The rise of militancy in the Muslim youth

Discourse analysis of recruitment tactics of militant groups in Pakistan for inciting youth to violence after 9/11.

Student: Abdul Sayed
Tutor: Manuela Nilsson (Ph.D.)
Course code: 2FU31E
Semester: Fall, 2016.
Dept.: Peace and Development Studies
Faculty: Social Studies
University: Linnaeus University, Växjö.
Date: 2017-01-09.
Abstract

This study is focused on the spreading wave of militancy in the Muslim youth after 9/11 era. The role Al Qaeda is researched in understanding this problem in the case study of Pakistan. Al Qaeda is considered as the nursery for the rising of militancy in the Muslims while Pakistan is the birthplace of Al Qaeda. The problem of militancy rose to the alarming level in Pakistan after 9/11 when the Pakistani state started to support the US in the war against terror which Al Qaeda and other Islamists consider as the war against Islam. The recruitment strategies of Al Qaeda and other Pakistani militant groups like Tihreek Taliban Pakistan (TTP or Pakistani Taliban movement) are studied through the discourse analysis. The primary data from the militant sources like the speeches, books and interviews of their leadership and ideologues, their official magazines and press releases are selected for this research. All this data is available in Urdu language which is translated to the English for this research. The theoretical framework of this research is based on the “Soft theory” of Josef Nye (2006) and the “three dimensions of Power” theory of Steven Lukes (2005). The results of this research show that the militants mostly use different types of arguments in their messages to the youth in their efforts for recruiting them to the path of militancy which include mostly the religious arguments. Along with it, they also attract youth to their path on targeting their grievances and hopes. They present to them the path of militancy as an end and the only way of revenge for their all grievances. These results also show that the militants also present militancy to the youth as the only mean for achievement of their various hopes which they believe these Muslims youth cannot get without militancy.

Key Words: Terrorism, militant recruitment, Al Qaeda, Pakistan, War on Terror.
# Table of Contents

Abbreviations ................................................................................................................. 01

1.0 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 01
  1.1 Context, research problem and previous research ................................................ 01
  1.2 Research Gap and research Relevance ................................................................ 04
  1.3 Research Objective and Research Questions ....................................................... 05
  1.4 Theoretical and Methodological considerations .................................................... 06
  1.5 Ethical Considerations ............................................................................................. 08
  1.6 Disposition ............................................................................................................... 08

2.0 Background Chapter .................................................................................................... 10
  2.1 Militancy in the Muslims and the role of Al Qaeda ................................................ 10
  2.2 The problem of militancy in Pakistan ..................................................................... 11
    2.2.1 Pakistani militant and sectarian groups ......................................................... 11
    2.2.2 The Influence of Al Qaeda over Pakistani militants after 9/11 ....................... 12

3.0 Theoretical Framework ............................................................................................... 14
  3.1 Josef Nye’s Soft Power theory .............................................................................. 14
  3.2 Steven Luke’s: Three Faces of Power ................................................................. 15
  3.3 Applications of the above two theories in this research ........................................ 16

4.0 Methodological Framework ......................................................................................... 18
  4.1 Methodological Tools .............................................................................................. 18
    4.1.1 Case Study ..................................................................................................... 18
    4.1.2 Discourse Analysis ....................................................................................... 20
  4.2 Sources ................................................................................................................... 21
    4.2.1 Speeches ...................................................................................................... 21
    4.2.2 Interviews .................................................................................................... 22
    4.2.3 Personalities ................................................................................................ 22
  4.3 Limitations and Delimitations ................................................................................ 23

5.0 Findings Chapter ......................................................................................................... 25
  5.1 Religious arguments ............................................................................................... 25
  5.2 Grievances of the Pakistani youth ........................................................................... 27
  5.3 Promises used to recruit Pakistani youth into militant ranks .................................. 33

6.0 Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 39
  6.1 Religious and ethnic arguments .............................................................................. 39
  6.2 Feelings .................................................................................................................... 40

7.0 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 44

8.0 References .................................................................................................................. 46

Appendix 1.0 ..................................................................................................................... 55

Appendix 2.0 ..................................................................................................................... 56
Abbreviations:

**ISIS:** Islamic State in Iraq and Syria

**LeJ:** Lashkar-i-Jhangvi

**NAJ:** Nawai Afghan Jihad

**SSP:** Sipahi Sahaba Pakistan

**TTP:** Tihraek Taliban Pakistan (Pakistani Taliban Movement)
1.0 Introduction

1.1 Context, research problem and previous research

Two well-known medical specialist brothers were arrested by the Pakistani law enforcement agencies in 2004 with connections to the Al-Qaeda linked terrorist outfit Jundullah. A kidney specialist, Dr Arshad Waheed, and a cardiovascular physician, Dr Akmal Waheed, belonging to the port city of Karachi, were accused of planning an attack to kill the corps commander of Karachi. After their release from prison, the Waheed brothers openly joined the cadres of Al Qaeda, moved to Waziristan and soon rose to the upper level of Al Qaeda and became in charge of an Al Qaeda brigade for Pakistan (Rehman, 2015). Later on, Dr Arshad Waheed got targeted in one of a drone attack in the tribal areas (Shahzad, 2010a). The As-Sahab Urdu media wing of Al Qaeda has released a detailed biography of Dr Arshad Waheed, portraying him as a role model for Pakistani youth to follow his path (Chishti, 2014). The young highly qualified Waheed brothers did not belong to the slums but instead they were from a reputed family of the elite class of the Pakistani society. Professor Hafiz Abdul Waheed, father of the two doctors, was a high-level government bureaucrat and a famous educationalist of the country. The two brothers themselves were enjoying a luxurious life (Shahzad, 2010a). This list does not end with the Waheed brothers. As after the 9/11 attacks when Pakistani joined the US in its war against terror, the country has faced a high level of militancy and a large number of sophisticated terrorist attacks. Hundreds of such educated youth have joined the path of militancy as a revolt against the state for its support in the war on terror. They are utilizing their talent against their own state. (Gillani and Tavernise, 2010; Yousafzai, 2010)

The problem is not limited only to Pakistan. After the 9/11 attacks and the launch of the Global War on Terror, thousands of Muslim youth have joined the path of militancy throughout the world. One can come across a large number of cases similar to the Waheed brothers in the Muslim countries and even in the Muslim Diasporas spread in the West (Atwan, 2006:219-222). The problem is getting more sophisticated day by day as militancy in the name of Islam takes new shapes. The current shape of this militancy in Syria and Iraq under the banner of ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) has attracted a
greater number of youth to this path of brutalities and destruction (Byman, 2015: 172-173). The problem is raised to such levels that even Muslim young girls are also adopting the path of militancy due to the recruitment tactics of these militant organizations (Bloom, 2011: 32, 208-209).

The question remains why Muslim youth like the Waheed brothers prefer a path of death and hardships to the luxurious life and get lured to the path of violence and why and how the rising wave of militancy in the Muslim countries after 9/11, detracts Muslim youth from becoming part of the development for their countries to instead becoming actors of destruction and miseries for their countries and the world.

The rise of militancy in the Muslim countries after 9/11 is researched by many scholars, using the cases of different Muslim countries. In the following, a few of such cases from South Asia, Middle East and Africa are discussed. An interesting contribution to the topic of this research paper is the article about the rise of Islamic militancy in Sierra Leone (O’Brien & Rashid, 2013). A Muslim populated country of West Africa, Sierra Leone experienced a rise of radicalization and militancy after 9/11. The country had not such trends before the US invasion of Afghanistan, Iraq and other similar developments in the Middle East. They attribute one of the main reasons for the rise of militancy in the Muslim youth of the country to their feeling of being part of a same Ummah (Global Islamic community). They possess anger against the West due to sufferings of their fellow Muslims in the mentioned countries (Ibid, 2013:170). The authors have also mentioned that religious ideology is also used as a tool for attracting youth to their ranks even by the militants groups considered to be secular (Ibid, 2013:180,186).

Ioannis Manzikos (2011) has discussed the rise of militancy in Muslim countries from the perspective of failed states. He has discussed the cases of Somalia and Yemen from the fragile states theory and has termed the strengthening of militancy in these two and other Islamic countries like Pakistan and Afghanistan from the perspective of fragile or weak states. He writes that scholars believe that failed states are prone to the rise of militancy and terrorism. He defines fragile states as those states that fail to provide physical security, political institutions, economic and welfare systems to their citizens. (Manzikos, 2011: 242-245)
Jeffrey Haynes (2005) has discussed the problem of Islamic militancy in the East African countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Haynes argues that the case of militancy in these countries has traces before to 9/11 incidents but the foundation lying of militancy in these countries is related to the rise of Al Qaeda and other similar Muslim militant organizations (Haynes, 2005: 1322). The author has pointed to the following reasons for the youth inclination to the path of militancy in these cases: domestic problems of these countries, sense of marginalization, socio-economic deprivations, grievances and feeling for the sufferings of fellow Muslims in the conflicts of Middle East, Afghanistan and other countries (Haynes, 2005: 1326).

Similarly, the close borders of these countries to Somalia, having training camps of Al Qaeda, is also a factor for youth moving towards militancy in these countries, as a result a huge number of youth from these countries have become big names in the ranks of global Islamic militants (Haynes, 2005: 1330). For example, Khalfan Khamis Muhammad from Tanzania, and Osama Al Kini and Shaikh Ahmad Salem Swedan from Kenya, who later rose to the central leadership of Al Qaeda after 9/11 (Coffman, 2014; The News International, 2011; Schmitt, 2009).

The presence of Islamic NGOs and charity organization from the Arab countries is also blamed for playing role in the rise of radicalization and extremism in these countries which subsequently leads to the path of militancy (Haynes, 2005: 1323).

The Yemeni case is researched by Laurent Bonnefy in his article from the perspective of weakness of the state. He has pointed to the double game of the state due to this weakness (Bonnefy, 2011: 327-328). The author argues that the state opened both arms to the militants for getting their support in the internal problems of the country and always played a double role in dealing militants and militancy. Militants were supported on the state level, their presence in the country was repeatedly denied even by the president and prime minister of the country, in response to the pressure by the west (Ibid, 2011:328). They were integrated in the security forces, were used against the civil war in the southern part of the country. Even the foreign comrades of the militants were provided shelter in the country (Ibid, 2011:327-329). After the USS Cole and 9/11 attacks, due to pressure from the USA, the state arrested and killed a number of them. Relatives and friends of militants were brutally tortured as well, which drove a huge
number of youth to the spreading wave of militancy in the country (ibid, 2011:330, 332-334). The author further says that along with it, the militants in Yemen tried to win the sympathy of the local population, avoid targeting them as was done in Iraq. This helped them getting sympathy and manpower from the local population. (ibid, 2011:330, 332-334)

The topic of this research paper is also studied in the case of Pakistan as well. Scholars like Michael Humphrey attributes the problem of extremist militancy in Pakistan to the post-colonial problems of the country for dealing the dispute of Kashmir with India. Scholar is of the opinion that militancy was produced and supported by the state for this problem. The author considers that the collateral damage due to the over-use of power by the state in its fight against the global jihad is one of the factors for the rise of militancy in the country. (Humharey, 2012:144-153)

1.2 Research gap and research relevance

The above debate mentions list of various factors which different scholars consider responsible for the rise of the problem of militancy in the Muslim Youth after 9/11. But the research lacks itself the important aspect of this problem of looking directly into the recruitment tactics that what tactics militant groups use for youth recruitment. This paper is covering this research gap to study the recruitment tactics of the militant groups for recruiting youth in Pakistan to the path of militancy through a research based on the primary sources of militants groups like Al Qaeda and Tihreak Taliban Pakistan (TTP or the movement of Pakistani Taliban).

The conflicts of today’s world are dominated by terrorism based insurgencies and revolts against the states (Ramsbotham et al, 2011: 77). The research on the problem of militancy in the Muslim youth lacks work done on the recruitment tactics of the militant groups. The outcome of this research paper would give a possible insight to the conflict resolution experts to understand the recruiting tactics of these militant groups. So by countering these tactics, it would drain the absorption of youth to their ranks, which would be subsequently helpful in the efforts for decreasing the number and extent of conflicts in the current world.
Similarly, youth and specially educated youth are considered the human capital which is important for the development of any country (Smith and Todaro, 2012: 361). The youth in the Muslim populated countries from Central Asia to North Africa and even in the Europe, are getting prey of these militant groups by the name of religion (Atwan, 2006: 219-222). By preventing youth from getting into militancy, would turn their abilities for the development of their countries and societies which will ultimately contribute to the sustainable development of the world.

1.3 Research Objective and Research Questions

This thesis is a contribution to the research about the rise of militancy in the Muslim youth by researching the recruitment techniques of the militant groups for spreading wave of militancy in the Muslim youth. The objective of this paper is to study the recruitment practices of the militant groups for getting Muslim youth into their ranks. Al Qaeda has a huge role in spreading militancy in the Muslim countries and is regarded as the nursery for the rise of militancy in the Muslims (Atwan, 2006: 219). Therefore, primarily the role of Al Qaeda in the case study of Pakistan is discussed in this paper. A good amount of work is done both on Al Qaeda and militancy in Pakistan, but not much work done on the recruitment tactics. This research paper investigates that what kind of recruitment tactics were used by Al Qaeda in its propaganda for turning the Pakistani youth into militancy. Through a discourse analysis of the data from the primary sources of Pakistani militant groups like their official magazines, speeches and interviews of their leadership and the books written by them, the thesis analyzes what arguments and strategies are used by them for militant recruitment.

The following three questions are answered through this research:

1. What religious arguments does Al Qaeda use for convincing Pakistani youth to wage a war against their own state?
2. What grievances of the Pakistani people does Al Qaeda bring forward in order to get Pakistani youth into their war against the state?
3. What hopes does Al Qaeda promise for recruiting Pakistani youth to the path of militancy?

As discussed in detail in the previous pages scholars have discussed the problem of the rise of militancy in the Muslim youth after 9/11 in different countries of the Muslim world and from different perspectives but nothing from recruitment aspect. This research has its own uniqueness that it investigates this problem in the case study of Pakistan with the focus on Al Qaeda that how the later recruited Pakistani youth for the fight against the Pakistani state. The uniqueness of this research is that this paper is going to conduct this research through discourse analysis of the publications from the media wings of Al Qaeda and other Al Qaeda inspired Pakistani militants’ organizations that with what recruitment tactics they recruited Pakistani youth.

There is quite a lot of data available online in this regard. The militant groups in Pakistan widely use internet and they are well active in the media. They have their own publications which are published both online and in printed form in Urdu and Pashto languages. It includes online books, monthly magazines and videos released from the official media wings of these militant outfits which contain the biographies, articles, interviews of such detracted youth. The online available data of these militant groups is a source for understanding the various tactics employed by these fundamentalists’ militant organizations for inciting Pakistani youth to the path of violence and militancy. The researcher of this paper has excellent command of Urdu and Pashto languages and will use his language skills to analyze those sources of data to get answer for the research problem of this paper.

### 1.4 Theoretical and methodological considerations

The theoretical framework of this paper is based on theories of power for understanding the recruitment of youth into the ranks of militants. For this reason, two well-known theories of power are selected, which are *Soft Power Theory* by Josef Nye and Steven´s Luke theory, *three faces of power*. Josef Nye theory of Soft Power brought revolutions in the discussion of powers in the world after 1990 when it was presented first time (Nye, 1990; Coutu, 2008:56-58). By soft power Nye means that one can make
others to do things which they would not otherwise do by attraction through charisma, vision, ideology etc. (Coutu, 2008:56-58). Nye believes that terrorists like Osama Bin Laden have more successfully used this aspect of power for attracting manpower to their mission and getting support of masses (Ibid. 2008:56-58).

In *Power: A Radical View*, Lukes has presented three views about power which he termed as One-dimensional view of power, two-dimensional view of power and three-dimensional view of power (Lukes, 2005:15). All these three views of power are based on this fact that in power relations between individuals A and B, A has some sort of effects on B (Ibid, 2005:30). These three views of power are discussed in detail in the theoretical chapter of this paper. The three-dimensional view of Luke’s theory which describes the power relations in humans on the basis of religion, ideology, media and mind control would be used in this paper (Lukes, 2005: 27; Plaw, 2007: 490).

The methodological framework of this research paper is based on qualitative methods and desk study. The selection of a qualitative desk study is the suitable choice for this research paper due to the employed methodological tools, which are *discourse analysis* and *case study*. A *discourse analysis* of the official propaganda publications released from the media wings of Pakistani militant organizations will be conducted to understand their tactics for inciting youth to violence. *Discourse analysis* is an interpretative and constructive type of analysis that is used for understanding types of communications that has meaning for the social world (Bryman, 2012:528, Halperin, 2012:310). It is *interpretive and constructivist* in the sense respectively that it explains how people act due to beliefs, values or ideology which gives meaning to their actions and it also explains that these meanings have social and discursive foundations (Halperin, 2012:310-311). *Discourse analysis* takes different forms and it is *critical discourse analysis* that will be used in this paper. *Critical discourse analysis* is of more importance for the analysis of this research topic on the basis that it tries to uncover the linkages between language, power and ideology. Moreover, it relies on a theoretical base to analyze data concerning how discourses give strength to a group in society (ibid, 2012:313). This is also relevant to the objective of this research paper, which is to uncover the reasons behind the spreading of militant ideologies in Muslim societies.
Pakistan is selected as a case study for the critical discourse analysis of the research problem of this paper. Creswell defines *case study* as to investigate deeply a program, event, activity, process one or more individuals etc. and Bryman says that the most ordinary purpose of *case study* is to study cases with locations (Creswell, 2009:15; Bryman, 2012:67). Cases are usually selected of a certain time period and due to a special activity (Creswell, 2009:15).

The above two mentioned theories would be used through an abductive mode for analysis in this research paper. *Abduction* is defined by Danemark as the one in which a phenomenon or a factual/real development is linked to a theory that gives us a new explanation about that development or phenomenon (Danemark, 2012:91). Abduction is the redefining and re-explanation of a phenomenon or development with a new insight to it (ibid, 2012:89).

### 1.5 Ethical Considerations:

This study is a desk study based on Critical Discourse Analysis of the documents, so there is not any problem of ethical considerations when it comes to interviewees or other persons involved in this research. However, as the author belongs to the same region, it is quite important for him to take care of safety in order to remain safe from getting into the “Hit-book” of these militants described in this research, although it is just a research work without criticizing any actor of this conflict, which even though can be considered by the militants as a work against them.

### 1.6 Disposition:

The next chapter is about the background understanding of the role of Al Qaeda in the rise of militancy in the Muslim world which is then going into a discussion specifically about this problem in the case study of Pakistan. The third chapter consists of about the theories that are used as lenses for explanation of this research. The afterward chapter to this tells reader about the adopted methodological framework of the thesis and about the sources which are used in this research. The fifth chapter consists of the collected
findings from the sources while the sixth chapter is based on the analysis of those findings. The conclusion is presented in the last chapter.
2.0 Background Chapter

This chapter gives insight to the reader about the role of Al Qaeda in the rise of militancy in the Muslim youth and also about the background of the problem of militancy in Pakistan.

2.1 Militancy in the Muslims and role of Al Qaeda

The rise of militancy leading to terrorism became a trend in the Muslim youth after the end of Afghan Jihad in the late eighties when most of the Muslim fighters belonging to different parts of the world, united under the platform of Al Qaeda. Most of these youth were influenced by the vision of Islamic ideologues like Dr Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, who was the founder of Al Qaeda. All of the Jihadi, from Osama Bin Laden to Abu Musab Zarqawi and Abu Bakr Baghdadhi, are inspired by the ideology of Azzam. The teachings of Azzam emphasize the use of power and violence for the defense and promotion of Muslim interests in the world. (Atwan, 2013; Lia, 2007; Shahzad, 2010b)

The success of Islamic warriors (Mujahedeen) in Afghanistan was the driving force for them to start the struggle for overthrowing the regimes in their native countries as well. Aim of these veterans of Afghan Jihad was to establish Islamic governments in their countries for making way to the creation of Khilafat. They considered it as the only solution for the Muslims problems in the world like that of Israel-Palestine issue, removing supremacy of the West over the Muslims, removal of the dictatorship regimes in their countries which they think as a source of all of the miseries of the Muslims. They spread to different parts of the world and participated in the conflicts of that time like Algeria, Chechnya, Bosnia, Kashmir, Somalia etc. These conflicts provided more space and strength to the spreading of the militancy ideology in the Muslims. (Shahzad, 2010b; Atwan, 2013)

The successful terrorists attacks of Al Qaeda against the American interests like that of Kenya and Tanzania, USS Cole and eventually 9/11 attacks made possible the efforts of Al Qaeda for getting these militants and Muslim youth into its organization. For example, Kahlid Shaikh Muhammad, the mastermind of 9/11 attacks, joined Al Qaeda after the first two attacks while Abu Musab Zarqawi (founder of Al Qaeda in Iraq which
has now became ISIS) became part of Al Qaeda after 9/11. Most of the Muslim militants officially joined the ranks of Al Qaeda after 9/11. Al Qaeda provided support and ideology to the militant groups which assisted in spreading the wave of militancy to different parts of the world after 9/11. Now Al Qaeda has networks of its franchises, affiliates and likeminded militants groups in most parts of the world waging a war against both the Muslim rulers and the Western interests specially targeting USA. Al Qaeda also attracted the militant groups in Pakistan and through them recruited the Pakistani youth for its mission. As a result the country became the base of the central leadership of Al Qaeda, accelerating and managing its network of franchises and other connected groups spread in the world from here. Pakistani people, mostly youth, were recruited in large number by Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda was in more need of manpower and local support from Pakistan for shelter and logistical support for its central organization. Similarly, Al Qaeda also started a war theater in Pakistan against the Pakistani state and Western interests due to the ongoing war on terror against them. (Shahzad, 2010b; Atwan, 2013; Leah, 2015)

2.2 The problem of militancy in Pakistan

Militancy in Pakistan against the state in the name of religion started with the US attacks against Afghanistan. These attacks were the first leg of Global War on Terror (GWoT) which were aimed to dismantle Al Qaeda and all other terrorist groups possessing threat to the west and also to remove the Taliban regime who were sheltering these groups (Kalthenthaler & Miller, 2015:940; Estes & Sirgy, 2013:616). It is important to know first about the origins of Pakistani militant and sectarian groups for understanding the rise of militancy in Pakistan.

2.2.1 Pakistani militant and sectarian groups

There are a number of militant and sectarian groups active in Pakistan from a long time. Militants are supported by the Pakistani state from the day of its creation for protecting the state interests in the region, important of which is its dispute with India over Kashmir issue and for having a friendly government in Kabul (Fair, 2008:93-94). These Pakistani militants had their training camps in Afghanistan where they were hosted by the Taliban
government, which had cordial relations with the Pakistani establishment (Riaz & Shah, 2013:100). As a result, the friendship of these Pakistani militants became stronger with Al Qaeda and the Arab and non-Arab militants sheltering in Afghanistan, which they had from the *Jihad* against USSR (Shahzad, 2010b:199-215).

Sectarian terrorism is also an important aspect of militancy inside Pakistan from the late eighties. Most of these sectarian militants were also “Afghanistan- trained fighters” which organized a sectarian terrorist group known as *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi* (LeJ) and were killing people from opposite Shia sect. LeJ was a splinter group of *Sipahi Sahaba Pakistan* (SSP) which was founded in 1986 during the Zia regime as a result of the increasing influence of Shia Muslims inside the country after the 1979 Iranian revolution. LeJ provided the most dreadful commanders and skilled militants to Al Qaeda and TTP like Amjad Farooqi, Qari Hussain, Tariq Afridi, Qari Zafar etc. (Shahzad, 2010b:09,11; Hashmi & Majeed, 2014:113)

### 2.2.2 The influence of Al Qaeda over Pakistani militants after 9/11

The members and leaders of Al Qaeda and all other terrorists groups crossed borders to Pakistan from Afghanistan after the fall of Taliban regime. They took shelter inside the cities and tribal regions of the country. During this time, Al Qaeda convinced, influenced and motivated the Pakistani militants for starting a war against their own state (Hussain, 2010:32-33; Byman, 2015:129; Shahzad, 2010:27-29). The aim of Al Qaeda by it was to put pressure on Pakistani state to withdraw its support from the war on terror and secondly target western interests inside the country (Shahzad, 2010:27). Moreover, Al Qaeda needed local Pakistani militants for logistic support, for creating its base camps in the tribal region and for a longer shelter in the country (Byman, 2015:129).

Al Qaeda succeeded to a large extent in these efforts. Al Qaeda accelerated the war theater against the Pakistani state after the July 2007 incident of Red Mosque in Islamabad. The anger of religiously devoted people in Pakistan rose to extreme when a pro- Al Qaeda clerk was killed with dozens of his supporters in Red Mosque incident and other hundreds of his male and female students supporters were arrested by the security forces. It recruited a great number of experienced skilled militants from these state
sponsored Pakistani groups and organized them in an umbrella like organization, known as TTP (Tihreek Taliban Pakistan). Similarly, Al Qaeda also inspired and recruited a large number of highly educated youth from the religious political parties of Pakistan and their student wings. Most of them become part of Al Qaeda, even rose to the central council of Al Qaeda and became their top ranking leadership, like Dr Arshad Waheed and Ustad Ahmad Farooq etc. (Roggio, 2016; Shahzad, 2010).
3.0 Theoretical Framework

This chapter of the thesis discusses the theoretical framework which is adopted for this research.

According to Coutu (Coutu, 2008:56), the ability of one to make another to do something which he would not otherwise do is called power. The topic of this paper is also based on the study of a form of power relations in the human beings, which is recruitment tactics of militant groups and how they make youth to join their path of violence. Therefore, this paper investigates the recruitment strategies of the militant groups that what attractive words and strategies do they use for getting youth into their ranks.

The theoretical framework of this paper is based on two theoretical perspectives on power, which are Josef Nye’s Soft Power and Steven Lukes’s three faces of Power. These both theories are briefly described in the following parts and are also explained that how these two would be used as analytical tools for this research.

3.1 Josef Nye’s Soft Power theory

According to the definition of Power, the ability to make others to do something that they would otherwise not do, Nye categorizes power into three types. He says that this ability can be achieved by three ways; coercion (sticks), payments (carrots) and attraction (soft power) (Nye, 2006). His theory of Soft Power revolutionized the discussions about power and got a prominent place (Coutu, 2008:56-58). The theory of Soft Power was first presented by Josef Nye in 1990 (Nye, 1990).

In his first paper on Soft Power, the theory was explained much from the nation’s perspectives but the scholar says that soft power is more humane than other powers. Nye describes charisma, vision and communication as prime arts of soft power for individuals. For nations, according to him, it lays in their culture, value and policies. (Coutu, 2008:56; Nye, 1990)

Nye terms the rise of Islamic militancy to the concept of soft power. He believes that Islamic militant leaders like Osama Bin Laden get manpower and recruits people into their ranks due to their ability of attraction. He says that soft power attracts youth to the ranks of terrorists and considers religion and ideology as sources of attraction for this
purpose. Nye, like Al Qaeda leaders (Al-Waliki, 2008), also terms the war on terror as the battle of hearts and minds of the Muslim nation, due to the concept of soft power. Nye believes that the ability of Soft Power is more used by the “evil people” like terrorists for attracting youth to their ranks and he presents often examples of Bin Laden in this regard (Coutu, 2008:56-58).

3.2 **Steven Lukes: Three Faces of Power**

In 1974, Steven Lukes presented his analysis about the concept of power known as the “Three-Dimensional approach to Power”. It became the popular source of understanding about power in the social sciences (Plaw, 2007:489). Lukes presented his views in a small and clearly written book entitled *Power: A Radical View* in 1974 and presented a revised edition of his book after thirty years in 2005 with some new explanation about his three concepts of power. Lukes has pointed to the shortcomings of his earlier concepts of power in the second edition of his book (Morriss, 2006:124).

Lukes three views of power are based on the concept that in the relations between A and B, A has some sorts of effects on B (Lukes, 2005:30). All three views have separate explanation about the nature and dimensions of such effects. In the following, each of Steven Lukes’ concepts about power is explained briefly.

The first concept of Lukes about power is based upon the analysis of the pluralists’ view of power in the sixty decades of American Political Science (Plaw, 2007:490). Lukes terms it as a “One Dimensional View of Power”. He has defined it in the words of Dahl, whose work he has discussed widely in the explanation of his first view about power. Dahl says that “A has Power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do”. Lukes writes that Dahl’s further explanation about this power relation is also related to the triumphant strive by A leading B to do something which he would not otherwise do (Lukes, 2005:15-16). This concept is more about the power relations due to decision makings etc. According to Lukes, this concept of power is related to a focal point on behavior in the formation of decisions on issues which have a visible disagreement of interests (Lukes, 2005:17-19).

Lukes second concept of power, which he terms as Two Dimensional View of Power, is based on the analysis of the critiques of the pluralists’ view of power (Lukes, 2005:15).
Lukes says that it is related to both *decision-making* and *nondecision-making* dimensions of power relations, is better than the first dimension and is exercised more than that. (Plaw, 2007:490; Lukes, 2005:22,25). This concept of power is exercised through making hurdles which keep away B from doing anything which could be harmful to A. In this way, A affects the interests of B by preventing B from doing something which could be harmful to A (Lukes, 2005:20; Plaw, 2007:490).

Steven Lukes considers his first two concepts of power as unsatisfactory for the explanation of power relations therefore put forwards a third concept of power as well. This third concept of Lukes about power, unlike the other two, does not discuss power relations from *behavioral focus* and is commonly known as the *Three Dimensional View of Power*. Instead, it explains the power relations in humans on the basis of mind control through domination of information, through mass media or through the process of socialization (Lukes, 2005:25,27). According to Lukes, it is defined as A can also use power over B by “influencing, shaping or determining his every wants”. It is actually to getting consent or obedience of someone by controlling his wishes and views (Lukes, 2005:27).

### 3.3 Application of the above two theories in this research

As the objective of this research is to understand the recruitment tactics of the militant groups to get youth into their ranks in the case study of Pakistan, these two theoretical lenses are used to understand what strategies are employed by these militants for recruiting youth into their ranks. From Lukes three-dimensional view and Nye’s Soft Power theoretical perspectives, the research questions of this paper could be operationalized into the following two independent variables:

i. **Religious aspect:** As discussed above that Luke’s defines the power relations in the human beings on the basis of “mind control”, so in this paper it is researched that how militants use religion for shaping and determining the wishes of Pakistani youth, for getting their obedience and subsequently recruiting them to militancy.
ii. **Feelings:** The Soft Power theory of Nye says that militants recruit youth into their ranks presenting to them some attractions, for example, on the basis of religion or ideology. In this research, it is studied that what feelings are tooled as a source of attraction for Pakistani youth by the militants for recruiting them into the path of militancy.
4.0 Methodological framework

This chapter of the paper discusses the adopted methodological framework and the details about the materials which are selected for this research. This is a desk study research using qualitative analytical methods for the research of this paper. The methodological tools of this research are based on the discourse analysis and case study approach. Pakistan is selected as a case study for an in-depth understanding of the rise of militancy in the Muslim countries after the launch of the global war on terror. In this case study, the publications of the militant groups are analyzed through discourse analysis method that what kinds of arguments are tooled by these militants for catching youth to their mission. The researcher of this paper has chosen to do an analytical study of the primary sources from the Pakistani militant groups for getting answer to the research questions of this paper.

4.1 Methodological tools

4.1.1 Case Study

Case studies are defined as to investigate deeply a program, event, activity, process one or more individuals etc (Creswell, 2009:15). The most ordinary purpose of case study is to study cases with locations (Bryman, 2012:67).

Case study is aimed for an in-depth understanding of cases that can be ranging from a certain dilemma, to the study of an individual, organization, country etc. Case studies are considered more favorable for qualitative studies like that of this paper (Bryman, 2012:12, 66-68). Case studies are usually chosen of a specific time period and for a specific activity (Creswell, 2009:15). The Pakistani case study is to analyze dilemma of the rise of militancy in Muslim youth in Pakistan after the launch of the global war on terror. The results from this case study would then contribute to the understanding of the overall problem of the rise of militancy in the Muslim youth in the world, both in the Muslim populated countries and Muslim Diasporas.

The importance of selection of Pakistan as a case study for this paper is logical from the following arguments. Pakistan is selected as a case study due to the fact that Al Qaeda
has special connections to the land of Pakistan and Al Qaeda had the prime role in spreading of militancy in the Muslim youth. Due to its immense role in the rise of militancy in the Muslim world, Al Qaeda is often regarded as the nursery of the global Muslim militants (Atwan, 2006: 219). Al Qaeda was founded in Peshawar, the capital of the North Western province of Pakistan, at the end of Afghan Jihad against the USSR in 1988 (Byman, 2015:129; Atwan, 2006: 74). Due to the lack of connections of Afghanistan to the world, Pakistan was a gateway for the leaders and members of Al Qaeda for going out and in to Afghanistan. It had its safe houses for these activities in the country and most of its leaders and members were living in Pakistan even before its creation (Byman, 2015:129).

During this period, Al Qaeda created relationships with Pakistani religious and militant organizations which became stronger and stronger as the Al Qaeda getting more prominence with time (Fair, 2010:495-497). Top leaders of Al Qaeda like Abu Zubayda and Khalid Shaikh Muhammad were spending most of their time in Pakistan for taking forward the business of their organization (Grenier, 2016:29-30; Fair, 2010:495-496). In short, Pakistan was another safe haven for Al Qaeda like Afghanistan but in Pakistan they were operating secretly (Byman, 2015:129). Similarly, the leaders of strong Islamic militant groups in the world like Abu Zubayr Al-Mukhtar: the overall leader of Al-Shabab in Somalia, Abu Musab Zarqawi: the founder of Al Qaeda in Iraq which later on transformed into ISIS, Commander Khattab: the founder of Islamic militancy in Chechnya and almost founders or leaders of all Islamic militant organizations of the current world have connections to the land of Pakistan (Khan, 2006; Cruickshank, 2013).

Pakistan became the operational base and launching pad of Al Qaeda and other global Islamic militants when hundreds of them and their leaders moved to the country from Afghanistan with the US invasion (Shahzad, 2010b). It also got victim of Al Qaeda when it became ally of US in the war against terror. After which militancy in the name of “Islam” has risen to the high levels in the country. Due to which Pakistan has faced serious threats to its peace, security and development during this period (Fair, 2008).

So the case study of Pakistan and the Al Qaeda connections would be quite interesting and advantageous for understanding the rise of militancy in the country and for the overall spreading of militancy in the Muslim youth in the world.
4.1.2 Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis is a qualitative approach for data collection and analysis in research processes that is more appropriate to desk studies. It highlights the manners through which discourses provide justifications and explanations to social actions and institutions. A discourse comprises of the combination of ideas, concepts and categories that create and recreates explanations in specific historical circumstances. The constituents of a discourse can be highlighted by analyzing the language, semiotics and practices present in different form of written, oral and visual texts. Discourse analysis not only analyses the texts but also the connections of text to its framework and further to the wider power interconnections that form that framework. (Halperin, 2012:309-310)

Discourse analyses have both interpretive and constructivist approaches. It tells that people react on the roots of beliefs, values or ideology which provide justification to their reactions (interpretive approach) and also further says that these justifications are socially and discursively shaped (constructivist approach) (Halperin, 2012:310-311).

Critical discourse analysis (CDA), the form of discourse analysis used in this study, looks for interconnections between language, power and ideology (Halperin, 2012:313).

The methodological framework of this paper is also based on the similar pattern to analyze the language of the arguments presented by Al Qaeda for adhering Pakistani militants to its agenda on the basis of power of ideology. Similarly, then the arguments of these Al Qaeda inspired Pakistani militants would also be analyzed that how they recruits ordinary Pakistani youth to their ranks.

In this study discourse analysis is done in two steps according to the background of the rise of militancy in Pakistan. First the speeches and documents of Al Qaeda leadership are studied that what attractive arguments used to convince Pakistani militants to join their agenda of war in Pakistan. In the second step, the strategies of these Al Qaeda inspired militant groups are analyzed in terms of the images of revenge they were portraying to the religious inclined youth of Pakistan who were grieve by the state policies after 9/11. Similarly, it would also be traced that what pictures of hopes are regularly presented by these militants in their publications to the youth belonging to the sectarian and religious political parties.
4.2 Sources

Data for this research is mostly selected from primary sources. The militant groups in Pakistan are active in the media. They have their own websites, blogs, pages and social media accounts where they publish their documents, books, magazines and audio/video materials etc. These huge amounts of data from militants are mostly available in Urdu language but are also issued in Pashto and English languages as well.

All issues of the official magazines of Al Qaeda in Pakistan, *Hitten* [A famous historical battleground of Middle Ages of Islam] and *Ihyae Khilafat* [Revival of Khilafat] of TTP is also researched. Likewise, there are also some books written on the top leaders and ideologues of Al Qaeda on *Jihad* in Pakistan, which try to legitimate on religious bases for revolt against the state. Noteworthy of them are *Speedai Sahar aur Timtimata Chiragh* (Rising morning and fading lights) by Dr Ayman Zawahiri and *Shamshiri Bi-niyam* (Sword without sheath) by Sheikh Abu Yahya Al-libi. Zawahiri is the current overall leader of Al Qaeda after the demise of Bin Laden while Al-Libi was the top ideologue and number two of Al Qaeda who was killed in the US drone strike in the tribal region of Pakistan in June 2012 (Roggio, 2012).

Along with these two sources, the following interviews and speeches directed at the Pakistani population of the top Al Qaeda leadership and ideologues and of other prominent Pakistani militant leaders released by As-Sahab, the media wing of Al Qaeda, are also quite important for answering the research questions of this paper:

4.2.1 Speeches:

2. “Shariat or Martyrdom.” by Osama Bin Laden
3. “A Message to the Pakistan Army and the People of Pakistan” – Ayman Al-Zawahiri
4. Message against the Crusaders attack of Pervez Musharaf on Red Mosque” by Ayman Al-Zawahiri.
5. “Message to the Pakistani Amy and People” by Ayman Al-Zawahiri.
6. “Is it that same Pakistan?.” – Mustafa Abu Yazeed.
7. “Knight of the martyrs: Dedicated to the martyrs and fighters of Red Mosque” by Shaikh Abu Yahya Al-Libi.

4.2.2 Interviews:
8. “Why Jihad in Pakistan” – a two parts detailed interview of Ustad Farooq Ahmad about necessity and legitimacy of fight against the Pakistani state.
9. Mullah Nazir Ahmad interview with As-Sahab.
10. Abu Yahya interview with Hitteen magazine. (two parts)
11. Ustad Fateh interview with As-Sahab.
13. Mulana Wali Ur Rehman Mehsud interview with As-Sahab.

Most of these speeches and interviews are originally in the audio and video formats which are then issued in the printed form by the As-Sahab. I have watched and listened to the original audio and video formats as well for more precise understandings of these data which are easily accessible from different YouTube channels.

Along with the above mentioned data, I have also studied some sixty issues of Nawai Afghan Jihad [NAJ or Voice of Afghan Jihad] magazine which is another monthly published official magazine of Al Qaeda in Urdu language. In addition to this, I have also studied some other documents for better understanding of this issue and Pakistani case, including the letters of Bin Laden released by the US authorities which they have recovered during the 2nd May 2011 Abbottabad raid in Pakistan during which Bin Laden was killed. All these additional sources which I have studied but could not use them directly in this research are mentioned in the appendix part at the end.

4.2.3 Personalities

The introduction of the above mentioned personalities would be helpful in understanding the importance of these sources which are focused for the research of this paper.

Ayman Al-Zawahiri is considered the brain behind Al Qaeda and the current overall leader of the organization after Osama Bin Laden. Mustafa Abu Yazeed was the number three top Al Qaeda leader after Bin Laden and Zawahiri who was the overall in charge of
Al Qaeda for Khurasan region including Pakistan and Afghanistan. In other words, he was the direct in charge of Al Qaeda war theater of Pakistan. Abu Yahya Al-Libi was one of the top Jihadi ideologue of the current world who became number two top Al Qaeda leader after the death of Bin Laden.

Ustad Farooq Ahmad is a very important name in the militant leadership and ideologues of Pakistan who have a large inspiration on the Pakistani youth. Ahmad was the in charge of Al Qaeda recruitment and its media wing for Pakistan.

Hakimullah Mehsud was the overall leader of Pakistani militant group known as Tihreek Taliban Pakistan or TTP (The movement of Taliban in Pakistan). Actually, TTP is an umbrella like organization including all Islamic militant groups who are fighting against the Pakistani state or involved in any kind of militancy inside the country.

Wali Ur Rehman Mehsud and Mullah Nazir Ahmad were the Deputies overall leader of TTP both had strong connections with Al Qaeda. These both had their own stronger group of militants which were part of TTP. Ustad Fateh is the top military commander of TTP.

4.3 Limitations and Delimitations

There is not any specific limitation in my opinion regarding this research so far. Delimitations in this research are that I have delimited this study of the rise of militancy in Muslim countries to the case study of Pakistan for the reasons that I have discussed above in the methodological considerations. Moreover, the Pakistani case is itself delimited to the problem of militancy in the country after 9/11 incidents when Pakistan became part of the global war on terror.

Similarly, the rise of militancy in the Muslim is only limited to the Sunni militant groups. Sunni makes more than 2/3 majority of the Muslims. Taliban, Al Qaeda, ISIS and all similar militant and terrorists groups which have caused a threat to the west and to the governments of their countries, all belong to the Sunni sect of Islam. Militancy is also active in the Shia sect but they do not constitute any such a threat to the West. Hezbollah
a Shia militant group is a well-known example of it. They are mostly involved in conflict with the Sunni for getting power, like in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Lebanon.
5. Findings Chapter

In this chapter the findings regarding recruitment strategies used by Al Qaeda and Al Qaeda inspired Pakistani militant groups for inviting Pakistani youth to the path of militancy are presented. These findings are divided into the following three main different categories which are majorly repeated in the publications of the above mentioned Pakistani militants groups:

1. Religious arguments.
2. Grievances of the Pakistani Muslims.
3. Promises used to recruit Pakistani youth into militant ranks

5.1 Religious arguments to convince Pakistani youth to join militant groups

The speeches and writings of the leaders and ideologues of the Pakistani militants are mostly focused on explaining different religious arguments for justifying the war against the Pakistani state to convince Pakistani youth to join their path. These arguments are discussed in details in the following:

The strongest religious arguments used by Pakistani militants are:

- Defence of the Muslim lands as the most important duty of every Muslim,
- Elimination of the corrupt apostate rulers
- Implementation of Sharia law system.

- Defense of the Muslim lands as the most important duty of every Muslim

This argument is widely used by the leaders and ideologues of Al Qaeda for convincing the Muslim youth of the world for inciting them to the path of militancy. It can be summarized as that it becomes the most important religious duty of every Muslim to liberate the Muslim land from the occupation of nonbelievers (Azzam, 1984; Zawahiri, 2008a:22)

Dr Abdullah Azzam was the founder of Al Qaeda and mentor of Bin Laden who is
considered the “godfather” of Islamic militants and widely followed by them. He was the first one who presented it in the form of theory in the beginning of 1980s (Azzam, 1984) for recruiting Muslim youth to the Afghan jihad against the Russians. After that it is been using in the Muslim world by the militant leaders and ideologues as the most convincing argument for youth recruitment. The Al Qaeda leaders have also used it widely for convincing Pakistani youth to join the path of militancy.

As Ustad Farooq Ahmad says: “Expulsion of nonbeliever invaders from Islamic lands is a compulsory duty of every Muslim even if they occupy a very small piece of land” (Farooq: 2010b:05, Khurasani: 2007:25). Ayman Zawahiri and Mullah Nazir Ahmad further takes direct this argument to Pakistani youth in the following words: “I urge Pakistani youth to fight against the crusaders invasion of Afghanistan and their supporters both in Pakistan and Afghanistan” (Zawahiri, 2008a:22; Ahmad, 2009:18).

Abu Yahya Al-Libi further adds to this argument in a message to Pakistani youth by saying that “It is double responsibility of Pakistani youth to become part of this fight as they are the close neighbors of Afghanistan and secondly the support of their rulers made possible the US invasion of Afghanistan” (Al-Libi, 2010:113).

- **Fighting apostate rulers is ordered from God**

Another strong argument presented by militant leaders in their messages to Pakistani youth for recruiting them to their path of militancy is the command from Allah (God) to believers to fight the apostate rulers.

Bin Laden in one his audio message to the Pakistani people define the apostate rulers as those who help nonbelievers in their fight against the Muslims (Bin Laden, 2009:09). Al Qaeda leaders terms the Pakistani support for the US in the war on terror and the military operations by the security forces against the militants in the country as the acts which according to them make Pakistani rulers apostates (Farooq, 2010a:35; Bin Laden, 2009:10; Al-Libi, 2010:64). Similarly, they terms the Red Mosque incident as a sign of hatred of Pakistani rulers against Islam and says that hating Islam is the highest level of apostasy which excludes a believer from the boundaries of Islam and therefore ask the
Pakistani youth to fight against the Pakistani security forces (Bin Laden, 2007:03; Al-Libi, 2010:53, 57).

To further strengthen this argument and make it more easily understandable for the Pakistani youth, Farooq and Bin Laden have given examples of the Afghan army soldiers at the time of USSR occupation of Afghanistan. They say that the soldiers of that Afghan army were also Muslims but when they supported the USSR invasion against the country so the Islamic scholars of the world including Pakistan issued religious verdicts against them of being apostates and ordered to fight and kill them. (Bin Laden, 2007:07; Farooq, 2010a:07). In the light of this argument Bin Laden emphasizes on the Pakistani youth that there should be no reluctance for them in the fight against the Pakistani rulers (Bin Laden, 2007:08, 10).

- Implementation of Sharia system

Using the Quranic references militant leaders in their message’s to the Pakistani people always seem to clarify that whoever implement any other system except than Sharia is infidel and enemy of Islam with whom fighting is ordained from Allah. Zawahiri’s book *Speedai Sahar aur Timtimata Chiragh* (Rising morning and fading lights) and Al-Libi’s *Shamshiri Bi-niyam* (Sword without sheath) is mainly explaining this argument for legitimacy of fight against the Pakistani state. The authors in these books like all other militant leaders and ideologues explain this point that Pakistan has a system opposite to Sharia law which is man-made law (democracy system). According to the orders of Quran anyone following any other system of law than sharia is infidel and fighting him is ordained from Allah (Zahairi, 2009; Al-Libi, 2010). The following quotations of Abu Yazeed also clarify these points:

“Pakistan was established 60 years ago for the implementation of Sharia law in the country but instead it has now a democratic system which is against Islam. The government system of Pakistan is not only against Sharia but it is a system supporting oppressors, corrupts and looters” (Abu Yazeed, 2009:09).

5.2 Grievances of the Pakistani Muslims
Al Qaeda and other Pakistani militant leaders seem using more energy in their recruitment techniques for getting Pakistani youth into their ranks by discussing the grievances of the Pakistani Muslims. In this section of the paper all these important grievances are discussed which are mentioned in the data from militant sources.

- **Offenses of Pakistani regime against the Islamists**

As Bin Laden and Al-Libi address Pakistani Muslims: “The rulers and army of Pakistan are responsible for all the destructions of the country that are always in the frontline of genocides of the Muslims in the whole world, so it is your duty to stand against these oppressors” (Bin Laden, 2009:14). “This army has killed thousands Muslims for crusaders in Somalia, Pakistan and Afghanistan” (Al-Libi, 2009a:117).

The top of these grievances which militant leaders use in their recruitment messages for the Muslim youth of Pakistan is the military operations and other offenses of the state against the Islamists inside the country. The most important of these operations are the operations in the tribal regions and the Red Mosque incident of Islamabad.

The Red Mosque incident took place in 2007 when the Pakistani military besieged the famous Red Mosque and adjacent female students’ seminary to it. They killed their leader Abdul Rasheed Ghazi along with dozens of his male and female student and arrested hundreds others. Ghazi was considered as pro Al Qaeda leader who was struggling for the implementation of Sharia in the country. Al Qaeda has used this incident greatly for cashing the grievances of Pakistani Islamists and inciting them into the path of militancy.

As Zawahiri and Al-Libi say in their messages, “Red Mosque has disclosed the anti-Islamic face of the Pakistani army. The ideology of Pakistan has got buried under the debris of Red Mosque and the purpose of the creation of Pakistan is buried down under the dead bodies of the students of the Red Mosque” (Zawahiri, 2008a:09). “The atrocities committed by the Pakistani security forces against the Red Mosque in Islamabad can only be cleaned with the blood of the culprits of the Red Mosque. If you do not take arms against them now, it will end at the disappearance of Pakistan from the world” (Zawahiri, 2007:26). “These martyrs (Red Mosque martyrs) challenged all the tyrants that Pakistan
was not liberated from the cow-worshippers (Hindus) to be enslaved by the misguided rulers, the rulers who are worse than animals” (Al-Libi, 2007:7-8).

Fateh and Ahmad connects the rise of the Pakistani militants in the country to the revenge of Red Mosque incident, “We started our war against the Pakistani state after the killings of innocent male and females students in the Red Mosque incident in Islamabad” (Fateh, 2009:08). “We will take revenge of the Red Mosque killings from the Pakistani government where they killed hundreds of male and female students” (Ahmad, 2009:20).

Like the Red Mosque incident, the collateral damage done in the Pakistani state military operations in the tribal regions against the Islamists after 9/11 is also another grievance whom the militant leaders often use for the recruitment of youth, as Ahmad, Mehsud and Zawahiri say about it, “(We) Pakistani Taliban provided shelter and protection to the immigrant mujahedeen, fought against the US forces in Afghanistan and now fighting against the Pakistani forces as the later attacked the tribal people on the orders from the USA” (Mehsud, 2009:03). “We did not want to start a war in Pakistan but it was the Pakistani state which pushed us to the war in the country by killing our comrades and targeting our military camps in the tribal regions” (Ahmad, 2009:05). “These rulers even killed hundreds of own Pakistani men, women and children and destroyed mosques for USA, in order to get more money from the White House” (Zawahiri, 2008a:05). So in the context Shaikh Hafiz Saeed also known as Mustafa Abu Yazeed asks Pakistani youth, “I ask Pakistani militants, if Jihad is obligatory in Kashmir and Afghanistan, so then why it is not obligatory here in Pakistan as well? Why we do not come to help our oppressed Pakistani brothers?” (Saeed, 2009:53).

Farooq gives last warning of fear to the youth for joining militancy, “If someone can not realize the seriousness of the situation in Pakistan today and do not wage Jihad against the rulers, so he can never do it” (Farooq, 2010a:43).

- **Pakistani regime crimes against the Islamists in the War on terror**

*Pakistani state is the top ally of the Crusade mission of USA in the region.*

(Abu Yazeed, 2009:12)

The militant leaders also regularly criticize the Pakistani support in the war on terror and have used it for inciting the Muslim youth of Pakistan for joining their path. They term
the war on terrors as the war against Islam: “The War on Terror started by the US president Bush is actually against the war against Islam” (Al-Libi, 2009b:94). “USA itself admits that the role of Pakistan in the War on terror is not negligible. Actually the existence of USA in Afghanistan is dependent on the support from Pakistan. Pakistan has become an inseparable part of USA in these crusades against Islam, so there is no difference in fighting in Afghanistan or Pakistan” (Al-Libi, 2009a:108).

The following different crimes of the Pakistani regime due to its support in the war on terror are mostly mentioned by the militant leaders in their messages:

**Arrests and killings of fellow Muslims on the orders of US is Betrayal with Islam and ideology of Pakistan**

Al Qaeda leaders like bin Laden, Zawahiri and Abu Yazeed accuse Pakistan for the killing and arrests of Muslims in the country after 9/11 on the US orders and call it betrayal against Islam and ideology of Pakistan: “The rulers of Pakistan are using Pakistani army against the Muslim for the appeasement of the White House which is betrayal with Islam. The only revenge for these crimes is Jihad against them” (Bin Laden, 2009:13-14). “Pakistan killed thousands of its own Muslims, their neighbors and supporters in the war on terror” (Zawahiri, 2008a:08).

A Pakistani militant ideologue, Yousafi, who regularly writes in the Hitteen magazine of Al Qaida, also writes about this betrayal: “Pakistani government, army and intelligence agencies traded their loyalty to the Americans in the global Crusades against the Muslims and arrested and killed hundreds of mujahedeen for Crusaders. They earned money from USA for this greatest betrayal with the Muslim nation” (Yousafi, 2009:101).

Due to these grievances Pakistani militant leaders say that they have taken guns against the state and term the fight against the Pakistani state as a legitimate and justified act: “We started our war in the country as a result of the stupid policies of the Pakistani rulers when they took a U turn on a single call from Bush, arrested and killed hundreds of mujahedeen and humiliated our dignity and religion” (Mehsud, 2009:07). “Fighting against the Pakistani state is obligatory as Pakistan provided support to the US in overthrowing the Islamic government in Afghanistan. Similarly, the Pakistani security
agencies arrested around 800 hundreds mujahedeen in the country and handed them to the US” (Farooq, 2010a:42).

**Pakistan is an occupied state like Afghanistan**

Due to the larger support of Pakistani support in the war on terror, the militant leaders in their speeches and messages give an impression to the Pakistani youth that their country is actually also occupied and controlled by the US. As Farooq says: “Pakistan is also occupied and invaded by the American as Afghanistan. After 911 the rulers of Pakistan opened doors of the country for the US army just through a telephone call from the White House. Now, Pakistan is like the “53rd” state of USA which we have to liberate from the US occupation. Fighting against this occupation is a religious obligation for all the Muslims of the country” (Farooq, 2010a:42).

**Pakistani rulers are acting against the ideology of Pakistan**

Pakistan was created on the ideology of Islam and the Pakistani support in the war on terrors is termed by the militants as an act against the ideology of Pakistan. Through these statements, they wanted to make Pakistani youth to become part of their war against the Pakistani state for the protection of the ideology and foundation of the country. As Abu Yazeed and Zawahiri addresses the Pakistani youth: “Pakistan was founded to provide protection for the Muslims but now Pakistani state is killing and arresting Muslims and selling them to the America. The rulers and army of Pakistan provided its support to the crusades in the killing of Muslims which is against the ideology of Pakistan” (Abu Yazeed, 2009:07, 10). “This Pakistan is not any more that country which the Muslims of Indian Subcontinent had dreamed. They had dreamed to establish a country where the Muslims would be protected but the present Pakistan has become the most important base of American crusades for fighting against the Muslims in the region” (Zawahiri, 2009:25-26). Al-Libi has also taken this point for knocking the hearts of the Pakistani youth and asks the youth to take the guns for protection the foundations of Pakistan (Al-Libi, 2007:11).

**Pakistani army kills fellow Muslims for dollars**
The militant leaders also term the role of Pakistani army as paid killers who are acting against the Islamists in the war on terror just for filling their pockets with the US dollars. They count is one of the main reason for fighting the Pakistani state and army. For example, Mehsud say about it: “Pakistani army is “rent-a-army” which kills innocent Muslims for US in the war on terror for US dollars. Pakistan arrests our Muslims sisters and hand them over to the US that is why we are fighting against them” (Mehsud, 2012:15).

_Pakistan helped thwart a Pakistan neighbored friendly regime from Kabul_

Pakistan has long border with Afghanistan in its west. The country did not feel any problems from western side in the presence of a friendly regime like Taliban in Kabul. The militant leaders also term it as an act against the Pakistani interests for removing that friendly regime from Afghanistan. This is mentioned often by all the leaders and ideologues of Al Qaeda and other Pakistani militants but here two quotes are mentioned from the messages of Zawahiri and AL-Libi: “Pakistani state supported the Crusaders in the removal of the Islamic government (of Taliban) from Kabul” (Al-Libi, 2010:64). “These rulers removed the Pakistan friendly Islamic government from Kabul and instead provided support for the establishment of a new government which is pro India and gangs of drug dealers and criminals” (Zawahiri, 2008a:05).

- **Muslim prisoners**

“Muslim nation is passing through the worst times of its history. Muslim lands are under the crusaders occupation, thousands of Muslims and scholars and even our sisters like Afia Sidiqi are in the prisons of apostates and non-Muslims. Their liberation is our duty which has made us to adopt the path of militancy (Jihad)” (Farooq, 2010b:06).

The arrests of Islamists is also another issue which the militants regularly use as a tool for inviting youth to the path of violence for it. In these prisoners, the release of a Pakistani woman Aafia Sidiqi arrested from Pakistan in the war on terror for connections with the Al Qaeda terrorists has become a slogan and message in every video and message of the militants. They blame Pakistan for the arrest of Sidiqi and all those who were arrested
from the Pakistani soil and then sent to the Guantanamo and other prisons: “The case of Afia is not only a problem of a woman but it has humiliated the dignity of Pakistani nation by handing its daughter to the American crusades for dollars. This humiliation cannot be removed with demonstration and protests but only armed struggle can remove it” (Hijaze, 2012:237).

They say that all these prisoners including Afia can only be released through the path of militancy: “Demonstrations and protests cannot release our sisters like Aafia Sidiqi and our other captives from the prisons of US crusaders. She could only be released through jihad” (Hitteen, 2010:180). “Muslims women like Dr Aafia Sidiqi are in the captivity of American Crusaders but why Muslims do not fight for their freedom??” (Al-Libi, 2009a:134).

5.3 Promises used to recruit Pakistani youth into militant ranks

A large number of various types of expectations are also mentioned in the messages and data of the militants that they promise they assure the Pakistani youth through from joining the path of militancy.

- Militancy will end the sufferings of Pakistani people

The spokesman of Al Qaeda branch in Pakistan, Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), convince the Pakistani youth that the path of Al Qaeda leads to the end of sufferings of the Muslims world as well Pakistani people: “O my beloved Muslim Pakistani brothers and sisters! Yours pain and blood is our pain and blood. Your protection is our responsibility. The Mujahedeen of Al Qaeda has taken guns just to end your sufferings and cut those hands that are causing these sufferings upon you” (Mehmood, 2014:1-2).

There is wide a perception both in the Pakistani nation as well throughout the Muslim community as majority of them consider USA as a source of all problems of the Muslims: “Al Qaeda is fighting as against the tyranny and barbarism of USA” (Mehmood, 2015:01).
Implementation of Sharia: Establishment of Khilafat

Implementation of Sharia law system is one of the oldest demands of the Muslims of Pakistan which they are dreaming and struggling from the day of its independence. Actually, Pakistan was separated from the Indians subcontinent in 1947 that due to the majority Hindu people, having freedom to follow religion in all parts of life is not possible for the Indian Muslims. This point lead to the creation of Pakistan that the Muslims of Indian subcontinent would get a separate state where they would be living under the Islamic laws. This has remained the slogan and manifesto of all religious political parties of Pakistan who get votes in the election primarily on the slogan of implementing Sharia system in the country.

The militant leaders have also used this point for getting the Pakistani youth to their ranks. As Ustad Fateh, says that “Our struggle is for the implementation of Sharia system” (Fateh, 2009:22). Other top leaders have also always repeatedly mentioned this claim to the people of Pakistan that they are struggling for the implementation of Sharia (Ahmad, 2009:07; Mehsud, 2009:04).

Pakistan has currently democratic system in the country, which these militant leaders term as an anti-Islamic system and in the presence of which Sharia law seems impossible to them. Therefore they ask Pakistani people that if they want sharia, so they could get it only through the path of militancy. As Al-Libi, Fateh and Asmatullah Muavia say in their messages to the Pakistani people that democracy can never lead them to the establishment of Islamic system in the country. The path of militancy can only get them the Sharia system implementation in the country (Fateh, 2009:8-9; Al-Libi, 2010:171; Muavia, 2012:21).

These militants also consider the current democratic system of Pakistan as the cause of all problems inside the country and try to assure the Pakistani youth that only the establishment of Khelafat can get rid not only Pakistanis but all Muslims of the world from the problems which they are facing (Hassan, 2009:49).

Explaining the usefulness of Sharia system, Zawahiri tells Pakistani people in his famous message to the people and army of Pakistan that “We (Muslims) cannot get freedom, justice, respect and dignity until Sharia is not completely implemented and the Crusaders
and their puppets are not eliminated. Otherwise, our lives are just similar like those of prisoners” (Zawahiri, 2008:26).

Similarly, Mehsud also attributes the restoration of peace and security in the lawless tribal areas due to the implementation of the Sharia law by Pakistan Taliban in the tribal areas under their control (Mehsud, 2009:14).

- **Defense of Pakistan against India**

Another important issue for the Pakistani people is the defense of the country against India. The separation of Pakistan from India was not accepted by the Hindus of India which consider greater India as their “mother” and separation of Pakistan meant as the division of their mother. The separation of Pakistan caused killings over two million people. Pakistan and India are two rival countries who have fought so far four wars. Pakistan people feel the country is under threat from the India as India being a bigger and stronger state. As Zawahiri addresses them, “I ask the Pakistani people that do they really want Pakistan to become Pakistan as they had dreamed or they want it to become the part of India again” (Zawahiri, 2008a:27).

The militants have also taken this point in their messages to the Pakistani people that as the Pakistani army are under the apostate rulers, so it is not capable of the defense of the country and instead militants can better defend Pakistan from any aggression from the India. As Bin Laden and Shaikh Mustafa Abu Yazeed say in their messages: “The time will show that only Mujahedeen are the sincere defenders of Pakistan and not Pakistani army” (Bin Laden, 2009:92). “The apostate army and the corrupt politicians of Pakistan cannot defend Pakistan but the mujahedeen will do it” (Abu Yazeed, 2009:05).

Similarly, these militants also say that they are protecting Pakistan from other threat as well: “The Pakistani army is the ally of the Crusader Christens which has put a war on the mujahedeen. These mujahedeen are obstacles in the plans of the crusaders who want to divide Pakistan into parts” (Abu Yazeed, 2009:06).

- **Achieving the Supremacy of Islam**

Ensuring Supremacy of Islam only, is ordained on the Muslims in Quran and fighting is ordered compulsory for this purpose. In order to convince Pakistani Muslims for fighting
against the current system of the country, Zawahiri and Al-Libi have written two detailed books on this topic for the Pakistani people. The books *Speedai Sahar aur Timtimata Chiragh* (Rising morning and fading lights) by Zawahiri and *Shamshiri Bi-niyam* (Sword without sheath) by Al-Libi both explain this issue in details that supremacy should be only for Islam and it should be achieved through the sword (Zawahiri, 2010; Al-Libi, 2009). As Al-Libi says that “The Mujahideen of Pakistan should bear it in mind that their fight is only for the supremacy of Islam and the implementation of the Sharia system leading to the establishment of Khelafat in the world” (Al-libi, 2009:99).

Farooq in his important interview of introducing the agenda of Al Qaeda to Pakistani people says “Al Qaeda organization is fighting in the world against evil, for supremacy of Islam and establishment of Khilafat” (Farooq, 2010b:01).

Similar other Pakistani Al Qaeda ideologues, Butaad Khurasani and Qari Abdul Hadi write in their articles in Hitteen, “Our fight is for the sake of religion which is legitimate on the basis of religious principles, so it is a “religious war” which is termed as “Jihad”. It is aimed for the supremacy of Islam in the world” (Khurasani, 2007:15). “To fight against the Crusaders in this war is duty of every Muslims of the world including Pakistani Muslims. It is a war for the elimination of evil from earth, to end the supremacy of non-Muslims and USA and to implement rule of Islam in the world” (Hadi, 2009:25).

- **Defeat of crusades against Islam**

A considerable majority of the Muslim society consider the “war on terror” as war of Crusaders against the Islam. They referred it to the continuation of the medieval ages when the Crusader army from the West united and fought against the Muslims leading to the capture of Jerusalem by the Christians. All Al Qaeda leaders like Bin Laden (Bin Laden, 2007), Zawahiri (Zawahiri, 2007) and Al-Libi etc. have repeatedly explained this point in their messages to the Pakistani people. As Al-Libi says “The “War on Terror” started by the Bush is actually the “War against Islam”. The word “Terror” instead “Islam” is sued by the west just hiding their real mission” (Al-Libi, 2009b:94).

Fateh, mentioned in the previous parts, also says something similar for recruitment of Pakistani youth, “Jihad in Pakistan is continuation of the war which Bush announced
after 9/11, which is a war between Islam and Christianity. I urge all Pakistani youth to join us in this war to demolish these enemies of Islam with our hands” (Fateh, 2009:24-25).

Explaining the importance of the role of Pakistan for success of Islam in these Crusade Al Qaeda ideologues have used different arguments for convincing Pakistani people to get part of this war. Like Khurasani says: “If we join the path of Jihad and have unity in our ranks, so this Crusader war against Islam will be remembered as historical defeat of Crusades in the history” (Khurasani, 2007:27) Another Pakistani Al Qaeda ideologue, who is also editor of the Urdu language Al Qaeda magazine Hitteen, quotes one of the top Al Qaeda strategists Abu Bakr Naji words, “Muslims can only get success in the war against the crusades if we extend our battle to the six strategical important countries of the world in which one is Pakistan” (Hadi, 2012:15).

Zawahiri and Farooq also use more convincing statements to the Pakistani people for this purpose, “Pakistan can become a strong and independent Islamic empire against the current Zionist-Crusade invasions against Islam” (Zawahiri, 2008:04). “The success for mujahedeen in Afghanistan is connected to jihad in Pakistan. It is also evident from the Obama speech of his new strategy announcement that the road towards success in Afghanistan passes through Pakistan” (Farooq, 2010:18).

- **Elimination of corrupt Pakistani rulers**

Elimination of the corrupt Pakistani rulers is another important goal which the militant leaders tell Pakistani people that they can only achieve through adopting the path of militancy. As Zawahiri addresses the people of Pakistan, “Pakistan is ruled by the corrupt leaders from the beginning. Pakistani people should understand that getting rid of these corrupt leaders, establishment of a true Islamic system in the country and implementation of Sharia is not possible without waging jihad against them” (Zawahiri, 2009: 26, 187-188). “My dear Pakistani brothers! Only the path of Jihad can get rid you people from your corrupt, apostate and cruel rulers” (Zawahiri, 2007:27). “I request all Islam loving people in Pakistan to join the path of Mujahideen. They only can eliminate the corrupt and evil rulers of your country who have occupied Islamabad and humiliated your army and have make it as dogs of the US” (Zawahiri, 2008:66).
While Muavia even further says that the corrupt system and corrupt leaders of Pakistan both can be removed through Jihad: “The democratic system of Pakistan has made us slaves of the non-Muslims. The problem is not in the leaders of Pakistan like Zardari or Musharaf but it lies in this system. Let’s fight together to remove this system from Pakistan” (Muavia, 2012:21).
6.0 Analysis:

This chapter is intended to present the analysis of the findings which is collected from the militant sources for understanding their language of recruitment of Pakistani youth to the path of violence. The findings from the collected data shows the three main points of the research questions; religious arguments, grievances and hopes. The analytical lenses of Nye’s and Luke’s theories are used for analyzing the answers of the research questions of this paper.

5.1 Religious arguments

The finding chapter showed that religious arguments are widely used by the militant leaders and ideologues in the strategies of recruiting Pakistani youth for militancy. Steven Lukes theory of three views of power also points to it as one of the view of power. The data shows that these religious arguments used as a source by the militants for getting the obedience of Pakistani youth and making them to join their path of militancy. These arguments are mostly divided into three categories that are aimed to convince youth both for a fight against the rulers and the system of the country. These arguments are grouped under the titles of fighting apostate rulers is ordered from God, implementation of Sharia system and defense of the Muslim land. These arguments are based on the Quranic and Islamic theological bases, which are not only limited to the Pakistani case but applicable to all other Muslim countries and their rulers as well. Similarly, the third argument is also general and can be used against not only the occupation of Pakistan but of any Islamic land.

In the first argument, various acts of Pakistani rulers are explained by the leaders and ideologues of Al Qaeda which according to the Islamic rules makes a Muslim ruler apostate. It is also explained at the end of these arguments that overthrowing such apostate rulers is the ordained duty from God. Different acts of Pakistani rulers, like their support in the war on terror, arrests and killings of Islamists in the country and helping the US in the removal of Taliban government from Afghanistan, are termed as factors which make them apostates.
The second argument, *implementation of Sharia system*, is also inter-related to the first one which is expressed almost in all messages of the militant leaders from different angles for proving the apostasy of the Pakistani rulers. They consider the current democratic system of Pakistan as an anti-Islamic system that these rulers are protecting. From the religious point of view, they consider it one of the prime duties of every Muslim for replacing such system with an Islamic system. They consider the rulers and of Pakistan and security forces of Pakistan as the protector of this system, so tell Pakistani youth that without elimination of them Islamic system establishment in the country is not possible. Therefore, they ask the Pakistani youth to join their path of violence for removing these obstacles.

The last religious argument is more general and of greater importance in the current rise of militancy in the Muslim youth. In the recent past, it was presented by Dr Abdullah Yusaf Azzam (Azzam, 1984) in a theory form that was signed by some of the important and prominent scholars of the Islamic world in the early 1980s for recruitment of Muslims for the Afghan Jihad against the Russians. This theory says that the liberation of Islamic land from infidels is the prime duty of every Muslim in the world. The militant ideologues in their messages to the Pakistani youth try to recruit them on this principle that the neighboring Muslim Afghan country is occupied by the crusaders and its liberation is duty of the Pakistani Muslims. Secondly, some of them also try to prove that Pakistani land is also under the occupation of American crusaders and militant struggle is required by the Pakistani youth for its liberation as well.

5.2 *Feelings*

From the lens of soft theory of Nye, militants recruit youth into their ranks by presenting them some attraction in their path or ideology. From the findings chapter, it is obvious that the militants use the feelings of hopes and grievances of Pakistani youth for inciting them to their path. These militant present their path of militancy as a revenge and end of grievances of the Pakistani Muslims and also attract them on the point that the path of militancy can only fulfill their hopes and desires.
Feelings of different grievance and hopes of Pakistani people mentioned discussed in the findings chapter are analyzed in the following:

- **Feelings: Grievances**

The grievances mentioned by the militants in the Pakistani case are also mostly applicable to the whole Muslim countries and their rulers for inciting Muslim youth for a war against them. The militants discuss the support of Pakistani state in the war on terror that made possible the elimination of Taliban government from the Afghanistan. The Pakistani people were supportive and sympathetic of the Taliban government in Kabul from a number of aspects. They considered as the land having Sharia law system and seeing it as a friendly government due to which feeling safe from the long spread borders with Afghanistan. Due to the Pakistani support in the removal of that government, majority people of Pakistani feel grieved from the regime. The militants clearly use this grievance for recruiting the youth to take the guns against the state for this crime.

Secondly, the arrests and killings of Islamists in the country, the military and security forces operations in the tribal region and inside the cities, especially the incident of Red Mosque and case of Afia Sidiqi are also some important issues due to which the Pakistani Muslims seem having hatred and grievances against the regime. Sidiqi was a Pakistani woman blamed for connections with the Islamic militants who was arrested by the Pakistani security forces on the demands of US and then handed over to them. Like Sidiqi, hundreds of other Pakistani and foreign Islamists were arrested by the Pakistani security forces in the ongoing war on terror which were traded to the America. The Islamists of the country turn these acts of the state as betrayal with Islam and the ideology of the country and due to which the Pakistani people feel much hatred against the state. The militants in their arguments try to convince the Pakistani youth that these crimes of the regime has damaged the dignity of the Pakistani nation which can only be repaired with the blood of Pakistani rulers. So they try to cash these grievances for their recruitment as well.

Similarly, the failure of implementation of the Islamic system in the country due to the last 70 years political struggle is also another grievance of Islamists in the country. These
militants blame the current democratic system of the country and the corrupt rulers as obstacles for Islamic system. So they tell them in their messages that only the path of militancy can remove these obstacles which are preventing the implementation of Islamic system in the country from the creation of Pakistan.

- **Feelings: Hopes**

A number of hopes are also given to the Pakistani youth by the militants in case if they join their path of violence. These hopes are used regularly for blinding the youth to control their minds and for pushing them into the path of militancy. The third dimension of Lukes theory also explain similar thing that a person can exercise power by others to make them to do something of his own interests by shaping the wants of those people. The militants give hopes to the Pakistani youth that path of militancy can lead them to such achievements which they want and need for themselves, for their country and for religion. For example, getting rid of their corrupt rules and system of the country, protection of the country from India which is the long historical enemy of Pakistan and getting Kashmir from India etc. can be possible only through religion. Incentives for religion through militancy, the militants give them hopes that the supremacy and dignity of Islam could be recovered in the world only through the guns. The enemies of Islam like crusaders (which they term the America and its allied western countries in the war on terror) will be defeated and Islam will be protected. The militants also try to convince them that militancy can only lead to the implementation of Islamic system in the country which is one of the oldest demands of the Pakistani people from its first day of independence. They explain to them that their all sufferings will end with the establishment of Sharia law in the country and they will also get rid of their corrupt rulers who are looting them and their country.

The above analysis of the findings of this research paper shows that the militant leaders and ideologues mostly use religious arguments for recruiting the Pakistani youth to the path of militancy along with trying to attract them on presenting various hopes in case of their joining the path of militancy as well a revenge and end of their grievances. The selected theoretical framework on this paper based on the Josef Nye’s soft theory and
Steven Luke’s “three dimensions of power” also explains the similar concepts. Nye says that soft power is exercised by the militants through their attraction abilities. Militants in the Pakistani case achieve these attraction through using of feelings of hopes and grievances which are successfully used by the militant leaders for recruiting youth to their path of militancy. These findings from the lenses of Luke’s theory can be summarized that religion is used by the militants for controlling the minds of Pakistani youth, for determining and shaping their wishes and priorities in the light of the religion in a way which ultimately leads them recruiting to the path of militancy.


7.0 Conclusion

The objective of this research was to understand the militancy problem in the Muslim youth especially after the 9/11 era. The case study of Pakistan was selected for this purpose as Pakistan is the birthplace of Al Qaeda and Al Qaeda is considered as the nursery for the rise of militancy in the Muslim countries in the current era. The wave of militancy rose to alarming level in Pakistan after the country decision of supporting the US in the global war in terror against the Islamist militant groups especially like Al Qaeda. The selection of Al Qaeda for understanding the problem of militancy in the Muslim youth becomes more important from the aspect that Al Qaeda has its franchises and networks in almost all parts of the world. All militant groups in the Muslims world and their leadership have connections to this organization. Therefore, the results from the role of Al Qaeda in the case study of Pakistani could also be helpful for understanding the recruitment strategies of the militants for the spreading wave of Islamic militancy in the global level.

This research is conducted through the discourse analysis of the publications of Al Qaeda and other Al Qaeda linked and inspired Pakistani militant groups like Tihreak Taliban Pakistan (TTP or Pakistani Taliban movement). The speeches, interviews and transcripts of other audio video data from the primary sources were selected from these publications for investigating that what kind of tactics and strategies these militants use for inciting Pakistani youth for violence. The researcher of this paper have also listened and watched the original audio and video interviews and speeches for better understanding of the data. All these sources are translated from Urdu language to English by the author of this research paper.

The findings from the militant sources are mostly based on the following three arguments in their messages along with number of others:

i) religious arguments to convince Pakistani youth to join the path of militancy

ii) they try to cash the grievances of the Pakistani Muslims for their recruitment mission of Pakistani youth

iii) they give different promises of hopes to the youth which according to them youth can achieve only through joining the path of militancy
Steven Luke’s theory of “three dimensions of power” gives explanation from the first point of the finding which mentions religion as one of the factor of the power relations between human beings. The grievances and hopes makes the bases for militants to attract the Pakistani youth into the path of militancy. Nye has termed them as soft power in his theory and has said that militant leaders like Bin Laden widely use it as a mean for recruiting youth to the path of militancy.

For further research suggestions, the author has planning to do a field research on this topic in Pakistan by interviewing those youth who have joined the path of militancy that what arguments of militants recruitment strategies implied to them for joining them. It can be done through getting access to those hundreds of youth who are turned militants and are in prisons or interviewing those who have abandoned the path of militancy. The results of that further research would be more helpful for getting a multi-dimensional understanding of the militancy problems in the Muslim youth that how these recruitment strategies effect youth belonging to different socio-economic classes of the society.
References:

Abu Yazeed, Shaikh Mustafa., 2009. Is it that same Pakistan?. Publisher: As-sahab (Al Qaeda Media wing), Available from: http://drs5.w8w.pl/interview_text.html, [Last Accessed: 20th Dec 2016]

Ahmad, Mullah, Nazir., 2009. Interview with As-sahab. Publisher: As-sahab (Al Qaeda Media wing) Available from: http://drs5.w8w.pl/interview_text.html [Last Accessed: 20th Dec 2016]

Ahmad, Ustad, Farooq., 2010a. Interview with As-sahab: 2nd part. Publisher: As-sahab (Al Qaeda Media wing) Available from: http://drs5.w8w.pl/interview_text.html, [Last Accessed: 20th Dec 2016]

Ahmad, Ustad, Farooq., 2010b. Interview with As-sahab: 1st part. Publisher: As-sahab (Al Qaeda Media wing) Available from: http://drs5.w8w.pl/interview_text.html, [Last Accessed: 20th Dec 2016]


Fateh, Ustad., 2009. Interview with As-sahab. Publisher: As-sahab (Al Qaeda Media wing) Available from: http://drs5.w8w.pl/interview_text.html, [Last Accessed: 20th Dec 2016]


Hussain, Zahid., 2012. “Pakistan's most dangerous place: Pakistan's remote and poorly understood tribal region has emerged as key to the future of both Pakistan and Afghanistan”, The Wilson Quarterly, 36(01), pp.16-21.


Khurasani, Butad., 2007. This is not a cultural clash but is a crusade, Hitteen: Volume 1st, pp.06-27. Available from: http://drs5.w8w.pl/Hittin.html, [Last Accessed: 21st Dec 2016]


Muavia, Ismatullah., 2012. If you do not stand against now, then you will only do on the doomsday, Ihya-e-Khilafat: 3rd Volume, pp.16-21. Available from:


Bachelor thesis - The rise of militancy in the Muslim youth

[Website: https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/298864-top-al-qaeda-leaders-captured-or-killed-on-pakistani-soil, [Accessed: 18\textsuperscript{th} Oct 2016]


Zawahiri, Shaikh Ayman., 2008a. Shaikh Ayman Zawahiri message to the Pakistani Amy and People. Publisher: As-sahab (Al Qaeda Media wing) Available from: http://drs5.w8w.pl/interview_text.html, [Last Accessed: 20\textsuperscript{th} Dec 2016]


Appendix 1:

The data which is collected and researched but not mentioned in this research due to lack of words:

1. **Bin Laden letters**

These letters were released by the US authorities which they had captured during the Abbottabad raid in May 2011. During this raid, Bin Laden was killed along with his son and two comrades in the north western part of Pakistan. US authorities have released two sets of this data in 2015 and 2016 which includes 233 letters and documents of Bin Laden both in the original Arabic language with English translations. The Al Qaeda leadership and their official magazines also regularly quote and use these letters released from the US authorities which proves the authenticity of these documents.

I have studied all these 233 files which can be accessed from the following links:


2. **Nawai Afghan Jihad [NAJ or Voice of Afghan Jihad]**

This is the monthly official magazine of Al Qaeda Pakistan published in the Urdu language. It covers all issues of the Islamic militant war in Pakistan. It is issued nearly every month from 2009 and almost all of its issues are available from different online web pages and blogs. I have downloaded from the following blog of Pakistani militants: Malhama Blog, Available from: [http://drs5.w8w.pl/interview_text.html](http://drs5.w8w.pl/interview_text.html), [Last Accessed: 20th Dec 2016]

I have studied almost sixty plus issues of NAJ which provides a much broader understanding of the militancy in Pakistan and the role of Al Qaeda in it.
Appendix 2:

Important personalities mentioned in this research paper:

**Abu Yazeed, Shaikh Mustafa:** Who was number two in Al Qaeda organization after Bin Laden and Zawahiri at the time of his death in 2010.

**Abu Zubyda:** A Palestinian veteran of Afghan Jihad who became a big name in the Islamic militant leaders during 90s. He had his own training camp and group in Afghanistan but later on joined Al Qaeda after 9/11 and was arrested from Pakistan. Bin

**Abu Zubayr, Mukhtar:** Leader of Al-Shabab militants in Somalia which later emerged as Al Qaeda franchise in Somalia in 2012.

**Ahmad, Mullah Nazir:** One of another deputy leader of TTP, having his own faction of militants, belonging to the Wazir tribes and was very closed to Al Qaeda.

**Ahmad, Ustad Farooq:** Al Qaeda central council member, Media and recruitment in charge of Al Qaeda for Pakistan, belonged to a highly educated family of Pakistan, is one of the most inspiring Al Qaeda ideologue of Pakistani origin.

**Al Kini, Osama:** A top leader of Al Qaeda who was member of its central council and in charge of militancy in Pakistan.

**Al-Libi, Shaikh Abu Yahya:** One of the top Al Qaeda ideologue who became number two leader of Al Qaeda in 2011.

**Al Waliki, Anwar:** A top Al Qaeda ideologue of Yemeni origin but grown up and educated in USA, fluent in English so have a huge influence in the recruitment of Western Islamic diasporas.

**Azzam, Dr Shaikh Abdullah Yousaf:** The founder of Al Qaeda which is considered the most influential and inspiring name for the Islamic militants who played a great role in recruiting youth from Arab world to Afghan jihad against the Russians in during 1979-1989. He was assassinated in Peshawar (Pakistan) in 1988.

**Baghdadi, Abu Bakr:** Over all in charge of AQI after the death of Zarqawi and two of his other successors, later on revolt against the central Al Qaeda leadership and announced the Khelafat and himself as Khelafat of Islam.

**Bin Laden, Shaikh Osama:** The most famous name in the Islamic militants, who became leader of Al Qaeda after Azzam till his death in 2011.
Farooqi, Amjad: A top Pakistani militant leader with deep connections with Al Qaeda, his militant group known as “Amjad Farooqi” became the most dangerous of Pakistani militant groups which carried out the most sophisticated and heaviest attacks against the Pakistani state.

Fateh, Ustad: A top military commander of TTP.

Ghazi, Abdul Rasheed: A pro Al Qaeda Pakistan religious leader and cleric of the famous Red Mosque who was killed by the Pakistani security forces in Islamabad in 2007 along with dozens of his followers. Due to the death of Ghazi in the Red Mosque incident, the level of militancy escalated very sharply in Pakistan.

Hussein, Qari: A top deputy leader of TTP who was in charge of the suicide bombers group of Pakistani militants.

Jhangvi, Haq Nawaz: Founder of SSP, a Sunni sectarian Pakistani cleric who was famous for his fiery oratory against the Shia sect and Iran. He was killed in 1990 and as a revenge his followers founded an underground militant group LeJ.

Khattab, Commander: A well-known militant leader from Saudi origin, trained and fought in Afghanistan alongside Al Qaeda who later on founded militant movement in Chechnya in the late 90s.

Mehusd, Hakimullah: The overall leader of TTP who was the most dreadful Pakistani militant leader fighting against the Pakistani state.

Mehsud, Wali Ur Rehman: The deputy leader of TTP, religious scholar and ideologue having his own stronger faction within TTP, in charge of TTP Mehsud tribe chapter and had close relationships with Al Qaeda.

Muhammad, Khalid Shaikh: The mastermind of 9/11 attacks.

Muhammad, Khalifan Khamis: A Kenyan origin top leader of Al Qaeda who was arrested from Pakistan.

Musharaf, Pervez: Musharraf was army chief of Pakistan who was a dictator and also served as president of Pakistan from 2002-2008. He was a key factor in the Pakistani support in the war on terror and is one of the most hatred figure for Islamic militants.

Sidiqi, Afia: A Pakistani female scientists who has lived and studied in USA, later on arrested from Pakistan with the her alleged connections with Al Qaeda and now serving 86 years sentence in the USA.
Swedan, Shaikh Ahmad Salem: A top leader of Al Qaeda who was member of its central council and in charge of militancy in Pakistan.

Tariq Afridi: One of the most dreadful and brutal commander of TTP who was in charge of TTP Dara Adam Khel chapter.

Waheed, Dr Arshad: A Pakistani origin Al Qaeda top leader who medical doctor by profession by later on become commander of one of Al Qaeda brigade for Pakistan.

Zarqawi, Abu Musab: A Jordanian veteran of Afghan Jihad who later found Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) which has now transformed into ISIS.

Zawahiri, Dr Shaikh Ayman: The current leader of Al Qaeda after Bin Laden who is an Egyptian surgeon and one of the top Jihadi ideologue.