From Sustainable Consumers to Ecological Citizens

Elucidating Attitudes towards Individual Environmental Action in Sweden: Some Empirical Explorations from the SHARP Research Program

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As the discourses of ecologically sustainable development point towards the active involvement of individuals in the environmental work as an important prerequisite for targeting the sources of environmental degradation, one of the main foci for contemporary environmental policy is the need for individual lifestyle-changes. However, most policies targeting environmental work at the individual level both in Sweden and in other countries is directed towards targeting individuals as consumers, and the corresponding active involvement is therefore primarily framed as a move towards *sustainable patterns of consumption*.

As an alternative to this rather narrow interpretation of what individual environmental action comprise, suggestions for an *Ecological Citizenship*, straddling the private – public; national – global; and present – future divides, has recently been granted a central position in research on political ecology. As this novel conception, however, is considerably more wide-ranging than a change in consumption-patterns, the prospect of legitimately realising or rhetorically framing individual environmental action as ecological citizenship has been strongly questioned. Even so, recent research indicates that people might hold values in line with those of the ecological citizen.

Based on mass-surveys to a total of 4000 Swedish households, this article investigates the values and attitudes established among the citizenry, in order to elucidate the seed-bed for cultivating ecological citizens in Sweden. What are the possibilities for environmental action in the shape of ecological citizenship in Sweden today? Do people in general hold values and attitudes in line with what is expected of the ecological citizen? If so, how? And if not, why?

I. Analyzing the foundations for an ecological citizenship

It is commonly agreed that new institutions and policy-instruments aiming both at instigating and sustaining individual environmental action need, for their long-term success, to be perceived by the individuals themselves as being *legitimate* in the sense that they build on, or at least can be justified by reference to, core values already established in society (see, for examples, Lipset 1981; Connolly 1984a & 1984b; Feldman, 1988; North, 1990; Beetham 1991; Knight, 1992; Levi, 1997; Widegren 1998; Birch, 2001; Føllesdal, 2004; Lundqvist, 2004c; Caprara et al., 2006). In a time when calls for a more comprehensive individual involvement in the environmental work are heard from policy-makers, environmental movements and scholars alike, it might therefore be relevant to ask what the prospects, in terms of policy legitimacy, are for moving towards such an expanded individual environmental responsibility permeating most, if not all, day-to-day activities. Would such

attempts to a 'greening' of individual lifestyles be considered politically legitimate? In other words, are those in society already established value-systems of such a nature that they will support calls for a more comprehensive understanding of individual environmental action? Are we, in fact, latent ecological citizens ready to take on a greater ecological responsibility?

Using data on values and attitudes among Swedish households collected within the SHARP Research Program[i], this paper aims at conducting an initial exploration of the existence and frequency of core values, environmental attitudes, and behavioural motivations which could form the basis for legitimately expanding the notion of what individual environmental action should comprise; and thereby facilitate a move towards new forms of individual participation in the pro-environmental work. Thus, a key assumption for this paper is that the nature of an individual's general value-system not only is a factor influencing her behavioural choices, but also to a significant extent shapes her acceptance of new public policy as well as her attitudes towards emerging social issues (cf. Rokeach, 1973; Feldman, 1988; Maio and Olsen, 1995; Stern et al., 1995; Barnea and Schwartz, 1998; Jacoby, 2006). As an illustration of the move towards an alternative framing of individual environmental action this paper discusses the prospect of a public value-based support for moving, in official rhetoric as well as in practice, from the idea that environmental problems can be mediated through a transformation in individual patterns of consumption, and towards the notion of an ecological citizenship as the basis for a more extensive individual environmental responsibility. The overall aspiration, thereby, is to examine if the values held by Swedish citizens in general are consistent with the environmentally protective agenda of ecological citizenship, or if the currently predominant policy-framing of individuals as sustainable consumers more adequately captures those values established, and therefore enjoys a higher level of legitimacy, in the Swedish society.

The paper proceeds as follows. First, I briefly present an overview of the dominant political framing of individuals as sustainable consumers along with the proposed shortcomings of this policy approach in effectively amending the environmental problematique. Second, the notion of an ecological citizenship as an alternative framework for individual environmental action is outline, and the proposed value-base underpinning the role of the ecological citizen highlighted. Third and last, by the use of empirical data, I provide an initial exploration of the strength of ecological citizen-values among the Swedish public and discuss the prospect for legitimately framing individual environmental action along the lines of ecological citizenship, as an alternative to the rather narrow discourse of sustainable consumption.

II. The individual and the environment

Today, it is no longer believed that the state of the environment can be addressed or amended by governments and multinational corporations alone. Rather, it is widely acknowledged that

the sources of, and by inference the solutions to, environmental problems are to be found also in the many decisions all of us make each day. Most current environmental problems – for example those concerned with pollution, resource depletion and greenhouse-gas emission – are thereby understood as collective action dilemmas, that is, situations in which the desirable outcome is dependent on the input from a large number of actors, but in which everyone's rational behaviour will result in a worse outcome for all (Ostrom, 1990; see also Olson, 1965; Hardin, 1968). As such, the current environmental situation is considered as requiring the contribution of individual citizens for its amendment, alongside the efforts made and measures taken by politicians and within the global business community. As put by Kymlicka and Norman (1994:360), 'the state cannot protect the environment if citizens are unwilling to reduce, reuse, and recycle in their own homes'. This, however, also requires policies directed towards involving the individual in this endeavour.

The imperative of individual participation in the work towards sustainability is expressed also in the environmental agreements of the Rio-conference, which indicates that there now exists a general consensus within the international political community on the individual's important role to play in the environmental work (cf. UNCED, 1992). Within most national policies in the industrialised world this role for individual environmental action predominately takes the form of *sustainable consumption*, as individuals are encouraged to do their bit for the environment by taking ethical and environmental concerns within the framework of their market-behaviour (Hobson, 2002 & 2004; Cohen, 2005; Dryzek, 2005; Martens and Spaargaren, 2005; Sanches, 2005; Cohen, Comrov and Hoffner, 2005; Seyfang, 2005; Carter and Huby, 2005). This promotion of market eco-efficiency and a more responsible individual consumption, it is believed, will work as a driving force behind a more comprehensive restructuring of production practices and a reduction in the overall environmental impact of the industrialised world. However, a range of critique has been directed towards sustainable consumption's effectiveness as a tool for reaching environmental sustainability, arguing that although transformed patterns of consumption are indeed highly desirable, the political application of this discourse does not so much constitute an innovative road towards strong environmental protection as an attempt, ultimately due to reasons of a legitimacy-deficit, to keep business running as usual. Therefore, alternative discourses of individual environmental action have also been suggested, promoting a more comprehensive role for the individual in the environmental work; with its foundation in a different set of values and motivations; and promoted primarily by the use of education and intrinsic motivation rather than fiscal (dis)incentives and other forms of market-based instruments.

One of the most fundamental objections is directed towards sustainable consumption *as-a-practice*, arguing that it fails to challenge the major driver behind socio-environmental injustices. By supporting a continued political and commercial quest for economic growth through a 'rationalisation' of consumption practices, rather than a reduction

in overall consumption and a rethinking of social structures, the politics of sustainable consumption keeps firmly within the consumer culture of contemporary industrialised economies (cf. Hobson, 2002:96; Carter and Huby, 2005; Davidson and Hatt, 2005; Dryzek, 2005). Therefore, sustainable consumption has been accused as a way to rhetorically address the environmental situation whilst in practice aiming for business as usual. Along these lines, Seyfang (2005:294) argues that 'The agenda has narrowed from initial possibilities of redefining prosperity and wealth and radically transforming lifestyles, to a focus on improving resource productivity and marketing 'green' or 'ethical' products'. Furthermore, although consumption is an highly important aspect of the socio-economic structure and therefore potentially could have a significant impact (Conca et al., 2001; but see Seyfang, 2005:296-298 for a further discussion on problems of scale and market-power) critics of sustainable consumption argue that a policy of this kind have a tendency to disregard, and even reduce the public motivations for, other forms of potential individual environmental action (cf. Maniates, 2001; Berglund and Matti, 2006). By highlighting the environmental significance of marginal changes in individuals' patterns of consumption, the discourse of sustainable consumption at least implicitly allows for individuals, governments and corporations alike to choose an 'easy symbolic alternative to confronting the structural causes of ecological destruction' (Dryzek, 2005:132).

Sustainable consumption *as-a-role-for-the-individual* is further criticised for its framing of individuals as consumers, predominately guided by individualistic and materialistic concerns (cf. Sagoff, 1988). Policy-instruments are therefore primarily designed as to promote the economic rationality of the proposed change in individual consumer behaviour, for example through green taxes and subsidies (Hobson, 2002; Davidson and Hatt, 2005; Seyfang, 2005), and thereby encourage people to respond to the (fiscal) incentive itself rather than to the (moral) reasons behind it (Barry 1999:226-230). This predisposition towards market-instruments, it is argued, is inadequate for several reasons. First, since it builds on a rather one-eyed model of human motivation that lacks adequate attention to the necessity of promoting a change in values which may form the basis for comprehensive and long-term stable lifestyle changes (Barry, 1996 & 1999; Dryzek, 2000; Dobson, 2003). Second, framing the individual as a consumer also implies that the her role is reduced to one of changing behaviour by passively reacting to fiscal (dis)incentives and governmental information, rather than taking an active part in deliberating on the moral foundations of the policy itself (Jacobs, 1999; Lundqvist, 2001 & 2004; Feichtinger and Pregering, 2005). Thus, the practice of sustainable consumption falls short of the assumed benefits of deliberative decision-making processes in the shape of transformed ecological consciousnesses; growth in other-regarding values; and strengthened norms of community cooperation (Goodin, 1992; Barry, 1996 & 1999; Dryzek, 2000 & 2001; Smith, 2003). Third, the use of external motivations for behavioural change also risks being at best unreliable and at worst counter-productive as it do

not acknowledge alternative motivations for holding a sustainable lifestyle and might even serve as to crowd-out a sense of moral obligation (Berglund and Matti, 2006).

The application of sustainable consumption as *the-political-strategy* for promoting individual environmental action is, by its critics, therefore taken to be a clear expression of Western governments' unwillingness or inability to challenge the structural connections between liberal democracy and the growth-oriented market economy (cf. Achterberg, 1993; Hayward 1998; de Geus 2004; Wall 2005). Instead of promoting a fundamental change in individual lifestyles and social structures, most governments committed to the policy of sustainable consumption advocates a simultaneous progress in ecological sustainability and economic growth as being both highly desirable as well as politically and scientifically possible (Hajer, 1995; Cohen, 1998; Langhelle, 2000; Mol and Sonnenfeld, 2000. See also Hobson, 2002 & 2004; Lundmark, 2003; Lundqvist, 2004; or Matti, 2006 for empirical examples).

Now, apart from remnants of a previously all-pervading belief in the splendour of technocratic solutions, the reasons for governments' application of this strategy is also found in the notion of a 'legitimacy – effectiveness dilemma' permeating contemporary environmental policy-making (Matti, 2007). As individuals in the policy-making process in general are depicted as rational, self-interested consumers (rather than other-regarding citizens), democratically elected governments are unlikely to risk unpopularity by portraying the environmental situation as a normative issue requiring fundamental changes in attitudes and lifestyles, and thus introducing a comprehensive individual environmental responsibility which is believed to lack popular support (cf. Lundqvist, 2001 & 2004). Instead, the notion of green growth as expressed within ecological modernisation presents a politically enticing way to decouple the goal of sustainability from too far-ranging demands on individual lifestyle-changes (Jansen et al., 1998). Following de Geus, (2004; see also Wissenburg, 2004; Davidson and Hatt, 2005), the past decades have therefore seen a pacification of the environmental issue as it has been rhetorically incorporated in the political discourse, but there reduced to an administrative problem which can be solved through technical adjustments of the market and of public policy. Hence, Hobson (2002:101) describes the ambition behind the policy of sustainable consumption as an aspiration 'not to threaten consumption, but seeks to incorporate a new preference without impinging upon individual's (supposedly) sacred and deeply entrenched lifestyles'.

Following on from this, the practice of framing individual environmental action as sustainable consumption is understood as being inadequate in several senses. Not only does it fail to address the core issues behind environmental degradation and social injustice, that is the global economic structures, but it also builds on an image of the individual as a rationally motivated consumer, and not as a moral-reflecting citizen. If this image of the individual and her values is flawed, the politics of sustainable consumption as practised in the industrialised

world also risk using the wrong triggers for making people both take on and sustain a strong environmental responsibility. Rather, it might even 'alienate [people] from the very causes it seeks to promote' (Hobson, 2002:97; see also Ostrom, 2002; Berglund and Matti, 2006).

IV. An expanded individual environmental responsibility

As a consequence of these shortcomings with framing sustainable consumption as *the* contribution individuals should make, scholars and activists alike has suggested that the interpretation of what individual environmental action comprises should be broadened; incorporating wide-ranging changes in lifestyles[ii] and thereby also a more active responsibility for citizens to, for instance, deliberate on the values that ought to guide both society in general and policy-making in particular (cf. Barry, 1999:226-236; see also Achterberg, 1993). Emanating from this proposed need for an increased individual responsibility in shaping the social-environmental relations, the individual's role in the environmental work has been proposed to take the form of either an ecological stewardship (Barry, 1999), or one of many variations on the concept of citizenship. From the relatively widely used environmental citizenship through less common concepts such as sustainability or green citizenship (for this, see Bell, 2005:180-181 & 193n2), and to the notion of an ecological citizenship (e.g. van Steenbergen, 1994; Dobson, 2003). The latter concept, which is in focus for this paper, uses the metaphor of the ecological footprint as a starting-point from which the balance of civic rights and duties emanates. As such, the ecological footprint, and in particular the acknowledgement that individuals in certain parts of the world let their activities expand way beyond what would be possible had the resources been evenly distributed, underpins ecological citizenship's holding of social justice as its core principle.

Now, although the act of environmentally or ethically motivated political consumerism as prescribed by the political discourse of sustainable consumption may very well be interpreted as an important tool for individuals aspiring to reduce their ecological footprint and thereby practise ecological citizenship (cf. Micheletti, 2003; Davidson and Hatt, 2005; Seyfang, 2005), sustainable consumers are not by necessity also ecological citizens, neither judging by the full range of their actions nor by the values or motivations underpinning these actions (see, for instance, the proposed problems with fiscal incentives above). It is only when an engagement in pro-environmental activities is guided by an intrinsic moral motivation, rather than a financial incentive, that it is to be considered an act of ecological citizenship. Dryzek (2005:190; see also Beckman, 2001:179) captures the notion of the ecological citizen as doing right for the right reasons, by arguing that 'It's not just a matter of doing green things, it's a matter of being green in doing them, of using these actions [e.g. green consumerism] to cultivate a post-industrial way of experiencing and relating to the world'. Following this, in contrast to the policy of sustainable consumption, which aims at changing market-behaviours, the crucial idea behind the notion of an ecological citizenship is

the need for a comprehensive rethinking of the values governing the balance between rights and responsibilities within both the human beings – nature, as well as the state – individual relationships (Bell, 2005:182). By primarily targeting values and attitudes rather than behaviour, proponents of ecological citizenship also foresees a more stable transformation of behaviour which are not subject to a constant presence of external motivations. Ecological citizenship thereby suggests an altogether reinterpreted conception of the features of contemporary democratic citizenship, strongly influenced by the primacy of social justice and the cross-boundary, post-cosmopolitan responsibilities this implies.

In particular, three aspects relating to environmental obligations function as the distinguishing characteristics of the ecological citizen. *First*, ecological citizenship implies the expansion of citizenship activities from exclusively being thought of as taking place in the narrowly defined public sphere, to also incorporating activities in what has previously been regarded as the private sphere (within the family, household or community; and outside the public, political institutions) as being of citizenly character (Dobson, 2003). This is first and foremost due to a shift in focus from citizenship as contained within the political state – individual relationship, to incorporating also the non-contractual relations between the citizens themselves. These previously considered private, and therefore non-citizenly, relations between individuals are now given a citizenship connotation on account of the claim that private relations and acts also have an (environmentally degrading) effect in the public arena and therefore should be included as a legitimate part of citizenship (cf. Naess, 1981; Tarrow, 1998; Oskarsson, 1999; Crossley, 2002). As a direct consequence of rethinking these boundaries for citizenly relations, a new set of values drawing on personal rather than political relationships are also recognised as core civic virtues, necessary for upholding the primacy of social justice: individual responsibility, care and compassion (Dobson, 2003). This feature also indicates a shift in focus from the motivational values constituting the main demarcation line in the political state-individual relations of traditional citizenship theory (e.g. self-direction vs. conformity and tradition), and towards values in the range between other-regarding values, and values promoting more of a self-regarding behaviour. This dimension corresponds quite well to the distinction that Sagoff (1988) has made between the citizen and the consumer, and to the, within environmental psychology often referred to, distinction between the Dominant Social Paradigm (DSP) and the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP), where the values characterising ecological citizenship are located within the latter.

Second, ecological citizenship implies an expansion of the scope of civic duties. From being confined within a nation-state, citizenship is now thought of as being global or universal in character. Following Jelin (2000:53): “although the ideas about citizenship and rights have been grounded in the notion of the modern nation-state, there is no intrinsic necessity that this be so: the public sphere might be ‘smaller’ or ‘larger’ than the state, or may even be different”. Remembering that ecological citizenship is not exclusively defined in

terms of the relations between the individual and the state, but rather expanded to also include private-sphere relations between citizens themselves, this indicates that ecological citizenship not needs to be identified with any contingent political space or a political authority towards which citizens owe duties or can claim rights. Instead the space of ecological citizenship is synonymous with the spread of negative effects our actions have for others and, since most environmental problems have the capacity to spread both geographically and over time, the scope of citizen duties can be extended both from one generation to another and across territorial borders. Pollution does not stop at national boundaries and, consequently, neither should the duties of the ecological citizen (Dobson, 2003).

Third, the duties of the ecological citizen are non-reciprocal in character. In other words, individuals are not asked to take on new duties with the motivation that they personally will gain from them and be able to claim some right or benefit in return (even if they will, especially in the long run, this is not *the* motivation). Rather, the duties of ecological citizenship are described as responsibilities for all personal actions that 'always already' affect others (cf. Dobson, 2003:49 & 115). Since all acts, in the case of environmental degradation especially those in the private sphere, have an impact on other individuals far and near, the civic duties therefore lies in making these impacts as sustainable as possible and not to use an unequal amount of environmental services, capital or space compared to others. The main (or only) motivation for taking on environmental obligations is, thereby, within an ecological citizenship founded in a sense of social justice; an acknowledgement that it is not right to compromise others ability to lead a full life by upholding an unequal distribution of resources (Connelly and Smith, 2003).

These defining characteristics will now be used as a framework for analysing the extent to which a value-foundation for ecological citizenship exists among the Swedish citizenry today, as well as more implicitly assessing the prospects for legitimately framing and promoting individual environmental action in terms of ecological citizenship. Do people in general hold values in line with what is expected of the ecological citizen? Is there, in other words, a possibility for policy-makers to legitimately expand the notion of what the individual's contribution towards a sustainable society should comprise? Or are we rather, as is implied by the assumptions underpinning the discourse of sustainable consumption, self-interested consumers?

V. Ecological Citizens or Sustainable Consumers?

The ecological citizen is expected to hold a specific set of values which underpin her predisposition to pro-environmental behaviour (or, following the definition of legitimacy, at least her willingness to accept new policies that corresponds to the environmentally protective agenda of ecological citizenship). Through an analysis of the core values held by the Swedish citizenry, this initial empirical exploration will attempt to highlight the existence of those

elements which conforms to Dobson's characterisation of the ecological citizen. The analysis will thereby primarily focus on the personal value-systems of the Swedish citizens and their (non)consistency with what can be expected of an ecological citizen In addition, more specific views on the causes to, responsibilities for and perceived solutions to the environmental problem, as well as the self-reported willingness to change behaviour as a response, will also be considered. As such, consistent with the outline of ecological citizenship, the analysis aims at elucidate how the respondents position themselves in questions regarding their willingness to participate in environmental activities; the acceptance of making a personal (economic) sacrifice in pursuit of a better environment; the application of social justice as a guide for attitudinal and behavioural decisions; as well as the use of motivations which go beyond the single nation-state and draws on a universalistic care for others.

More specifically, in order to elucidate the prospects for, or indeed the existence of, ecological citizenship as the basis for a more comprehensive individual environmental action, the analysis applies Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) proposed hierarchical ordering of belief-systems. Thus, general values representative for the deep-core (i.e. human beings – nature relationship; basic priority of core values; and criteria for distributive justice) are thought of as informing both more specific values in the policy-core (i.e. seriousness of and causes to the problem; distribution of authority; participation; and preference for policy-instruments) as well as attitudes and motivations directly relating to a specific policy-issue: the 'secondary aspects' (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999:133).

a. Basic Value-Priorities

As a first instance, Schwartz' (e.g. 1992) value-inventory scale is applied for assessing the respondents' basic priority of core values. The scale arranges a set of 10 motivational value-types based on the inherent conflict and compatibility between each type's organizing value-items. Through numerous empirical tests, the structure and content of the 10 values-types has proven to be both universally valid and reliable in categorizing individuals according to their preference for certain values over others, and is therefore widely referred to as a theoretical starting point in research both on values and behaviour in general (cf. Schwartz and Boehnke 2004; Rohan and Zanna 1996) and with a specific reference to the environment (cf. Stern et al. 1995; Widegren 1998; Schultz and Zelezny 1999). The results from this inventory of core values are believed to provide a reliable indication of how the respondents rate the importance of different core values, and thereby serve as to elucidate the foundation for individuals' value-formation on more specific topics, for example in relation to the environment.

On a scale ranging from -1 (*opposed to my values*) to 7 (*of supreme importance*), the respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which 20 indicator-values functioned as guiding principles in their life (cf. Rokeach, 1973). From this inventory of basic value-priorities, three indices were calculated following a triarchal classification of

motivational domains as suggested by Schwartz and Bilsky (1987); Merchant (1992); Axelrod (1994); Stern and Dietz (1994) and Stern et al. (1995). The three motivational value-domains – here termed Universal; Social and Self-Enhancement – collect values which indicates both how the individual prioritise between various motivational value-types (e.g. power, benevolence, universalism, conformity), as well as her basic view on the proper distribution of welfare. As such, these three domains could therefore be applied as an indication of the respondent's motivation to pursuit, or at least accept, activities with a particular set of consequences (cf. Stern et al., 1995:1624).

Self-Enhancement is one of the higher order value-types elaborated by Schwartz (1992:43-4) and contains motivations for the individual to pursuit 'personal interests (even at the expense of others)'. This self-regarding focus makes it consistent with what other studies have classified as an economic (Axelrod, 1994); egoistic (Stern et al., 1995); or egocentric (Merchant, 1992) value-orientation, all of which have a focus on outcomes that maximise self-interest rather than the interest of a larger community. So does also Sagoff's (1988) characterisation of the motives inherent in the consumer-role, which thereby corresponds to the values in the Self-Enhancement value-domain. Although this value-orientation may well form the basis for an individual's pursuit of a better environment, persons attributing great importance to Self-Enhancement are expected to be motivated primarily by the benefits environmental protection might have for their own personal good. In those instances where the pursuit of environmental and economic ends conflict, they are therefore more likely to prioritise the latter (Axelrod, 1994). Thus, given the suggested value – policy-acceptance connection (e.g. Rokeach, 1973; Feldman, 1988; Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky, 1990; Hendricks; 1999; Caprara et al., 2006), it seems reasonable to assume that Self-Enhancement also guides the formation of attitudes in a way that makes the individual less inclined to respond positively to policies suggesting increased environmental protection, if these are understood as entailing some form of individual cost, and similarly more inclined to accept policies promising personal benefits in exchange for individual action. This is taken to be the dominate perception of the individual targeted in those policies aiming at resolving the collective-action dilemma through a framing of individual pro-environmental contributions as essentially a win-win activity, where changes in behavioural (or, more specifically, consumption) practices for a global good will result in short-term positive benefits also for the individual (e.g. health or personal economy).

The two other value-orientations differentiate considerably from Self-Enhancement in having a strong other-regarding focus where their motivational goals not is confined to short-term personal gains but rather driven by an ambition to enhance the welfare of others. Schwartz's (1992) higher order value-type Self-Transcendence forms the basis for both of these value-orientations, as it, in contrast to the self-regarding focus of Self-Enhancement, motivates people to 'transcend selfish concerns and promote the welfare of

others, close and distant, and of nature' (Schwartz, 1992:44). Thereby, it also corresponds clearly to the motives held Sagoff's (1988:8) citizen who 'is concerned with the public interest, rather than my own interest'. However, as evident from its motivational goals, Self-Transcendence is constructed by two values-types (benevolence and universalism), which both express an altruistic outlook but differ somewhat in scope. Whereas benevolence is defined as the 'Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact', universalism instead captures the 'Understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature' (Rohan, 2000:261). Albeit both being other-regarding in a general sense, they also indicate a difference in the proposed focus for the proper distribution of welfare. This highlights the need for making a further demarcation of value-orientations expressing a prominent universal and social scope respectively[iii].

A *Social* value-orientation indicates prioritising a sense of belongingness and acceptance from others as well as a pursuit of goals which enhances the welfare of close others as a means to this end. A social value-orientation therefore incorporates the value-type benevolence, but also items drawing on the value of conformity which motivates the individual to restrain actions that are likely to upset others and violate social norms (Schwartz, 1992:9; Axelrod, 1994:88). This altruistic care for close others, although in stark contrast to Self-Enhancement, is not entirely in line with ecological citizenship's sense of a non-territorial (or non-personal) moral sphere. It rather reflects the territoriality inherent in traditional understandings of citizenship, where civic right and duties are defined by the relations among those individuals who share membership in a clearly defined (territorial) community. Thus, individuals holding a strong social value-orientation are expected not to support environmental protective policies in those instances where these are understood as having short-term negative consequences for close others, and actively support environmental claims if they are perceived as beneficial for the own in-group and/or for their own social status (Axelrod, 1994). A *Universal* value-orientation, in contrast, is the one most closely associated with the morality and non-territoriality of the post-cosmopolitan ecological citizen. People holding it as their dominating value-orientation are therefore expected to make their judgements based on the perceived benefit or cost to the world at large, including the non-human environment, not based on the short-term costs facing either the own person or close others (cf. Schwartz, 1992; Axelrod, 1994). It is also within this value-type that the strongest connections to pronounced environmental attitudes have been observed throughout previous research (cf. Merchant, 1992; Stern et al., 1995; Schultz and Zelezny, 1999; Barr, 2003). As such, people attributing great importance to universal values are assumed to respond positively towards policies promoting a greater individual environmental responsibility along the lines of an ecological citizenship. To a greater extent they are also expected to, on a

voluntarily basis, actively pursue environmental protection even though no immediate economic or social benefits would result from this.

So, how do these three value-orientations resonance among the Swedish public? In other words, considering the dominant value-base, what is the prospect for policies prescribing a more comprehensive individual environmental action being viewed as legitimate? The means and standard deviations for the three indices, including their indicator-values, are illustrated in tables 1 to 3 below.

Table 1: Self-Transcendence v. Self-Enhancement (Mean, SD and scale reliability)

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Cronbach's α
Self-Transcendence	**5,02**	**1,07**	**0,70**
Broad-Minded	4,68	1,62	
Protected environment	5,11	1,66	
Social justice	5,21	1,63	
Helpful	4,52	1,50	
Loyalty	5,54	1,40	
Self-Enhancement	**2,47**	**1,24**	**0,76**
Wealth	3,31	1,76	
Social power	0,54	1,55	
Authority	1,04	1,73	
Influential	3,31	1,79	
Successful	4,13	1,65	

Table 2: Social value-orientation (Mean, SD and scale reliability)

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Cronbach's α
Social	**5,11**	**0,96**	**0,66**
Family Security	6,36	1,06	
Self-discipline	3,90	1,82	
Obedience	5,20	1,53	
Helpful	4,52	1,50	
Loyalty	5,54	1,40	

Table 3: Universal value-orientation (Mean, SD and scale reliability)

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Cronbach's α
Universal	**5,00**	**1,23**	**0,62**
Broad-Minded	4,68	1,61	
Protected environment	5,11	1,66	
Social justice	5,21	1,63	

As it stands, the respondents attributes a far greater importance to other-regarding values as guiding principles in life than to values in the opposite value-type of Self-Enhancement. Though it should be noted that a division of the other-regarding values into two separate value-orientations display a marginally stronger overall support for values relating to the

welfare of close others (i.e. a Social value-orientation), than to universal outcomes. So far, however, it is possible to conclude that the altruism of the Citizen enjoys a significantly higher support than the values motivating the self-regarding Consumer. The Self-Enhancement value-orientation should therefore neither be regarded as a core factor underpinning individuals' attitudinal or behavioural decisions[iv] nor, and more significantly, as an important predictor for the respondents' inclination to legitimise new public policy. In fact, considering the respondents' value-orientations, it can be expected that the acceptance for a policy-discourse drawing on other-regarding motivations would be significantly higher than for a policy building on traditional motivations for collective action (i.e. economic rationality).

Obviously, it is perfectly reasonable to argue that people have multiple preference orderings, and apply different preference maps in different contexts (Arrow 1951; Schwartz, 1977; Hausman and McPhearson 1996). To some extent, individuals' are thereby motivated by values within all three domains, and in those situations where positive personal, social and universal outcomes all will result from a specific course of action, or where the consequences are clearly decoupled, little significance would be attributed to a specific value-orientation. For instance, a person ascribing great importance to personal economy may or may not engage in activities or support policies with no clear economic consequence for the own person, and will do so based on other factors that her self-regarding orientation. However, from time to time individuals' are also faced with situations where two values conflict and where the making of value trade-offs therefore become unavoidable (cf. Hadari, 1988; Tetlock, Peterson and Lerner, 1996). For environmental problems this is often the case (hence the framing of them as collective-action dilemmas), as the attainment of positive environmental outcomes might entail both significant economic and social costs for an individual. It is in conflict-situations like these that a person's hierarchical ordering of values is believed to be of significant importance, as it will serve as a guide for choosing between different attitudinal or behavioural decisions (Rokeach, 1968; Schwartz, 1996; Rossteucher, 2004). Thus, as we here are dealing with individuals' predisposition to act (or accepting policy) in a context ridden with potential conflicts between personal, social and universal outcomes, it seems reasonable to also take into account how people rate the three motivational value-domains relative to each other. This is assumed to provide a further indication of the respondents' willingness to accept one outcome, in situations where this will mean a simultaneous sacrifice of two others. To what extent, then, do people clearly embrace one value-orientation over another? How large is the portion of potential ecological citizens in the sample?

In order to determine the extent to which the respondents should be assigned one of the three value-orientations as being dominant (and by inference the extent to which the respondents hold mixed or uncertain value-orientations) two criteria were applied. First, the

respondent's mean-score for her dominant value-orientation had to be greater than her mean-scores for the other two. Second, the respondent's mean-score also had to be greater than the mean-score for the value-orientation in the total population[v]. In this way, the strength of the respondents' preference for a value-orientation is considered to be clearly displayed. This distribution of strong dominant value-orientations is illustrated in table 4 below.

Table 4. Distribution of dominant value-orientation (% of respondents)

DOMINANT VALUE-ORIENTATION	STRONG (%)	WEAK (%)
SELF-ENHANCEMENT	1,1	1.1
SOCIAL	33,2	54,9
UNIVERSAL	37,4	43,9
UNCERTAIN/MIXED	28,3	N/A

About 72 % of the respondents were possible to assign a dominant value-orientation, whereas the remaining 28 % held a value-orientation that were either uncertain or mixed and were thus not possible to place in either one of the three categories. It should, however, be noted that when only the 'highest mean-score criterion' was applied, respondents in the uncertain/mixed category were distributed on among the Social and Universal value-orientations as illustrated in the far-right column (labelled weak dominant value-orientation). A somewhat larger proportion of these respondents held Social as their highest rated value-orientation, whereas none displayed a highest mean-score for Self-Enhancement. The analysis thus reveals that over one-third of the respondents hold core values consistent with those expected of the ecological citizen, and are therefore also believed to possess a stronger predisposition to act as well as a higher acceptance of policy and policy instruments in matters regarding environmental protection in general and individual environmental action in particular. What is more, the value-orientation most closely associated with that of the rational consumer (i.e. Self-Enhancement) is only assigned as dominant for a small fraction of the respondents. Consistent with the low overall mean-score for Self-Enhancement (as displayed in table 1 above) did this not change when people holding mixed or uncertain value-orientations where redistributed into one of the three categories.

A strong Social value-orientation was possible to assign to about one-third of the respondents thereby assumed to lend their active support to environmental protection primarily in those situations where they also perceive some social benefit from this, either in the form of acceptance for themselves by a community or in the form of positive effects for close others. This could be further interpreted as the traditional (as opposed to post-cosmopolitan) sense of civic duty being generally strong, in particular when considering the total amount of respondents holding an overall high mean-score for the Social value-orientation. In line with this, it could also be argued that although a social-altruistic care for others, as here defined, not constitutes the proposed value-base for an ecological citizenship

as such, it could indeed be interpreted as an important step on the way towards a 'sense of collective purpose' (Barry, 1999:198). Following the deliberative-turn within political ecology, social-altruism is considered a first way-station on the road towards a transformed ecological consciousness as prescribed by the idea of an ecological citizenship, as: 'once the shift from 'self-regarding' individual to 'other-regarding' citizen has been made, it is a much smaller step to extend that public concern to foreigners, future-generations and non-human nature' (Carter, 2001:54; see also Barry, 1999; Dryzek, 2000). Applying this interpretation, the strong support for social-altruistic values among the respondents could thereby be viewed as a movement, however small, in the right direction.

As evident from this analysis of general value-orientations, it is here possible to conclude that self-regarding values serve only a minor function as a guiding principle determining individuals' attitude formation and their readiness to act. Instead, the respondents are considerably more likely to be motivated by the concern for a larger community; something which can be expected to have a positive effect on the prospects for negotiating the economic – environmental conflicts underpinning the framing of environmental problems as a collective-action dilemma. For political practice, an emphasis on self-regarding values in policy-discourses aiming towards expanding individual environmental action would, as it stands, not be of relevance (or even counter-productive, cf. Berglund and Matti, 2006) as the willingness among the respondents to pursue goals with an other-regarding focus is considerably higher. As the legitimacy of a policy here is considered dependent on its justification by reference to the values already established in society, this analysis of core values also suggests that new institutions aiming towards reducing the environmentally degrading consequences of citizens' lifestyles should, for their legitimacy, draw on an altruistic care for others rather than on individual benefits.

b. Environmental values

How does this distribution of general value preferences impact on the respondents' formation of attitudes in more specific matters, in this case the environment? A range of previous research have demonstrated the connection between values and attitude formation, concluding that personal values function as a backstop for attitudes on more specific matters, thus indicating how the individual responds to, for instance, new public policy (Feldman, 1988; Olsen and Zanna, 1993; Tetlock, Armor and Peterson, 1994; Maio and Olsen, 1995; Tetlock et al., 1996; Caprara et al., 2006). This is certainly true also for environmental issues where underpinning core-values have proven to have both a direct and an indirect effect on a person's predisposition to act in an environmentally protective way (Stern and Dietz, 1994; Stern et al., 1995; Thøgersen and Grunert-Beckmann, 1997; Widegren, 1998; Stern et al., 1999; Schultz and Zelezny, 1999; Stern 2000; Nordlund and Garvill, 2002; Thøgersen and Ölander, 2003). Therefore, as the aim is to assess the prospect for legitimately making the

transition from sustainable consumption as the dominant policy-discourse (as well as the framework for individual environmental action) and towards an ecological citizenship, considering also the extent to which the above elucidated value-orientations guide respondents' support of an environmental worldview seems highly relevant in this endeavour. How, then, does the Swedish citizenry rate the importance of more specific environmental beliefs?

The New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) scale (Dunlap and Van Liere, 1978; Dunlap et al., 2000) has been widely used during the past three decades as a measure of a person's pro-environmental orientation. Findings from these studies suggest a significant relationship between ratings on the NEP-scale and both behavioural intentions as well as actual behaviour[vi] (Schultz and Zelezny, 1999; Stern and Dietz, 1994; Stern et al., 1995). How a person score on the NEP-scale should therefore be taken as a further reflection of her inclination to form pro-environmental attitudes on a wide range of issues, and, by inference, of her probable response towards specific policies in these matters (cf. Dunlap et al., 2000:428). The NEP-scale aims at capturing a person's view on five facets believed to form the core of environmental concern: the possibility of an ecological crisis; the rejection of exemptionalism; the reality of limits to growth; anti-anthropocentrism; and the fragility of nature's balance. Apart from elucidating the respondents' views on the relationship between human beings and nature, the NEP-scale also serves as to tap individuals' attitudes towards what Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) terms policy-core preferences, that is, how the respondents consider the overall causes to; seriousness of; and prospect for the society to solve the environmental problem. Which is more pronounced: the need for a structural change of society in order to cope with the environmental situation or the belief in technological solutions and human ingenuity? Thereby, in line with the notion of ecological citizenship, NEP indirectly describes the tension between new and old politics by accentuating a universal care for others; the need for comprehensive lifestyle-changes; and new politics in the form of increased individual participation; as well as deemphasising technological optimism and market solutions (Milbrath, 1986:99-103). NEP can, in this respect, also be applied to highlight the difference in worldview underpinning the environmentalism – ecologism divide (Dobson, 1995 & 2003; see also Naess, 1973; Cotgrove and Duff, 1981; Doherty, 1992; Young, 1992; Barry, 1994 for more examples on the ideological division between reformist and radical greens).

In the SHARP-survey, the respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with 15 statements about the environment. The response categories range between 1 (completely disagree) and 5 (completely agree). Whereas agreement indicates a worldview in line with NEP for eight of the items, seven of the statements were worded so that disagreement instead follows the NEP-worldview. These are marked with (-) in the table below. In calculating the mean-score for NEP in total the ordering

for these items have been reversed so that high scores correspond to a stronger pro-environmental orientation than low scores. Based on the above proposed connection between a universal values and environmental awareness, it is can here be hypothesised that individuals holding a strong universal value-orientation will display a high NEP-score in total, as well as, in comparison with the other two dominant value-orientations, a lower score on the seven items marked with (-). The results from this survey are presented in table 5 below, including the significance of the relationship between each of the three value-orientations and NEP-score.

Table 5. Mean NEP-score (including significance for dominant value-orientation)

	UNIVERSAL	SOCIAL	S-E	TOTAL
NEP-TOTAL (α = .78)	3,83***	3,59*	3,33***	3,67
POSSIBILITY OF AN ECO-CRISIS				
Humans are severely abusing the environment.	4,36***	4,11*	4,00	4,17
If things continue on their present course, we will soon experience a major ecological catastrophe.	3,89***	3,57**	3,75	3,70
The so-called "ecological crisis" facing human kind has been greatly exaggerated (-).	2,20***	2,76***	3,08***	2,55
REJECTION OF EXEMPTIONALISM				
Humans' ingenuity will insure that we do *not* make the earth unliveable (-).	2,77***	2,95**	3,50***	2,87
Despite our special abilities, humans are still subject to the laws of nature.	4,30***	4,12**	3,92**	4,20
Humans will eventually learn enough about how nature works to be able to control it (-).	2,62***	2,93***	3,00	2,79
REALITY OF LIMITS TO GROWTH				
We are approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can support.	3,51	3,48	3,85	3,49
The earth has plenty of natural resources if we just learn how to develop them (-).	3,90**	3,91**	4,00	3,82
The earth is like a spaceship with very limited room and resources.	3,87***	3,60**	3,54	3,70
ANTIANTHROPOCENTRISM				
Humans have right to modify the natural environment to suit their needs (-).	1,83***	1,97	2,85***	1,99
Plants and animals have as much right as humans to exist.	4,24**	4,27	3,38***	4,15
Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature (-).	1,88***	2,33***	3,23***	2,14
FRAGILITY OF NATURE'S BALANCE				
When humans interfere with nature it often produces disastrous consequences.	4,03***	3,87	3,54***	3,89
The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern industrial nations (-).	1,75***	2,33***	2,46**	2,10
The balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset.	4,29***	4,04***	3,67***	4,14

Note: * *p* < .10 (two-tailed); ** *p* < .05 (two-tailed); * *p* < .01 (two-tailed).**

The respondents lend an overall rather strong support for these pro-environmental statements, as the mean NEP-score is 3,67 on a scale ranging from 1 to 5. This result corresponds rather well to previous studies of support for the NEP-worldview, although Widegren (1998) and Gooch (1995) have both reported an even stronger support for a pro-environmental stance in Sweden. As the table above illustrates, the respondents in total display both a high sense of environmental risk-awareness, as well as an acknowledgement of the place of human beings *in* nature rather than above it. These factors are, in turn, understood as highly significant basic

prerequisites for the respondents' general willingness to accept environmental protective policies, and for the development of individual norms for acting as a response to the understood environmental situation (cf. Schwartz, 1977; Hopper and McCarl-Nielsen 1991; Guagnano, Stern and Dietz 1995; Widegren 1998; Nordlund and Garvill 2002; Barr, 2003).

As expected, respondents assigned a strong universal value-orientation also display the most positive disposition towards the NEP-worldview. They agree strongly with the statements on environmental risk and fragility, and demonstrate an equally strong disagreement with statements placing human beings at the top of the natural hierarchy. In particular, a universal value-orientation seems to imply high awareness that the practices within contemporary developed countries imply significant negative consequences for the natural environment. Together with the non-territorial focus on the primacy of social justice within this value-orientation, it seems reasonable to assume that this drives a strong predisposition to accept and voluntary engage in individual environmental action. In contrast to the pro-environmental support within the universal value-orientation, respondents holding strong self-regarding values are significantly less inclined to support the NEP-worldview than what is the case for the sample in total. The Self-Enhancement set of core-values is instead strongly connected to the worldview of the Dominant Social Paradigm (e.g. Milbrath, 1986; Schultz and Zelezny, 1999), where a belief in the privileged status of human beings (pronounced anthropocentrism) and a strong trust in the market's and technology's prospect to solve problems of environmental degradation and resource depletion is prominent. However, due to the marginality of this group among the respondents, the analysis of the NEP-scale can conclude that people in general agree on the basic causes to the environmental problem, and express a need both to rethink the human beings – nature relationship as well as to move beyond short-term technological inventions as the primary tool for reaching sustainability. This points clearly towards the environmentally protective agenda as delineated within ecological citizenship, and away from the need to politically frame environmental protection as merely a 'technical policy issue' (de Geus, 2004).

The analysis of value-orientations among the Swedish public has so far demonstrated a rather strong support for both basic- and environmental-values related to the notion of an ecological citizenship. Similarly, and of equal interest, is a remarkably weak support for the, following Sagoff (1998), consumer-perspective in which market-solutions and economic rationality constitute the framework for as well as the motivations driving individual environmental action. This far, therefore, it can be concluded that a majority of the respondents hold a dominant value-orientation which emphasises other-regarding values, and therefore can be considered displaying at least an expression of traditional, territorial civic duties, and at best a post-cosmopolitan ecological citizenship. Taken together with the respondents' overall high score on the NEP-scale, there seems to be support for the assumption that a significant share of people in general hold core values which not only guide

a predisposition to support or engage in comprehensive individual environmental action, but also a sense of 'being green in doing them' (e.g. Dryzek, 2005:190). To answer one of the initially posed questions, about a third of the respondents seem indeed to be latent ecological citizens, while a further considerable proportion hold certain values in line with an other-regarding focus. From a policy-perspective, the possibility for legitimately expanding the notion of what a greening of individual lifestyles comprises should therefore be considered positive.

c. Policy-specific attitudes and behavioural readiness

The last set of questions that now will be scrutinised deals with the practical side of the above elucidated value-base; the respondents' self-reported willingness to accept policy-instruments aiming to enhancing the individual's pro-environmental contributions, as well as their willingness to change behaviour in a more pro-environmental direction. The question here is if the above displayed, in general rather strong, orientations towards other-regarding values also drive the practice of ecological citizenship. If statements are presented in a concrete form, where actual implications for the respondents' social and economic status are clearly displayed, how will this impact on their reported pro-environmental disposition?

Now, when examining these answers, it must be noted that they aim at pointing towards the level of support for individual environmental activities and policy instruments presently debated in society, which to certain extent is relevant for providing an indication of environmental policy legitimacy. However, the questions asked in the survey do not capture the entire spectre of possible policy-measures aimed at enhancing individual environmental responsibility, nor do they report on the willingness of the respondents to express their environmental awareness in new, innovative ways. For instance, opening up for a more extensive public participation in decision-making processes as a step towards transforming environmental consciousnesses and initiating a stronger other-regarding sense of purpose through the practice of deliberation is not included among the possible institutional or behavioural changes. Furthermore, as the survey merely reports on the stated support for certain specific measures or activities, they neither give any indication on the reasons underpinning a respondent's support or opposition. As it is possible to hypothesise that people holding strong universal and pro-environmental values are more likely to also actively pursue environmental protection (in addition to viewing strong environmentally protective policies as legitimate), it is also necessary to acknowledge that the value – behaviour connection unavoidably is distorted by other factors such as context, resource-constraints and personal habits (cf. North, 1990; Stern, 2000; Batley et al., 2001; Krantz-Lindgren, 2001; Hobson, 2004). It can thus be anticipated that opposing a certain policy-measure or activity can be founded in other reasons than a rejection of the core values on which it rests, as well as it is entirely possible that people in practice do not put their money where their mouth is due to

experienced structural constraints. Although it is firmly believed that the below results provide an indication of the respondents willingness to accept new policy-instruments or to take on an increased environmental responsibility, it is nevertheless necessary to interpret them with a bit of caution.

First, are the Swedish public willing to take on a greater individual environmental responsibility? In the SHARP-survey, respondents were asked to state their willingness to increase pro-environmental contributions in the form of (a) increased sorting of household waste; (b) reduced private car-use; and (c) increased consumption of eco-labelled products. The scale ranged from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree). These responses are summarized in Table 5 below, together with a Willingness-to-Change index comprised of the three variables together. The significance of the relationship between WTC and dominant value-orientation is also displayed.

Table 6. Mean value for willingness to change behaviour.

	UNIVERSAL	SOCIAL	S-E	TOTAL
I am willing to increase my sorting of household waste in order to reduce the negative effects on the environment.	4,33***	4,00	3,38	4,06
I am willing to reduce my car-use in order to reduce the negative effects on the environment.	3,39***	2,93	2,42	3,04
I am willing to increase my purchase of eco-labelled goods in order to reduce the negative effects on the environment.	4,08***	3,58***	3,46	3,74
WILLINGNESS TO CHANGE (α = .66)	3,90***	3,50	3,06	3,59

Note: * *p* < .10 (two-tailed); ** *p* < .05 (two-tailed); * *p* < .01 (two-tailed).**

Right across the three value-orientations, the respondents demonstrate a rather strong willingness to increase their personal pro-environmental efforts. Unsurprisingly, the support for the activity where there are no, or only marginal, conflicts between environmental and socio-economic outcomes (i.e. household waste-management) enjoys a stronger support than what is the case for activities where these conflicts are more visible (i.e. car-use and green consumption). Here it should also be noted that the relatively lower willingness among the respondents to reduce their car-use to a certain extent might be explained also by structural difficulties constraining the possibilities of trading the car for public transport. Also as predicted, respondents' willingness to change varied as a function of their value-orientation, where the emphasis of universal values clearly implies a higher willingness to change in all three types of behaviour. Similarly, people holding a self-regarding value-orientation reported that they were less inclined to an overall change in behaviour, although this relationship consistent with previous research on the connection between Self-Enhancement an pro-environmental norms of behaviour (cf. Nordlund and Garvill, 2002) not is found to be statistically significant. This, however, further supports the proposition that 'citizen-values' are of strong significance for driving a personal readiness to act in environmental matters.

Second, respondents were also asked to state the extent to which they supported an introduction of new policy instruments aiming at promoting a change in individual behaviour on the same three areas: household waste-management; car-use; and green consumerism. The scale ranged between -2 (completely against) to 2 (completely for), with 0 marked as neither for nor against. The stated willingness to accept new policy-instruments is illustrated in table 7 below.

Table 7. Willingness to accept new policy-instruments

	UNIVERSAL	SOCIAL	S-E	TOTAL
INFORMATION CAMPAIGN (HOUSEHOLD WASTE-MANAGEMENT)	0,88***	0,74	0,31***	0,71
WEIGHT-BASED SYSTEM (HOUSEHOLD WASTE-MANAGEMENT)	0,59***	0,29*	0,38	0,37
MUNICIPAL WASTE COLLECTION SYSTEM	-0,15***	-0,63**	0,00***	-0,38
INFORMATION CAMPAIGN (CAR USE)	0,35***	-0,07***	-1,38*	0,04
RAISED TAX ON PETROL	-0,53***	-1,14***	-1,15	-0,90
INCREASED PUBLIC TRANSPORT AVAILABILITY	1,33***	0,96**	0,92	1,07
INFORMATION CAMPAIGN (GREEN CONSUMPTION)	0,69***	0,26**	-0,08***	0,41
INTRODUCE TAX ON NON ECO-LABELLED PRODUCTS	0,23***	-0,33***	-0,38	-0,14

Note: * *p* < .10 (two-tailed); ** *p* < .05 (two-tailed); * *p* < .01 (two-tailed).**

As the table illustrates, the respondents in total are considerably less supportive of the introduction of policy-instruments in the shape of fiscal disincentives. Negative results are thus displayed for the introduction of taxes on both petrol (as an effort of discouraging private car-use) and on non eco-labelled goods (as an effort to encourage green consumption). Furthermore, respondents are also negative to the introduction of a municipal waste-collection system, where households not have to transport their waste to drop-off stations themselves as is common practice in Sweden today. Judging by the fact that respondents holding a strong social value-orientation (followed by those holding a strong universal value-orientation) are the ones most negative to the introduction of such a system, this result might imply that the practice of taking household-waste to the drop-off station is valued in itself. Doing one's share by sorting household-waste is perceived as an activity which produces a notable outcome for the individual with a strong pro-environmental orientation, or as an activity which demonstrates conformity with what is understood as a strong social norm[vii]. Persons holding strong universal or social value-orientations could therefore be anticipated to be particularly sensitive to this type of motivation. Corresponding to the relatively lower willingness to decrease private car-use, the weak support for a raised tax on petrol is complemented by an overall weak support also for an information campaign aiming at encouraging alternative modes of transport.

The strongest overall support is displayed for the introduction of policy-instruments which can be interpreted as preserving the individual's ability to choose increased participation or not. A strong support is thereby presented for information campaigns aiming at encouraging pro-environmental behaviour, and, in particular, for an improvement of the public transport system through increased availability (more departures) and lower prices. A relatively weaker support of these instruments among the respondents holding self-enhancement as their dominant value-orientation might be due to the fact that the posed questions specified that the information campaigns should be financed by municipal tax revenues.

Finally, it is possible to note that these results suggest that a significant relationship exists between the universal value-orientation and the willingness to accept all of the proposed policy-instruments. As respondents categorised as holding this value-orientation as dominant also are more inclined to support the introduction of new policy-instruments, including a positive stance towards taxes on non eco-labelled goods, this further supports the assumption that the values inherent in this value-orientation are of considerable importance for the acceptance of new environmental responsibilities. Clearly, respondents holding what has been characterised as the value-base of the ecological citizen are willing to both accept policies aiming at the transformation of behavioural patterns, as well as to change behaviour themselves.

VI. Concluding remarks

This paper set out to assess the existence and strength of ecological citizenship-values among the Swedish citizenry, with the overall aim of analysing the prospect for a policy suggesting more comprehensive individual environmental action to be understood and accepted as legitimate. The prospects for legitimising such a policy is deemed useful insights both for political decision-makers and the public administration, in particular as both international environmental agreements as well as national environmental policies stress the importance of a broad involvement on the individual-level in the work towards ecological sustainability. One core assumption guiding this paper is, thus, that policy makers need knowledge on the importance of different values for environmental policy acceptance and compliance. Such knowledge can be used for construction of a more legitimate environmental policy, and for increasing the chances of selecting policy instruments that work as intended.

On a more theoretical note, the currently predominant political framing of individual environmental action as sustainable consumption has been heavily criticised by political ecologists arguing that it does not present an adequate answer to the environmental situation and therefore is in strong need of replacement (or expansion). One of the most debated suggestions for how an expanded individual environmental engagement could be framed come in terms of a rethinking of the concept of citizenship. However, as the theory of

ecological citizenship has been widely discussed, there has been a shortage of research on the actual possibilities, in terms of a value-attitude base, for implementing ecological citizenship in contemporary societies. Therefore, this paper has also aimed to provide an initial exploration of the strength of ecological-citizen-values among the Swedish public.

Some limitations of the conducted analysis should be acknowledged. In particular the fact that the respondents were drawn from four Swedish municipalities (not from the Swedish population as a whole), and the relatively low response–rate (32 %) suggests that generalisations should be made with outmost care. Also, it is once again necessary to point out that the focus for this study has been on values, attitudes and legitimacy, and that a strong value-behaviour connection therefore not should be expected. As behaviour is dependent also on several other factors (hence, the 'value – action gap'), this study should only be taken as to elucidate one significant factor controlling behaviour; the respondents predisposition to act in relation to environmental matters. Lastly, as values differ between different cultures and context, the possibility for these results to travel well abroad should not be overstated. This said, the fact that values are an important (if not *the* most important) factor determining how an individual understands the world, and how she forms her attitudes and behaviour as a response should not be overlooked, and, therefore I believe that this analysis of core (environmental) values are of significance for understanding the context of environmental policy-making in Sweden and the legitimacy for framing individual environmental action as ecological citizenship.

The results from the SHARP-survey demonstrate that a value-base consistent with ecological citizenship already exists among a significant share of the Swedish citizenry. A further part conforms to the territorially-bound altruism of the citizen, which can be understood as a step on the way towards an expanded sense of duty, and almost none of the respondents hold the strong self-regarding values expected of the consumer. This rather strong inclination towards other-regarding values is further confirmed by the support granted an environmental worldview (following the NEP-scale), and the relatively high overall willingness to take on a more comprehensive environmental responsibility. Thereby, it can be concluded that the sometimes envisioned need to deal with individuals as rational consumers, promoting individual environmental action through the use of fiscal (dis)incentives and the promise of reciprocity, not should be taken for granted. The attribution of considerably higher importance for other-regarding values should instead be taken as to reflect the likeliness for a positive formation of attitudes towards policies promoting a greater individual environmental responsibility on the basis of altruism and social justice. Thus, the task for government should primarily be to create a social structure and design environmental policies which supports these other-regarding values, thereby allowing for people to be (or at least become) ecological citizens also in practice.

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[i] The SHARP (Sustainable Households: Attitudes, Resources, and Policy Instruments) Research Programme is financed by the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency and the Swedish Research Council for Environment, Agricultural Sciences and Spatial Planning (Formas) for the period 2003-2008 (www.sharpprogram.se). During spring 2004, 4000 questionnaires were sent out to randomly drawn household members, 20-75 years old, in four different Swedish municipalities (Piteå, Huddinge, Växjö and Göteborg). The survey collected information about how Swedish households perceive different PEB that can be undertaken to improve the environment (sorting waste at source, mode of transportation choice etc.), as well as the households' opinions about a set of policy instruments that can be implemented to encourage these activities. The overall response rate was 32 percent.

[ii] Following Dobson (1995:543) lifestyle-changes indicates transformations of a wide range of day-to-day activities, for instance "care with the things you buy, the things you say, where you invest your money, the way you treat people, the transport you use, and so on". This is contrasted by policies which successfully regulates or governs certain *activities* (for example through the use of laws or economic incentives governing recycling of soda-cans) for as long as the policy-instruments are in place, but does not implement a transformation in consciousness and thus a long-term, stable change in norms of behaviour.

[iii] The Universal and Social value-orientations are similar, but not entirely correspondent, those value-orientations termed either Biospheric and Social-Altruistic (Stern et al., 1995), or Ecocentric and Homocentric (Merchant, 1992). However, in difference to Stern's and Merchant's categorisations, the demarcation between ecocentrism and anthropocentrism in these two value-orientations is not as strong, as evident by, for instance, the inclusion of social justice and broad-mindedness as two of the motivating values in universalism. It is neither

expected that the ecological citizen is anything but a shallow-ecologist or a weak-anthropocentric (cf. Dobson, 2003), thus corresponding to the value-base of universalism.

[iv] That is not to say that economic considerations do not matter, however, in terms of value conflict, people with a low rating of SE-values will be more likely to allow ST-values to guide their formation of attitudes or selection of behaviour. In particular, as the core issue dealt with in this paper concerns the *legitimacy* of an expanded individual environmental responsibility, the core value-base is significant as it determines more specific policy-preferences as well as individuals' reactions and attitude formation towards new social objects.

[v] This follows the method designed by Axelrod (1994).

[vi] Again, it should be made clear that this is a measure of attitude formation and therefore of empirical legitimacy. Due to the many structural constraints influencing behaviours in specific situations, a strong NEP – behaviour connection should not be taken for granted.

[vii] Previous research has also suggested that people indeed value this activity to (surprisingly) large extent. See Berglund and Söderholm (*forthcoming.*…).