t collected then, and not because inequalities didn’t exist (see next paragraph).

1981

There is evidence of inequalities between groups in 1981: “It is difficult to over-emphasise the extent of the political, economic, and education difference defined by ethnicity in this setting. In 1981, a [Bosniak] was 20 times more likely to be illiterate than a Croat, and was likely to have less than one-half the income.” (Botev and Wagner 1993, 30) It is important to keep in mind that this did not open up suddenly. This figure is from 1981 because it is data from the census and the census was completed every 10 years. Nonetheless, it is important evidence of inequalities in this time frame. It is not clear if this stems from the salient group identities suggested by the same census or not, but the possibility cannot be ruled out.

1981 KOSOVO CRISIS

In discussing inequalities in 1981 in Yugoslavia, special attention must be given to events in Kosovo. As noted, Kosovo was by far the worst-off region in all of Yugoslavia economically, generating a GDP of just 26% of the national average. Further, within Kosovo, Serbs were 17% of the available workers, but had 26% of the jobs. Albanian Kosovars, who were 74% of available workers had just 65% of the jobs. (Jović 2009) This is evidence of economic inequality against Kosovar Albanians.
A perception of political inequality occurred at this time too – both the Albanians and the Serbs in Kosovo felt that they didn’t have a fair share of the power. Serbia itself also felt unfairly treated in this way. (Cohen and Warwick 1983) Kosovo (and Vojvodina) had a veto on all Serb parliament bills. The veto came from a clause that required Serb legislation to be approved by the provincial parliaments, but not vice versa. (Hudson 2003)

Further, there is evidence the Serbs perceived the Albanians as a threat as well. Albanians put heavy pressure on Serbs to leave Kosovo. Their goal was an ethnically homogenous Kosovo. (Hudson 2003) However, “Kosovo is to Serbs what Jerusalem is to Jews” (Zimmermann 1995) It was their ancestral, sacred homeland. This means that both the Albanians and the Serbs in Kosovo saw their group as the victims.

In March, Albanian protests began and took on an ethnic and nationalist tone such as “we are Albanians, not Yugoslavs”. They saw the inequality as unfair treatment for Albanians. The political leaders in Belgrade crushed the protests brutally. (Jović 2009, 185)

The Yugoslavian National Army (JNA) and militia then remained very visible in Kosovo from 1981-82, posing as a clear threat to the Albanians. However, Albanian violence against Serbs and their property in Kosovo continued during this time, posing a threat to Serbs. (Binder 1982) After the protests, between 1981-1983 there was a purge of nationalists from Kosovo. (Cohen and Warwick 1983) This was an example of the method the Yugoslavian government had for stopping the spiral of negative contact – remove the nationalists and you prevent the (expression of) nationalism.

Returning to a view of all of Yugoslavia, Jović’s (2009) main argument is that the debate in Yugoslavian policies the late 1970s and early 1980s centred not on ethnic questions but on Serbian political questions. Serbia felt like it was disrespected by its provinces and couldn’t control them – from their perspective this was political inequality. If true, that suggests that the lack of ethnic salience may have prevented the negative contact spiral from occurring.

In sum, there is very little evidence of the four variables, nor of any relationship between them, during case one, with the exception of the events of the 1981 Kosovo crisis.
1982

There was economic inequality in 1982. Slovenian GDP was 193% of the Yugoslavian average, while Kosovo’s was just 28% of the average. BiH, Serbia and Croatia were 68%, 91% and 125% respectively. (Jović 2009) This inequality of relative wealth lead to Slovenians taking a protectionist stance and workers from other regions expressed feeling unwelcome if they tried to move to Slovenia and find jobs there. (Jović 2009) So it appears inequality may have lead Slovenia to express NOAs. However, it is not clear this perception of inequality stemmed from a salience of group identity, especially considering economic inequality had been building for decades – it did not simply pop up in one year.

CASE TWO– 1987-1991: PROCESS TRACING

This time period begins in April 1987 with Milošević’s historic visit to Kosovo and subsequent rise to power, and ends in 1991 with the outbreak of war.

1987

The tensions in Kosovo simmered throughout the 80s. Kosovar Serbs continued to be persecuted and flee Kosovo. (Szayna 2000) Further, felt unfairly treated because, unlike Kosovar Albanians, Kosovar Serbs didn’t have minority rights, since Serbs weren’t a minority under Yugoslavia’s constitution29. (MacQueen and Mitchell 1995; Hudson 2003)

In 1987 the Kosovar Serbs had been protesting against their situation. Milošević was sent to Kosovo and learns about the problems there. (Dragnich 1992) Before this time, Milošević had never made any nationalist remarks. However, in Kosovo he learns of the situation there from the local Serbs. He also witnessed a protest where he saw the police beating back the Serbs. (Lampe 2003) In response, he gave a landmark speech in which he says, “No one will be permitted to beat you” “They will never humiliate the Serbian People again.” (Woodward 1995, 229) That speech was the beginning of the wave of nationalism that would tear the country apart within 5 years30.

29 The constitution provided minority rights only to groups who didn’t have a ‘home’ republic for their ethnicity. For Serbs in Kosovo, Serbia was seen as their ethnic home.
30 He wasn’t completely Serb nationalist immediately, however, it would be a gradual change over several years before the idea of a multicultural Yugoslavia altogether. Milošević is an ironic figure in some ways because he is both the spark that ignites the wave of nationalism, as well as one of the leaders who most wanted Yugoslavia to stay whole. For more on this see (Hudson 2003; Woodward 1995)
The Belgrade media spread this story to populations in other areas of Yugoslavia, creating a salience of identity for all Serbs as a group. (MacQueen and Mitchell 1995) Serbia felt that Serbs were threatened and provoked by the actions of the other Yugoslavian leaders. However, the other Yugoslavian leaders, supported the Kosovar Albanians and saw their actions as defending the integrity of Yugoslavia. (MacQueen and Mitchell 1995) Milošević felt that in supporting the Kosovar Albanians, the other republics were turning their back on Serbia and the unity of Yugoslavia and “sold out to separatism.” (Dragnich 1992, 165)

In Serbia at this time, there was a major problem of unemployment partially due to Serbs migrating there from Kosovo. Serbia fell below the Yugoslavian economic average. (Hudson 2003) This could mean that the people there were already primed by this inequality to take on these NOAs against the Kosovar Albanians.

When Milošević visited Kosovo, the Serbian ethnicity became very salient for him and he saw the Albanians as a threat to Serbs just as Kosovar Serbs already had. It is very difficult, however, to say that it was the salience that lead to the sense of threat since this incompatibility had been simmering since (long) before the first case. Nonetheless, there is clear evidence that Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo were both threatened by each other, and both saw ethnic identities as being salient. Further, both felt themselves victims of inequalities. Serbs felt they should have the rights of a minority in Kosovo as prescribed other minorities by the Yugoslavian constitution. Serbs also felt politically excluded since Kosovo had a de facto veto on all Serbia’s legislation. Albanians felt they were politically excluded since they did not have their own republic and they felt economic inequality since they were still by far the poorest region in Yugoslavia. (Jović 2009)

1988

In a famous speech in 1988, at a rally of 1 million people in Belgrade in support of Milošević, (Suro 1988), he said: “At home and abroad, Serbia’s enemies are massing against us. We say to them ‘We are not afraid.’ ‘We will not flinch from battle’.,” (MacQueen and Mitchell 1995) On the following day, 100 000 Albanians protest in Kosovo. (Reuters 1988)

This shows that Milošević, since he is expecting a ‘battle’, was expressing a sense of threat to Serbs and NOAs at this time. Again, it is very difficult to say that this followed from a salient ethnic identity, and not vice versa. Nonetheless, it is clear that Milošević was seeing Serbian
identity as salient and was feeling threatened. Also, the Kosovar Albanians protesting his speech suggests they too were feeling threatened.

During late 1988 and early 1989, Milošević carried out the ‘Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution’, which involved placing his supporters in control of Kosovo, Vojvodina and Montenegro. (Silber and Little 1996) It was also at this time that the presidency was reduced to 8 members from 9 as the LCY ceased to have a seat. (Klemenčič and Žagar 2004, 281) So now, Serbia controlled 50% of the votes in the presidency, representing just over 40% of the population. (‘Yugoslavia’ 1990) In the eyes of many in other groups, this is a political inequality and a threat, as shown below.

1989

In February, partially in reaction to Serbia now controlling half the votes in the Presidency, Milan Kučan, leader of Slovenia, was afraid that the Serbs would take over control of his republic next. In Milošević controlling so many votes he was “turning Yugoslavia into Serboslavia” felt Kučan. (Silber and Little 1996, 63). He saw the Serbs controlling share of votes as a threat to Slovenia. This suggests a perception of political inequality leading to a sense of threat.

Milošević also used his control to force Kosovo to cede all its power to Serbia through both military force and a constitutional change, thus excluding the Albanian people from political power. This political inequality lead to even more protests and unrest in Kosovo throughout 1989. (MacQueen and Mitchell 1995) This is diagrammed in the flow chart below; reflecting the mechanism predicted by the negative contact spiral fairly well.

It is also known, however, that in Serbia the majority of the population still was in favour of a Pro-Yugoslav, pro-European and liberal solution. (Woodward 1995) Nationalism hadn’t taken hold of the majority yet.

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31 For more on this, read about the Trepca mine protests.
FIGURE 20 - SERB/ALBANIAN INTERACTIONS IN KOSOVO CASE TWO


Now the process tracing slows down and becomes more complex. It was in 1990 that the transition in power took place as well as where significantly more NOAs emerged. Communism fell and the republics began holding multi-party democratic elections.

In January 1990, the Serbs called a League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) congress. (MacQueen and Mitchell 1995) The Slovenes wanted more decentralisation of power in Yugoslavia, but the Serbs moved to retain democratic centralism. (Hudson 2003) The Serbs used their 50% of the power to vote down everything the Slovenes proposed. The situation has been described as a political game of chicken with both sides seeing the other as a threat. This impasse grew to the point that the Slovenes and Croats walked out. (MacQueen and Mitchell 1995) It was effectively the end of the LCY, which was formally dissolved in May 1990. (Hudson 2003) This forced the republics to have multi-party elections.

During 1990, Slovenia, Croatia, BiH, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia all held multi-party elections. Nationalists won in Slovenia and Croatia. In Serbia Milošević won a majority and in Montenegro a communist party won. In BiH it was a three-way nationalist split along

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32 When they did, Milošević’s response was to joke that they were going home early because they were so stingy they wanted to save on the hotel bills. (MacQueen and Mitchell 1995) This belies NOAs engrained in him against the Slovenes at this point.
ethnic lines. And in Macedonia it was a Communist/Ultranationalist coalition that won. (Dragnich 1992; Woodward 1995)

This shows that the political inequality Serbia controlling so much of the power in the presidency lead to the dissolution of the LCY, and the calling of elections which nationalist parties won. Thus the political inequality did lead to an expression of NOAs.

**MID 1990 – THE EMERGENCE OF CROATIAN NATIONALISM AND THE CONFLICT IN KRAJINA**

Croatia’s election of the nationalist Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica; HDZ) party and their leader Franjo Tudjman threatened the Serbs in the south of Croatia in an area called Krajina. (MacQueen and Mitchell 1995; Hudson 2003; UCDP 2017a).

When Tudjman took power, the 12% of the Croatian population who were Serb had their homes and other property attacked, were required to take oaths of loyalty to Croatia and dismissed from their work. (Zimmermann 1995) This appears to be Croat NOAs leading to a Serb sense of threat and inequality.

August 1990 is when the Serb minority began resisting and they did so in the town of Knin in the Serb-majority region called Krajina. Police in Knin refused to serve the Croat nationalist government. (MacQueen and Mitchell 1995) When Croat authorities tried to intervene, a crowd of thousands protested saying they support their police. “It’s not just us police who are protesting. The whole Serb nation is with us.” Said a Serb Police officer in Knin at the time.

There were many references to Serbs (in both Serbia and Knin) needing to protect each other. (MacQueen and Mitchell 1995) It is clear that ethnicity was salient for all involved and that people felt threatened.

Knin then blockaded itself by felling trees over the roads leading into the town and declared Croats banned from the area, as advised to do so by Serb politicians in Belgrade. (Reuters

33 The problem of not having minority rights because they were a nation not a nationality also faced the Serbs in Croatia, just like it did in Kosovo, and just like it would in Bosnia. (Dragnich 1992)

34 In Croatia’s spring 1990 election, the HDZ got 2/3 of the seats but only had 42% of the popular vote. (Perunovic 2016) This could been seen as evidence of a disconnect between the will of the population (58% of which didn’t vote for Tudjman) and those in power. More evidence of the importance of noting the heterogeneity of ethnic groups and not assuming leaders speak the minds of the people.
The Croatian government saw this Serb control of Knin as a threat – in part because it threatened Croatia’s tourist revenue due to Knin being on the route from the capital, Zagreb, to the coast. (MacQueen and Mitchell 1995)

Croatia then sent Special Ops police in a helicopter to crush the Knin revolt but Serbia, feeling more empathy to the Serbs in Knin than to the Croatian government, instructed the JNA\(^{35}\) to force the helicopter to return to Zagreb. Tudjman saw this as evidence that Yugoslavia supported the rebellion on his territory, thus was undermining him. (MacQueen and Mitchell 1995)

As a reaction to the Serb control of the JNA, and to Milošević’s grip on the Yugoslavian government, Croatia formed its own National Guard. (UCDP 2017b) Croatia arming itself threatened Serb-controlled Yugoslavia. Croatia accused Serbia of trying to dominate Yugoslavia, and Serbia accused Croatia of trying to breakup Yugoslavia. (Reuters 1990) Thus, the Serbs in Croatia felt threatened by Croatia, and Croatia felt threatened by Serb control of Yugoslavia and the JNA and Serbia felt that Yugoslavia was threatened by Croatia.

Also at this time, in December 1990, Croatia changed its constitution, removing reference to Serbs as a constituent nation of the republic in the process, further exacerbating the sense of salience and inequality for Croatian Serbs. (Widner 2017)

Croatia threatened to secede and walk out of Yugoslavia if Yugoslavia and JNA continued to support the Knin rebellion. But Yugoslavia saw the Croats as arms smugglers creating a rival army. (MacQueen and Mitchell 1995) Serbs saw the idea of the secession of Croatia as treason to the idea of Yugoslavia and the Serbs felt they had sacrificed the most for the Yugoslavian cause over the decades and thus were betrayed by this move. (Dragnich 1992)

This is evidence of Croatian nationalism leading to a sense of threat for Serbs in Croatia. This lead to Croatian Serbs taking on NOAs against Croatians, which lead to Serbia to perceiving threat against the Croatian Serbs and stepping in (via the JNA) to protect them. This in turn lead to Croatia feeling threatened by Serbia (and the JNA) and feeling like it was the victim of

\(^{35}\) The JNA was large and well equipped. Many saw the JNA as a unifying Yugoslavian force, before the crises began. But after the crisis in Knin, it was seen as a tool of Serbia and the Serbs. Also, a disproportionate number of officers in JNA were Serb. (Dragnich 1992; Zimmermann 1995) This could be due in part, to the fact that one must speak Serbo-Croat to join the armed forces (Paxton 1990), though it doesn’t explain a lack of Croat of Bosniak officers.
political inequality since Serbia controlled 4 of 8 votes, which lead to Serbia seeing Croatia as a threat to Yugoslavia.

This process is depicted in the diagram below.

FIGURE 21 - SERB/CROAT INTERACTIONS IN CASE 2
1990 IN SERBIA

In 1990, Milošević’s nationalism deepened. It had been the goal previously to ensure the rights of Serbs anywhere were protected. Now he added that they must also control their own territory – regardless of the current sovereignty situation there. This meant that in places like Kosovo, Serbs’ ancestral holy land, the Serb minority asserted a right to the land based on history. However, in places like the Krajina in Croatia, where Serbs were a majority but had no historical claim to the land, they used the argument of being a majority. Not acknowledging the inconsistency in these different tactics. “Revealingly, Milosevic was unwilling to give the Albanians in Kosovo the same right of self-determination that he demanded for Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia.” (Zimmermann 1995) This reveals that Milošević and Serbia now felt even more NOAs against other groups and saw those other groups as not worthy of the same rights as Serbs. So, their NOAs led to inequalities.

In July, Kosovo declared itself a republic equal to the others. Serbia rejected that and changes the Serbian constitution removing all autonomy the provinces had left and shut down all Albanian language media. (Sudetic 1990a; Hudson 2003) This created social/cultural inequality against the Albanians. Following that, in September, there was another major strike in Kosovo (Sudetic 1990b). This is more evidence that Kosovo felt it was treated unequally, and proof that Serbia wanted to keep it that way.

It is worth noting that there were Serbian groups opposing Serbian nationalism at this time. However, those who spoke out often suffered attacks, death threats, ransacking of their offices, arrests and beatings. (Zimmermann 1995)

1990 IN BOSNIA

BiH was both afraid of being in a Yugoslavia dominated by Serbs after Croatia and Slovenia seceded. (UCDP 2017d), but also threatened by the prospect of separation and the near certainty of war that would bring. All the groups in Bosnia felt threatened now. As Woodward notes, “In Bosnia-Herzegovina, where votes were cast most overwhelmingly for ethnonational parties, public opinion polls in May an June 1990, and again in November 1991, also showed overwhelming majorities (in the range of 70-90 percent) against separation
from Yugoslavia and against an ethnically divided republic.” (Woodward 1995, 225–28)\(^{36}\) So, they voted for nationalist parties, and voted along ethnic lines.

If the majority Croats and Bosniaks were threatened both by remaining in Yugoslavia and by the prospect of secession, Bosnian Serbs, were clear that they wanted to say in Yugoslavia. They felt threatened by the prospect of being a minority in an independent Bosnia. So, the same situation as in Croatia and Kosovo was developing in BiH: the Serb minority felt threatened by the majority in their republic, but the republic’s ethnic group felt threatened by Serb dominance in the power of Yugoslavia. (MacQueen and Mitchell 1995)

Bosnian Serbs also overtly threatened the Bosniaks. Radovan Karadžić, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, said at this time: “You Muslims aren’t ready for a war – you could face extinction!” Izetbegović’s response: “Mr. Karadžić’s speech and his behaviour here show why we cannot remain part of Yugoslavia” (Ibid.)

### EARLY 1991 – SLOVENIA AND CROATIA BREAK AWAY

By 1991, Slovenia and Croatia blamed Serbia for dominating the Yugoslavian government unjustly while Serbia accused Slovenia and Croatia of separatism. (ICTY 2017)

Immediately after Slovenia declared independence, the JNA was ordered to try and prevent it, but the conflict lasted only 10 days before the JNA retreated. (Klemenčič and Žagar 2004) (ICTY 2017)

Then, in May 1991, Serbs in Croatia voted to leave Croatia and join Serbia. (Sudetic 1991) Just a month later, Croatia and Slovenia each declare independence (Lampe 2003). This made the Serb minority in eastern Croatia feel even more threat of becoming second-class citizens in independent Croatia. Croatian Serbs then declared their territory to be ‘The Serbian Republic of Krajina’. Before long, Croatia was engulfed in war. (UCDP 2017b)

### BOSNIA 1991

In Jan 1991 In Zagreb, peace protests occurred because the public felt threatened by the (Serb-controlled) JNA. By mid 1991, Bosnia’s president Alija Izetbegović was feeling threatened too. He pursued all international avenues he could to get EC, UN or US help to protect Bosnia. (Zimmermann 1995) He had good reason to feel Bosnia was threatened. At

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\(^{36}\) The election in BiH was in November 1990.
this time Serbia and Croatia were having talks about how to divide Bosnia between them – without consulting Bosnia! (MacQueen and Mitchell 1995)
THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA

The role of the media is important in case two – it played into all four factors in the negative contact spiral. They spread fear and promoted homogenisation programs. (Biro et al. 2004) They also magnified injustices against one’s own group and spread lies and hate. (Zimmermann 1995)

For example, Serb TV transformed Milošević into a legend and generally distorted the reporting of events to portray the Serbs as innocent and victims. In one case, Serb community leadership had parked trucks of stones nearby a protest ‘just in case’. Serbs then pelted police with the stones. Serb TV left that out and only showed the police beating Serb protestors back. (MaQueen and Mitchell 1995)

Croatian media also contributed to this problem by mocking Serbs. When the Serbs in Knin isolated their territory by felling trees over the highway, Croatian TV responded by portraying them as drunk and stupid. This displays clear NOAs against Croatian Serbs.

FIGURE 23 - STILL IMAGE FROM CROATIAN MEDIA PORTRAYING SERBS IN KRAJINA AS DRUNK, STUPID AND VIOLENT (MACQUEEN AND MITCHELL 1995)
### TABLE 9 - SFC SALIENCE QUESTIONS SUPPORT FOUND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Saliency SFC Questions</th>
<th>Support Found</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I) Do most people choose to identify with their ethnic identity on the census at this time, or do they identify themselves as ‘Yugoslav’?</strong></td>
<td><strong>Virtually no support</strong> - although the percentage identifying with their ethnicity increased as expected, the very high percentages in both times (94.6% in 1981 and 97% in 1991) makes it difficult to see this as meaningful. (See page 40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II) Is there evidence that people commonly tended to describe others in terms of ethnic identity?</strong></td>
<td><strong>Indirect and mixed evidence.</strong> In both times it seems it was a concern of politicians. It may have become a concern for more of the population during the second time, but it is difficult to say. (See page 42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Summary of SFC Salience findings (IV)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Very little support.</strong> It appears that ethnicity was salient in both times, though evidence is mixed. No significant difference in salience between case 1 and case 2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOAs SFC Questions</td>
<td>Support Found</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III) <em>Do the people of any ethnic group express negative attitudes to other groups? How widespread are such views?</em></td>
<td><strong>Somewhat supported</strong> – there an increase in nationalism in the population between the two times, however there is also significant evidence that this wasn’t the opinion of majority of the population in either time. (see page 45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV) <em>Do the leaders of any ethnic group express negative attitudes to other groups in speeches made in public, on media or in parliament? The leaders of how many groups are expressing such views?</em></td>
<td><strong>Supported</strong> – there is a significant increase in nationalism in politicians between the two times (from two groups in 1980 to five groups in 1990). (see page 47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V) <em>How common are mixed marriages at this time? What trends or patterns, if any, are evident?</em></td>
<td><strong>Very little support.</strong> Mixed marriages were never common (An average of 12% from 1961-1989) so it is difficult to see a little decrease between the two cases as significant. (13.1% of all marriages 1980-1982 and 13.0% 1987-1989) (Botev 1994) (see page 48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Summary of SFC NOAs findings (DV)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Somewhat weakly supported</strong> – There is clearly an increase in NOAs among politicians, but the evidence that everyday people carried more NOAs in case two than case one is much weaker. Evidence suggests the change in DV may only or primarily have been among politicians.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 10 - SFC NOAS QUESTIONS SUPPORT FOUND**
This table lists the hypotheses (based on the links in the negative contact spiral) and what evidence was found to support each of them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesised Link</th>
<th>Evidence Found</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Hypothesis 1: **Salient group identities leads directly to negative outgroup attitudes** | Case one: No evidence found  
Case two: Slovenes referring to all southerners as *Bosanci* reveals a level of Slovene identity being salient for Slovene. That term then taking on a derogatory meaning, shows it morphed into NOAs. (pg. 45) |
| Hypothesis 2a: **Salient group identities leads to a perception of other groups as threats** | Case one: No evidence found  
Case two: When Serbs outside Kosovo learned of the situation for Serbs in Kosovo, their Serb identity became salient and they saw Serbs in general as threatened. (pg. 54) |
| Hypothesis 2b: **A perception of other groups as threats leads to negative outgroup attitudes.** | Case one: No evidence found  
Case two: Serbs saw Kosovar Albanians as a threat to Serbs, and changed the constitution to exclude them from political power. (pg. 55)  
Case two: Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks in BiH were all threatened by the situation in 1990. This lead to all groups voting overwhelmingly for nationalist parties. (pg. 60) |
| Hypothesis 3a: **Salient group identities leads to a perception of inequalities.** | Case one: No evidence found  
Case two: Serb salience lead Milošević/Serbs to see the constitution as unfair to Serbs. (pg. 54) |
| Hypothesis 3b: **A perception of inequalities leads to negative outgroup attitudes.** | Case one: Economic inequality lead Slovenians to express negative attitudes towards other groups. (pg. 53)  
Case two: Milošević’s perception that the constitution was unfair to Serbs lead him to change it and exclude Kosovar Albanians from political power. (It may also be true that he harbours NOAs against them) |
and this also lead to this decision, which would be an example of NOAs -> inequality). (pg. 55)

Case two: Serbia controlling 50% of LCY, a political inequality, lead to the dissolution of the LCY and to elections, many of which nationalists won. This is an indirect link between inequality and NOAs. (pg. 56)

TABLE 11 - SUPPORT FOR HYPOTHESES

Clearly, hypothesis 3B had the strongest suggest with three examples found, all other hypotheses were only weakly supported with just one or two pieces of supporting evidence each.

FIGURE 24 - NEGATIVE CONTACT SPIRAL WITH HYPOTHESES SHOWING RELATIVE STRENGTH OF SUPPORT FOUND (3B HAD STRONGEST SUPPORT)
This table lists links found between the four variables other than those predicted by the negative contact spiral.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unexpected Links Found</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Perception of Inequality -> Perception of Threat | Case one: Albanian Kosovars felt they were treated unequally and as a result persecuted the Serbs causing Serbs to see the Albanians as a threat. (pg. 52)  
Case one: 1981 Kosovar Albanian protests lead to perception of threat from the Yugoslavian authorities, who then crushed the demonstration. (pg. 52)  
Case two: in 1989 Slovenia was afraid that Serbia would use it’s 50% of the power in the LCY to take over Slovenia. (pg. 55)  
Case two: in BiH the Croats and Serbs were threatened by the prospect of remaining in a Yugoslavia dominated by Serbia/Serbs. (pg. 54)  
Case two: in BiH the Serbs felt threatened by the prospect of being a minority in BiH should it secede. (pg. 54) |
| Perception of Threat (for one group) -> Perception of threat (for another group) | Case one: Yugoslavian government felt threatened by Albanian protests, thus sent JNA and militia to control Kosovo 1981-1982 causing the Albanians to feel threatened. (pg. 52)  
Case one and two: Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo were both threatened by each other. (pg. 52)  
Case two: Serbs in Knin feel threatened by Croatia, so rebel, threatening Croats. (pg. 58)  
Case two: Serbs controlled JNA and Yugoslavian government, and didn’t support Croatia in Knin, so Croatia felt threatened and armed itself. (pg. 58)  
Case two: Serbia/JNA feels threatened by Croatia arming itself. (pg. 58)  
Case two: in BiH, the Serbs, threatened by the idea of BiH seceding, turn and overtly threaten the Bosniaks. (pg. 54) |
NOAs -> Inequalities

Case one: No evidence found
Case two: Serbs feeling they have more right to land than other groups in comparable situations, leads to them perceiving the situation as unjust and in need of rectifying. (pg. 60)

NOAs -> Perception of Threat

Case one: No evidence found
Case two: Croatia elects nationalist party (NOAs) who then attacks the Serb minority there, thus presenting a threat to the Serbs. (Pg. 57)

There appears to be strong evidence that perception of inequality leads to perception of threat (five examples) and that perception of threat (for one group) leads to perception of threat for another group (six examples). Moderate support was found for NOAs leading to perception of inequalities, and for NOAs leading to a perception of threat.

These results clearly show that there is much more going on than predicted by the negative contact spiral. Also, since this was just a surface-level study, much further study would be needed to confirm these results and rule out alternative explanations.
RESULTS DISCUSSION

It is good that the study found little evidence to support the negative contact spiral in the PT of case one (with the exception of the 1981 Kosovo Crisis) since the objective was to show that the spiral didn’t occur at that time. However, the lack of clear support from the PT second case, especially combined with the weak and mixed support from the SFC, shows clearly that the mechanism proposed by the negative contact spiral needs revision and makes it difficult to draw other meaningful conclusions based on these results.

Tito once said of the borders in Yugoslavia that they “ought to be like the white bands on one marble pillar” in that they “are the borders of unification and not division” (Jović 2009, 192). It seems he felt that ethnicities could be salient without that greatly increasing the risk of division and conflict. Perhaps he was right – perhaps that’s why there wasn’t evidence that salience is what sets off the negative contact spiral and the descent into ethnic conflict.

The support for the existence and change in both IV and DV was much weaker than expected. Also, the process tracing reveals some support for the predicted paths, but also support for a number of connections that weren’t predicted by the spiral. Clearly all four factors in the spiral were present in Yugoslavia, and all were involved in its descent towards disintegration and interethnic war. However they do not seem to have interacted in the way predicted by the negative contact spiral. This means that my novel theory, the negative contact spiral, did not hold for this case and needs revision. It was based on lab studies and established theories, so the question now becomes – do those lab results and established theories not hold up in the real world? Or, is my adaptation of them into my negative contact spiral faulty.

I expect, given the enormous complexity of these topics and my inexperience with research, that it is the latter. Perhaps a different variable should be IV (or DV), perhaps the relationships between them need to be mapped out differently or perhaps more variables need to be added. Perhaps more digging into the case – especially by someone who speaks the languages and could read Yugoslavian documents - would reveal more evidence of the actual links between them.

However the other idea – that perhaps the result of the lab studies used to build the negative contact spiral do not hold up in the real world – is not out of the question. In fact, this is a
discussion in the field today. Several authors including Tredoux and Finchilescu (2007), Paolini, Harwood, and Rubin (2010), and even Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) point out this possibility. Pettigrew and Tropp even noted that it could be related to the fact that in lab studies (of prejudice) group salience is often very high and that this could alter the results.

Also, in any measure of ethnicity one must keep in mind that it is a changeable construct. Botev (1994) illustrates this with an example of five brothers. Two of them classified themselves as Macedonian, two as Bulgarian and the fifth sometimes chose Serb and sometimes Yugoslav. No data was available on the frequency with which such categorisations changed, but it does illustrate that one must not see ethnicity as an unchanging fact determined by birth.

Nonetheless, it seems clear that these variables interact and reinforce each other in a descent into conflict. This suggests that the basic idea of a negative contact spiral is sound, but that this study hasn’t succeeded in parsing out what it looks like yet.

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF RESULTS

This section looks at alternative ways to explain the findings.

One important alternative explanation to the results in this case was that nationalism was just used as a tool by politicians – they didn’t actually believe it. (Perunovic 2016; Hammel, Mason, and Stevanovic 2010) It is known that the nationalist leaders eroded Yugoslavia by fuelling mistrust and fear between the different ethnic groups. (ICTY 2017) Thus, the leaders were responsible in large part for fomenting the NOAs. Evidence of both salience and NOAs appeared stronger for politicians than for the public, perhaps this is why.

There was also a pattern evident in the process tracing – in Kosovo, Croatia and in BiH it was a minority group (the Serbs) who felt threatened by the majority, but only after the majority started expressing nationalism. This, to me, is a fantastic counter-argument to racists and xenophobes who might suggest that this kind of research only goes to show that groups should be kept separate37. Instead, I suggest that a minority can only be happy if the government isn’t nationalist. Thus suggesting a policy prescription of trying to ensure

37 See Research Gap section for more of a discussion on this point.
populations are very ethnically mixed, since that would prevent ethnic identity from overlapping with a regional identity so neatly as it did in Yugoslavia, and of course banning nationalist parties and leaders.

Another alternative explanation to why this study found (or rather, didn’t find) what it did is that the wrong time points were chosen. Perhaps the entire time from 1980 (or 1978) until 1991 should be seen as one case of as a descent into ethnic war. Perhaps the death of Tito was the beginning of the end, so to speak, and the reason no clear contrast between case one and case two in this study was that both cases are within this time. The idea is that these ethnic tensions were present under Tito’s reign, just repressed. Further, that the evidence against found against that, such as survey data, is simply the result of people giving socially desirable answers to questions while living under a repressive regime. This is a perspective that several authors, including Biro et al. (2004), and Hammel et al (2010) seem to share.

Perhaps one reason for the low intermarriage rates in both cases is the high homogeneity of the republics. Also worth noting is that BiH had the highest percentage of mixed marriages of any Yugoslavian republic. (Zimmermann 1995) It was also the least homogenous.

One important possibility as to why contact theory failed to produce positive results is the possibility of a self-selection bias – that people who have some NOAs then avoid contact with outgroups and thus do not get the possible benefits of contact with others.

The research question was ‘How do negative outgroup attitudes, such as prejudice and nationalism, arise in multiethnic societies?’ The expected answer was that they start with salient group identities and progress through the negative contact spiral. However, given the results found, that answer is unsupported and as such this study cannot provide an answer to the research question in this paper.

LIMITATIONS, WEAKNESSES AND ANTICIPATED CRITIQUES

The negative contact spiral is my own creation and is based on innumerable other theories and studies. I was aware this would be an ambitious topic for a master’s thesis, but wasn’t aware

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38 There certainly are accounts of the reasons for the war that go much farther back in time. Serb propaganda even referenced events from the middle ages!
just how ambitious it would turn out to be. As such, there are several serious weaknesses and potential sources of criticism of the theory, methods and analysis used.

Theoretical

Objections may be made about the lack of depth accorded to the various fields of study that went into building the negative contact spiral. This is understandable – one could easily write a book about them and the relations between them given the depth of the fields already. However, that was precisely the point of the spiral – of undertaking ‘psychosocial geology’ to fill the gap in Contact Theory – to see how these variables connect to each other, rather than attempting to deepen any one ‘mine’ of knowledge about a variable deeper. Especially considering the space restrictions of this paper, a lack of depth is unavoidable. As such, do not consider this a finished product, but a jumping off point for future investigations into the real-world interplay between these four variables (and perhaps others). This study is the start of a discussion, let’s see where it goes.

In terms of the studies used in building the negative contact spiral, could be some criticism there for several reasons. First, most of the studies were done in the US, on university students and were based on the American race context of black versus white. This certainly differs from the context of studying a population of all ages and demographics and where the ethnic differences weren’t visible to the eye. Not to mention all the other differences between the US and Yugoslavia. Also, a number of other studies were looking at immigrant communities in Europe and how the native European populations reacted to them. This is also markedly different from Yugoslavia, where the various ethnic groups have coexisted for centuries. Nonetheless, this is the research available on prejudice, perception of threat, nationalism, salience, etc… so this is what was used for this study. A final caution here regards the risk of an ecological fallacy – applying results to a different level of analysis and getting a misleading result. (Johnson and Reynolds 2012) Since many of the studies used looked either at individuals or small groups, it is reasonable to expect that the results may be different when you are looking at interactions of populations in the millions. There is a debate in the field about whether individual level effects can be separated from group ones. The debate is unsurprisingly complex, but suffice it to say that some authors argue that groups don’t act, individuals act, whereas others argue that individual act different when they are acting as part of a group and thus is it valuable to study the group level. This debate and the lack of clarity around it did pose challenges in this research and may have also
influenced the results. Nonetheless, I did my best to stick to the group level in my analysis, except when looking at politicians where an individual level to some degree is unavoidable.

Finally, critique is anticipated of the design of the negative contact spiral itself. The spiral needs to be expanded to show the interplay between groups and within groups. Does Serb salience lead to Croat perception of threat or to Serb perception of threat or both? This is a serious design weakness in the negative contact spiral that I didn’t anticipate while creating it. The spiral as it is now contains information both on cause and effect within a group as well as between groups and that really needs to be parsed out as two mechanisms.

**Methodological**

There may also be objections relating to the operationalisations and measurements. Concepts like salience and NOAs simply do not lend themselves to easily quantifiable and measurable descriptions. This is especially true since I was trying to understand the psychological motivations of groups in taking certain actions and because I am conducting this research decades after the fact. Because of these difficulties I have been unable to be more specific than to use terms such as ‘very little support’ or ‘somewhat supported’.

It may be tempting for researchers to leave out ‘messy’ variables, like perceived inequalities, perceived threats, nationalism and prejudice in order to create elegant and easily tested theories, but many of the world’s most damaging and intractable conflicts are ethnic conflicts, and I argue that we need to study these variables to be able to understand how these conflicts begin.

Data collection also presented limitations. I had great difficulty finding evidence, especially for the first time period since the first time is not a time period that has been of significant focus for researchers and thus there simply isn’t that much written about it. This made data comparability between the two times a significant challenge. Again, an ability to read the language and access to more primary materials from the time period would also have made an enormous difference.

There are limits to process tracing as well. For one, PT requires vast amounts of data, and a lack of data on the links hypothesized in the theory weakens the results and can make it difficult or impossible to eliminate competing theories. (George and Bennett 2005) This is the case in this paper since there simply isn’t data available on how much people had contact
with each other, let alone how much salience or NOAs they felt, nor what their motivations were for what they did.

For the variables, potential critique may arise in the distinction between salience and NOAs, as mentioned earlier (pg. 34). However, salience, as defined here, is simply a matter of how an individual identifies themselves with a group. There is no element of favourable or unfavourable judgement in the concept of salience. With NOAs, in contrast, one must be judging another group as inferior to one’s own, or one’s own group as superior to others. This is the key distinction between the two.

**Empirical**

Empirical inaccuracy can arise from using self-reports. (Wagner et al. 2003) Anecdotes and information about either of the time periods gathered after the war are at risk of being misremembered or misreported for any number of reasons. As such, efforts have been made to rely on information collected at the time – such as news stories and surveys – as much as possible.

As noted earlier, the governments and the Yugoslavian media during these periods were opaque, so trying to determine ‘truth’ from documents of the time is also problematic. This is compounded by the fact that I cannot read any Yugoslavian language to even see for myself what these documents, such as the census, actually state.

Thirdly, the issue of biased sources also noted earlier can be criticised. As mentioned, my inexperience in research led me to read a couple sources that turned out to be biased. This, in turn, did not leave me time to read other sources which are much more widely accepted as unbiased.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTACT THEORY**

The purpose of this study was to attempt to knit together a multitude of psychosociological theories and studies in order to fill an established gap in contact theory – explaining why contact sometimes has negative effects.

I claim to have partially achieved this. While my particular version of the negative contact spiral isn’t supported, I still think the basic idea holds. I also think that I have zeroed in on
several key factors in this mechanism. If contact theory scholars and other experts in psychosociology continue to adjust and develop the negative contact spiral – to try out different constellations of the variables and to add or remove variables – I am confident that a negative contact spiral will one day help to fill that gap.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

In the process of writing this I have come up with many ideas for how future research could help to expand and build on this foundation.

First, I can speculate as to what mechanisms might actually work in a modified negative contact spiral based on the results I did find. Upon reflection, I think salience is an illogical choice for an IV. It was chosen because there was strong theoretical and lab evidence that showed that it lead to all three other variables, however, that could just mean it plays a key role within the negative contact spiral, not necessarily that it must be the first step. If I were to revise the negative contact spiral, this would be my first change – reconsidering the IV and repositioning salience.

I felt that there is an obvious gender angle that hasn’t been discussed – all of the actors in this story are men. Perhaps an examination of the development of nationalism through a gendered lens could shed new light.

Also, it seemed to me that Kosovo was a simmering problem for a very long time, and yet war didn’t break out there until long after the other wars had died down. Why not? Also in Kosovo, it would be interesting to compare and contrast Kosovo, which long had ethnic tensions, with the other province, Vojvodina, which did not.

More focus on the role of politicians in this dynamic may be warranted – several of the results here suggest that salience and NOAs were much more prevalent in politics than elsewhere in society.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Serious questions remain about exactly what can be done policy-wise to help reverse the spiral of negative contact effects once it has begun in a population. However, given the highly inconclusive results of this study, it would be imprudent to try to devise policy recommendations from it. Policy recommendations will have to come from future research.
CONCLUSION

This study attempted to shed light on one of the most destructive problems of our time: interethnic conflict. It started with the recognition that the vast majority of multiethnic societies do not erupt in conflict and thus those that do are deviant cases.

In order to investigate this puzzling phenomenon this study used the lens of contact theory. Specifically, the aim was to fill a gap: it is known that most of the time, contact between groups has positive consequences, but contact theorists do not know why, occasionally, it has negative consequences.

In order to fill this gap, and recognising that other fields of psychosociology had knowledge that could help explain this, this study devised the idea of a spiral of negative contact. In tying together a large number of studies and theories in one large mechanism, the aim was to show how these phenomena interacted and produced prejudice and nationalism – negative outgroup attitudes. A prerequisite to interethnic conflict.

The research question was: How do negative outgroup attitudes, such as prejudice and nationalism, arise in multiethnic societies? Having looked closely at Yugoslavia during two different time periods, this study was unable to answer the research question with any certainty, nor was it able to find strong support for the hypotheses in the negative contact spiral as proposed by this paper.

Nonetheless, I am confident that it is not the concept of a negative contact spiral that is faulty, rather, it is this specific mechanism that doesn’t reflect reality. Science is a cumulative process and as such, future research can determine a negative contact spiral that could plausibly be capable of closing this gap, though much more work is needed to do so.

In the case of the former Yugoslavia, this spiral lead to a war that kills over 100 000 and forced another two million to flee their homes in BiH alone (Stewart 2010). The conflict became the worst armed conflict in Europe since WWII. (UCDP 2017c) Any closer research can get to identifying the mechanism at work and stopping it is a victory for humanity.


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## APPENDIX 1 – STEPS IN THE RESEARCH PROCESS

Here I list the steps in the research process and where in the document they are covered.

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**Summary and Conclusion**

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