Political Entrepreneurship in Swedish: Towards a (Re)Theorization of Entrepreneurial Agency

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Faculty of Human Sciences
Thesis for Doctoral/Licentiate degree in Political Science
Mid Sweden University
Sundsvall/Östersund, 2016-10-21
Akademisk avhandling som med tillstånd av Mittuniversitetet i Östersund framläggs till offentlig granskning för avläggande av filosofie doktorsexamen fredag, 20 januari 2017 kl. 1015 i sal F234, Mittuniversitetet Östersund. Seminariet kommer att hållas på engelska.

Political Entrepreneurship in Swedish: Towards a (Re)Theorization of Entrepreneurial Agency

© Evangelia Petridou, 2016-01-20
Printed by Mid Sweden University, Sundsvall
ISSN: 1652-893X
ISBN: 978-91-88025-82-1

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Mid Sweden University Doctoral/Licentiate Thesis 252
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Abstract

Public policies affect all of us, regardless of who we are or where we live. The study of public policymaking necessarily entails the study of the entire political system and to this end, researchers employ a multitude of frameworks, theories, and models, which tend to be complementary rather than mutually exclusive. The focus of this dissertation is on political entrepreneurship as an actor-based framework to examine and understand policy change. The dissertation’s main aim is to conceptually enhance entrepreneurship and the entrepreneur in the polis by leveraging them in the Swedish political context. In this research, political entrepreneurship and the political entrepreneur are examined in the background of the Swedish corporatist policymaking system with its consensual sensibilities. The five (two theoretical and three empirical) papers as well as the cover essay comprising this dissertation attempt to answer the following questions: first, how do contextual factors inform the realization of entrepreneurial agency? Second, how do contextual factors inform the strategies entrepreneurial actors use to affect change? Third, what is the role of political entrepreneurship and the political entrepreneur in macro-level theories and specifically in critical junctures and policy transfer? Contextual factors here are understood to be the general political system; the level of governance; the substantive policy sector, and the stage of the policy process. Predominantly qualitative methods and a variety of analytical tools, ranging from formal social network analysis (SNA) to process tracing are used to investigate the research questions in the national, regional, and local levels of governance and in the fields of crisis management, risk governance, and economic development respectively. Findings suggest that overwhelmingly, political entrepreneurs come from the ranks of public officials and thus political entrepreneurship is a feature of the policy implementation stage rather than the agenda setting stage of policymaking. There is no space for the outsider, single issue entrepreneur in the Swedish consensual system, which provides for extensive inclusion, but of actors organized in interest groups. Political entrepreneurs are action-oriented, problem solving doers, characterized by perseverance and resourcefulness and are key in consolidating policy change in the aftermath of a crisis. Though in broad terms the strategies political entrepreneurs use in the Swedish context are concomitant with the ones used in pluralistic contexts, specificities diverge. In the Swedish corporatist consensualistic system, political entrepreneurship becomes a conduit
facilitating interconnections among a multitude of actors; opens up additional channels of communication, while the political entrepreneur is a network maker. Finally, political entrepreneurship is focused on forging a consensus rather than winning the competition: the art of quiet cooperation and collaboration.
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*Keep Ithaka always in your mind.*
*Arriving there is what you are destined for.*
*But do not hurry the journey at all.*
*Better if it lasts for years,*
*so you are old by the time you reach the island,*
*wealthy with all you have gained on the way,*
*not expecting Ithaka to make you rich.*
CP Cavafy, Translated by Edmund Keeley/Philip Sherrard

*Is it the compass that turns, or the ship?*
Nikos Kavadias

It is, of course, rather an unforgivable cliché for a Greek to use Cavafy and Kavadia as points of departure. But then again, this journey has been literal as well as a metaphor for the intellectual transcendence one is reported to achieve through an untold amount of years of education. My journey lasted far longer than the 10 years that took Odysseas to return to Ithaka and it has spanned three countries, two colleges and two universities; at times there was no compass and I got stranded somewhere unnamed.

I start by giving thanks to influential teachers earlier in my career as a student at Missouri State University: Patrick Scott, who made me love Public Administration, διδάσκαλος Ed Carawan and Sister Pauline Nugent, with whom I read Euripides, Homer and Aristophanes for the sheer pleasure of it. I am eternally grateful to my first advisor, Marie-Louise von Bergmann-Winberg for giving me a chance when nobody else would and for introducing me to the field of political entrepreneurship. Without you, Marie-Louise, this piece of research would never have existed. I managed to finish my dissertation, and for this I must thank my advisors, Bo Svensson, Pär Olausson, and Lee Miles: thank you for your support and for sticking with me. A very special thanks to Michael Mintrom for the tremendous inspiration he has been to my work. A big thanks to Anna Olofsson and all my colleagues at the Risk and Crisis Research Center for the support and for making me feel at home rather than being on the outside looking in. Thanks to Gertrud Alirani, Minna Lundgren, Hanna Jonsson- Liljendahl, and Erna Danielsson for being there when the academic part gets impossible and one simply must vent and/or organize a party in the fika room.
Many thanks to Jörgen Sparf for being a friend and co-author, as well as reading version after tedious version of this cover essay, editing my less-than-sophisticated Swedish and solving Microsoft Word and other technical mysteries that befuddle a Luddite like me.

My son, Michael Daughtrey, does not have a memory of me being out of school. Mikie, I know this has not been easy for you, this non-linear way of doing things. It seems to me that you are on your way to find your Ithaka now and I only hope that I have shown you the way a little bit.

And finally, Dimitri Ioannides, our life together is Ithaka, no? You are my compass and I dare not think where I would be now if it were not for you. I learn from you every day and not only because you always read and critique my texts—from term papers to PhD dissertation. Thanks to you I am a better writer and a better person. Thanks to you, I started and finished this. Thanks to you, I am laughing.

Και το ταξίδι συνεχίζεται.

Evangelia Petridou

Östersund, August, 2016
1. Introduction

The object of policy research is the understanding of the interactions between the machinery of the state and political actors. These actors are broadly defined as officials working in the public sector (appointed or elected) or as interested private citizens, a part of civil society. They might be acting individually or in groups in any one level of governance aiming at producing pervasive public action not solely limited to legislation, rules and regulations and executive orders (John, 2012; Theodoulou and Cahn, 1995). To this end, researchers employ a large number of tools in the form of theories, models, and frameworks. Due to the plethora and complexity of the questions raised by scholars, these tools tend to be more complementary than contending, unlike in many subdisciplines of social sciences (Peters and Pierre, 2006). More specifically and in the face of the immense complexity of policymaking, Cairney (2013) warns us of the dangers of selecting theories on the basis of some absolute criteria which in practice are not applicable everywhere, all the time; instead he proposes methodological pluralism and urges us to ensure that we are clear in citing the reasons behind the narrative we choose to explain change.

The focus of this dissertation is on political entrepreneurship (PE) as an actor-based framework to examine and understand policy change. Rooted in Kingdon’s (1984/2003) Multiple Streams approach (MSA), the concept of political entrepreneurs allows for the exploration of the role of ideas without altogether discounting the role of self-interest. The entrepreneur in the polis is defined as “a special kind of actor, embedded in the sociopolitical fabric, who is alert to opportunities and acts upon them; he or she amasses coalitions for the purpose of effecting change in a substantive policy sector, political rules or in the provision of public goods” (Petridou, Narbutaité Aflaki, and Miles, 2015, p. 1).

The broader conceptual architecture underpinning the theory of political entrepreneurship was first referred to as a ‘model’ by Mintrom and Vergari in 1996 and further developed as such by Mintrom and Norman, 2009. Political entrepreneurship refers to the agentic capacity of political actors operationalized as (i) access to resources such as information and personal contacts; (ii) alertness to recognize opportunities and take advantage of them; (iii) the willingness to take risks, and (iv) leadership skills. The strategies these actors use to navigate the policymaking process are a function of their agentic capacity and the context in which they find themselves operating.
In this dissertation I treat PE as a framework (as opposed to a theory or a model) because of the meta-theoretical qualities of frameworks. First, developing and using a framework helps to identify all the relevant components and the relationships among these components. Second, frameworks are fruitful for diagnostic and prescriptive (as opposed to, for example, predictive) inquiry. They do this by providing a most general list of variables that can be used to make theories and they provide the language to compare these theories. Finally, researchers can use frameworks to guide them in generating questions. (E.Ostrom, 2007).

The concept of the political/policy entrepreneur has been regarded as fuzzy, meaning different things to different scholars (Cairney, 2013) even within the same discipline. This is not surprising considering its metaphorical nature and transdisciplinary travel. What is more, PE is as much as about the actor (the entrepreneur) as it is about the process (entrepreneurship). Despite these points, or perhaps because of them, the literature examining the political entrepreneur and political entrepreneurship beyond multiple streams has exploded in the recent years. Most of the extant research devotes itself on the entrepreneur, neglecting the theorization of entrepreneurship.

As I will show in the literature review which follows this introductory section, implicit in the PE literature is the concept of conflict arising from the competition among divergent interests. This is the case also with the attendant concept of resistance expressed by blowback exerted from different actors, individual or collective. In other words, the literature seems to take it for granted that entrepreneurship is explored in systems where open conflict exists—if not encouraged—and resistance is the norm (see, however, Magnier, 2006, for a study on Dutch local politics). Additionally, the core of the theoretical discussions of PE, as I will discuss in a later section, centers on the agenda setting phase of the policy process, perhaps a corollary of the origins of the framework in the MSA.

Wilson (1980) spoke of ‘entrepreneurial politics’ as playing out in policies involving concentrated costs and diffused benefits, such an environmental politics. Otherwise, however, the contextual issues of conflict and resistance, complexity, type of substantive policy sector, level of governance and stage of the policy process have by-and-large remained opaque in the literature. The puzzle that emerges then centers on the questions of what happens when, in terms of the broader context in which entrepreneurship might unfold, the political system does not encourage conflict; what
does PE look like in consensual systems? What does PE look like in the implementation stage of the policy process and which actors become entrepreneurial? What strategies would entrepreneurs use to achieve consensus vis-à-vis a winning coalition? Do actors go out of their way to behave entrepreneurially in a noncomplex policy setting? In other words, can we theorize on entrepreneurship without the clear articulation of conflict, and complexity?

The chief inspiration for this work was the 2009 article by Michael Min trom and Philippa Norman, urging researchers to explore entrepreneurship in diverse contexts and among a diverse group of actors.

1.1 Aim and Objectives

The overarching aim of this dissertation is to conceptually enhance entrepreneurship and the entrepreneur in the polis by leveraging them in new country and policy contexts. This (re)theorization implies theoretical development that goes beyond the identification of policy entrepreneurs, the strategies they use to couple the policy and politics streams and whether they succeed or fail in the process because this mode of thinking treats policy entrepreneurship solely as the independent variable. The added value of the theoretical contribution made in this dissertation is two-pronged. First, I explore agency in Swedish policymaking in three levels of governance which is intrinsically salient for the Swedish audience and adds to the volume of knowledge on Swedish politics. Second, I contribute to the (re)theorization of political entrepreneurship by pointing out that most of the literature in the field implies conflict and complexity (though this has not been clearly articulated in the literature) and then apply the PE framework to a consensual system, partly in noncomplex policies. The ambition of this research is not to conduct another empirical study, but to tweak the existing framework based on my findings. As I argue later in this cover essay, this is a practice that has served other frameworks of the policy process well in terms of broadening their explanatory value beyond the pluralistic political systems which engendered them.

While not losing sight of the impact of policy entrepreneurship in the policymaking process, one objective of this dissertation is to tease out contextual factors that potentially inform the realization of policy entrepreneurs as well as influence their gamut or strategies, thus also treating policy entrepreneurship as the dependent variable. An additional objective of this dissertation is to explore the structure/agency dichotomy by interrogating and situating the role of PE in theories of change focused on institutions —
such as critical junctures and policy transfer—similarly to Mintrom and Norman (2009) pinpointing the role of the entrepreneur in the major theories of the policy process.

These are addressed in the five papers comprising this dissertation. This cover essay provides the theoretical and empirical linkages among all the papers and discusses their contribution to the aim and the main research questions of this dissertation. These are as follows:

- How do contextual factors inform the realization of entrepreneurial agency? (Q1)
- How do contextual factors inform the strategies entrepreneurial actors use to affect change? (Q2)
- What is the role of political entrepreneurship and the political entrepreneur in macro level theories such as critical junctures and policy transfer? (Q3)

“Contextual factors” in this dissertation are understood to be (i) the general political system (consensual vs. pluralistic); (ii) the level of governance; (iii) the substantive policy sector; (iv) the stage of the policy process.

More specifically:

**Paper I** identifies the locus of policy entrepreneurship in the broader landscape of policy process theories. A systematic review of recent literature (2011-2012), the paper shows the relevance of policy entrepreneurship as a framework to understand agency in the policy process.

**Paper II** is a theoretical paper outlining the relationship among PE, resilience, and the political aspect of crisis management. This paper shows that a better understanding of agency in the space created by the aftermath of crisis has the potential of promoting resilient societies.

**Paper III** is a historical analysis of the critical juncture resulting in the paradigmatic shift that took place in the crisis management policy sector nationally in Sweden between 2001 and 2009. It resulted in the establishment of the Secretariat for Crisis Management in the Government Offices and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency. Drawing from the second paper, the hypothesis is tested that policy entrepreneurship takes place at the policy formulation stage during the political aspect of crisis management. A major finding of this paper is that entrepreneurial action is indeed found to be a catalytic factor, but during the implementation phase of institutional change.
Paper IV is an analysis of the policy transfer process of collective action arrangements from the regional to the national level in Sweden. More specifically, this study aimed at (i) tracing the transfer process of the self-organizing coordination network for flood risk management from the regional level to the national level and (ii) comparing the resulting enforced networks which formed as a result of the transfer process. Findings suggest that PE partly explains the variation in the resulting networks, along with factors such as (i) pluriformity of network members; (ii) member interdependence; (iii) redundancy of structures, and (iv) degree of formality (in terms of meetings).

Paper V is a study of a two-year “mundane” planning process aimed at drafting the vision plan document for the municipality of Östersund in Northern Sweden. The aim of the study was to interrogate PE in a low conflict, noncomplex, local policy environment. Findings on the one hand suggest entrepreneurial agency among the team of public officials in charge of the process; on the other, social network analysis (SNA) revealed more active and less active actors among civil society members, but further analysis did not reveal any policy entrepreneurs. Table 1.1 summarizes the relationship between the individual papers and the research questions.

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1.2 The Market Model vs. the Polis Model

The market model of society, apotheosizing an apolitical science of government, comes under the banner of rational choice in the disciplines of political science and public administration. (Stone, 2002). In simple terms, rational choice can be seen as neoclassical economic theory applied to public sector governance. Its basic assumption is that the actions of bureaucrats, elected officials, and private citizens are motivated by self-interest; the same self-interest that drives consumer choices in conditions of competition among producers within an unregulated market (Frederickson, Smith, Larimer, and Licari, 2012).

In her attack of the market analogy as the appropriate model in the public domain, Stone (2002) argues that the “rationality” project not only misses the point, but it is also an “impossible dream” (p. 7). In its place, she proffers the polis model, in which communities deal with commons problems as communities — instead as an aggregate of individuals — assuming both individual and collective action. Her choice of the word polis, which is the Greek word for city (and city-state) reflects “an entity small enough to have very simple forms of organization yet large enough to embody the elements of politics (Stone, 2002, p. 17). In the polis model, actions are driven by public interest instead of self-interest.

I adopt the word polis in this dissertation to talk about the public sphere in broad terms. This choice connotes not only the political aspect of the public sphere, but also the antipodes of the market, especially when it comes to political entrepreneurs. Though political entrepreneurs do act on the expectation of “political profit”, the concept of “profit” may be misleading as it is not neatly defined in monetary terms. Kingdon (1984/2003) conceptualized entrepreneurs as acting in conditions of ambiguity and being entrepreneurial partly for the love of the political game. Entrepreneurs in the polis in this research are not seen as a part of the rationality project but as a part of the polis model of society.

1.3 A Note Regarding the Fuzziness of Entrepreneurship in the Polis

The concept of entrepreneurship, with its snug fit in the dominant neoliberal discourse fetishizing innovation and creativity, is not only popular among many disciplines such as economics, business administration, organizational and policy studies, and political science, but it has also developed into its own distinct subfield. Nuanced usage across disciplines has
contributed to the lack of conceptual sharpness of a construct already multidimensional and complex. Its etymological roots in both Latin (entre + prendre) and Greek [ἐπιχείρω] point to hands-on action. The Latin says to catch; to grab; to take that which is rolling in between (Hjorth, 2003) while the Greek says to put one’s hand on (a thing or work), to set to work. A related noun derivative used only in the plural (epiheira, [ἐπίχειρα]) means ‘wages’ (Liddell and Scott, 1889). It follows then that entrepreneurship conveys the purposive action of putting one’s hand on to ‘things’, e.g. opportunities, with a view to getting compensated in return.

As mentioned earlier, this dissertation focuses on entrepreneurship in the polis that is, the purposive political action of getting hold of opportunities for political profit. In the political science literature, multiple modifiers of the noun “entrepreneurship” are used, including the following: public, political, policy, bureaucratic, service, managerial, party, norm, moral, legislative and institutional. Nuances among these modifiers range from the established body of work of Michael Mintrom and others on “policy entrepreneurs” to the — perhaps — arbitrary distinction between “political” and “policy” entrepreneurs in a 2012 article by Hogan and Feeney. Though the multidimensionality of the concept will be taken up later in this cover essay, I must state here that I am using the adjective “political” as an umbrella modifier for entrepreneurship in the polis. “Political” (a word which in most languages is the same as “policy”) is intrinsic to concepts such as the polis, the conduct of public affairs, governance, policymaking and the distribution of public goods. I do not dismiss the other modifiers and in fact I use them interchangeably unless noted otherwise.

This choice is based on Warren’s (1999) definition of politics (defining, by extension, the referents of ‘political’) articulating politics as “the subset of social relations characterized by conflict over goods in the face of pressure to associate for collective action, where at least one party to the conflict seeks collectively binding decisions and seeks to sanction decisions by means of power” (p. 218). Entrepreneurial action in the polis, much like in market entrepreneurship, is inextricably related to the concept of creativity (McCaffrey and Salerno, 2011). The symbolic value of entrepreneurship of any kind is related to innovation (Klein et al., 2010). A political actor is “a single individual or a group functioning as a corporate actor” whereas action is defined as “those human behaviors to which the acting individual attaches a subjective and instrumental meaning” (E. Ostrom, 2007). A large
part of the scholarship on political entrepreneurship has focused on the individual actor though recent literature has treated institutional actors as political entrepreneurs as well (see, for example Kaunert, 2010; Nay, 2012).

1.4 Dissertation’s Audience
This dissertation is geared toward several audiences. First, it is my hope that the study’s theoretical focus on political entrepreneurship at the local, regional, and national levels will be meaningful reading for political scientists and public administration scholars in general and in particular for those in the subfield of policy analysis. Second, the study’s policy contexts of local economic development, crisis management, and flood risk management could attract transdisciplinary interest from geographers, planners and crisis management scholars. Finally, the in-depth overview of the field might be of value to practitioners in Sweden and elsewhere.

1.5 Structure of Cover Essay
The purpose of this cover essay is to build a theory of political entrepreneurship through the discussion of the individual papers’ findings. It unfolds in the following chapter with a state-of-the-art, at the end of which, puzzles in the literature are identified. Chapter three details the methodology employed in the studies. Chapter four reviews the results of the studies and connects them to the dissertation’s research questions while analyzing in depth the role of each paper to the dissertation. Chapter five synthesizes the results and delves into some policy implications while chapter 6 offers a future research agenda along with closing remarks.
The Conceptual Development of the Entrepreneur and Entrepreneurship in the Polis: Where We Are, How We Got Here, and Things We Missed Along the Way

This section is an in-depth review of the various aspects of political entrepreneurship. The exhaustive character of the review and the large number of examples from pluralistic environments set the stage and detail the larger context in which this study, empirically set in Sweden, is situated.

The trajectories of the scholarship on political entrepreneurship have developed mostly along two broad lines within political science. One is in the subfield of political economy and public choice literature with synergies with the Austrian School. In this trajectory, the political entrepreneur is an agent in the market for public goods, whereas political entrepreneurship refers to strategies for the effective cooperation in solving (wicked) commons problems. The first trajectory’s focus is on the rationality of the political entrepreneur as a political actor and their ownership (or not) of resources (McCaffrey and Salerno, 2011; Shockley, Stough, Haynes, and Frank, 2006). A second trajectory in the policy sciences focuses on the political entrepreneur as a driver for policy change, both in radical and incremental terms in a variety of substantive policy sectors. The policy literature emphasizes decision making in conditions of ambiguity, the variety of strategies entrepreneurs in the polis use, as well as the creativity of these entrepreneurs rather than rationality as the motive behind entrepreneurial behavior. This is the strand of the literature that has served a springboard for this dissertation. In these broad trajectories, bleed the tensions between agency and structure as well as the contested action spaces of the entrepreneur vis-à-vis the leader.

In this theoretical overview section I first trace the early scholarship on entrepreneurship and the subsequent rationality turn. I then flesh out the conceptual evolution of the terms in the policy literature before I move to the contested spaces of entrepreneurial agency. I proceed to specify the assumptions that make up entrepreneurship theory before taking stock of the scholarship in the context of Sweden. Finally, I present the lacunae in the literature this dissertation proposes to fill.
2.1 Early Scholarship

In this trajectory, the entrepreneur in the polis closely resembles the entrepreneur in the market. PE is not a metaphor but rather a conceptual transplant.

2.1.1 Schumpeter and Dahl

Schumpeter’s work on entrepreneurship and the entrepreneur has provided the basis for much of the subsequent discourse on the subject. Though known mostly for his economic theory of the private entrepreneur, Schumpeter recognizes that entrepreneurs exist in other sectors of society, such as art and politics (1911/2011). He distinguishes between men who are static and men of action. The former are people who do what they are told, are passive and seek equilibrium. Men of action are the entrepreneurs, dynamic leaders who break the equilibrium through new ideas. This is not surprising given the etymology of the word, implying dynamic action. If there is no demand for their ideas they create it and they assemble the individuals necessary for their implementation (Becker, Knudsen and Swedenberg, 2011). “In all sectors he does so in a manner very analogous to that in which something new is carried out in the economy... [i]t is always an imposition of a new thing, which just a little earlier was still derided or rejected, or just neglected (Schumpeter, 1911/2011, p. 215). Entrepreneurs create new lines of art, schools of thought or parties, which in turn ‘create’ the league of followers, the static individuals.

Schumpeter’s macro view of the entrepreneur is complemented by Kirzner’s (1973; 1985) entrepreneurial alertness to opportunities as the micro-cause of entrepreneurship. Far from entrepreneurship being confined to the market, entrepreneurial behavior is universal: “[A]ll that is required for entrepreneurial behavior is that an actor discovers and acts on an opportunity, and these opportunities exist in every social arena” (Shockley, Stough, Haynes, and Frank, 2006, p. 210).

In political science, the obligatory onset of any discussion on public entrepreneurs is Robert Dahl’s *Who governs?* (2005), although the term as such is used only once and it is not included in the index. In this seminal work first published in 1961, Dahl chronicles the transition of the local government structure of New Haven, CT, from oligarchy to pluralism. He views the “gifted political entrepreneur” as an actor instead of somebody being acted upon by the political machine; indeed “a leader who knows how to use his resources to the maximum” (p.6). Dahl devotes a chapter to the private entrepreneurs (the self-made men) who, at the cusp of the industrial
revolution, had the resources, the know-how and perhaps were “a touch too ruthless and aggressive” comprising the governing elite of New Haven. As Dahl puts it, “why nominate and elect a grocer as mayor if you can have a manufacturer or bank president” (p. 30)?

As exemplified by Dahl’s quote, in this early literature of entrepreneurship in the polis, the policy entrepreneur literally is the market entrepreneur. The specificities of politics and political structures are at this point of the conceptual evolution far from fleshed out. The political entrepreneur, not even a heuristic, is an unproblematized tautology of its market counterpart. Overtly masculine and implicitly always successful, the entrepreneur in the polis can shatter the status quo like a bull in a china shop and creatively shape a new order.

Regardless of its disciplinary roots, entrepreneurship in the polis is inextricably bound to collective action and the provision of public goods, if policies are to be seen as a form of public good (see Böcher, 2015). Entrepreneurship as a concept is loaded with neoliberal connotations (see for example, Hjorth, 2003) and is seen as desirable and a state of affairs towards which everyone should strive. Critical objections aside, entrepreneurial behavior in the polis is abundant (Carter and Scott, 2010) and the better we understand it, the better we can understand (policy) change.

2.1.2 Public Choice and the Efficient Delivery of Public Goods, or: the Rationality Turn

In 1965 E. Ostrom introduces the term ‘public entrepreneur’ in the discourse with her doctoral dissertation. She uses the concept of public entrepreneurship to explain “strategies which people followed in seeking to solve a common problem through public actions which could not be solved by individual private actions” (p.8). Subsequent discussions on the public entrepreneur form a more complete definition cast in theories of public goods and pressure groups in American politics. Writers such as Olson (1971), Salisbury (1969) and Wagner (1966) view the political entrepreneur as the organizer of coalitions in search of opportunities through which to obtain and provide public goods.

This much is common ground with the later trajectory led by Kingdon and later Mintrom, the work of whom suggests that inter alia, policy entrepreneurs amass coalitions for the purpose of changing policy. However, the view of the entrepreneur in the polis in this stage is very rationalistic and tied to the rational choice and public choice school of thought championed by the Ostroms. In this evolutionary stage of the concept, the political entrepreneur is an exceptional individual, in a formal leadership position,
who acts motivated by clearly defined profit. Engaged in a transcactive relationship, “the group entrepreneur invests his capital to create a set of benefits, composed of some combination or mix [among material, solidary and expressive benefits] which he offers at a price to the market” (Salisbury, 1969, p. 17). Salisbury conceptualizes all interest groups as actors in benefit exchanges. The group entrepreneur/organizer is the single most important catalyst in this exchange and must make the first move. Just as “…in terms of any specific organized economic exchange the entrepreneur is the starting point” (p. 12), the group entrepreneur is the starting point in the formation of an interest group.

Along the same lines, Olson (1965) posits that organizations (or associations or groups) exist in order to further the common interests of their members. However, large organizations face free rider problems and the difficulty in providing collective goods for unorganized groups engenders “the idea of the entrepreneur who might help a group obtain a collective good it lacked” (p. 175). The profit-seeking behavior of the political entrepreneur in relation to the formation of interest groups is hailed as catalytic in the context of (American) democratic decision making; without the entrepreneur and their self-interest, no exchange activity is likely to occur (Salisbury, 1969; Wagner, 1966). What emerges in the early stages of his discussion and later becomes explicit is the issue of leadership. “The entrepreneurial role is generically identical with that of the leader; the leader is perforce an entrepreneur” (p. 29). A leader here has a very narrow, rational definition as the individual who takes action in providing a collective good without providing all the resources by themselves (Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young, 1969).

The attractiveness of rational choice in terms of the motives of political actors notwithstanding, a rational view of the political entrepreneur has limited explanatory value. In decision making which is highly programmed, when for example a policy is being iteratively revised in an incremental fashion (Peters, 2015) and the preferences of the actors are known, then a rational choice take on political entrepreneurship may be appropriate. However, contextual factors such as conditions of ambiguity, high risk policy issues or the perception of crisis tend to reduce the capacity for rational decision making (Peters 2015) and therefore diminish the explanatory value of the political entrepreneur as a rational actor in a market for public goods. In other words, a transcactive angle on political entrepreneurship does not go far enough neither in exploring the dialectic relationship of the entrepreneur with their context, nor in explaining resultant
change. At the same time, this literature was a sign of its times and a necessary step in the conceptual evolution of the political entrepreneur.

2.1.3 Fragmentation and Rationality

Public economic entities enter in horizontal and vertical relationships making the role of the public entrepreneur navigating these relationships quite salient. In the US federal system, Oakerson and Parks (1999) cite nonhierarchical, polycentric arrangements in complex metropolitan economies as the fertile ground for the development of political entrepreneurship. The more the decision points in overlapping jurisdictions, and the greater the number of elected officials, police chiefs, special district directors, public administrators and public managers, the larger the likelihood for political entrepreneurship to take place. Drawing from Polanyi’s work, V. Ostrom (1999) describes polycentricity as a pattern of organization of social affairs where many actors at different organizational levels are capable of making mutual adjustments for ordering their relationships with one another. The most important principle of a polycentric arrangement is that the arrangement is spontaneous that is, self-generating and self-organizing at different levels of conduct. This discussion becomes relevant especially in paper IV, where entrepreneurship is interrogated in polycentric, horizontal arrangements in the form of networks—self organizing and enforced.

In the case of the production and delivery of public goods and services this principle can be met only if there are individuals who, acting as public entrepreneurs, are willing to create appropriately structured public enterprises to supply these public goods and services. Necessary conditions of polycentricity include a system of public and constitutional laws that are enforceable, low entry barriers for seeking public office in transparent elections, and the ability to form political coalitions. If these conditions exist, one should expect to see individuals acting as political entrepreneurs, initiating “proceedings for the organization of various municipal corporations, quasi-municipal corporations and other forms of public enterprise to undertake the provision of public goods and services” (V. Ostrom, 1999, p. 70). Polycentricity is in line with the perception of policy entrepreneurs as actors who, according to public choice literature, engage in strategic coalition building, manipulate political competitors or, as argued by Kirzner (1973; 1985) and others in the Austrian school, show alertness and an ability to discover opportunities.

Polycentricity and jurisdictional fragmentation are salient analytical concepts in the American environment of intergovernmental relations (IGR) defined as “the subject of how many and varied American governments
deal with each other and what their relative roles, responsibilities, and levels of influence should be (O’Toole, 1999/2005, p.27). In the beginning of the 2000s there were approximately 85,000 American governments with overlapping jurisdictions and fragmented responsibilities (O’Toole, 1999/2005). Such a system set in a background of federalism, separation of powers and weak political parties allows, and even encourages, venue shopping as an entrepreneurial strategy. Venue shopping is not possible as an entrepreneurial strategy or indeed any other kind of strategy in a European multi-governance context, where this kind of polycentricity and jurisdictional fragmentation is simply irrelevant. Thus polycentricity in the V. Ostrom terms has very little explanatory value outside the U.S.

However, we can utilize the concept of the decision venue as a factor influencing successful entrepreneurial actions. For example, Verduijn (2015) shows that despite the entrepreneurial activity at the local level, success is blocked by the sheer distance between the local (municipality level) and the national level, which is where decisions are made.

2.2 The Political Entrepreneur and Policy Change: Navigating Ambiguity

With the first systematic study on the entrepreneur as an agent of change at the local level, Schneider, Teske and Mintrom straddle the two schools of thought: the entrepreneur in the polis as a rational actor and the Kingdonian entrepreneur as a coupler of streams in conditions of ambiguity. In a departure from earlier literature in political science (Kingdon 1984/2003; Lewis, 1980; Loomis, 1988) the authors analyzed data from suburbs of major metropolitan areas in the U.S. with a population ranging from 2,500 to more than 200,000. This had some very meaningful implications: first, these communities are small enough for an entrepreneurial individual to make a difference and the effects of public entrepreneurship are easier to discern. Second, and in relation to the first point, researching the local level reveals that a public entrepreneur does not have to possess the power and standing of Robert Moses or J. Edgar Hoover (see Lewis, 1980); rather s/he can be an ordinary citizen, drawn to local politics because of a single issue (Schneider, Teske, and Mintrom, 1995). Third, by using this level of analysis Schneider, Teske, and Mintrom are able to converge the two trajectories in which the literature on public/political/policy entrepreneurship has moved that is, in relation to the delivery of public goods on the one hand, and as an explanatory factor of change in the public policy process on the other. To be sure, one of the chief reasons for organizing collectively at the local level is the
delivery (if not the production) of public goods and services such as education, health, transportation infrastructure, etc. What is more, while most policy is made at the national (or in the U.S. even state) level, the municipality does have competence in education, growth, planning, and local economic development. Thus this is the arena where not only the provision of public goods is intertwined with policy making, but also the governance structure where an individual is most likely to feel like they are making a difference if they decided to get involved in public affairs.

Exploring the rationality vein of the entrepreneur, the authors argue that local governments in the suburbs of large metropolitan areas in the U.S. operate in a semi competitive environment which they call “the local market for public goods” (Schneider, Teske and Mintrom, 1995, p. 9). This is an oligopolistic milieu involving imperfect competition among a small number of sellers of public goods and services. Because of the limited number of sellers, any decision made by one of them is more likely to affect the others than in a market environment where competition is more perfect and the sellers theoretically unlimited. In addition to the relative importance of strategic decisions, incomplete information and uncertainty, characteristics found in the political as well as the private market, provide a host of opportunities for public entrepreneurs. According to Schneider, Teske and Mintrom (1995), public entrepreneurs are actors who operate within the system and create fundamental change in the political market.

All public entrepreneurs perform three functions: they discover unmet needs and select suitable solutions for them; the bear the economic, political and personal risk associated with introducing these solutions, and they built teams of individuals willing to work towards fulfilling these needs (Schneider and Teske, 1992). The first of these functions refer to the agenda setting stage of policy making and especially in framing problems in order to gain support for the proposed solutions. Kingdon’s (1984/2003) seminal research on agenda setting at the US federal level established the concept of the policy entrepreneur in policy studies, further elaborated later by Zahariadis (e.g. 2007; 2014).

Kingdon’s image of the policymaking process as a primordial soup is very salient in departing from rational choice, emphasizing ambiguity and conceptualizing three non-linear streams: problems, policies and politics. Problems mutate; different versions of them appear at different times emphasizing different perspectives, whichever seems to be ‘hot’ at any given time. Policy change happens when, at propitious times, a window opens and a solution that was floating in the policy stream gets coupled with a
problem floating on the top of the policy stream because it happened to be politically relevant at the time. Though there are no single-factor explanations as to how a subject finds its way on the top of the agenda, the policy entrepreneur has a catalytic role in the policy making process by being the one who couples streams that is, matches solutions to problems. Indeed Kingdon reports that in 23 case studies, policy entrepreneurs were coded as very important in 15 and only in three were they found unimportant (1984/2003).

In an earlier study of the US Congress, Price (1971) emphasized passion and creativity (vs. rationality) in agenda setting and framing. He explored the differences between neutrally competent ‘professional’ staff members, and the ‘entrepreneurs’, those staff who were equally competent, but also creative and indeed passionate (though Price does not use the latter word) about the policy they were working on and were active in pursuing it:

Staff members... were engaged in a continual ‘search’ operation, seeking both gaps for policy initiatives and fledgling proposals that might be developed and made politically viable. They framed alternative courses of action for the chairman and sometimes for the other members, paying considerable attention to the realities and possibilities of public and group support in the process. They devised hearings to achieve maximum publicity and leaked news of rumored defections and opposition efforts to the press (p.322).

Price’s findings effectively challenge the politics/administration dichotomy in this instance. He concludes that entrepreneurial staff members driven by partisanship and their passion became activists about a certain policy which in turn rendered them more effective staff members in terms of actually getting the policy through committee and on to the senate floor, turning weak bills into strong ones.

Martin and Thomas (2013) take political entrepreneurship at the congressional level one step further by postulating that when a political entrepreneur is unsuccessful in securing a favorite policy, they attempt to change the political rules in order to exploit political profit at a later time. Institutional entrepreneurs are seen as agents of change in political institutions by “identifying opportunities to change the rules of the political game in their favor” (p.22). Martin and Thomas focus on “entrepreneurship on the margin” (p.22), the kind that produces incremental change in political rules. They argue that there are two tiers of political entrepreneurship: in
the lower one, policy change happens within the rules; in the higher tier change happens to the political rules by institutional entrepreneurs. An important implication of this research is that it sheds light to yet a different level by which political entrepreneurs seek to accomplish their goals.

Indeed, the proactive assertiveness of congressional entrepreneurs has shaped American foreign Policy since WW II (Carter and Scott, 2009). Their numbers are increasing while they tend to ‘fly under the radar’. They employ a variety of activities and they tend to be more entrepreneurial the more time they have served, pointing to the notion of power gained through insidedness. Additionally, entrepreneurs tend to be from the non-presidential party, hinting at the notion of resistance, i.e. actors turn to entrepreneurial activities when they encounter resistance.

Mintrom and Vergari (1996) and Mintrom and Norman (2009) further the theorization of policy entrepreneurship, respectively by constructing a policy entrepreneurship model to explain policy change and by exhibiting that the concept of policy entrepreneurship works in tandem with established theories of the policy process. Mintrom and Norman (2009) find that policy entrepreneurs feature not only in the policy streams theory, but in four additional mainstream theories of policy change: punctuated equilibrium theory (PET), incrementalism, institutionalism, and Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). The role for the entrepreneur in the theories of policy process proffered by Mintrom and Norman (2009) is related to framing. As mentioned earlier in this cover essay, the polis model of society — vis à vis the market model champion by Osborne and Gaebler (1993), for example — is characterized by commons problems and the very special challenge of how to combine private benefits with collective benefits in order to satisfy both the private and the public interest. In order to solve commons problems collective action is required, meaning that it is necessary for individuals to be motivated to act and thus take on private costs (i.e. time) in the name of the collective good. One way to motivate an individual is to make them believe in, and work for, a specific policy a solution to a problem.

“[A] problem definition is a statement of a goal and the discrepancy between it and the status quo” (Stone, 2002, p. 133). However, neither the definition of the goal nor the status quo are objective and universally accepted state of affairs. Any facts (bits of information) on which they are based come with words and numbers and thus they are a portrayal of one of many points of view. Price, drawing from Deutsch, posits that creativity in a de-
cision making system has nothing to do with the capacity to amass information, instead it is a function of how this information is cast. Indeed, “innovation is a matter of combining already available bits of information in a new way of or orienting them towards new ends” (1971, p.318).

As in policy streams theory, political entrepreneurs attract some attention in PET (Mintrom and Norman, 2009; Schlager, 2007). The theory tries to explain the fact that political processes are generally characterized by stability and incrementalism punctuated with infrequent spikes of substantial change. More specifically, “[p]unctuated equilibrium theory includes periods of equilibrium or near stasis, when an issue is captured by a subsystem, and periods of disequilibrium, when an issue is forced on the macropolitical agenda” (True, Jones, and Baumgartner, 2007, p.160). On one hand, the complexity of the policies and the multitude of policy images, which are a combination of empirical information and emotive appeals, and on the other the fragmentation of the federalist system fosters (in the U.S. at least) propitious conditions in terms of multiple opportunities for policy entrepreneurs to make their case supporting their favorite policy. A subject that has not succeeded in advancing in the national agenda might encounter less friction in state governments and vice versa (True, Jones, and Baumgartner, 2007).

The policy entrepreneur has a role in framing also in ACF. Although its original scope was limited within the American policy arena, significant revisions have increased its scope of application to European and even developing countries (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). For example, in a typology of policy relevant resources, Sabatier and Weible identify “skillful leadership” as a resource important to those who seek to change policy (p.203). These entrepreneurial leaders are able to seize opportunities while creating a positive vision for the coalition by which to attract additional resources and use them strategically (see also Mintrom and Vergari, 1996; Sheingate, 2003).

In conclusion, the political entrepreneur becomes the idea maker, the individual who manipulates the distance between the goal definition and the status quo. I note here that ‘manipulation’ simply means interpretation of information and a strategic framing of an issue. For example, the American public in general rejects any mention of ‘socialized’ medicine as something straight out of the Soviet Union. ‘Universal’ medicine is a more palatable term but the policy has met with extraordinary resistance. Ask people if they want small children to have access to medical care, however, and most are likely to answer ‘yes’ (Stone, 2002).
Therefore, the leverage of the public entrepreneurs when it comes to framing problems centers on their ability to manipulate ideas and recast problems as well as solutions for these problems. “Policy entrepreneurs can advance themselves and their favorite issues by shaping their stories for the most attentive national reporters” (Loomis, 1988, p. 82). Loomis goes on to say that entrepreneurial politicians do not perceive themselves as manipulating the press or the debate itself; rather they see themselves as trying to steer the issue toward one way or another.

The somewhat limited scope of this literature underscores the need to go looking for entrepreneurship “beyond Kingdon” that is, beyond the agenda setting stage of the policy process, beyond the entrepreneurs as taking advantage of windows of opportunity, beyond the entrepreneurs as skillful framers of policy images. There is a need to explore political entrepreneurship at the implementation stage of the policy process. Such an approach will enhance the understanding of the political/bureaucratic entrepreneur on the ground. It will also shed light on the strategies such actors employ after the framing of a certain policy problem has been entrenched in public opinion (for a more detailed discussion on this, see Petridou, Narbutaité Aflaki and Miles, 2015). What is more, public officials implementing a policy have central positions in other stages of the policy process, such as agenda setting and policy formulation (Hysing and Olsson, 2011).

Going beyond the Kingdonian policy entrepreneur also involves the dialectic relationship of context and policy change. Transcending the trite adage “context matters”, the goal at hand is to interrogate which context matters and in what way. An added value of a dialectic approach to understanding context and entrepreneurship is that it does not support monocausal, often simplistic explanations of change. We need to imbue context to agency as much as we need to imbue agency to context.

2.3 Contested Entrepreneurships

In this section I briefly explore the tensions emerging in terms of entrepreneurs and institutional contexts as well as those concerning the nature of the entrepreneur vis-à-vis the leader or the broker.

2.3.1 Agency and structure: entrepreneurial agency and institutions.

Tensions between structure and agency can be illustrated by high-profile decisions made by elite actors: in the last stages of composing this cover essay in late June, 2016, the European experiment stands perching atop a perilous edge. What has brought it to that edge is the decision of the British
PM David Cameron to call a referendum on the issue of Great Britain’s exiting the EU. Just over 52 per cent of the UK’s population voted for (Br)exit and the effective dismantling of a 43-year-old bureaucratic machine deeply institutionalized in the British state, market, and state of being. For sure, journalists, analysts, and researchers alike will dissect what led to this referendum for a long time to come, but one explanation, not mutually excluding others, is that this was brought upon by one political actor — PM Cameron — hedging a bet on his political survival and losing miserably.

I neither propose to solve the agency-structure debate nor to conduct an exhaustive analysis of the fairly vast literature on institutional theory. The purpose of this section is to show the utility of the concept of entrepreneurial agency in institutional theory, especially when it comes to institutional change. The institutions investigated in this dissertation (paper III) are formal political organizations and fit in the broad conceptualization of institutions which “today [encompasses]… rules, structures, practices, routines, recurrent patterns of behavior, equilibrium among rational actors, organizations, and public authorities” (Pierre, Peters and Stoker 2008: p. 234). The literature on institutions and entrepreneurship has developed, if not in the same volume as the literature on policy and entrepreneurship, at least in somewhat parallel terms, facing some of the same problems, such as endogenous vs. exogenous causes of change, change vs. stasis, etc. The different fields of study (policy studies vs. institutional theory) have developed largely independently and do not tend to cross over at all. However, as I will show below, there are parallels between the way we understand political entrepreneurship and a recent development in institutional theory.

The problem of agency refers to the difficulties of developing a theory that accounts both for the agentic power of actors in terms of making action happen as well as the causal structural factors of action. Any meaningful conceptual and analytical framework must necessarily make room for both structure and agency (which the PE framework does), even if does not fully explain both (Dessler, 1989). On the one hand, stakeholders are embedded in institutional contexts which inform their actions, whereas structures can be perceived as constantly reproduced (as opposed to fixed) and as something internalized by actors and utilized as constraints and resources of action (Bogason, 2000; Giddens, 1984; Wang, 2010). Steelman notes that “there are limits to what individuals can accomplish on their own” and for the implementation of innovative action, new structures have to build to compete with the old structures actors seek to change or replace (2010, p.4).
Structures do not fully account for all outcomes; a significant degree of uncertainty depends on the actions of strategic actors, who, order to be classified as (institutional) entrepreneurs, must have “an interest in particular institutional arrangements and who leverage resources to create new institutions or to transform existing ones (DiMaggio, 1988; Hay, 2002; Maguire, Hardy, and Lawrence, 2004, p. 657). This is a definition very much a parallel to the one of the policy entrepreneur. The theoretical conundrum of agency/structure is broadly referred to as ‘the paradox of embedded agency’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Garud, Hardy, and Maguire, 2007). The theoretical puzzle is complex, not in the least because the concept of institutional entrepreneurship developed to refocus the debate on agency tends to be either too process oriented or relying on a few heroic entrepreneurial individuals (Hardy and Maguire, 2008; Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca, 2011; Olsson, 2016).

This echoes discussions in policy studies literature. Schneider, Teske, and Mintrom (1995) take the approach of the Austrian school that entrepreneurship is a function rather than a person. Entrepreneurs, public or private, are not just the special few—an entrepreneur is any rational individual, who after a cost-benefit analysis decides that the benefits of making political innovation outweigh the costs and is willing to bear the risk of doing so. Interpreting Schumpeter, Becker, Knudsen and Swedberg (2011) state that anyone can become an entrepreneur at some occasion—but no one will be so all the time.

Conversely, Christopoulos (2006) postulates that political entrepreneurs are exceptional actors distinct from the ordinary. He goes to define them, through a network perspective, as actors who possess: traits which increase their odds of being political leaders; a unique political utility function making it likely for them to invest their resources in collective action toward a favorite policy; certain socio-political structural constraints which could affect their ability for political intervention, and finally unique relational attributes which influence their relative power in their political networks through the control of information flows. The power of structural analysis notwithstanding, most current literature in the policy studies field points to the everyday-ness rather than the exceptionality of political entrepreneurs.

To highlight the intentional actions of institutional actors, Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca (2011) elaborate on the concept of institutional work, which takes institutional entrepreneurship further and parallels the discus-
Institutional work describes "the purposive action of individuals and organizations aimed at creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions (Lawrence and Suddaby cited in Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca, 2011, p. 1) and is predicated on an increasing interest in agency motivated not strictly by rational self-interest, but also idiosyncratic factors aiming at changing or maintaining institutions. (Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca, 2011). This development in institutional theory is of interest to the discussion in the policy literature in general and to this dissertation in particular for two reasons. First, entrepreneurial action is used to not only affect change, but also resist it with incremental adjustments, something that has been gaining traction in the policy literature. Second, the entrepreneur is not a super hero; any actor may act entrepreneurially in one situation but not all the time, which is accepted in the policy literature in general and in this dissertation in particular. In a nutshell, it would be fruitful to bridge the concept of institutional work with that of the political entrepreneur because of the focus on the mundane and incremental.

Even though the development in the literature above is mainly in sociological institutionalism, there is room for agency in historical institutionalism as well. The basic idea behind this dominant approach to institutions within political science is path dependency, or the notion that early decisions in the development of a policy shape later decisions and that decisional inertia makes it so that any change requires a very large degree of political pressure (Peters, 2005). Conceptualizing entrepreneurial agency to be geared towards the preservation of an institution after it has been created, as in paper III, contributes to the understanding of transformative change.

### 2.3.2 The Entrepreneurial Leader or the Leader-like Entrepreneur

Entrepreneurship is "a particular form of leadership" with an emphasis on problem solving and the synthesis of already existing processes in forming an effective solution (E. Ostrom, 2005, p.1). In a departure from the emphasis on rationalistic relationship of the entrepreneur as the leader of an interest group in the marketplace for public goods, public entrepreneurs are reported to be motivated by benefits including delivering improved services to their communities and sharing the burden for increased benefits, the excitement of innovation, and receiving monetary income as well as respect from their positions as public officials (Mintrom in E.Ostrom, 2005).

In policy studies, Capano and Howlett (2009) speak of (policy) entrepreneurship as a component of leadership, a trait of a political agent who is also a leader. As Petridou, Narbuaité Aflaki and Miles (2015) have pointed
out, there has not been a clear conceptual distinction between the entrepreneur and the leader in the literature with the exception of research by Timmermans, van der Heiden and Born (2014), whose findings suggest that policy entrepreneurs score high in transformational leadership as opposed to transactional leadership. This implies that when it comes to leadership skills, policy entrepreneurs exhibit leadership behaviors described as “visionary, change-oriented and non-conservative” (p. 102). This type of leader according to the authors is generally more effective under socially stressful and crisis situations.

Even though the notion of leadership is generally not clearly articulated, it is nonetheless present, explicitly or implicitly, in the literature. The question that emerges then is whether in the cases where political entrepreneurs are treated as leaders, they are assigned or emergent leaders. Assigned leadership is based on a position occupied in an organization. Team leaders, department heads and directors are assigned leaders. Emergent leadership, on the other hand is not based on the formal position an individual occupies in an organization. An emergent leader is one that is perceived as such by the other members of the group, regardless of his or her formal position. Emergent leadership occurs over time through communication. Communication behaviors accounting for successful emergent leadership include being verbally involved, being informed, and initiating new ideas (Fisher, 1974; Northouse, 2007).

Entrepreneurial party leadership creates partisan regimes, that is, a political coalition organized under a common party label with the power to challenge prevalent governing tenets and to thwart opposition efforts to erode it. (Polsky, 2011). In American politics, cabinet members, members of congress as well as legislators at the state level, all holding formal leadership positions have exhibited entrepreneurial behavior in the policymaking process (Carter and Scott, 2010; Thompson, 1994; Weissert, 1991). “[T]he fact that such [legislative] entrepreneurs can be found consistently over time indicates that they are no aberration, but instead are a standard feature of the U.S. foreign policy-making process” (Carter and Scott, 2010, p. 422, original emphasis).

Hammond (2013), conversely, identifies the informal ‘leading by example’ quality as one of the fundamental functions of a policy entrepreneur also tied to risk taking. Capano and Galanti (2015), however, in their theoretical juxtaposition of the broker, the entrepreneur, and the leader, specifically differentiate the leader from the entrepreneur. In a list of qualities for
these three functions, for example, risk taking is part of being an entrepreneur, but not a leader. At the same time, recent work by Mintrom, Salisbury and Leutjens (2015) interrogates collective entrepreneurship and teams, which would point to the entrepreneur as a team leader and therefore in line with Hammond (2013) and leadership as inherent to entrepreneurship.

Blavoukos and Bourantonis (2012) and Hays (2012) examine perhaps the most visible actors who might be understood as political entrepreneurs that is, national leaders. The former analyze the actions of Greek PM Simitis during the Greek-Turkish rapprochement, highlighting the importance of PE in foreign policy change as well as consolidation of new foreign policy. Simitis succeeded in normalizing the relationship between Greece and Turkey as part of a broader plan of the modernization of the country. Conversely, Hays (2012) demonstrates the failure of PE in the inability of Reagan to establish school prayer despite creating the Office of Legal Policy and the Committee of Federal Judicial Selection, which prioritized philosophical and ideological issues in the selection of Supreme Court Judges, thus ensuring the selection of conservative jurists. Hays (2012) argues that the legal system proved to be too resilient and thus Reagan’s actions, though entrepreneurial, failed.

Miles (2015) and David (2015) argue that the PE approach is fruitful as an agent based approach in foreign policy analysis. Here a handful of entrepreneurs who are also very powerful political insiders navigate the political landscape in order to promote they own preferred ideas and policies, working around resistance from democratic accountability mechanisms. Miles (2015) identifies Carl Bildt (the Swedish PM and later Foreign Minister) as the political entrepreneur who contributed to the substantive change of Swedish security policy, whereas David (2015) explores the political entrepreneurship within the Bush administration after 9/11 and the framing of national interest leading to the preemptive strike in Iraq and the redefinition of torture.

Foreign policy analysis, if it can refrain from the exclusive study of exceptional individuals, holds the best promise of a theorization of leadership in entrepreneurship. Despite attempts—some more direct than others—to broach the issue of leadership and entrepreneurship, the issue is far from settled. Are all entrepreneurs leaders or are all leaders entrepreneurs? In what ways do leaders behave entrepreneurially and conversely, what kind of leadership qualities do entrepreneurs have? The leadership literature has yet to infuse the policy entrepreneurship literature, in which, as explained above, is dealt rather tangentially. Returning to the Capano and Galanti
2015 paper, for example, the authors cite negotiation, cooperating with elites and important individual actors, and decision making as the main activities in policy dynamics for brokers, entrepreneurs, and leaders respectively. However, entrepreneurs also negotiate and make decisions. At which point do these characteristics become “main dynamics” is not clear, pointing to conceptual imbroglio entangling not so much brokers, but certainly leaders and entrepreneurs.

2.3.3 Entrepreneurs and Brokers

A parallel concept within the broader field of agency is that of the policy broker. From a structural (network) perspective, a broker is an actor with a structural advantage because they provide a link between actors who are otherwise not connected. In the network literature, entrepreneurs and brokers are often conflated, with an emphasis on how actors manipulate information, innovate, and link other actors (Ingold and Christopoulos, 2015). In the policy literature, a broker is a feature of the ACF, and is an actor who “[…] typically intervene[s] in situations where two or more advocacy coalitions are in competition […] about their beliefs and policy positions” (Ingold and Varone, 2012, p. 319). Though Ingold and Christopoulos (2015) make a convincing argument that in policy studies the broker and the entrepreneur are distinct concepts, elsewhere there is a call for conceptual disentanglement (Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt, Weible, and Sabatier, 2014). In this dissertation I do not venture in the conceptual interrogation of brokers for the following reasons. First, the emergence of broker is inextricably tied to the ACF architecture in general and the advocacy coalitions in particular, which presuppose controversial policies and (until the latest revision of ACF) a pluralistic environment (see, however Nohrstedt [2010] for an application of ACF in the Swedish system). I do not employ ACF in this research, nor do I set out to identify advocacy coalitions. Secondly, the research focus is on entrepreneurs, and a narrow focus on this concept is meant to place it in sharp relief with a view to exploring it further in a non-pluralistic context. For this I made a conscious decision to delineate this study excluding brokerage. In the following section, I lay out the assumptions I employ to identify entrepreneurs in the polis.

2.4 Entrepreneurial Assumptions: How Do We Know an Entrepreneur When We See One?

Mintrom (2000) outlines a set of six assumptions which comprise his theory of policy entrepreneurs. Firstly, policy entrepreneurs must be creative and
insightful and have the ability to see how their proposals will affect the policy debate in the long run. Secondly, policy entrepreneurs are socially sensitive, and perceptive enough to be able to view problems from many different angles. These two assumptions relate to previously articulated theories of policy entrepreneurs and the tenet that they have to be alert and in tune with the community so that they are able to discern emergent problems. Thirdly, policy entrepreneurs must be able to move in and out of a variety of social and political settings—in other words, they must be networked. Fourthly, policy entrepreneurs must be able to argue persuasively, in other words they must be able, through effective rhetoric, to transform social perceptions. By reframing an issue “the entrepreneur generates ‘needs’ and then meets those needs with specific responses” (Scheider, Teske, and Mintrom, 1995, p. 43). Fifthly, policy entrepreneurs must be able to build teams able to pursue their goal successfully. Sixthly, they must be able to ‘lead by example’ that is, inspire their team with their vision for the future, which must appear realistic.

What is more, the public entrepreneur is not an individual working in isolation; rather the milieu in which s/he operates is very important; the social nature of entrepreneurship is undisputed (Mintrom, 2000). Contacts are commonly the main source of ideas that public entrepreneurs come across and take advantage of. They are social actors embedded in local networks, which in turn can alleviate some of the costs of entrepreneurship. I make use of these assumptions as the departure point for identifying political entrepreneurs in research conducted within this dissertation.

2.5 Political Entrepreneurship in Sweden

Conspicuous in this review has been the research in American politics. In addition to Miles (2015), Hogan and Feeney (2012) have researched the role of entrepreneurs in the national Swedish context in a comparative study with the US environment. The authors compare economic policy change in Sweden and in the US in the aftermath of economic crisis and find that the post crisis policy change was the result of the activities of entrepreneurial networks.

Swedish political scientist Elin Wihlborg (2015) employs the concept of translation and sense making to investigate the policy entrepreneur in network governance structures. Though the piece is conceptual and not necessarily grounded in a Swedish empirical context, it does echo the advances in Swedish institutionalism, which, influenced by Latour, also draws on translation and sense making to investigate how organizational actors make sense of public reforms as well as how their everyday interpretations
is a form of agency, which informs their practices (Boxenbaum and Strandgaard Pedersen, 2011).

Additionally, the paradox of local party formation in Sweden is solved by introducing the concept of party entrepreneurs (Erlingsson, 2011). These are self-interested, discontent with the status quo individuals, who build political parties (understood to be collective goods) for personal profit. As with the discussion earlier in this chapter, the notion of profit here implies political, rather than monetary, profit. What is more, Erlingsson (2008) points to the diffusion of party entrepreneurs as the reason behind local party formation in the Swedish context. More specifically, potential entrepreneurs in one municipality at a given point in time are inspired by an earlier party entrepreneur who formed a party at an earlier time in a neighboring municipality.

Conversely, Hysing and Olsson (2011; 2012) and Olsson and Hysing (2012) examine the agentic capacity of public officials in Swedish municipalities. In the context of a strong, constitutionally mandated strong local self-government, the responsibility for many major welfare functions rests with the municipality. The authors develop a concept similar to the one of the political entrepreneur, that of the inside activist. Hysing and Olsson (2011) identify the inside activist as: a public official and therefore an insider; an expert in (environmental) policy; an actor making use of network resources (knowledge, lobbying, and the shaping of opinion), and an actor committed to green values. These actors were active in the percentage of Swedish municipalities (23 percent) that performed better in environmental governing.

According to the authors, the main difference between the policy entrepreneur and the inside activist is that the latter is a person in comparison to the former, which is a function. Additionally, though inside (green) activists promote their own green values, policy entrepreneurs might not promote their own policies. These differences blur, however, and activists tend to often bleed into entrepreneurs and vice versa and the distinction becomes more a matter of emphasis and perspective.

Regarding the first point, can we claim that a person in general and a public official in particular is an activist at all times? Perhaps if the same person found themselves in a more restrictive context, or conversely, a more progressive one in which they would not need to be activists to promote their green values, they would not act in such a way to be characterized as ‘activists’. Additionally, and to the extent that this actor is a public
official often with managerial responsibilities, does this not point to the activist being a function rather than a person?

What is more, the concept of an inside activist might very well be a function of the substantive policy sector (environmental politics), the wickedness of which tends to engender Wilson’s (1980) entrepreneurial politics. A study conducted in the U.S. at the state level, finds policy entrepreneurs to be particularly similar to inside activists. More specifically, Rabe (2004) finds that the variation in state response when it comes to environmental policy is largely due to policy entrepreneurs rather than institutional factors or even focusing events. The entrepreneurs are usually mid-level public officials in state bureaucracies (in other words, actors with managerial responsibilities), experts in the field of environmental policy, with experience in navigating arduous policymaking environments and well positioned to build coalitions. Similarly to the local public officials in the studies by Hysing and Olsson (2011) and Olsson and Hysing (2012), these actors have quite a bit of latitude. Finally, “[t]hese officials consider what they are doing to be among the most exciting and meaningful work of their careers” (Rabe, 2004, p. 25).

Indeed the question of what actually motivates the policy entrepreneur is under researched in the literature (Mintrom and Norman, 2009). Additionally, anecdotal evidence (see for example vignettes in Schneider, Teske and Mintrom, 1995) points to policy entrepreneurs pushing for policies based on their own values. Generally, the policy literature is equivocal regarding whether entrepreneurs promote their own values or not because it is more fruitful to theorize process rather than individual’s motives at the micro level. This does not mean, however, that entrepreneurs exclusively promote policies other than their own.

The difficulty in determining the motives of entrepreneurs is illustrated in the case of ‘entrepreneurial politicians’ in Åre (Nyhlén, 2011). Nyhlén reports that the motives of elected politicians were to create a successful region for people to live and work in, rather than (political) profit, painting a rather normative picture of politicians. In other words, the evidentiary parameters and subsequent analytical tools remain opaque; would politicians be entrepreneurial in the name of a successful region if that meant they would not be reelected? What is more, the motive of having a successful region for other people to live in could also be interpreted as self-interested if it resulted in reelection. Nyhlén acknowledges this and calls for a broader conceptualization of ‘profit’.
2.5 Entrepreneurship in the Polis: Taking stock and minding the gaps

This review of the extant literature reveals that by-and-large, the dimensions of the agentic capacity of actors in the public sphere is fairly well researched though with considerable divergence. It is also well accepted in the literature that the goal of entrepreneurs is to affect change or to contribute to the consolidation of such change. It is the general political context and the consequences that has on entrepreneurship and the entrepreneur in the polis that is generally under researched. This implies the interrogation of contextual contingencies such as the kind of substantive policy sector, the complexity of the policy problem, the stage of the policy process and whether or not there is a crisis present, all set in the larger background of a pluralistic vs. a consensual political system.

Figure 1.1 provides a visualization of the preceding literature review.
Figure 1.1 is a visualization, indeed a graphic representation of the extant PE literature. A picture. It is meant to distill the literature and to convey the familiar interactions and tension points between agency and structure. The outer circle represents the broad, de facto political context at hand. The political entrepreneurship research reviewed in this cover essay (with the exception of Hammond, 2013) takes place in Western advanced democracies, though Meydani (2009; 2015) has explored PE in Israel as well. The broad distinction made here is between pluralistic and consensual systems. Though conceivably one could interrogate PE in non-democratic environments, I do not believe such an exercise would be fruitful.

The inner circle represents the more specific contextual factors of level of governance, substantive policy sector, level of complexity of the policy sector, perception of urgency, and stage of policy process. The solid circle
in the middle, political entrepreneurship, is operationalized as the agentic capacity of the entrepreneurial actors manifested in such actions as mobilizing resources; the willingness to take risks for political profit: amassing coalitions and the leadership skills required for this, and being embedded in the sociopolitical fabric that is, being well networked. Political entrepreneurship aims at changing (and at times maintaining in the face of resistance) the status quo in terms of policies and institutions.

Though this broad framework does not include sharply defined causal relationships, it does reflect the fact that political entrepreneurship is being shaped by, and at the same time shapes, the contextual factors in the inner circle. The broad political context is given and it also informs all the factors in the inner circle as well as political entrepreneurship itself.

As elaborated during the literature review, most of the extant research has focused on the entrepreneur in the polis as an agent of change. In 2009, Mintrom and Norman outlined a set of directions for the scholarship of policy entrepreneurship, noting that “[f]urther work to integrate policy entrepreneurship into mainstream theorizations of policy change holds the potential of changing our notions of the mainstream itself” (p. 663). Inter alia, and in turning mainstream on its head, Mintrom and Norman (2009) (i) recognize the need for a better understanding of the interaction between policy entrepreneurs and their contexts; (ii) bring attention to the bureaucratic actors who act entrepreneurially, and (iii) call for further investigation of how contextual factors hinder or foster entrepreneurship. What is more, most policy process models and frameworks aimed at understanding public policy making downplay the role of agency. Peters (2015) contends that a better understanding of behavior at the individual level could explain more about the way decisions are made and counterbalance the more mechanistic features of these models. He also cites the role of the entrepreneurial agency as an example of a tool with which to understand processes that might otherwise be attributed to randomness.

This dissertation is geared towards responding to these calls for further research, which mark the gaps in the extant literature. Here I remind the reader the research questions outlined in the beginning of this cover essay and I create linkages between them and the points above by Mintrom and Norman (2009) and Peters (2015).

- Q1: How do contextual factors inform the realization of entrepreneurial agency? This question addresses directly point iii above. As I explain in the next chapter, I interrogate policy entrepreneurship in the Swedish context (across levels of governance and substantive
sectors) with a view to understanding how a consensual system, in
which conflict is not encouraged, affects the emergence of entrepre-
neurial agency among member of civil society, bureaucrats and pol-
iticians.

• Q2: How do contextual factors inform the strategies entrepreneurial
actors use to affect change? This question connects to point ii in the
sense that implementation of policy is carried out by bureaucracies.
At the same time, it is the question which challenges the main-
stream the most in my view, because we tend to associate the policy
entrepreneur as the framer of policies, making a splash with their
efforts to bring public opinion on their side. It is very fruitful for the
conceptual development of policy entrepreneurship to understand
how bureaucrats can be entrepreneurial while they implement a
policy. Here we must recognize also that bureaucrats have also the
ability to make policy and this is a point taken up in this disserta-
tion. This question is further explored through three different p
olicy sectors that may call for different strategies, all in the general
background of the Swedish context which promotes cooperation
and collaboration among actors.

• Q3: What is the role of political entrepreneurship and the political
entrepreneur in macro-level theories such as critical junctures and
policy transfer? Investigating the role of PE in them can further our
understanding of interplay between agency and structure when it
comes to affecting change.

Finally, and if we accept the assumption that PE is a framework through
which we understand public policy making, stretching the applicability of
it not only increases the legitimacy of the framework, but also has the po
tential to conceptually enhance it through lessons learned with each appli-
cation. In fact, in the introduction of the second edition of the Theories of
the Policy Process (2007) Sabatier makes specific reference to the changes
made in that edition “in reaction to the charge of American chauvinism” (p.
11). These changes included inter alia expanded applications in non-Amer-
ican contexts specifically for ACF and PET. This dissertation should be seen
as an application of PE in a non-American pluralistic environment, build-
ing on extant work in such contexts. This does not mean that one has to
throw away the baby with the bathwater. Instead, expanding the applica-
bility allows us to conceptually tweak the framework’s components, while
having its core as a departure point.
3 Research Design

I don’t doubt, of course, that there are products of the human mind, which, by nature, are more “objective” and self-evident than others — a mathematical equation, for example. However, one must be a bit naïve to not have realized in our age how limited — in all its glory — the poor human mind is, and with what staggering speed this thing that we call “reality” transforms, in spite of all the “constants”. (Costas Tahtsis, From the Low Viewpoint).

3.1 Philosophical Commitments

All research is framed within certain assumptions that is, philosophical views which inform the ways knowledge is produced (Mir and Watson, 2000). Although often the researchers’ philosophical viewpoints are hidden in the research, Creswell (2009) argues for the explicit articulation of philosophical worldviews in the text, since such an articulation will elucidate the researcher’s choice of qualitative, quantitative or mixed methods. Worldviews are also called paradigms or “basic set[s] of beliefs that guide action” (Guba quoted in Creswell, p. 6). Creswell goes on to say that the choice of worldview depends on the discipline area of the researcher, their past experiences, the philosophical positions of their advisors, their academic interests, and the way they write. The adherence to a philosophical worldview will shape the subsequent choice of research method, as well as the structure of the text. Costas Tahtsis, well known author, public figure and one of the very few to boldly step out of the closet during the schizophrenic realities of Greece after the fall of the junta in 1974, expresses within the quote above the worldviews guiding my research. Realities play out in the plural, though mercifully, some realities are more valid than others. This is not an unproblematic way of understanding the world, of course,
as in recent decades intellectual “paradigm wars” have been waged be-
tween the positivist/empiricist paradigm and the constructivist/interpre-
tive one in an effort to prove the superiority of each respective model
(Tashakkori & Teddlie 2008, p.8).

Concepts central to philosophy in general and to philosophy of science
in particular are those of ontology and epistemology. The former broadly
refers to the study of what there is, dealing with the nature of reality and
covering a multitude of philosophical questions (Bevir, 2008; Hof-
weber, 2011; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). Not surprisingly it comes from
the Greek, in which the plural of the root, ὄντα (onda), means” existing
things, the present (as opposed to the past and future)”, but also “reality
and truth (as opposed to that which is not)”; it also refers to” that which
one has, a property”, substance (Liddell and Scott, 1889). Many classical
philosophical problems are ontological problems indeed, including
whether or not there is a god or the question of the existence of universals.
However, the philosophical problem of ontology, especially if we under-
stand it as the second meaning of Liddell and Scott above (that which one
has), also pertains to the relationship of the universal to the particular, to
the extent that there are universals and particulars. Ontology also refers to
the way events like “John eating a cookie” relate to the particulars of John
and the cookie as well as the relation of (John’s) eating (Hofweber, 2011,
p.7). What is more, there are debates regarding whether an object can re-
main the same if its constituent parts change. For example, do legislative
bodies remain temporally identical if all their members change (Bevir, 2008)?

If ontology deals with things we believe are out there, epistemology
deals with how we can know these things (Steffensmeier, Brady, and Col-
lier, 2008). In political science, knowledge largely comes from experience,
rendering for the most part political scientists empiricists (Bevir 2008). This
dovetails with the meaning of the word of which epistemology is a deriva-
tive. Ἐπιστήμη (episteme) means ”acquaintance with a matter”; generally ”knowledge” and especially ”scientific knowledge” (Liddell and Scott, 1889).

Neither the nature of things nor the way we come to know these things
is constant and without debate in philosophy of science in general and po-
litical science in particular. For example, logical positivists (even though
political science has moved quite far from logical positivism) disregarded
ontological questions as meaningless (Bevir, 2008). Foucault conducts an
archaeological inquiry in the “episteme of the Western Culture” not “to de-
scribe the progress of knowledge towards an objectivity in which today’s
science can finally be recognized” but rather to show “the configurations within the space of knowledge which have given rise to the diverse forms of empirical science” (Foucault, 1970, p.xxii). Foucault posits that episteme at the time of Renaissance was characterized by similitude whereas in the Classical era the prevalent episteme was resemblance and ordering. The episteme of the human sciences is precarious because the object of study is the individual (man in Foucault’s words). This episteme occupies the three dimensional space in the interstices between mathematical and physical sciences; philology, economics and biology, and philosophy. Foucault warns us of the precariousness of this episteme stemming from the association of human sciences with the sciences that predate them (1970). In other words and without intending to reduce this discussion to a mere sentence, I want to point out that both ontology and epistemology are fluid concepts that do not remain unchanged over time. The way we understand the world and how we go about finding things out is fluid.

Philosophical debates about (the existence of) reality, whether and how objectively it may be knowable have practical implications to the practicing political scientist. The methodology one uses provides a tool kit for the researcher investigating questions not unlike the research questions mentioned elsewhere in this dissertation. The philosophical position one holds belies the choice between quantitative and qualitative methodological traditions. “Mainstream quantitative methods” associated with (post)positivism is an approach characterized by the use of regression analysis and similar methods for the purpose of causal inference, whereas qualitative methods may encompass single-case studies, small N comparisons, concept analysis, the comparative-historical method, and ethnographic studies associated with constructivism and interpretivism (Brady, Collier, and Seawright, 2004). The former became prevalent in political science after the rise of the behavioralism in the 1950 and 60s; a backlash in the 1970s and 80s brought on the rise of constructivism and a subsequent polarization of the two camps.

Briefly, the main difference between positivism and interpretivism is that the former rejects any form of metaphysics, positing that knowledge is based on pure observation; the latter embraces the notions that metaphysics (in the form of human intentions, beliefs, norms etc.) cannot be eliminated (Howe, 1988). Again in brief, as this is not a dissertation on the philosophy of science, the fundamental assumptions of each tradition are arranged in the table below:
Table 2 Paradigmatic Tenets of Competing Traditions (based on Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Positivism/Postpositivism</th>
<th>Constructivism/Interpretivism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ontology</strong></td>
<td>An independent reality &quot;out there&quot; exists</td>
<td>Reality is socially constructed; collective reconstructions sometimes merge into consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Epistemology</strong></td>
<td>Dualist/objective</td>
<td>Subjectivist; new knowledge is a function of the interaction between the inquirer and the inquired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Methodology</strong></td>
<td>Experimental, time and context free generalizations, causal relationships</td>
<td>Dialectic, hermeneutic, constantly refined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Values</strong></td>
<td>Values are excluded and have no influence</td>
<td>Values are formative and are included in the research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Position of inquirer</strong></td>
<td>The objective scientist is placed outside his/her research to maximize objectivity</td>
<td>The researcher is a participant, enabling the multitude of voices to emerge</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

My own view on the debate is summarized by Howe (1988): [n]either dogmatic adherence to the positivistic pipe dream nor chaotic methodological relativism (let alone the two, side by side) promise to advance research” (p. 14). At a time where social questions are complex and increasingly investigated in interdisciplinary environments, it seems oxymoronic to adhere to a purist view. Moreover, I firmly disregard the existence of one universal truth and find large scale quantitative research to lack the depth necessary for an interesting narrative. At the same time, though naive and impossible total objectivity might be, a world (un)governed by total subjectivity is rather hard to imagine (Morgan, 2007). I view method merely as a means to an end, the end being to make some interesting knowledge claims about a specific subject.

Therefore, I concur with Howe (1988) and use his argument to substantiate the pragmatic approach I take in this dissertation in practical as well as philosophical terms. In practical terms, I use the methodological tool that works as a means to the end of each constituent paper. In philosophical terms, I am attracted to a school of thought which rejects a priori metaphysics and foregrounds the notion that knowledge claims are not abstract but
tied to contingencies in terms of beliefs, interests and projects (Hookway, 2013; Howe, 1988).

### 3.2 Pragmatism

With American origins and based on the writings of Peirce, James and Dewey, pragmatism considers the effects and consequences of our actions. In other words, when judging ideas or theoretical frameworks, instead of thinking in terms of one universal context-free right way on one hand, or multiple, indistinguishable realities on the other, one should consider the practical empirical consequences of this theory. Pragmatism addresses the “so what” and the “what does it matter” of research and “…unstiffens all our theories, limbers them up and sets each one at work” (James, 1907/2014, p. 63). Pragmatism offers the bridge from theory to practice and considers the practical implications on the ones who are being researched. It encompasses elements from positivism and constructivism, if one imagines the two paradigms on a continuum. It allows for the usage of both qualitative and quantitative methods, depending on the kind of data collected. Rejecting both total objectivity and total subjectivity it espouses the concept of intersubjectivity, which captures the duality of doing research between the two different frames of reference. (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Morgan, 2007)

What is more, pragmatism acknowledges different levels of reality with varying degrees of anchoring (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Morgan, 2007). James (1907/2014) takes an instrumental view of truth, claiming that ideas become true insofar that they satisfactorily connect parts of our experience. It follows, then, that not only realities play out in the plural, but so do truths. Both Peirce and James endorse the fallibilist view that any of the beliefs we hold and methods we use might turn out to be flawed. Later pragmatists, like Rorty and Davidson, claim that since we are fallible, we are not in the position to recognize if any of our beliefs is actually true; all we can do is recognize if it meets the standards of acceptance in our current scientific community (Hookway, 2013). This is a notion similar to Kuhn’s normal science (1970). In Deweyan pragmatism the mind is in continuous interaction with the world, producing knowledge in a series of transactional experiences and that knowledge has the ability to reshape reality (Garrison, 1994; Hall, 2013). “Pragmatism is a commitment to uncertainty” in that knowledge produced by research is relative with transitory causal relationships—even if any exist (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009; Feilzer, 2010, p. 14). Bottom line, when mixed methods are used pragmatically, they
are being used intelligently and with care in order to provide information for informed judgements for the purpose of solving a given problem; the choice of the using one method vs. another is not dogmatic, but rather utilitarian: can it help me solve my problem? (Feilzer, 2010; Hall, 2013). This instrumental side of pragmatism is perhaps its strength but also its weakness in the sense that when it comes to a pragmatism approach to mixed methods, the result might be an uncritical adoption methods without adequate justification. (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Hall, 2013). Researchers must take care in justifying their choices.

My choice of methodology in each individual paper outlined in the remainder of this section was driven by the research question and the purpose of each paper and was geared towards, as explained above, to solving the problem at hand. My choices were driven by the sole question: how can I best investigate agency with the cases and the data at hand? What practical implications do my choices have? Pragmatism as a philosophy behind the choice of methodology is appealing because it sidesteps the quantitative-qualitative debate. In any event, this is a qualitative dissertation building on case study work. As will be shown below, the “mixed methods” notion comes in the choice of data collection tools and analytical tools.

In paper III Petridou and Sparf sought to explore the role of entrepreneurial agency during a critical juncture which brought about institutional changes in the crisis management field in Sweden. The ambition of the paper was to understand the mechanism behind the critical juncture as well as place the role of agency in it. What is more, the circle of actors in the field of crisis management at the national level is rather small, lending itself to interviews and the qualitative (albeit systematic) analysis of the data using process tracing. Paper IV also lent itself to process tracing and interviews as the method of data collection, at least in the first part of the paper. In the second part, Petridou and Olausson interviewed the entire population of existing river groups, which was indeed a small N. This lent itself to within-case comparison supported by across-case, small N comparison. Paper V combined interviews with formal social network analysis. The number of the focus groups participants as well as the purpose of the paper, which was partly to investigate entrepreneurial agency among the participants, favored a survey questionnaire as opposed to interviews with the more than 100 participants. In conclusion and adhering to pragmatic values, I made use of the methodological tools that fit each case best.
3.3 Case Selection

Kyle laughed. “Bill, we’re nearing political silly season right before the presidential election. Magnitsky is too much of a win-win for the leadership to schedule a vote.”

“But we have full bipartisan support. This seems to be the one thing in Washington that everyone agrees on.”

“That’s the point, Bill. Now that the election is in full swing, no one wants to talk about things that everyone agrees on. None of these guys can afford to make the others look good.” (Bill Browder, Red Notice).

An election period is, of course, a time for supreme posturing and rhetoric but the exchange above captures American politics in general: a pluralistic system based on separation of powers, where being perceived by your constituents in agreement with the other side might cost you your seat. As will become evident in the next section, a large segment of the literature on political entrepreneurship has been generated from empirical studies in conflictual political environments and in complex policy fields. After all, “…much of the study of politics revolves around conflict in the public sphere” (Rathbun, 2008, 694).

Although the papers comprising this dissertation are distinct pieces of case study research and neither comparative nor cumulative when considered together, taken as a whole they shed light to the nuanced agency at the Swedish local, regional and national levels of governance. It is implicit in the literature that PE takes place in high conflictual systems. Sweden, with its consensus-oriented democratic tradition, does not exhibit the “flexible bargaining culture” exhibited in the Anglo-American system (Kuhlman and Wollmann, 2014, p. 13). In other words, what does PE look like, if at all, in a consensual system? In this sense, research of policy entrepreneurship in a single country context is in implicit comparison with other systems (Peters, 1998).

The Nordic model in general and the Swedish model in particular, are “consultative democracies”, focused on inputs rather than outputs (Goodin, 2001, n.p.). The aim of the Swedish model emphasizes the process in which every distinct organized interest has a voice, rather than equal amount of actual influence in the outcome of this process. A most salient feature of Scandinavian politics and consensus models is that actors strive for compromise and even literal consensus as well as inclusion of all possible organized interests rather than open conflict and exclusion (Goodin, 2001).
Drafting legislation at the national level requires systematic consultation of a multitude of groups—all major interest groups involved, mainly through the process of *remiss*. This is an extensive process during which the proposal is sent out to all relevant organizations for feedback, encouraging a rational debate about the merits of the proposal and finding points of consensus among major parties and interest organizations (Einhorn and Logue, 2003). Accommodating conflicting interests by seeking compromise so that everyone agrees on the output is part of the Swedish exceptionality thesis, an exceptionality which according to Pierre has been on the decline in recent years (Pierre, 2016). Still, the Swedish way of policymaking stands out in comparison to that of other countries. In addition to being open and consensual as described above, Swedish policymaking is also deliberative in the sense that problem-solving is done by technocrats and rationalistic in that great efforts are being made to amass as much information as possible about the political issue at hand (Petterson 2016, Anton 1969). In other words, the opposite of “rash, abrupt, irrational, or indeed, exciting” (Petterson 2016, p. 651).

Interestingly, this seemingly democratic and inclusionary process can result in the debate being foreclosed before it reaches the public (Goodin 2001). Even though Pettersson (2016) contends that the degree in which the Swedish policymaking is open, deliberative, rationalistic and consensual has decreased since the 1960s, [o]pen conflicts are often avoided and the political rhetoric of the major political actors is still comparatively low-keyed and open-minded.” (Pettersson 2016: 660). Goodin says that [t]he operative rule is “fight in private” (Goodin, 2001, n.p.).

This dissertation is set up as a crucial case and more specifically a least-likely crucial case that is, “least likely to fulfil a theoretical prediction” (Eckstein, 1992; Gerring, 2008, p. 659). Even though the methodological value of the crucial case in confirming or refuting a theory has been criticized by methodological purists, the crucial case rationale is implicit in case study research (Gerring, 2008). In simplified terms, the least-likely crucial case subscribes to the Sinatra doctrine: if the theory can make it here, it can make it anywhere. This “most difficult” research design requires that it be “extremely difficult or clearly petulant” to dismiss a finding as simply an aberration (Eckstein, 1992, p. 157; Gerring, 2008).

Sweden, because of its consensual system, is the crucial case. In order to fully explore the Swedish case on the basis of its consensual sensibilities, I made an effort to achieve within-case variation resulting in research on
three levels of governance (national, regional, and local) and three substantive policy sectors. Studying PE at three levels of governance was a way to parse the Swedish case and peer into its constituent parts. The choice of policy sectors underscores their relevance at their respective level of governance that is, crisis management at the national level, flood risk governance at the regional level, and economic development at the local level. The variation in the policy sector is salient; as Peters (2015) states: “[p]erhaps the fundamental point […] is that policymaking is not the same across policy areas and dependent on the degree of urgency in making a policy choice” (p.62). Peters (2015) goes on to discuss complexity in policymaking as an important issue in policy terms. Complexity has at least two dimensions: technical and political. Technically complex issues are hard to understand (e.g. tax reforms) or they involve many interactions between the individual and social issues (e.g. crime). Political complexity mainly speaks to the multitude of interest involved in the policy domain, with very different understandings of what the policy problem is. An example of this is education policy.

Crisis management at the national level was chosen partly because of the magnitude of the tsunamic crisis, which was in the same league as the 9/11 attacks, Katrina, and the Madrid and London bombings (Boin, McConnell and ’t Hart, 2008). Recent literature (Hogan and Doyle, 2007 and Hogan and Feeney, 2012) explored the role of entrepreneurs in the policy making after a crisis (notably the latter using a Swedish crisis in a comparative study) and part of the research is a contribution to this literature. This case was politically complex due to bureaucratic reforms it entailed and the subsequent amount of resistance these reforms faced. The sense of urgency was quite heightened as well.

Flood risk governance, “denot[ing] both the institutional structure and the policy process that guide and restrain collective activities of a group, society or international community to regulate, reduce or control risk problems” (Renn, Klinke, and van Asselt, 2011, p.231) echoes the work of E.Ostrom (1965) on public entrepreneurship and water resource management. Though the Swedish case is not about the allocation of scarce water resources, it involves the collective action of stakeholders with diverse interests organized in networks (self-generating and enforced). Insights on the role of agency in the functioning of flood risk governance structures, i.e. the networks, may contribute to our understanding of successful cooperation and collaboration among state, private, and volunteer organizations which is a very relevant issue currently in Sweden. The multiple interests
the stakeholders represent as well as the nature of flood risk governance belie the political complexity of this case. This policy domain also has the potential of being technically complex due to the multidimensionality of flood risk prevention and management.

Conversely, economic development at the local level was a way to research a noncomplex policy process (both in technical and political terms) since no funds or major capital investment decisions were directly connected to the act of drafting a vision plan for the city. In this instance, economic development includes “soft” development factors and in the spirit of a more holistic notion of community development. This policy field, especially at the local level is a classic case for the research of PE as has been mentioned elsewhere in this cover essay. In an effort to decouple PE from policy change, I conducted research while the process was unfolding. In the previous two cases I chose on the dependent variable (for a discussion on this, see for example Collier, Mahoney and Seawright, 2004) and worked backwards. The added value of these two cases was the opportunity to examine how entrepreneurial agency can inform macro-level theories such as critical junctures and policy transfer.

3.4 Methodological Considerations

Case study research enjoys not an insignificant amount of criticism in political science. In this section I address potential methodological considerations.

3.4.1 Validity and Reliability issues

Where quantitative studies focus on breadth, case studies focus on depth and thick description based on a high degree of contextualization. This level of contextualization in the Swedish case was a direct response to the call by Mintrom and Norman (2009) for conceptual refinement with a view to theoretical refinement. The investigation of PE in the Swedish case and a conceptual refinement of what it means to be a political entrepreneur in Sweden, enhances the levels of conceptual validity, or the identification and measurement of the indicators that represent the theoretical concepts under investigation (George and Bennett, 2005). The concept of political entrepreneurship in this dissertation is treated as dichotomous; a person is an entrepreneur in a particular situation or they are not. My coauthors and I as the researchers identified individuals as entrepreneurs or not, in paper V with the help of SNA, otherwise by comparing them against the defini-
tional behavioral manifestations of taking advantage of opportunities, be-
ing certain in networks, being politically astute and taking advantage of opportunities. The other alternative would have been to ask a co-worker or manager whether a specific actor are an entrepreneur (see for example, Mintrom, 2000). This solution, however, would be just as (if not more) sus-
ceptible to bias as the researcher doing the identification. Does the third party understand what a policy entrepreneur is? Are they more likely to answer one way or another based on whether they like the person in ques-
tion or not?

Yin (1994) identifies a further four criteria for judging the quality of re-
search designs and proposes tests to ensure quality. First, to ensure con-
struct validity, the establishment of “correct operational measures for the concepts being studied “(p. 33), Yin proposes the use of multiple sources of evidence; establish chain of evidence, and using key informants to review a draft of the text. Multiple sources of evidence were used in papers III, IV, and V. What is more, drafts of papers III and V were sent to key informants. Papers III and IV were co-authored with the authors analyzing the data independently.

Second, to ensure internal validity, defined as “establishing a causal rela-
tionship, whereby certain conditions are shown to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious relationships” (Yin, 1994, p. 33), I used counterfactual logic to shore up the exploration of causal mechanisms through the use of process tracing. This addressed the issue of equifinality. In paper III, the historical analysis of the critical juncture shored up by counterfactual logic shows that close cooperation between the entrepre-
nears—the politician and the bureaucrats—overcame resistance and con-
tributed to the establishment of the new bureaucracy. In paper IV, policy entrepreneurs were one of many factors which rendered some networks more functional than others, but how much they contributed to this is not disaggregated. At the same time, case studies are good at identifying vari-
ables that matter, but now how much they matter. Finally, in paper V, an account of the actions of the public officials details the fact that the process would have looked very different if they (the public officials) were not pre-
sent—an implicit counterfactual logic.

Third, external validity refers to generalization, which is not necessarily the aim of a single case study. However, through the application of the PE framework in multiple levels of governance and three different policy sec-
Least-likely, crucial case studies are important to theory testing and building by using multiple observations from a single case (George and Bennett, 2005). Finally, to address the reliability problem, or to what extent the operations of this research can be replicated, data analysis was conducted on software such as netigate for the survey, UCINET for the SNA, and atlas.ti for the interview data. Data were coded and the codebooks are stored for eventual future use. What is more, in papers III and IV, two researchers analyzed the data separately. The following section details the data collection procedures.

3.5 Data Collection

In the first paper, I sought to position recent PE research in the wider scholarship of policy process theories. The role of the entrepreneur has been well documented in the past as a crucial complement to the most established theories at the time (Mintrom and Norman, 2009), but the question remained on whether entrepreneurship has evolved in itself as a lens with explanatory power. The review was designed to capture both trajectories because it focused on the larger topic of theories of the policy process and not just PE. It was limited to journal articles in 2011 and 2012, though it included a 2013 special issue of the Policy Studies Journal on new theories of the policy process. Consistent keywords spelling out the titles of each of the frameworks were used in major databases (for example Web of Knowledge and Google Scholar) while each issue of the major political science, policy sciences, and public administration journals in 2011 and 2012 was researched in detail to ensure that no salient article was missed. The result was a systematically state of the art on the trends of policy process theories.

In addition to public documents, in depth (elite) interviews were used in all empirical papers (III, IV, and V). This was not only unavoidable, but also desirable. In paper V, interviews were used to triangulate data from participant observation and formal social network analysis. In papers III and IV, interviews were the main source of data for the ensuing analysis. Naïve behavioralism with its obsession with objectivity on one hand and naïve rationalism with its assumption that actors would respond the same (rationally) to the same stimuli on the other, have cast not insignificant skepticism to the use of interviews as a data collection tool in political science (Rathbun, 2008). However, following a trend of methodological pluralism in the discipline, in-depth interviews along with participant observation and qualitative content analysis are accepted as data collection means that give greater depth compared to quantitative data sets (Munck,
Most importantly, interviews often times are the best means to explore the important of agency (Rathbun, 2008), which is at the very heart of this dissertation as expressed in its aim and research questions in the introductory section.

Using interviews as a data collection tool does not imply uncritical acceptance of information. We were aware of “the perils of strategic reconstruction” (Rathbun, 2008, p. 694), especially in paper III which involved a historical account of institutional change and the national level. To combat this, we had very few a priori questions; we mainly let our respondents tell their story interrupting for questions only when needed. The stories told by politicians (by both major parties) and public officials (active and retired) when compared to each other within each paper were very similar revealing very little bias, if any.

There is an added layer in the collection of data for these papers that has to be noted. I am not a Swede, though the co-authors of papers III and IV are. The standard caveat at the start of any interview (whether I conducted it alone or together with my co-author) was that I speak and understand Swedish and that the respondent was encouraged to speak in their own language even if I might switch temporarily to English. I experienced my outsidership as an advantage during the interview process as respondents were very willing to tell as complete a story as possible. What is more, as part of the same introduction we made a conscious effort to convey to the respondents that we were experts in the field (Rubin and Rubin, 1997). In papers III and IV, where co-authors were involved in analyzing the data, arriving (separately) at the same conclusion with them only strengthened the validity of our study.

Interviews and participant observation were the data collection methods used at the onset of the empirical investigation of paper III. This was an unusual case in the sense that it involved an ongoing process with a yet undetermined result. Because of this, it lent itself to the purpose of the paper, which was to interrogate entrepreneurship in everyday, noncomplex, mundane processes. This involved identifying the entrepreneur through the behaviors documented in the literature without having the benefit (or handicap) of hindsight. Interviews and participant observation were suitable for the four public servants which as a first step I identified myself. This is common practice among PE case studies--for example, see Brouwer and Huitema 2015; Meydani 2009, 2015; Mintrom 2013, 2015; Seifert 2015; Verduijn 2015).
As a second step, the focus group participants were asked to name influential stakeholders and many identified the public servants. A total of 127 people participated in the focus groups, the latter arranged thematically. Their number, the thematic setup of the participation process, and the affiliation of the participation with civil society organizations were factors that pointed to the use of a survey to uncover not only background information, but also their perception of the process in terms of manifested conflict and influential actors.

3.6 Analytical Tools

The analytical tools used in the individual papers range from formal social network analysis to process tracing and their role in this dissertation is outlined below.

3.6.1 Formal Social Network Analysis

The survey distributed in paper V went one step further in applying formal network analysis to one of the focus groups, which was chosen for this purpose because of its theme (enterprise) and its high level of activity relative to the other groups thus making it more likely that entrepreneurial activity would be present. What is more, the vast majority of the focus group participants were either representatives of an interest group or public servants; it was reasonable to make the assumption that they had had earlier interactions with each other in some capacity. Formal network analysis has been used elsewhere to interrogate policy entrepreneurship, mostly in complex policy sectors such as the environment (Christopoulos and Ingold, 2015; Ingold, 2011; Ingold and Christopoulos, 2015). The main rationale for choosing SNA is the “generic hypothesis of network theory“, which states that “an actor’s position in a network determines in part the constraints and opportunities that he or she will encounter, and therefore identifying that position is important for predicting actor outcomes such as performance, behavior, or beliefs” (Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson 2013, p.1). The question that I set out to answer by utilizing network theory was whether central actors acted entrepreneurially in this particular network. The network data gleaned by the survey was triangulated with qualitative data that is, participant observation and interviews.

3.6.2 Process Tracing, Within-Case Analysis, and Small N Comparison

“Living forwards and understanding backwards—a crucial condition of what it means to be human” (Olsson 2005: iv). This is the tenet in papers III
and IV, which aim at interrogating the causal mechanism resulting in change. A causal mechanism is understood to be “a system of interlocking parts that transmits causal forces from X to Y” (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 29), or in other words the processes through which causes articulate their effects (Goertz and Mahoney, 2012) Taking a mechanistic approach allows us to focus on actors and actions without disregarding the role of institutions and other entities beyond the individual (Hedström and Ylidoski, 2010); in other words, this pragmatic approach allows for the interrogation of the role of entrepreneurial actors (agency) in the contiguous sequence of events within the critical juncture and policy transfer processes respectively, leading up to change.

The point of the body of research comprising this dissertation is to produce new knowledge on the subject of PE specifically in the Swedish context with the understanding that policy is highly contextualized in spatial as well as temporal terms. For this reason, in configurative, qualitative research, considerable attention is paid to the linkages among events, process, and actors within an individual case, which are the main sources of leverage when it comes to causal inference. (Goerz and Mahoney, 2012; Peters, 1998). The exegetical narrative must then necessarily consist of ‘thick description’, focusing on depth (rather than breadth) of knowledge so that the reader can fully understand the specificities of the case and the individual components of the researcher’s argumentation (Peters, 1998). This has been the case in papers III, IV, and V, where a full comprehension of the context is essential.

At the same time and in order to shore up the causal logic of paper III, we conducted a series of hoop tests (Collier, 2011; van Evera, 1997; Mahoney, 2012). A hoop test is a process tracing test proposing that a presence of a piece of evidence in a case be necessary for a hypothesis to be valid (Goertz and Mahoney, 2012). Since we claim in this paper that a series of events were individually necessary and collectively sufficient for the result of the critical juncture, proving that each event was necessary goes a long way to support our causal mechanism.

Additionally I take care to address equifinality in papers III, IV, and V. We do this with counterfactual logic, used in both qualitative and quantitative studies. In order for one to assess a counterfactual argument, one needs to conduct a within-case analysis of a case (Goertz and Mahoney, 2012). A counterfactual is not a statement of fact and is always expressed as a conditional statement in optative mood: would X have taken place if Y were not present? Would the Secretariat for Crisis Management have been
under the Prime Minister’s office if it were not for the critical juncture? Would the river group networks have been nationwide practice if it were not for the policy entrepreneur? Would the networks which function well be functioning just as well if entrepreneurs were not present? Would the drafting of the vision plan in Östersund look the same if it were not for the entrepreneurs? The fundamental problem of causal inference is that we cannot rewind the series of events so that we can observe what happens if we change an event—or a value in a variable. The analysis of the counterfactual helps us assess what would have happened if---by using general knowledge and in depth knowledge of the particular case (Goertz and Mahoney, 2012).

The choice of a specific context speaks to implicit comparison with the larger body of scholarship. A small N comparison is a useful analytical tool to interrogate the role of policy entrepreneurs in the implementation of a transferred policy. The main question with small Ns (other than the fact that the N is small, that is) is which cases to include in the comparison and not necessarily how many. The rationale of the selection depends on whether one aims at explaining similarities or differences; case selection attempts to manipulate the independent variables as well as control extraneous variance (Peters, 1998).

Therefore, a controlled comparison based on similar systems design (George and Bennett, 2005; Gerring, 2008) is conducted among the river groups in Northern Sweden in paper IV. We draw relevant variables from theory in order to determine why some enforced networks in the same geographical area of the same country were more functional than others. This is a hypothesis testing comparison; we hypothesize that the presence of policy entrepreneurs in river groups would explain its high level of functionality. Because this is a small N qualitative comparison, the causal reference is leveraged on within-case analysis, supported by cross-case analysis (George and Bennett, 2005). This is because within-case analysis is a way for researchers to understand and assess the degree to which the hypothesized mechanism was present in each case. This means that researchers can make inferences about the hypothesized mechanism not only across cases, but also determine to which extend it produced the outcome in each individual case (Munck, 2004).

In the following section, I review the results of each paper and demonstrate how they contribute towards answering the research questions put forth in the beginning of this cover essay.
4 Review of Results

The first issue addressed in this dissertation was whether PE is a standalone framework, one by which we can understand policy change. As mentioned elsewhere in this paper, considerable scholarship has been devoted to the entrepreneur as the agent of change on the one hand and as a component of policy process theories on the other. The review of recent literature undertaken in the first paper sought to position PE research in the broader landscape of policy process theories. A finding of this review is that the policy entrepreneurship approach has developed to a meso-level framework. A critique commonly leveled against frameworks and models is that they lack explanatory power through the paucity of causal mechanisms. Applications of PE in a variety of contexts have demonstrated its explanatory salience in terms of policy change—or stasis. Opaque, however, remain the contextual factors that foster or hinder entrepreneurship. I will return to this issue later in this section.

If PE is a framework through which we can understand policy change, how might we be able to apply it to understand policymaking after crises? The second paper concerns itself with conceptualizing the space that opens up during the political perspective of crisis management. The question that emerges is: why does crisis lead to change in some instances but not others? Without discounting historical and political contingencies that come to play, we concur with Hogan and Feeney (2012) in that change is not automatic and that a more nuanced understanding of agency lends added value to the research in crisis management and resilience.

The argument that entrepreneurship can lead to resilience is not new. In the urban governance literature, Williams, Vorley and Ketikidis, (2013) link economic entrepreneurship and the economic resilience of regions. The authors find that (market) entrepreneurship is a dynamic driver of resilience. This is because the diversity and flexibility of entrepreneurs, which are attributes critical to competitiveness and growth, are also sources of resilience.

Entrepreneurial resilience is an attempt to trace the convergence of resilience and political entrepreneurship especially during and in the aftermath of crises. Resilience, especially with recent developments in the literature within the social sciences rejecting equilibria, is another way to conceptualize change. Implicit in the resilience scholarship is the understanding that there must be space for change to take place. Political entrepreneurs have been theorized as the agents of change, the actors who aim to
change the status quo. A focus on actors can better equip us to understand variations in response during and after crises, with the latter emerging as decision venues in which entrepreneurial agency can take place producing innovative policies. Such policies can potentially promote resilience.

Within the general context of resilience, Miles and Petridou conceptualize the synergies between the political perspective of crisis management and policy entrepreneurship. We do this through the juxtaposition of lessons drawn by Lansford, Covarrubias, Carriere, and Miller in a 2013 study of Hurricane Katrina and Mintrom’s 2000 landmark study on policy entrepreneurship. Lansford et al. (2013) argue that effective crisis management includes: battling complacency; the inclusion of resilience planning into transitions of leadership; understanding that individual leadership matters; being able to navigate a politically arduous landscape, and the ability to include actors other than public officials in defining what is doable in terms of resilient policies.

Firstly, policy entrepreneurs as actors who are focused on transforming the status quo are well poised to combat the settling of complacency and institutional ossification. Secondly, policy entrepreneurs form and lead coalitions by example and would be able to foster and integrate leadership in times of crisis. For these same reasons, they are also able to identify individuals that matter. Thirdly, the policy acumen that is necessary for policy entrepreneurs to be successful is also a requirement for Lansford et al.’s (2013) conclusion that resilient policymaking requires navigating politically arduous territory. Lastly, policy entrepreneurs with their ability to form coalitions and reframe problems would be in the best position to set the limitations and boundaries of what is doable through partnerships and linkages with the private and third sectors.

The logical follow-up to this paper was to investigate the mechanism leading to change in the aftermath of a crisis. Paper three does just that, with data collected at the national level but with a slightly narrower focus; it centers on the linkages of PE and change, without directly linking this change to the concept of resilience. Having said this, crisis management, is—directly or indirectly—related to the concept of resilience. The paper makes an additional theoretical contribution by locating the role of entrepreneurial agency in the broader macro-theory of critical junctures.

More specifically, Petridou and Sparf investigate the critical juncture spanning from 2001 to 2009 which resulted in a shift in how crisis management is done in Sweden. This shift was partly articulated with bureaucratic reforms at the Cabinet and agency levels respectively: the establishment of
the Secretariat for Crisis Management under the Prime Minister’s office and
the merger of three bureaucracies to form the Swedish Agency for Civil
Contingencies.

By the end of the 1990s it had become evident that the bureaucratic and
legal architecture in Sweden in terms of crisis management belonged to an
era when the major threat to the country was an invasion from the East. A
2001 commission of inquiry (SOU 2001:41) concluded that ideational and
structural changes were in order to ensure effective crisis management. The
report suggested legal changes as well as the establishment of a crisis coor-
dination office inside the Government Offices and a strategic planning
body at the agency level. A legal change did indeed take place and a stra-
etic planning agency was created as a result of that report, but the Social
Democratic government in power at the time were diametrically opposed
to a coordination office close to the PM. It took a major political crisis
casted by the 2004 S.E. Asian tsunami and an election resulting in change
of government for a Secretariat for Crisis Management with expanded re-
sponsibilities to be placed in the Prime Minister’s Office as well as yet an-
other agency to be established partly by absorbing that earlier, strategic
planning agency.

We sought to interrogate the role of agency in this paper. Drawing from
paper II, we hypothesized that entrepreneurs would be at work during the
political aspect of crisis management that is, at the agenda setting and pol-
cy formulation stages of the process deciding the bureaucratic reforms in
the aftermath of the crisis. Instead we found that bureaucratic actors in co-
operation with a political actor acted as institutional entrepreneurs in the
implementation phase of the Secretariat for Crisis Management.

Policymaking in Sweden is rationalistic, meaning that great emphasis is
placed on the preparatory phase with commissions of inquiry gathering in-
formation and making recommendations. At the same time, the Swedish
system is consensual, which means that open conflict is frowned upon and
efforts are made on the front end through negotiations among interested
parties to include as many voices as possible before legislation goes up for
debate in Riksdagen. Additionally, the PM has considerable power, espe-
cially since Sweden’s ascension to the EU.

Our research reveals that the decision to enact the bureaucratic reforms
was unopposed and no actor acted entrepreneurially during the agenda
setting or policy formulation of this shift. Despite the political rhetoric at
the time, the bureaucratic reforms were incremental in a way. Responding
to the severe media criticism regarding their handling of the crisis, the Social Democratic Government did establish a crisis coordination unit inside the government offices just before they lost the 2006 election, though by all accounts it did not have any power at all. The center-right Alliance assigned a special investigator to explore the logistics of a unit with 24/7 operations and direct access to the PM, rather than decide on whether there would be such a unit in the first place. That decision had been already made.

The political support for the new bureaucracy was well articulated and explicit. The resistance by the ministries comprising the Government Offices was palpable and perhaps not a surprising reaction to the creation of a new office in their midst with direct access to the PM. It is at this stage, the implementation stage, when entrepreneurial agency becomes crucial for the institutionalization of the new unit, in other words, for transformative change. The actors acting as institutional entrepreneurs in this instance are the then State Secretary of the Prime Minister, the first Director General and the first deputy director. The strategies they used to delineate the boundaries of the Secretariat and defend them against the existing units of the Government Offices are of a different nature than the strategies we come across in the broad scholarship of PE outlined earlier in this dissertation. Here, and in line with Rabe’s (2004) entrepreneurs within bureaucracies, the strategies were of a quiet kind, designed to not make a splash, but rather, to increase the legitimacy of the new bureaucracy.

More specifically, the institutional entrepreneurs listened and were responsive to the needs of the politicians as information consumers. Rather than throwing their weight around, they were also responsive to the needs of the ministries and provided non-threatening support to them. What kind of information was needed, how much and when? The ultimate goal was to prove the utility of the new unit by winning the power struggle.

Additionally and to the same end, the Secretariat took advantage of educational crises. Not only did these events proved the usefulness of the unit, but they also forced people to work together and this was a way to forge relationships between different actors and increase trust among them. Finally, institutional entrepreneurs used their personal connections to shore up legitimacy, access, and ease of communication between the secretariat and the political leadership. They took advantage of the political support they had gained and often got things done by “picking up the phone”.

We used critical junctures theory in order to organize the events that lead to change in crisis management policy and bureaucratic reform. The
added value of this paper was to show that entrepreneurial agency is salient not only in the framing of the problem as illustrated in the extant literature, but in the implementation of the change, contributing to its institutionalization.

Similarly, an entrepreneur was found to be a key actor in the policy transfer process which was the focus of the dissertation’s fourth paper. The purpose of the study was to investigate the organizational change resulting in the formation of a coordination network in regional flood risk management—the first of its kind in Sweden. Petridou and Olausson ask the following questions: first, would the policy innovation (the new network) have taken place if a policy entrepreneur were not part of the process? Second, what is the role of policy entrepreneurship in the implementation of the policy after its nationwide adoption? Third, what other factors played a role in the variation of the result in the implemented policy that is, the enforced networks?

The crisis that ensued after the severe flooding which hit Northern Sweden in 1993 exposed the inadequacies in the flood risk management apparatus. Organizations were siloed professionally and geographically making flood risk management an impossible proposition. The then director of the Water Regulation Corporations, Anders Lindh, noticed this and started laying the groundwork for a regional coordination network. Early on in the process he enlisted Staffan Edler, a public official working for the county. They formed an entrepreneurial team in the making and institutionalization of this networked structure. First, Lindh saw an opportunity in the failure of the existing (or rather non-existing) architecture of flood risk management and seized it in his efforts to establish a new network. Edler’s opportunity was in the challenge to implement it. Taking advantage of opportunities is a core entrepreneurial behavior. We must note here that the opportunities presented to entrepreneurs who are public officials are of a different nature than the ones presented to politicians or members of the public such as shifts in public opinion or crisis they can incorporate to their rhetoric in an effort to create a momentum towards their proposed solution. The opportunities presented to bureaucrats are integral to the context of their professional activities and their ability to take advantage of them in practice depends on the space in which they are allowed to take initiatives and work towards realizing these initiatives. This space is created by the political support offered to these bureaucrats. In this case, as in paper III, the public official had the full political support of the county governor, who is a political appointee.
Second, both actors had established networks within the regional crisis management structure and were able to convince others to come on board. Using their positions and personal networks, they were able to bring all relevant stakeholders to the table, which was necessary for the establishment as well as the institutionalization of the coordination network. Third, perseverence played an important role in the implementation of the coordination network. Edler specifically was a troubleshooter and “a doer” and did not let things stand in his way. At the same time he would never perceive himself as an entrepreneur; rather he thinks of himself as a goal oriented person who does not give up. Finally one should not underestimate the informal meetings and ties that increase trust among network members. Lindh often organized retreats for stakeholders to meet and get to know each other in order to facilitate better cooperation in times of crisis.

As mentioned earlier in this dissertation, preparing policies through commissions of inquiry is a central feature of Swedish policymaking. Also in this case, a commission of inquiry was the vehicle through which the policy transfer (coercive, from the regional to the national and back to the regional) took place. Lindh, as member of the commission of inquiry, was the entrepreneur involved in the policy transfer process which in effect made coordination networks obligatory nationwide.

Not surprisingly perhaps, the networks that formed as a result of the nationwide policy (enforced networks) were of varying functionality and utility. If policy entrepreneurship was a deciding factor in the formation of the coordination group (which notably, of course, was a self-generating network), it could very well follow that entrepreneurial activity would contribute to an active enforced network after the policy became nationwide practice. We conducted a comparative study of the twelve river groups formed in Northern Sweden so as to control for geographic and demographic factors.

We also considered additional variables affecting the functionality of networks. For this, we drew from B.Guy Peters (1998) and his conceptualization of factors which affect the politics of coordination. In addition to the presence of a policy entrepreneur, we compared: (i) pluriformity of network members; (ii) member interdependence; (iii) redundancy of structures, and (iv) degree of formality (in terms of meetings). We found that six out of the 12 river groups were functional that is, meeting regularly and making strategic as well as operative decisions which their members accepted as legitimate. All six of them were managed by counties that were involved in the original coordination group: Jämtland, Västernorrland,
Gävleborg, and Dalarna. All six had higher levels of pluriformity and member interdependence, but lower levels of redundancy. In other words, their members were diverse and dependent on each other and did not have any other networks to turn to in order to manage their river. Five of them (all but the Skellefte river group) had formalized meetings and in four out of the six (all but Skellefte and Dalarna) policy entrepreneurs were active.

Our findings suggest that entrepreneurs contribute to the variation in the functionality of the enforced river groups, though we show that other factors play a significant role as well. Most importantly, perhaps, we did not find identify entrepreneurs in any of the river groups which were not functional.

Public officials were the entrepreneurial actors in paper V as well, though this time at the municipality level, in the local economic development sector. The research question this paper set forth was whether entrepreneurs in the polis are active in low salience, mundane planning processes and in low-conflict, consensual policymaking arrangements. This paper differed from the others because the process was ongoing and the result unknown; the focus was on the process rather on whether or not it resulted to change. This was one of the reasons for choosing this case; additionally, local economic development issues are a classic arena for policy entrepreneurship, though this particular case lacked the conflict and controversy engendered by large capital investment projects such as large stadia or exurban shopping centers.

The Swedish municipality of Östersund is situated in the rural north of the country. Due to its geography, the region faces regional disparities and population imbalances—common core-periphery issues (Petridou and Ioannides, 2012). I followed a two-year process during which a municipality unit called Tillväxt Östersund (Development Östersund) drafted the planning document for the city. This was a two-stage participatory planning process involving the drafting of a general document with seven development factors the municipality would agree to prioritize, followed by a more detailed document outlining specific measures that city ought to take so that Östersund achieves more of each chosen factor. A total of 127 people took part in the series of focus group meetings set up by municipality. The overwhelming majority of the participants represented organized interest groups; others were politicians or public servants. Based on the literature, I expected to find entrepreneurial actors among the focus group participants active in an effort to promote their own organized group interests. For this reason, I chose to investigate closer the focus group dedicated on
the factor that commonly engenders lively debates: the municipality’s business climate.

Formal social network analysis on the 35 focus group participants tasked to discuss the vision of the municipality regarding private businesses did not reveal any policy entrepreneurs. Notably some actors were considerably more central than others in the network formed by the participants, specifically actors from associations supporting businesses and politicians. However, the hallmark behavior of policy entrepreneurs — taking advantage of opportunities; taking risks for (political) gain; amassing coalitions, resource mobilizing resources, all in an effort to affect change — were not articulated.

This is perhaps not surprising if we consider what ‘opportunity’, ‘gain’, and ‘change’ mean for these actors. The participatory planning process had not clear winners and losers, nor were any funds tied to any specific policy outcome. It was inclusive in nature in the sense that all realistic suggestions were welcome. All the participants reported that the development of the municipality was a matter very urgent to them, however, the distance between making suggestions for development and affecting transformative change was perhaps too long to warrant the investment of time and energy required if an actor is to be entrepreneurial.

Conversely, the concepts of ‘opportunity’, ‘gain’ and ‘change’ had a different meaning for the public servants setting up and leading this process. The four members of the Development Östersund unit acted as (bureaucratic) entrepreneurs. First, they seized the opportunity to initiate a process that was different to what the municipality had done in the past. They reported that their goal was to be as inclusive as possible because they viewed the last vision plan as inconsequential. Second, they mobilized resources to achieve their goal in the form of applying for, and receiving project financing. Third, they worked on building consensus through continuous negotiations with the politicians. Fourth (and perhaps most importantly), they were network makers, actively trying to bring people together. Finally, they worked as a team, with a common visions and distinct, if not overlapping at times, responsibilities.

Bureaucrats were entrepreneurial in this case, as in the cases explored in papers III and IV. In the section that follows I draw parallels among the findings of all the papers as a whole.
5 Synthesis and Policy Implications

The main inspiration for the research undertaken in the course of this dissertation came from the 2009 seminal Mintrom and Norman article. In it, the authors identify the need for more research into the interactions between policy entrepreneurs and their contexts; the motives belying entrepreneurial actions; the intricacies of bureaucratic entrepreneurs as well as the way contextual factors influence the emergence of entrepreneurship. Mintrom and Norman end their article with a punch: “[i]f you want to make a splash in the study of policy change, doing some innovative work on with the concept of policy entrepreneurship would be a great place to start” (p. 663). The innovation of this dissertation is the interrogation of policy change through the framework of policy entrepreneurship in the context of Swedish input democracy that demands consensus rather than a winning coalition.

Policy is made at different levels of governance and it encompasses a broad array of rules, regulations, statutes and organizations. In order to make meaningful statements about the Swedish context in general, I chose case studies in all three levels of governance. Not only is the level of governance different in each of the empirical studies, but the policy sector is different as well—crisis management, flood risk governance and economic development. Papers III and IV deal with crisis management and flood risk governance respectively. Conversely, paper V deals with economic development at the local level, a context potentially open to single-issue entrepreneurs. The point was to achieve within-case (Sweden) context variance. Taken together, findings suggest the following:

5.1 Entrepreneurship in the Swedish Polis

Entrepreneurship is dialectic. It needs friends and an audience. The entrepreneurship revealed in the papers is centered not on loud activities by issue entrepreneurs trying to win over public opinion or the opinion of elite politicians, but instead on the quiet cooperation and collaboration among public officials, or between public officials and politicians. As one informant from paper III put it, PE is a ‘charm offensive’, the art of cooperation and of convincing people. This element is an extension of the concept of the entrepreneur as a network maker, only in this context entrepreneurship rests specifically on the strategies of cooperation and navigating the politics
of horizontal governance within bureaucracies. The importance of the individual actor is even more accentuated in small policy environments in a small country.

More specifically, the Scandinavian corporatist system coupled with the Swedish consensual sensibilities make for a context where every actor has a voice, meaning that every sanctioned actor has a voice. As opposed to pluralistic systems, “corporatist structures involve strong norms of consensus and compromise, and relatively restrictive norms of participation” (Sabatier and Weible, 2007, p. 200). There is not much room for actors who do not belong in an organized interest group and thereby fall outside the policy subsystem. Additionally, in a relatively flat, networked governance arrangement, the end game is coordination and collaboration, with all the actors on board. This puts an emphasis on entrepreneurship as (i) a conduit facilitating interconnections among a multitude of actors, (ii) opening up of additional channels of communication, and (iii) network making. There is a marked shift from winning the competition to forging a consensus.

5.2 The Entrepreneur in the Swedish Polis

Here I must stress that I make knowledge claims about what political entrepreneurship looks like when it emerges in the Swedish context, not whether it emerges or not. In other words, the papers were not set up to prove a causal argument linking the emergence of entrepreneurial action and a certain policy sector or level governance. Rather, this research sought to interrogate the specificities of entrepreneurship in the polis in terms of the kind of actors who act entrepreneurially and the range of activities they employ for that purpose. Before I distill the conclusions drawn from the papers, I must say that the toolkit of strategies entrepreneurs use, is in broad terms the same across contexts, though specificities diverge. For example, entrepreneurs mobilize resources to achieve their goals—be it monetary or political. In paper V, entrepreneurs applied for project funds; in case studies elsewhere, entrepreneurs might raise private funds (see for example, Meydani, 2015). Bottom line, however, there is some kind of resource mobilization activity.

First, an observation common in all empirical papers is that the entrepreneurs come mostly from the pool of actors who implement a policy, mainly bureaucrats. In the field of crisis management at the national level and flood risk governance at the regional level we would not expect to see individual interested citizens acting entrepreneurially. We might though
expect to see such an actor at the local level, in economic development issues, something which we did not see the case study of paper V. However, it is not clear whether the reason why the entrepreneurs numbered solely among the public officials was the consensual Swedish governance system or simply because the drafting of the vision plan was not controversial enough. In any event, the threshold for the engagement of individual interested citizen is higher than a public official, if only because public officials are embedded in the governance network and some of them are keen to do a good job. In the Swedish system specifically, they also have plenty of leeway to do so.

Second, policy entrepreneurs work together in teams. This confirms earlier research and should not come as a surprise because even though the stereotype of the Schumpeterian market entrepreneur is the lone individual, the Kingdonian (and beyond) policy entrepreneur has to work with others and often under the radar in order to get anything done in a politically arduous environment. The constitution of such teams is context specific; in paper V the team consisted of public officials tasked to work together, whereas in papers III and IV teams were ad-hoc and included public officials and politicians or public officials and members of organized associations. What is more, these teams were “project-specific” that is, close cooperation lasted until the goals of affecting change (paper IV) and change consolidation (paper III) were achieved. This strategy seems to be constant regardless of the context in which we investigate political entrepreneurs. In the Swedish context, these teams cut across the actor’s formal position to include politicians and public officials, or public officials and members of interest organizations.

Third, and following the first two points, PE in the Swedish consensual system is more of a feature of policy implementation rather than agenda setting. Well networked, willing and creative bureaucrats with an interest in the policy at hand contribute to its implementation through cooperation with politicians on one hand and policy consumers on the other. This is facilitated by the generous space bureaucrats enjoy in Sweden in general as well as the enhanced political will and support translating to enlarged spaces that open in the aftermath of crises.

Fourth, to the extent that entrepreneurs are implementers, they are action-oriented ‘doers’. These are actors who would not self-identify as entrepreneurs, but rather as trouble-shooters, people who actively work towards solutions instead of ‘sitting on their hands’, characterized by perseverance and tenacity. Affecting and consolidating transformative change is not a
one-and-done affair but rather a prolonged process requiring constant effort.

Finally, policy entrepreneurs are insiders and if not in a top leadership position, then in a position with decision making powers— or in the words of McCaffrey and Salerno (2011) decision making resource owners. This finding also confirms earlier research— in Sweden and elsewhere, and in a variety of policy sectors. The insidedness of the entrepreneur combined with the highly organized input process in the preparatory phase policy design and the emphasis on cooperation and consensus points to the tensions between power and legitimacy. It also does not leave much room for the concerned citizen to become a single issue policy entrepreneur.

5.3 Entrepreneurship, Policy Transfer, and Critical Junc-
tures

This insidedness is a salient factor in policy transfer especially in a policy-making system such as the Swedish one, which relies heavily on the front-loaded process of commissions of inquiry. By taking part in such a commission, an entrepreneur can have direct influence on a policy transfer process from the regional to the national level, such as the entrepreneur in paper IV. What is more, political entrepreneurs played a role in the implementation of the transferred policy, which in that case was flood risk governance arrangements. More research is required to elaborate further on the role of policy entrepreneurs in well-functioning networks.

Entrepreneurial actors were found to play a role in consolidating a bureaucratic reform that is, in the implementation stage. We showed that the chain of events comprising the critical juncture that resulted in the crisis management bureaucratic reforms could only have produced that result; the changes were an idea whose time had come. However, it took intense collaboration among political entrepreneurs to fight the push back by the existing bureaucracies and consolidate the reform once that reform had been decided upon.

5.4 Summary of findings and how they relate to the re-
search questions

In this section, in a rather Sisyphean effort towards simplification (compounded by the risk of being reductionist and even repetitive), I remind the
reader once again of the research questions outlined on p. 5 and then *summarily* connect them to the findings outlined in this section of the cover essay.

Q1: How do contextual factors inform the realization of entrepreneurial agency? Overwhelmingly, political entrepreneurs come from the ranks of bureaucrats and thus political entrepreneurship is a feature of the implementation rather than the agenda setting stage of the policy process. This held at the national, regional, and local levels of governance, in the substantive sectors of crisis management, flood risk governance, and local economic development. Having said that, the freedom bureaucrats enjoy in the Scandinavian system often turns them into *de facto* policymakers rather than mere implementers of policy.

The Swedish corporatist system does not seem to allow for the lone interested-private-citizen-turned-single-issue-entrepreneur. The channels of deliberative and rational policymaking are set and inclusion is broad, but organization in interest groups is a prerequisite. One could argue, of course, that crisis management at the national level and perhaps even flood risk governance at the regional level are not environments conducive to the emergence of single-issue political entrepreneurs. However, this pattern held at the local level as well, which traditionally is a fertile ground for the interested citizen to become entrepreneurial.

The politician found to be acting entrepreneurially at the national level did so in close cooperation with bureaucrats. This brings me to my second point, that political entrepreneurship takes place within teams. The teams observed in this research were *ad hoc*, problem-solving instruments focused on the task at hand. Indeed, in a network governance arrangement with flat hierarchies, the goal is to forge a consensus rather than win the competition. Cooperation and collaboration are the normative—and practical—goals of solving commons problems. Political entrepreneurship is realized out of a need for a conduit for facilitating interconnections among a multitude of actors; it facilitates communication by opening up new channels (such as simply “picking up the phone”), and finally it promotes network making.

Q2: How do contextual factors inform the strategies entrepreneurial actors use to affect change?

My findings suggest that the strategies political entrepreneurs use in the Swedish context are by-and-large along the same lines as the strategies outlined in the extant literature, but certain specificities differ. These actors mobilize resources; either political ones by tapping into their networks or,
as in the case of paper V, by applying for EU funds in search of monetary resources.

The political entrepreneurs in my research are idea makers and are well networked, indeed insiders. Beyond this, however, they are network makers. More specifically they are the driving force behind self-organizing networks and though paper IV did not show a mono-causal relationship between political entrepreneurs and well-functioning networks, no political entrepreneur was found in networks that did not function well. They work on forging consensus instead of coalitions with strategies aimed at inclusion of all stakeholders. What is more and in line with extant research, political entrepreneurs in Swedish are problem-solving doers, tenacious until they reach their goal.

Q3: What is the role of political entrepreneurship and the political entrepreneur in macro level theories such as critical junctures and policy transfer? This research illustrates the role of entrepreneurial agency in the institutionalization of transformative change, especially in the aftermath of crisis. The political entrepreneurs in this case were active in the implementation stage of the policy. Entrepreneurial agency played a role in the process of policy transfer. In this case, the entrepreneurial actor was part of the policy formulation stage as part of the Swedish deliberative and rational policymaking process of a commission of inquiry.

5.5 Policy Implications

The policy implications of the research conducted for this dissertation are twofold. The first dimension is normative. If public officials in Sweden, notwithstanding the autonomy they enjoy, work in the service of the elected officials and in extension to serve the public, is it acceptable for them to be entrepreneurial? The answer is yes, but any reservation lies perhaps in the connotations the concept of entrepreneurship has in the vernacular. Political entrepreneurship must be recast at a distance from market entrepreneurship and the emphasis instead ought to be placed on the creativity, innovation and the action-mindedness of entrepreneurial actors. Secondly, if entrepreneurs, as they are shown here, open communication channels and facilitate cooperation, then harnessing that entrepreneurship and channeling across horizontal governance arrangements—networks—then we could expect to increase the level and quality of lateral (and vertical) cooperation and collaboration.
6 Suggestions for Further Research and Closing Remarks.

Though this dissertation went a long way to investigate various aspects of policy entrepreneurship, several issues require further research. The conceptual interrelations of entrepreneurship and leadership are, if present and implicit in this dissertation, not exhaustively theorized. What makes a leader behave entrepreneurially and conversely, are all entrepreneurs leaders? What is more, more theoretical work is needed to integrate theories of leadership with those of policy entrepreneurship. A fruitful trajectory along these lines is work on entrepreneurial teams. More specifically, more research is needed in the interaction within entrepreneurial teams. Making use of formal social network analysis would go a long way towards this especially if the team were large enough spanning a number of organizations.

A related trajectory is that of the relationship between policy entrepreneurship on the one hand and power and legitimacy on the other. From a structural perspective, power translates to control of the flow of information, though further theorization of the linkages of entrepreneurship and power would further our understanding of what makes entrepreneurs tick. In conjunction with research at the micro level in the motives of policy entrepreneurs and the kind of profit they seek we stand to gain normative insights in the role of entrepreneurial agency as an instrument of political power.

Additionally, the call by Mintrom and Norman (2009) for cross-country research is still relevant. Studies comparing countries as well as substantive policy sectors in terms of policy entrepreneurship can reveal nuances in terms of how and how much context shape policy entrepreneurship and the policy entrepreneurs. Comparing networks in cross country comparisons or even within the same country can yield fruitful results in the relationship between entrepreneurship and horizontal governance.

Finally, so far research on entrepreneurship has been gender blind. A particularly fruitful future research agenda would be to interrogate gender aspects of policy entrepreneurship. A few questions that emerge are: are women as likely to behave entrepreneurially as men? Are there certain contextual factors that might hinder or foster policy entrepreneurship among women? Do women policy entrepreneurs employ different strategies, behave differently in networks or have different positions than their male counterparts? What is more, there is room for a feminist analysis of political
entrepreneurship. So far and on the face of it, the discourse is quite masculine, especially earlier research of the lone entrepreneur, the larger-than-life figure. How much of this discourse is gender biased and could it be that we are missing women entrepreneurs because we don’t know what to look for? How would a gender angle move forward the discussion on entrepreneurship and leadership?

To paraphrase Mintrom and Norman (2009), if you want to make a splash in the study of policy entrepreneurship, innovative work in the fields of leadership, power, legitimacy and gender would be a great place to continue.
7 References


## 8 Appendix:

### Conceptual diversity in the PE literature: indicative publications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>By/ Year</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dahl, 1961/2005</td>
<td>A leader who is an effective user of resources; others are his agents instead of him/her being the agent of others</td>
<td>political entrepreneur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Ostrom, 1965</td>
<td>The strategies which people follow in order to solve a commons problem through collective action, which would not be possible through individual actions.</td>
<td>public entrepreneurship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salisbury, 1969</td>
<td>The individual investing resources to organize an interest group in order to obtain a public good—conflated with the definition of the leader.</td>
<td>group entrepreneur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olson, 1971</td>
<td>The individual who helps a group obtain a public good.</td>
<td>political entrepreneur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price, 1971</td>
<td>As opposed to the &quot;professional&quot;; congressional staffer who passionately tries to enact policies.</td>
<td>policy entrepreneur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lewis, 1980</td>
<td>An individual who either creates or greatly expands a public organization with the purpose of changing the allocation of scarce resources.</td>
<td>public entrepreneur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdon, 1984</td>
<td>Advocates for proposals or for the prominence of an idea. They are willing to invest their resources in the hopes of political profit—for this idea to be made into policy, job satisfaction and security, career promotion.</td>
<td>policy entrepreneur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Definition</td>
<td>Type</td>
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<tr>
<td>Loomis, 1988</td>
<td>A metaphor of the politician as an entrepreneur. A policy entrepreneur reshapes policy solutions to fit emerging political situations.</td>
<td>policy entrepreneur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roberts and King, 1991</td>
<td>Public entrepreneur as an umbrella concept of an actor who has an innovative idea and translates it into an explicit statement.</td>
<td>public entrepreneur typology: political entrepreneur--holds elected office; executive entrepreneur--holds appointed leadership position; bureaucratic entrepreneur--holds formal position in government, but not leadership; policy entrepreneur--works outside the formal governmental system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schneider, Teske, and Mintrom, 1995</td>
<td>The individual who discovers unfulfilled needs, bears the cost of seizing opportunities and assembles teams to undertake change.</td>
<td>public/political entrepreneur at time referred to as entrepreneurial politician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schneider, Teske, and Mintrom, 1995</td>
<td>Same as above, but specifically relating to local growth politics.</td>
<td>growth/anti growth entrepreneur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schneider, Teske, and Mintrom, 1995</td>
<td>A sub-category of the public/political entrepreneur.</td>
<td>bureaucratic entrepreneur, for instance the city manager, also referred to as the entrepreneurial manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mintrom, 1997; 2000;2013; Mintrom and Norman, 2009</td>
<td>A political actor who promotes policy ideas; a person who seeks to initiate dynamic policy change.</td>
<td>policy entrepreneur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakerson and Parks, 1999</td>
<td>Individual able to identify needs (among citizens of diverse, urban communities), propose ideas, organize people and carry out the process of implementing solutions.</td>
<td>public entrepreneur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Definition</td>
<td>Type of Entrepreneurship</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kuhnert, 2001</td>
<td>A political actor who has certain characteristics that are also found in the economic sector.</td>
<td>public entrepreneur</td>
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<tr>
<td>Holcomb, 2002</td>
<td>A political entrepreneur is alert enough to recognize an opportunity and act on it expecting political profit.</td>
<td>political entrepreneur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harris and Kinney, 2003</td>
<td>An individual who brings together and integrates disparate elements of demand in order to facilitate policy change and innovation; identify emerging problems, bear risks, organize others.</td>
<td>policy entrepreneur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheingate, 2003</td>
<td>An individual whose creative acts have transformed politics, policies or institutions.</td>
<td>political entrepreneur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingram, Schneider and DeLeon, 2007</td>
<td>An actor who translates negative perceptions of a marginal group into a legislative crusade.</td>
<td>moral entrepreneur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burress and Cook, 2009</td>
<td>Entrepreneurial endeavors in the pursuit of public, common pool, or club goods</td>
<td>collective entrepreneurship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meydani, 2009</td>
<td>A person or group with the intention to change the rules of the game or policy outcomes within the established rules</td>
<td>political entrepreneur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaunert, 2010 (also earlier work)</td>
<td>An institution (such as the European Commission) acting as a ‘norm-shifter’ in the supranational arena</td>
<td>supranational policy entrepreneur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Definition</td>
<td>Interpretation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Martin and Thomas, 2013</td>
<td>An agent of change at a two-tiered level: lower—policy, higher—constitutional rules</td>
<td>political entrepreneur as an umbrella concept; lower level—policy entrepreneur, higher level, institutional entrepreneur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCaffrey and Salerno, 2011</td>
<td>A principal of the state who exercises control over the use of resources</td>
<td>political entrepreneur</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>