VIOLENT CITIES IN TIMES OF PEACE
A Study on Reducing Criminal Violence in Post-War Urban Communities in South Africa

UPPSALA
UNIVERSITET

ELMO JANSEN
Spring 2017

Supervisor: Kristine Höglund
“If you want the cooperation of humans around you, you must make them feel they are important - and you do that by being genuine and humble.”

“It always seems impossible until it's done.”

- Nelson Mandela -
ABSTRACT

The end of civil war does not equal the end of violence. Many post-war societies struggle with an outburst of criminal violence in major cities, after armed conflicts have officially ended in peace agreements. Crime control programs are a response to reduce criminal violence, but vary greatly in terms of level of implementation, approach, and success. This study explores why some of those criminal violence control programs are successful in reducing violence, whereas others are not. Deriving from a theoretical framework of urban crime prevention, it is argued that a multi-sectoral control program, targeting social and situational causes of crime, is more successful in reducing violence in post-war urban communities than a single sector approach. Through a structured focused comparison, this hypothesis is tested on three urban communities in post-apartheid South Africa, where high levels of criminal violence were addressed by three different types of crime control. The results show that only the multi-sectoral approach correlates with a reduction of criminal violence levels. While the type of control program seems to impact the level of success, there are various other explanatory factors that correlate with a successful reduction of crime, such as community participation and effective partnerships.

Keywords: Post-War Urban Criminal Violence, Crime Control Programs, South Africa
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................. vi
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES ............................ vii
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................ 1
2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH .................................. 3
   2.1 Post-War Criminal Violence .......................... 3
   2.2 Urban Violence and Crime ........................... 4
   2.3 Urban Peacebuilding and Crime Prevention .......... 6
3. THEORY ................................................... 8
   3.1 Conceptualizing Crime Control Programs .......... 8
   3.2 Conceptualizing Post-War Urban Criminal Violence 10
   3.3 Argument and Causal Mechanism .................... 11
4. RESEARCH DESIGN ..................................... 13
   4.1 Case Selection and Method ......................... 13
   4.2 Sources and Time Frame ............................ 14
   4.3 Operationalization .................................. 15
5. POST-WAR SOUTH AFRICA ........................... 18
   5.1 From Institutionalized to Criminal Violence .......... 18
   5.2 Post-Apartheid Urban Violence ..................... 19
   5.3 Post-Apartheid Crime Control ...................... 21
6. CASE I. THE ALEXANDRA RENEWAL PROJECT ........ 23
   6.1 Background – The Community of Alexandra, Johannesburg 23
   6.2 ARP. A Situational Approach ........................ 23
   6.3 The Effect of the Program ........................... 24
   6.4 Changes in Criminal Violence ....................... 26
   6.5 Summary ............................................ 28
7. CASE II. THE COMMUNITY WORK PROGRAMME .......... 29
   7.1 Background – The Community of Ivory Park, Johannesburg 29
   7.2 CWP. A Social Approach ............................. 30
   7.3 The Effect of the Program ........................... 30
   7.4 Changes in Criminal Violence ....................... 32
   7.5 Summary ............................................ 34
8. CASE III. VIOLENCE PREVENTION THROUGH URBAN UPGRADING ...................... 36
   8.1 Background – The Community of Khayelitsha, Cape Town ........ 36
   8.2 VPUU. A Multi-Sectoral Approach .................. 36
   8.3 The Effect of the Program ........................... 37
## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Alexandra Development Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARP</td>
<td>Alexandra Renewal Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCTV</td>
<td>Closed-circuit television</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPF</td>
<td>Community Policing Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPTED</td>
<td>Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWP</td>
<td>Community Work Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECD</td>
<td>Early Childhood Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCCS</td>
<td>National Crime Combatting Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCPS</td>
<td>National Crime Prevention Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>National Peace Accord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>Structured Focused Comparison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRHR</td>
<td>Sexual and reproductive health and rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP</td>
<td>Uppsala Conflict Data Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URP</td>
<td>Urban Renewal Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VPUU</td>
<td>Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1. Case Selection Criteria.................................................................................. 14
Table 2. Measuring the Type of Program...................................................................... 17
Table 3. Measuring Post-War Criminal Violence....................................................... 17
Table 4. Number of Reported Crimes Alexandra...................................................... 27
Table 5. Number of Reported Crimes Ivory Park.................................................... 33
Table 6. Number of Reported Crimes Khayelitsha.................................................. 39
Table 7. Overview of the Findings.............................................................................. 44

Figure 1. Proposed Causal Mechanism................................................................. 12
Figure 2a, b. Crime Trend Alexandra, 2000 – 2006.............................................. 27
Figure 3a, b. Crime Trend Ivory Park, 2009 – 2015............................................. 34
Figure 4a, b. Crime Trend Khayelitsha, 2004 – 2010........................................... 40
1. INTRODUCTION

The end of war is not the same as the end of violence. As many cases have shown in the past and continue to do in the present, post-war societies regularly experience extremely high levels of violence, even years after armed conflicts have officially ended (Darby 2006, 6). Many post-war states are significantly more violent than they were before armed conflict emerged (Mac Ginty 2006, 101). The rise of violent crime after wars have ended with an agreement is no exception, with countries like Guatemala, El Salvador, and Liberia serving as examples. What all of these countries have in common, is the fact that crime generally concentrates in urban areas (Apraxine et al. 2012, 13). Manifestations of violence in the world’s major cities has a large inhibitory effect on sustainable development and is present across all continents, but especially prevalent in the Global South (Kasang 2014, 23). And while urbanization rapidly continues, it is likely to become an even more prominent issue for various countries (Koonings and Kruijt 2009, 1). Governments, NGOs, and other development organizations are tasked with the objective to control and reduce this type of violence. A popular approach in controlling urban violence is the implementation of crime prevention programs, which have led to mixed results over the past few decades (Lab 2016).

Scholars have theorized about the causes and solutions for both post-war violence and urban crime (e.g. Mac Gintry 2006; Steenkamp 2005; Moser 2004; Muggah 2012), but little is known about the realities where the phenomena overlap (McMichael 2014; Deglow 2016). As causes for post-war and urban criminal violence intertwine, policymakers need comprehensive programs to control and reduce it effectively in those complicated contexts (UNODC 2010, 3). Crime prevention programs have been introduced worldwide over the past 50 years, with examples from cities in the United States to China, from the Netherlands to South Africa (Cozens and Love 2015). These programs are “strategies and measures that seek to reduce the risk of crimes occurring, and their potential harmful effects on individuals and society, including fear of crime, by intervening to influence their multiple causes” (UNODC 2010, 9). However, in order to control violence in major cities that have a recent history of armed conflict, like Cape Town, San Salvador, or Guatemala City, more knowledge is required, both theoretically and empirically, on what works and what does not. In the process of understanding the conditions of successful control programs in post-war contexts, this thesis asks the following question: why are some crime control programs successful in reducing criminal violence in a post-war urban setting, whereas others are not?

This research departs from a theoretical starting point in which the idea of a multi-sectoral crime control approach is seen as most promising to reduce levels of criminal violence in the city. While single sector programs focus on one specific element, such as the physical environment or the social causes for crime, the multi-sectoral approach combines the two. Surprisingly, little
empirical research has been done to systematically test this theoretical claim by comparing the different types of programs. In addition, research on the impact of crime control in a post-conflict setting provides an understudied perspective on the topic. In other words, we do not know exactly what works, and what does not in battling urban criminal violence in a post-war context. Despite the lack of empirical evidence, there are theoretical arguments stating that a multi-sectoral approach is more successful as it can combine the mechanisms of single sector programs (Fay 2005, 160; Waller 2006, 89; AIC 2015). Therefore, this thesis tests the notion that **multi-sectoral programs are likely to be more successful in reducing post-war urban criminal violence than single sector programs**, as they are able to combine mechanisms of reducing incentives and opportunities for turning to acts of violent crime.

Through a method of structured focused comparison this claim is tested on three urban communities in post-apartheid South Africa. The research finds that the multi-sectoral approach is the only control program that correlates with a reduction in criminal violence, confirming the proposed hypothesis. In contrast, the communities in which a single sector approach was used, show an increase in reported cases of criminal violence. Despite finding support for the theoretical claim, there are several important alternative explanations that help understand the different outcomes of crime control programs. Particularly the level of community participation, and effective partnerships seems to play an influential role in explaining variation in the dependent variable.

The results of this thesis have double purpose in contributing to existing literature. First, from both an academic and policy oriented perspective, the findings can help to better understand what strategies are effective in trying to control, reduce and eventually prevent urban violence from happening in a post-war setting by systematically comparing the effects of existing programs. Secondly, this research aims to bridge the academic gap between the fields of conflict studies, criminology, and urban studies. New in the field of urban studies and criminology is the post-war dimension, which can be important in understanding specific root causes and types of violence that occur in these realities. And within the field of conflict studies, there has been little attention for the urban arena when it comes to the topics of peacebuilding and understanding post-war violence.

After this introduction, the main theoretical argument is developed and presented based on previous research and conceptualizations of the variables of interest. Afterwards, the research design explains the adopted method and scope of the study. The part thereafter discusses a short background of post-apartheid criminal violence in South Africa, after which the three cases are empirically analyzed and compared. Finally, a more general discussion is included before providing a summary with some general conclusions, reflections and implications derived from this thesis.
2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH

This research aims to explain why some crime control programs are successful in a post-war urban setting, and others are not. For these programs to become successful in reducing violence, it is essential to understand what causes violence in this specific context. The theoretical argument builds on the assumption that post-war urban criminal violence is a result of combined causes, studied in different bodies of literature (World Bank 2008). Understanding the interacting and multidimensional causes for the studied phenomenon therefore requires a holistic approach (Apraxine et al. 2012, 19). Theoretical concepts are taken from the fields of conflict studies, urban studies, and criminology, relating to both causes and posed solutions for post-war urban criminal violence. This chapter explores the existing theoretical ideas provided by previous research and aims to connect them.

2.1 Post-War Criminal Violence

When violence continues after war, the causes for it can be more diverse than the causes for the political conflict that preceded it, as post-war stories rarely unfold as they were predicted by policymakers (Boyle 2014, 1-4). Research has shown that post-war societies are significantly more violent than they were before war (Suhrke 2012). Archer and Gartner (1976) conclude that countries that have been at war show higher homicide rates than non-war countries. In addition, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Rivera (2016) find that the experience of armed conflict leads to higher levels of criminal violence after war. These societies are seen as providing an environment which is “permissive for the use of violence” (Deglow 2016, 787).

A country’s transition from war to peace, even under the most favorable circumstances, can take decades before it develops into a peacefully functioning state and is often known for being vulnerable to renewed violence (Suhrke 2012, 19). Part of this vulnerability is attributed to weak state security institutions, resulting in fear, distrust, and impunity as triggers for renewed violence (Fernández Garcia 2004, 4). In addition to this institutional legacy of war, there are socio-cultural factors that influence the occurrence of post-war violence. On the one hand, there is a socio-cultural legacy of war, meaning that violent conflict creates a certain “value structure” that allows for criminal violence to take place. This structure helps to explain high levels of violence in the post-war period (Steenkamp 2005, 265). A culture of violence causes people to turn to violence for interpersonal conflict resolution and personal gain (Nordström 1992). Steenkamp (2009, 2014) for example finds that this ‘culture’ gives rise to the shaping of new types of violence in a post-war context, such as criminal violence, showing examples from Syria, Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and South Africa.
While violence during armed conflict is characterized by political motivations concerning territory or state control (UCDP 2017a), post-war criminal violence is often socially or economically motivated, and identified by a breach of the law after the conflict has officially ended, resulting in the injury of a person (Moser and McIlwaine 2001; Deglow 2016, 786). There is only limited existing literature that has studies the effect of armed conflict on the occurrence of post-war violent crime. Bateson (2013) for example points out that conflict intensity positively affects post-war criminal violence in Guatemala. Deglow (2016) finds that high levels of anti-government violence during conflict, increase the likelihood of post-war crime in local communities in Northern Ireland.

Building on explanations that focus on a history of war, the period of peace that follows the signing of an official peace agreement can also affect levels of violence (Suhrke 2012, 2). In particular, the idea of liberal peace, based on liberalist markets and political democracies is being criticized for contributing to post-war violence. This western idea of capitalist global economies often goes hand in hand with systematic inequality, the exclusion and marginalization of certain groups in society (Ibid., 3). As Horwath points out, the conditions of these types of peacebuilding and democratization processes, can “exacerbate perceptions of relative deprivation that cause a resurgence in post-conflict interpersonal violence and crime” (2014, 261). In addition, Nussio and Howe (2016) show that demobilization processes after civil war can cause an increase in violent crime through the breakdown of non-state protection systems. Also, the state’s capacity in governing the security sector after wars end is assumed to impact the level of violent crime (Zinecker 2006, 2007). In short, existing conflict studies literature provides different causes for why societies remain violent after armed conflict, or experience a significant increase in levels of violence after a civil war has officially terminated.

2.2 Urban Violence and Crime

Explanations for post-war violence do not specifically cover the urban dimension of violence. In other words, the factors mentioned above relate mostly to macrolevel dynamics and do not explain why urban areas are often the epicenter of criminal violence (Østby 2016). As a result of continuing urbanization, it is likely that specific urban areas are, will become, or remain hot-spots of criminal violence (World Bank 2011, 29). Höglund et al. (2016) find that urban areas experience more armed conflict that rural locations, but the process of urbanization and the effect of high population densities is not considered to be an explanation for why violence occurs in the city (Østby 2016, 508-9).
Urban violence literature is separated from ‘traditional’ conflict studies as it differs in levels of actor organization, state involvement, and conflict intensity (Apraxine et al. 2012, 25). However, there are multiple scholars arguing that urban violence can take on war-like proportions in terms of violence levels and its impact on society, including the risk of renewed conflict (Kaldor 2006; Patel and Burkle 2012). The differences between traditional armed conflict and urban violence mostly stem from the fact that the latter is often not politically motivated against the state and less organized in nature and collectiveness. The term criminal violence in this way provides a conceptual alternative for political violence.

Criminal violence in the city is a long-studied phenomenon that has been explained by various theories, like social disorganization theory and ecological systems theory (Bronfenbrenner 1977; Muggah 2012). Previous literature emphasizes that risk factors and triggers on various levels help to explain why violence occurs in some states and not in others. There are certain structural causes for violence, like inequality, poverty, unemployment, and the lack of education (Poveda 2011). When these issues are combined with institutional weaknesses, like labor market exclusion and weak security systems, conditions for criminal behavior thrive (Muggah 2012). A history of armed conflict adds up to these macrolevel causes for urban violence. However, country-level processes alone cannot explain why some areas are more violent than others and why some people use violence where others do not. This is where interpersonal and individual causes come into play. Intra-family dynamics, biological dispositions, and influential relationships on a local level contribute to the decision to turn to violent behavior (Apraxine et al. 2012, 19; Muggah 2012; Kasang 2014).

The latter explanations focus on social and institutional factors in explaining urban violence, while the spatial dimension plays an important role as well. The World Bank points out that the “rapid growth of cities feeds the chaotic formation of slums, in which overcrowding and competition for scarce resources combine with weak state security presence to foster criminality and violence” (2011, 15). It is often that in large informal settlements, or slums, without sufficient facilities and infrastructures, opportunities for would-be perpetrators to commit crimes are ideal as the sense of impunity is high (Kasang 2014, 28). The field of criminology labels this third type of explanation as situational causes of crime, influenced by the physical environment. One of the theories in this category is the ‘broken window’ theory (Kelling and Coles 1996). This theoretical argument builds on the notion that disorderly conditions in urban communities create an environment, or situation, that is conducive to crime. These disorderly conditions can be further categorized in physical and social forms. Vacant buildings, broken windows, trash on the streets, informal settlements, and bad infrastructure are all examples of physical disorder. Examples of
social disorder are prostitution, public drinking, gambling, and loitering (Welsh et al. 2015, 448-9). Failing to address such disorderly conditions can spark waves of violent crime within those specific neighborhoods (Kelling and Coles 1996).

In sum, explanations for violent crime in a post-war city can broadly be labelled into three different categories. First of all, there are institutional factors that contribute to the existence of societies that are at risk of experiencing criminal violence. Secondly, these factors are exacerbated by social processes, from a structural to individual level, and explain why some people portray criminal behavior and others do not. Thirdly, situational elements help to understand why crime often takes place specifically in poor urban areas.

2.3 Urban Peacebuilding and Crime Prevention

The finding that the urban arena experiences a higher risk of armed conflict (Höglund et al. 2016) and general risk of criminal violence (Østby 2016), highlights the importance of urban peacebuilding. As post-war violence is likely to concentrate in the informal settlements of urban areas (Altpeter 2016; James and Potter 2008, 49), the need for addressing the city as an independent unit of analysis becomes more apparent (Bollens 1999, 2011; Björkdahl 2013). Sawalha (2010) finds for example that a history of segregated urban spaces obstructs the process of post-conflict reconstruction. Polarization within urban areas is often a consequence of armed conflict, a process that is theoretically linked to a renewed outbreak of violence (Bollens 1999; Østby 2008). Criminal violence in the city thus poses as risk to a state’s transition towards sustainable peace.

The most relevant evidence-based strategies that are used by practitioners to deal with urban violence are crime prevention programs. The field of criminology has developed three conceptual approaches, based on the three categories that cause crime. Firstly, institutional crime prevention addresses institutional causes of crime, by targeting a weak or vulnerable state apparatus, through judicial or policing reforms (Hughes 1998). Secondly, situational crime prevention focuses on taking away opportunities for crime, by addressing the disorderly conditions for criminal behavior as explained in the previous paragraph (Clarke 1995). The third approach focuses more on the social processes that underlie crime. Social crime prevention aims to take away the desire for criminal behavior by resolving underlying problems, such as unemployment, poverty, and inequality (Rosenbaum et al. 1998). These urban crime prevention programs are often part of governmental or developmental objectives, rather than peacebuilding efforts in which the urban atmosphere is specifically targeted (Homel and Homel 2012). Also, the effects of different programs are not always clear and comparable. For example, Beato and Silveira (2014) point out that there is a lack of systematic evaluations of crime prevention programs in Latin-America,
making it uncertain what the effect of different programs is. Sherman et al. (1997) studied the effect of different crime prevention strategies, but remained limited to comparing efforts within the United States. Moreover, Welsh (2016) emphasizes the need for more systematic and comparative research to create a stronger theoretical framework for effective crime prevention.

To sum up, previous research from the fields of conflict studies, urban studies, and criminology has focused on causes for post-war violence, urban violence, and crime. The overlapping realities have however not been studied extensively, and neither have the proposed solutions. One of the consequences of distinguished academic fields is that crime prevention often does not include a ‘history of conflict’ component as being a relevant factor in achieving success, making it unclear what approach to controlling criminal violence is most successful in this specific context (MDG Achievement Fund 2013). In contrast, peacebuilding initiatives have so far not substantially focused on the urban arena as an independent unit of analysis. In addition, the effects of existing crime prevention programs have not been tested in a systematic comparative manner. Therefore, this research takes on a holistic theoretical framework to study the multidimensional causes and systematically compare control strategies for post-war urban criminal violence.
3. THEORY

Building on the theoretical fundamentals presented in the previous part, this chapter develops more specific conceptualizations of crime control programs and post-war urban criminal violence. By further exploring these concepts, a framework is built that provides an explanation for why some urban communities witness a successful reduction in criminal violence after a program is implemented, while others do not. The fundament of the argument consists of the notion of a multi-sectoral approach, which combines elements of situational and social crime prevention.

3.1 Conceptualizing Crime Control Programs

While existing literature mostly refers to the term crime prevention programs, this research adopts the term control rather than prevention. Since the focus here lies on communities that have experienced high levels of violence at some point in history, the term prevention becomes inappropriate. The objective for the programs is to control and reduce criminal violence. After all, what has already happened cannot be prevented. Control programs are understood here as being identical to the concept of crime prevention from the field of criminology, but placed in a post-war context. The working definition for these programs is adopted from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), stating that crime control programs are “strategies and measures that seek to reduce the risk of crimes occurring, and their potential harmful effects on individuals and society, including fear of crime, by intervening to influence their multiple causes” (UNODC 2010, 9). These programs usually fall under the responsibility of national and regional governments, but are in practice often combined efforts by different entities, such as NGOs, donor states and organizations, and research institutes (Homel and Homel 2012).

Theories exploring the different forms of crime control categorize programs based on two conceptual levels. The first category is the level of implementation. Although the field of crime prevention knows many strategies and policies that are developed and implemented on a national level, there is a growing consensus that community-based programs are more effective (UNODC 2010, 108). Based on the idea that every urban area is unique and has its own crime traits and characteristics, crime control programs are increasingly adapted to the specific needs of individual communities (Kasang 2014, 36; Fay 2005, 144-5). The proposed mechanism for this community-based approach is that social cohesion increases on a local level, which in its turn positively impacts a reduction of criminal violence (UNODC 2010, 13; Langa et al. 2016, 41-2). Building on this assumption, the research only looks at programs on a community level and assesses their effectiveness within that area.
The second category differentiates between the focus areas of the strategy, what is here conceptualized as the type of program. The three different types of crime control are 1) institutional control, 2) situational control, and 3) social control, as they were identified in the previous chapter. The first type entails programs that emphasize the role of the state’s institutions, for example by reforming the police forces or judicial system to better serve crime combatting strategies (Kruger et al. 2016, 8). These institutional programs are beyond the scope of this theoretical model, as they often take on a more regional or national approach in crime control (UNODC 2011). In order to really account for variation on the community level, the theoretical framework focuses solely on situational control programs, social control programs, or a multi-sectoral approach combining the two.

As discussed in the previous research section, situational crime control focuses on taking away opportunities for potential perpetrators to turn to crime, by increasing the costs and reducing the potential rewards of criminal behavior (AIC 2015; UNODC 2010, 13). An example of the situational approach to crime control is Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). These interventions physically design or renew (usually) urban communities according to principles that aim to deter crime (Crowe 2000; Gardner 2004; Cozens 2008). More examples of situational crime control are gated communities or closed-circuit television (CCTV), all aimed at removing disorderly conditions and creating an environment that makes the decision to turn to crime less rewarding (Clarke 2003; Fay 2005, 160; Kruger et al. 2016, 8).

Rather than focusing on the opportunities for crime, social control programs address the root causes of criminal violence, such as poverty, inequality, and economic exclusion (Rosenbaum et al. 1998). Examples of social violence control on a community level are employment or education projects, sports or art interventions, vocational skills programs, or victim support (Kruger et al. 2016, 8). The aim of this second program type is to remove drivers of criminal behavior by addressing underlying issues. By providing people with alternatives opportunities, incentives for criminal violence are reduced. Several scholars argue ideal crime control programs should contain elements of both approaches, by which the multi-sectoral approach is theoretically able to reduce both incentives and opportunities for crime (Nel et al. 2000, 7; Fay 2005, 160).

The post-war urban community provides an empirical context in which the multi-dimensional causes for violence are all at play. These realities are known for having vulnerable institutions as a result of armed conflict (Fernández García 2004). Additionally, urban areas where post-war criminal violence concentrates are illustrative of the social and situational causes for crime, as levels of informality, poverty, and socio-economic exclusion are generally high (Muggah 2012). Therefore, this research provides a test for discovering whether the proposed mechanisms for
social and situational crime control reinforce each other in a multi-sectoral approach in post-war urban communities.

3.2 Conceptualizing Post-War Urban Criminal Violence

Post-war urban criminal violence contains a number of theoretical elements that are derived from broader social processes, without an existing working definition for the phenomenon as a whole. In order to conceptualize and define it, this thesis breaks down the concept into four parts: post-war, urban, criminal, and violence.

The term post-war refers to the period of time after a peace agreement has been reached, even though this might not be the same as the end of conflict and violence (Mac Ginty 2006, 103). The temporal dimension for this research is therefore bound by the preceding of a peace agreement, which was signed to resolve an armed conflict.

The spatial dimension refers to the city, areas within states where population densities are high, resulting from processes of urbanization (Muggah 2012). Although there is no globally adopted definition, an urban area is characterized by population size and density, political boundaries, and economic function (Weeks 2010, 33-4). The topic of this thesis is most relevant for rapidly urbanized major cities with over 350,000 inhabitants, where informal settlements have formed, accompanied by high levels of poverty, inequality, and competition over scarce resources (World Bank 2011, 15-7). Urban areas are defined as “demarcated geographic zones of dense human habitation and a degree of physical separation from rural areas” (Muggah 2012, 15). More specifically, the communities that experience high levels of criminal violence are often slums, which are urban areas that are deprived of one or more basic needs, such as access to clean drinking water, sufficient living space, and basic public services like health care and education (Ibid., 18).

This thesis focuses on criminal violence, as opposed to political violence. Within the literature on violence, there is a distinction between socially and economically, or politically motivated types of violence (Moser and McIlwaine 2001). The adopted definition of violence for this research is taken from the World Health Organization (WHO), framing it as “the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or a group/community, that either results or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury or death” (Krug 2002).

---

1 All definitions here are taken from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). A peace agreement refers to “a formal agreement between warring parties, which addresses the disputed incompatibility, either by settling all or part of it, or by clearly outlining a process for how the warring parties plan to regulate the incompatibility” (UCDP 2017a).

2 “An armed conflict is a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year” (Ibid.). The term armed conflict is used here interchangeably with the term civil war.
et al. 2002, 4). While political violence is motivated “by the will to win or hold political powers”, social and economic violence are driven by interpersonal social control and material gains (Moser and McIlwaine 2001, 60).

Another important classification of violence has less to do with the incentives behind it, and more to do with the actual manifestation of it. There is a theoretical distinction between direct, structural and cultural violence (Galtung 1990; Kasang 2014). Although the three concepts are closely related, it is the first concept that is measured here as the dependent variable, as it is physically perceivable. Structures and cultures of violence are important components in explaining why societies are violent, but are excluded from this theoretical framework due to difficulties with measuring them empirically. The thesis therefore limits itself to cases of direct interpersonal violence, which are criminal in nature.

What makes violence criminal is a less clearly defined concept, as it differs across countries and over time. An act of crime is one that is punishable by law, meaning that it is state specific (Moser and Winton 2002, 6). Some of the most illustrative examples of direct criminal violence are punishable by law in all countries, such as murders, assaults, robberies, or kidnappings. The operational definition used for post-war urban criminal violence is the following: post-war urban criminal violence contains any unlawful act committed with intentional physical force directed at other individuals or groups within an urban area of a country that experienced war.

### 3.3 Argument and Causal Mechanism

I argue that it is the type of control program that determines whether or not an intervention leads to a reduction of post-war urban criminal violence. A multi-sectoral program that addresses both the situational and social causes, will presumably have an effect on both the incentives and opportunities for criminal behavior and thereby increases the likelihood of reduced violence. In a post-war urban context where both social and situational factors are important contributors to the occurrence of criminal violence, it makes sense to assume that multi-sectoral criminal violence control programs are a necessary requirement for an effective control strategy.

Even if social control programs are able to successfully address root causes, situational factors still cause ‘would-be criminals’ to turn to crime, as they may believe there is little consequence to their actions (Kelling and Coles 1996). An example of a social program could be organizing sports and education activities for at-risk youth, decreasing their motives to hang out on the streets and commit crimes. But if their neighborhood remains a poorly developed area with underdeveloped infrastructure and lacking public facilities it is likely that these youths still end up in situations that are ‘inviting’ criminality. Situational programs on the other hand are designed
specifically to address those opportunities for crime, but are unlikely to be successful in a poor post-war urban area where deeply rooted social factors underlie manifestations of criminal violence. An example of situational crime control would be the installation of surveillance cameras in a neighborhood with high levels of criminality. The program might influence the local opportunities to turn to crime, but incentives for potential perpetrators are still present, which is likely to result in a relocation of criminality to areas in the neighborhood that are not under surveillance.

The above mentioned single sector approaches thus only focus on either social or situational causes and leave room for alternative causes of criminal violence. Despite successes of single sector approaches in several non-post-war contexts (Sherman et al. 1997), I argue that a multi-sectoral approach to reduce criminal violence is requirement for success in countries that have a history of war. Based on this reasoning, the thesis draws on the testable implication that multi-sectoral programs are likely to be more successful in reducing post-war urban criminal violence than single sector programs.

Social control elements of the multi-sectoral program target root causes for violent crime, such as poverty, inequality, and unemployment. By improving social cohesion, socio-economic opportunities, and the general well-being in the community, incentives to turn to crime decrease. In addition, the situational elements reduce opportunities for potential perpetrators by increasing the costs of criminal behavior. The combination of these mechanisms is what enables a multi-sectoral control program to have an effective impact on local levels of criminal violence in a post-war context. The logic of this argument is illustrated in figure 1.

![Diagram](image.png)

**Figure 1. Proposed Causal Mechanism**
4. RESEARCH DESIGN

This chapter outlines the research design that is adopted to systematically test the theoretical notion that the type of crime control program impacts the reduction of post-war urban criminal violence, as developed in the previous chapter. Through a qualitatively structured, focused comparison, the study analyzes three urban communities in post-apartheid South Africa. All three communities experienced a post-war history with high levels of criminal violence. Three different approaches were used in the respective urban areas to control and reduce violent crime. The following paragraphs explain the design choices, including case selection, method, sources, and time frame of the study before the theoretical argument is tested empirically.

4.1 Case Selection and Method

This study will follow a structured focused comparison design to test the hypothesis in a systematic manner across different empirics (George and Bennett 2005). This is done through a between-case comparison of three urban communities in post-war South Africa. A structured focused comparison allows for testing the theoretical argument on three different empirical cases. This comparison measures the impact that the type of violence control program (independent variable) has on the reduction of post-war urban criminal violence (dependent variable) through both reduced incentives and opportunities for criminal violence (causal mechanism). This method is chosen over a large-n design as it allows for a more detailed process tracing of the proposed causal mechanism. In addition, data availability limits the possibilities for a quantitative approach to answer this specific research question. Structurally asking the same questions in all cases allows for a systematized way of data collection through which comparability increases, while focusing on only the specific variables of interest over a set period of time (George and Bennett 2005, 67).

The population of cases for this study consists of urban areas that have experienced high levels of criminal violence at some point in post-war history, since the research focuses on explaining the reduction of it. This process was completed by looking at official crime statistics in communities that witnessed the implementation of a crime control program. Although it is likely that these particular urban areas experienced high levels of criminal violence, the pre-program statistics were compared to national averages to evaluate the relative intensity of violent crime (Crime Stats SA 2017). A limited population to generalize conclusions to remains, making random sampling inappropriate (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 295). The alternative method and decision-making for sampling the cases is influenced by three different factors: 1) data availability, 2) the expected relationship/variation, and 3) comparability across cases. While the case selection in general was determined by data availability, selecting cases based on expected variation and
comparability deals with risks of systematic error through selection bias (Collier and Mahoney 1996; Seawright and Gerring 2008).

Both comparability across cases and variation in the IV and DV are essential in minimizing selection bias. To ensure comparability, the aim is to keep all other variables constant while observing variation in one of the key variables. This most-similar case study design thereby precludes the constant variables across all cases as possible explanations for variation in the outcome (Powner 2015, 124). In order to have most variables constant, cases were selected from the same country within approximately the same time period, to control for the impact that nationally determined social, institutional, and situational factors might have on all communities. Testing the theoretical argument in terms of the expected relationship, required me to select cases that vary in terms of the independent variable, but are likely to have the same causal mechanism at play (Weller and Barnes 2016, 433). By taking into account three different cases, the research leaves room to consider alternative explanations and potential confounders as well.

All case selection criteria taken into consideration have led to the selection of three communities within the cities of Cape Town and Johannesburg, two of the most violent cities in South Africa. All three of these urban areas have shown high levels of criminal violence in the past two decades, but vary in the approach that was used to reduce it. Table 1 provides an overview of the case selection.

### Table 1. Case Selection Criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban Area</th>
<th>Type of Program (IV)</th>
<th>High levels of criminal violence before start of the program?</th>
<th>Timeframe for analysis*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alexandra Renewal Project (ARP).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The starting year of implementation is put between parentheses.

### 4.2 Sources and Time Frame

The type of control program is measured by determining the objectives and method through which it aims to realize those objectives. Their outcome and impact on levels of criminal violence is
measured by looking at community level crime statistics from an independent data management organization. An important note here is that these statistics can suffer from various fundamental problems. Although being a reliable measurement in terms replicability, criminal statistics rarely capture the entire reality of criminal violence, which causes some validity issues. Due to a lack of better indicators, crime statistics are used and the consequences of this decision are covered in more detail in the discussion chapter. Problems with using crime statistics as a valid measurement for the reality of criminal violence are for example underreporting, police corruption, or purposive altering of crime categories to portray an alternative image of the reality (Bruce 2010; Brodie 2013).

In order to determine the relative success of each program, data are also collected through secondary sources, like expert reports and program evaluations, focusing more on the process and causal mechanism.

This thesis deals with the type of violence that occurs after a peace agreement has been signed. It therefore adopts a post-agreement time frame by solely looking at programs that commenced in the period after a sustainable agreement was signed. For the case of South Africa, this starting point is identified by the signing of the National Peace Accord (NPA) in September 1991. This post-war time frame also helps confirming the theoretical assumption that post-war urban criminal violence knows both war related and peace related causes. The initial levels of criminal violence are taken from one year before the crime control program started to ensure the causal direction of the hypothesis. The next points of measurement are taken from the following years of implementation in order to capture a trend in violence levels, rather than assessing only one moment in time.

Since all programs are based on achieving sustainable urban development, there are no clear end dates for the programs, making it difficult to assess the final moment of impact. Especially programs that target underlying social processes of violence are less likely to have an immediate effect on criminal violence. Therefore, looking at the impact of the program is done by observing the crime trend for a period of seven years, starting in the year before implementation commenced. The final point of measurement is thus five years after the start of the program. The consequences of adopting this particular scope are critically discussed in the reflection.

4.3 Operationalization

Five crime categories are used to measure dependent variable, based on crime statistics and the operational definition from the previous chapter. These categories are 1) murders, 2) attempted
murders, 3) sexual assaults, 4) assaults\(^3\), and 5) robberies\(^4\). These categories best illustrate the conceptualization of direct interpersonal and criminal violence as identified in the theoretical framework. It is important to note here that this operationalization excludes manifestations of for example domestic violence, self-directed violence (e.g. suicides), or drug-related crimes that do not involve the use of direct violence. All indicators used here are separate categories within the adopted crime statistics sources.

Measuring the statistics over time provide an overview of the general trends of criminal violence before and after implementation started. Regarding the relative nature of the theoretical argument and hypothesis, determining the level of success will be relative as well. This assessment mainly builds on the crime statistics due to limited availability of comparable secondary sources, like program evaluations or local surveys. Where possible, an analysis of such reports is made to triangulate findings and provide an additional stand on the empirical material. Based on this setup, the analysis can be drawn as to whether or not the multi-sectoral program is more successful in reducing post-war urban criminal violence than the single sector approaches.

The previously introduced concepts of situational and social crime control are used to distinguish between the different types of programs. A situational program is focused on reducing the opportunities for criminal violence that arise from the environmental context in the community. Clarke (1995) provides an overview of various strategies that are part of situational crime control. Examples are upgrading the physical design, controlling the access to facilities, extending guardianship, increasing public surveillance, and reducing anonymity. This research takes that overview as a basis for determining whether a program is situational in nature.

The social dimension is focused on addressing one or several of the underlying social causes for criminal violence in the city. Determining the nature of a social control program depends on the assessment that the program deals with root causes of post-war criminal violence, as they were identified in the theory chapter. Such interventions can for example focus on unemployment, education, health, and a lack of social cohesion. A multi-sectoral approach thus consists of a combination of both situational and social elements. The empirical analysis is guided by structured and focused researched questions, which will help to systematically measure the variables of

---

\(^3\) The category assaults consists of common assaults and assaults with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm. Common assault is referred to by South African law as unlawfully and intentionally applying (the believable threat of) force to another person, where assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm is characterized by the perpetrators intention to cause serious bodily injury (SAPS 2017).

\(^4\) The category robberies consists of common robberies and robberies with aggravating circumstances. Common robbery is “the theft of property by intentionally using violence or threats of violence to induce submission to the taking of it from another”, where aggravating circumstances consist of the wielding of a fire-arm or other dangerous weapon and (the threat to) inflicting grievous bodily harm (SAPS 2017; Stevens 2014, 189).
interest. Table 2 provides an overview of the set of questions that is used to determine the type of control program.

**Table 2. Measuring the Type of Program.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions (Independent Variable)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Is the program community-based?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Is the program aimed at addressing violent crime?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the specific objectives of the program?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- What method is used to reach these objectives?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the program adopt a situational, social, or multi-sectoral approach?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The level of success for the different types of program is not as easily categorized as the nominal independent variable. Therefore, the success of the violence control programs depends on two types of sources and is a relative assessment based on that data collection. The main indicator for success is the seven-year crime trend, consisting of the five categories of direct interpersonal violence. A reduction of crime during this period of time correlates with the program being successful, whereas an increase of violence on the other end of the spectrum corresponds with an unsuccessful approach to crime control. In addition to the crime statistics, the assessment is supported by secondary sources such as program evaluations, and expert reports. Table 3 shows the set of questions that is asked in comparing the three urban communities in terms of criminal violence.

**Table 3. Measuring Post-War Criminal Violence.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions (Dependent Variable)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- What are the levels of reported interpersonal crimes in the community one year before the implementation of the program?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- What are the levels of reported interpersonal crimes in the community five years after implementation started?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- What is the crime trend during this period of time?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Is there a reduction in the number of reported interpersonal crimes in the community?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- What is the perception of the crime control program in the community?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. POST-WAR SOUTH AFRICA

Before discussing the three specific criminal violence control programs, it is important to briefly address the South African context and history of urban criminal violence in which all programs are positioned. This part shows an empirical overview of the shift in violence from the war-time system of institutionalized political violence towards a post-war criminal violence era. The most common forms of post-apartheid urban criminal violence are discussed. The chapter further illustrates some of the initial state responses in dealing with post-war violence, mostly on a national level. By discussing several early post-war crime control approaches, this chapter builds an empirical fundament, a starting point for where the need for community-based programs became more apparent.

5.1 From Institutionalized to Criminal Violence

Over forty years of institutionalized racism and segregation in South Africa officially ended with the abolishment of apartheid and the signing of the NPA in 1991. The first democratic elections the country witnessed since its independence in 1918 resulted in the victory of Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress (ANC) in 1994, and marked the start of a post-war transition to peace. Although often not analytically portrayed as a civil war, the apartheid system was designed for the violent if needed - oppression of all non-white categorized racial groups. During the apartheid regime, which started in 1948, approximately 21,000 people died as a result of the political conflict (Samara 2011). Additionally, by the year of 1983, 3.5 million people had been affected by forced removals (Duncan 2005). Especially between the years 1981 and 1988 the conflict escalated into an actual civil war, resulting in at least 25 battle related deaths each year, in fights between government forces and armed opposition groups from the ANC and Pan African Congress (PAC) (UCDP 2017b). While a peace agreement was signed in 1991, large scale political violence did not cease until the white minority rule ended in 1994. It is therefore that South Africa’s post-war period is considered to begin in that year, when large scale political violence decreased (Ibid.).

Some of the impacts the apartheid system has had on the country are caused by racist political ideology and practices, exemplified by spatial segregation of socially constructed identity groups, based on skin color. The majority of the black South African society was isolated in the slums, or townships, built around the centers of South Africa’s major cities (Findley and Ogbu 2011). The white minority rule enforced this separation between so-called distinct ethnic groups,

---

5 According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), the apartheid era in South Africa did not take on war-like proportions every year in terms of conflict-related deaths. Although this threshold was not reached in every apartheid year, the country is analyzed here as a post-war society starting from the year 1994, when political violence largely reduced (UCDP 2017b).
categorized as White, Black, Colored, and Indian (Abrahams 2010, 496). Through systematic oppression, the regime created the foundations for deeply rooted poverty and inequality, illustrated by the unequal access to and quality of schools, healthcare, public transport and various other state based services (Duncan 2005, 9). The government regularly resorted to violence as a repressive means for maintaining a system of discriminatory law enforcement (Abrahams 2010, 497). Duncan (2005) points out that especially within the oppressed poor townships, the system gave rise to violence in various forms, remaining largely neglected by law enforcement.

During the early post-war years, levels of violence actually increased after the signing of the 1991 accord with an estimated count of 12,000 conflict related deaths between 1990 and 1994 (Ibid., 11). During this time, there was a shift from mostly political violence in the years leading up to Mandela’s presidency, towards more socially and economically motivated types of criminal violence, concentrated in the townships and becoming increasingly lethal (Duncan 2005, 14-5; Shaw and Gastrow 2001, 236). Since the end of the apartheid regime, South Africa has systematically been ranked amongst the countries with the highest levels of interpersonal violence, illustrated by extremely high numbers of murders, assaults, and robberies (UNODC 2010). Despite numerous anti-violence policies from the government, levels of criminal violence have remained relatively constant and even increased slightly between 2005 and 2015, according to national crime statistics (Crime Stats SA, 2017).

5.2 Post-Apartheid Urban Violence
Post-apartheid urban violence is linked to the history of war and racial segregation, or as Christine Hentschel calls it, a dramatic history of space (2015, 15). The apartheid era created a culture of legitimized and excessive violence, illustrated by repressive police forces and ignored clashes of criminal violence among the urban poor (Steiner 2015). Several common types of violence occurring in the post-war cities are discussed here, to provide an overview of what phenomena the control programs aim to reduce.

Violent crime related to ‘gangsterism’, is one of the most common forms of criminal violence in South African cities (Abrahams 2010, 500). These manifestations of violence are linked to the history of institutionalized segregation, fueling urban battles for territory based on ethnicity or neighborhood (Ibid.). Both victims and perpetrators of gang violence are often young males between the age of 15 and 24 (Ward et al. 2012). Examples of this type of violence are the Cape Flats Gang Wars in Cape Town (Samara 2011), or the Ninevites Gang with mafia like activities in Johannesburg (Abrahams 2010). These gang-related forms of violence are also linked to drug trafficking practices accompanied by high numbers of murders, assaults, robberies, and kidnappings (Samara 2011).
A second type of violence that is specifically interesting in the poor urban townships, is xenophobic violence. South Africa’s cities are known for hosting many poor immigrants, who settle and work in the cheap informal areas surrounding the city centers (Tevera 2013). “African immigrants from Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Nigeria and Malawi – to name a few – running spaza shops, stalls and other businesses in the informal economy, mainly in townships, are the most susceptible to xenophobic attacks” (Mutanda 2017, 3). Immigrants are often blamed for the lack of economic opportunities for residents of the townships, fueling robberies, assaults, and even murders (Reddy 2012). As Mutanda (2017) points out, foreigners everywhere are blamed for taking away jobs. Examples of xenophobic violence are the riots of May 2008, starting in the township of Alexandra, Johannesburg. These attacks led to national level assaults on immigrants, in which 62 people died. In 2015, similar events happened where at least seven people got killed in the violent riots (Ibid.). These manifestations of violence are also linked to the apartheid legacy, which has created deep divides between ethnic groups (Misago 2017). Although having political roots, this type of violence is categorized as criminal, serving mostly social and economic motives.

Gender-based, domestic and sexual violence can roughly be analyzed as a third category of commonly occurring violence in the townships of South Africa. Claassens and Gouws point out that in the year 2013, over 65,000 people were victims of sexual violence, a number that can easily be multiplied by twenty because of heavy underreporting (2016, 34). They find that especially for this type of violence, victimization is a major problem.

Very often women rape survivors are not believed or they are turned into spectacles to be laughed at when reporting rape at police stations—a form of secondary victimization. It has been said that given the sheer magnitude of these statistics, South Africa has a similar profile of sexual violence as countries that are at war (Ibid.).

High numbers of domestic and sexual violence illustrate the culture of violence, theoretically linked to the history of war. Violence seems to be rooted into the South African society, and concentrated in the poorest urban areas (Jewkes and Abrahams 2002, 1239). The intensity of violence is aggravated by the high numbers of firearms that are present within the South African society, both legally and illegally (Safer Spaces 2017). These combined processes have created violent slums were feelings of fear and insecurity are part of daily life.
5.3 Post-Apartheid Crime Control

The three control programs discussed in this research are not the first measures taken in combatting criminal violence in post-war South African cities. Since the end of apartheid, many initiatives have been set up with the aim to control and reduce urban violence. The first major government policy targeting crime was the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) of 1996, aimed at creating a comprehensive policy framework for the emerging democratic society to deal with the national crime issues (Newham 2005). One of the biggest challenges for South Africa in the first decade after apartheid ended, was the process of transitioning from an institutionalized oppressive regime into a peaceful democratic nation, including a well-functioning criminal justice system and a renewed security apparatus designed to protect the rights of all South Africa’s civilians. This transition took place in an atmosphere of exploding numbers of criminal violence sweeping the country (Dixon 2006).

Crime control does not work without a well-functioning criminal justice system (UNODC 2010, 3). In the case of South Africa, national processes of reforms within law enforcement and the criminal justice system were made to promote a sovereign government framework capable of controlling crime and providing justice in the early post-apartheid years (Singh 2008). These changes resulted in renewed strategies and policies in the years that followed, with for example the White Paper on Safety and Security and the National Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS), implemented respectively in the years of 1998 and 2000. Despite the knowledge at the time that situational and social factors have a large impact on the occurrence of crime, the first decade of post-apartheid South African crime control focused almost solely on institutional policies fighting criminal violence (Newham 2005, 7). This ‘war on crime’ did not address the influential social and situational causes, tracing back to the apartheid era, but rather aimed at making arrests and filling up South African prisons. As a result, crime levels did not decrease (Du Plessis and Louw 2005).

In addition to government efforts, which did not prove to be sustainable or effective in reducing criminal violence, a large private security sector emerged in the country. The marketization of security led to a further concentration of crime in the poorest communities of South Africa, amongst those who are unable to afford private forms of protection (Singh 2008, 59). Examples of these private forms of crime control are CCTV and the creation of gated communities (Landman 2004; Breetzke et al. 2014).

By the end of 1990s, it became apparent that an alternative approach to combat urban criminal violence was needed. As Dixon concludes in reference to national strategies like the NCPS and NCCS, “it is a very long way indeed from paper to practice and it would be unwise to assume that the proposals put forward in the documents and ministerial statements (...) simply spilled off
the page on to the streets. They did not” (2006, 183). The most recent policies, like the National Development Plan (NDP) from 2012, and the 2016 White Paper on Safety and Security therefore also emphasize the importance of a community-level approach, well-coordinated throughout the different levels of society, from local to national (Safer Spaces, 2017). One of the early strategies that focused on the community level, were Community Policing Forums (CPFs). These locally managed neighborhood watch models were implemented in most of South Africa’s townships to facilitate the cooperation of law enforcement between different levels of the South African society (Schärf 2001).

In sum, the country has undergone a large shift in terms of the governing and judicial system, law enforcement, manifestations of violence, and crime control strategies. And although various strategies and programs have been implemented over the past fifteen years, the country has not been able to sustainably reduce urban criminal violence on a national level as crime statistics point out (Crime Stats SA 2017). The early post-apartheid era illustrated the need for community level approaches and a focus on social and situational prevention, besides earlier implemented institutional policies.
6. CASE I. THE ALEXANDRA RENEWAL PROJECT

The South African government started the implementation of an urban renewal and crime control program in 2001 in the township of Alexandra, Johannesburg. This urban area is historically known for having high levels of poverty, unemployment, and post-war criminal violence. Through a process of urban renewal, based on CPTED principles, the ARP implemented a situational approach to crime control. And although the program succeeded in providing renewed housing, services, infrastructure and public facilities, levels of criminal violence did not reduce during the first five years of implementation. The adopted program strategies of de-densification and housing relocation resulted in mass criticism from the community, resembling tactics of forced movement used during the apartheid regime. And while the number of murders in the community dropped over 45% between 2000 and 2005, the total number of interpersonal violent crimes increased with 70%, especially due to a large increase in assaults. Dissatisfaction in the community reached an absolute peak when violent riots emerged in 2008, confirming the inability of the Alexandra Renewal Project to reduce criminal violence.

6.1 Background – The Community of Alexandra, Johannesburg

Alexandra is a densely-populated township within the city of Johannesburg and one of the poorest in the country (Sinwell and Podi 2010). Population estimations for this eight square kilometer area vary greatly from 180,000 to 700,000, making it difficult to assess the actual number precisely (Thwala 2009, 15). A survey conducted in 2000 estimated the population at 300,000 - 350,000 people (Rauch 2002). The slum is mostly inhabited by black South Africans and migrants from neighboring countries. The urban area is severely overcrowded; facilities are only available for approximately 70,000 people, leaving the existing public services overcrowded (UN Habitat 2009, 2). Alexandra was built in the early twentieth century, after which the Apartheid regime controlled the area’s population and isolated the community. During apartheid times, people were occasionally coerced to move from the overcrowded area to prevent civil unrest (Roefs et al. 2003, 17). Like most large informal urban settlements in South Africa, Alexandra has extremely high levels of poverty, unemployment, and crime. Both situational and social causes for crime are present in the community. The murder rate in 1999 was 117 per 100,000 inhabitants, making it one of the most violent communities in the country (Schönteich and Louw 2001, 12).

6.2 ARP. A Situational Approach

After several failed attempts to physically upgrade the township in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Alexandra Renewal Project was announced in 2001, as part of the national Urban Renewal
Programme (URP), designed with the aim to develop six of the poorest urban areas in the country (Rauch 2002). The URP is one of the first South African crime control strategies that shifted from a national approach to a more fine-tuned community-based perspective (Donaldson et al. 2013, 631). For Alexandra, the project was designed as a multi-sectoral approach, to trigger the overall development of the urban area in a time where the need for social and situational elements became more apparent for South African policymakers (Schönteich and Louw 2001, 5). Therefore, a community level approach was adopted, based on local participation and receiving large political support. The development of community-based urban renewal programs recognized that national institutionally oriented policies had not proved to be successful on the local level (Sinwell 2009, 163). The objectives of the ARP were stated as follows:

The Johannesburg Alexandra Urban Renewal Project seeks to fundamentally upgrade living conditions and human development potential within Alexandra by substantially improving livelihoods within Alexandra and wider regional economy; creating a healthy and clean living environment; providing services at an affordable and sustainable level; reducing levels of crime and violence; upgrading existing housing environments and creating additional affordable housing opportunities and de-densification to appropriate land (Thwala 2009).

The ARP had an initial budget of 1.3 billion Rand for seven years of investments in the urban community. More specifically, the project set the goal of reducing crime levels by 50% and unemployment by 20% in the first seven years of implementation (Sinwell 2009, 166). An evaluation in 2007, however, showed that the program had only focused on physical upgrades in the urban area, excluding the social component of the initial project design (Sinwell and Podi 2010, 16). Therefore, this program is analytically considered to be a situational crime control program in this research, rather than the multi-sectoral one it was originally designed to be. The situational approach of the Alexandra Renewal Project focused on creating a renewed urban environment in Alexandra in which disorderly conditions were removed, in order to stimulate local development and simultaneously reduce levels of crime.

6.3 The Effect of the Program

One of the most important objectives for the ARP was to literally create a new physical environment, less conducive to crime and more open to safe public life and development. Realizing this objective in a vastly overcrowded township, caused that many residents had to leave their homes to make room for renewed housing. In addition, the program aimed to clear out dangerous living areas, such as the informal shacks close to the Jukskei River which suffered from risks of flooding (Sinwell 2009, 167). Because of the complexities that arose in the process of legally moving
people from their homes, compromises had to be made between the government and Alexandra’s inhabitants. This time consuming and complicated process of agreeing to land rights and temporary housing eventually turned out to be one of the major pitfalls of the ARP, and is further discussed in the following section (UN Habitat 2009, 7-8). The strategy used to realize the urban renewal of Alexandra, involved moving families away from the most dangerous places in the community. Besides the temporary relocation of Alexandra’s population, there was the objective of de-densifying the township, meaning that one of the goals for the project was to structurally relocate residents (Thwala 2009, 16). By rebuilding areas in a less densely organized manner, situational causes for crime were addressed, by for example improving visibility, territoriality, and the general aesthetics (Kruger 2005, 6). Kotze and Mathola point out several of the program’s accomplishments in the township.

Houses have been built, existing schools have been upgraded and new schools have been developed. Recreational centres, parks and sports fields for leisure time activities have been established. Police stations have been upgraded and newly-trained staff has been employed to help combat crime. On the visible front, evidence of urban renewal in Alexandra appears to be a symbol of success (2012, 255).

The situational approach of the program showed productivity and potential by providing several thousands of new houses, including renewed public facilities. The program renovated facilities such as sanitation, water supply, and electricity. In order to specifically deal with the issue of crime, the first year of the ARP ensured the construction of a new police station and street lighting (Davie 2012, 3). The program thus focused on several concepts from situational crime prevention, as identified by Clarke (1995). Despite the investments in the community infrastructure, overall perceptions of the program are not generally positive. A study conducted in 2012 by Kotze and Mathola shows that over 70% of their respondents were not content with the renewed housing structures provided by the ARP. Relating to the upgrading of basic facilities, only half of the respondents showed to be satisfied by the overall projects interventions (Kotze and Mathola 2012, 252). Sinwell and Podi provide a potential explanation for the dissatisfaction:

While the ARP aimed to deliver 22 250 [houses] in seven years, by August 2007, the ARP website noted that there were only 2 727 completed housing units (including 2 000 in Bramfischerville), and more than 7 000 under construction. Even if people were able to immediately occupy the other 7 000 houses that were under construction, the number of households receiving houses would be 9 727. While this seems substantial at first glance, it is less so given the fact that there is a housing backlog of approximately 40 000 in Alexandra (2010, 16).
The ARP staff attributes these limited results to the earlier mentioned problem of dealing with land rights and relocation agreements (Kotze and Mathola 2012, 253). In addition, the fact that housing is mostly an individual benefit, rather than being beneficial for the entire community, makes low satisfaction levels understandable (Ibid.). Besides the practical issues the ARP ran into, there are several accusations of corruption and other organizational malpractices, having a potential negative impact on the outcome of the program (Sinwell 2005; Belanger 2016). However, these accusations are difficult to measure. Another factor that seemingly impacted the influence of the program in a negative way, is the approach that was used to ensure cooperation from the local community. To stimulate community participation, the Alexandra Development Forum (ADF) was established in 2001 to involve civil society in the project development. However, practice showed that this forum did not fulfill its purpose of actually involving local citizens in decision-making processes (Sinwell 2005, 165). The need for de-densification led to the enforced evacuation of Alexandra homes, creating a top-down approach resembling ‘apartheid types’ of governance (Ibid., 166-7).

Thus, despite a relatively negative perception of the program, the ARP was able to make substantive physical changes to the urban community, reducing opportunities to turn to criminal violence by adopting a CPTED approach. The accomplishments of the program by 2005 did not meet the initial criteria set in the project design. The changes in levels of criminal violence levels during the first five years of ARP implementation are discussed in the following section.

6.4 Changes in Criminal Violence

Before discussing the trend of criminal violence in Alexandra for the period 2000 - 2006, it is important to mention that less specific data are available for the years leading up to 2004, especially regarding the levels of sexual offences and assaults with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm. These two categories are therefore excluded in analyzing the total number of interpersonal violent crimes. The crime situation in the year 2000 was alarming, with levels of violent crime being at its highest since the start of Mandela’s presidency (Schönteich and Louw 2001, 4). Table 4 shows the number of reported crimes in Alexandra for the both the year 2001, before the ARP started and the year of 2006, five years after implementation.
Table 4. Number of Reported Crimes in Alexandra, 2000 and 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Murders</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempted murders</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Assaults</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>1301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robberies</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of interpersonal violent crimes</td>
<td>1394</td>
<td>2377</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An interesting finding is the drop in the number of reported murders between the year 2000 and 2006, a reduction of 45.5%. And although this number is regularly used as an indicator for general violence levels, in the case of Alexandra the shift in murders does not portray a complete picture of violent crime. In fact, all other categories of interpersonal violent crime show an increase in number. Figure 2 illustrates this trend for the urban community in Johannesburg, where especially the number of assaults shows a dramatic increase. Other statistics remain relatively stable but still generally show a slight increase over the period between 2000 and 2005.

![Number of reported crimes in Alexandra, 2000 - 2006.](image)

Source: Crime Stats SA

**Figure 2a, b. Numbers of Reported Crimes, Trend 2000-2006**

Regarding the types of violence, as discussed in the background chapter, there are some factors worth mentioning for the community of Alexandra. Especially xenophobic violence has played an important role in the urban community, since the end of apartheid. Consistent with the negative
perception of the ARP, tensions in the community intensified as many local residents felt consistently unsatisfied with their socio-economic situation. One of the consequences of this increasing local dissatisfaction was the scapegoating of local politicians and immigrants (Sinwell and Podi 2010, 18). And although murder rates dropped during the first five years of the ARP’s work, an outburst of violence occurred in May 2008, starting in Alexandra. With several casualties, and over 60 people injured, the violent xenophobic attacks in Alexandra sparked a national outburst of violent riots in which more than 40 people died and over 20,000 people were displaced (Tevera 2013). What this event illustrates in the case of Alexandra, is that social causes for criminal violence remained unaddressed in the community, which eventually led to renewed collective violence. The fact that the overall number of reported cases of criminal violence increased, rather than decreased, underscores this finding.

6.5 Summary

In sum, despite a promising program design, the implementation of the Alexandra Renewal Project remained limited to providing several thousand renewed houses, including facilities and public services in the first five years of implementation, which started in 2000. The situational approach was able to address several of the physical disorderly components for crime and correlates with a 45.5% reduction of murders during the first five years of implementation. However, the overall level of criminal violence shows a great increase in the same period of time. In addition, perception of the program turned out to be negative, exposing resentments towards the socio-economic situation in the community, sparking violent xenophobic riots in 2008. This finding confirms the hypothesis in the sense that a sole situational approach does not correlate with a reduction of criminal violence in a post-war urban community.
7. CASE II. THE COMMUNITY WORK PROGRAMME

The township of Ivory Park, Johannesburg is known for being one of the poorest areas in the city and is troubled by societal issues, like large and overcrowded informal settlements, structural poverty, unemployment, public disorder, and high levels of criminal violence. In order to deal with some of the root causes of criminal violence, the Community Work Programme (CWP) was implemented in 2010, providing community beneficent employment for unemployed and at-risk groups in Ivory Park. Despite the successful efforts of this social crime control program in providing employment and community activities as alternatives to criminal behavior, levels of violence increased over the years that followed. This is illustrated by an increase of interpersonal crime of more than 20% between 2009 and 2015. Despite positive local perceptions of the program, it proved unable to reduce criminal violence. The need for situational improvements in the community became more apparent when a violent protest broke out in the spring of 2015, during which local residents demanded the improved access to public services.

7.1 Background – The Community of Ivory Park, Johannesburg

Ivory Park is an urban community, located on the edges of South Africa’s second biggest city, Johannesburg. Ivory Park was mainly built by informal settlers and is known for people living in shacks, with little access to public services (Masuku 2015, 8). Since 1997, the municipality of Johannesburg has been investing in infrastructure, sanitation, and clean water through the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The urban area therefore appears as some kind of mix where “shack-type dwellings intermingle with RDP structures and clean streets intersect untidy ones” (Ibid., 8). Illustrative of the poorest urban areas of the country, Ivory Park is also known for having high levels of illiteracy and unemployment, drug abuse, poverty and crime (Maduna 2015). A large informal settlement has formed and is still growing, illustrated by a population growth from 135,000 to over 185,000 inhabitants between 2001 and 2011 with large numbers of migrants coming from both within South Africa and neighboring countries. The township qualifies as a community with high levels of criminal violence, and both social and situational causes for crime are rooted into the urban area. While problems cumulate in the urban area, a survey found that according to the perception of inhabitants, criminal violence is seen as one of the two the biggest problems negatively impacting the development of the township (Masuku 2015, 17).
7.2 CWP. A Social Approach

The Community Work Programme is a national initiative by the South African government, which was launched in 2007 and aims to provide employment opportunities for unemployed and underemployed people who are eighteen years or older. Its main objectives were initially limited to providing a social service, an income safety net for the poorest population across the country (CSVVR 2017). But early on in the implementation stages, the potential of the program for crime and violence control was recognized (Bruce 2015). The CWP has a community-based approach, adapting the types of jobs to the needs of the local population (Langa et al. 2016). Due to its focus on the addressing the problem of unemployment, the CWP can be categorized as a social control program, focusing on what is theoretically identified as one of the main root causes for criminal violence.

In the case of Ivory Park, there is a specific emphasis on addressing crime and violence, which are considered to be major obstacles for development in the area (Ibid., 44). The objectives for the Ivory Park program are 1) to grow and develop social life, local economic structures and increase working skills for participants, and 2) to reduce crime and substance abuse by applying the social activities and economic contributions as transforming tools (Masuku 2015, 18). By providing jobs in relevant working sectors that have an influence on criminal behavior, the CWP tries to contribute to a reduction of crime in the community. In Ivory Park, these sectors are defined as environment, infrastructure, social, and economic. The first two sectors interestingly provide jobs in those sectors that are also linked to situational crime control. For example, jobs that the CWP created in Ivory Park are removing illegal dumps, cutting long grass and trees, and cleaning parks, schools, and churches (Masuku 2015, 19). In addition, CWP workers help in improving public facilities and infrastructure by fixing broken windows, improving public pedestrian areas, and building new houses. This part of the CWP in that sense fulfils a situational component of crime control, by changing an environment that is conducive to crime and thereby reducing opportunities. However, it must be said that the central focus of the CWP lies on the social approach, as these situational aspects fulfill a minor role in the overall focus of the program. The sectors social and economic consist of jobs like helping with the distribution of food, supporting the sick, elderly, and disabled, or maintaining food gardens.

7.3 The Effect of the Program

National levels of criminal violence have been high continuously throughout the post-war history of South Africa. Langa and Masuku (2015, 80) point out that every month almost 6,000 law offenders are released from prisons and other correctional institutions to reenter society after
committing a crime. Due to stigma and selection procedures, these people get stuck in situations of unemployment as employers easily exclude ex-offenders from applying for available jobs. This process of exclusion increases the chances of recidivism (Ibid.). Employment and involvement in the community are seen as positive contributions to successful reintegration and reduced risks of returning to criminal behavior (Langa et al. 2016). The CWP therefore specifically recruits these ex-offenders who are willing to ‘pay back’ their community (Langa and Masuku 2015, 83-4). The scholars explain that for these former perpetrators of crime,

serving the community through CWP work is seen as a form of public apology and an expression of remorse to the community members who were once negatively affected by their criminal activities. As argued earlier, this is evidence that participation in CWP work facilitates ex-offenders’ reintegration into a normal community life. The social nature of the CWP work also forces ex-offenders to show empathy while assisting community members. In this way, participation in the CWP decreases their risk of reoffending (2015, 84).

By establishing a new reputation in the community, the CWP gives renewed purpose to the lives of former criminals, stimulating reintegration for those who are willing to change. This opportunity to contribute to the community simultaneously reduces their incentives to recommit a criminal offence (Ibid., 83). One of the ways to contribute for ex-offenders, besides doing the regular jobs, is to be part of public campaigns, for example against substance abuse. The messages of ex-offenders are perceived to be “powerful tools” in getting through to young people and convincing them to not make similar mistakes (Ibid., 88).

The process of employment also has a similar impact on those who have not committed any type of crime in the past, as the CWP provides opportunities to earn a steady income, which reduces the chances of criminal activities. Any adult above the age of eighteen who meets the criteria can join the CWP. This inclusive approach fosters the local notion of social cohesion which is perceived to have a positive impact on the reduction of criminal violence (Langa et al. 2016, 43). Enhancing the social relations and community networks in this way increases the livelihood of the entire urban area (Ibid., 44).

As previously observed, the majority of violent crimes in urban South Africa is being committed by young males between the age of 18 and 25 (Shaw 2002). They are also most often the victims of crime, making this group generally vulnerable and important to address in crime control programs. This group often lacks education and employment opportunities and is therefore found on the streets gambling, loitering, and using drugs (Langa and Masuku 2015). These groups of youth may commit crimes out of boredom, group pressure, or for status and local power, for example in gangs. It is therefore difficult to engage these young people in CWP work activities,
such as cleaning streets or schools. However, sports are seen as an effective means to reach out to this particular group (Langa et al. 2016, 44). The CWP addresses the at-risk youths by organizing sports tournaments with educational elements, discussing the issues of drugs, crime, health, and unemployment. These initiatives minimize incentives to take part in criminal behavior, by providing an alternative activity, while the educational elements aim to deter them from future decisions to commit crimes. Teaching the youth valuable life skills can help them to develop into adults that positively contribute to their community.

Unlike situational crime control, which shows a direct and observable change in the physical environment, targeting social underlying causes of crime is a less clearly observable process, making the outcomes more difficult to measure. The CWP invests in the future of the community by providing help in Early Childhood Development (ECD). Because many kids in Ivory Park grow up with limited possibilities, providing assistance to the most vulnerable aims to reduce the chances that they will become an at-risk group for crime or substance abuse in the future. As Langa and Masuku point out,

\[ \text{CWP is also impacting positively on children by supporting ECD centres or crèches. CWP provides staff to keep these centres clean, wash blankets and cook for the children and in some cases also supplies them with fresh vegetables from CWP gardens. The CWP also conducts door to-door visits in the informal settlements in order to identify problems and either deal with them or refer community members to appropriate government departments. These door-to-door visits are important as they have assisted in identifying children who are not enrolled in schools or who are not in ECD centres when they are supposed to be (2015, 44).} \]

This approach again explains the social transformation that the CWP is pursuing. Instead of only focusing on the direct problem of criminal perpetrators, the program targets those people on which it hopefully can have an impact in the long run. It is an approach that provides opportunities for education, employment, and other daily activities that make crime more redundant. The program thereby targets the incentives that people might have to turn to social or economically motivated types of violence, like robberies or gang-related crimes.

**7.4 Changes in Criminal Violence**

The CWP setup provides jobs and income to vulnerable groups in the urban community. At the same time, these jobs are all designed to be an investment on various levels, from early childhood development to providing physical training for the elderly. Interestingly, the program is locally not perceived as able to reduce levels of crime. In interviews assessing the effect that the CWP can
have on controlling criminal violence in Ivory Park, respondents mentioned the need for firearms to control crime in the community, and that such activities are solely the responsibility of the police (Masuku 2015, 43).

These answers portray a local perception on criminal violence control that is strongly centered on the law enforcement and institutional aspect of it, excluding the notions of situational and social crime prevention. While respondents confirm that the program has a positive impact on Ivory Park, the effect on criminal violence proves to be limited. The positive perceptions of the program make it unlikely that the intervention in itself has exacerbated the crime situation in Ivory Park. However, the crime statistics portray an image that illustrates the fact that the program has not reduced levels of criminal violence at all. Table 5 shows the number of reported cases of interpersonal violence in the year before CWP implementation, and after five years of activity in Ivory Park.

Table 5. Number of Reported Crimes in Ivory Park, 2009 and 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Murders</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual offences</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempted murders</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assaults</td>
<td>873</td>
<td>1018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robberies</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of interpersonal violent crimes</td>
<td>1809</td>
<td>2312</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The local Community Policing Forum confirms that the CWP is seen as purely an employment program aimed at doing simple jobs that might help the community in its general development (Masuku 2015, 43). In other words, the ability of the CWP to impact crime is locally contested. In addition, the program encountered several organizational setbacks, illustrated by political parties’ interference and financial problems when the number of participants outweighed the CWP’s budget (Ibid., 19, 31). These issues might be linked to a lack of effective partnerships, which would could have enabled the program to have a larger impact on the community. This potential alternative explanation for the unsuccessful outcome is discussed in more detail after the comparative analysis. The crime statistics confirm that the CWP has been unable to reduce criminal violence in Ivory Park. In fact, the total number of interpersonal crime increased with 21.8% between 2009 and 2015. So, despite a positive perception of the program, it has not proved capable
of dealing with a deeply rooted problem of crime in the community. The crime trend portrayed in figure 3a and b shows a slow but steady increase of criminal violence in Ivory Park.

![Number of reported crimes Ivory Park, 2009 - 2015.](image)

Source: Crime Stats SA

**Figure 3a, b. Numbers of Reported Crimes, Trend 2009-2015.**

To highlight some of the most interesting statistics, the crime trend shows a large increase in sexual offences (60.6%) and robberies with aggravating circumstances (45.4%). So, despite the efforts of the CWP in Ivory Park, residents are somehow still triggered to commit violent crimes. Illustrative for this case is a public protest in June 2015, when local residents occupied the streets to demand better public services for their community (Debeila 2015). While rallying for improved services, the protest became violent when Ivory Park residents starting throwing petrol bombs towards the police forces. The demand for better roads, housing, and public facilities highlights the apparently unaddressed need for situational improvements in the urban community.

7.5 Summary

In short, the Community Work Programme in Ivory Park, Johannesburg has not led to a reduction of criminal violence during the first five years of its implementation, which started in 2010. The program is locally received as providing a positive contribution to the community, but simultaneously viewed as not having a real potential in reducing crime. This local perception is confirmed by the trend of reported interpersonal crimes, indicating an increase of violence between 2009 and 2015. The findings of this case study provide support for the hypothesis, illustrating that
a social sector approach proves to be insufficient in reducing criminal violence in a post-war urban community. Violent riots in 2015 emphasized the need for situational improvements in the physical environment of Ivory Park.
8. CASE III. VIOLENCE PREVENTION THROUGH URBAN UPGRADING

The community of Khayelitsha, Cape Town is known to be one of the most violent places in post-war South Africa. Previously called the murder capital of the country, this urban area was in urgent need of an effective crime control program to bring down levels of criminal violence. The Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) project was implemented in 2005, with various interventions in both situational and social crime control. During the first five years of its implementation, the Khayelitsha urban area showed a large reduction in violent crimes, illustrated by a decrease of over 70% in the total number of interpersonal crimes between 2004 and 2010. Although the participatory model for community involvement is criticized for taking on a top-down approach, the program is generally received with positive attitudes. And despite the large reduction of criminal violence during the VPUU’s implementation, attributing this finding solely to the multi-sectoral approach is difficult.

8.1 Background – The Community of Khayelitsha, Cape Town

Khayelitsha is one of the biggest townships in South Africa. Located on the South-East border of the city of Cape Town, this mainly informal settlement hosts between 400,000 and 750,000 people, according to various estimations (Super 2015, 1; Graham et al. 2009, 68). Designed to be an isolated area for black people during the apartheid regime in the 1980s, this flat landscape was deliberately deprived of the most essential services, facilities, and infrastructures (Barolsky 2016, 8). The area was one of the several places where black people relocated to, during the apartheid regime, when local conflicts in other townships remained unaddressed by the South African government (Graham et al. 2009, 68). Even twenty years after apartheid ended, half of Khayelitsha’s population lives in shacks, and unemployment rates are equally high reaching up to 50% (Green 2012). The problematic history of the township is filled with social and situational causes for crime in the community. This history has led to Khayelitsha being an urban area that is known for having some of the highest levels of criminal violence in the entire country (Super 2015, 1).

8.2 VPUU. A Multi-Sectoral Approach

Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading is an example of a multi-sectoral crime control program, which was found in 2004 and implemented one year later in the community of Khayelitsha. The project is the result of a partnership between the City of Cape Town and the German Development Bank. It is designed to increase overall safety through crime reduction by improving the socio-economic situation of about 200,000 – 300,000 residents in defined, so-called
Safe Node Areas within the community (Graham et al. 2009, 69). The program aims to transform the problematic spaces in such a way that “dark, neglected and dangerous hotspots are filled with active life through crime-sensitive urban design” (Bauer 2010, 11). More specifically, the program’s objective is officially stated as:

An integrated human settlement can be achieved through socio-economic improvements together with institutional capacity building and access to cultural facilities. Violence levels can also be reduced in the target areas by providing victim support and implementing situational, social and institutional violence prevention measures (Graham et al. 2009, 69).

VPUU is one of the first programs in South Africa that focuses on incorporating both situational and social elements of criminal violence control into one project. This multi-sectoral approach builds on renewed physical space as the foundation for creating an improved sense of community citizenship and ownership for the people of Khayelitsha (Barolsky 2016, 22-3). Addressing the social root causes of criminal violence in addition provides the population with the necessary skills and frameworks to utilize the renewed public spaces in a peaceful and constructive manner. Central objectives in this approach are ensuring community participation, local capacity building, and effective mentorship in order to create sustainable socio-economic opportunities within the upgraded areas (Graham et al. 2009, 69).

8.3 The Effect of the Program

The program was designed as a situational violence control program, focusing on the physical upgrading of certain crime hotspots within the urban area (Barolsky 2016, 22). As theorized, situational control programs focus on reducing opportunities for potential perpetrators to turn to violence, by removing disorderly conditions, such as vacant buildings, broken windows, and a lack of street lighting. The VPUU mainly fulfilled this part of the approach through CPTED, transforming a crime conducive environment into safe and publicly accessible areas. The VPUU’s goal was to create ‘active boxes’ in the community, where daily life is vibrant and includes safe pedestrian walkways, public open spaces and buildings, business opportunities, and sport and recreation facilities (Graham et al. 2009, 71). The program identified four of these areas within Khayelitsha through a baseline survey that took place in the early stages of implementation. The first VPUU intervention was the creation of the Harare Peace Park, a previous hotspot for crime as was identified in the survey (Ibid.). The entire park, including the main park building were renovated to include a care taker’s flat, meeting rooms, and public toilets. Simultaneously, local groups with interest in taking care of the area were trained in their organizational capacity,
management, and maintenance skills (Ibid., 72). In this way, the situational aspect sustainably prevents perpetrators of crime to become active in the renewed urban area where public spaces are naturally supervised by community members to prevent public disorder. The three other situational interventions with an identical approach include the Urban Park Precinct 3, Kwam Fundo Sports Complex, and Harare Square. All these interventions were designed to provide better public services to the residents of Khayelitsha, according to principles of situational crime prevention.

These situational interventions all focus on reducing the opportunities for potential perpetrators to turn to violent behavior by changing the physical environment in a way that removes physical and social disorder. Firstly, the urban upgrading part of VPUU created a better image and aesthetic view of the urban area. The four designated program sites were all transformed into public spaces with open pedestrian walkways, community buildings, and public facilities (Graham et al. 2009, 71-4). Secondly, these newly created public spaces were designed according to architectural principles that ensure visibility, surveillance, and territoriality. This intervention takes away the broken window from the broken window theory, meaning that a renewed physical environment demotivates the opportunistic perpetrators of crime. Additionally, the project staff invested in the creation of community structures for sustainable surveillance and maintenance of the renewed public areas, thereby “positively occupying perceived dangerous places” (Graham et al. 2009, 73).

Building on a theoretically driven approach to include the different types of criminal violence control elements, the implementing partners recognized the need for social interventions in order to ensure a sustainable impact. The social part of the program was designed to both support the newly designed active boxes, and to create a general trigger for development, lawfulness and tolerance (Graham et al. 2009, 75). The goal of the social component within the VPUU program is to “prevent and reduce the impact of crime or violence by strengthening relationships between people, drawing vulnerable people into safer conditions and improving the collective capacity of Safe Node Area residents to resist becoming victims or perpetrators of crime or violence” (Ibid.). This is done by focusing on several root causes of post-war criminal violence, such as unemployment, a lack of education, and social distrust between community members.

The VPUU program uses the renovated areas within Khayelitsha as the bases for social violence control by enlarging the local capacity to positively influence the wider community (Diab 2015). This long-term process is mainly enabled through the creation of structures for cooperation between different stakeholder in the urban area. An example of a social intervention is the partnership with local NGO Mosaic, which provides support and services to victims of violence, mostly women and children. This is done by raising awareness, legal counselling support, job skills
development, and education on sexual and reproductive health and Rights (SRHR). Another example is the social development fund, enabling new business opportunities by providing financial assistance and thus directly targeting unemployment. Also school-based programs and ECD are part of the long-term strategy used by the VPUU program to minimize incentives for criminal behavior.

Another major social component of the program is the attempt to increase the idea of social cohesion in the community (Barolsky 2016, 23). This is partly done by actively involving the community in the crime control program, enhancing the sense of local ownership. Interventions that focus on for example capacity building illustrate the program’s objectives to stimulate the involvement of local actors (Cassidy et al. 2015). However, the VPUU’s approach to community participation is also criticized for being a top-down model where local residents do not hold any significant decision-making power (Ibid., 28).

8.4 Changes in Criminal Violence

Before the VPUU program was introduced in 2005, Khayelitsha was known for being the ‘murder capital’ of South Africa. In 2004, 358 murders were reported, equaling almost one killing a day (Crime Stats SA 2017). Statistics also show extremely high numbers of sexual offences, assaults, and robberies. A survey by the VPUU staff in the developmental phases of the program confirmed that these are the most pressing types of criminal violence in the urban area (Bauer 2010, 10). Table 6 shows the number of reported crimes in Khayelitsha for the year of 2004, before the VPUU program started, and 2010, five years after implementation.

Table 6. Number of Reported Crimes in Khayelitsha, 2004 and 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Murders</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual offences</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempted murders</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assaults</td>
<td>5109</td>
<td>1224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robberies</td>
<td>2308</td>
<td>904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of interpersonal violent crimes</td>
<td>8758</td>
<td>2602</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows that all numbers have dramatically decreased, with reported murders dropping over 65% and the total number of interpersonal crimes even more, with 71.3%. In addition, all categories of direct interpersonal crime are at least halved in this seven-year period. Although it is
not possible to solely accredit the VPUU for this remarkable shift in criminal violence, the correlation between the program and the corresponding statistics is notable. Some say for example that the reduction is largely a result of increased policing in the township, rather than the merit of the crime control program (Mtyala 2010). An indicator that alternative explanations like the one just mentioned play a role, is the fact that the reduction of violent crime already started before the program was implemented, between 2004 and 2005. Despite potential alternative explanations, there seems to be a correlation between the combination of situational and social initiatives and the reduction of urban violence in the case of Khayelitsha. The crime trend, illustrated in figure 4a and b, confirms the overall reduction of criminal violence during the period of 2004 to 2010.

The strongest drop in crime is reported between the years 2004 and 2006, which includes the first two years of VPUU’s involvement in Khayelitsha. For example, sexual offences decreased from 588 reported cases in 2004, to 331 in 2006, a reduction of 43.7%. In addition, the total number of assaults reduced by 63.1%, from 5109 reported cases in 2004, to 1881 in 2006. After the second implementation year, the numbers remain relatively constant but still show a slight decrease until the final year of measurement.

A study by Trupe (2016) confirms the positive effect that the VPUU program has had on the urban community. The specific safe node areas prove to provide increased safety and a smaller
risk of witnessing violent crime. She concludes that inhabitants of Khayelitsha living in these specific project areas have a lower risk of experiencing violence than the people living in surrounding communities (Trupe 2016, 57; Brown-Luthango and Gubevu 2014, 5). The discussion revolving around whether to label the multi-sectoral program as successful in reducing post-war criminal violence is continued in the next chapter. The findings do confirm the hypothesis, as the VPUU’s approach is correlated with a reduction of criminal violence in the post-war community of Khayelitsha.

8.5 Summary

The Violence Prevention Through Urban Upgrading program in Khayelitsha, Cape Town correlates with a large reduction of criminal violence between 2004 and 2010. The multi-sectoral approach has implemented both situational and social interventions, such as the creation of renewed public spaces and social structures for community ownership and development. Despite some critical feedback on the participatory model, the program puts emphasis on involving the local residents. This positive effect is underpinned by the criminal statistics, showing a decrease in all relevant categories of violent crime. The findings therefore confirm the proposed hypothesis, as the multi-sectoral approach corresponds with a reduction of post-war urban criminal violence in this community. However, it is difficult to attribute the change in crime solely to the program as alternative explanations are likely to play a role in the outcome.
9. DISCUSSION

After having analyzed all three cases individually, this part of the study aims to compare the different programs and evaluate the proposed hypothesis based on the independent and dependent variable. The case studies show support towards the idea that a multi-sectoral criminal violence control program is more successful in reducing violence than single sector approaches in a post-war urban context. The multi-sectoral program correlates with a large reduction of reported incidents of criminal violence, while the single sector approaches do not correlate with a reduction of crime at all. In fact, both of these communities witnessed an increase in levels of criminal violence during the first five years of implementation. Despite finding support for the hypothesis, there are several important alternative explanations to be discussed as well, including the level of community participation and the impact of effective partnerships. Moreover, this chapter discusses some reflections on the study that impact on drawing general conclusions.

9.1 Comparative Analysis – Influence of the Programs

The theoretical framework used for this comparative study assumes that a multi-sectoral crime control program, combining situational and social elements is more successful in reducing violence than a single sector approach. This hypothesis is tested by looking at the changes in community level criminal violence up to five years after implementation started. Based on those relative changes it is possible to compare the three urban communities and the effect of the respective programs on local crime levels. Observing the criminal statistics over time on a community level portrays the changes in violence levels over a period of seven years, starting one year before program implementation. For Alexandra, this period ranges from 2000 to 2006. The VPUU in Khayelitsha started implementation in 2005, where the crime trend is observed between 2004 and 2010. And for Ivory Park, the time frame for analysis ranges from 2009 to 2015.

The VPUU in Khayelitsha is the only program in this research that adopts a multi-sectoral approach. The fundament of the project is situational violence control by changing the environmental design of the community, and is complemented with social control measures to maximize the impact on violent crime in the community. The ARP in Alexandra took on a situational approach to crime control by implementing urban renewal interventions and providing public services to the community according to principles of CPTED. Thirdly, the CWP in Ivory Park has a social approach and specifically focuses on the roots of criminal violence by addressing social processes that underlie crime in the township, with its main emphasis on reducing unemployment.
Although the exact effect of the programs on levels of violence is difficult to assess, there seems to be a correlation between the theoretical argument and the outcome in these specific urban areas. In Khayelitsha, where the multi-sectoral approach was implemented, criminal violence levels dropped dramatically in the first five years of implementation. All types of interpersonal violence adopted in the research design show a large reduction in the period of 2005 to 2010. All categories are at least halved in 2010 compared to 2005. The investment in renewal of specific areas within the community according to principles of situational crime prevention have led to the creation safer public areas in which opportunities for criminal behavior are largely reduced through an open design, including lighting, surveillance, and pedestrian walkways. Through social programs in these specific areas, the program stimulates community participation. Although the participation model is criticized for taking on a top-down approach (Barolsky 2016), increasing social cohesion is a key concept in the VPUU program. By increasing social cohesion and civic ownership, the notion of socio-economic exclusion is addressed and simultaneously lowers incentives for criminal behavior.

The combined mechanism that is at play in the community of Khayelitsha is not present as a whole in the other two communities. In Alexandra for example, the focus was entirely on providing renewed housing, infrastructure, and public services to as many inhabitants of the community as possible. Where community participation was a central objective in the VPUU program, the ARP did not invest largely in involving the local community in decision-making processes. Combined with several thousand enforced evictions to create space for urban upgrading, this program neglected some of the root causes for urban violence in the country. The control over people’s housing situation and the seemingly biased selection of housing allocations created a feeling of dissatisfaction and even renewed senses of government oppression, linking back to apartheid times (Sinwell 2005). The project was able to restructure parts of the urban community, creating several renewed areas in which situational crime prevention ideas were incorporated. The statistics however show, that this approach has not been able to substantially impact criminal violence in the wanted direction.

The CWP in Ivory Park is the only case in which the physical environment did not play a central role in crime control. The program focused on underlying causes of criminal violence, rather than reducing the situational causes. This program provides an alternative for crime, by providing jobs to those who are in need of them, including ex-offenders. Additionally, the CWP organizes a range of social community activities to target issues related to education, socio-economic exclusion, and health. The CWP thus takes on a participatory approach, involving local stakeholders and directly reducing the criminal incentives of at-risk groups by improving social cohesion. However, when looking at the crime statistics it reveals the limited impact that the program has had on levels
of criminal violence. With a slight increase in all categories of interpersonal violence, the CWP has not been able to reduce criminal violence in the community at all, despite being received with positive feedback. Table 7 provides an overview of the main findings, confirming the hypothesis as only the multi-sectoral program is correlated with a reduction of criminal violence in the first five years of implementation.

**Table 7. Overview of the Findings**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program/Community</th>
<th>Multi-sectoral program? (IV)</th>
<th>Reduction in criminal violence? (DV)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violence Prevention Through Urban Upgrading (VPUU). Khayelitsha, Cape Town.</td>
<td>Yes.</td>
<td>Yes. A large reduction in the number of reported cases for all types of criminal violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandra Renewal Project (ARP). Alexandra, Johannesburg.</td>
<td>No, only situational.</td>
<td>No. A reduction in the number of murders, but an increase in the total number of reported cases of criminal violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Work Program (CWP). Ivory Park, Johannesburg</td>
<td>No. only social.</td>
<td>No. A small increase in the number of reported cases of criminal violence.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The fact that Khayelitsha is the only community that shows a reduction of criminal violence confirms the idea that the two proposed causal mechanisms enhance each other and are both conditional for successfully reducing urban criminal violence in a post-war context. While it is difficult to assess the individual strength of the separate mechanisms, the combination is the only case of criminal violence control that is correlated with a reduction of violence in this specific post-war context. Sole situational crime prevention programs, like the ARP, have gained results in various cases in a non-conflict affected context (Sherman et al. 1997; Cozens 2008), but do not prove to be a sufficient approach when communities have a history of violent conflict, oppression, poverty, and social exclusion. In contrast, an approach solely based on the social causes of violence also does not have a large enough impact to positively influence the levels of crime in the community during the first five years of implementation, as the CWP in Ivory Park illustrates. Despite finding support for the hypothesis, other factors might have impacted the outcome of this thesis.
9.2 Alternative Explanations

This research focuses specifically on the type of program in accounting for the variation in levels of criminal violence. However, there are various other explanatory factors, beyond the scope of this thesis, that might account for the variation observed in the dependent variable. Four of those explanations are discussed here in more detail, based on factors that seemed most relevant during the empirical analysis.

One of the most prevalent alternative explanations that seems to have impacted the outcome of all three programs, is the level of community participation. While having established that a community-based approach works best in criminal violence control, the actual level of local involvement and ownership seems to be critical as well. All programs were designed to involve the local community to a high extent, but the level of involvement seems to differ between the three cases. The multi-sectoral program placed a large emphasis on community participation and civic initiatives for ownership of the project, where representatives from the community were involved in decision-making processes (Cassidy et al. 2015). The ARP had a similar intent, creating the Alexandra Development Forum for voicing the community’s opinions and interests. However, Sinwell (2005) concludes after interviews that the Forum’s influence on the program implementation process was limited in practice, since decision-making was completed on a more elite level. The CWP is a more puzzling case in this sense, where the entire program revolves around community participation, and is perceived positively by the local residents. In that case, there seem to be other factors at play, such as the program’s budget and the political support for the initiative, which leads to the second alternative explanation.

An effective partnership between the various stakeholders seems to be a second explanatory factor that influences the outcome of crime control programs. The CWP in Ivory Park is seen as a positive contribution to the community, but not necessarily viewed as having great potential in reducing levels of criminal violence. This lack of influence is illustrated by the fact that for example coordination with the local Community Policing Forum (CPF) is missing (Masuku 2015). A partnership between these community level stakeholders is likely to have a positive impact on the program’s outcome. In addition, insufficient funding and local political disputes negatively impact the program and are indications that partnerships did not prove to be effective on different societal levels (Ibid.). The same types of problems seem to have impacted the potential of the ARP, where only several of the program’s objectives were reached after eight years of implementation and allegations of corruption and organizational problems frequently were brought up by different civil and political stakeholders (Sinwell 2009).
A third alternative explanation that can account for changes in the dependent variable, is the institutional element of crime control. Besides the concepts of situational and social crime prevention, the institutional component of the theoretical framework provides a potential explanation for why criminal violence might reduce. After all, a well-functioning judicial system and police force are essential conditions for successfully reducing crime (UNODC 2010, 3). Especially in the case of South Africa, but often more generally applicable to post-war societies, law enforcement played an active role in wartime oppressive practices. Therefore, the post-war police forces and judicial system were largely reformed (Singh 2008), aiming to build trust between the state and its citizens. One of the most important reforms that directly impacts community level crime rates are the CPFs, designed to improve local surveillance and the partnership with local police forces. One reason to disregard this explanatory factor largely is the fact that all three studied communities did have a CPF in place during the implementation of the respective crime control programs. However, what could be an interesting add-on in explaining the variation between the different communities, is the level of functionality of each respective CPF to determine their impact on local crime levels. In Khayelitsha for example, the claim was made that the drastic decline in criminal violence was not so much the result of the VPUU, but rather a consequence of increased policing in the community (Mtyala 2010). Including the policing factor in the comparative design would therefore be interesting, but was beyond the scope of this thesis.

A fourth and final factor that is interesting to keep in mind when discussing the outcome of this analysis, is the relocation of violence as a direct result of the control programs. Especially situational approaches to crime control, like the VPUU and ARP programs, have been theoretically linked to a relocation, or displacement of crime. Changing the physical environment to one that is less conducive to crime, makes it likely for perpetrators to relocate to urban areas more beneficial for criminal behavior (Clarke 1995). Regarding the analysis, displacement of criminal violence would cause limited outcomes if crime is only reduced on a community level and not necessarily in absolute numbers in the wider urban area. Situational crime prevention methods, like CCTV and gated communities have shown to cause a relocation of criminal offences to other areas (see for example Breetzke et al. 2014). It is therefore likely to assume that displacement of criminal violence also played a role in the two situational programs in Cape Town and Johannesburg. It is difficult to assess the specific effect of potential relocation, but could provide an interesting new perspective in future research.
9.4 Critical Reflections

All choices made during the research process influence the outcome of this study. This section discusses several of the implications that these choices have on the findings of this thesis and the explanatory power of the suggested theoretical model, research design, and empirical application.

Firstly, the most important theoretical reflection revolves around the degree of causal inference. Although crime control programs are designed to reduce levels of criminal violence, it is not a direct analytical step from implementation to observing their effect on crime levels. A critique on the theoretical argument could therefore be that it is not the type of program that impacts the level of success for the programs, but endless other variables that are at play within or outside the specific communities. It is important to consider that this research is not able, nor intends to pinpoint the exact mechanism that is at play at every single community. Rather, despite some limitations in observing such a detailed mechanism, the study points at an interesting correlation, a direction for potential success in reducing criminal violence in post-war urban communities. The correlation that is found reveals a theoretical direction that invites for further exploration, in order to shed more light onto the specific mechanisms that are at play.

Secondly, the adopted research design has consequences for the generalizability of the findings. The method of comparing three case studies has a limited extent to which it represents all post-war urban communities that witnessed the implementation of a crime control program. Regarding the comparability of this research it was important to select three cases that were as similar as possible and only vary on the explanatory factors of interest. This choice in the research design thus affects the level of generalizability across countries other than South Africa, but is a necessary trade-off with the comparative explanatory power of the empirical analysis in itself. These choices are also influenced by limited data availability, making cross-country comparisons even more difficult to realize. However, the findings for example raise the question to what extent these programs are different in a post-war context compared to an urban environment without a history of armed conflict. It is questionable and interesting to determine whether or not the post-war context is significantly different from non-post-war cases, such as the favelas in Brazil. Although being proposed in this study, it remains an interesting discussion if the post-war context should be categorized separately in academic research on urban criminal violence.

The third and final reflection discusses the empirical part of the study, including the data that was used in reaching the particular results. The study is heavily impacted by data availability, meaning that a generally existing lack of systematic evaluations makes it difficult to successfully compare the impact of crime control programs. In addition, the time frame to assess the specific impact on the community is unclear, making it even more difficult to assess the exact effects of the
programs. For example, it makes sense that social control programs take longer to have an actual impact of crime rates, as they target root causes, whereas changing the physical environment yields more direct results. The fact that crime statistics are used as the primary indicator to evaluate the level of success stresses this important point. Although being relatively reliable in a cross-case comparison, there are some validity issues with using crime rates as the main indicator for success. For example, underreporting and the categorization of crimes make it problematic to use these measurements as a valid indicator for the real levels of criminal violence in urban communities.

Related to these data issues is the use of crime rates, based on population estimates. A disadvantage of greatly varying numbers for population estimates is the fact that it makes crime statistics, and especially relative measurements like the murder rate, more unreliable than in areas where a census is more accurate. For example, in Alexandra the murder rate in 2000 was 68.3 per 100,000 inhabitants when the calculations are based on the low population estimate of 180,000 people living in the township. Comparing this number to the national average of 49.8 makes Alexandra seem like an extremely violent urban area. However, taking an estimate of 350,000 people in Alexandra, which is also commonly used in other literature, leads to a murder rate of ‘only’ 35.1 for the year 2000. This is an important side note to keep in mind while using these statistics for the comparative analysis. Especially in the poor informal settlements of the urban arena, population estimates are often far from precise, making statistical calculations based on these estimates far from reliable (Kuffer et al. 2016). Due to the localized approach used in this type of research, it is very likely that these issues remain, making it even more important to keep them in mind while drawing conclusions.
10. CONCLUSION

Building on a gap between the academic fields of conflict studies, urban studies, and criminology, this thesis aimed to assess the impact of different criminal violence control programs implemented in post-war urban communities. By using a comparative design, the research sheds light on why some criminal violence control programs are successful in reducing violence in a post-war setting, whereas others are not. A theoretical model is developed that positions the type of program as the explanatory variable in understanding variation in the reduction of post-war urban criminal violence. As this type of violence is caused by institutional, social, and situational factors, the argument is made that on a community level, both situational and social control elements are required to successfully reduce criminal violence. The thesis therefore argues that a multi-sectoral approach in controlling urban violent crime is more successful in reducing levels of violence than programs solely focusing on situational or social elements.

Through a method of structured focused comparison, three urban communities in post-apartheid South Africa were analyzed, where high levels of post-war criminal violence were recorded and different approaches to tackle the issue were implemented. The empirical analysis shows that the type of control program impacts the level of reduction in the expected direction, where a multi-sectoral approach proved to be only type of program that correlates with a reduction of criminal violence. Both communities where a social or situational sector approach was implemented, portrayed an overall increase in levels of criminal violence. The findings suggest that the proposed mechanisms of reducing opportunities and incentives for crime reinforce each other, making a multi-sectoral approach to criminal violence control in a post-war setting seem like the most effective one.

As expected, pinning down the exact mechanism that explains a reduction in criminal violence is problematic, leaving room for alternative explanations. For example, the degree of community participation seems to play an important role in the level of success. Where community participation is encouraged, social cohesion is enhanced which in its turn can have a positive impact on the outcome of the program. In addition, effective partnerships are an explanatory factor that likely influence the budget, organizational capacity, outreach, and eventually the impact of the program on criminal violence.

Although being limited in its scope, this research has contributed to existing bodies of literature in two distinct ways. Firstly, this thesis sheds light on an existing gap within the field of conflict studies which needs further exploration, by addressing the topic of urban peacebuilding and urban criminal violence in a post-war setting. The study connects the fields of urban studies, criminology, and conflict studies by focusing on a societal dimension that is of great interest to all.
of these academic fields. More can be done in connecting the existing knowledge of these bodies of literature when researching the phenomenon of post-war violence in the city, but this research shows that the fields have several important elements in common. Secondly, the research contributes to existing theories and policies on crime control and prevention by empirically testing and systematically comparing different types of programs. By zooming in on the community level, this thesis provides new data on the correlation between crime control programs and a reduction of violence, confirming the need for comprehensive community-based and multi-sectoral approaches.

Comparing similar types of programs in future research would improve existing knowledge by including one or more of the above mentioned explanatory variables, such as community participation, effective partnerships, the long-term impact of social programs, and the effect of crime displacement. Future studies could benefit from focusing more on the urban dimension of post-war violence and peacebuilding, where little is known on how the history of conflict impacts both the type of violence occurring in cities and the solutions that are utilized in trying to resolve these issues. In order to create improved criminal violence control programs and successfully address the problem of increasingly violent cities, it is important to come to a better understanding of how post-war criminal violence in urban areas differs from situations in which no recent history of war is recorded. In the end, practice will show how issues revolving around post-war urban violence will develop in the near future. It seems that having situational and social elements incorporated in crime control programs is essential in reaching the most effective results, while simultaneously success depends on various other unexplored factors. Therefore, a more educated and developed view on what works and what does not will surely help to improve our practices in resolving violence in the city.
REFERENCES


Bruce, David. 2010. “‘The ones in the pile were the ones going down’. The reliability of violent crime statistics.” *S.A Crime Quarterly* 31: 9-17.


Kruger, Tinus, Lizette Lancaster, Karina Landman, Susan Liebermann, Antoinette Louw and Rory


